Case:

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drug Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3,
2008

Facts: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of
Section 36 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. According to Aquilino
Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections,
said mandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond
that which are provided by the Constitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes
the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates
for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) are
constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student
or employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached. In addition to the abovementioned contentions, Atty. Manuel
J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and
for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

Issue: Whether or not Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional.

Held: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not.

Section 36 (c) and (d) – as to students and employees of private and public
offices

 Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Section

36(c) applying the following reasonable deductions: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools,
acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of
their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
 Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
 prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level
students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165
for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not
exactly for the same reason.
 For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As
to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ
two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless
to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of
Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate
chain of custody. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy,
under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
 The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy
means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from
intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person's ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general agreement as to
the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of
the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into
workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,"
to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that
the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the state's exercise of police power.
 The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which affects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution intrudes. Just as defining as the first
factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced
to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly
drawn" or "narrowly focused?"
 To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the
country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth,
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. Taking into account the
foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the
 well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct
of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is,
under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, constitutional.
 Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees
also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
 On the charge of being an undue delegation, the provision in question is not so
extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. It expressly provides how drug testing for
students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of
public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall
undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance
with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the
company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed,
meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance
or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.

Section 36 (f) – as to persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with criminal
offenses

 The Court found the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6)
years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicion less." In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicion less. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicion less are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out
and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact
of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
 criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in
this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art.
III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.

Section 36 (g)- as to candidates for public office

 It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the

Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is
the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
 Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is
subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The
substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and
other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.
 In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.

Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Torres-Gomez, G.R.

No. 202202, March 19, 2013

Facts: On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez filed his Certificate of Candidacy
seeking the Congressional office of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of
Leyte. In his CoC, he indicated that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng Ormoc
City. Bueneventura Juntilla, one of the opposing candidates, questioned the residence
indicated in the CoC before the COMELEC. Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office.
Juntilla argued that, Richard is a resident of Colgate St, East Greenhills, San Juan City,
Metro Manila and not of Can-adieng Ormoc City
 In its ruling, the COMELEC 1 st division granted Juntilla's petition without any
qualification. And in its dispositive portion it stated, "Richard Gomez is disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Congresssman, Fourt District of Leyte, for lack of residency
requirement."

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) then filed her
COC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party
endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate of her husband Richard
wherein the COMELEC En Banc approved such substitution.

In the ruling of COMELEC En Banc, It held that the disqualification does not
automatically cancel one's CoC and the political party is still allowed to substitute the
candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified.

Pending resolution of Juntilla's May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local
elections were conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections,
Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his
opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino,
obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. In view of the aforementioned substitution,
Richard's votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was
proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending
May 9, 2010 Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890. The said motion, however,
remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in
order to oust private respondent from her congressional seat.

In the ruling of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), It

dismissed the petition and declared the substitution as valid and it also said that the
COMELEC 1st Division's resolution spoke of disqualification and not the cancellation of
the COC.

Then, Tagolino filed for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court stating
that: It is petitioner's submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it
upheld the validity of private respondent's substitution despite contrary jurisprudence
holding that substitution is impermissible where the substituted candidate's CoC was
denied due course to and/or cancelled, as in the case of Richard. On the other hand,
respondents maintain that Richard's CoC was not denied due course to and/or
cancelled by the COMELEC as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was properly
substituted by private respondent.
Issue: Was there a valid substitution? And as a consequence of such substitution, was
Lucy Torres-Gomez validly elected as a representative of the 4th District of Leyte?

Held: No. A valid CoC as a condition sine que non for the substitution of candidate.

 Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, if an official candidate of a

registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified
 Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official candidate” before candidate
substitution proceeds.
 As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate
of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties.
 Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be
considered a candidate.

Effect of Sec 68 and Sec 78 on candidate substitution under Sec 77

 Sec 68 speaks of a disqualification of the candidate based on the election offenses

enumerated therein while Sec 78 speaks of due course to and/or cancellation of
a COC based on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material
qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough there
was lack of qualification but there was also a false representation in the COC.

 And under Sec 68, a person disqualified can be validly substituted pursuant to Sec
77 because he remains a candidate but is ordered to discontinue such candidacy
as a form of penal sanction by the commission of the election offenses
enumerated in Sec 68.
 But a person whose COC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Sec 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. Hence,
being a cancelled COC it is considered void ab initio and thus cannot give rise to
a valid candidacy and valid votes.

 In this case, there was confusion as to the word "disqualified" in the resolution of
the COMELEC 1st division, which was also adopted by the COMELEC En Banc
and HRET.
 But it must be noted that Richard's "disqualification" was due to his failure to
comply with the residency requirement and misrepresenting his residence which
is a ground for denial due course to and/or cancellation of COC under Sec 78.
 Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional
candidate for the Fourth District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one
 year residency requirement; (2) Juntilla's petition prayed for the denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of his COC; and (3) the COMELEC First Division
granted the foregoing petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and
essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En
Banc's erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010
Resolution "speaks only of "disqualification and not of cancellation of Richard's
COC" and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private respondent.
 Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET's independence is not without
limitation. As earlier mentioned, the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the
HRET if only to check whether or not it has gravely abused its discretion. In this
regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRET's
independence; rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution and
the laws are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.
 In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by
deliberately adopting the COMELEC En Banc's flawed findings regarding private
respondent's eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed from her
substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its
discretion.
 Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was
therefore not a bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not
have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent
reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondent's own
qualification to office.
 Hence, there was no valid substitution and Lucy Torres Gomez was not a bona
fide candidate for the position when she ran for office, which means she could
not have been elected.

Case: Barbers v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165691, June 22, 2005

Facts:

Robert Z. Barbers (Barbers) and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the
Senate of the Philippines. The COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of
Senators promulgated a Resolution proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in the
elections.The COMELEC declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning
candidate for Senator after canvassing the remaining unsubmitted COCs. The
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution proclaiming Biazon as the 12th ranking duly
elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines.
Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers.  The COMELEC stated that
this difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where
there was failure of elections.Claiming that Biazon's proclamation was void, Barbers
filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as Senator. Barbers asserted that
the proclamation of Biazon was illegal and premature being based on an incomplete
canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the
results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly
affect the results of the elections. Barbers further claimed that there were Municipal
COCs still to be included in the senatorial canvass and special elections still to be held
in certain municipalities.Thus, Barbers insisted that suspension of the effects of the
proclamation of Biazon was necessary.  Barbers stressed that there could be no valid
proclamation based on an incomplete canvass. The COMELEC issued the first assailed
Resolution, denies the petition to annul the proclamation. Barbers filed a motion for
reconsideration which the COMELEC en banc denied.
Issues:

 Whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when
it deliberately insisted in resorting to and in using and considering mere
improvised Municipal COCs, which are non-canvassed election documents
instead of availing and relying on official canvass documents provincial COCs
submitted to COMELEC, as the National Board of Canvassers for Senators.
 Whether or not this Court can take cognizance of this petition.

Held:

Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17.  The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective
Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the
Commission on Elections of its... jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election
cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress).
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contester’s title.
"Election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to
the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the
election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of
the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal ("SET") underscore the exclusivity of
the SET's jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate.It is
therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Since Barbers contests Biazon's proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial
candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) which has exclusive jurisdiction to
act on Barbers' complaint. "Where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in
the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with
the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives." As in the present case, Barbers
assails Biazon's proclamation as the 12th duly elected Senator, Barbers' proper
recourse is to file a regular election protest with the SET.
While the resolution of the issues presented in this petition falls within the sole
jurisdiction of the SET, still we opt to discuss them to show the absence of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC. An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. However, this is true only where the
election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election.
The COMELEC, in proclaiming Biazon as the 12th duly elected Senator,
observed the following provisions of the Omnibus Election Code:
SEC. 233.  When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. In case its copy of
the election returns is missing, the board of canvassers shall obtain such missing
election returns from the board of election inspectors concerned or the board of
canvassers, upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of the authentic
copies of said election returns or certified copy of said election returns issued by the
Commission.
The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns
have been received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates
elected on the basis of the available election returns if the missing election returns will
not affect the results of the election.
The Supervisory Committee's report shows that the total number of registered
voters in areas where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2,931,
covering only 19 precincts in three municipalities.
Assuming that the remaining uncanvassed votes of two thousand nine hundred
thirty-one (2,931) in places where special elections are yet to be held were all votes in
favor of petitioner Barbers, nevertheless, this will not materially affect the results of the
election.
To say the least, even if private respondent's lead was decreased to three
thousand two hundred ninety-nine (3,299) votes, he remains to be the winner and
therefore the lawful occupant of the 12th slot for the senatorial position.
 The alleged invalidity of Biazon's proclamation involves a dispute or contest
relating to the election returns of members of the Senate.  Indisputably, the resolution of
such dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.
In addition, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Resolutions affirming Biazon's proclamation since the uncanvassed
returns and the results... of the special elections to be held would not materially affect
the results of the elections.
The Court dismissed the instant petition.

Case: Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 141489,

November 29 2002