ZAFIRO L.

RESPICIO, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS Petitioner was the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) when 11 Indian
nationals (the Indians), who were facing criminal charges for drug trafficking, left the country on August 12, 1994 on
the basis of a BID Self-Deportation Order (SDO) No. 94-685 dated August 11, 1994. The Order was signed by
petitioner and then Associate Commissioners Bayani Subido, Jr. (Subido) and Manuel C. Roxas (Roxas). The issuance
by petitioner, Subido and Roxas of the Order resulted in the filing before the Sandiganbayan by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of Information dated October 10, 1994 against them, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21545,
charging them of falsification of official document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Subido and
Roxas were likewise, by Information also dated October 10, 1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21546, charged,
together with them National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Deputy Director and Chief of the Intelligence Service
Arturo Figueras (Figueras) and John Does, of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Pending trial or on
February 27, 2003, Figueras died. The case against him for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 was thus
dismissed. By Decision of October 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan in both cases exonerated Subido and Roxas but found
petitioner guilty.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged (YES)
RULING Section 3(e) of RA 3019, violation for which petitioner was charged, provides: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of
public officers.— In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x x (e) Causing any
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The elements of the
offense are thus: a) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; b) one
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; c) the action caused undue
injury to any party including the Government, or has given any party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his functions. [37] The elements of falsification under paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code for which petitioner was likewise charged are: a) the offender is a public officer; b) the accused takes advantage
of his official position; c) accused knows that what he imputes is false; d) the falsity involves a material fact; e) there
is a legal obligation for him to narrate the truth; f) and such untruthful statements are not contained in an affidavit or a
statement required by law to be sworn in. RESPECTING THE CHARGE OF VIOLATING 3(E) OF RA 3019, the
elements which must be indubitably proved are whether petitioner acted with manifest partiality or evident bad faith,
and whether such action caused undue injury to any party including the Government, or gave any party unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Both elements are present in this case. The presence
of manifest partiality and evident bad faith on the part of petitioner is gathered from his hardsell stance that he never
was aware of a case filed in court. Even if indeed that were true, he had priorly been informed by Usec. Esguerra’s 3rd
Indorsement of July 27, 1994 that the Indians were undergoing preliminary investigation. In fact, at the witness stand,
after vacillating, he finally admittedthat the criminal charges against the Indians were under preliminary investigation.
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 141 RESPECTING THE CHARGE FOR
FALSIFICATION, petitioner untruthfully stated that there is no indication from the records that the Indians are the
subject of any written complaints before any government agency nor before any private person. For that statement is
belied by documentary evidence - the July 5, 1994 letter of Figueras to petitioner, the July 28, 1994 Indorsement of
Usec. Esguerra to petitioner (of Figueras recommendation for the deportation of the Indians) and petitioner’s own
August 4, 1994 4th Indorsement to Lugtu. Petitioner’s refuge by blaming his subordinates does not lie. For one, he
failed to disclose to Caronongan or to Sta. Ana the information which he had received about the Indians undergoing
preliminary investigation. Such omission is telling. For another, while the BID may indeed have had only in its
possession at that time only derogatory records of aliens but not criminal or administrative as Caronongan claimed,
since the BID is an attached agency of the DOJ, petitioner could have easily requested information on the outcome of
the preliminary investigation, of which he was informed about, or if a case had already been filed in court against the
Indians.
Norma Delos Reyes vs People GR 186030 March 21 2012

Facts: Norma Delos Reyes vs People GR 186030 March 21 2012 Topic: Facts  Norma Delos Reyes was charged
with falsification under RPC 172 of a Deed of Succession when she and the other accused were the only heirs of
Rafael Del Prado when in fact, Ma. Corazon Del Prado is also an heir entitled to inherit.  Corazon is a daughter of
Rafael while Norma is the suriviving spouse.  MTC, RTC and CA found the petitioners as guilty.  petitioners invoke
the existence and contents of the several documents which they had presented before the MTC. filed by Norma, in
which documents they claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is also an heir of the late Rafael. Given
these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with falsification for having excluded Corazon as
an heir of their decedent.
Issue: WON The elements of RPC 172 were satisfied by the petitioners
Held: we find no cogent reason to reverse the CA decision appealed from, considering that the elements of the crime
of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof, were duly proved
during the proceedings below. Said elements are as follows: (a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; and (c) The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. The material document claimed to be falsified in
this case is the Deed of Succession dated July 19, 1991 The first and third elements were committed by the inclusion
in the subject deed of the clause that states, "(w)hereas, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first
name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent."22 The untruthfulness of said statement is
clear from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their defense, such as the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties’ confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Norma’s
petition for guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is the fact that
Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael. The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in
their deed of succession is clear, taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The deed, which was
transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary public, required only truthful statements
from the petitioners. We cannot subscribe to the petitioners’ claim of good faith because several documents prove that
they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the deed of succession. Decision: Petition Denied. CA
Decision Affirmed.
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE, GR No. 179448, 2013-06-26
Facts:
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations[7] for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed
against petitioner.
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea.[9]  The cases
were then consolidated and jointly tried.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the audit investigation;
that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and
was threatened by the police that he will be... brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult
a lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; [and] that "just to get it over with" he signed the
paper which turned out to be a confession.
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision[11] dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the
crimes charged
On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision[13] affirming with modification the RTC Decision
While he admits signing a written statement,[18] petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he
was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents.  He asserts that said written statement was taken in
violation of... his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right
to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights.  Hence, the same should not have been admitted in
evidence against him.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains
that petitioner's written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner
does not apply to inquiries made in the... context of private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial
interrogation.
Issues:
whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's admission in evidence of the petitioner's written statement based on its
finding that he was not in police... custody or under custodial interrogation when the same was taken
Ruling:
Petitioner's written statement is... admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in
custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.  Indeed, a person under custodial
investigation is guaranteed certain rights... which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2)
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other
rights above.[19]  In the present case, while it is... undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and,... (2) petitioner
was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning.  Clearly, petitioner
cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during
the taking of his... written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,[20] we declared that the right to counsel "applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation."  Amplifying
further on the... matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:[21]
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a
suspect during custodial investigation.  Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights applies only to... admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.[22]
Here, petitioner's written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in
connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment.  No error can
therefore be attributed to the courts below in... admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner's
written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
Moreover, "[i]t is settled that a confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary."[23]  Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption.  On the
contrary, his... written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously.  The pertinent details he
narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.
In People v. Muit,[25] it was held that "[o]ne of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of [petitioner's]
extrajudicial [statement] is that [it] contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have
known and could... not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by [him]."
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against
the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare
assertions of compulsion and... intimidation.  It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of
compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where
no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial... statement shall be considered as having been
voluntarily executed.
Neither will petitioner's assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his signature
thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition.  To recall, petitioner has a masteral degree from a
reputable educational institution and... had been a bank manager for quite a number of years.  He is thus expected to
fully understand and comprehend the significance of signing an instrument.  It is just unfortunate that he did not
exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own affairs.  He can... therefore expect no consideration for it.
LEONILA BATULANON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006 

FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from
May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member
of the cooperative. 

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. It
was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to
different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were
granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never
received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance,
Batulanon released to herself the checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her
own use and benefit. 

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against
Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose
job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of
Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her
son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors. 

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition. 

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents. 

HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule that it is
the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the
preamble of the information. 

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to ascertain
whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a
private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the
Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. We find that the
Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in
the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. 

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did
was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does
not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact
that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI.
The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As
to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make
her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also
guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.
Guillergan vs People
G.R. No. 185493 February 2, 2011

FACTS:

Sometime in 1987, petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the AFP, directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon,
Chief Clerk of the Comptroller’s Office, to cause the preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents
with supporting time record and book. The agents’ names were copied and, based on their appointment papers,
certified as correct by Guillergan
and then approved by Brigadier General Domingo T. Rio. Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack
of signatures of the payees, Guillergan would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon (Butcon), the Budget and
Fiscal NonCommissioned Officer, to affix his initial on the "Remarks/Sig" column of the payrolls to complete the
requirements and facilitate the processing of the time record, book, and payrolls.

ISSUES:
WON petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public
documents.

HELD:
YES. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a
private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and 3) the falsification was committed in a public
or official or commercial document.
All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case. First. Guillergan as a public officer
when he committed the offense charged. He was the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. While the
Information said that he took advantage of his position in committing the crime, the Sandiganbayan found that his
work as comptroller did not include the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official
custody of the pertinent documents. His official function was limited to keeping the records of the resources that the
command received from Camp Crame.
 Serana v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 162059
FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada  as a student regent of
UP, to serve a one-year term.
Petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.
Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation.
The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and the 
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of
the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian
D. Serana for estafa.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent, claiming that
she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held
their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any
salary as a student regent.
The OMB opposed the motion. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a
public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the
corporate powers of UP.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a public officer.
 
RULING:
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-
paying student. This is bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office.
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer.
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR Nos. 186739-960, 2013-04-17
Facts:
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004... he organized a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly... in view of regulating and monitoring the... transportation of salvaged forest
products within the vicinity of General Nakar.
During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the... salvaged forests products, the
Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding
fees to the municipal treasurer.[2]
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest
products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while
the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused
Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.[3]
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art.
177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and
Sabiduria
As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to
transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also
those powers that are necessarily implied from the powers... expressly granted as well as those that are
necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGU's efficient and effective governance.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan... acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits
with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to the local... government of General
Nakar.[9] To the graft court, Ruzol's issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the
official functions of the DENR.
Issues:
whether the authority to monitor and regulate the... transportation of salvaged forest product is solely
with the DENR, and no one else.
the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as Municipal Mayor
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid... the LGU also has, under the LGC of
1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged
forest products, provided that... the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been
faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of
promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of natural
resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such... authority.
Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word
"primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent
provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such
authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e.,... LGUs.
the claim of DENR's supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of
usurpation of DENR's authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement
DENR's duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the
LGU's territorial jurisdiction.
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the
subject permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges
under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the... enactment of an appropriate
ordinance wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.[24] Needless to say, one
of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local revenue is generated only from
sources expressly... authorized by law or ordinance."[25]
Ruzol's insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU's devolved function to "manage and control
communal forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-30[29] is specious. Although We
recognize the LGU's authority in the management and control of... communal forests within its
territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance
with the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and efficient execution.
Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged
forest products under the alleged "pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do
so, such authority properly... belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
he Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were attendant in the present case because
the authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the
DENR.[35]
We rule otherwise.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution's theory that the
DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest
products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official... functions that properly belong to
the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the
authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that,
pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority.
Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not
to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR.
Gigantoni v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988

Facts: Accused was a PC-CIS agent. He was suspended and also terminated on June 20, 1980. However, he received
only the notice of suspension and hence, he had no knowledge of his termination from service. On May 1981, he went
to the PAL office and inquired about something. He represented himself as a PC-CIS agent and exhibited an
identification card supposedly establishing his identity as such agent for the purpose of examining PAL records. Later,
PAL inquired to the PC-CIS whether accused was indeed an agent. PC-CIS confirmed that accused was no longer
connected with PC-CIS. Accused was charged with the crime of usurpation of authority under Article 177.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty as charged.

Held: No. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service
negatives the charge that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. The constitutional
presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and credible proof and never by mere disputable
presumptions, as what the lower and appellate courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his
dismissal by applying the disputable presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed. The Solicitor General
has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference
 G.R. No. 154098 – Miranda vs Sandiganbayan
PUNO, J.

FACTS
1. Jose Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Isabella.
2. The Ombudsman placed him under preventive suspension for six months for alleged violations of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
3. A complaint for violation of Article 177 of the RPC (usurpation of authority or official functions) was later filed with the
Ombudsman, alleging that during the time of his preventive suspension, he:
a. Issued a memorandum addressed to the Vice Mayor, adivisng her that he was assuming his position as City Mayor;
b. Gave directives to heads of offices and other employees;
c. Issued an order authorizing certain persons to start work;
d. Insisted on performing the functions and duties of Mayor despite the Vice Mayor’s requests to desist from doing so, without a
valid court order, and in spite of the order of the DILG Undersec directing him to cease from reassuming the position.
4. Mayor Miranda argued that:
a. He reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer, in good faith.
b. Under Sec. 63 (b) of the LGC, local elective officials could not be preventively suspended for a period beyond 60
days.
c. He immediately complied with the DILG Undersec’s directory.
5. The Ombudsman then filed an information against Mayor Miranda for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC before the Sandiganbayan
(SB).
6. The prosecution filed before the SB a motion to suspend Mayor Miranda pendente lite.
7. The SB preventively suspended Mayor Miranda from office for 90 days.
a. It held that a violation of Art. 177 of the RPC involves fraud which in a general comprises anything calculated to deceive.
b. This includes all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another.
c. Miranda’s act also fell within the catch-all provision “any offense involving fraud upon government.”
8. Hence this present petition before the SC, assailing the preventive suspension orders. Miranda argues that:
a. The offense of usurpation of authority/official functions under Art. 177 of the RPC is not embraced by Sec. 13 of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which only contemplates offenses enumerated under RA 3019, or which involve fraud
upon government or public funds or property.
b. Usurpation of authority is not fraud upon government or public funds or property.

ISSUE with HOLDING

1. WoN Sec. 13 of RA 30191 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or property. NO.
a. Section 13 of RA 3019 covers two types of offenses:
i. Any offense involving fraud on the government; and
ii. Any offense involving public funds or property.
b. Nothing in RA 3019 limits sec. 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase “any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property” is clear and categorical.
c. The interpretation of Miranda that “government” only serves to qualify the nature of the funds or property is erroneous.
d. A statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a
meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object.

2. WoN the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves fraud upon government or public funds or property found in Sec.
13 of RA 3019. YES.
a. The phrase fraud upon government means any instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government.
b. It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is already covered by the preceding
phrase “any offense involving . . . public funds or property.”
c. Assuming the duties and function of the Office of the Mayor despite his suspension from said office resulted in a clear
disruption of office and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government as the employees, as well as the public,
suffered confusion as to who is the head of the Office.

3. WoN Miranda reassumed office under an honest belief he was no longer under preventive suspension. NO.
a. In his own affidavit, he refused to leave his position despite the memorandum of the DILG Undersec, and left only a few
days after its receipt due to coercion of the PNP. This is contrary to his claim that he immediately complied with the
memorandum.

4. WoN the Ombudsman has the authority to preventively suspend local elective officials for 6 months. NO.
a. Firstly, the issue in this case is the propriety of the preventive suspension of the SB, not the Ombudsman’s.
b. In any case, the Ombudsman is not mentioned in Section 63 of the LGC and was not meant to be governed by that
provision.
c. The provision was meant as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor to impose excessively
long preventive suspensions. They are political personages. The possibility of extraneous factors influencing their decision to
impose preventive suspensions is not remote.
d. The Ombudsman on the other hand is not subject to political pressure given the independence of the office which is
protected by the Constitution.
e. The 6 month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman was within the limit provided by RA 6770 (i.e. not
more than 6 months).
f. Contrary to the dissent, giving a 6 month limit for the Ombudsman but only giving 60 day limit for executive officials does not
violate the Equal Protection clause.
i. As pointed out, there is a substantial distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by the Ombudsman
and those imposed by executive officials.
ii. The Constitution has given the Ombudsman unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure (e.g.
fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office, classification as an impeachable officer).

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 iii. The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) also requires stricter safeguards for the imposition of preventive
suspension. The Ombudsman must determine:
1. That the evidence of guilt is strong
2. That any of the following circumstances are present:
a. Charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty;
b. The charges would warrant removal from service; or
c. Continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
g. Yes, there is possibility of abuse by the Ombudsman as the dissenting opinion fears but all powers are susceptible of abuse.
That is no reason to strike down the grant of power. The proper remedies against abuse are a petition for certiorari under R.
65 or amendment of RA 6770 by the legislature, not a contortionist statutory interpretation by the Court.