The Mongols and the West, 1221 – 1410. By PETER JACKSON.

Harlow: Pearson

Longman, 2005. Pp xxxiv + 414 £17.99 ISBN 0 582 36896 0

Reviewed by R.I.Moore

RIMoore1@aol.com

Between the proclamation of Chinggis Khan as their supreme ruler in 1206 and the

final overthrow of the Song dynasty in southern China in 1279 the Mongols created

what is conventionally called the greatest land empire the world has known, though

after the death of Mongke Khan in 1259 its territories acknowledged different, and

often competing rulers. While both the short- and the long-term consequences of the

conquests remain controversial in many aspects, few would disagree that they mark

an epoch in the history of Asia, overthrowing with great violence the Abbassid and

Song empires and the Kievan Russian kingdoms, to replace them with very different

patterns of government and of social and cultural domination. Assessment of their

impact on Europe has been more hesitant, not least because, until now, nobody has

produced, or indeed seriously attempted, a substantial, comprehensive and coherent

account of it in English. The difficulties, beginning with the obscurity of the sources

and the number and variety of the languages in which they are to be found, are

formidable. Peter Jackson – the author of important work on the crusades, on Saladin

and on the Delhi sultanate as well as on the Mongols themselves – is outstandingly

equipped to overcome them, and has done so emphatically: it must be said at once that

irrespective of any carping that may follow this is a book that – nowadays rather

unusually so far as European medieval history is concerned – fills a real and large gap
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in our knowledge, in the good, old-fashioned positivist sense of those words. This,

we can say with gratitude, is work that needed to be done, and will not need to be

done again.

As Gibbon remarked, 'the difference between East and West is arbitrary and shifts

around the globe,' and it slithers occasionally even in Jackson's grasp. In this book 'the

West' means, in principle, Latin Christendom – 'the area that observed the Latin rite

and looked to Rome for ecclesiastical and spiritual leadership' - roughly

corresponding to western and central Europe. Pedantically speaking that definition

might also extend to much of the Anatolian territory of the former Byzantine Empire,

fragmented after the Frankish conquest of Constantinople in 1204, and the

principalities established by the crusaders in the Middle East (where the greatest

power was that of the Mamluk sultans of Syria and Egypt who in 1260 inflicted on the

Mongols their only military defeat [in the west], at Ayn Jalut in Galilee). In practice

they are fully included, for while Jackson's principal concern is ostensibly with the

'Latin' West he actually ranges, inevitably and to the great benefit of his reader, across

the whole of the vast and contrasting territory which lay to the west of the Mongols,

from the Baltic to the Fertile Crescent. Admirably clear accounts of 'Latin

Christendom and its neighbours in the early thirteenth century' and of the Mongols

and their early conquests are followed by seven central chapters which provide

detailed, blow-by-blow accounts of Mongol assaults on the lands to their west, from

the traumatic onslaught of 1241 – 2 which destroyed Kiev Rus and devastated

Hungary to the revival of Chinggis's dream of world domination by Temur (fl. 1360 –

1405), which effectively completed the fragmentation of Mongol power. The

diplomatic and ideological responses, especially those of or inspired by the papacy,

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are followed in great detail, perhaps as much because that is what the sources survive

to tell us about as for their limited practical effects. A comprehensive and entertaining

description of 'Images of the Enemy,' showing among other things how conveniently

the Mongol menace might be, and was, invoked in the interests of almost any cause,

including attacks on Jews and heretics, is a highlight.

Jackson's forte is description and survey: he is judicious, critical, shrewd on particular

points, but he is not constructing a thesis, or even an overview, either in individual

chapters – which are almost collections of short essays - or in the work as a whole.

His book is remarkable above all for its throughness, both in its coverage of its

selected territory and topics and in its enumeration and scrutiny of sources: the

apparatus accounts for well over a third of the volume. Its main interest and emphasis

is political, military, diplomatic, across a vast and fragmented territory at a critical

moment in Eurasian, and thence of global history. The last three chapters, on religion,

trade, and the influence of the Mongol experience on the mental horizons of western

Europeans – and that they are the last three may say something about Jackson's

priorities – are probably those of greatest interest to world and global historians. That

Jackson turns to these topics somewhat belatedly does not prevent him from treating

them extremely well. But he is not greatly interested in large theses. He shows that the

notion of a 'Mongol Peace' greatly exaggerates the security of communication across

the steppe, especially after 1261, and that the growth of trade in staples from the

Black Sea region was far more important to western merchants of the period than that

of luxury items from the Far East, but does not consider whether, or how far, this

undermines the view that a comprehensive set of linkages between the regional

economies of Eurasia was created in the century after 1250: the phrase 'world
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economy' does not occur. That the Black Death gets only a cursory mention is

particularly disappointing, for its relation to the history of the Mongols, and their

respective and interacting impacts, are surely central to any assessment of the near-

collapse of Eurasian political and economic structures in the fourteenth century.

Jackson might retort that that is because the evidence is not good enough to support a

sustained analysis, but as he remarks of Marco Polo (in defence of whose visit to

China there is a pithy and helpful appendix), if he can't tell us who can? At a time

when it is safe to predict that the phenomenon of systems collapse will command

increasingly anxious attention for some time to come, the failure of the civilizations

constructed in western Europe between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries to

succumb to it in the fourteenth does not lack interest. It is a pity that Jackson does not

care to contribute directly to that discussion, but his book has a lot to offer, by way of

insight and critical acumen as well as indispensable information, to those who do.

Dear professor Moore,

          Thank you very much for sending us your thoughtful and

interesting review of Jackson's book on the Mongols and the

West.  The editors have consulted, and we would liek to ask you to

consider a few small changes.  (I emphasize that these are optional,

as reviews are necessarily a matter of the reviewer's opinions.)

           On p. 2, you refer to Ayn Jalut as the Mongols' only

military defeat.  I think the balance of the current scholarship

suggests that they were defeated militarily in Vietnam as well,

though terrain and disease certainly played a role there; some would

argue the same for Burma, though that is murkier.  Would you consider

either calling it "one of their very rare defeats," or adding a

modifier such as "only purely military defeat"?

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        On p. 3, you refer to Jackson's critique of the idea of the

Mongol peace, but don't elaborate.  If you were willing, it might be

helpful to expand on that slightly, as an awful lot of people still

utilize that concept (especially in teaching).  In the process, you

could probably also make it clearer why this is connected to

Jackson's apparent decision not to speak of a "world economy" in this

period; the probable nature of  the link becomes clear when one

thinks about it for a minute, but it might be worth making explicit.

         One editor also suggested rephrasing the reference near the

end of your text to the "failure" of European societies to succumb to

the Mongols, though i personally have no problem with the current way

it is written.

         Finally, I assume that "througness" is a typo for

"thoroughness."  Please let me know if this is not the case. thank you very much for

considering these matters -- and

best wishes for a happy new year.

Sincerely,

Ken Pomeranz

Dear Professor Pomeranz,

 
Thank you, and your colleagues, for taking so much trouble over my review. It is
both helpful and stimulating.

           On p. 2, you refer to Ayn Jalut as the Mongols' only

military defeat.I think the balance of the current scholarship
suggests that they were defeated militarily in Vietnam as well,
though terrain and disease certainly played a role there; some would
argue the same for Burma, though that is murkier. 

I didn't know this,and had forgotten about Japan too. Would 'defeat in battle'
meet the SEA cases? If not I suggest 'in the west': 'purely military' seems to beg
too many questions to which I don't know the answers!
 
        On p. 3, you refer to Jackson's critique of the idea of the
Mongol peace, but don't elaborate.  If you were willing, it might be
helpful to expand on that slightly, as an awful lot of people still
utilize that concept (especially in teaching).  In the process, you
could probably also make it clearer why this is connected to
Jackson's apparent decision not to speak of a "world economy" in this
 6

period; the probable nature of  the link becomes clear when one
thinks about it for a minute, but it might be worth making explicit.
How about this?
 
He shows that the notion of a 'Mongol Peace' greatly exaggerates the security of
communication across the steppe, especially after 1261, and that the growth of trade
in staples from the Black Sea region was far more important to western merchants of
the period than that of luxury items from the Far East, but does not consider whether,
or how far, this undermines the view that a comprehensive set of linkages between the
regional economies of Eurasia was created in the century after 1250: the phrase
'world economy' does not occur, in Wallerstein's or any other sense.
 
(Or just stop at 1250: I thought some of your readers would want to know that he
doesn't get into this discussion, but can't see a short way to put it that might not
confuse someone unfamiliar with it)
 
You kindly don't ask for corresponding economies, but if you wanted to drop the phrase  
'–
which are almost collections of short essays - ' earlier in the para  I wouldn't mind: it
rather labours the point.
 
I think I'll stick with 'failure', but I did mean 'thoroughness'.
 
Don't hesistate to come back if this doesn't do what you want. And a happy new
year to you too.
 
Best wishes,
 
Bob Moore

         One editor also suggested rephrasing the reference near the
end of your text to the "failure" of European societies to succumb to
the Mongols, though i personally have no problem with the current way
it is written.
         Finally, I assume that "througness" is a typo for
"thoroughness."  Please let me know if this is not the case.
          thank you very much for considering these matters -- and
best wishes for a happy new year.
Sincerely,
Ken Pomeranz