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The ascendancy of Thebes

Theme – PluTarch as a source // The BaTTle of leucTra // The sacred Band

sPecials – reading roman TomBsTones // conTacT BeTween rome and china

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aw_9-2.indd 2 22/04/15 10:01
 Publisher: Rolof van Hövell tot Westerflier
Managing Director: Jasper Oorthuys
Editor: Josho Brouwers
Design & Media: Christianne C. Beall
Design © 2013 Karwansaray Publishers

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Marc G. DeSantis, Arianna Sacco
theMe: e ascendancy of ebes
Contributors: David Balfour, Matthew Beazley,
Thanks to the genius of its military leaders, Thebes was able to
Duncan B. Campbell, Marc G. DeSantis, Joe Hall, dominate Greece for a brief period in the fourth century BC.
'
Jona Lendering, Roel Konijnendijk, Friedrich
Wilhelm Miesen, Owen Rees, Samuel Zilincik,
Graham Sumner, Ryszard Tocarczuk.
6 The Theban ascendancy 18 The siege of corcyra
Illustrators: Carlos García, Milek Jakubiec, Julia Lillo, Historical introduction Spartan eclipse
Angel García Pinto, Maxime Plasse, Johnny Shumate.

Print: Grafi Advies 9 Plutarch of chaeronea 24 educating Philip of macedon

The biographer and the moralist Sowing the seeds of destruction
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PO Box 4082, 7200 BB Zutphen, The Netherlands 12 first among the greeks 26 on the dancing floor of ares
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4 news & letters 58 on the cover
in this publication may be reproduced in any form Opinions and recent developments The death of Epaminondas
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ISSN: 2211-5129 epaMinondas the battle of leuctra the sacred band

Printed in the European Union. The Theban Hegemony owed its The Thebans accomplished the The Theban army possessed an
existence largely to the work of impossible: they defeated Spar- elite military unit, the hieros
one man, Epaminondas. ta in a pitched battle. lochos or Sacred Band.

ancient warfare iX-2 3

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 News & letters
ws & ers
editorial
When the last issue went to print, we were
preparing to launch a Kickstarter campaign
for a new magazine devoted more gener-
ally to the ancient world called Ancient
History Magazine. One issue later and I am
happy to report that the campaign was suc-
cessfully funded. This means that Ancient
History Magazine, edited jointly by Jona
Lendering and myself, is a go. The first is-
sue, which has the theme ‘Discoveries in
the ancient world’, is scheduled to hit the
presses in September of this year (2015),
and should be on its way to Kickstarter sup-
ports and other readers in October.
If you missed out on the Kickstarter or
were otherwise unable to pledge, you can
still support us by subscribing to the new
magazine. (I assume, no doubt correctly,
that you already subscribe to Ancient War-
fare.) As stated in last issue’s editorial, An-
cient History Magazine will be similar to
Ancient Warfare in style (accessible, richly
illustrated articles), but will deal more
broadly with socio-political, economic,
a warm seat for a soldier on the edge of the roman empire
The remarkable find of a wooden seat
from a latrine at Vindolanda fort is shed-
ding light on the personal comforts sol-
diers enjoyed when nature called on
the northwestern frontier of the Roman
Empire. The seat was preserved in near
perfect condition in the anaerobic (ox-
ygen-free) conditions that exist at the
military site in northern Britain. It was
discovered during the dig of 2014 by Dr
Andrew Birley, Director of Excavations,
in the pre-Hadrianic period III level oc-
cupied by Cohors VIIII Batavorum.
‘We know a lot about Roman toilets
from previous excavations at the site and
from the wider Roman world, but never
before have we had the pleasure of seeing
a surviving and perfectly preserved wood-
en seat,’ Dr Birley told Ancient Warfare.
4 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 4
and cultural aspects of the ancient world.
Taken together, the two magazines will of-
fer a good overview of the ancient world,
with Ancient Warfare released one month
and Ancient History Magazine the next.
This particular issue of Ancient Warfare
is one that I have been looking forward to
for some time. It has a very tight focus on
the rise (and eventual fall) of Thebes, one
of the major cities of Classical Greece. The
so-called Theban Hegemony lasted for less
than a decade, from 371 to 362 BC, or from
the Battle of Leuctra to the second Battle of
Mantinea. It offers a good slice of Classi-
cal Greek history, with plenty of big names
such as Epaminondas and Agesilaus. The
issue highlights an important stage in the
development of Greek warfare: the Thebans
developed a new way of deploying the
hoplite phalanx in the field that was to have
a profound impact on Philip II of Macedon.
—Josho Brouwers
Editor, Ancient Warfare
There are many examples of stone and
marble seat benches from across the Ro-
man world, but this is believed to be the
only surviving wooden seat of the period.
‘It would be far more comfortable to sit on
in the cool climate of Britannia,’ he added.
‘The seat is made from a very well-
worked piece of wood and looks pretty
comfortable,’ said Dr Birley. It measures
30cm wide by 31cm long by 3.5cm deep
and is carved from an as yet unidentified
hard wood, but not oak. A large oval-
shaped hole was cut in the centre with a
4cm opening on one side. The seat shows
that it had been well used before being
decommissioned and discarded amongst
the rubbish abandoned in the timber fort
at the site before the construction of Had-
rian’s Wall began in AD 122.
22/04/15 10:01

Treatment of human waste in Ro-
man times was a matter of containment
or dispersal. Ann Olga Koloski-Ostrow,
Professor and Chair of Classical Studies
at Brandeis University, and author of The
Archaeology of Sanitation in Roman Italy:
Toilets, Sewers, and Water Systems (North
Carolina Press 2015), said: ‘If there even
was any systematic plan, the evidence of
it is virtually non-existent today. We do
know that ancient city sewers occasion-
ally had blockages of excrement build-up,
but there was not much that could be done
about them except manual removal.’
The technology to manage sanitation
used by Roman engineers is demonstrated
at the nearby fort at Housesteads on the
Wall. In the southeastern corner of the fort
is a latrine large enough to seat twelve at
any one time. It was served by a stone cis-
tern that stored rain, since there was no
other easily accessible source of water at
this elevated location. Water, fed by gravity,
passed along a sluice and down to a deep
sewer beneath benches arranged in horse-
shoe format on three sides of the build-
ing originally covered with toilet seats. At
floor level, in front of the benches, an open
trough allowed each user to rinse his spon-
gia – a natural sponge tied to a stick, which
was the toilet paper of the day.
At Housesteads, the effluent then
flowed along a covered drain running
through the fort’s circuit wall and was col-
Themes and deadlines
The following will be the themes for
upcoming issues of Ancient Warfare:
• IX.3 War in Anatolia
• IX.4 The First Punic War
• IX.5 Hellenistic soldier
• IX.6 Aftermath of battle (20 July)
• X.1 The Peloponnesian War
(20 September)
aw_9-2.indd 5
News & letters
lected outside in a trench. ‘Open sewage
may have been covered in lime to alleviate
the stench, but in the sewers water erosion
has removed any evidence of treatment
there,’ said Prof. Koloski-Ostrow.
Roman toilets were stinky by modern The wooden toilet seat found
standards. ‘We can say that the Romans at Vindolanda Roman fort in
certainly had a sense of disgust, but even the 2014 season.
the medical writers do not make it clear © Vindolanda Trust
that they could or did draw any direct
connections between what we call “sani-
tation” and disease,’ she said.
Back at Vindolanda, Dr Birley said:
‘Now we need to find the toilet that went
with the seat. It could possibly be in the
headquarters (principia) of the pre-Hadrianic
fort, but certainly in a building central to the
fort on the south side of the via Principalis.’
The archaeologist hopes to locate it this year.
‘Roman loos are fascinating places
to excavate,’ remarked Dr Birley. ‘Their
drains often contain astonishing artefacts.
Let’s face it, if you drop something down a
Roman latrine you are unlikely to attempt
to fish it out unless you are pretty brave or
foolhardy.’ Past discoveries at Vindolanda
from latrines have included a baby boot,
coins, a betrothal medallion and a bronze
lamp. The wooden seat itself will take up to
eighteen months to conserve. When ready,
the unique artefact will be put on display at
the nearby Roman Army Museum.
— Lindsay Powell
If you have a proposal that fits our themes,
we would be interested to hear from you
to discuss the possibility of publishing an
article. Send your proposal – including
the angle you would like to take, ideas for
illustrations and artwork, and your quali-
fications – to editor@ancient-warfare.
com. Do make sure you send them before
the proposal deadlines mentioned above.
ancient warfare iX-2 5
22/04/15 10:01
 The ascendancy of Thebes

The Theban ascendancy

Historical
introduction
The women of sparta screamed at the sight of the flames that raged just
across from the bridge over the eurotas. Their men were in a panic, rush-
ing to prepare and defend the unwalled city. fighting had broken out in
the nearby village of amyclae. lacedaemonians were falling to the earth,
dead. The soil of sparta had been invaded for the first time in centuries.
The mightiest warriors of greece were at the mercy of a new order in the
hellenic world. Thebes had finally ascended to its place of power and con-
trol. all it needed to do was learn from the mistakes that sparta had made.

by owen rees accept defeat. As they descended the hill,

A terracotta relief depicting the
abduction of Europa, daughter
of a Phoenican king, by Zeus in
the guise of a white bull. The
supreme god of the Greeks
took the girl to Crete. The con-
tinent of Europe was named
after her. Among the brothers
sent out to find Europa was
Cadmus, the legendary found-
er of the city of Thebes. Allard
Pierson Museum, Amsterdam.
© Livius.Org
T
he Boeotian or Theban War,
which broke out in 378 BC, was
of Sparta’s own making. With
the King’s Peace in place, Sparta
held the strongest position in Greece, with
no equal to challenge her. In 382, an oppor-
tunity arose that proved too enticing for the
Spartan commander Phoebidas. Ostensibly
marching north to Olynthus to support his
brother Eudamidas, his army of 8,000 men
made camp outside the walls of Thebes. At
the behest of an internal faction in the city,
Phoebidas entered the city walls during a
festival and took control of the acropolis, the
Cadmea. This was an act of aggression that
violated the peace established by the Persian
King. For three years, Sparta held the heart of
the city, proving just how powerful she was.
But these actions would spawn a monster
that would cause Sparta’s eventual downfall.
A group of Theban exiles executed a
masterful plan that removed the pro-Spar-
tan Thebans from power. They then laid
siege to the Cadmea from all sides. The
1,500-strong Spartan garrison was forced to
they walked past two faces that would have
a greater impact on their world than anyone
at the time would have believed: a young
Pelopidas, the mastermind of the revolt, and
Epaminondas, the embodiment of the new
order that would lead Thebes’ military resur-
gence (see David Balfour’s contribution).
The outbreak of war
For three years, the Thebans waged war
with the Spartans, with little in the way
of battlefield confrontations. Sparta was
content with raiding Boeotia, though they
were given a bloody nose at the hand of
Pelopidas’ Sacred Band, at the Battle of Te-
gyra (see Ryszard Tokarczuk’s article). By
375, Athens, Thebes’ strongest ally, began
to feel the financial pressure of the conflict
and arranged a cease-fire that lasted two
years. It was broken by Athenian actions
in the Ionian Sea, which saw the theatre of
conflict shift to the island of Corcyra (see
Marc DeSantis’ contribution).
When the Athenian general Iphicrates
finally took control of the island, he began to
expand Athenian influence over the region.

6 ancient warfare iX-2

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 The ascendancy of Thebes

From this position, he was ready to launch

new raids into Laconia. But by this time,
something had changed in the alliance be-
tween the Thebans and the Athenians.
The year 371, which should have seen
the first acts of aggression against Sparta,
instead saw Athens pull out of the war
entirely. Whilst Athens had been fighting
tooth and nail to confront the ever-grow-
ing power of Sparta, Thebes was thriving
without a Spartan presence in their city.
They saw the opportunity to regain con-
trol of their former Boeotian League, and
instead of helping in the fight with Sparta
they were campaigning against the smaller
poleis that surrounded them. These includ-
ed two longstanding allies of Athens: Thes-
piae and Plataea. When Thebes turned
its attention to yet another ally of Athens,
Phocis, the Athenians had to intervene and
so negotiated for peace with Sparta.
The peace saw to it that all of the Greek
poleis would be autonomous, with foreign
garrisons having to be recalled. All of the
contingents present for the meeting signed
the oath, including Thebes. But the follow-
ing day, the Theban envoy Epaminondas
recalled the meeting and requested that
the wording of Thebes’ oath be changed
from ‘the Thebans swear’, to ‘the Boeotians
swear’, thus validating Theban control over The Thebans rise to power © Maxime Plasse

the Boeotian League. The notoriously anti-
Theban king of Sparta, Agesilaus, refused
and instead struck their name from the oath.
For the rest of Greece the peace was
enacted, isolating Thebes and its small
Boeotian alliance against the might of
Sparta and her many allies. The latter
wasted little time. The second Spartan
king, Cleombrotus, had been stationed in
Phocis and, rather than being recalled to
Sparta, he was sent straight into Boeotia to
force the Thebans into battle. His march
led the army into the heart of Boeotia,
stopping in the flat plains outside the small
village of Leuctra. Here, Cleombrotus was
faced by the army of Epaminondas, who
orchestrated one of the greatest military
victories of the classical Greek world (see
the article by Roel Konijnendijk).
Although Sparta had been resoundingly
beaten, her fighting strength was left in
good health. But the defeat had a greater
effect on Sparta’s allies, many of whom
broke away. The poleis in Arcadia banded
together and formed the Arcadian Federa-
tion, based in the new city of Megalopolis.
In anticipation of a Spartan backlash, they
called on Thebes to send help.
Epaminondas led a large army to Man-
tinea to discover that the Spartans had in-
deed invaded, but then left without a battle.
With the intention of returning home him-
self, Epaminondas had to be talked into us-
ing the large army at his disposal to attack
Sparta itself. Epaminondas pushed south
into Laconia, following the Eurotas River to
Sparta. On seeing the defensive preparations
of the Spartans, he decided to continue ram-

ancient warfare iX-2 7

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 The ascendancy of Thebes
A tombstone from Thebes.
National Archaeological Mu-
seum, Athens.
© Livius.Org
8 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 8
paging through the countryside before cross-
ing the river further south and entering into
the one isolated village of Sparta, Amyclae.
After a few days marauding and fighting with
Spartan bands of resistance, Epaminondas
continued marching his army all over Laco-
nia before heading into Messenia, the land
of the helot slave population who were vital
to the continued survival of Sparta. There, he
re-established the city of Messene.
Trapped between an Arcadian Federa-
tion growing in stature on the one hand, and
a resurgent Messenia on the other, Sparta
was unable to leave the Peloponnese with
any meaningful force. Epaminondas had
followed up his victory at Leuctra by trap-
ping the Spartans in a life of danger, but he
had not taken the city. This mistake would
become the greatest thorn in his side.
The Thebans’ authority and control
over much of mainland Greece was never
secure, even with Sparta hamstrung in the
Peloponnese. By 368, the Arcadian Fed-
eration was already making overtures to
create an autonomous military command
separate from Thebes. The Spartan victory
in the Tearless Battle that same year also
showed that they still held a military repu-
tation of high esteem in Greece.
Theban attempts in 366–365 to draw
Persia into Greek affairs (to establish an-
other peace) were short-lived, after many
of the great poleis refused the deal out-
right because they had not been consult-
ed. The following year saw the members
of the Arcadian Federation begin to fight
amongst themselves concerning the sacri-
legious use of sacred funds from Olympia
to bankroll an elite fighting force called
the Eparitoi. After a volatile standoff be-
tween Mantinea and the rest of the Fed-
eration, a resolution was agreed upon.
Thebes’ descent
Thebes had lost control of the Peloponnese.
Its own allies were much to blame. After a
failed Theban-led coup in the Arcadian town
of Tegea, Thebes was called upon by Mantin-
ea to condemn the actions of one of the gov-
ernors responsible. Instead, they condemned
the actions of the Federation for conducting a
truce without their permission, and then sent
an army under the command of Epaminon-
das to retake control of the situation.
Mantinea became the centre of re-
sistance to Thebes. Drawing allies from
Athens and Sparta (among others), they
intended to confront Epaminondas in the
field. After a failed attempt from Epami-
nondas to take Sparta while its army was
marching to join the new coalition, he fi-
nally met the Mantineans in the field at
the second Battle of Mantinea in 362 BC.
The battle ended in a confusing draw.
Epaminondas was killed, but the Thebans
had shattered the enemy right wing. Ath-
ens had also held the coalition’s left wing
without withdrawing. Both sides raised a
trophy, both sides returned the dead, both
sides had won, and both sides had lost.
The battle brought the Theban ascendancy
to a faltering halt, creating a power vacu-
um. Who better to fill it than the Macedo-
nian king, Philip II, who was schooled in
the Theban military tradition as a young
man (see Matthew Beasley’s article). The
Theban demise was as fast as its ascent,
but Theban influence in the life of Philip
II led to a series of events that would ulti-
mately bring about an end to the autono-
my of the Greek city-states. 0
Owen Rees is a freelance historian and
author who specialises in ancient Greek
warfare. He is a regular contributor to
Ancient Warfare.
further reading
• J. Buckler and H. Beck, Cen-
tral Greece and the Politics of
Power in the Fourth Century BC
(Cambridge 2008).
• L. Tritle (ed.), The Greek World in
the Fourth Century: From the Fall of
the Athenian Empire to the Succes-
sors of Alexander (New York 1997).
• J. Wickersham, Hegemony and
Greek Historians (London 1994).
22/04/15 10:01
 The source

Plutarch of Chaeronea

Biographer
and Moralist
charming, wise, humane: Plutarch of chaeronea (ca. 42–ca. 122) is one
of the most accessible authors from antiquity. he was influential, too.
for centuries, no one dared to challenge his idea that the greeks and
the romans were two nations with one culture. it’s not untrue, but we
must remain critical. his texts are not without pitfalls.
by Jona lendering Still, although their civilization was

I
n the age of Plutarch, education or
paideia had become one of the de-
fining characteristics of Greekness.
It consisted of language, literature,
values, and customs that were shared
by wealthy men who considered them-
selves civilized. Of course, there were
other aspects, like the cult of the gods,
but education was what mattered. This
meant that you could learn how to be
a Greek. After proper schooling, people
from Hellenistic monarchies or Romans
could (and were) recognized as mem-
bers of Greek civilization.
Still, the age-old dichotomy between
Greeks and barbarians had not completely
vanished. Plutarch, who was sympathetic
to Rome and had read quite a lot of Latin
texts, treats the Romans as equals of the
Greeks, but he did not consider them
Greeks. Whereas civilization came almost
naturally to the inhabitants of the province
of Achaea, Romans had to study to acquire
paideia. Consequently, there was always a
risk that they might again lose it or might
not be fully educated. It is highly signifi-
cant that Plutarch can suggest that a Cic-
ero and a Demosthenes were fully compa-
rable and at the same time digress on the
shortcomings of Cicero’s education.
less profound, it was obvious to Plutarch
that divine providence had wanted the
Romans to be the masters of the known
world. Of course the conquest had been
cruel. Plutarch’s biography of Sulla men-
tions how the general seized sacred funds
from Delphi and acted unreasonably dur-
ing the siege of Greece’s cultural capital,
Athens. However, by Plutarch’s own age,
Rome had become a cultured ruler, which
helped to bring the benefits of Greek civi-
lization to the western edges of the earth.
To a man like Plutarch, this was prob-
lematic. The gods had wanted Greece to
be the place where true civilization origi-
nated, but had given power to a nation
that might ‘rebarbarize’. He does not re-
ally solve this problem, but wrote a series
of double biographies, comparing Greeks
and Romans. The message is clear. The two
were equal and a Greek might learn from
a Roman. Although the battlefields near
Chaeronea, where Greece had lost its au-
tonomy, were more or less in his backyard,
Plutarch did not hold a grudge.
The Parallel lives
Typically, the double biographies consist
of three parts: the life of a Greek, the life of
a Roman, and a conclusion in which les-
sons are made explicit. So, we have an Al-

ancient warfare iX-2 9

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 The source
This bust from Delphi has
been identified as Plutarch,
although it may in fact be a
generation too young. Archae-
ological Museum of Delphi.
© Livius.Org
10 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 10
exander and a Caesar, a Themistocles and
a Camillus, and a Lycurgus and a Numa,
telling us something about what it means
to be a conqueror, an exile, or a lawgiver.
It must be stressed that Plutarch’s he-
roes are always politicians, never artists
or writers. His program is clearly differ-
ent from that of his contemporary and
colleague Suetonius, who was not above
publishing the Lives of Famous Prostitutes
(which is unfortunately lost). Plutarch is
interested in people whose personal qual-
ities – their virtues and their vices – deter-
mined the fate of nations, and he wants to
understand what these virtues and vices
were. It is not surprising that the Parallel
Lives were written by an author who also
wrote a great number of moral treatises.
The biographies are, in a way, the empiri-
cal basis of his moral advice.
Plutarch mentions the events of the
Theban Hegemony in several biogra-
phies: the Agesilaus, the Epaminondas,
and the Pelopidas. In the first of these, the
events of these years were used to show
Agesilaus as informal leader of Greece,
comparable to Pompey’s supremacy in
the Roman republic. In the Epaminon-
das, which is lost, Plutarch must have
shown the Theban statesman as someone
with a sincere interest in philosophical
wisdom. For obvious reasons, we can-
not be certain, but it’s especially likely if
the Scipio, to whom Plutarch compared
Epaminondas, is Scipio Aemilianus, who
was often seen in the company of phi-
losophers. Pelopidas, who was a close
friend and successor of Epaminondas,
is presented as the equal of Marcellus
(one of Rome’s leaders in the war against
Hannibal): both were brave men, who
put the state’s interests above their own
and were killed in action because they
forgot to take care of themselves.
The point of comparison, a glorious
death, does not really illustrate a trait of
their shared character. One gets the im-
pression that in his heart, Plutarch was
not interested in Pelopidas, who had to
share the stage with the great Epami-
nondas. Plutarch knew the fourth cen-
tury BC well – he had read the World
History of Ephorus – but the best stories
were about Epaminondas, who achieved
the most spectacular successes (see the
article by David Balfour in this issue of
Ancient Warfare). Besides, Epaminondas
must have appealed more to Plutarch’s
own philosophical nature than Pelopi-
das. Still, the information in the Pelopi-
das is valuable, as it appears to come
from a contemporary source.
Plutarch’s audience
But does Plutarch tell everything he knows?
Ephorus wrote in the second half of the
fourth century BC and may have hoped
that his contemporaries, Greeks living in
city-states that remembered their freedom,
found his History useful. But the world had
changed – and Plutarch surely knew. In his
age, the name of his hometown, Chaero-
nea, had become shorthand for the end
of Greek autonomy. His target audience
consisted of wealthy, well-educated Greek
citizens of the Roman Empire, who took
responsibility for their fellow-citizens.
Plutarch offered them advice, so that they
might be virtuous administrators.
Seen in this light, some of his stories be-
come understandable. For example, in his
Precepts of Statecraft (811B–C), Plutarch
mentions how Epaminondas was responsi-
ble for “a sort of supervision of the alleys for
the removal of dung and the draining off of
water in the streets”, a lowly office in a city
state, but something his readers must have
“
recognized immediately. Plutarch contin-
ues with a personal confession:
no doubt i myself seem ri-
diculous to visitors in our
town when i am seen in public, as
i often am, engaged in such mat-
ters. (…) i say to those who criti-
cize me for standing and watching
tiles being measured or concrete or
stones being delivered, that i at-
22/04/15 10:01

tend to these things, not for my-
self, but for my native place.”
This was not how a well-educated man
“
wanted to be seen. Plutarch thinks there
are more importan things to consider:
if a man does this for the
public and for the state’s
sake, he is not ignoble. on the
contrary, his attention to duty
and his zeal are all the greater
when applied to little things.”
As a comment on Epaminondas’ tenure as
inspector of Thebe’s sanitation, Plutarch’s
comments are far too long. He really wants
to teach his audience something – as he al-
“
ways does. He’s a moral teacher. Another
example is a lesson from his Pelopidas (4.3):
The true reason for the su-
periority of the Thebans was
their virtue, which led epaminon-
das and Pelopidas not to aim in
their actions at glory or wealth,
which are naturally attended by
bitter envying and strife; on the
contrary, they were both filled from
the beginning with a divine desire
to see their country become most
powerful and glorious in their day
and by their efforts, and to this
end they treated one another’s
successes as their own.”
Politicians should cooperate, not compete.
Or, as Plutarch says in, again, his Precepts
of Statecraft (813a): “statesmen ought not
to let any real enmity or disagreement
against themselves subsist”. Lessons like
these have ensured that the treatises and bi-
ographies by the Sage of Chaeronea always
found an audience, but to us, a different
question arises: how much of it is true?
aw_9-2.indd 11
The source
evaluation
If Plutarch was a moral teacher, he wasn’t a
biographer in our sense of the word. He is
certainly not a military historian: his audi-
ence was not interested in military matters.
Still, Plutarch read his sources carefully. The
Agesilaus and Pelopidas probably are quite
reliable in those parts where Plutarch took
information from Ephorus. However, we Inscription from a marble
must keep in mind that Plutarch selected pillar from Delphi. It states
stories. Information that did not match the that the bust, once placed
message he wanted to convey – Agesilaus on its top, was dedicated in
as informal king of Greece, Pelopidas as so honour of Plutarch.
courageous that he forgot himself – was left © Livius.Org
out. Stories that contradicted the comparison
with Rome may have been left out as well.
Worse, it is not likely that Plutarch found
anecdotes in Ephorus’ World History like
the one about Epaminondas responsible for
the street cleaning. He can have found them
everywhere and we have no means to check
them. As information, we can neither verify
nor falsify it. This means that Plutarch needs
to be read with great care. He was never a
proper biographer, interested in his subject
only; he was always a moralist first.
When we are dealing with the The-
ban Hegemony, we ought to read Xeno-
phon, Diodorus of Sicily, and Cornelius
Nepos as well, and focus on inscriptions
too. Reading only Plutarch, although
pleasurable, is never enough. And this
simple conclusion is, of course, valid for
every ancient author. 0
Jona Lendering read History in Leiden,
is the webmaster of Livius.org, and is co-
editor of Karwansaray’s new magazine,
Ancient History Magazine.
further reading
Bernadotte Perrin’s translations of all
Parallel Lives can be found on Lacus-
Curtius, where you can also find Har-
old North Fowler’s translation of the
Precepts of Statecraft.
Plutarch’s ideas about Rome are dealt
with in chapter 5 of Simon Swain’s
Hellenism and Empire (1996).
ancient warfare iX-2 11
22/04/15 10:01
 The ascendancy of Thebes

First among the Greeks

Epaminondas
The architect of the Theban hegemony was the brilliant philos-
opher-general epaminondas. Theban ascendancy in greece com-
menced in 371 Bc with his crushing defeat of the spartans at leuc-
tra and ended when he fell at mantinea in 362. in the brief interim
framed by these events, epaminondas toppled the foundations of
sparta’s military supremacy. universal acclaim from ancient writers
for the man who “won independence and freedom” for all greeks
(Pausanias 9.15.6) was epitomized by cicero in two words, “Prin-
ceps Graeciae” (1.2.4): epaminondas was “first among the greeks.”

by David balfour Working in collusion with this cadre of fifth-

A view of the ruins of the Arca-
dian Gate at Messene. Epami-
nondas oversaw the construc-
tion of the city. Evidence
suggests that the original gate
was replaced by the extant
structure around 300 BC.
© Livius.Org
E
paminondas was born towards the
end of the fifth century BC to an
aristocratic, but less-than-wealthy
family. A naturally inquisitive
mind was sharpened by a wide-ranging
education centered on Pythagorean phi-
losophy. But in spite of the Pythagorean
belief in an eternal soul, Epaminondas still
pursued the sort of immortality desired by
most ancient Greek males. It was his “na-
ture (…) to crave for everlasting fame” (Di-
odorus Siculus 15.16.1).
The dancing floor of war
Epaminondas came of age at a time when
Thebes increasingly bore the brunt of
Sparta’s hegemonic ambitions. The fre-
quent invasions of the Boeotian Plain in
the early fourth century led Epaminondas
to label it “the dancing floor of war” (Plu-
tarch, Moralia 193E). Then, in 382, the
Spartans seized the Theban acropolis, in-
stalled a garrison there, and forced a pro-
Spartan oligarchy upon the city.
While several democratic, anti-Spartan
leaders took refuge in Athens, others, in-
cluding Epaminondas, remained in Thebes.
columnists, in December of 379, a handful
of the exiles secretly returned to Thebes.
In a daring operation they struck quickly
against the pro-Spartan leaders and then
rallied the Theban population to drive out
the Spartan garrison. It is said that Epami-
nondas refused to take part in the removal
of the Theban collaborators because he was
reluctant to spill the blood of his fellow citi-
zens. But once the fighting turned from the
Theban partisans to the Spartans occupying
the acropolis, he “took his stand among the
foremost” (Cornelius Nepos 15.10). Victori-
ous, the Thebans restored their democratic
government and re-established the Boeo-
tian Confederacy, which had been disband-
ed at Spartan insistence in 386.
The Spartans did not take their ex-
pulsion lightly. They invaded Boeotia four
times between 378 and 371, but the The-
bans, supported by the Boeotian Confed-
eracy, were able to prevent Thebes itself
from being seriously threatened. Their
confidence received an enormous boost
in 375/4 when the 300 elite infantry of the
Theban Sacred Band, backed by about 200
cavalry, routed a detachment of approxi-
mately 1000 to 1800 Spartans at Tegyra,

12 ancient warfare iX-2

aw_9-2.indd 12 22/04/15 10:01


the first time a Spartan army had been de-
feated in battle by a smaller force.
Bearding the lion
Epaminondas had acquitted himself hon-
ourably enough in Theban warfare and
politics, though without winning any no-
table renown. But he abruptly captured the
attention of the entire Greek oikouméne at
a peace conference in Sparta in 372/371.
There, as the head of the Theban delega-
tion, he locked horns with the venerable
Spartan king and general, Agesilaus, and
set the stage for the events at Leuctra.
At the conference, Agesilaus, citing
the principle of the sovereignty of the polis,
repeatedly demanded that the Thebans dis-
solve the Boeotian Confederacy. But every
time he did so, Epaminondas “promptly
and boldly” asked if the Spartans intended
to make the cities of Laconia independent
(Plutarch, Agesilaus 28.1). With each ex-
change, Agesilaus grew more heated while
Epaminondas maintained his calm reserve.
Finally, the enraged Agesilaus removed
Thebes from the general peace, essentially
declaring war upon the city.
Agesilaus savoured the prospect of set-
tling with the troublesome Thebans once
and for all, and it was widely assumed
among the Greeks that Thebes, now isolat-
ed, would be easy prey for the Spartans. It is
equally evident, however, that Epaminondas
had orchestrated the conference proceed-
ings so as to force a decisive confrontation
in which he could test his own mettle and
that of his countrymen against the vaunted
Spartan military. Events moved quickly fol-
lowing the assemblage’s dissolution. Just
twenty days later in July 371, Epaminondas
displayed his remarkable military genius for
the first time, leading the Thebans and the
Boeotian confederacy to dramatic victory
over the Spartans and their allies at Leuctra
(see Roel Konijnendijk’s article in this issue).
Quick to follow up, in December of 370,
Epaminondas led a force of roughly 10,000
Boeotian and allied troops into the Pelopon-
nesus. At Mantinea they rendezvoused with
contingents from several Peloponnesian
aw_9-2.indd 13
The ascendancy of Thebes
towns eager to exploit Sparta’s sudden vul-
nerability and throw off the yoke of centuries
of suppression. Epaminondas’ army swelled
probably to somewhere between 30,000 to
40,000 troops, though some sources put the
number as high as 70,000.
To counter the logistical difficulties
of moving such great numbers of men and
equipment across difficult winter terrain,
Epaminondas divided his army into four
columns, with each advancing separately to-
ward Laconia. They rejoined ranks at Carya
and continued toward Sparta along the east-
ern bank of the Eurotas River, destroying eve-
rything in their path. For the first time since
the emergence of the Greek poleis, invaders
had “burst into an unravaged and inviolate
land” (Plutarch, Agesilaus 31.2). Rather than
confront so vast a force, Agesilaus ordered
the Spartans to remain holed up in the city.
Younger, hot-headed Spartans clamoured to
confront their tormentors, but were restrained
by Agesilaus and other elders. Fighting was
confined to a few skirmishes in the suburbs.
Bronze figurine from Do-
Unwalled Sparta must have presented
dona, dated ca. 300 BC and
a tempting target to Epaminondas. But the
thought to depict a general.
Theban was always loath to expend the lives
Note the use of the Corin-
of his men recklessly and knew the toll that
thian helmet. Such helmets
street fighting would exact on his forces. He
had become rare after about
was also fully aware that by facing down the
the middle of the fifth cen-
Spartans in Laconia itself, he had already
tury BC, but continued in use
shattered their pretence of invulnerability.
among the higher-ranking
and wealthier warriors, at
liberating greece least if depictions in art are
Epaminondas’ plan was to inflict a more
anything to go by. Currently
critical blow to Sparta by striking still fur-
in the National Archaeologi-
ther from the city itself. His campaign cul- cal Museum in Athens.
minated in an unimpeded progress through © Livius.Org
Messenia, which liberated approximately
200,000 helots from centuries of brutal
servitude. To secure their freedom for the
long-term, Epaminondas oversaw the con-
struction of the massively-fortified city of
Messene on the heights of Mt Ithome, a site
sacred to the Messenians. By this stroke,
he destroyed the economic underpinnings
of Spartan military might and initiated the
city’s decline into inconsequentiality.
Following brilliant campaigns in 368
and 367 against Thebes’ Thessalian rival,
ancient warfare iX-2 13
22/04/15 10:01
 The ascendancy of Thebes
Mantinea looking from Myti-
kas to Kapnistra Ridge.
© David Balfour
14 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 14
Alexander of Pherae, Epaminondas once
more turned his attention to the Pelopon-
nesus. On an expedition in 364, he liber-
ated several Achaean towns from Spartan
control, only to see his work quickly un-
done by an over-reaching Theban govern-
ment which installed military governors in
each city. This move provoked an anti-The-
ban reaction which resulted in most of the
towns returning to the Spartan fold.
final glory
With the threat from Sparta removed, some
Arcadian cities believed they no longer
needed Thebes to safeguard them. Led by
Mantinea, they formed an anti-Theban
coalition in northern Arcadia. In turn, pro-
Theban Arcadian states, headed by Tegea,
appealed to Thebes for aid against this new
bloc. Athens, in the meantime, had aligned
itself with Sparta against what they now
perceived as the greater threat from Thebes.
The confident Epaminondas was keen
to respond to the Tegean appeal in order
to draw the Spartans and Athenians into a
conclusive battle. The Boeotians and several
northern allies embarked once more for the
Peloponnesus, where they were joined by
contingents from Argos, Messene, Sicyon,
and the pro-Theban Arcadian towns. Epami-
nondas quartered this army in Tegea. From
there, he learned that three Spartan divisions
were already at Mantinea and that Agesilaus
had just departed Sparta with the remainder
of the army. Undefended Sparta was too en-
ticing a prize to pass up. Epaminondas set
out with seasoned Boeotian troops and select
Thessalian cavalry on a night march to the
city. But a Cretan traitor reached Agesilaus
just 7 miles from Sparta and informed him
of the Theban general’s designs. The Spartan
king rushed back to Sparta, arriving before
the Boeotians. As in 369, he abandoned the
countryside, evacuated the suburbs, and pre-
pared to defend the city centre. At strategic
points, buildings were levelled and the rub-
ble piled to block the narrow streets.
On the following morning, the Boeo-
tians descended from the mountains to the
northeast. Across the summer-shallow Eu-
rotas, Epaminondas’ troops poured into the
city at several points, and the heart of Spar-
ta itself was violated by hostile forces. The
Boeotians were met by desperate resistance
in the constricted streets. Combat probably
continued into the afternoon, when Archida-
mus, the son of Agesilaus, managed to push
the invaders back across the Eurotas.
To keep the Spartan troops holed up,
Epaminondas left a few cavalry to maintain
campfires and create the impression that
his entire force remained outside the city.
Meanwhile, he led the bulk of his troops
back to Tegea under cover of night. He knew
the Mantineans had dispatched military aid
to the Spartans, so he sent a contingent of
Theban and Thessalian cavalry to Mantin-
ea, probably to steal the harvest. But to the
south of the city these mounted troops were
met by a cavalry force newly arrived from
Athens. After a brief clash, the Athenians
forced their opponents to retreat to Tegea.
Epaminondas’ foiled attempts on Sparta
and Mantinea had been militarily sound.
Save for one treasonous Cretan, he might
have taken Sparta. And he had succeeded in
drawing Agesilaus and the bulk of the Spartan
army away from Mantinea, where the crucial
military confrontation would take place.
Intent on a showdown, Epaminon-
das led his forces north toward Mantinea.
The enemy occupied an advantageous
defensive position in the narrowest point
between Mt Maenalus on the west and
Kapnistra on the east. Stretched across
the generally level ground was an army
of approximately 20,000 infantry and 200
cavalry. The right wing consisted of three
Spartan divisions and the Mantineans. To
their left were additional Arcadian allies,
followed by the Elians and Achaeans. Athe-
nians manned the left wing on the lower
slopes of Kapnistra. Because of the narrow-
ness of the gap and steepness of slopes be-
tween the two mountains, the cavalry was
placed six deep in front of the infantry.
As he came within sight of his oppo-
nents, Epaminondas drew his army of rough-
ly 25,000 into a shallow line and advanced
in a leftward slant towards Maenalus. Reach-
22/04/15 10:01

ing a shallow ridge, he ordered his troops to
ground arms. Thinking that the enemy was
about to pitch camp, many of the opposing
forces broke ranks and prepared to do the
same. But as their infantry began removing
their armour and cavalry led their horses
away from the line, Epaminondas abruptly
ordered his own mounted troops to the front.
Behind the screen of dust raised by his cav-
alry, Epaminondas re-deployed his infantry.
As at Leuctra, he planned to stake
everything upon a swift, smashing blow
inflicted upon the crack troops of the en-
emy. But this time the weight of that blow
would be even heavier. On his left wing
he assembled all of the Boeotian hoplites
into a phalanx fifty ranks deep. To the
right, the allied contingents were arrayed
in an oblique fashion, slanting away from
the enemy, leaving the massive left wing
jutting out from the line like the “prow
of a trireme” (Xenophon 7.5.23). He ar-
ranged his cavalry in front of his infantry
in a wedge formation. Finally, in another
innovation, he interspersed lightly-armed
infantry among the mounted ranks.
As at Leuctra, Epaminondas held the
initiative from the first. A sudden cavalry
charge caught many of the opposing forces
still scurrying into formation while hast-
ily mounting horse or throwing on armour.
Panicked disorder was compounded as – in
another echo of Leuctra – the superior north-
ern cavalry drove the opposing horsemen
back into their own line. A flanking attempt
by the infantry mingled with Epaminondas’
cavalry was repulsed, but the lightly-armed
foot soldiers were able to generate further
mayhem in the enemy ranks.
As the confusion mounted, Epaminon-
das’ left wing advanced, and suddenly out of
the dust the crushing mass of the Boeotian
“fire-breathers” drove into the enemy right
(Xenophon 7.5.12). After a short period of
intense combat, the Spartan and Mantinean
ranks broke and the Boeotians pursued. But
precisely as the battle was tilting into a rout,
Epaminondas was felled by a spear wound
to the chest. With astonishing rapidity, his
entire army seemed to deflate around him.
aw_9-2.indd 15
The ascendancy of Thebes
As Epaminodas was carried to the rear of the
lines, his cavalry and light infantry retreated,
oblivious to the Spartans and Mantineans still
fleeing past them in the opposite direction.
Behind the lines, physicians quickly
determined that Epaminondas would die
when the spear point was removed. Upon
hearing that the battle had been won,
Epaminondas declared, “I have lived long
enough; for I die unconquered” (Plutarch, Detail from the lower frieze
Moralia 194A). When a friend lamented of the Nereid Monument
that he died childless, he responded, “No, from Xanthus (Anatolia),
by Zeus, on the contrary I leave behind two dated to between 390 and
daughters, Leuctra and Mantinea” (Diodor- 380 BC. These generic battle
us Siculus 15.87.5). With that, he directed scenes depict Greek warriors
that the spear point be withdrawn. in contemporary dress. Here,
Both armies erected trophies at Man- a horseman is unseated. Cur-
tinea. Though the battle can be viewed as a rently in the British Museum.
“tactical victory” for Epaminondas (Buckler, © Josho Brouwers
p. 219), his death marked the end of The-
ban Hegemony. Nevertheless, he left Thebes
much stronger and more secure than he had
found it. Boeotia – formerly the “dancing
floor of war” – hosted not a single major bat-
tle between Leuctra in 371 and Chaeronea
in 338. Moreover, Epaminondas had freed
Greece from a particularly repressive he-
gemony and liberated the Messenians from
a servitude that ranks among the cruellest
and most degrading in history. “Princeps
Graeciae” is a fitting appellation for this ex-
traordinary figure of the ancient world. 0
David Balfour is Academic Dean and a Pro-
fessor of History at the College of St Joseph
in Rutland, VT. He holds a PhD in Medieval
History and writes regularly on topics in an-
cient and medieval military history.
further reading
• John Buckler, The Theban He-
gemony 371–362 BC (Cam-
bridge, MA and London 1980).
• G.L. Cawkwell, ‘Epaminondas
and Thebes’, Classical Quarterly
22 (1972), pp. 254–278.
• Victor Davis Hanson, The Soul of
Battle (New York 2001).
ancient warfare iX-2 15
22/04/15 10:01
 The reenactor

A hoplite at the dawn of Theban Hegemony

on the fields
of Leuctra
when night fell on the battlefield near the small Boeotian town
of leuctra, the might of the spartan army had been crushed. The
soldiers of Thebes stood triumphant over the scattered remains
of a foe once thought invincible. while their enemy had been
trained since childhood, the Theban hoplites were a classical
city-state army. aristocrats, merchants, and craftsmen, as well
as peasants, filled their ranks instead of professional soldiers.
it was their general, epaminondas, who made the difference.
his superior tactics and formidable use of the forces available
to him paved the way for Theban predominance.

by friedrich wilhelm miesen A hoplite equipped in the manner

Hoplites in action.
© Friedrich Wilhelm Miesen
A
t the time Thebes set out to
crush the hegemony of Sparta
and its soldiers, the hoplite
was still the main pillar of
Greek warfare. The round hoplite shield
dominated the battlefield. The battle itself
featured the crash of tightly-packed pha-
lanx formations. The hoplite had, however,
evolved since the days of the Persian Wars.
While the Peloponnesian war had
seen warriors favour lighter equipment,
heavier body-armour was again in wide-
spread use in the early fourth century BC.
The iconic Corinthian helmet was no long-
er in general use as heads were now pro-
tected by lighter types of helmets, which
left more of the face exposed and were
often also cheaper to produce. City-states
could now muster larger armies through
arsenal stocks and citizenship through
military service became more affordable.
shown on the opposite page would be
a common sight in the front ranks of the
Theban army and represents a type of
hoplite called a promachos, a soldier of
the first rank (a term common, too, in
Homeric epic). The high quality of his
equipment indicates a high social status,
which qualifies him for this position, a
place of honour in the Theban order of
battle, or perhaps even for the elite Sa-
cred Band, the most renowned and ex-
clusive unit in the Theban army. 0
Friedrich Wilhelm Miesen is a Biologist
(MSc, BSc) focusing on ichthyology at the
Zoologisches Forschungsmuseum Alexander
Koenig in Bonn, Germany. In his spare time,
he focuses on the study of ancient warfare.
As a re-enactor, he enacts both a late clas-
sical hoplite and a Samnite Warrior of the
fourth century BC. He is a member of the
German reenactment group Hetairoi e.V.

16 ancient warfare iX-2

aw_9-2.indd 16 22/04/15 10:01

 The head is protected
by a simple bronze pi-
los helmet, providing an
excellent field of vision.
This helmet was a com-
mon sight on the battle-
fields of the late fifth to
mid-fourth centuries BC.
To protect his torso, our hop-
lite has donned a bronze tho-
rax, an expensive and exqui-
site piece of armour imitating
human anatomy.
Our reconstructed Theban
hoplite is clad in a woollen
ionic chiton, the standard gar-
ment of Greek soldiers, made
of two rectangular pieces of
cloth fastened at the sides and
on top of both shoulders.
aw_9-2.indd 17
Our hoplite has discarded his
primary weapon, the 2.5m-
long thrusting spear or dory,
and has instead drawn his
secondary weapon, a slashing
sword called a kopis. A weap-
on like the kopis required
strength rather than skill for ef-
fective use in combat.
The hoplite’s shield did
not change markedly
from its inception around
700 BC. It is made from
planks of cured wood
(especially oak) and, in
this case, painted.
The legs are protected
by a pair of decoratively
painted bronze greaves
or knemides.
22/04/15 10:01
 The ascendancy of Thebes

The Siege of Corcyra, 374–372 BC

Spartan eclipse
The defeat of athens at the end of the Peloponnesian war (431–404
Bc) may have left sparta as the most powerful state in greece, but the
following years were troubled. The corinthian war of 395–387 Bc found
sparta warring with Thebes, athens, argos, and corinth until peace
was made under the auspices of the great King of Persia. The political
acumen of sparta’s rulers was severely limited, and they managed to
turn greek opinion against sparta through their arrogance and brutish
foreign policy. one ill-considered move was the seizure of the cad-
mea, the acropolis of Thebes, in 382, which was then garrisoned by
spartan soldiers. The spartan hegemony, as it is known, was an impe-
rial dominion underwritten by naked military power.

by marc G. Desantis mand of Chabrias soundly defeated a Spartan

Marble grave stone of a priest
and two warriors. Note the pi-
los helmets. Dated to the end
of the fifth century BC. Perga-
mon Museum, Berlin.
© Karwansaray Publishers
T
he losses that Athens sustained left
it much diminished from its fifth
century imperial peak. When the
Cadmea was retaken in 379, ten-
sions escalated between Athens and Sparta.
In response, in 378, Athens created the Sec
Sec-
ond Athenian Sea League. The new alliance
was much less strict when compared to the
Delian League that Athens had hijacked
and turned into a maritime empire in the
admit-
preceding century. Thebes was also admit
ted into the League, and Diodorus reports
that ultimately some seventy cities joined
the anti-Spartan coalition. The final break
came when the Spartans tried and failed
Ath-
to seize Athens’ port city of Piraeus. Ath
ens decided that the truce between it and
Sparta, which had been in effect since the
end of the Corinthian war in 387, had been
breached. In 378, Athens declared war.
The Boeotian war
Athens showed sparks of her old glory at sea.
In 376, a newly built fleet under the com-
fleet off Naxos. A lack of money was a con-
tinuing impediment, and hindered further
naval operations. For some time after Naxos,
Athenian naval commanders had to sail from
place to place, collecting tax money to pay
for the upkeep of the fleet. Yet the Atheni-
ans’ seafaring skill still gave them an edge
over their main rival. At Alyzia, in 375, an
Athenian fleet of just twenty triremes under
the command of Timotheus cunningly out-
manoeuvred and exhausted a Spartan fleet
of fifty-five ships, making it ripe for a devas-
tating counterattack by forty other Athenian
vessels that had been kept in reserve.
The costliness of the ongoing war made
ending hostilities prudent, and in 374 a peace
was concluded. But on his way back to Ath-
ens, Timotheus put a group of exiles ashore
on the island of Zacynthus, where they pro-
ceeded to set up a coastal stronghold named
Arcadia. This brought the short-lived peace to
an end. The city of Zacynthus on the island
was dominated by a pro-Spartan faction,
which appealed to Sparta for assistance. The
Spartans made a complaint to Athens, but
observing that the Athenians had no inten-

18 ancient warfare iX-2

aw_9-2.indd 18 22/04/15 10:01


tion of doing anything about it, sent twenty-
five ships to Zacynthus to help the loyalists.
At Corcyra, where the main city shared
its name with the island, the pro-Spartan
faction had been sent into exile, and the
Spartans dispatched a flotilla of twenty-two
ships under Alcidas to capture it. The Cor-
cyraeans now made a plea to the Athenians
for help. If the Spartans took Corcyra, they
warned the Athenians, its large fleet and the
great wealth of the strategically located is-
land in the Ionian Sea would fall to Athens’
enemy. So in 374, Athens sent a small force
of 600 lightly armed peltasts under Ctesi-
cles to bolster the islanders. These soldiers
reached Corcyra and successfully slipped
into the city under the cover of darkness.
In 373, Athens organized a fleet of
sixty triremes under the command of Tim-
otheus to mount a more substantial relief
expedition to Corcyra. But Timotheus first
took his fleet not south in the direction
of the Peloponnesus toward Corcyra, but
northward to Thrace, where he collected
additional men and thirty more ships. Ath-
ens was simply not capable of sustaining
such a massive war effort all on its own.
The Second Athenian Sea League, because
it did not make mandatory the provision of
funds by member states, was less than ef-
fective in securing the money that Athens
needed to equip its ships. Thebes, for one,
despite the benefit that it gained from being
a part of the alliance, had not been forth-
coming with money for the League's fleet.
Sparta, upon learning of the fitting out
of the large Athenian naval force, in 373
sent its own fleet of sixty triremes under the
command of Mnasippus to attack Corcyra.
Mnasippus landed and quickly took con-
trol of the country outside of the city. The
Athenians, scratching their heads as to why
Timotheus had seemingly dithered so long
without sailing to Corcyra, removed him
from command, and in his stead appointed
Iphicrates as admiral of the fleet.
Iphicrates was a self-made man and
a talented general who had made a name
for himself during the Corinthian War.
Once Iphicrates assumed command of the
aw_9-2.indd 19
The ascendancy of Thebes
Athenian navy, he wasted no time and set
about finding oarsmen for his ships. He in-
sisted that his trierarchs, wealthy Athenian
citizens whose communal duty was to
outfit, maintain, and captain a trireme for
active fleet service, actually fulfil their ob-
ligations. Iphicrates even pressed his own
government hard, taking over any ship he
could get his hands on; including the two
state-owned triremes ordinarily used only
on official business, the Paralos and the Sa-
laminia (Xenophon, Hellenica 6.2.14).
mnasippus and the siege of corcyra
In 372, Mnasippus was still besieging Cor-
A bronze pilos helmet. These
cyra. His army, apart from the Spartans, also simple conical helmets had
included 1,500 mercenaries. With his troops become common from the
he raided the nearby countryside, destroying middle of the fifth century BC
farms and homes wherever he found them. onwards. This example is dec-
His haul of wine was so great that his sol- orated with an olive wreath.
diers became wine snobs, with Xenophon Antikensammlung, Munich.
writing that they refused to drink anything © Livius.Org
“unless it had a fine bouquet” (6.2.7).
Mnasippus established his army camp
at one side of the city and his naval camp on
the other to keep watch for any approach-
ing relief fleet, and at the harbour mouth he
set up a blockading force. The Corcyraeans
were trapped. They could not reach their
farms or bring any food or other supplies
into the city. Many defected to the Spartans,
seeking food. Some slaves were expelled
from the city too. But Mnasippus had no
wish to make life any easier for the people
holding out inside by reducing the number
of mouths that they had to feed. He chased
anyone who tried to exit the city back in-
side with whips. The desperate Corcyraeans
would not let them back in, and many of
these miserable souls perished in the forsak-
en no-man's land between the city and the
Spartan siege lines (Xenophon 6.2.15).
Conditions inside the Spartan camp
were not pleasant either. Relations between
Mnasippus and his mercenaries were poor,
and grew worse over time. He had already
dismissed some of them from service, even
while the siege was on going, and then with-
held two months of pay from the remainder
once he thought that the city would soon
ancient warfare iX-2 19
22/04/15 10:01
 The ascendancy of Thebes
(Opposite page) Disaster strikes
the Spartans in the cemetery
beneath the walls of Corcyra.
© Milek Jakubiec
20 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 20
be his. Xenophon makes it clear that Mna-
sippus did not do this out of a shortage of
funds (Xenophon 6.2.16). The Spartan com-
mander was simply being stingy.
The Spartan army was clearly unhappy
with its general and grew lax. The Corcyrae-
ans noticed that the enemy soldiers were
being careless about keeping up their guard
and that many of them had taken to wander-
ing about the countryside. They made a rapid
sortie, slew some of the enemy, and took
others prisoner. Mnasippus reacted quickly
and rushed to contain the attack. He ordered
his officers to bring the mercenaries into the
fight, but the truth was that the sellswords
had become intractable. When some of his
officers told him that the mercenaries would
not obey because they had been deprived of
their pay, Mnasippus struck one of them with
his staff and another with the butt of his spear.
Spartan morale was shaken by this epi-
sode, but they still fought well and drove
the Corcyraeans back toward the city gates.
The Corcyraeans made a stand beneath the
walls in the midst of a cemetery just outside
of the entrance. Another force of Corcyrae-
ans emerged from other gates and formed
a battle line, which attacked one end of the
Spartan phalanx. The Spartans, arrayed in
a formation eight men deep, saw that the
end of their own line was too weak to hold
back the enemy charge. They undertook
the anastrophe, a manoeuvre in which the
file leaders of the phalanx marched to the
back of their own line, followed by each
man behind them in succession. The whole
of this segment of the army thereby turned
about and faced in the opposite direction,
so that it could come to the aid of the be-
leaguered fighters on the end.
Such a difficult manoeuvre could only
be executed in battle by a highly disciplined
force, and the Spartans had accomplished
it before. Outside of Corcyra, however, the
result was disaster. The Corcyraeans oppo-
site the Spartans performing the anastrophe
had not been driven from the field. They
interpreted the Spartan manoeuvre as a re-
treat, and then rushed into the attack, driv-
ing off the Spartans before the anastrophe
was complete. The fleeing Spartans were
followed in flight by those men next to
them in the line (Xenophon 6.2.21).
Mnasippus could not go to the aid of
his faltering troops because he was already
engaged by the Corcyraeans to his fore.
With his soldiers dying all around, he made
his last stand. The Corcyraeans regrouped,
and augmented by reinforcements from in-
side the city, they crushed the remaining
Spartans. Mnasippus was slain.
Back in their camp, the dejected Spar-
tans took stock of the situation. The lengthy
siege had gotten them nowhere. Their gen-
eral was dead, and now word came that the
Athenian fleet under Iphicrates was due to
arrive soon. Putting what they could onto
their ships, the Spartans gave up the siege
and sailed away (Xenophon 6.2.24–26).
There is no doubt that Mnasippus was
much to blame for the difficulties that he
experienced with his troops, but the under-
lying cause of his troubles had its origin in
the long-term decline of Spartan manpow-
er. Sparta was reluctant to accept new men
as citizens, and as time wore on, the num-
ber of full citizens, or Spartiates, shrank. At
its greatest in the sixth century, the number
of Spartiates numbered about 10,000, but
by the great battle of Leuctra that would oc-
cur shortly after the siege of Corcyra, there
were just 700 Spartiates. To make up the
shortfall in soldiers, Sparta recruited mer-
cenaries, such as those who served them at
Corcyra. The friction that Mnasippus expe-
rienced with his mercenaries, exacerbated
by his own pig-headed miserliness, was an
unfortunate symptom of this decline.
The voyage of iphicrates
The siege had been broken, but Iphicrates,
being at sea, did not yet know this. He had
made the voyage around the Peloponnesus
to Corcyra a novel one. When he departed
with his fleet he left his main sails behind,
carrying only his ships' smaller foresails with
him. Iphicrates had the large sails taken off
at the beginning of the voyage, as if he were
anticipating a fight right away. He was com-
manding a fleet filled with untrained men
22/04/15 10:01
aw_9-2.indd 21 22/04/15 10:02
 The ascendancy of Thebes
who were unprepared to fight and needed
much more practice. Iphicrates made his
men row all the way to Corcyra so that by
the time they arrived they would be stronger
rowers, the ships would be faster, and the
fleet more formidable in battle. When the
time came for breakfast and supper, he
would have all of his triremes face the shore
and then make them race toward their land-
ing spot. The crew of the swiftest ship was al-
lowed to eat in leisure, while the men of the
slowest ship had to wolf down their food be-
fore hurrying back to their ship when the sig-
nal to depart was given (Xenophon 6.2.28).
As the fleet sailed, he had his crews
practice travelling in column, and also in
battle formation, learning all the while
as they neared Corcyra. Iphicrates let the
men stay on dry land only briefly to have
their meals, before enemy soldiers dis-
Bronze spearheads from covered their presence and attacked. Be-
Olympia. Dated to the fifth cause of Iphicrates’ unwillingness to re-
century BC. British Museum. main beached any longer than absolutely
© Karwansaray Publishers necessary, he made rapid progress to the
besieged island (Xenophon 6.2.30).
The Athenian fleet passed the Sphagiae
Islands, from whence it went to Elis, and then
anchored north of the Alpheus River at the
Ichthys Peninsula. By now, Iphicrates had re-
ceived a report of the death of Mnasippus,
but was reluctant to believe it since he had
not heard the story from an eyewitness, and
he was suspicious that the tale had been fab-
ricated to get him to relax his guard. So when
he next sailed to Cephallania, he made the
move in battle formation (Xenophon 6.2.32).
He then sailed on to Corcyra, where he
learned definitively that Mnasippus had been
killed and also that a flotilla of ten Syracusan
triremes under Crinippus was on its way to
bolster the Spartan force on the island. Iphi-
crates left nothing to chance. He sought out
the best ground from which to keep a watch
for the Syracusan approach and instructed
his lookouts on how to send their signals
back to him in the city that the enemy fleet
had appeared and dropped anchor.
When the Syracusans arrived, Iphi-
crates and the crews of a select group of
twenty triremes embarked. The Syracusans
22 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 22
were taken completely by surprise. Some
of their men had already gotten off of their
ships when the Athenians hove into view.
They and their triremes were all captured,
with the exception of a single ship whose
captain, Melanippus of Rhodes, had been
wary of making landfall there, and had al-
ready put his men back aboard. His ship
alone escaped from Iphicrates' trap. Still
suffering from a shortage of funds, Iphi-
crates decided that he would pay his ship
crews with the proceeds realized by ran-
soming the captured Syracusans. Diodorus
says that Iphicrates collected sixty talents
of silver in this way (15.47). For Crinippus
he anticipated a huge ransom, or perhaps
even to sell him as a slave, but the Syracu-
san admiral committed suicide rather than
suffer any further indignity.
Peace was at last made between Ath-
ens, Sparta, and Thebes, bringing the Boeo-
tian War to a conclusion. Iphicrates and
his fleet were recalled. In the decades that
ensued, Athens would enjoy a renaissance
of her naval power, until a defeat by Mac-
edonia in the Lamian War of 323–322 BC
Theban dissatisfaction with the wording of
the peace treaty that concluded the Boeotian
War, however, would bring about continued
fighting between it and Sparta, leading di-
rectly to the epic Battle of Leuctra in the next
year. The Theban victory there would end the
Spartan Hegemony in Greece forever. 0
Marc DeSantis is a historian and attorney.
He is a regular contributor to Ancient War-
fare. Currently, he is working on a book
about the naval aspects of the Punic Wars.
further reading
• John R. Hale, Lords of the Sea
(New York 2010).
• Raphael Sealey, A History of the
Greek City States, 700–338 BC
(Berkeley 1976).
• Robert B. Strassler (ed.), The
Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenika
(New York 2009).
22/04/15 10:02
aw_9-2.indd 23 22/04/15 10:02
 The ascendancy of Thebes

The Theban education of Philip of Macedon

Sowing the seeds

of destruction
The quick rise of Thebes as the dominant power in greece obviously
benefited the city in the short term. however, in the long term, the
success of epaminondas on the battlefield would plant the seed of
the city’s own destruction. Thebes’ military success led to numer-
ous governments sending their young nobles to the city as hostages,
who were tutored in a variety of subjects, one of which was military
drill and tactics. in an effort to curry favour, Ptolemy the macedonian
usurper, sent one such hostage to the city. his name was Philip.

by matthew beazley Philip most assuredly learned much about

P
hilip was the youngest son of King
Amyntas the second. In all likeli-
hood, Philip would never be King
of Macedonia, for he had two
older brothers. However, a devious aristocrat
by the name of Ptolemy, who was married
to Philip’s sister and also having an affair
with the queen, seized power after Amyn-
tas’s death. To further solidify his position,
Ptolemy swiftly had Philip’s oldest brother
Alexander executed. Philip’s other brother
Perdiccas was still a minor, so Ptolemy ruled
on his behalf under the guise of regent. Eager
to make an alliance with Thebes, Ptolemy
found a useful way to get Philip out of the
way by sending him to Thebes as a hostage.
Philip in Thebes
At the time of his arrival in Thebes, Philip
was fifteen years of age. He proved to be a
good student and in the four or five years
that he was there he learned everything he
could from his Theban patrons. He lived
with the Theban general Pammenes, who
was a close associate of Epaminondas.
military drill and tactics from Pammenes,
who was a skilled general in his own right.
However, it is not too difficult to imagine
Epaminondas tutoring Philip in military
matters of training, drill, tactics, and logis-
tics. Additionally, Philip would have had
numerous opportunities to watch the The-
ban Sacred Band in training.
Epaminondas was a pioneer in several
military principles and tactics. The princi-
ple of concentration of force and attacking
in echelon formation were used brilliantly
against the Spartans at Leuctra. Epaminondas
understood that the quickest way to win a
battle was to defeat the enemy at their strong-
est point. Philip took these lessons to heart.
One only has to review the battle of Chaero-
nea to see Philip skilfully employing the les-
sons he learned at Thebes. Philip’s army at-
tacked the allied Theban and Athenian army
in an echelon formation and used concentra-
tion of force to overwhelm the Theban force
and annihilate the Sacred Band.
Philips’ training at Thebes not only in-
cluded military matters but also diplomacy,
politics, and philosophy. One of Philip’s

24 ancient warfare iX-2

aw_9-2.indd 24 22/04/15 10:02


tutors was a Pythagorean. Given what we
know of Philip’s character and of the future
events in his life, it is amusing to think of
Philip being taught vegetarianism, paci-
fism, and abstinence. He obviously did not
take any of those things to heart. However,
Philip did take his diplomatic and political
education to heart. He would come to un-
derstand that most people could be bought,
either with money or with position.
Philip was also quick to grasp the ad-
vantages that Macedonia’s government had
over their southern neighbours. The king
of Macedonia had absolute authority over
his subjects and the country was feudally
organized, with lands being held by noble-
men at the king’s bequest. They owed their
position to their king and their king de-
manded their loyalty. Unlike a democratic
government such as that of Thebes, a Mace-
donian king could make decisions instantly
and move to carry them out quickly.
events in macedonia
While Philip waited in Thebes for events
to unfold in Macedonia, his brother Per-
diccas made his move. After four years of
biding his time and quietly gaining allies
to his cause, Perdiccas had Ptolemy ar-
rested and executed in 365 BC. Perdiccas
quickly recalled his brother, appointed
him the governor of a district, and al-
lowed him to recruit and train troops.
Although Macedonian cavalry had
long had a reputation for being excellent,
their infantry were abysmal, and consist-
ed almost entirely of undisciplined peas-
ant levies. Putting his Theban education
to work, Philip began to raise and train a
professional infantry force in his district.
Philip also performed joint exercises be-
tween the peasant infantry and aristocrat-
ic cavalry. In Philip’s army, being of noble
birth did not exempt you from discipline,
as many noblemen were to discover. Al-
though it took some time to achieve, he
eventually moulded Macedonians of all
ranks into a cohesive and well-trained
professional force. In this way, the fa-
mous Macedonian army was born.
aw_9-2.indd 25
The ascendancy of Thebes
After the death of Perdiccas, Philip be-
came King of Macedonia and would go on
to train and wield an extremely effective
army. He would use this army to essential-
ly conquer Greece and in the process de-
feat the Theban army, using tactics taught
to him in Thebes. Philip undoubtedly had
high regard for Thebes, given his time spent
there. However, his son did not have such
sentimental attachment to the city. After
Philip’s murder, Alexander became king
and all of Greece saw the occasion as the
perfect time to rebel against Macedonian
rule. Believing Alexander to be a weak
child, city-states such as Thebes threw out
their Macedonian garrisons. In typical Al-
exander-fashion, he moved fast. A coin depicting Philip II of
By virtue of geography, Thebes would Macedon. The king of Mac-
be the first major city Alexander’s army edon had spent his late teens
would encounter and he intended to make in Thebes as a hostage.
an example of them. In the face of the Mac- © Livius.Org
edonian army, Thebes remained defiant and
was therefore attacked. Theban soldiers and
non-combatants alike were butchered in the
streets. Over 6,000 Theban citizens were
killed and another 30,000 taken prisoner
and sold into slavery. No building within the
city was spared. Everything was looted and
destroyed. Although the city of Thebes
would be rebuilt 30 years later, this was a
catastrophe of biblical proportions for the
citizens who had to endure Macedonian
reprisals. One must wonder, had the The-
bans not educated Philip, would things
have turned out differently? 0
Matthew Beazley is a professional archae-
ologist with an educational background in
history and anthropology. He is a regular
contributor to Ancient Warfare.
further reading
• Alfred Bradford, Philip the II
of Macedon: The Life from the
Ancient Sources (Westport and
London 1992).
• Peter Green, Alexander of Mac-
edon, 356–323 BC (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, and London 1991).
ancient warfare iX-2 25
© Angel García Pinto
22/04/15 10:02
 The ascendancy of Thebes

On the dancing floor of Ares

the BattLe of
Leuctra
The Boeotian victory at leuctra was the most decisive event in clas-
sical greek history. athens eventually recovered from her complete
defeat in the Peloponnesian war, but sparta, crushed in battle on the
plain of Boeotia, was cast down for good. no spartan army would ever
again leave the Peloponnese. a power centuries old had been broken.

by roel Konijnendijk what is likely to have happened at Leuctra.

Head of a warrior with pilos
helmet. Altes Museum, Berlin.
© Karwansaray Publishers
S
ince the time of the battle itself,
people have wondered how this
could have happened. Leuctra was
a favourite subject of ancient au-
thors: four full accounts of the battle survive
in the sources – unparalleled for any other
Greek engagement – along with countless
smaller references, related stories and apoc-
ryphal legends. The travel writer Pausanias
called it the most famous victory of Greeks
over Greeks (9.13.11). Plutarch complained
about an acquaintance of his who would
bore his audience at every dinner party with
yet another account of the battle of Leuc-
tra; the man was so obsessed with it that his
friends dubbed him Epaminondas.
Given the keen interest of the ancients,
we might assume that the events at Leuc-
tra are easily reconstructed. Sadly, nothing
could be further from the truth. The ac-
counts we have are all deeply problematic;
they are all incomplete in their own partic-
ular way; they cannot be reconciled with
each other. Ironically, the sheer wealth of
source material has only caused confusion
and disagreement. The unfortunate truth is
that we will only ever be able to establish
Yet there is enough in such a reconstruc-
tion to explain how the finest army of an-
cient Greece could be so heavily defeated.
The campaign
The Peloponnesian army that invaded
Boeotia in the summer of 371 BC was led
by the Spartan king Cleombrotus, who had
a lot to prove. On previous campaigns,
his behaviour had been notably timid,
and some were beginning to suspect that
he had little enthusiasm for the war. He
needed to show that he was resourceful,
aggressive, and, most of all, eager to harm
the Boeotians. Therefore, when he found
the nearest pass from Phocis into Boeo-
tia blocked by the enemy, he did not turn
back as he had done before; instead, he
took an unexpected route down the coast,
fell upon the small harbour town of Creu-
sis, captured twelve Theban triremes, and
marched north across the mountains into
Boeotia. Soon after he had made his camp,
near the Thespian village of Leuctra, the
Boeotian army gathered to oppose him.
With the capture of Creusis, Cleom-
brotus may have already done more dam-
age to the Boeotians than he had ever done

26 ancient warfare iX-2

aw_9-2.indd 26 22/04/15 10:02

 The ascendancy of Thebes

before. Yet at this point, as Xenophon tells
us (Hellenica 6.4.5), the king’s friends were
urging him to show his mettle by fighting a
battle, while his detractors hoped that he
would reveal his true colours by marching
home. For his own sake, he had no choice
but to engage the Boeotian army.
Indeed, it seemed the circumstances
favoured him. Since the Thebans had pro-
voked the whole war by clinging to their
hegemony over the cities of Boeotia, the
other Boeotians were reluctant to fight on
the Theban side. The force that the The-
bans had scraped together was outnum-
bered by Cleombrotus’ army; with the
loyalty of their Boeotian subjects in doubt,
they faced battle against overwhelming
odds. Yet it was a battle they could not af-
ford to refuse. If they withdrew, the Boeo-
tian cities were likely to revolt at once,
and Thebes itself would be besieged by
Sparta. The Thebans felt they had only one
chance to avert disaster. Regardless of the
odds, they would have to make a stand
against the invaders at Leuctra.
The armies
It may come as a surprise, consider-
ing the quantity of sources on the bat-
tle, how poorly informed we are about
the nature of the armies involved. Only
later authors provide us with numbers
for both sides, and these numbers are al-
ways different; they range from the plau-
sible to the completely fantastical. Since
ancient writers were normally only in-
terested in light troops if their pres-
ence was decisive, we have almost
no indication as to their number
or role at Leuctra. All we can do
is stitch together the bits of which we
may be reasonably certain.
Plutarch says Cleombrotus’ army con-
sisted of 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 caval-
ry in total (Pelopidas 20.1). Most scholars
have accepted this number as a reason-
able estimate, though its original source is
A terracotta figurine from
unknown. As a ballpark figure it certainly
Boeotia depicting a rider.
sounds closer to the mark than the 24,000
Dated to the fifth century
or even 40,000 offered by other authors
BC. Allard Pierson Museum,
from the Roman period. Such numbers
Amsterdam.
served only to increase the glory of the
© Livius.Org
Boeotian victory; they have no basis in fact.
The core of this army was the Spar-
tan contingent, consisting of four morai,
that is, two-thirds of Sparta’s total levy
– about 2,300 hoplites in all. Seven hun-
dred of these were full Spartan citizens
(Xen. Hell 6.4.15). If the morai were
each accompanied by their full cavalry
detachment, 400 of the 1,000 cavalry
would have been of Spartan origin.
The 700 Spartiates did not fight as a
separate unit. While the 300 royal body-
guards called hippeis were probably sta-
tioned around the king in the first mora, the
remaining 400 Spartiates were scattered
about the Spartan formation. Long before

The battlefield
Boeotia is one of the largest expanses of flat land in mainland Greece – but the plain
of Leuctra, an offshoot on its southwestern edge, is no vast open space. The two armies
were encamped on hills on opposite sides of this plain. It was typical for hoplite armies to
retreat to high ground for safety; hills were easily defended and difficult for horsemen to
traverse. The Spartans in fact either fortified their camp with a ditch, or situated it strategi-
cally behind a ditch that was already there (Xenophon, Hellenica 6.4.14).
Not much is known about the space in between the two camps, except that
it was flat enough for cavalry manoeuvres, as Xenophon explicitly says (6.4.10).
We do not know the width of the lines; we do not hear of any terrain features
influencing the deployment of the armies, and indeed, none have been observed
on site. In the surviving descriptions of the clash, the particulars of the battlefield
have no part to play. As such, we should probably assume that the plain was flat
and wide enough to be, for all intents and purposes, featureless.

ancient warfare iX-2 27

aw_9-2.indd 27 22/04/15 10:02

 The ascendancy of Thebes
The two armies faced each
other from opposite sides
of the plain of Leuctra. Both
deployed a wide phalanx of
infantry, but it was the core
units – the Spartans on the
right of their line, and the
Thebans on the left of theirs
– that would decide the bat-
tle. Both sides drew up their
cavalry in front of the lines
to start the fight. Depth and
relative size of formations
can only be guessed; the siz-
es given here are approxima-
tions for the sake of clarity.
© Julia Lillo
28 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 28
Leuc-
tra, Spar-
tan army units
had become completely
mixed, with full Spartan citi-
zens taking their place in the ranks be-
side Lacedaemonians of lesser status. This
did not mean, however, that the quality of
the Spartan army had declined. Spartan ar-
mies were not trained at home, but in the
field; it was only after the levy had been
called up that drill began in earnest. Non-
Spartiates in the ranks therefore would
have received the same combat training
as the Spartiates themselves. Moreover, by
being trained at all, even in the most rudi-
mentary way, these men would have been
significantly better prepared for battle than
any other Greek militia army of the day.
We know nothing about the size or
quality of the contingents sent by the
Peloponnesian allies. The Peloponne-
sians at Leuctra were no more eager for
the fight than their Boeotian counterparts
(Xen. Hell. 6.4.15; Paus. 9.13.9), and it is
likely that the Spartans would have con-
sidered them too unreliable for any tacti-
cal cooperation. We only get a glimpse of
the role of the allied cavalry and peltasts
in a skirmish before the actual battle.
As for the Spartan horsemen, Xeno-
phon emphatically declares that they were
just about worthless (Hell. 6.4.10-11).
They were poorly trained, inexperienced
riders, unfit for the exertions of horseman-
ship, and no match for the excellent cav-
alry of the Boeotians. Good use of cavalry
was often decisive in Greek battles; for the
Spartans at Leuctra, on the other hand, the
presence of their mounted troops proved
more of a curse than a blessing.
If this account of the
Spartan army seems little
more than a patchwork
of plausibilities, we are
even less well informed
about the army that op-
posed them. Late sources
tell us that the Boeotian army
was no more than 6,000 strong (Diod.
15.52.2; Polyaen. 2.3.12). While we once
again have no idea how they arrived at this
number, it sounds plausible if we compare
it to the Boeotian levies seen elsewhere.
The full militia raised by the region con-
sisted of 11,000 hoplites and 1,100 cav-
alry (Hell. Oxy. 16.3-4), but even for ma-
jor engagements only part of this levy was
called up. The Battle of Leuctra was fought
close to home and against the will of most
Boeotians; it is likely that few besides
the Thebans had bothered to turn up in
strength. Unfortunately, no ancient source
tells us whether the number of 6,000 in-
cluded the cavalry. Most modern authors
estimate that the Boeotian army total lay
between 6,000 and 7,000 men.
It is generally assumed that the The-
bans themselves did march out in full force
– 4,000 hoplites and 400 cavalry in all. Their
contingent made up about two thirds of the
Boeotian army. This meant that, if the unre-
liable allies on both sides were discounted,
the Thebans actually outnumbered their real
enemies. Moreover, while the performance
of hoplite militias could be wildly unpredict-
able, the Theban detachment included the
elite Sacred Band – a unit of 300 hoplites
maintained by the state to add some much
needed professional skill to the mayhem of
Greek battle. These and the cavalry were the
trump cards held by the Thebans.
The other contingents of the army,
however, were thoroughly unreliable. The
Thebans had so little faith in them that they
actually allowed some of them to leave,
fearing that if they were led into battle they
might go over to the Spartan side (Xen.
Hell. 6.4.9; Paus. 9.13.8). All sides were
probably aware that the Thebans would
have to fight this battle practically alone.
22/04/15 10:02
 The ascendancy of Thebes

While Cleombrotus was supreme
commander of his army, the Boeotian
force was led by a council of seven gen-
erals called Boeotarchs. Later sources tell
us that the Theban Epaminondas was ef-
fectively in charge, but we need not as-
sume this was the case; Xenophon, who is
full of praise for Epaminondas elsewhere,
does not mention him once in relation
to this battle. An inscription from Thebes
contains the indignant claim of at least
if they wanted the job done right, they’d
have to do it themselves.
Unfortunately, the deployment of the
rest of the Boeotian army is an open ques-
tion. They placed their cavalry in front of
their phalanx, to ward off the assault of the
Spartan horse; other than this, we know noth-
ing for certain. Diodorus claims that Epami-
nondas deployed the Boeotian right wing in
echelon, placing units progressively further
back from the Theban front line, in order to
(Following pages) Their own
fleeing cavalry had thrown the
Spartans into confusion. Just
as they tried to restore order,
the charging Thebans were
upon them. The elite Sacred
Band led the way, the club of
Hercules on their shields, tar-
geting Spartan officers as they
crashed into the line.
© Johnny Shumate

one Boeotarch that he was not second
to Epaminondas at Leuctra. It is possible
that the success of the plan proposed by
Epaminondas to his colleagues led to the
retroactive inflation of his status. Ancient
writers report that the plan to fight had to
be decided by a vote – which tells us a
good deal about the functioning efficien-
cy of this force. However, few believed
the Boeotians would win the day.
The deployment
We know that Cleombrotus stationed himself
and his Spartan contingent on the right wing
of his hoplite line, as Spartan kings usually
did. The morai were drawn up twelve ranks
deep. No source tells us anything useful
about the deployment of the Peloponnesian
allies. The only other thing we know about
the Spartan deployment is that Cleombrotus
placed his cavalry in front of his phalanx, a
common ploy, especially against an enemy
who might not stand his ground.
The Boeotians seem to have drawn up
their army in response to the Spartan de-
ployment, or perhaps in response to what
they expected that deployment would be.
They placed their main force, the entire
Theban hoplite contingent, on their left
wing – fifty ranks deep, and therefore no
more than eighty files wide; a massive
block deployed directly across from the
core units of the Spartan army. This was an
old expedient of Greek warfare. As early
as the battle of Salamis we see Greek com-
manders looking to confront the enemy’s
best troops with the strongest forces they
had at their disposal. The Thebans massed
their best men on the left – convinced that
keep his less reliable troops out of the fight
(15.55.2). But Xenophon tells us nothing
about this. He reports this tactic only at the
second battle of Mantinea, in 362 BC (Hell.
7.5.23); perhaps Epaminondas’ achieve-
ments were conflated in the later tradition.
The greatest puzzle, though, is where
the Sacred Band was deployed. Plutarch is
our main source for this unit, but his de-
scription is unclear; the Sacred Band liter-
ally appears out of nowhere in his narrative
of the battle (Pel. 23.2). In order to make
sense of this, scholars have variously sug-
gested that the Sacred Band was deployed
behind the Theban phalanx, in front of it,
on its left flank, or within it, making up its
front left corner. All of this is possible; even
the deployment of an independent hoplite
detachment fits perfectly well within the
parameters of Greek tactical thought. But
with no compelling reason to prefer one
explanation over the others, perhaps Oc-
cam’s Razor should be brought to bear here.
The course of the battle does not require
us to suppose complicated deployments or
careful coordination. Therefore, we should
assume the simplest solution is the correct
one – namely, that the Sacred Band, as per
its original intention (Plut. Pel.. 19.3), served
as the cutting edge of the Theban phalanx.
Etymologically speaking,
The battle Boeotia derives its name
Polybius calls Leuctra a simple battle from being good cattle coun-
(12.25f.4), and so it seems to have been. try. This Boeotian statuette
The Spartan cavalry attacked first, and was depicts a farmer ploughing
promptly repulsed by its Boeotian counter- his field using a set of oxen.
part; in full retreat, the horsemen fell afoul Dated to the first quarter of
of their own phalanx, throwing the ranks of the sixth century BC. Louvre.
Spartan hoplites into disorder. The Boeotians © Livius.Org

ancient warfare iX-2 29

aw_9-2.indd 29 22/04/15 10:02

aw_9-2.indd 30 22/04/15 10:02
aw_9-2.indd 31 22/04/15 10:02
 The ascendancy of Thebes
A bronze helmet of Thracian
type from Lake Copais, Boeo-
tia. The inscription along the
rim reads HIARON (‘sacred’),
indicating that it had been
dedicated to the gods. Dated
450–400 BC. British Museum.
© Karwansaray Publishers
32 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 32
seized their chance: their left wing charged
and struck the Spartan line head-on. A hard
fight followed. At first the Spartans seem
to have held the upper hand, but soon at-
trition started to weigh against them. Their
king and several high-ranking officers fell,
and they began to lose spirit and cohesion;
confusion overtook them as orders stopped
coming through. Eventually the hippeis fell
back, and the rest of the phalanx crumbled.
A thousand Spartan dead littered the field.
This is the account of Xenophon,
and to him it was enough. Pitched bat-
tles were always risky; Cleombrotus
gambled and lost. Yet, from Antiquity to
today, people have insisted that things
cannot have been that simple.
Xenophon is often accused of a pro-
Spartan bias and a deep hatred for the
Thebans. Many believe that this makes
his account of Leuctra worthless. Plutarch
talks about a complex Spartan encircling
manoeuvre, cleverly disrupted by the Sa-
cred Band dashing into the fray – a far more
satisfying picture to those who expect tac-
tical brilliance on both sides (Pel. 23.1–3).
Diodorus similarly writes that the Spartans
deployed in a crescent formation, and that
Epaminondas masterfully countered this by
attacking one of its pincers with all his might
(15.55.2–3). Yet these accounts appeared
centuries after the battle. Their authors were
no experts on military matters. Xenophon
was. What is more, he frequently shows
himself capable of praising Thebes and criti-
cizing Sparta. His contemporary account
should be preferred wherever possible.
This is not to say that it is perfect. In
fact it raises several questions. Firstly, what
happened to the Boeotian cavalry after it
routed the Spartan horse? We do not know.
Later sources are no help here – they do
not mention the horsemen at all. Disap-
pearing units are a frequent problem in
surviving Greek battle accounts.
Secondly, why did the Spartans not
try to outflank the narrow Theban forma-
tion? Again, we do not know.
Thirdly, why did the Spartan allies
on their left fail to come to the aid of
Cleombrotus? Here, perhaps, we might
turn to Pausanias; he claims that the
Peloponnesians fled as soon as the Boe-
otian right wing charged (9.13.9). If we
are sceptical toward this late source,
however, we do not know. They may
have simply decided it was not worth
risking their lives for the Spartan cause.
Finally, why does Xenophon completely
fail to mention the Sacred Band? He knew
that the unit existed (Hell. 7.1.19). His omis-
sion is probably for the same reason that no
ancient author tells us anything about the role
of light troops in the battle: their contribution
was not decisive. While the Sacred Band is
likely to have done most of the fighting, they
did so as part of the greater Theban phalanx.
In the end, however, those who hold
that Xenophon’s account is biased and
incomplete are wrong in one important
respect. Xenophon does not just tell us
why the Spartans lost; he also makes it
very clear how the Boeotians won.
The tactics of epaminondas
At Leuctra, the Boeotians faced an army
with a fearsome reputation. The Spartans
had not lost a pitched battle in well over
a hundred years.
This was not a matter of individual
fighting skill. The main difference lay in or-
ganization and training. Unlike any other
Greek militia, Sparta’s hoplites were subdi-
vided into smaller units, which were sub-
divided in turn, down to groups of about
36 men; each unit at each level had its
own commander, who got his orders from
the man above him in the chain of com-
mand. The resulting hierarchy of officers
made up the front line of the Spartan pha-
lanx. The men in the ranks behind them
were trained simply to follow their lead.
The Spartans won pitched battles be-
cause of the advantages offered by this
system. A normal phalanx rushed into bat-
tle, screaming and losing cohesion in the
charge. Not so the Spartans. Their hoplites
marched in step; their commanders kept
their wits about them, and their officer hi-
erarchy allowed them to adapt their forma-
22/04/15 10:02

tions to circumstance with a few shouted
words. Both at Mantinea (418 BC) and at
the Nemea they showed themselves capa-
ble of large-scale tactical manoeuvres – a
skill the untrained hoplite militias of other
Greek states could never hope to match.
Yet the Boeotians were getting wise to
their methods. The battles of Coronea (394
BC) and Tegyra (375 BC) had taught them
the major weakness of the Spartan system.
Once the commander of a Spartan force
got stuck in, the chain of command broke
down; when he was killed, it could vanish
completely. Spartan tactical responsive-
ness depended on the freedom of the gen-
eral and his direct subordinates to seize
control of the situation. If these men were
removed from the equation, the Spartan
phalanx was just another phalanx.
The Theban hoplite levy could not
be raised to Spartan standards of infantry
training at short notice. But they were ea-
ger and willing to fight. All the Boeotarchs
had to do was create a situation where
they would be on the Spartan king before
he had a chance to react – and make it
so that the fight against the hippeis would
ultimately fall out in their favour.
Xenophon flat-out tells us that this
was the Boeotian plan (Hell. 6.4.12). They
put their best troops on the left to face
the Spartans directly. They deployed fifty
ranks deep to give the enemy no hope of
winning through by sheer skill at arms.
The narrow front of the Theban phalanx
was a calculated risk; if their plan worked,
the rest of the Spartan army would not be
receiving any orders to outflank them.
Speed was the decisive factor. The
Sacred Band led the way. It is likely that
Plutarch’s confused account of the bat-
tle derives from poorly transmitted eye-
witness accounts of the shock when the
Sacred Band burst forth from the dust
clouds raised by the cavalry, crashing
into a Spartan line thrown into chaos by
its own fleeing horsemen. The rest of the
Theban phalanx followed on their heels.
Cleombrotus was mortally wounded in
the fighting – the first Spartan king to die
aw_9-2.indd 33
The ascendancy of Thebes
in battle since Leonidas at Thermopylae.
His death sealed the Spartans’ fate.
The aftermath
When the Spartans lost at Leuctra, they lost
everything. Among the dead were 400 Spar-
tiates: a third of the citizen body, wiped out
in a single day. The Spartan reputation for in-
vincibility in pitched battle was forever lost.
The Thebans, their losses negligible and their
confidence at an all-time high, had Epami-
nondas lead their army into the Pelopon-
nese to liberate Messenia and turn the whole
peninsula against Sparta. While the Spartans
were able to reassert themselves with some
success in the Peloponnese, they could nev- The monument at Leuctra,
er again dream of empire. What had started looking north.
as a campaign to put the Thebans in their © David Balfour
place ended with the Thebans – however
briefly – as masters of Greece. 0
Roel Konijnendijk is in the final stages of a
PhD in Ancient History at University Col-
lege London. His research is on Classical
Greek tactical developments and military
thought. He has also contributed to aca-
demic works on Persian military history
and the historiography of Greek warfare.
further reading
• J.K. Anderson, Military Theory and
Practice in the Age of Xenophon
(Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970).
• V.D. Hanson, ‘Epameinondas,
the Battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.)
and the ‘Revolution’ in Greek
Battle Tactics’, Classical Antiquity
7 (1988), pp. 190–207.
• J. DeVoto, ‘Pelopidas and Kle-
ombrotos and Leuktra’, Ancient
History Bulletin 3.6 (1989), pp.
115–119.
• J.E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts:
A History of Battle in Classical
Antiquity (London 2005).
• S.M. Rusch, Sparta at War:
Strategy, Tactics, and Campaigns,
550–362 BC (London 2011).
ancient warfare iX-2 33
22/04/15 10:02
 The ascendancy of Thebes

The Theban Sacred Band

A chosen few
during the fifth and fourth centuries Bc, some ancient greek city-
states fielded elite units of warriors. for the most part, greek cit-
ies mustered their troops only when needed. elite units, however,
sometimes served all year round. such ‘picked’ troops – the greek
word is epilektoi – were maintained either at the expense of the
city or were rich enough themselves to dedicate their time and
efforts to military pursuits. of these elite units, one of the most
famous is the Theban sacred Band (hieros lochos).

by ryszard Tokarczuk be traced back further in time. Diodorus Sic-

The great hero Heracles was
born in Thebes. This herm in
his likeness was erected at the
gymnasium in Messene, the
city that was built by order
of Epaminondas after the lib-
eration of the helots. The gym-
nasium was built in the third
century BC.
© Livius.Org
A
t the Second Battle of Mantinea,
the Argives fielded a thousand
hoplites. According to Diodorus
Siculus, the group consisted of
citizens freed from all other duties to their
city except military service and training,
which were paid for by the demos, or the
community at large. Even before the siege
of Syracuse (415–413 BC), the Syracusans
possessed a similar elite unit of 600 hop-
lites. Xenophon, in several passages of his
Hellenica, makes mention of other elite
military units, such as the five thousand
eparitoi (‘picked’, ‘chosen’) troops of the Ar-
cadian League, who were maintained at the
expense of the League’s treasury, and the
Three Hundred fielded by the Eleans. Elite
military units are also encountered among
the armies of other ancient peoples. We
know that Carthage, the great rival of the
Roman Republic, possessed a Sacred Band
in the second half of the fourth century BC,
which consisted of the richest citizens.
Of all early elite military units, we know
the most about the Theban Sacred Band. It
existed for sure in the fourth century BC and
is connected to the Theban rise to power.
However, the history of the Sacred Band may
ulus, in his account of the battle of Delium
(424 BC), writes that the Boeotian army had
“charioteers and passengers” (12.70.1) num-
bering three hundred in all, the same num-
ber of men that served in the Sacred Band.
Since chariots were no longer a feature in
Greek warfare in the fifth century BC, it is as-
sumed that these ‘Charioteers’ were actually
a military unit consisting of well-born men,
who were rich enough to afford horses. This
military unit may have been the precursor to
the later Sacred Band.
The Theban sacred Band
In the aftermath of the Corinthian War,
Thebes found itself occupied by a Spartan
garrison. In 379 BC, a group of citizens
conceived a plot with the aim of regain-
ing independence. Among the conspirators
were Gorgidas and Pelopidas, two experi-
enced Theban military officers. When the
Spartan officers were having a party, the
conspirators assassinated them. They were
able to enter dressed as women (according
to one version of the story), or simply by
forcing their way in. After the officers were
killed, the Spartan garrison was thrown out
of the city. The inner city fortifications of
the Cadmeia were seized and Thebes was
liberated. The Thebans now needed to

34 ancient warfare iX-2

aw_9-2.indd 34 22/04/15 10:02


come up with a military force that could
defend their recently won freedom.
Four military generals were appointed,
among whose number Epaminondas (who
hadn’t participated in the earlier coup) was
originally not included. One of the ap-
pointed leaders, Gorgidas, is credited as
first commander and is quite probably the
creator of the Sacred Band. Under Gorgi-
das’ command, the men of the Sacred Band
saw action in the front lines of battle. Ac-
cording to Plutarch, the Sacred Band fought
in the first rank of the Theban army and was
thus spread thinly along the army’s front.
This changed with the appointment of a
new commander, Pelopidas. Three hundred
soldiers were gathered together in a body to
fight as a single, cohesive force. This is how
the Sacred Band was deployed at the bat-
tles of Tegyra, Leuctra, and Cynoscephalae,
where it fought against Alexander of Pherae.
The greatest victories of Theban military
might were achieved at this time and the
“
Sacred Band certainly played its part (Plut.
Pelopidas 18. 1, transl. B. Perrin):
The sacred band, we are
told, was first formed by
Gorgidas, of three hundred chosen
men, to whom the city furnished
exercise and maintenance, and
who encamped in the cadmeia; for
which reason, too, they were called
the city band; for citadels in those
days were properly called cities.
but some say that this band was
composed of lovers and beloved.”
Perhaps the most memorable aspect of the
Sacred Band is that it purportedly consisted
of 150 homosexual couples. Same-sex love
had a particular importance for aristocratic
Greeks. In so-called pederastic relation-
ships, an adult man would introduce his
younger lover to the values shared by the
community and provide him with a proper
example to follow as an adult citizen. While
there is no direct testimony from historical
aw_9-2.indd 35
The ascendancy of Thebes
sources chronologically close to the fourth
century BC for the existence of homosexual
relationships within the Sacred Band,
there are nevertheless reasons to
connect the Theban way of life with
homosexual love in particular. The
rationale behind organizing a unit of
lovers that would fight together was to put
an emphasis on the immense loyalty the
warriors had towards each other, and sup sup-
posedly increase the willingness to defend Inside of an Attic red-figure
one another from harm. cup depicting a running hop-
lite, equipped with Argive
Such readiness to put oneself at risk did
shield, Chalcidian (or At-
not necessarily come from love only. Mem-
tic?) helmet, and sword with
bers of the Band were probably recruited
straight crossguard.
from the ranks of patriotic Theban young
© Livius.Org
men. Before the coup, these young men had
gone with Gorgidas and Epaminondas to the
public gymnasia to wrestle with their Lace-
daemonian oppressors. Victories obtained in
these wrestling matches must have demon-
strated that the Spartans were less intimidat-
ing than their reputation perhaps led people
to believe, and that they therefore could
indeed be ousted from Thebes. After the es-
tablishment of democracy in Thebes, patri-
otic fervour most likely swelled the ranks of
the Theban army and the most courageous
would find their way into the Sacred Band.
The unit was stationed on the Cadmeia, the
fortified acropolis of the city named after its
founder, the hero Cadmus. Because it was
maintained at the expense of the State, the
warriors could live and train together.
Plutarch adds some details on Theban
customs. First, he writes that the name of
the Sacred Band derives from the oath to
Eros that members took at the shrine of Io-
laus, Heracles’ nephew and squire (Moral-
ia 761d–e), which was situated next to the
city’s gymnasium. No text of this particular
oath remains and it can be understood as a
lovers’ pledge of faith to each other. It also
cemented the personal ties and the broth-
erhood of arms within the unit through
divine sanction. The cult of Iolaus is con-
nected directly with the cult of Heracles,
who was himself a hero and divinity of
crucial importance to Theban civic iden-
tity. In this context, the heroes have been
ancient warfare iX-2 35
22/04/15 10:02
 The ascendancy of Thebes
(Opposite page) An older
man helps a younger man
with his equipment. Note the
pilos helmet and the Argive
shield emblazoned with the
club of Heracles.
© Angel García Pinto
36 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 36
regarded as examples of the comraderie
that should exist between warriors.
Plutarch adds further details. When a
young lover was coming of age and was
enrolled as a full citizen, he also received
a set of arms from his older lover. While
this may have been a general custom prac-
tised in Thebes, it can be understood that a
young man, upon becoming a citizen, also
became a soldier, quite possibly within the
ranks of the Sacred Band, in order to protect
his city-state and to fight alongside his elder
lover. If that is indeed the case, new recruits
would have likely been around twenty years
of age at the beginning of their service. The
upper age limit within the Sacred Band can-
not be estimated with any certainty, though
in most Greek cities few would have been
expected to serve in the army once they had
reached sixty years of age.
leadership
Leaders of the unit set an example for other
members to follow. Soldiers were also en-
couraged to compete against each other in
military achievements. High esprit de corps
was necessary, because the role of the Sacred
Band on the battlefield seems to have been
extraordinary. Their first leader, Gorgidas,
drops from the pages of history shortly after
a campaign near Thespiae (378 BC), where
his actions resulted in victory and the death
of a Spartan harmost (military governor),
Sphodrias, the very same who had initially
captured the Theban Cadmea. Gorgidas
probably died in battle. Greek commanders
usually fought in the front line and so their
casualty rate was usually high. Theban lead-
“
ers are credited with outstanding morals and
great military skill (Plut. Pelopidas 19.3–4):
Pelopidas, after their [i.e. sa-
cred band’s] valour had shone
out at Tegyra, where they fought by
themselves and about his own per-
son, never afterwards divided or
scattered them, but, treating them
as a unit, put them into the fore-
front of the greatest conflicts. for
just as horses run faster when yoked
to a chariot than when men ride
them singly, not because they cleave
the air with more impetus owing
to their united weight, but because
their mutual rivalry and ambition
inflame their spirits; so he thought
that brave men were most ardent
and serviceable in a common cause
when they inspired one another with
a zeal for high achievement.”
Pelopidas’ character was discussed by Plu-
tarch in great detail (see Jona Lendering’s
contribution to this issue). He was a dar-
ing commander, whose rashness eventu-
ally cost him his life, but at the same time
incited his men to extraordinary feats of
valour. In 375 BC, the Sacred Band, with
a contingent of cavalry, found itself facing
two Spartan morai near Tegyra. Despite
being outnumbered, Pelopidas decided
to attack. Both sides met each other at
the narrow pass. The engagement started
with a cavalry attack. The smaller Theban
hoplite force attacked where the Spartan
commanders were located and managed
to kill them. The Lacedaemonians opened
their ranks as they believed that Pelopidas
was just trying to push his way through
the enemy ranks, but this only allowed
the Thebans to concentrate on those en-
emies who were still standing firm and, in
the end, defeat them all.
The battle itself was more a prestig-
ious victory than a real one: to the Thebans
and other Greeks it demonstrated that the
Spartans were not invincible. Pelopidas
was able to direct his effort particularly
against the enemy commanders in the first
place and this paid off. This sequence of
events foreshadows the more famous Bat-
tle of Leuctra (371 BC), which also started
with a cavalry battle and where the Band
suddenly attacked the mora led by the
Spartan king Cleombrotus, despite being
outnumbered almost two to one (see Roel
Konijnendijk’s article in this issue).
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aw_9-2.indd 37 22/04/15 10:02
 The ascendancy of Thebes
Greek bronze arrowhead.
Dated to the fourth century
BC. British Museum.
© Karwansaray Publishers
38 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 38
Use of the Sacred Band specifically
against opposing leaders, in a chosen spot
on the battlefield, can be seen as a pattern,
the result of a conscious decision by its
leaders, reflecting the changes in approach
to hoplite warfare. Epaminondas particu-
larly is quoted before the battle against the
“
Peloponnesian coalition as saying (Poly-
aen. 2.3.15, transl. R. Shepherd):
in order to encourage the
Thebans to make a vigorous
attack on the lacedaemonians,
epaminondas produced a large
snake, and crushed its head in front
of the army: ‘if you crush the head
(…) you see how impotent is the
rest of the body. so let us crush the
head of the confederacy, that is the
laconians, and the power of their
allies will become insignificant.’”
Such an approach explains the tactics em-
ployed by the general at Leuctra: the attack
focused on the best units of the enemy’s army.
Cutting these down was meant to demoralize
and crush the will to fight of the rest of the
warriors, just as at Tegyra. It is quite interest-
ing that another general of the fourth century,
the Athenian Iphicrates, made comparisons
between army units and parts of the human
body. By cutting off the head, the rest of the
army would be rendered powerless.
closing remarks
The Sacred Band existed for around for-
ty years and became closely connected
with the city of Thebes. After Leuctra,
Pelopidas and Epaminondas continued
to work together. A sudden change came
with Pelopidas’ death in 364 BC in battle
against Alexander of Pherae. In a char-
acteristic attempt by Theban leaders to
attack an enemy general, Pelopidas lost
his life in a fight with Alexander’s body-
guards. In 362 BC, in the Battle of Man-
tinea, Epaminondas was killed and the
Theban hegemony began to wane.
Available sources stress particularly
the courage of the Sacred Band. The use of
homosexual warriors fighting beside each
other increased the fame of the unit even
further, culminating in a lasting legacy in
the aftermath of its last battle at Chaero-
nea, in 338 BC. There are other Theban
generals like Pammenes (Xen. Hell. 7. 4.
36) and Theagenes who might be connect-
ed with the Sacred Band. At the Battle of
Mantinea, the hieros lochos made up only
1% of Epaminondas’ force. The small size
of the unit must have limited its use. The
lack of a leader like Pelopidas may explain
why we hear little about the unit after the
end of the Theban Hegemony.
Even the use of the Sacred Band in its
last famous battle, Chaeronea, proves that
some changes must have happened. It was,
in fact, arrayed not against the best units
in the Macedonian army, such as the hy-
paspists, nor did it try to engage Philip II.
Instead, it had been deployed on the oppo-
site wing. Therefore, they were being used
to secure the flank of the Theban contingent
and were not intended to be used in a direct
assault. Tradition tells that they fell in that
battle to the last man. Greece lost its inde-
pendence when Philip II bested the Greeks
at Chaeronea, and the Theban Sacred Band
passed into memory. It would be remem-
bered as one of the most distinct and memo-
rable military units of ancient Greece. 0
Ryszard Tokarczuk is a PhD student at
Jagiellonian University, Kraków. He is
currently working on his thesis on Syra-
cusan tyrannies.
further reading
• J. De Voto, ‘The Theban Sa-
cred Band’, Ancient World 23
(1992), pp. 3–12.
• Georgiadou, Plutarch`s Pelopi-
das: A Historical and Philological
Commentary (Stuttgart 1997)
• W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek
State at War, vol. 2 (Berkeley 1974).
22/04/15 10:02
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 Special

From the spirits of the departed

Roman military
tombstones
The many histories, biographies, legal texts, and treatises which
comprise the historical record tell us the majority of what we
today know about the roman military, with archaeology further
supplementing this picture by providing evidence of the physi-
cal world within which the legions operated. But what of the
soldiers themselves; where is their story told? although brief
and often fragmentary, it is through the words inscribed on
their own tombstones that we see how these men lived, occa-
sionally how they died, which deeds they wanted posterity to
remember, and who mourned them after they were gone.

by Joseph hall enabling modern historians to read the

L
ining the roads leading out of
almost every urban centre in the
Roman Empire, be it a sprawl-
ing metropolis or modest rural
town, stood the tombstones of the dead.
Since the Roman-era these monuments
have been whittled down through a
combination of weathering and – as such
concentrations of ‘free’ stone have al-
ways proved a tempting quarry for build-
ers of later ages – loss through re-use.
For the last century-and-a-half though,
the messages inscribed onto these stones
have been systematically catalogued,
very words of the ancients themselves.
As military installations were places
where social rank was held in high regard,
its frequent public assertion via inscrip-
tion has meant that the Roman soldiery
are amongst the most visible group when
examining surviving tombstones. Many
were simple affairs, noting in a highly ab-
breviated format their name, age, and the
unit in which they served. Some epitaphs
however, record details unavailable else-
where, and have the potential to add to
what we already know about the work-
ings of the Roman military, and the every-
day life of the men in the ranks.

Bibliographic note
Citations to inscriptions in this article are expanded as follows: CIL = Corpus In-
scriptionum Latinarum, ILS = Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, RIB = Roman Inscrip-
tions of Britain. The easiest online database to search and begin translating Latin
inscriptions is the Epigraphik Datenbank Clauss/Slaby (www.manfredclauss.de/gb).

40 ancient warfare iX-2

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reading military tombstones

As with most epigraphic evidence, the desired epitaph had to contend with the limi-
tations of physical space on the stone itself. Due to this, and the expense of the
process, formulaic standardisations were used to drastically shorten the amount of
inscription required, whilst keeping the original message relatively clear. Soldiers’
tombstones often follow a predictable sequence, which usually includes an initial
dedication to the dead followed by: their name; father’s name; place of origin; name
of military unit served in; and the number of years served, before ending with a
standard statement like ‘he lies here’. Fairly common additions to this list include the
soldier’s age at death, his military rank; and who commissioned the epitaph itself.
The following inscription (RIB 492) of an optio shows how these abbreviations are
expanded and understood. The letters which appear outside of brackets are visible on
the stone, with the letters in brackets being the expanded form of the abbreviation.

Original
D(is) M(anibus)
Caecilius Avitus Emer(ita) Aug(usta)
Optio Leg(ionis) XX V(aleriae) V(ictricis)
st(i)pe(ndiorum) XV vix(it) an(nos) XXXIIII
h(eres) f(aciendum) c(uravit)
Translation
To the spirits of the departed.
Caecilius Avitus, from Emerita Augusta,
Optio of Legio XX Valeria Victrix,
of 15 years’ service, lived 34 years.
His heirs set (this monument) up.

Nonetheless, one unfortunate his-
torical quirk means that before the mid-
first century BC, few surviving epitaphs
reference military service. This is likely
due to the fact that before this time,
the duties of a soldier were undertaken
by the Roman citizenry, who primarily
saw themselves as citizens under arms
when drafted into the legions, and not
de facto professional soldiers. With the
professionalization of the army came
career soldiers, who thereafter attested
this status in their funerary inscriptions.
It is these soldiers then, whose names
and deeds dominate when studying Lat-
in military epigraphy.
The soldier in death
The historical record itself rarely conde-
scends to mention the lives, or even the
names, of common soldiers, and when
military affairs are mentioned, it is over-
whelmingly grand strategy and generals
who make the edit. As such, it can be
all too easy to forget that the impersonal
sounding exercitus – the common Latin
name for Rome’s armies – were in fact
comprised of tens of thousands of often
diverse individuals. If the historical re-
cord is silent regarding the lives of these
men however, their tombstones are not.
Perhaps paradoxically given their
nature as funerary monuments, epitaphs
themselves rarely mention the manner
of a soldier’s death, unless the circum-
stances were deemed to be somehow
important or unusual. Perhaps the best-
known tombstone of a Roman soldier
actually killed in battle is that of Marcus
Caelius, who fell in the Varian disaster in
AD 9 (CIL 13, 8648). Technically a ceno- In addition to the inscribed
taph – or empty tomb – it records that he words, information from fu-
was a centurion in Legio XIIX, but most nerary monuments can also be
interesting is the line that states ‘it will gleaned from the reliefs carved
be permitted to bury the bones here’. The upon them. This relief, part of
Varian disaster saw the virtual annihila- the sarcophagus of Q. Sulpicius
tion of three legions in the Teutoburg For- Celsus, shows his armour, a
est in Germania, and many of the slain torc, and a corona muralis – or
were never recovered. The cenotaph of ‘mural crown’ – awarded to the
Marcus Caelius was therefore erected first man over the enemy wall.
both to commemorate him, and to pro- Capitoline Museums, Rome.
vide a place for his bones to be reinterred © Karwansaray Publishers

ancient warfare iX-2 41

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 Special

Cenotaph of Marcus Cae-
lius, lost in the Varian disas-
ter of AD 9. On his uniform
can be seen many military
decorations, and although
now faded, on his head rests
the corona civica – or ‘civic
crown’ – awarded for saving
the life of a Roman citizen in
battle. Rheinisches Landes-
museum, Bonn.
© Karwansaray Publishers
should they ever be recovered. The fact
that his freedmen, who appear on the
stone as busts on either side of Caelius,
were not mentioned as erecting the mon-
ument (his brother Publius undertook that
task) presumably meant that they were
killed alongside Caelius, which could in
turn mean the cenotaph acted in some
small way as their memorial as well.
Lucius Flaminius, a soldier in Legio
III Augusta, is another attested as ‘killed
in action by the enemy’ in Africa Pro-
consularis in the early first century AD
(CIL 8, 14603). Before his death, Fla-
minius had served nineteen of his re-
quired twenty (or possibly twenty-five)
years with the army on garrison duty.
Additional information from his epitaph
shows that he was ‘chosen in the levy by
Marcus Silanus’, who was Proconsul of
Africa at the time. The fact that this event
was inscribed on his tombstone shows
that the honour was one he wished fu-
ture generations to know about.
In a similar vein is the epitaph of Fla-
vius Romanus found in northern Britan-
nia, which recounts that he was ‘killed
in the camp by the enemy’ (RIB 03,
03218). Whilst providing this additional
detail of his death, it also raises further
questions. Was his death the result of the
camp being stormed by an enemy army;
opportunistic infiltration by hostile na-
tive partisans; or the clashes that erupted
between supporters of the rival claimants
during the crisis of the third century? The
answer is, of course, unknowable.
In spite of these examples, not all
serving soldiers who were killed died at
the hands of the enemy. Commemorated
at Deva in Britannia is an optio who was
awaiting promotion, but was ‘lost in a
shipwreck’ before a new posting could be
found (RIB 01, 544). A praetorian soldier
was also granted a public funeral after
he was ‘lost whilst extinguishing a fire’
which had broken out in Ostia, the port
of Rome (ILS 9494). A praetorian cohort
had been stationed in Ostia for this very
reason, and the town’s granting of such a
public commemoration shows their grati-
tude for the dangerous work the praetori-
ans were doing to keep their homes and
businesses safe from these conflagrations.
and in life
If few epitaphs exist which shed light on
the circumstances of a soldier’s death,
many more include information which
can shed light on how they lived. For
example, the tombstone of M. Aure-
lius Apollonius of Legio XV Apollinaris
shows that it was evidently not beyond
the capabilities of certain skilled legion-
aries to fabricate items of military equip-
ment when necessary, as it records that
he doubled as a ‘sword-smith’ alongside
his other duties within the legion (CIL 3,

common abbreviations
The following list contains the ten most common abbreviations found on military tomb-
stones, although confusingly some have multiple meanings. For example, MIL can mean
both ‘soldier’ (miles) and ‘years served’ (militavit), 7 can mean either ‘centurion’, or ‘in the
centuria of’, and F can mean both filius (son of) and fecit (built this). For a fuller list of ab-
breviations see appendix 2 of L. Keppie’s book in the bibliographic note on p. 40.

ANN: annos, ‘years’ MIL: miles, ‘soldier’

BM: benemerenti, ‘well-deserving’
COH: cohors, ‘cohort’
DM: Dis Manibus, ‘to the spirits of the dead’
HSE: hic situs est, ‘he lies here’
LEG: legio, ‘legion’
OP: optio, ‘optio’ (rank below centurionate)
POS: posuit, ‘set this (epitaph) up’
STIP: stipendia, ‘years of service’
VET: veteranus, ‘veteran’
7 (or ‘>’): centurio, ‘Centurion’

42 ancient warfare iX-2

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dating military tombstones

In dating military inscriptions, the only way to arrive at an accurate and reliable
date is if the text itself mentions a known person or event which is externally
verifiable using evidence independent of the inscription. However, the formulaic
nature of the information inscribed usually omits any mention of external events
or people apart from in exceptional circumstances Dating can, however, also be
done by examining the linguistic formulas. For example, the inclusion of a vot-
ing tribe is typically indicative of a first century AD date, and a stated place of
origin can often help to date the inscription to before the Hadrianic era. The le-
gion in which a soldier served may also include its honorific title; many of which
were conferred around specific dates. For example, mention of Legio XVI Gallica
would date an inscription from between 49 BC when it was founded and AD 70
when Vespasian renamed it Flavia Firma. By aggregating such pieces of informa-
tion, an inscription can often be reliably dated to a specific period.

00006). In Syria, the epitaph of Verinus
Marinus of Legio II Parthica states that
he was also a “clerk in the office of the
Legate” before his death at the tender
age of 22; only four years into his mili-
tary service (AE 1993, 01587).
The inscription on the tombstone of
C. Herrenius Festus, veteran of Legio X
Fretensis, includes his role as “prefect of
recruits” undertaken whilst serving in the
military (AE 1921, 21). Upon discharge it
also mentions that he took on the role of
“prefect of the youth”. This role placed
him in charge of the youth collegia,
which broadly speaking both educated
and guided upper-class youngsters from
around the age of fifteen to twenty; a nat-
ural vocation for a man with his previous
experience with recruits. Festus is also
attested as having held the position of
joint-head of his community (duumvir)
twice, the highest civic rank available in
the town in which he settled.
Epitaphs can also highlight family
life beyond the camp, as does the tomb-
stone set up by Julius Maximus, an officer
attached to a unit of Sarmatian auxiliary
cavalryman stationed in Britannia. On a
single epitaph, the unfortunate Maximus
commemorated the death of his ‘incom-
parable’ wife, his ‘most devoted’ young
son, and ‘most steadfast’ mother-in-law
(RIB I 594); a reminder that soldiers
could and did have lives and families –
official or otherwise – outside the camp
walls, and that personal tragedy was not
always the result of enemy action.
A glimpse of the soldiers’ wider
community can also be seen when look-
ing at who erected the tombstones for
these men. The headstone of G. Julius Sa-
binus, soldier in Legio XIII Gemina, was
put up by his father – who felt obliged to
include his own high-status role as office
holder in the local town – and his moth-
er. The words of his epitaph nonetheless
end with the poignant refrain: ‘his sor-
rowful parents set this up’ (CIL 3 7979).
Even when tombstones commemorate
those beyond military circles, an occa-
sional close connection between the two
worlds can be seen. The funerary monu-
ment dedicated to Victorius Regulus, a
civilian trader, was erected by “his most
beloved brother” Vicrius Tetricus, him-
self a veteran of Legio XXII Primagenia
Pia Fidelis (AE 1982, 0709).
In addition to their lives, deaths, and
Tombstone of T. Calidius, cen-
families, tombstones of veterans can also
turion with Legio XV Apollinar-
show us how the legions aided in the dis-
is. When studied alongside the
persal men from diverse backgrounds and
historical and archaeological
ethnicities around the empire. For exam-
records, such monuments as
ple, instead of heading back to his na-
this can provide vital informa-
tive Thacape in Africa upon his discharge tion regarding military equip-
from the army, L. Gargilius Felix settled ment in the Roman-era. Kun-
in Poetovio (modern Slovenia), a town sthistorisches Museum, Vienna.
where his legion had long been stationed © Matthias Kabel (via
(ILS 9085). His epitaph also records he Wikimedia Commons).

ancient warfare iX-2 43

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 Special
Tombstones bare of text can
still tell us a lot. This one, now
in the Rheinisches Landesmuse-
um, Bonn, stylistically belongs
to the local workshop where
tombstones were carved on a
large scale. Evidently they were
finished before an 'owner' was
designated. Roman soldiers, or
their heirs, could select the style
that fit their taste and budget
from a range of example stones.
The finished example would
have been painted as well.
© Karwansaray Publishers
44 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 44
was given a cash-grant upon discharge,
not land, and so presumably was free to
settle where he pleased. His long service
had evidently produced in him a strong
connection with the area in which he had
been stationed however; so much so that
he preferred to stay within that commu-
nity than return to his former home.
It is also interesting to see that not all
soldiers left the legions after their period of
service expired. Some, as evidenced by the
epitaph of Legio IIII Scythica’s “intelligence
officer and chief clerk” Aelius Verecundi-
nus, were retained as evocati; men whose
knowledge and experience were too useful
to lose to discharge (AE 1993, 1577).
The value of epitaphs
Very occasionally the information in-
scribed upon tombstones can be used to
shed more light on the historical sources
themselves. Mentioned in a passage by
Cassius Dio is Emperor Hadrian’s tour of
the empire, during which he personally
inspected his many troops. At the end of
the passage Dio states that: “So excel-
lently had his soldiery been trained that
the cavalry of the Batavians (…) swam
the Danube in full armour” (69.9.6). The
historical record gives no further details
of this event, but a tombstone of one un-
named Batavian who was present that
day has been recorded.
Found on the bank of the Danube in
Pannonia, the epitaph lists the soldier’s
many deeds he performed in front of the
watching emperor: “I was able to swim
across the wide waters of the deep Dan-
ube in all my armour”, he boasted, before
adding: “whilst an arrow from my bow
hung in the air, I loosed another and hit
it as it fell back to earth.” The unnamed
Batavian finished his epitaph in gran-
diose style: “Here I entrust my deeds to
the memory of this stone. It remains to
be seen whether anyone can emulate my
deeds. As the first to do these things, I
was my own example” (CIL 3, 3676). Far
from the martial grandeur of parades by
the Danube however, in the cramped and
overpopulated confines of Rome, a distin-
guished praetorian guardsman felt com-
pelled to add a far less eloquent, albeit far
more practical, line to his own epitaph:
“nobody is to urinate here!” (CIL 6, 3413).
In similarly contrasting styles, Prop-
ertius the poet and Titus Cissonius, vet-
eran of Legio V Gallica, wrestled in their
own differing ways with the nature of
life and death. The spirits of the dead
held meaning, argued Propertius; their
significance lay in showing “that not
everything ceases with death”. The “pale
ghost”, he continued, perhaps more in
an effort to convince himself than his
readers, “escapes the ruinous pyre”
(Eleg. 4.7 1–4). A world away from the
sensitive elegist and his ethereal mus-
ings, the veteran Cissonius offered more
tangible words of advice on his own epi-
taph: “Whilst I lived I drank freely. You
who still live, drink!” (CIL 3, 293). 0
Joseph Hall works in the UK heritage
sector introducing modern audiences to
British history. He is a regular contribu-
tor to numerous history magazines, in-
cluding Ancient Warfare. For more in-
formation, go to joseph-hall.co.uk
further reading
• J. Bodel, Epigraphic Evidence:
Ancient History from Inscriptions
(London and New York 2001).
• M. Hartnett, By Roman Hands:
Inscriptions and Graffiti for
Students of Latin (Newburyport,
Mass. 2008).
• L. Keppie, Understanding Roman
Inscriptions (Baltimore 1991).
• J. Rogan, Reading Roman Inscrip-
tions (Stroud 2010).
• A. Scott-Anderson, Roman Military
Tombstones (Aylesbury 1984).
• G.C. Susini, The Roman Stone-
cutter: An Introduction to Latin
Epigraphy (Oxford 1973).
22/04/15 10:02
 The debate

Did the Romans have links with the Far East?

Rome and China
writers and scholars have periodically flirted with the idea of histor-
ic links between rome and china. There is no denying the obvious
parallels between the two great empires, each run by a bureaucrat-
ic civil service and served by a professional army, poised to defend
long frontiers against the barbarians beyond. however, there has
been a tendency to assume that two empires of such sophistication
must have maintained communications between themselves. so, is
it likely that the romans had links with the far east?

by Duncan b. campbell may profess about the moon, for exam-

I
n 1866, Sir Henry Yule, late of the
East India Company, published his
Cathay and the Way Thither in two
volumes, the first of which com-
prised an essay on the relations between
China and the West prior to the medieval
period, supported by extensive source
material in translation. Greek and Roman
writers’ knowledge of the Far East, he
concluded, was understandably vague,
given the remoteness of China from the
Mediterranean, and he warned against
those scholars who “have attached as
much precision to the expressions of
partial knowledge hovering on the verge
of ignorance, as if these had been the
expressions of precise but fragmentary
knowledge, such as our geographers pos-
sess of the Antarctic Coasts”.
Finding a similar vagueness in the
Chinese accounts of the west, Yule per-
ceptively drew a distinction between
‘partial knowledge’ – the kind of third-
hand rumour that may be based on a
kernel of fact but whose substance has
been embroidered with fantastic and
sensational additions – and ‘precise but
fragmentary knowledge’ – the kind of
knowledge that most of us nowadays
ple. It is worth bearing this distinction in
mind when assessing the degree of geo-
graphical familiarity of both parties.
One recent book on ancient geogra-
phy claims that “the Romans reached as
far as China, establishing contacts with the
local people” (D. Dueck, Geography in
Classical Antiquity). Another, aimed at col-
lege students, assures its readers that “both
primary textual sources and physical evi-
dence hint at direct commercial exchanges
[between China and Rome] as early as the
first century BC” (J.M. Moore & R.W. Wen-
delken, Teaching the Silk Road). Similarly,
the suggestion, in a serious work of Ro-
man archaeology, that “Hadrian may have
been influenced by travellers’ accounts of
the Great Wall of China” (D.J. Breeze & B.
Dobson, Hadrian’s Wall), implies routine
contact between the two empires. On the
other hand, another popular book fudges
the issue by conceding that both cultures
were only “dimly aware of the other’s exist-
ence” (A. Goldsworthy, How Rome Fell). So
should we believe in direct contact or dim Chinese warriors of the so-
awareness? And does this dim awareness called 'terracotta army', dat-
constitute Yule’s ‘partial knowledge’, or is it ing from 210 BC during the
supposed to imply ‘precise but fragmentary Qin Dynasty.
knowledge’? Exactly how much did Rome © User ‘Maros’
and China know about each other? (via Wikimedia Commons)

ancient warfare iX-2 45

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 The debate
Terracotta figurine, Eastern
Han. Dated to the third cen-
tury AD, it depicts a foreign
soldier. Musée Guimet, Paris.
© User ‘PHGCOM’
(via Wikimedia Commons)
46 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 46
roman geographers
The real difficulty in an exercise such as
Yule’s lies in the fact that neither culture
utilized the same geographical and ethno-
graphical terminology. We simply do not
know, with any degree of certainty, what
the Romans called the region now known
as China. It is generally supposed that the
anonymous first-century Greek author of
the Voyage Around the Erythraean Sea was
referring to China, after his itinerary reached
the mouth of the River Ganges, when he
writes that “the outer sea ends in a land
called Thin, in which there is a large inland
city called Thinai”. Similarly, when Ptolemy,
author of the second-century Geography,
writes of “the eastern peoples of Great Asia,
the Sinai and those in Serika”, whom he
also locates beyond the River Ganges, they
are assumed to be the Chinese.
Scholars have suggested that these
names preserve some memory of the
Ch’in dynasty (often nowadays spelled
Qin), which ruled the area in the later
third century BC, on the grounds of pho-
netic similarity. Such a theory would im-
ply genuine (if limited) knowledge of the
country. But Ptolemy is the only writer to
use the form ‘Sinai’. Other writers (even
including Ptolemy himself) refer to a peo-
ple called the Seres, from the Greek word
for silk. Modern authorities routinely as-
sume that these Seres (or ‘silk people’)
were the ancient Chinese, but it need
hardly be stated that this is pure conjec-
ture. (Pliny, for one, says that they were
tall, with golden hair and blue eyes!)
On the other hand, the Romans were,
of course, well acquainted with India. By
sea, merchants plied their trade along the
coast of the Erythraean Sea, which in an-
cient times encompassed the Red Sea, the
Persian Gulf, and the northern waters of
the Indian Ocean. By land, Alexander the
Great had forged a route via Ecbatana,
through the true Caspian Gates, to An-
tiocheia Margiana (Merv), from where
any travellers who did not proceed east
through Bactria, heading for Maracanda
(Samarkand) or Bactra (Balkh), could turn
south to Alexandropolis (Kandahar) and
cross into India by the Bolan Pass. How-
ever, knowledge of the Caspian Gates
was soon lost and it is debateable wheth-
er any Roman ever followed this path (see
‘Who built Alexander’s Wall?’ in Ancient
Warfare VII.6, pp. 47–51).
Greek and Roman writers appear to
have assumed that, in the East, the land
mass ended at India, and the River Gan-
ges poured out eastwards into the en-
circling sea. Thus, Alexander the Great
(who, in reality, had only reached the
Indus River in the Punjab) could be said
to have stood at the far side of the world.
Strabo, writing at the end of the first cen-
tury BC, preserves a rumour that, con-
trary to all other reports, Alexander had
actually reached the Ganges, and that
his general Craterus “saw the river and
the sea-monsters in it”. The same basic
geographical error is found in Pomponi-
us Mela’s On the Structure of the World,
in which he claims that “the first peoples
we encounter in the East are the Indians,
the Seres and the Scythians. The Seres
inhabit roughly the middle part of the
East, with the Indians and Scythians on
the extremities, both occupying broad
swathes, and spreading, not only in this
place, to the ocean”. From these hazy
reports, it is plain that no Roman geog-
rapher had any more than the vaguest
notion of the Far East – in Yule’s termi-
nology, ‘partial knowledge’.
chinese annals
The ancient Chinese texts are even more
problematic, owing to scholarly disagree-
ment over the meaning (and even the pro-
nunciation) of the relevant place-names.
Foremost amongst these is Ta-ts’in or Ta
Ch’in (often nowadays spelled Da Qin),
which literally means ‘Great China’, and
its capital city of An-tu, or ‘City of Peace’.
Yule believed that Tathsin (as he spelled
it) referred, broadly speaking, to the Ro-
man Empire, and that its capital city of
An-tu was “Antioch, probably”, because
it sounded similar. The German sinologist
22/04/15 10:02

Friedrich Hirth refined this view, asserting
(in his work of 1885, China and the Roman
Orient) that “Ta-ts’in was not the Roman
Empire with Rome as its capital, but merely
its oriental part, viz., Syria, Egypt and Asia
Minor; and Syria in the first instance”.
However, twentieth-century sinolo-
gists have noticed remarkable similarities
between the Chinese description of Ta
Ch’in and the idealized Utopia of Taoist
texts. Of course, the details may be sim-
ple embroidery around a kernel of fact;
rather than ‘partial knowledge’, this could
be Yule’s ‘precise but fragmentary knowl-
edge’. Unfortunately, it is equally possible
to interpret Ta Ch’in as India or Burma –
the details, such as they are, would fit ei-
ther place – so it is unwise to claim (as one
recent book has) that “this ‘other China’
must have been the Roman Empire” (R.
McLaughlin, Rome and the Distant East).
aw_9-2.indd 47
The debate
The silk route © Carlos García
In any discussion of Rome and China,
thoughts soon turn to the so-called ‘Silk
Road’, a nineteenth-century coinage
meant to encapsulate the land routes
across Central Asia, familiar from the
tales of thirteenth-century explorers like
Marco Polo. One modern commentator
has helpfully confirmed that “we know
of no Chinese travellers who certainly
went the entire length of the Silk Roads
in the classical era” (David Christian, in
Journal of World History Vol. 11, 2000).
Yet much of the modern literature con-
tinues to give the impression that, in
ancient times, there was a lively com-
ing-and-going along this fabled route.
Consider Raoul McLaughlin’s claim that
“by using these trails, a few fortunate
Romans were able to reach the Chinese
Empire”. We gain much the same im-
ancient warfare iX-2 47
22/04/15 10:02
 The debate

pression from the trust the reports of merchants. (…)

The inhospitable terrain of the
Hindu Kush forms a daunting
barrier between east and west.
© User ‘Ziegler175’
(via Wikimedia Commons)
comment of David for he says that they are not con-
Breeze and Brian
Dobson, quoted
cerned to establish the truth, be-
above, or Adrian ing only interested in commerce,
Goldsworthy’s re- and often increase the distance out
mark that “traders of boastfulness. and not once, dur-
also trekked over
ing the seven-month journey, in the
vast distances to
carry goods over- story of their travels, did they deem
land along the fa- any marvel worthy of remembrance,
mous Silk Road”. except for the length of time.”
But is there any
basis for this belief in long-distance It is not clear whether Maes’ informants had
overland communication? made the entire journey or had stopped at
First, it’s worth pointing out that there the Stone Tower, whose whereabouts, in
is, in fact, a single reference to such a jour- any case, remain a mystery (some have
ney, preserved by Ptolemy, who got it from placed it at Darautkurgan in Kyrgyzstan;

“
the now-lost work of a previous geographer
named Marinus (Geography 1.11.4, 7, 8):
from the euphrates crossing
to the stone Tower, the dis-
tance is reckoned at 26,280 stades,
and from the stone Tower to sera,
the capital city of the seres, a jour-
ney of seven months, at 36,200 sta-
des. (…) marinus said that a certain
man from macedonia called maes,
also known as Titianus, a son of a
merchant, wrote down the details
and measured out the journey, not
himself having traversed it, but hav-
ing sent certain others to sera. how-
ever, it seems that he himself did not
others prefer Tashkurgan, near the mod-
ern Chinese border with Tajikistan). Mari-
nus was suspicious at the lack of detail in
their account. Surely their safe arrival at the
‘Jade Gate’, the westernmost point in an-
cient China’s frontier, after a gruelling thou-
sand-mile journey around the Taklamaken
Desert should have merited a mention?
Second, it is also worth pointing out
that, leaving the claims of Maes aside, all
other traders (as far as we can tell) headed
down the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf,
where they joined the maritime route to
Barygaza. The caravan inscriptions from
the great trading city of Palmyra, for exam-
ple, repeatedly mention successful trips to
the Persian Gulf. There is no hint of a ‘silk
route’ heading east across Iran to China.
Nevertheless, McLaughlin assures us that
“the Parthian subjects of Iran denied Ro-

The ancient chinese sources

Scholars of ancient China draw upon several state-sponsored historical works, the so-
called ‘Standard Histories’, of which the most important are the Shi-ji or Shih-chi (the
‘Records of the Historian’, written in 91 BC), the Han shu or Ch’ien-han-shu (the ‘Book
of the Former Han’, covering the period 206 BC-AD 24, and written around AD 90),
the Hou-Han shu (the ‘Book of the Later Han’, covering the period AD 25–220, and
written in the mid-fifth century), and the Wei-shu (the ‘Book of Wei’, covering the
period AD 386–550, and written in the mid-sixth century). There is also a lost work
known as the Wei-lüe or Wei-lio (the ‘Brief Account of Wei’), part of which is quoted
in the San-guo-zhi (‘Record of the Three Kingdoms’), written in the later third century.

48 ancient warfare iX-2

aw_9-2.indd 48 22/04/15 10:02


man merchants access to these overland
routes”, but offers no proof that such routes
existed, beyond the itinerary followed by
Alexander the Great (mentioned above).
Tall tales?
Given the unlikelihood of direct contact
between the two empires, separated by the
great mountain barrier of the Himalayas,
what are we to make of the report, in Flo-
rus’ Epitome of Roman History, that “the
Seres and the Indians who live under the
very sun” travelled for four years to bring
tribute to the Emperor Augustus? No other
author corroborates the claim, though the
partnership of “Seres and Indians” was in
the air in Augustan Rome; both Strabo and
Horace repeat the stock phrase. Yet it is re-
markable that Augustus himself mentioned
only embassies from India, in his monu-
mental Res Gestae Divi Augusti (‘Achieve-
ments of the divine Augustus’).
Another writer who might be expected
to have mentioned the Seres is the Anto-
nine historian Appian, a close contempo-
rary of Ptolemy the geographer. In the last
book of his Civil Wars, he recorded an event
from 41 BC concerning the caravan city of
Palmyra. Setting the scene for his second-
century readers, he tells us a little about
the Palmyrenes: “being merchants, they
import Indian and Arabian goods from the
Persians and pass them on to the Romans”.
This would have been a prime opportunity
to mention the Chinese, if Palmyra had
been dealing directly with that far off land
along the so-called Silk Road. However,
we have seen that the route favoured by the
Palmyrene caravans followed the Euphrates
to the Persian Gulf, where their merchants
handled goods arriving by sea.
It is nowadays a common belief
that direct diplomatic contact had been
achieved by the second century. In one
recent popular book, we read that “in
166 (in the wake of Roman victories
over the Parthians) envoys arrived in
the Han court from Marcus Aurelius,
‘king’ of Rome” (Alfred Bradford, With
Arrow, Sword, and Spear). No Roman
aw_9-2.indd 49
The debate
source betrays the
slightest hint of
this momentous
event. Some have
attempted to ex-
plain away this si-
lence by claiming
that the ‘envoys’
were actually only
merchants. But the
source of the story,
a remark in the
Chinese Hou-Han
shu, says only that “the king of Ta-ts’in, Some scholars believe that
An-tun, sent an embassy from Ji-nan Tashkurgan marks the location
with gifts of ivory, rhinoceros horn, and of Ptolemy’s ‘Stone Tower’,
tortoise shell”. These are curious gifts for but the ruined fort dates from
a Roman emperor to send, and precisely the thirteenth century AD.
© User ‘Drgkl’
why they came by way of Ji-nan (thought (via Wikimedia Commons)
to be Vietnam) is never explained. And
while it is true that, by AD 166, the em-
peror Marcus Aurelius had, for some
time, been styling himself ‘Marcus An-
toninus’, this bears only a superficial
similarity to ‘An-tun’. Clearly, this tale
should be treated with extreme caution.
We should also be suspicious of the
complete absence of Roman artefacts from
Chinese archaeological sites, and vice
versa. In the final analysis, it seems highly
doubtful that the Romans had any links
with China and the Far East. 0
Dr Duncan B. Campbell received the de-
gree of PhD for his thesis on aspects of
Roman siegecraft. He is currently Tutor in
Archaeology at Glasgow University’s Cen-
tre for Open Studies. He is a regular con-
tributor to Ancient Warfare.
further reading
• D.B. Campbell, ‘A Chinese puz-
zle for the Romans’, Historia 38.3
(1989), pp. 371–376.
• K. Rezakhani, ‘The road that nev-
er was’, Comparative Studies of
South Asia, Africa and the Middle
East 30.3 (2010), pp. 420–433.
ancient warfare iX-2 49
22/04/15 10:02
 Hollywood Romans

The Roman army on screen, part 1

Caesar and
CLeopatra (1945)
for most people, their impression of the roman army is not formed
as a result of reading academic works, archaeological reports, or even
seeing re-enactors, but through watching hollywood movies or televi-
sion programs. almost all were produced well in advance of modern
research into roman arms and armour and, as a result, these films are
often derided for their inaccuracies. nevertheless, this series of articles
will show that, on occasion, movie researchers did get things right and
that these extraordinary results should be both praised and recorded.

by Graham sumner The Egyptian government supplied 1,200

(Opposite page) Centurion
and legionary as seen in the
movie Caesar and Cleopatra
(1945). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the armour and
weapons, please refer to the
main text, page 52.
© Graham Sumner
© Eagle-Lion Films
C
aesar and Cleopatra (1945),
made in the last year of World
War II, was amongst the cin-
ematic releases that aimed to
show that the British film industry could
compete with its American counterpart in
the post war world. It was the most expen-
sive film produced in Britain at the time, but
in spite of its then-lavish budget, wartime
restrictions meant there were severe short-
ages that had to be overcome, in particular
by the art and wardrobe departments.
creating the movie
Fortunately, Oliver Messel, the costume de-
signer, had been an officer with a camou-
flage unit. Messel and his team were able to
make jewellery out of thin wire, plastic, cel-
lophane, and bits of glass. Gold plates and or-
naments were made out of gilded leather and
papier mâché. Papier mâché was also used to
make all the shields, which were varnished
with a fish glue. This had unfortunate con-
sequences when the production moved to
Egypt to film some of the large battle scenes.
soldiers as extras and they found the shields
to be a tasty snack! Hundreds of new shields
had to be hastily made as replacements. Fur-
ther production problems occurred back in
London when Gabriel Pascal, the director,
and several members of the crew had to dive
for cover when inspecting the Pharos set, as
a V1 flying bomb flew overhead and explod-
ed nearby.
During the Pharos scenes, at least three
Roman artillery machines can be observed.
They are all reasonably accurate versions of
the ballista, modelled on designs by Erwin
Schramm that were published in 1918, or
even De Reffye's model that could be seen
in the Musée de Saint-Germain in the late
nineteenth century. They probably took
some time to research and construct, but
none are shown in use in the ensuing battle
of the Pharos island.
Considerable effort also went into
setting up the climactic battle of the Nile,
marketed in the trailer as one of the films
main attractions. However, on screen it
is somewhat confusing and again is over
in a matter of seconds. Nevertheless, the

50 ancient warfare iX-2

aw_9-2.indd 50 22/04/15 10:02

aw_9-2.indd 51 22/04/15 10:02
 Hollywood Romans
Caesar’s second in com-
mand Rufio, right (played by
Basil Sydney), with a centu-
rion (Michael Rennie), left.
Behind them can be seen a
standard bearer (signifier)
and legionaries. Most of the
equipment is based on the
column of Marcus Aurelius.
© Eagle-Lion Films
Caesar’s galley prepares
to depart. The legionaries
are equipped with both a
thrusting spear (hasta) and
a throwing javelin (pilum).
Just visible behind the two
legionaries at the extreme
right can be seen a cornu.
© Eagle-Lion Films
52 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 52
Roman army does briefly appear to use
a series of wedge shaped formations (cu-
nei) to attack the enemy line.
As the film is technically not a ‘Holly-
wood’ movie, there are some items of equip-
ment that never appear anywhere else. Both
the helmets of the two leading Romans are
worth mentioning. Caesar’s helmet is copied
from a sculpture of Mars on the Cancelleria
relief in Rome, while the elaborate helmet
worn by Rufio has some similarities with the
third-century helmets found at Theilenhofen
in Germany and Worthing in Britain. The lat-
ter would have been highly appropriate for
a film made in Britain, but ironically the hel-
met was found two years after the film was
made! Rufio's sword scabbard nevertheless
was modelled on the ‘sword of Tiberius’,
now in the British Museum.
When the Roman army enters Alex-
andria, both horn players and drummers
accompany the troops. As yet, there has
never been any convincing evidence that
the Roman army used drums, but this is not
the last time they will appear in a film.
arms and armour
Although the film is set in the last days
of the Republic, the illustrated legionary
equipment (on page 51) is clearly based
on the more familiar imperial sources,
in particular the column of Marcus Au-
relius in Rome. This is especially true
of the shield and its motif. His helmet
and armour (lorica segmentata) are lit-
eral copies of Antonine sculpture. Some
of the spears appear to be genuine at-
tempts to reconstruct the pilum with a
soft iron shank. However, the costume
department seems to have had trouble
determining how the sword scabbard
was attached and this film is not unu-
sual in showing a much more complex
method with a chain and snap hook.
‘Hollywood’ often gets the blame for
creating the popular image of the Roman
soldier in red tunic and cloak. However, it is
this movie that seems to be the first to do so.
In fact, soldiers do not appear in red again
until Cleopatra in 1963, which was also
begun in Britain with Messel as the origi-
nal costume designer. The film is unusual in
equipping the soldiers with boots rather than
the classic sandal type caligae. Ironically,
while caligae would have been more ap-
propriate for both the actual period the film
was set and the source for most of the other
equipment, boots were possibly more com-
mon items of kit for the Antonine soldier.
The illustrated centurion's uniform
(based on that worn by the actor Michael
Rennie) is distinguished by his very elabo-
rate helmet, which in spite of its unusual
appearance, again appears to be copied
from examples on the column of Marcus
Aurelius. However, the crest is rendered
in metal when actual feathers would have
been more likely. Nevertheless, full marks
to the wardrobe department for resisting
temptation and equipping these soldiers
in scale shirts rather than leather cuirasses.
The blue cloak and red studded baldric
are strongly reminiscent of the Fayum por-
traits, but the centurions in the film are
also conspicuous for their blue tunics.
The centurion's equipment is
rounded off by a set of awards phalarae,
decorated greaves and a vine stick vi-
tis topped with an eagle’s head. Once
again, the centurion’s sword scabbard
seems to be a copy of the sword of Tibe-
rius. Finally, the centurion’s cloak, like
those of the other soldiers, is actually
fastened with a brooch, as opposed to
some of the more bizarre methods em-
ployed in subsequent movies. 0
Graham Sumner is a freelance archaeo-
logical illustrator and member of the
Chartered Institute for Archaeologists. He
contributes regular to Ancient Warfare.
Graham would like to thank David Reinke,
Mike Bishop, and Duncan Campbell.
further reading
• M. Deans, Meeting at the Sphinx:
Gabriel Pascal's Production
of Bernard Shaw’s Caesar and
Cleopatra (London 1946).
22/04/15 10:02

reviews
Modern Syria has become a regular fixture
in today’s news. Reporters file a daily litany
of depressing stories of death and destruc-
tion. And yet, to read Ancient Syria one is
reminded of how invasion, oppression and
war has always been part of the story of this
troubled region.
This single volume textbook is written
by Trevor Bryce, Honorary Professor and
Research Consultant in the University of
Queensland, Australia. His previous works
include books and articles on the history and
civilizations of the ancient Near East. The
scope of Ancient Syria is enormous: three
thousand years of continuous history from
the Bronze Age in 27th century BC to the
Iron Age under the Romans/Byzantines in the
fourth century AD. But it is not a sprawling
book. In his preface Bryce explains that he
focuses “primarily on the political and mili-
tary events of the ages covered by this tale,
and particularly of the ‘big people’ who in-
habited these ages” (p. 5), “the human char-
acters who instigated, participated in, and
became victims of these events” (p. 4).
Bryce divides his survey into five sec-
tions. In Part 1 he describes the first kingdoms
of the area. Conventional wisdom was that
the region across the Euphrates River in the
27th–24th centuries BC was merely a back-
water to the brilliant civilization in Meso-
potamia centered on Babylonia, Sumer and
Ur. Bryce challenges the notion, presenting
evidence that, in fact, there was a kingdom
of Ebla ruled from Tell Mardikh. In its vast
multi-chambered complex scribes wrote in
a Semitic language on clay tablets, many of
which survive. It was a city important enough
for the Akkadian kings Sargon and his grand-
son Naram-Sin to want to conquer it.
Thereafter a succession of other inter-
national intruders would come to take what
they believed was theirs. Amorite warrior-
chiefs clashed in 24th–21st centuries; the
Assyrian Shamshi-Addu invaded in the eight-
aw_9-2.indd 53
Reviews
Ancient Syria:
A Three Thousand Year History
ISBN: 978-0199646678
Author: Trevor Bryce
Pages: 379
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Address of publisher:
http://global.oup.com/
Reviewer: Lindsay Powell
eenth century. Then in the seventeenth, King
Hattusili I of the Hittites made claim to the
region for reasons likely to do with control-
ling the trade which passed through its lands,
launching no fewer than six campaigns, yet
failing to capture Aleppo, its leading city by
then already hundreds of years old. The Hit-
tite king's successor Mursili would finally
capture and destroy it, and steal its treasures
back to Hattusa. And so the narrative saga
of the centuries-long struggle over land and
cities between neighbours continues, cul-
minating at the battle between Egyptian and
Hittite armies at Qadesh (or Kadesh). Phar-
aoh Ramesses II and King Hattusili III both
claimed victory, but settled for a peace treaty
drawn up and written on silver tablets in
1259 BC. In the years that followed the As-
syrians and the mysterious Sea Peoples vari-
ously took their turns at conquering Syria.
In Part 2 Bryce examines the Iron Age,
from the 12th century BC to the conquest
of Syria by Greek-speaking Alexander.
When Assyria fell the Neo-Babylonian Em-
pire assumed supremacy of the region. The
“defining figure of the age” (p. 140) was
Nebuchadnezzar II, who Bryce describes
as a “battle-hardened veteran”. To him fell
Jerusalem, and after a thirteen-year siege,
the island city of Tyre. When he died,
Cyrus II (known as the Great) became the
new overlord of Syria. The Persian king
showed restraint levying annual tribute
ancient warfare iX-2 53
22/04/15 10:02
 Reviews
of just 350 talents of silver compared to
Egypt's 700, according to Herodotus. In
the summer of 333 BC the 23-year old
son of Philip II of Macedon arrived and
began operations to conquer the region,
taking Tyre by siege two years later.
One of Alexander’s successors, Selu-
ecus I, assumed the region as his domin-
ion. In Part 3 Bryce describes the founding
of his capital, Seleuccia on the Tigris River,
whose population reached 600,000 by the
end of the first century AD, if Pliny the El-
der is to be believed. Under his successor
Antiochus I Syria saw protests and revolts;
the intervention by neighbouring Lysima-
chus led to the so-called First Syrian War
between the rival Ptolemies of Egypt and
Seleucids of Syria, ending in 198 BC dur-
ing the Fifth Syrian War when Antiochus
III expelled the Graeco-Egyptian dynast.
When the Seleucid king became entan-
gled in the affairs of Greek cities in Asia
Minor he would find himself in conflict
with a burgeoning superpower – Rome –
which had its own interests in the region.
In this context Bryce tells the story of the
Maccabean Rebellion of Judaea, a tale
known to many from Bible studies.
The coming of the Romans and their
occupation is the subject of Part 4. Natural
barriers did not stop ambitious Romans. At
Carrhae in 53 BC M. Licinius Crassus bit
the dust. Two decades later M. Antonius
tried for a final reckoning. He, too, failed.
In the meantime, however, an incursion by
the Parthians into northern Syria was re-
buffed, restoring the region to Roman con-
trol. Smartly, a decade or so later Caesar
Augustus used diplomacy to settle Rome's
differences with Parthia, ending her terri-
torial expansions in the East for the next
century. But the policy of peaceful co-
existence would end under Trajan, who
annexed Mesopotamia and other territory
from Parthia. His conquests were prompt-
ly abandoned by his successor, Hadrian.
Nevertheless, later emperors would be
tempted to pick a fight with the Parthians
and their successors, the Sassanians, using
Syria to launch their offensives.
54 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 54
Syria did produce its own own, na-
tive-born champions. Some tried to free
their lands from foreign occupiers; others
saw opportunities to profit from squab-
bles between their oppressors. Two of
them are discussed in Part 5. Bryce clear-
ly relishes the tale of the rise and fall of
the desert kingdom of Palmyra and its
royal family, which flourished under Ro-
man patronage. Mystery enshrouds the
life of the regent, Odenathus who died in
AD 267 or 268. The culminating figure of
the story of Ancient Syria is his widow,
Zenobia. Under its new queen, Palmyra
became wealthy and powerful. “Sheba
and Dido may have served as role models
for Zenobia” (p. 298), remarks Bryce. She
looked for new conquests, which brought
her into conflict with Roman emperor
Aurelian. War ensued. Mystery also ob-
scures her departure from this world.
For almost two hundred years, Syria
enjoyed unprecedented peace and pros-
perity. Under Diocletian it was tightly in-
tegrated into the apparatus of the eastern
Roman Empire, particularly so after Con-
stantinople became its leading city. In the
520s the Sassanians invaded and natural
disasters took their toll on the popula-
tion. Finally, in AD 636, when Heraclius’
army was defeated by that of the Muslims
at Yarmuk, the empire of the Romans/
Byzantines lost Syria forever. In 661 the
first Islamic empire chose Damascus to
be its capital, placing Syria at the heart of
the emerging Muslim world.
Bryce’s text is lucid and will not tax
the general reader. He uses his source
materials deftly and highlights where the
evidence is problematic. While one of
the stated focuses is military events, the
opposing forces, their arms and equip-
ment, the orders of battle or the battles
are not described in detail, or at all. The
“big people” are presented as thumbnail
sketches rather than in-depth character
portraits. The volume includes three ap-
pendices consisting of a chronology of
major events and periods, a list of kings
and literary sources. There is a short bib-
22/04/15 10:02

liography and an adequate, but not ex-
haustive, end notes section.
The book is illustrated with twenty-
seven black-and-white figures and twelve
maps. When the author writes that the
topography “helps account for the rich
cultural melting pot that ancient Syria be-
came” (p. 7), it is surprising that there is no
map showing the region’s natural features:
all the maps are flat, with only names of
major rivers and cities shown. Another sur-
Biographers of Hannibal face a daunting task
if they wish their book to stand out. Polybius
and Livy remain the only extensive ancient
sources on the general’s amazing career (sup-
plemented mostly by stories in Plutarch and
Nepos), the archaeological and philological
record is not uncovering new details on Han-
nibal’s life and the story itself is one of the
best known in ancient history. If you want
to bring new energy to a tale told dozens of
times over, you’ve got to find a new angle.
Eve MacDonald’s angle is to place
Hannibal back in the context of the Hel-
lenistic world, framing him as a proto-
typical heroic figure emulating the leg-
ends of Alexander and his successors
while building his own legend.
Given that we know much more in detail
about Hannibal’s military successes and fail-
ures in the Second Punic War than we do
about much else in his life, MacDonald’s
biography is more traditional than her ambi-
tion promises. Most of the book is the famil-
iar story of how Hannibal led a multinational
force across the Alps, into the heart of enemy
territory where he defeated a series of Roman
armies. Finally, inertia and lack of home sup-
port forced him to return to Africa where he
would lose his final battle against Scipio Afri-
canus, the greatest Roman general of his age.
The author’s argument is strongest in
the opening chapters. The First Punic War
fell fast on the heels of the failed invasion
of Italy by Pyrrhus, pretender to the throne
of Macedon and one of the most celebrated
captains in antiquity. His daring escapades
and the wider context of Mediterranean em-
aw_9-2.indd 55
Reviews
prise is the absence of colour plates; in a
book of this quality and price (£25 RRP/US
$50) this is disappointing. The photograph
on the jacket of an unidentified ruined city
– Palmyra? – at sunset hints at the beauty of
this country and its antiquities.
These shortcomings aside, anyone in-
terested in the history of the ancient world
and the Middle East will find much in this
book to inform and entertain them and, for
that reason, I recommend it highly. 0
Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life
ISBN: 978-0300152043
Author: Eve MacDonald
Pages: 330
Publisher: Yale University Press
Address of publisher:
http://yalepress.yale.edu/
Reviewer: Troy S. Goodfellow
pire building are held up as inspirations for
glory-seeking leaders in the West. Hanni-
bal’s father, Hamilcar, comes out of that war
a hero and uses his prestige and talent to
both suppress a general revolt of Carthagin-
ian mercenaries and African subject states.
He then goes on to build his own mini-em-
pire in Spain, which would be the base of
family power until the Roman conquest.
It could be argued that MacDonald’s
Hellenistic Life is better suited for her ac-
count of Carthage itself than it is for a sin-
gle individual. Carthage is never treated as
a remote point of origin for Hannibal, only
lukewarm in its commitment to his adven-
tures. In fact, the city is situated as a thriving
but divided mercantile hub, able to weather
terrible storms through wealth and tenacity,
but also prone to the sorts of schisms that
rocked contemporary oligarchies. The wider
commercial world of the Mediterranean,
Carthage’s Phoenician origins and its tenu-
ous relationship with its neighboring cities
and North African vassals is never far from
MacDonald’s mind, and she is at her best
when she reminds us that the Punic Wars
ancient warfare iX-2 55
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 Reviews
took place in a global context much larger
than simply Carthage versus Rome.
Beyond this, however, MacDonald
struggles to draw the wider connection be-
tween Hannibal and Hellenistic military cul-
ture in any new or interesting way. Yes, some
of the legends of Hannibal’s skill and popu-
larity are attributed to other Hellenistic gen-
erals, but many of these tropes are recycled
throughout history because of their familiar
symbolism. The combined arms warfare of
Hannibal may have been modeled on Alex-
andrian lines, but his preference for ambush-
es stands in stark contrast to the Greek gener-
als who followed the Macedonian model.
The book is quite convincing when it
comes to the argument that this second war
between Rome and Carthage was inevita-
ble. MacDonald, in line with most mod-
ern accounts, suggests that Rome baited
Carthage into war through its annexation
of Sardinia and obstinacy over Hannibal’s
siege of Saguntum. But her argument is nu-
anced enough to leave room for misunder-
standing, vagueness and simple confusion,
especially in regards to the Spanish treaty.
Roms vergessener Feldzug.
Die Schlacht am Harzhorn
ISBN: 978-3806228229
Authors: Heike Pöppelmann, Korana Depp-
meyer, Wolf-Dieter Steinmetz (editors)
Pages: 408
Publisher: Konrad Theiss Verlag
Address of publisher:
http://www.theiss.de/
Reviewer: Seán Hußmann
One of the most spectacular archaeo-
logical discoveries of the last decade
was that of the ancient battlefield of
Harzhorn. Here, near Northeim, in the
densely forested western foothills of the
Harz, hobby archaeologists (basically
treasure hunters, operating illegally with
metal detectors)found some artifacts in
2000. Initially, they identified them as
medieval. It took eight years until one of
56 ancient warfare iX-2
aw_9-2.indd 56
She is also quite skilled at painting
Hannibal as a general who was not a su-
perhero, but a man who made some rash
decisions and sometimes painted himself
into a corner. His genius is always evident,
but with few strategic options open to him
(MacDonald doesn’t spend much time on
the question of marching on Rome), his
personal ability to keep his army united
and effective for a decade in Italy never
fails to impress the author or the reader.
Hannibal: A Hellenistic Life won’t re-
place Goldsworthy’s history of the Punic
Wars on my bookshelf. Still, MacDonald
has a masterful command of the material
and the varying reliability of the sources,
and curious newcomers to the topic will
find Hannibal a quick and exciting read. It
is, unfortunately, not supported by the charts
and maps that would make the text come to
life for those unfamiliar with the story. Peo-
ple already even somewhat knowledgeable
about the Second Punic War, however, will
find little new here outside the vivid account
of the Roman and Carthaginian rivalry be-
fore Hannibal comes on the scene. 0
the artifacts was correctly identified as a
Roman hipposandal, after the finder had
posted photographs of his discoveries
on the internet. To his credit, he imme-
diately contacted the archaeologist re-
sponsible for the Northeim district – Ms.
Petra Lönne – and in summer 2008, seri-
ous archaeological surveys were made.
What the archaeologists unearthed
during the following years can only be
described as a sensation: Roman coins,
missiles, weapons and other military ar-
tifacts – more than 1700 pieces by 2013.
They had discovered the site of a battle
between Romans and Germans dating
back to the third century AD. All evidence
points to a sizable Roman force of at least
two cohorts – roughly 1000 men – being
involved, with less conservative estimates
going as far as 9000 Romans (the equiva-
lent of two legions). Whatever took place
here was a major operation at least.
22/04/15 10:02

Numismatic and archaeological evi-
dence allowed the battle to be dated back
to 235 or 236, thus placing it in Emperor
Maximinus Thrax’ great German War. But
a Roman incursion this deep into Ger-
man territory? Analysis of the battlefield
proved that much of what we thought
to know about the military and political
relations between Rome and Germania
during the crisis-riddled third century
needs to be re-thought and re-written.
By September 2013, the finds were
made public in a beautiful and very in-
formative and successful exhibition in the
Landesmuseum Braunschweig. Parallel to
the exhibition, the Braunschweigisches
Landesmuseum published this equally
beautiful catalogue. Lavishly illustrated with
photographs, maps, pictures and graphs, 67
articles cover all you ever wanted to know
about the Harzhorn battle and more.
The catalogue is divided into themati-
cally ordered sections; the first section deal-
ing archaeological aspects, with several
articles on battlefield archaeology, illegal ar-
chaeology, the archaeology of the Harzhorn
and the interesting history of the battlefields’
initial discovery. A number of articles cover
the previous Roman-Germanic military his-
tory, the broader context of Roman external
policies, Roman military settlements in Ger-
mania and – of course – the life of Maximi-
nus Thrax and his campaigns into Germa-
nia, with a special focus on their historical
and numismatical records.
The next section provides the reader
with an insight into life and death amongst
the ancient Germans. Being a ‘barbarian’
people with no literary tradition and all too
often acting as Rome’s enemy, Latin litera-
ture is seldom kind to Rome’s north-eastern
neighbors. And even when it is, as in Taci-
tus’ Germania, it is to be treated with cau-
tion, to say the least. Thus, historians have
to rely largely on archaeological finds when
researching ancient Germania. Neverthe-
less, the articles in this section manage to
paint a comprehensible and lively picture
of conditions of life in Germania, geogra-
phy and climate, Germanic religion, social
aw_9-2.indd 57
Reviews
structures and, of course, the Germans as
warriors – size, equipment and social com-
position of their warbands for example.
The following section focusses most-
ly on Rome and her professional armies.
Maximinus Thrax’ soldiers are discussed,
as is their equipment, ranging from cavalry
equipment and the famous lorica segmenta-
ta to the torsion artillery, whose tactical use
and deployment in battle can be deduced
from the Harzhorn discoveries. Further arti-
cles compare Roman and Germanic tactics,
give insight on the logistical aspects of Ro-
man campaigns, touch on Roman religion
and the daily life of Roman legionaries.
The fifth section covers the Harzhorn
battle and attempts to reconstruct the events
that took place here almost 1800 years ago.
The articles here are certainly the ‘heart’ of
the catalogue and – to me personally – the
most interesting and exciting, as they attempt
the experiment of telling the story of a battle
on the basis of the archaeological record.
This section is followed by one that
deals with the aftermath of the battle. Be-
sides Maximinus Thrax’ personal history
after his expeditio Germanica and the al-
ways fragile and often turbulent history of
Roman-Germanic relations in the follow-
ing centuries, the articles here also deal
with casualties and survivors of the battle.
Again, these topics rely heavily on archae-
ological evidence, mainly coinage and
burial sites with their relevant inscriptions.
One last, short section deals with the de-
piction of Roman soldiers in modern art.
On the whole, the articles are well-
written, comprehensible, easily accessible
and – as already implied – cover almost
every question the reader might have,
though some of them must necessarily re-
main unanswered. Extensive, informative
and intelligible, one could ask no more
from an exhibition catalogue. The sheer
mass of photographs and detailed maps
add the perfect icing to this cake.
Unfortunately, the catalogue can be
hard to obtain and is quite costly. Another
caveat: the catalogue is (to my knowledge)
only available in German. 0
ancient warfare iX-2 57
22/04/15 10:02
 On the cover

Death of
Epaminondas
There is no better moment to illustrate the twilight of the greek poleis
than the death of epaminondas at a critical moment during the Battle
of mantinea (362 Bc). This ended the Theban hegemony. what followed
were two decades of strife before Philip ii arrived on the scene.

by samuel Zilincik typical for the century or so after the mid-

O
ne can hardly find better
words to describe the situa-
tion after the battle than Xeno-
fifth century BC. It is also possible that war-
riors were experimenting, maybe even trying
to find the best balance between efficiency
and style. Helmets of these types are found

A modern statue in Thebes
commemorating Epaminondas.
© David Balfour
“
phon does in the final lines of
the Hellenica (translation by H.G. Dakyns):
here, where well-nigh the
whole of hellas was met
together in one field (…). and
though both claimed to have
won the day, neither could show
that he had thereby gained any
accession of territory, or state,
or empire, or was better situat-
ed than before the battle.”
Johny Schumate has illustrated the mo-
ment of Epaminondas’ death at Mantinea.
The famous general has been mortally
wounded by a spear and is watching the
battle for a little while before he dies. He
is supported by his fellow soldiers, who are
both confused and in despair because of
the impending death of their leader.
The equipment used by the warriors in
the image is typical for the period. As far as
helmets are concerned, we can spot both
the conical pilos helmet, as well as the older
Chalcidian type. While the former was pop-
ular on account of its low cost and simplic-
ity, the latter was still used by wealthier men.
This mixture of helmets on the battlefield is
in museums all over the world.
There are also two types of armour in
the picture. Epaminondas is wearing a more
traditional metal muscle cuirass. Because
of its weight and problems with heat-man-
agement, most warriors instead seemed to
have opted for the lighter, airier linen cors-
let, which is the second type of armour in
the picture. Linen corslets, being made of
perishable material, are only known from
Greek art and a few mentions in texts. Made
from linen, the corslet was lighter and more
flexible than a bronze or iron cuirass, while
still offering decent protection against mis-
siles or even weaker slashes from blades.
(For more, please refer to the detailed article
by Gregory S. Aldrete, et al., in Ancient War-
fare VII.6.) A metal cuirass, similar to those
shown on the cover, is on display at the Met-
ropolitan Museum of Art in New York.
The warriors in the picture are also
equipped with round Argive shields deco-
rated with the club of Heracles, the Classical
symbol of the city that, according to tradition,
had been the birthplace of Greece’s greatest
hero. These shields are depicted on coins
such as the ones currently on display at the
Manchester museum. Finally, their lower legs
are protected by metal greaves, as typical for
much of the Greek historical period. 0

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