Quorum:
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1 is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress
function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellant be compelled to attend
legislative sessions to constitute a quorum?
HELD: No.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six
months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
Disqualifications and Inhibitions
                  Effect of Imprisonment
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts1 is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First
District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard
and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House
of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the
concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his
duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied
with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave
jail.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from
in general?
HELD: No.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials
of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to
the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in
the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common
restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law,
not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher
the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather
than exemption.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or
after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must
protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to
others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes
of the administration of justice. The accused-appellant states
that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office
cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape
eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional
duties outside his regular place of confinement.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
reasons. There is no showing that the said privileges are
peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed
to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon
court orders.
He is to be treated like any other citizen considering that
there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should
not go unpunished.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like
any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is
provided with a congressional office situated House of
Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned
by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through
[an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents."
Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention,
he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he
has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits.
Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his
mandate as a member of the House of Representative
consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not
even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the
National Pentientiary to perform these acts.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws." 6 This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.7 The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.
Discipline of members
                  Suspension vs. Preventive Suspension
    
Osmena vs. Pendatun
G.R. No. L-17144            October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA,
FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO
DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G.
TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES
ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59, respondents.
Facts:
Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the
House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President.
A special committee was created under House Resolution No. 59 to
investigate the truth of petitioner’s charges against the President.
Petitioner was given a chance to defend himself and substantiate his
charges and if he fails to do so, he is required to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House.
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun
and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members
of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance
with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition
that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should
not punish him.
The special committee find said petitioner guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved
on the same day—before closing its session—House Resolution No.
175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from
office for fifteen months.
Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House.
Osmeña contended in his petition that the House has no power,
under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
ISSUE: WON the House has power to suspend one of its members?
HELD: Yes.
Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of
Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison 3, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision
amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the
practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take
disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment,  suspension or expulsion.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives of
a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other
words the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already
pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months
in 1949.
Note: Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It
is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to
investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from
intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him.
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then
Commissioner of theCommission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID), approved the application for legalizationof the stay of about 32
aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faithand
it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). Thelegalization of such is also a violation of Executive
Order No. 324 which prohibits thelegalization of disqualified aliens.
The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known byher to be
disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago.
Pursuant to thisinformation, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan, issued awarrant of arrest against Santiago.
Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion
was filed with theSandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who
was already a senator by then. TheSandiganbayan ordered the Senate
President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for90 days.
Issue:
Whether the order of preventive suspension issued by the
Sandiganbayan was proper.
Ruling:
Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the
case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan 6 observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension."
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under
the Constitution which provides that each -
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days."
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is
a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member. While the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not
err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Electoral Tribunals
Composition
Bondoc vs. Pineda
Facts:
The case arose when Dr. Emigdion A. Bondoc from the Nacionalista
Party (NP) was declared winner against the supposed proclaimed
winner Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP)after filing a protest with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita
G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed
Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of
March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind
the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol
or whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent
Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging
functions as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura
to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a
member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Issue:
Is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do
that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the
House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Ruling:
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990).
The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although
two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a
sea of politicians.
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the
independence of the HRET
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be
the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the
work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a
mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which
the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member
would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well
abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan.
They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence even independence from the political
party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach
of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice,
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a
lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of
the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec.
17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated
March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as
a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio
Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
Powers
Aquino vs. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of
Makati City. Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate
for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.
The Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant
petition for Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and
declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the
Second Legislative District of Makati City.
Petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven
(38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who
obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.
Comelec en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner’s
proclamation.
Petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995 elections,
the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner’s
qualifications to run for member of the House of Representative. He
claims that jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification is
exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet-unresolved question of jurisdiction,
petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error and grave
abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as
the winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati
City.
Issue:
Whether or not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner
after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly
assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns
and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House
only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the
House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed
16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a
member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of
Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning
candidate in an election is ministerial, B .P. 881 in conjunction with
Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under
circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner’s contention that
"after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been
established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of
election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass
upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even
after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in
relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992.]
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G.
TIOZON, Petitioners, v. RAUL. A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as
Secretary of the House of Representatives, MR. JOSE MARIA TUAÑO,
as Officer-in-Charge, Gen. Services Division of the House of
Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA, as Chief Accountant of
the House of Representatives, and the HON. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
Respondents.
Doctrine:
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL; SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO
THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ITS MEMBERS. —
Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since
petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the
appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel
respondent Daza’s certificate of candidacy before the election or a
quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10)
days after Daza’s proclamation.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; DE FACTO OFFICERS;
ENTITLED TO EMOLUMENT FOR ACTUAL SERVICES RENDERED. — As a
de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse
funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid
as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
Facts:
On February 18, 1992, Petitioners, residents of the second
Congressional District of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for
prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, on the ground
that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident
of the United States since October 16, 1974.
Petitioners allege that Hr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration,
renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section
68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section
18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact
that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he
was accorded a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as
evidenced by a letter order of the District Director, US Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., he had long waived
his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.
Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before
the COMELEC (SPC 92-084) and hypothesizing that the case before the
COMELEC would become moot should this Court find that his
permanent resident status ceased when he was granted a US non-
immigrant visa.
Issue: virtual lawlibrary
whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member
of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Ruling:
We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case.
First, this case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the
manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 8 that they seek
to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the
duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending
June 30, 1992.
Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House
Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification
of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of
Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a
petition to cancel respondent Daza’s certificate of candidacy before
the election 9 or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral
Tribunal within ten (10) days after Daza’s proclamation.
Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent
since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not
intended to provide for acts already consummated. Fourth, as a de
facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds
disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as
those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled
to emoluments for actual services rendered.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for
being MOOT and ACADEMIC.
 Commission on Appointments (CA)
Nature of CA and Composition
  
Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789
EN BANC
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners,vs.NEPTALI A.
GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA,
respondents.
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.
Facts:
As a result of the national elections of 1992, the Senate was composed
of 15 senators coming from LDP, 5 from NPC, 3 from LAKAS-NUCD and
1 from LP-PDP-LABAN. To suffice the 12 representatives of Senate in
the Commission on Appointments, they agreed to use the traditional
formula, having LDP with 7.5 members, NPC with 2.5 members,
LAKAS-NUCD with 1.5 members and LP-PDP-LABAN with 0.5 member.
Respondent-senator Alberto Romulo then nominated for and in behalf
of the LDP, eight senators. Such nomination was objected by
petitioner-senator TeofistoGuingona, Jr. To resolve the case, Senator
Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise with elected members
consisting of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-
NUCD. Petitioner Guingona, Jr. then filed a petition for the issuance of
a writ of prohibition to prohibit the recognition of Senators Romulo
and Tañada as members of the CA as it is a violation of the rule of
proportional representation and that it is the right of the minority
political parties in the Senate, consistent with the Constitution, to
combine their fractional representation in the Commission on
Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who,
among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and
elected thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the election of Senators Romulo and Tañada as
members of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with
the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
No.
The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of
Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the
mathematical representation of each of the political parties
represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP — 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN — .5
NPC — 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD — 1.5
A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution
leads to no other manner of application than as above. The problem is
what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one
half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one
other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the
Senate.
This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be
based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The
election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and
reduced the representation of one political party — either the LAKAS-
NUCD or the NPC.
We find the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on
Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the
Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in
compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be
elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties represented therein.
To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties
in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to
make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation
because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by
utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who
is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by
sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority.
This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the
Constitution providing for a multi-party system, entitlement to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments
requires a minimum membership in each house. The statement of this
Court in Daza vs. Singson to the effect that "under the Constitutional
provision on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the
members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority parties
therein but extends to all the political parties represented in each
house of Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean
that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in
the Senate, are entitled by Constitutional fiat to at least one
representation in the Commission.
The Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.
made this clear where it ruled that proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a
party in each house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a
political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to membership
in the Commission on Appointments.
We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full
complement of 12 Senators be elected to the membership in the
Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and
that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The
overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a
proportional representation of the political parties in the membership
of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12
members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the
maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of
filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of
proportional representation of the parties even if it results in
fractional membership in unusual situations like the case at bar.
Section 18 provides, in part, as follows:
There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and . .
. , elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation . .
..
The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve
Senators and twelve Representatives in order that the Commission
may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the Commission
on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by
majority vote of all the members", and in Section 19 of the same
Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only while
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its
Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it".
In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13)
members is necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however,
that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should
come from either house". Even if the composition of the Commission
is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not
fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less
than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the
Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its business
even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto.
Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose
who among them will sit as members of the Commission on
Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed
by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be
chosen must comply with the rule on proportional representation. The
question of who interprets what is meant by proportional
representation has been a settled rule — that it belongs to this Court.
The framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of
other states, thought it wise to vest in the Supreme Court the role in
final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the
fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the
unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence the
minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by
force of numbers.
The election of respondents Senators Tañada and Romulo is a clear
disregard of the constitutional provision and when done over the
objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse
of discretion.
For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with
FINALITY.
  Powers and Function
    
          Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA,
petitioners,vs.SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
intervenor.
Facts:
In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments.
Herein petitioners, both of whom happened to be lawyers and
professors of constitutional law, filed the instant petition for
prohibition on the ground that the aforementioned appointment
violated Section 16, Art. VII of the1987 Constitution.
Petitioners argued that the appointment of a bureau head should be
subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments.  their judgment and opinion in its adoption."
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without
the confirmation from COA is valid.
Ruling:
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to
time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone
of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But
we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction.
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional
provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the
light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference
to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, it is provided that
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of
colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or
commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and
offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the
rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of The
government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime
Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts,
Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint
inferior officers in their respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments
required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the
power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments,
the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are
a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices. not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by
successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in
the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and
the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to
state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first
group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e.,
officers of lower rank.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident
that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau
head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments
where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601
of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such
officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose
appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor
requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if
he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such
power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it
is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated
that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were
approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which
the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No.
1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII,
with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted
within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as
they are, hereby DISMISSED.

In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule,

presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an
exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers
lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,

In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear

and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no
reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word
"alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by
law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President
alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the
power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.

Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated
merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by
law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the
heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word
"alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10,
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the
light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the