Educ Stud Math (2013) 82:417–438

DOI 10.1007/s10649-012-9437-3

Learning in collaborative settings: students building

on each other’s ideas to promote their mathematical
understanding

John M. Francisco

Published online: 9 October 2012

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Abstract The purpose of this study is to contribute insights into how collaborative activity
can help promote students’ mathematical understanding. A group of six high school students
(15- to 16-year olds) worked together on a challenging probability task as part of a larger,
after-school, longitudinal study on students’ development of mathematical ideas in problem-
solving settings. The students solved the problem and produced a valid justification of their
solution. This study shows that collaborative activity can help promote students’ mathemat-
ical understanding by providing opportunities for students to critically reexamine how they
make claims from facts and also enable them to build on one another’s ideas to construct
more sophisticated ways of reasoning. Implications for classroom teaching and ideas for
future research are also discussed. The study helps address a documented need for a better
understanding of how mathematical learning evolves in social settings.

Keywords Collaborative work . Students’ reasoning . Probability . Mathematical

understanding

1 Introduction

Collaborative activity remains a key topic in mathematics education (e.g., NCTM, 2000;
Balacheff, 1991; Bauersfeld, 1995; Lampert & Cobb, 2003). Several studies have tried to
explain how it helps promote mathematical learning. For instance, research shows that
discussions can “allow students to test ideas, to hear and incorporate the ideas of others,
to consolidate their thinking by putting their ideas into words, and hence, to build a deeper
understanding of key concepts” (McCrone, 2005, p. 111). Discussions can encourage
students to take a more reflective stance on their mathematical reasoning (Manouchehri &
Enderson, 1999) and learn to communicate mathematically and participate in a wider range
of mathematical argumentation (Lampert & Cobb, 2003; Sfard, 2001). Discussions can also
invite “students to be explicit both about the ways in which they make new claims from

J. M. Francisco (*)
School of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA
e-mail: jmfranci@educ.umass.edu
418 J.M. Francisco

previously established facts and about the standards they are using in defining whether an
argument is acceptable” (Weber, Maher, Powell, & Lee, 2008, p. 248). Yet, how and in what
conditions collaborative work helps promote students’ mathematical understanding remains
an open question (Lampert, Rittenhouse, & Crumbaugh, 1998; McCrone, 2005; Weber et al.,
2008; Martin, Towers, & Pirie, 2006).
The purpose of this article is to contribute insights into this question, based on the
analysis of the mathematical activity of a group of five high school students who worked
successfully together on a challenging probability task. The task was known as the World
Series Problem, and the students worked on it as part of a larger, after-school, longitudinal
study on students’ development of mathematical ideas funded by the National Science
Foundation.1 The following research question guided the analysis of the students’ collabo-
rative activity: how, if at all, did the collaborative activity help promote the mathematical
understanding that allowed the students to solve the problem? This was an open question.
However, there was a particular interest in three aspects: (1) how particular ways of engaging
in collaborative activity established over time in the longitudinal study or other settings
might have helped promote the students’ mathematical understanding; (2) how the students’
mathematical understanding emerged from their collaboration, and (3) how the students’
collaboration influenced the quality, i.e., the validity and sophistication, of the mathematical
knowledge that constituted their mathematical understanding. The results show that collab-
orative activity can promote students’ mathematical understanding by creating opportunities
for them to critically reexamine their mathematical reasoning and build new, more sophis-
ticated forms of reasoning from hints or ideas of others. Specifically, challenges or questions
in a collaborative setting can invite students to examine the validity of their claims about a
particular situation or even induce them to build more sophisticated claims. Implications for
classroom teaching and ideas for future research are discussed.

2 Theoretical framework

The conceptualization of the present study relied on several theories. These helped address
the three aspects of the research question mentioned above.

2.1 Sociocultural perspectives

Sociocultural (e.g., Cobb, 1999; Cobb, Boufi, McClain, & Whitenack, 1997; Lampert &
Cobb, 2003; Saxe, 2002; Sfard & Kieran, 2001; Vygotsky, 1978) and situated cognition
(Lave, 1997; Lave & Wenger, 1991) theories maintain that learning is a social and cultural
process. Bowers and Nickerson (1991) claim that learning is “an inherently social process”
(p. 2). Lave (1997) argues that “Knowing, thinking, and understanding are generated in
[social] practice” (p. 19). Lampert and Cobb (2003) claim that a mathematical activity can be
construed as a form of participation in established mathematical practices. The theories
define learning in sociocultural terms. Vygotsky (1978) claims that learning is an internal-
ization process whereby social phenomena are transformed into psychological phenomena.
A Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is “The distance between the actual developmental
level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development

1
The longitudinal study was supported, in part, by National Science Foundation grant REC-0309062
(directed by C. A. Maher). The opinions expressed are not necessarily of the sponsoring agency and no
endorsement should be inferred. The authors were part of the research team.
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 419

as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more
capable peers” (Vygotsky 1978, p. 86). For example, “functions are first formed in the collective
in the form of relations among children and then become mental functions for the individual …
research shows that reflection is spawned by argument” (Vygotsky, 1978; p. 86). The ZPD
highlights the role of experts in promoting student learning.
Cobb and Yackel (1996) propose a sociocultural perspective on learning that emphasizes
the importance of interactions among participants. They argue that learning takes place in
and through social interactions, as participants negotiate meanings and interpretations in
search of consensual or compatible forms of understanding. Social interactions are not mere
sources of internalizations. They are the very process by which learning takes place. The
implicit attempt to coordinate, rather than separate, the psychological and social dimensions
of learning is shared by other scholars. Salomon (1993) argues that purely social or cognitive
theories of learning are unlikely “to do justice to the understanding of human activity and the
informed design of education” (p. 135). Dörfler (2000) claims that meaning making is an
individual but socially mediated process. Yackel and Cobb (1996) also emphasize the
importance of the particular “culture” or expectations of “doing” mathematics that often
emerges in mathematics classrooms. These include what counts as a correct solution to a
mathematics problem in the classroom—for example, does it include a justification or just an
answer?—what counts as a valid justification—for example, does it have to convince other
students?—or whether mathematics is about sense making or simply manipulation of rules.
Yackel and Cobb (1996) call such expectations “sociomathematical norms” and argue that
they are negotiated and take shape in the classroom discourse, and influence students’
mathematical learning. In this study, Yackel and Cobb’s (1996) sociocultural perspective,
particularly sociomathematical norms as expectations about mathematical practice, helped
address the first aspect of the research question: determine if particular ways of engaging in
mathematical activity, established in the longitudinal study elsewhere, helped promote the
students’ mathematical understanding.

2.2 Improvisational theories

Sociocultural theories may provide a powerful framework for explaining learning in social
settings. However, some scholars argue that these theories do not adequately do so. One
criticism is that they fail to capture learning as it emerges and evolves in the dynamic,
moment-by-moment interactions of individuals working collaboratively on a task (e.g.,
Davis & Simmt, 2003; Martin et al., 2006). For example, Cobb and Yackel (1996) claim
that sociomathematical norms “emerge over a relatively long period of time, and [are] seen
as stable and constant once negotiated and established.” Stephan, Cobb, and Gravemeijer
(2003) also characterize their theory of how mathematical practices evolve in mathematics
classrooms as “a way to account for the mathematical learning of a classroom community
over long periods of time” (p. 100). Martin, Towers, and Pirie (2006) argue that theories that
rely on constructs that develop and remain stable over relatively long periods of time cannot
adequately explain the emergent and evolving nature of learning in collaborative settings.
They propose improvisational theories.
Improvisational theories view collaborative activity as an improvisational process, as in
jazz or theater. In particular, Sawyer (2001) distinguishes among three rules of collective
improvisation. The first is the group’s ability to generate potential pathways, i.e., different
ways the collective activity can proceed at any given moment. The second is the group’s
ability to come up with a collective structure, i.e., a set of ideas that participants agree upon
and that subsequently guides their collective actions. The third is the group’s ability to
420 J.M. Francisco

develop an etiquette and a group mind, i.e., a way of being in the group in which “everyone
pays attention to the other players and are willing to alter what they are doing” if it makes
sense (p. 161). Martin et al. (2006) add the notions of interactions and coactions. Inter-
actions involve the “process of acting on the ideas of another in a reciprocal or complemen-
tary way.” Coactions refer to the “process of acting with the ideas and actions of others in a
mutual, joint way” (p. 156; emphasis added). In coactions, individuals work jointly together
on the same idea, whereas in interactions they may pursue their own ideas as long as this
complements the group’s work. Also, in coactions, “Mathematical ideas and actions initially
stemming from an individual learner become taken up, built on, developed, reworked, and
elaborated by others, and thus emerge as shared understandings across the group, rather than
remaining located within any one individual” (p. 156). The result is a collective mathemat-
ical understanding, which Martin et al. (2006) define as a form of understanding that
emerges as participants take up each other’s ideas and collectively develop and refine them
into agreed-upon sophisticated ideas or ways of reasoning. Martin et al. (2006) argue that
coactions are the conditions that help promote collective mathematical understanding.
In this study, improvisation theory helped address the second aspect of the research
question, namely, account for the students’ mathematical understanding as it emerged in
their collective work on the World Series Problem. In particular, coactions helped determine
the extent to which the emerging understanding was collectively shared.

2.3 Theories of argumentation

Theories of improvisation may help account for the emergence of mathematical understand-
ing in collective activity. However, they do not provide as rich a framework to examine the
quality of such understanding, the third aspect of the research question. Notions of inter-
actions, coactions, or even collective mathematical understanding emphasize what members
of a collective do with each other’s ideas such as whether they take them up. They do not add
much about the validity and sophistication of such ideas, and, in particular, how the ideas
may be interactively constituted in collaborative activity. For such accounts, several
researchers have relied on Toulmin’s (1969) model of argumentation (e.g., Krummheuer,
1995; Yackel, 2001; Rasmussen & Stephan, 2008). The model states that an argument has
three main parts. The claim is the assertion of which an individual is trying to convince
others. The data are the evidence that the individual presents to support a claim. The warrant
is the explanation why the claim follows from the data. Sometimes, members of a group may
not be convinced that a claim follows from the data and may question the validity of the
warrant. In such cases, the individual may present a support or backing for the warrant
(Stephan & Rasmussen, 2002). An argument in Toulmin’s model also has two additional
parts: a modal qualifier, which refers to the degree of confidence about a claim, and a
rebuttal, which refers to the conditions under which the conclusions may hold or not hold.
Toulmin’s (1969) model relates mathematical aspects (such as claims or warrants) with
interactional, discursive aspects (such as explaining or convincing someone of a claim). This
helps explain researchers’ use of the model to examine how the quality of mathematical
arguments may be related to collective activity. In mathematics education, the model has
been used in at least one of two ways: to analyze students’ evolving conceptions by
documenting their collective argumentation. Stephan and Rasmussen (2002) consider an
idea “taken as shared” in a group if it is used in argumentation and no one in the group
challenges it. The model has also been used to evaluate the quality of mathematical argu-
ments, either as a normative tool to help judge if an argument constitutes a valid proof
(Pedemonte, 2007; Weber & Alcock, 2005; emphasis added) or to describe the progression
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 421

of an informal argument to a valid deduction (Pedemonte, 2007). Weber, Maher, Powell, and
Lee (2008) used the model in both senses. In this study, the model helped address the third
aspect of the research question, namely, determine the extent to which the quality of the
students’ mathematical understanding was directly related to the students’ collaboration on
the World Series Problem. In particular, warrants helped determine the validity of the
students’ mathematical ideas by examining the type of mathematical reasoning behind the
ideas.

2.4 Mathematical understanding

One of the several existing theories of mathematical understanding is Davis and Maher’s (1990)
theory of mental representations. Davis and Maher (1990) argue that when thinking of a problem
situation, learners cycle several times through five main steps: (1) building a mathematical
representation of the input data (i.e., data representation), (2) carrying out memory searches to
retrieve or reconstruct a representation of the knowledge that helps solve the problem or further
the task (i.e., knowledge representation), (3) constructing a mapping between the data represen-
tation and knowledge representation, (4) checking this mapping (and these constructions) to see
if they seem to be correct, and (5) using technical devices (or other information) associated with
the knowledge representation to solve the problem. Davis and Maher (1990) claim that they
mean mental representations even when these are built with the help of paper and pencil or
manipulative objects. In particular, a mental representation of an idea is a “mental image to
represent the meaning of the word/idea” (Davis & Maher, 1990; p. 66, emphasis added). This
suggests that a mental representation of an idea can be construed as a personal understanding of
the idea, and Davis and Maher’s (1990) theory provides a framework for characterizing
mathematical understanding at five levels of sophistication of problem-solving activity: under-
standing the problem, the knowledge needed to solve it, how to apply it, how to justify its use, and
how to implement it to solve the problem.
Mathematical understanding, however, can be domain specific. In probability, tasks are often
interpreted in different ways and misunderstandings are common. For example, the classical
definition of probability is that it is a ratio between favorable and all possible outcomes in an
experiment, provided that they are equally likely. Boero and Guala (2008) note, however, that
“many mathematics teachers at all school levels are not aware of the crucial importance of the
condition ‘provided that they are equally likely’ and (if they are acquainted with it) of its
possible epistemological limitation (“the definition seems to depend on the notion of ‘equally
likely,’ thus on the application of the defined notion” (p. 243). When asked to solve the
problem, “let us throw two dice and consider the sum of the upper digits. Is it preferred to
bet on odd or even?” many teachers bet on even, because there are more even sums than odd
sums. They treat the 11 sums as equally likely events. They treat the 11 digits as equally likely
events. Also, students often take absolute size (there are more possibilities for even than there
are for odd numbers) for relative size, thus demonstrating a misunderstanding of probability as a
part-whole relationship (Shaughnessy, 2003). Shaughnessy (2003) also notes that “students are
weak on the concept of sample space and need more opportunities to determine and discuss the
set of all possible outcomes for a probability experiment or sampling activity” (p. 223). The
variety of interpretations and misconceptions mean that probability tasks are likely to generate
more discussions than tasks in other areas. This makes probability a potentially rich context for
studying collaborative learning. In the present study, mathematical understanding was con-
strued as in Davis and Maher’s (1990) theory. In particular, the five problem-solving levels
helped account for the quality of the students’ mathematical understanding, specifically its
sophistication.
422 J.M. Francisco

3 Research context

A description of the longitudinal study is provided below. The emphasis is on the goals and
the particular conditions or “culture” in which students engaged in mathematical activity in
the study. However, the focus of the current study is the group work of the five students on
the World Series Problem. The description of the longitudinal study is provided as back-
ground information for the present study.

3.1 Goals and participants

The longitudinal study took place in a school district located in a blue-collar, working-class
community in the USA. The first 8 years were classroom based. Afterward, data were
collected in informal, after-school sessions. The goal was to study students’ development of
mathematical ideas and different forms of reasoning as they worked on well-defined, open-
ended mathematical tasks in several mathematical content strands. In particular, the tasks
were challenging in the sense that the methods for solving them were often not obvious to
the students and had to be built (Schoenfeld, 1985). Approximately 25 students started the
study voluntarily. Over time, however, the researchers followed the mathematical behavior
of smaller focus groups, one of which was the six students in this study. The one female and
five male students were known as Romina, Mike, Jeff, Brian, Ankur, and Robert, and they
participated continuously in the longitudinal study from second grade to high school and
beyond. This longitudinal study differed from teaching experiments where researchers have
particular concepts that they want students to construct, often by traversing an anticipated
learning trajectory (e.g., Simon, 1995). In the longitudinal study, there were no specific ideas
that students were expected to learn, nor were there particular stages they were supposed to
traverse. The students’ ideas and ways of reasoning were the result of investigations and not
of preconceived goals. The researchers called the research sessions “learning” rather than
“teaching” experiments. The informal, after-school setting with no fixed curriculum allowed
the research to have such an orientation.

3.2 Setting

Students worked on mathematical tasks in the longitudinal study in particular conditions

consistent with a constructivist approach to learning. They were encouraged to work
collaboratively in the sense that the researchers encouraged them to engage in the “coordi-
nated, synchronous activity that is the result of a continued attempt to construct and maintain
a shared conception of the problem[s] in their groups” (Roschelle & Teasley, 1995, p. 10).
The students were encouraged to always justify their solutions to one another. Their
contributions were received positively, and no judgments were made about their validity.
Instead, the students were encouraged to be arbiters of the validity of their peers’ claims,
based on whether they thought that the claims made sense. The students were given
extended time to work on the tasks and opportunities to work on different tasks involving
similar ideas. The researchers avoided telling them what to do. They spent most of the time
listening to the students’ ideas and encouraging their mathematical thinking through inter-
ventions such as “tell me more,” “what do you mean?” “why do you think that way?” or
“can you convince me you got the right answer?” Often, the researchers moved out of the
students’ view and later learned from studying the videos what problem-solving strategies
the students had used. The researchers avoided forcing closure, and delayed it until the
students were ready.
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 423

3.3 Data collection

Each research session lasted approximately 1.5 h and was videotaped. Two videographers,
working in tandem, videotaped a group of four to six students working together at a
particular table. The cameraman captured the students’ mathematical activity. The sound
technician captured their conversations. A roving camera captured the researchers’ inter-
actions with students and the students’ presentations on the overhead projector. Occasion-
ally, task-based interviews were conducted with students at the end of the research session.
These interviews were aimed at obtaining a more in-depth understanding of their mathe-
matical thinking. Over time, the longitudinal study accumulated a large database of videos,
students’ written work, researchers’ notes, still photos, and other forms of information. The
video data, now in digital format, and accompanying metadata are currently archived at the
Robert B. Davis Institute for Learning at Rutgers University and are stored in the Video
Mosaic Repository (VMC). The World Series Problem, with accompanying video data,
transcripts, and related metadata, is part of the VMC database. The problem was part of the
combinatorics/probability strand, along with other problems such as the Tower Problem and
the Pizza Problem. These tasks are described below, in the order in which they were
implemented in the longitudinal study. The World Series Problem was implemented in the
tenth grade. The Tower and Pizza Problems were implemented in the sixth grade.

3.3.1 The four-tall tower problem

“Work together and make as many different towers five cubes tall as possible when selecting
from two colors. See if you and your partner can find a way to convince yourself and others that
you have found all possible towers.” The students came up with a convincing argument that
there are 2n towers n cubes tall when choosing from two colors (see, e.g., Maher & Martino,
1996). The common strategies used were reasoning by cases and inductive reasoning.

3.3.2 The four-topping pizza problem

“A local pizza shop has asked us to help them keep track of pizza sales. Their standard
‘plain’ pizza contains cheese with tomato sauce. A customer can then select from the
following toppings to add to the plain pizza: peppers, sausage, mushrooms, and pepperoni.
How many different choices for pizza does a customer have? List all the possible different
selections. Find a way to convince one another that you have accounted for all possibilities.”
The students came up with 16 pizzas. They used mostly reasoning by cases. However, Mike
was able to use a binary notation of “0” (has no topping) and “1” (has a topping) to solve the
problem using a string of zeros and ones. This helped him use Pascal’s Triangle to solve the
problem and explain the Addition Rule in terms of pizzas.

3.3.3 The world series problem

“Two teams play each other in at least four and at most seven games. The first team to win
four games is the winner of the World Series. Assuming that the teams are equally matched
and that there are no ties, compute the probabilities of the World Series being won in (a) four
games, (b) five games, (c) six games, and (d) seven games.” There were three sessions
devoted to this problem over a 6-month period. In session 1, the students worked together on
the problem for the first time and came up with the solution: p(4)02/16, p(5)08/32, p(6)0
20/64, and p(7)040/128. In session 2, they were asked to compare their solution with one
424 J.M. Francisco

proposed by a group of graduate students: p(4)02/70, p(5)08/70, p(6)020/70, and p(7)040/

70. All the students except Mike believed that their solution was the correct one, and they
tried to convince Mike that he was wrong to think otherwise. To stimulate the students’
thinking, the researchers deliberately withheld the graduate students’ explanations. The
students tried to use this as an argument to reject the “solution.” However, Mike argued
that the graduate students may very well have included explanations in their “solution.” The
students then tried to argue that there were not 70 games in the sample space, but they could
not explain why. Mike liked that the probabilities of the series ending in six and seven games
were different in the graduate students’ “solution.” In session 3, Mike eventually was able to
explain why the probabilities of the series ending in six and seven games were the same and
reached closure by agreeing that the solution his group had arrived at during session 1 was
correct.

3.4 Data analysis

The analysis of the students’ collective work on the World Series Problem was consistent
with Powell, Francisco, and Maher’s (2003) methodology for tracing the development of
students’ mathematical reasoning in problem-solving situations. A central aspect of the
methodology is the identification and analysis of solution-critical episodes, i.e., instances
of verbal and nonverbal mathematical behavior that provide insights into students’ thinking
about a task. Overall, the analysis involved several iterations of five main steps. First, the
videos of the students working on the problem were viewed several times, so as to give a
strong sense of the data as a whole. Second, solution-critical episodes were identified in the
videos. Third, solution-critical episodes were analyzed in two parts. In part 1, improvisation
theory was used to analyze the students’ interactions around mathematical ideas. This
involved coding suggested ideas for making sense of the problem as (creating) potential
pathways. Students’ reactions challenging the ideas were coded as (a display of) etiquette,
and agreements were coded as the (emergence of a) collective (mathematical) structure. In
particular, an idea was regarded as “agreed upon” if it was used and no one challenged it
(Stephan & Rasmussen, 2002). In part 2, Toulmin’s (1969) model was used to conduct a
mathematical analysis of the ideas/arguments presented in the episode. The focus was on the
warrants, or explanations of why particular ideas or claims were a way to identify the type
(and validity of) the reasoning the students were using. When warrants were not explicit,
researchers tried, whenever possible, to infer them from the students’ ideas (Weber et al.,
2008). Fourth, Davis and Maher’s (1990) theory was used to describe the overall progress in
the students’ attempts to solve the problem. Fifth, interpretations were discussed with other
researchers to enhance accuracy. The two-part analysis of the critical episodes is consistent
with the idea of collaborative work used in this article. Part 1 focuses on the coordinated,
synchronous activity and consequent emergence, or not, of a shared conception of the
problem. Part 2 examines the mathematical nature of the conception of the problem(s)
agreed upon. All along the researchers looked for evidence that the particular conditions in
which the students engaged in mathematics activity in the longitudinal study influenced
collective activity.

4 Results

Twelve critical episodes were identified in the students’ collaborative work on the World
Series Problem. These are described below in the order in which they occurred. The
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 425

description starts with an analysis of the episode using improvisation theory, followed by a
transcript of the episode and mathematical analysis of the episode using Toulmin’s model.
The coding of the episodes is exemplified in the first episodes for illustration purposes.

5 Building a method for solving the problem

5.1 Episode 1: Romina’s guess

In this episode, Romina suggests that the probability of a team winning the series in four
games, p(4), could be one half, because there are two ways the series could be won in four
games: AAAA and BBBB (potential pathway). Jeff challenges the idea by saying that
winning the series in four games is hardest, suggesting that one half is too high a value
for p(4) (etiquette). The students agree with Jeff and decide to drop Romina’s idea (collective
structure):
Romina: They can go all seven or they could go all four. So, it would be A, A, A, A
and B, B, B, B—Team A and Team B?
Jeff: Wait, what’s the—wait—wait—
Romina: So those are the only possibilities for four?
Jeff: Mm hm.
Romina: So, in four games, would it be, like, one-half [1/2] of a chance? Or would
we have to write it out with—using all seven?
Jeff: See, I think that it’s the hardest to win it in four games. [It is] definitely the
hardest.
Romina: Yeah, exactly.
Jeff: So, it wouldn’t be one-half [1/2].

Romina does not present an explicit warrant for her (qualified) claim that p(4) could be
one half, which follows from the fact that there are two ways the series can be won in four
games (data). However, she seems to be using a principle of fairness: If two teams are
equally matched and have the same number of ways of winning the series, then it is fair to
say that the probability of either team winning the series is 50/50, or one half. Jeff challenges
this claim through reasoning by contradiction, which can be described as follows: If p(4) is
one half, then the rest of the probabilities would have to be smaller than one half and, hence,
smaller than p(4). This is a contradiction, since, intuitively, it is harder to win the series in
four than in five, six, or seven games.

5.2 Episode 2: Brian’s multiplicative strategy

In this episode, Brian suggests computing the probability of a team winning the series in n
games by multiplying the probability of a team winning a single game (i.e., one half) n times
(potential pathway). However, Romina challenges the idea by pointing out that the odds of
winning the series do not get easier that way (etiquette). The students agree to drop Brian’s
idea (collective structure):

Brian: Isn’t it the odds of winning one game, times the odds of winning one
game, times the odds of winning one game?
Ankur: It’s a 50 % chance of winning the first game.
Romina: [It’s] One-half.
426 J.M. Francisco

Brian: So, it’s like, half times a half—no, wait—remember the odds get harder to
win two [games] in a row, like a coin flip?
Romina: Yeah, that’s how you do it.
Brian: Yeah.
Romina: [computing p(4)] Four—hold on—four times—
Brian: That’s one-sixteenth.
Romina: [computing p(5)] Is it 132? Oh, never mind, I get it. Now, would you
have, for five games, like, would it be like that [1/2*1/2*1/2*1/2*1/2]?
[pauses and looks at her paper] Wouldn’t you have easier odds of winning
in six games than in four?
Jeff: Yeah.
Romina: Doesn’t it get less, though?
Jeff: That’s why it’s wrong.
Romina: Okay. [crosses out what she has written]
The expression “like a coin flip” suggests that Brian is mapping or building an
isomorphism between the World Series Problem and the coin problem. The isomor-
phism is the warrant or justification for his suggestion (claim) above. The claim follows
from recognizing that if “tossing heads” is made equivalent to “team A winning a
game” and “tossing tails” is equivalent to “Team B winning a game” (data), then the
probability of team A winning the series in n games is equivalent to the probability of
tossing four heads, with the fourth head being in the last toss. This probability is

n
C4n 12 , where C4n is the number of ways one can get four heads in n tosses of a coin,
with the fourth head coming in the last toss. Now, in n tosses of a coin, there are more
ways of getting four heads if some tails are allowed in between than there are ways of
getting four heads in a row. So Brian is right to warn that winning games in a row
should get harder. This is equivalent to saying that the odds of winning the series

n
should get easier. However, Brian retrieves only the part 12 of the formula above,
and Romina correctly points out that the formula makes the odds of winning harder. As
in the previous episodes, Romina challenges Mike’s claim through reasoning by
contradiction: If Brian’s suggestion/claim if correct, then the odds of winning the series
get harder, but this is a contradiction. Hence, Brian’s idea is not correct.
5.3 Episode 3: Mike’s idea of the probability ratio

In this episode, Mike suggests computing p(n) by dividing four, the number of wins needed
to win a series, by n, the number of games played (potential pathway). This can be inferred
from claims below, such as a team needs to win four out of the four games, i.e., be a 100 %
winner, and that a team needs to win four out of the seven games. However, Jeff challenges
the idea by pointing out that it makes p(4) equal to 100 %, which is counterintuitive
(etiquette). The students subsequently drop Mike’s idea (collective structure):
Mike: There’s probably a different way to do it than say, multiplying [Brian’s
idea above]. There’s gotta be a different way of looking at it, because if
you just say, multiply the probability in four games and seven games, it’s
gonna be harder in seven, but actually, it’s really not.
Brian: ’Cause you’ve got more chances.
Ankur: ’Cause you could win one, lose one. You could win three and lose three.
Mike: Then you go like this. With the four games, you have a maximum of four
and you have to win four, so it’s like you have to be a 100 % winner. And,
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 427

with seven games, you have seven possible games; all you have to do is
win in four. So you got a four-out-of-seven chance of winning
Jeff: What’s the probability of winning four games, if that’s the case?
Mike: I don’t know.
Jeff: You can’t say 100 %.
Mike: Yeah.
By suggesting that p(n) be 4/n (claim), because a team has to win four out of n games
(data), Mike is taking the n games as the sample space (warrant). Jeff and Ankur do not
challenge this. They challenge the claim through reasoning by contradiction: if p(n) is 4/n,
then p(4) is 100 % and this is a contradiction.

5.4 Episode 4: Romina’s brute force strategy

In the episode below, Romina suggests listing game combinations as strings of As and Bs
(potential pathway). However, Jeff points out that there may be too many game combina-
tions for the students to be able to list all of them (etiquette). He asks if game combinations
can be computed as 27 (potential pathway). Romina agrees that there may be lots of games
but thinks that there are 2n game combinations (adding potential). Ankur intervenes to say
that the series-winning game combinations (i.e., favorable outcomes) cannot be computed as
either 2n or 27 (etiquette). Brian adds an explanation: the order of wins matters for such game
combinations (adding potential). The students decide to list only series-winning game
combinations (collective structure):
Romina: You know how we do this thing [indicates strings on her paper]? Wouldn’t
we just do that? Say we did that, right? Whatever the probability would be
say, the probability of someone winning like B, B, B, B.
Jeff: Yeah, that’s what I was thinking, but—
Ankur: So, then we got to do it like that.
Jeff: Well, wait. Before we do that, let’s look at, um, how do you get to that
point in the first place? ’Cause there’s like a lot of different combinations
—two to the seventh. Is that two to the seventh?
Romina: Isn’t it—yeah, two n?
Jeff: Yeah. All right, so say it’s two to the seventh.
Ankur: For this, you’ve gotta find all possibilities with—
Brian: Yeah, it’s the order you win, though, too.
Romina: Yeah, I know.

Romina’s suggestion/claim of determining game combinations through listing suggests

that she is considering a combination of brute force and probability ratio as a valid strategy
for solving the World Series Problem (warrant). The other students do not challenge
Romina’s idea. On the contrary, they try to improve or refine her suggestion. Jeff suggests
determining game combinations as 27 to avoid listing. However, Ankur and Brian argue they
cannot determine series-winning game combinations as 2n or 27, because the order of wins
matters for such games.

5.5 Episode 5: “should it be over seven?”

In this episode, Romina asks if the denominator of the probability ratio p(5) should be
“seven” (potential pathway). However, Ankur argues that none of the denominators should
428 J.M. Francisco

be seven (etiquette). Specifically regarding the denominator of p(5), Ankur suggests that it
should be equal to “the total possibilities of two, like two colors and five things” (adding
potential). The students take up Ankur’s idea (collective structure):
Romina: Should it [the probability ratio] be over seven, though?
Ankur: It’d be over, like, total possibilities of—
Jeff: Yeah, the total possibilities is eight, right?
Ankur: They have eight ways of winning but it’d be over—it’d be over—the total
possibilities of two, like two—two colors and five things.
Mike: It should be over—over seven, ’cause it’s four out of seven games.
Ankur: But this one wouldn’t be over seven.
Jeff: It wouldn’t be.
Ankur: It wouldn’t. None of this would be over seven.

By suggesting that the denominators of the probability ratios could be seven

(claim) because it is a best-of-seven series (data), Romina takes the seven possible
games as the sample space (warrant). Yet she fails to realize that the seven games
cannot be equally likely. Ankur challenges Romina’s claim, not the warrant. He does
not point out what is wrong with her thinking. He proposes an alternative idea for
computing the denominators. The expression “two colors and five things” suggests
that Ankur is mapping or building an isomorphism between the World Series Problem
and the Tower Problem. If we make “a red unifix cube” equivalent to “team A wins a
game” and “a yellow cube” equivalent to “team B wins a game,” then the number of
all possible game combinations in the series is equivalent to the number of all possible
towers five cubes tall when choosing from two colors. Ankur is suggesting that the
denominator of p(n) be computed as they determined towers in previous years, i.e., as
2n. The students adopt the idea.
5.6 Episode 6: determining the sample space: “2n or 27?”

Building on Ankur’s isomorphism, Romina asks if the denominator of p(5) should be 25 or

27 (potential pathway). Jeff rejects the idea because he cannot make sense of series-winning
game combinations such as BBBBBBB. He argues that such games “wouldn’t count,”
because the series will have ended by the fourth game (etiquette). Ankur insists that the
denominator of p(4) should be 24 (etiquette). More generally, he insists that the denominator
of the probabilities ratio p(n) should be 2n. The students agree with Ankur (collective
structure):

Romina: Wouldn’t it be over two to the fifth or over two to the seventh?
Jeff: Two to the seventh is 128. But, like B, B, B, B, B—like B seven times
wouldn’t count.
Romina: But, I’m saying for this one, would it be eight over two to the seventh or
two to the fifth? Maybe to the fifth?
Ankur: Well—what’s the first one? Yeah, it’s two over two to the fourth
Jeff: Why is it two to the fourth?
Ankur: Because that’s the total, like—two to the fourth will give you the total
possibilities of four things—You know what I mean? Do you know what
I’m talking about or not?
Jeff: Yeah, it’s got to be over two to the fourth—four spaces.
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 429

Ankur: The total possibilities of A, B—yeah, four spaces.

Jeff: Yeah, all right. It makes sense.
By asking if the denominator of p(5) should be 25 or 27 (claim), Romina entertains the idea of
probability as a proportion (warrant). However, the other students fail to see the merits of the
idea. For instance, Jeff rejects the idea of a sample space of 27 elements based on empirical
grounds: game combinations such as BBBBBBB are not possible, because the series would have
ended in the fourth game. Ankur insists on denominators as 2n. In particular, the statement “total
possibility of A, B—four spaces” (emphasis added) suggests a different justification or warrant
for such a claim based not on isomorphism (as in the previous episode) but rather on combina-
torial reasoning: there are 2n different ways of arranging two objects A and B in four spaces
when order does not matter (see Fig. 1 below, for the number 2 written in every single space).

5.7 Episode 7: a sample space of 27

In this episode, the researcher challenges the students to decide if the probabilities would
change if all seven games were played (potential pathway). Mike and Romina argue that
they would stay the same. Jeff initially claims that they wouldn’t (etiquette). The researcher
insists that they compute the probabilities (potential pathway). Jeff finds that the probabil-
ities stay the same and changes his mind (etiquette). The students agree that the probabilities
stay the same, i.e., the sample space can be 2n:
Researcher: How would you answer the question of winning in four when now you’re
considering 128?
Jeff: He’s [Mike] gonna say that this still counts, that we’re still counting this after here
[indicating the games after four are won], and that’s why it’s out of 128. And then
I could say, well, I’m not counting that—that once you win the four games.
Romina: Both of them make really good sense, though.
Mike: The top number would get higher, too—let’s say this was ten different
possibilities at the end. It would have ten different wins for each possi-
bility—I guess the probability would stay the same.
Researcher: What would it be?
Mike: For this series, it would come up eight times, then this win; all the
probabilities for the first ones would be times eight.
Jeff: Actually, it would be 16 out of 128, because you have to consider the other team
winning. [He and Ankur reduce the fraction, finding it is 1/8.] It’s the same.
Ankur: It is the same.

Fig. 1 The students listed series-

winning game combinations as
strings of As and Bs
430 J.M. Francisco

Jeff: What that basically does is add three more two’s. There will be eight more
different combinations—it still counts as a win. The two turns into eight
for one team and eight for the other team, so it ends up to be 16 out of 128,
and that reduces down to one-eighth, which is right back to when you
started, and that’s why it’s the same. So, the reason that it is the same is
because now that you add the win, it’s proportionally bigger, because you
add these on, but for every one you add on, your wins still just increase
because the games after it don’t matter.
The researcher’s challenge helps the students think of probability ratios in terms of
proportion. Now the students understand that they can use denominators such as 25 or 27.
The probabilities would stay the same because, as Jeff explained, the numerators would get
“proportionally bigger.”

6 Solving the problem

6.1 Episode 8: two troubling questions

In this episode, Romina asks why the probabilities of the series ending in six and seven games in
their solution are the same. Ankur also points out that they have no proof that they have listed all
series-winning game combinations. The students agree that they have no answers to these
questions. However, they go ahead and explain their solution to the researchers:

Romina: Why are [parts] C and D the same? How did you guys get those numbers
[for C and D]? I’m just curious. I hope we can discuss it.
Ankur: Both. Six [game series] and seven [game series] are the same.
Jeff: Six and seven [are the same].
Brian: They’re both the same thing.
Ankur: I don’t know how to explain it.
Jeff: Well, we can explain up to six.
Ankur: But then we’ll be—then we can’t prove that—we have all the possibilities,
you know what I mean?
Jeff: Right.
Romina’s question about parts C and D reflects a collective understanding strengthened
in previous episodes that the odds of winning the series had to get easier with number of
games. This explains why the students were puzzled to find that p(6) 0 p(7). They cannot
explain this finding in this episode.

7 Justifying the solution

7.1 Episode 9: Pascal’s Triangle

In this episode, the researcher challenges the students to prove that they did not
double count when listing favorable outcomes. Suddenly, Mike tells the group that he
discovered a connection between the World Series Problem and Pascal’s Triangle,
whereby the number of ways the series could be won in four, five, six, and seven
games is the same as twice the fourth numbers in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth
rows of Pascal’s Triangle, respectively:
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 431

Researcher: How do you know you’re not double counting?

Jeff: That’s the big question.
Mike: All right, I just found that if you take the fourth number in each one [circles
these entries]—that way, if you double each number, ’cause you have two
teams, you can get the possibilities of four games. Four games, um, equals
two, right? You got eight, 20, and 40, like they said. [see Fig. 2]
Researcher: Mm uhm.
Mike: I don’t know how I’m going to explain it.
Researcher: You’re—you’re doing fine.
Mike: But, um—do you guys see anything?
Jeff: Well, obviously, there’s something going on with the one, four, 10, and 20.
Ankur: Yeah.
In the next episodes, Mike succeeds in explaining the connection after further question-
ing. He brings in other problems to build his rationale or warrant.

7.2 Episode 10: the pizza problem

Picking up from the previous episode, the researcher asks Mike to explain again the
Addition Rule in Pascal’s Triangle in terms of the Pizza Problem, which the students had
worked on in previous years. In response, Mike explains a number of ideas, which are
described after the transcript:
Researcher: Mike, you see that addition of 10, the six and four, or the 20? Why do you
add them together? You had an explanation using pizzas.
Mike: Yeah, I remember. This [row 1 3 3 1] is like a three-topping pizza. There
will be one with plain [zero toppings], three with just one topping, three
with just two toppings, and one with all [three] toppings.
Researcher: Show me the one and the three giving you the four, in pizzas.
Mike: I’m trying to think. I had it last time. All right. You’re going to add a
topping to every single pizza on there, right? There’s going to be twice as
many pizzas. But these three pizzas—three of them got a topping, went
there, and three of them didn’t, went there. ’Cause these three pizzas are
going to turn into six pizzas. Now I got it, right? That’s why they add—
Researcher: Uhm …
Mike: Now with the one, three, three, one [row 1 3 3 1], that circled one is, um, I
guess you win those three games in a row. There’s only one possibility. Now,
your next time you either win a game or you don’t. And that’s how it goes with

Fig. 2 Mike notices a connection

between The World Series
Problem and Pascal’s Triangle
432 J.M. Francisco

that, you know? You know what I’m saying? How many is up there? One plus
three—eight up there? What was our probability? Two out of 16. All right.
Ankur: And that’s one out of eight.
Mike: Yeah, it’s one out of eight. You have a one-out-of-eight possibility of
winning three in a row. I’m saying, the probability of getting—of win-
ning—you have to count the number before it. Like, winning three—let’s
see. It’s confusing. I can see it in my head.
Researcher: Can someone help Mike out? He’s trying to summarize this. He’s sort of
suggesting, gosh, if you follow sort of that path you can get those
probabilities pretty fast, right?
Ankur: Actually, I was going to say that one represents the, like, winning three
games in a row, or like three. And then, if you go to the right, that’s like
getting another A, and there’s only one way to get four A’s. If you go to
the left that’s like getting a B, and that’s like three A’s and a B, and there’s
four different ways you can write that.

Rows as pizzas (first intervention) Mike explains that the numbers 1 3 3 1 represent the
number of pizzas with no topping, one topping, two toppings, and three toppings, respectively.
In other words, he suggests that the numbers on the nth row of Pascal’s Triangle represent the
number of pizzas with zero, one, two, up to n toppings, respectively.

Addition Rule (second intervention) Mike explains that the two threes in 1 3 3 1 add to make
a 6 in the following row, because one can make pizzas with two toppings (when choosing
from four toppings) by adding one topping to pizzas that have one topping or adding no
toppings to pizzas that have two toppings (all made when choosing from the three toppings
group). Since there are three pizzas in each category, they add up to six pizzas.

Doubling Rule (second intervention) Mike explains why the number of pizzas that can be
made doubles when the number of toppings to choose from goes up by one: Pizzas of the
latter group can be made from pizzas of the former group by either adding or not adding the
extra topping (two possibilities for each).

Connection between the World Series Problem and Pascal’s Triangle (third intervention) Mike
explains that the numbers on the row 1 3 3 1 represent the number of ways a team can win
three, two, one, or zero games in the World Series. In general, Mike suggests that the nth row
gives the number of ways a team can win, n, n–1, n–2, n–3, up to 0 games, respectively.

Rows as probabilities (third and fourth interventions) Mike explains that one can get the
probability of a team winning the series in four games by dividing 1, the first number on row
1 3 3 1, by the sum of the numbers, i.e., eight. More generally, Mike suggests that the
probability of a team winning a series ending in four, five, six, and seven games can be
obtained by dividing the first, second, third, and fourth numbers on the third, fourth, and
fifth rows of Pascal’s Triangle by the sum of the numbers on those rows.

7.3 Episode 11: are they equally likely?

To help the students decide which solution is correct (theirs or the graduate students’), the
researcher asks the students if the 70 game combinations in the graduate students’ solution
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 433

are equally likely. The students immediately say that the 70 games are not equally likely and
use it to reject the graduate students’ “solution.” They even communicate this decision to the
graduate students through a written note (Fig. 3):
Researcher: Do you have an opinion whether the 70 are equally likely?
Ankur: They’re not equally likely because one of the 70 is counting on having
Team A winning all four games. And then a seven—one of the 70 could
also be Team A winning four games and losing three games. I don’t know
how to explain it best.
Jeff: That game where Team A wins four but loses three has nothing to do with
Team A winning four in a row. ’Cause if it’s an equal chance to win,
winning four games in a row is much harder than winning—than winning
four games and losing three games. Because that gives you a lot more
room for error, ’cause you could slip up there.
Researcher: What do you guys think?
Romina: I don’t think the 70 is right because we, we considered only, they only
played four games and they won. And I think they’re considering playing
all the games and, like, you can’t keep on going after, like, a person has to
win the first four games in order for ours to be right, like our one-eighth.
Jeff: I think we’re right.
Ankur: Each of these 70 aren’t equally as likely to happen—the probability
[referring to 2/70] means nothing.
Researcher: Michael, you’re nodding. What do you think?
Mike: I don’t know, but if, if that—I don’t know. If that was the case, then, yes,
their probability is faulty.
Jeff summarizes the students’ explanation of why the 70 are not equally likely events by
saying that “winning four games in a row is much harder than winning four games and losing
three.” This makes the students aware of the condition that sample space events must be equally
likely in the classical definition of probability. Mike also admits that the graduate students’
“solution” cannot be correct if the 70 games are not equally likely.

7.4 Episode 12: explaining why p(6)0p(7)

In this episode, Mike explains how he finally came to the conclusion that the probabilities of
series ending in six and seven games can indeed be the same. He subsequently reaches
closure; i.e., he decides which solution is correct: the students’ solution from episode 1:
Mike: You know how it doubles from 20 to 40? I was thinking when you have
six and if you didn’t win at six, what you’re going to have is, like, three
and three. [indicates this with his fists]
Researcher: Mm uhm.

Fig. 3 The students tell the grad-

uate students why their “solution”
is not correct
434 J.M. Francisco

Mike: You’re going to have three wins and three losses, whichever way they are,
that’s how it’s going to be.
Researcher: Got you.
Mike: And—oh, what’s that three choose six? [Robert says, “20.”]
Mike: Well, that’s 20, right? There’s your, like, um, there’s your different
possibilities that you can have those three, right? So, there’s 20 losing,
you know, not-winning-yet possibilities.
Researcher: Ties.
Mike: Yeah, ties, 20 ties. And when you go another game, it can either be a win
for one team or a win for the other. So, that’s why it would be like—
Researcher: The tiebreaker.
Mike: That’s a tiebreaker. You would either have 20 different ways that A would
win or 20 different ways that B would win. And I guess, being that six
choose three and six choose four are the same number—oh, not the same
number, six choose three is the same number that we come up with here—
that’s probably why, it’s why the numbers are—like, the probability or
whatever of you winning in six is the same of, you know, being a tie in
six, and when, the tie, and you go another game, it just doubles.

8 Discussion

8.1 Learning in collective settings

In the episodes above, the students addressed several mathematical challenges as they tried
to solve the World Series Problem. In the earlier episodes, they reevaluated their ideas and
realized that they were not valid for solving the World Series Problem. For example, in
episodes 1, 2, and 3, the students realized that the probability of the series ending in four
games could not be one half, the probability of the series ending in n games could not be
determined by multiplying one half n times, and neither could the probability be computed
by dividing four by n, respectively. In episode 4, the students realized that the number of
series-winning game combinations could not be computed as 25or 27, or even 2n because the
order of the wins matters for such games. In later episodes, however, the students built new,
valid ideas to deal with the challenges often from hints implicit in the challenges. For
instance, in episodes 9 and 10, they built a connection between the World Series Problem
and Pascal’s Triangle and isomorphisms between the problem and the tower and pizza
problems. As a result, they were able to justify that they had not missed any series-winning
game combination in their listings. In episode 12, Mike built a convincing explanation why
the probabilities of the series ending in six and seven games could be the same. All this
supports the claim that collaborative activity can help promote students’ mathematical
understanding by creating opportunities for students to reexamine the validity of their
reasoning and build new, more sophisticated forms of reasoning from suggested hints.
In the episodes above, the students rejected or accepted suggested ideas for solving the
World Series Problem depending on whether the ideas made or did not make sense to them.
In episode 3, the students rejected Mike’s suggestion that p(n) was 4/n because it implied
that p(4) was 100 %. They found the suggestion counterintuitive, since they knew that the
series could also be won in five, six, or seven games. In episode 2, Romina rejected Brian’s
multiplicative strategy because it meant that the odds of winning the series got harder the
more games were played. The students believed that the odds had to get easier. In episode 8,
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 435

Romina insisted on knowing why the probabilities of the series ending in six and seven
games were the same in their solution. Ankur also pointed out that they could not prove that
they had listed all of the series-winning game combinations. In episode 12, Mike discarded
the graduate students’ “solution” only after he was able to explain why the probabilities of
the series ending in six and seven were the same. These episodes show that the students’
commitment to mathematics as a sense-making activity was crucial in helping them suc-
cessfully solve the World Series Problem. Since sense making is a sociomathematical norm
(Yackel & Cobb, 1996) that was emphasized in the longitudinal study (e.g., the students
were asked to always justify their ideas to each other), the episodes suggest that the culture
of “doing” mathematics in the longitudinal study helped promote the students’ mathematical
understanding.
In several episodes above, the students showed an ability to come up with several ideas,
correct or not, to approach the World Series Problem. This is consistent with findings that
suggest that probability is an area of mathematics where students are likely to interpret tasks in
several different ways (Boero & Guala, 2008). Also, among the incorrect ideas are common
misconceptions in probability. For instance, in episode 11, the students failed to attend to the
condition that events must be equally likely in the classical definition of the probability ratio.
This prevented the students from seeing that the graduate students’ “solution” could not be
correct. Failure to attend to such a condition is a common misconception among teachers
(Boero & Guala, 2008) and students (Shaughnessy, 2003). The students in this study also
struggled through several episodes to decide on the denominators of the probability ratios
(seven, 25, or 27?). This is an example of students’ difficulty in determining sample spaces
(Shaughnessy, 2003). All this provides further support to the idea that probability is a rich
domain for studying (learning in) collaborative activity. The variety of interpretations common
to probability tasks increases the groups’ potential to solve problems. However, it also enriches
discussions as a result of students’ attempts to make sense of each other’s ideas.
In several episodes above, the students’ collective behavior resembled coactions (Martin
et al., 2006), i.e., members of a collective working jointly together on the same idea. For
instance, in early episodes, the students worked jointly together to evaluate a suggested idea
for solving the World Series Problem. In later episodes, they joined Mike in trying to come
up with an explanation why Pascal’s Triangle could be used to solve the World Series
Problem. Nevertheless, there were also episodes in which the students’ collective behavior
resembled interactions, i.e., members of a collective working independently on their ideas,
which later complemented the collective’s efforts to solve the problem. Mike’s discovery of
the connection between the World Series Problem and Pascal’s Triangle is one such
example. He made the discovery while working independently in the group. The idea,
however, was later used by the students as a collective to try to justify that they had listed
all of the favorable outcomes. It complemented the collective’s work. The third session on
the World Series Problem is another example. In the previous two sessions, the students were
so strongly invested in their own solution that they were not prepared to hear Mike’s
different ideas, particularly his ambivalence regarding which of the two solutions (the high
school students’ or the graduate students’ solution) was correct and also his reluctance to
reject the graduate students’ “solution” unless they could explain why the probability of the
series ending in six and seven games could be reasonably the same. So, the third session
provided Mike with an opportunity to explore separately his ideas, raised earlier in the
group. It created a situation of interaction in the sense defined above. The move paid off.
Mike was able to eventually explain why the probabilities of the series ending in six and
seven games could be the same, and this helped the group reach closure on which solution
was correct. All this suggests that, in collaborative activity, interactions can be as crucial in
436 J.M. Francisco

promoting (collective) mathematical understanding as coactions. Coactions may enhance the

process of making the understanding of an idea collective or shared (Martin et al., 2006).
However, interactions can enhance the discovery of ideas, as they allow for more room for
individual ways of thinking than joint coactions.
In several episodes above, the researcher posed the challenges that the students had to
address and on which they built to come up with ideas about how to solve the World Series
Problem. In episode 9, the researcher challenged the students to prove that they had not
double counted in their listings of series-winning game combinations. This led to the
students’ discovery of the connection between the World Series Problem and Pascal’s
Triangle. In episode 11, the researcher challenged the students to consider if the 70 outcomes
in the graduate students’ “solution” were equally likely. This allowed the students to
articulate a valid argument for rejecting the graduate students’ “solution.” In episode 12,
the researcher insisted that Mike consider why the probabilities of the series ending in six
and seven games could be the same before using the finding to reject the graduate students’
solution. Subsequently, Mike produced a valid explanation for the finding. The episodes
show that the researcher played a key role in promoting the students’ mathematical under-
standing in the World Series Problem. In particular, they shows that outside experts can help
promote students’ mathematical understanding in collaborative settings. This is an example
of experts helping promote students’ mathematical learning through the ZPD (Vygotsky,
1978).

8.2 Implications for practice

Some implications for teaching can be drawn from this study. The idea that researchers can
influence students’ building of mathematical understanding in collective activity suggests
that, as experts in the classroom, teachers may need to avoid seeing themselves as outsiders
in students’ group work. Just asking students to work in groups may not be enough. Teachers
may need to find ways to facilitate the group’s mathematical discourse without taking away
the students’ initiative and ownership of the mathematical activity. The suggestion that the
particular conditions in which the students engage in mathematical activity may influence
their collective activity suggests that teachers also need to pay more attention to the culture
of “doing” mathematics that they may be promoting in their mathematics classrooms. This
can be the difference between students developing positive or negative views and disposi-
tions toward mathematics, which can have a positive or negative effect on their achievement.
Teachers may want to remember that they do not only teach content in mathematics class-
rooms. They also convey ways of construing and engaging in the mathematical activity,
which may hinder or help promote students’ mathematical learning.

8.3 Future research

This study suggests a few ideas for future research. First, if experts play a key role in
collaborative activity, then maybe more research is needed on how they can do so. Facili-
tating learning in one-on-one settings does not seem to be the same as in group settings. Yet,
while a lot is known about the former, not as much seems to be known about the latter.
Second, collaborative work is a complex process, wherein several variables interact simul-
taneously. Capturing such complexity is an ongoing challenge for researchers, requiring
creative theoretical frameworks that can best account for the intended level of complexity.
This study relied on several theories, including more recent ones such as improvisation
theories borrowed from other fields. However, other frameworks could be considered,
Learning mathematics in collaborative settings 437

depending on the purpose of the research. Third, it seems that more research is needed on the
concept of collective mathematical understanding, the collective structure that emerges in
collaborative work. Specifically, more is needed on the conditions that contribute to the
emergence of mathematically valid collective structure. The goal of collective activity is not
only to promote common or shared forms of understanding but also valid forms. The rules of
improvisation and coactions may determine the extent to which an idea is collective or not.
However, they may not say much about how valid collective structures emerge in collective
settings.

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