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WILLS
3-‐D
2016
DIGEST
GROUP
(FIRST
BATCH)
INHERITANCE
RATIO:
NO.
Respondent
Japitana
has
no
cause
of
action
against
petitioner
Nacar.
A
cause
of
action
is
an
act
or
omission
of
one
Case
No.
1
party
in
violation
of
the
legal
right
of
the
other.
Its
essential
Nicanor
Nacar
(Petitioner)
vs.
Claudio
Nistal,
Municipal
Judge,
elements
are,
namely:
(1)
the
existence
of
a
legal
right
in
the
Agusan
del
Sur;
Provincial
Sheriff
of
Agusan
del
Sur,
Ildefonso
plaintiff,
(2)
a
correlative
legal
duty
in
the
defendant,
and
(3)
an
Japitana,
and
Antonio
Doloricon
(Respondents)
act
or
omission
of
the
defendant
in
violation
of
plaintiff's
right
G.R.
No.
L-‐33006
with
consequential
injury
or
damage
to
the
plaintiff
for
which
he
December
8,
1982
may
maintain
an
action
for
the
recovery
of
damages
or
other
GUTIERREZ,
JR.,
J.
appropriate
relief.
FACTS:
Sometime
in
1968
Petitioner’s
stepfather,
Isabelo
Nacar,
Indeed,
although
respondent
Japitana
may
have
a
legal
right
to
incurred
an
indebtedness
against
the
Respondent
amounting
to
recover
an
indebtedness
due
him,
petitioner
Nicanor
Nacar
has
no
P2,791.00.
Despite
repeated
demands
by
the
respondent,
Isabelo
correlative
legal
duty
to
pay
the
debt
for
the
simple
reason
that
was
not
able
to
pay.
Thus,
prompting
the
respondent
to
file
a
civil
there
is
nothing
in
the
complaint
to
show
that
he
incurred
the
debt
action
for
the
collection
of
money
against
Isabelo.
In
the
year
or
had
anything
to
do
with
the
creation
of
the
liability.
As
far
as
the
1970,
Isabelo
died.
Respondent
then
filed
a
complaint
in
Civil
Case
debt
is
concerned,
there
is
no
allegation
or
showing
that
the
and
entitled
it
"Claim
Against
the
Estate
Nicanor
Nacar
the
Late
petitioner
had
acted
in
violation
of
Mr.
Japitana's
rights
with
Isabelo
Nacar
With
Preliminary
Attachment".
consequential
injury
or
damage
to
the
latter
as
would
create
a
cause
of
action
against
the
former.
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss,
to
dissolve
writ
of
preliminary
attachment,
and
to
order
the
return
of
the
carabaos.
In
his
motion
The
carabaos,
if
really
owned
by
Isabelo
Nacar,
pertained
to
his
to
dismiss,
the
petitioner
raised
the
issue
of
lack
of
jurisdiction
and
estate
upon
his
death.
The
claim
of
the
private
respondents
may
absence
of
a
cause
of
action.
Mr.
Nacar
averred
that
the
only
be
satisfied
by
a
voluntary
act
on
the
part
of
the
heirs
of
indebtedness
mentioned
in
the
complaint
was
alleged
to
have
Isabelo
Nacar,
or
pursued
in
the
appropriate
settlement
been
incurred
by
the
late
Isabelo
Nacar
and
not
by
Nicanor
Nacar.
proceedings.
A
municipal
court
may
not
entertain
such
a
There
was,
therefore,
no
cause
of
action
against
him.
proceeding,
it
not
being
vested,
under
the
law
then
in
force,
with
probate
jurisdiction.
Private
respondent
Japitana
filed
an
opposition
to
this
motion
while
intervenor
Antonio
Doloricon
filed
a
complaint
in
intervention
asserting
that
he
was
the
owner
of
the
attached
carabaos
and
that
the
certificates
of
ownership
of
large
cattle
were
in
his
name.
The
respondent
Judge
denied
the
motion
to
dismiss.
Hence
this
instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
a
complaint
against
an
heir
of
a
decedent,
who
incurred
the
indebtedness,
is
the
correct
action
for
the
collection
of
money.
Case
No.
2
belonging
to
the
estate
had
been
made.
because
it
was
perishable
Dora
Perkins
Anderson
(Petitioner-‐Appellee)
vs.
Idonah
Slade
in
nature.
Perkins
(Oppositor-‐Appellant)
GR
L-‐15388
Lower
court’s
decision:
The
lower
court
approved
the
proposed
January
31,
1961
sale
and
also
authorized
the
Sheriff
of
Manila
to
conduct
the
same.
REYES,
J.B.L.,
J.
Despite
of
the
defendant’s
Motion
for
Reconsideration,
the
lower
court
denies
such
MR.
(Motion
for
Reconsideration)
FACTS:
On
May
10,
1956,
Dora
Perkins
Anderson
filed
a
petition
for
the
probate
of
the
supposed
last
will
and
testament
of
the
late
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
special
administrator
may
sell
the
Eugene
Arthur
Perkins
who
allegedly
possessed
of
personal
and
properties
of
the
late
Eugene
Arthur
Perkins
real
properties
with
a
probate
value
of
P5,000.00
and
Dora
also
filed
an
urgent
petition
for
the
estate.
On
the
same
day,
the
court
RATIO:
NO.
The
Supreme
Court
held
that
the
special
issued
an
order
appointing
Alfonso
Ponce
Enrile
as
special
administrator
can
not
sell
the
property
of
the
late
Arthur
Perkins.
administrator.
It
is
true
that
the
function
of
a
special
administrator
is
only
to
collect
and
preserve
the
property
of
the
deceased
until
a
regular
Idonah
Slade
Perkins,
surviving
spouse
of
the
deceased,
opposed
administrator
is
appointed.
Both
the
estate
and
and
its
value
to
the
said
probate
and
the
special
administrator
submitted
an
should
be
preserved.
inventory
of
the
assets
of
the
deceased
at
the
time
of
his
death.
Records
show
that
up
to
the
time
the
proposed
sale
was
asked
for
Two
years
later,
the
special
administrator
submitted
to
the
court
a
and
judicially
approved,
no
proceeding
has
yet
been
taken
or
even
petition
seeking
authority
to
sell
or
give
away
to
some
charitable
started,
to
segregate
the
alleged
exclusive
property
of
the
institution/s
certain
personal
properties.
Court
required
the
defendant
from
the
mass
of
the
estate
supposedly
left
by
the
administrator
to
submit
an
inventory
of
the
properties
and
thus,
deceased
or
to
liquidate
the
conjugal
partnership
property.
he
likewise
submitted
it.
Idonah
Perkins
opposed
to
the
said
proposed
sale.
It
does
not
appear
that
defendant
was
given
a
reasonable
opportunity
to
point
out
in
which
items
in
the
inventory
she
did
Plaintiff’s
contention:
The
special
administrator
has
the
not
want
to
sold.
Also,
it
did
not
even
show
that
an
inquiry
was
authority
to
sell
the
properties
of
the
late
Eugene
Arthur
Perkins.
made
as
to
the
validity
of
the
grounds
of
her
opposition.
Lower
That
the
special
administrator
claims
that
oppositor/defendant
court’s
decision
was
set
aside
and
with
costs
against
the
special
should
allege
on
the
properties
which
she
did
not
want
to
sell
and
administrator.
that
her
refusal
to
do
so
is
an
indication
of
her
unmeritorious
claim.
Defendant’s
contention:
Idorah
Perkins
contention
was
that
the
special
administrator
has
no
legal
authority
to
sell
the
properties
because
it
was
perishable
in
nature.
That
such
properties
sought
to
be
sold
were
conjugal
properties
of
herself
and
her
deceased
husband
and
the
unauthorized
removal
of
fine
pieces
of
furniture
RIGHTS
TO
THE
SUCCESSION
ARE
and
petitioners
are
barred
by
prescription/laches.
The
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
the
petitioners.
TRANSMITTED
FROM
THE
MOMENT
OF
DEATH
CA
reversed
the
ruling
of
the
RTC
stating
that
there
was
a
valid
oral
partition
of
the
lot
wherein
the
questioned
Lot
No.
1-‐A-‐14
is
a
Case
No.
3
part
thereof
and
such
lot
was
owned
by
Rafael
Reyes
Sr
and
validly
Maria
Vda.
De
Reyes
et
al.
(Petitioner)
vs.
CA
and
Sps.
sold
to
Gardiola.
Dalmacio
Gardiola
(Respondents)
GR
No.
92436
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Rafael
Reyes
Jr.’s
successors-‐in-‐interest
is
July
26,
1991
the
lawful
owner
of
Lot
No.
1-‐A-‐14.
Davide,
Jr.,
J.
RATIO:
NO.
According
to
the
Supreme
Court,
the
rights
to
the
FACTS:
Gavino
Reyes
was
the
owner
of
a
more
or
less
70
hectares
succession
are
transmitted
from
the
moment
of
death
of
the
parcel
of
land
located
in
Sangayad,
Ulong-‐Tubig,
Carmona
Cavite.
decedent.
Rafael
Reyes
Jr.
never
became
the
owner
of
Lot
No.
1-‐A-‐
When
he
died
in
1921,
the
said
land
was
never
been
registered
14
because
it
was
sold
by
his
father,
Rafael
Reyes
Sr.
during
his
under
Torrens
System.
Gavino’s
son,
Marcelo
Reyes
became
the
lifetime.
An
extrajudicial
settlement
does
not
create
a
right
in
administrator
of
the
said
land
and
applied
for
registration.
When
favor
of
an
heir.
Petitioners,
as
mere
successors-‐in-‐interest
of
the
lot
was
surveyed
and
subdivided
by
the
heirs
of
Gavino.
Few
Rafael
Reyes,
Jr.,
the
son
of
Rafael
Reyes,
Sr.,
can
only
acquire
that
years
after,
Rafael
Reyes,
Sr.
another
son
of
Gavino
sold
a
parcel
of
which
Rafael,
Jr.
could
transmit
to
them
upon
his
death.
land
with
an
area
of
23,431
square
meters
to
the
private
respondents,
Gardiola.
However,
the
said
land
with
Lot
No.
1-‐A-‐14
was
never
been
indicated
in
the
deed
of
sale.
After
the
fulfillment
of
the
sale,
private
respondents
immediately
took
possession
of
the
property
and
started
paying
the
land
taxes.
On
October
21,
1967,
the
heirs
of
Gavino
Reyes
executed
a
Deed
of
Extrajudicial
Settlement
of
Estate.
Rafael
Reyes
Sr.
and
Marta
Reyes,
children
of
Gavino
both
deceased,
represented
by
their
children
Rafael
Reyes,
Jr
only
son
of
Rafael
Reyes
Sr.
and
Rosario
Martillano
for
Marta
Reyes.
This
was
the
time
when
Rafael
Reyes,
Jr.
discovered
that
they
are
the
lawful
owner
of
Lot
No.
1-‐A-‐14.
Rafael
Jr.
filed
a
case
against
the
private
respondent
for
recovery
of
possession
or
in
the
alternative,
for
indemnification,
accounting
and
damages.
Private
respondents
deny
the
material
averments
in
the
complaint
and
assert
that
they
are
the
lawful
owner
of
the
lot
in
question,
which
they
bought
the
same
lot
from
Rafael
Reyes
Sr.
and
such
sale
was
known
to
Rafael
Reyes
Jr.
that
they
have
been
in
possession
of
the
property
and
have
been
paying
the
land
taxes
Case
No.
4
ground
of
failure
to
prosecute.
However
it
was
subsequently
lifted
Danilo
I.
Suarez,
et
al.
(Petitioners)
vs.
CA,
et
al.
by
the
same
court.
The
Court
of
Appeals
then
granted
Raymundo's
(Respondents)
appeal
seeking
to
annul
the
order
of
the
lower
court.
Hence,
this
G.R.
No.
94918
appeal.
September
2,
1992
Nocon,
J.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
respondents
can
validly
acquire
all
the
five
(5)
parcels
of
land
co-‐owned
by
petitioners
and
registered
in
the
FACTS:
In
1995,
petitioners’
father
died
and
since
then
his
estate
name
of
petitioners'
deceased
father,
Marcelo
Suarez.
consisting
of
several
valuable
parcels
of
land
in
Pasig,
Metro
Manila
has
lot
been
liquidated
or
partitioned.
In
1977,
petitioners'
RATIO:
NO.
Only
one-‐half
of
the
5
parcels
of
land
should
have
widowed
mother
and
Rizal
Realty
Corporation
lost
in
the
been
the
subject
of
the
auction
sale.
The
legitime
of
the
surviving
consolidated
cases
for
rescission
of
contract
and
for
damages,
and
spouse
is
equal
to
the
legitime
of
each
child.
The
proprietary
were
ordered
by
RTC
of
Pasig
to
pay,
jointly
and
severally,
herein
interest
of
petitioners
in
the
levied
and
auctioned
property
is
respondents
the
aggregate
principal
amount
of
about
P70,000
as
different
from
and
adverse
to
that
of
their
mother.
Petitioners
damages.
became
co-‐owners
of
the
property
not
because
of
their
mother
but
through
their
own
right
as
children
of
their
deceased
father.
The
judgment
against
petitioners'
mother
and
Rizal
Realty
Therefore,
petitioners
are
not
barred
in
any
way
from
instituting
Corporation
having
become
final
and
executory,
five
(5)
valuable
the
action
to
annul
the
auction
sale
to
protect
their
own
interest.
parcel
of
land
in
Pasig,
Metro
Manila,
were
levied
and
sold
on
execution
in
favor
of
the
Private
respondents
Raymundo
as
the
NOTES:
highest
bidder.
Article
777:
“The
law
applicable
at
the
time
of
the
institution
of
the
Private
respondents
were
then
issued
a
certificate
of
sale
which
case.
"The
rights
to
the
succession
are
transmitted
from
the
was
subsequently
registered.
Before
the
expiration
of
the
moment
of
the
death
of
the
decedent."
redemption
period,
petitioners
filed
a
reinvindicatory
action
alleging,
among
others,
that
being
strangers
to
the
case
decided
Article
888:
"The
legitime
of
the
legitimate
children
and
against
their
mother,
they
cannot
be
held
liable
therefor
and
that
descendants
consists
of
one-‐half
of
the
hereditary
estate
of
the
the
five
(5)
parcels
of
land,
of
which
they
are
co-‐owners,
can
father
and
of
the
mother.
The
latter
may
freely
dispose
of
the
neither
be
levied
nor
sold
on
execution.
The
Provincial
Sheriff
of
remaining
half,
subject
to
the
rights
of
illegitimate
children
and
of
Rizal
issued
to
private
respondents
a
final
deed
of
sale
over
the
the
surviving
spouse
as
hereinafter
provided."
properties.
Article
892,
par.
2:
"If
there
are
two
or
more
legitimate
children
or
A
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
was
issued
enjoining
private
descendants,
the
surviving
spouse
shall
be
entitled
to
a
portion
respondents
from
transferring
to
third
parties
the
levied
parcels
of
equal
to
the
legitime
of
each
of
the
legitimate
children
or
land
based
on
the
finding
that
the
auctioned
lands
are
co-‐owned
descendants."
by
petitioners.
The
RTC
granted
the
respondent's
motion
to
dismiss
on
the
INTESTATE
Petitioner
on
the
other
hand,
interpose
a
defense
that
the
real
Case
No.
5
intent
of
the
parties
was
to
make
the
entire
lot
the
subject
matter
Nelia
A.
Constantino
(Petitioner)
vs.
CA,
Aurora
S.
Roque,
of
the
sale.
Priscilla
S.
Luna,
and
Josefina
S.
Austria
(Respondents)
G.R.
No.
116018
RTC:
Annul
and
cancel
the
Deed
of
Extrajudicial
Settlement
of
November
13,
1996
Estate
with
Sale
and
Subdivision
Plan.
Bellosillo,
J.
CA:
Sustained.
FACTS:
Josefa
Torres
died
intestate
leaving
a
parcel
of
land
located
at
Balagtas,
Bulacan.
In
1984,
the
heirs
(respondents
in
this
case)
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
Extrajudicial
Settlement
of
Estate
with
and
respondents,
entered
into
a
contract
to
sell
a
parcel
of
land
Sale
is
valid.
with
a
total
land
area
of
250
sq./m
and
pursuant
to
their
agreement,
the
heirs
authorized
petitioner
to
prepare
the
RATIO:
NO.
When
respondents
affixed
their
signatures
on
the
necessary
Deed
of
Extrajudicial
Settlement
of
Estate
with
Sale.
deed,
it
was
still
incomplete
since
petitioner
who
caused
it
to
be
prepared
left
the
spaces
as
regards
the
dimensions
of
the
property
After
having
the
document
drafted
—
with
several
spaces
left
to
be
sold
blank
and
that
the
heirs
were
persuaded
to
sign
the
blank
including
the
specification
as
to
the
metes
and
bounds
of
the
document
only
upon
the
assurance
of
petitioner
that
respondent
land
—
petitioner
asked
the
heirs
to
affix
their
signatures
on
the
Roque,
would
be
present
when
the
property
would
be
surveyed.
document
which
the
heirs
signed
with
the
understanding
that
As
it
surfaced,
the
supposed
understanding
was
merely
a
ruse
of
respondent
Roque,
would
be
present
when
the
latter
would
seek
petitioner
to
induce
respondents
to
sign
the
deed.
Apparently,
permission
from
the
Bureau
of
Lands
and
have
the
land
surveyed.
petitioner
deceived
respondents
by
filling
the
blank
spaces,
having
the
lots
surveyed
and
subdivided,
and
then
causing
the
issuance
of
However,
without
the
participation
of
any
of
the
Torres
heirs,
the
transfer
certificates
of
title
without
their
knowledge,
much
less
property
was
subsequently
surveyed,
subdivided
and
2
TCTs
were
consent.
issued.
When
respondent
was
able
to
secure
a
copy
of
the
deed,
they
learned
that
the
area
of
the
property
purportedly
sold
to
NOTES:
petitioner
was
much
bigger
than
that
agreed
upon
by
the
parties.
[This
case
is
primarily
about
the
validity
of
the
contract.
However,
Respondents
then
sent
a
letter
to
petitioner
demanding
the
this
is
listed
under
the
topic
of
Intestate.
Perhaps,
Atty.
wanted
this
surrender
to
them
of
the
deed
of
settlement
and
conveyance,
the
case
to
be
an
example
of
the
definition
of
intestate.]
subdivision
plan
and
the
certificates
of
title;
but
to
no
avail.
This
prompted
the
respondents
to
file
with
the
RTC
an
action
for
Intestate
–
is
a
decedent
who
left
no
will.
annulment
of
the
deed
and
cancellation
of
the
certificates
of
title
interposing
that
all
the
heirs
signed
the
document
before
the
land
Settlement
of
an
estate
need
not
undergo
judicial
proceedings
all
the
was
surveyed
and
subdivided,
hence,
there
was
yet
no
definite
time.
Rule
74,
Section
1
of
the
Rules
of
Court
allows
the
extrajudicial
area
to
be
sold
that
could
be
indicated
in
the
deed
at
the
time
of
settlement
of
estate
by
agreement
among
the
heirs.
the
signing.
Sec.
1.
Extrajudicial
settlement
by
agreement
between
heirs.
–
If
the
decedent
left
no
will
and
no
debts
and
the
heirs
are
all
of
age,
or
the
minors
are
represented
by
their
judicial
or
legal
representatives
duly
authorized
for
the
purpose,
the
parties
may,
without
securing
letters
of
administration,
divide
the
estate
among
themselves
as
they
see
fit
by
means
of
a
public
instrument
filed
in
the
office
of
the
register
of
deeds,
and
should
they
disagree,
they
may
do
so
in
an
ordinary
action
of
partition.
If
there
is
only
one
heir,
he
may
adjudicate
to
himself
the
entire
estate
by
means
of
an
affidavit
filed
in
the
office
of
the
register
of
deeds
HEIRS
the
respondent
court
should
have
proceeded
with
the
trial
and
simultaneously
resolved
the
issue
of
heirship
in
the
same
case.
Case
No.
6
Heirs
of
Guido
and
Isabel
Yaptinchay
(Petitioners)
vs.
Court
of
ISSUE:
Should
the
respondent
court
have
proceed
with
the
trial
Appeals
et
al.
(Respondents)
and
simultaneously
resolve
the
issue
of
heirship
in
the
same
case?
G.R.
No.
124320
March
2,
1999
RATIO:
NO.
The
Court
ruled
that
the
trial
court
cannot
make
a
Purisima,
J.
declaration
of
heirship
in
the
civil
action
for
the
reason
that
such
a
declaration
can
only
be
made
in
a
special
proceeding.
FACTS:
Petitioners
are
the
legal
heirs
of
the
late
Guido
and
Isabel
Yaptinchay,
the
owners-‐claimants
of
Lot
No.
1131
situated
in
Under
Section
3,
Rule
1
of
the
1997
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
a
civil
Bancal,
Carmona,
Cavite.
Petitioners
discovered
that
a
portion,
if
action
is
defined
as
"one
by
which
a
party
sues
another
for
the
not
all,
of
the
aforesaid
properties
were
titled
in
the
name
of
enforcement
or
protection
of
a
right,
or
the
prevention
or
respondent
Golden
Bay
Realty
and
Development
Corporation
redress
of
a
wrong"
while
a
special
proceeding
is
"a
remedy
by
(GoldenBay)
under
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
Nos.
225254
and
which
a
party
seeks
to
establish
a
status,
a
right,
or
particular
fact."
225255.
The
Court
held
that
the
declaration
of
heirship
can
be
made
only
in
They
filed
a
complaint
for
annulment
and/or
declaration
of
nullity
a
special
proceeding
inasmuch
as
the
petitioners
in
the
case
at
bar
of
TCT
Nos.
493363-‐67
and
its
derivatives
and
as
alternative
are
seeking
the
establishment
of
a
status
or
right.
reconveyance
of
realty
with
prayer
for
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
and/or
restraining
order
with
damages
with
the
In
Litam,
etc.,
et
al.
vs.
Rivera,
this
court
opined
that
the
Regional
Trial
Court
in
Imus,
Cavite.
declaration
of
heirship
must
be
made
in
an
administration
proceeding,
and
not
in
an
independent
civil
action.
This
doctrine
Private
respondents
presented
a
motion
to
dismiss
on
the
grounds
was
reiterated
in
Solivio
vs.
Court
of
Appeals,
where
the
court
held:
that
the
complaint
failed
to
state
a
cause
of
action
and
that
petitioners
did
not
have
a
right
of
action,
that
they
have
not
"In
Litam,
et
al.
vs.
Rivera,
100
Phil.
364,
where
despite
the
established
their
status
as
heirs
and
that
the
land
being
claimed
is
pendency
of
the
special
proceedings
for
the
different
from
that
of
the
private
respondents.
The
said
motion
to
settlement
of
the
intestate
estate
of
the
deceased
Rafael
dismiss
was
granted
by
the
respondent
court
holding
that
Litam,
the
plaintiffs-‐appellants
filed
a
civil
action
in
which
petitioners
have
not
shown
any
proof
or
even
a
semblance
of
it
they
claimed
that
they
were
the
children
by
a
previous
except
the
allegations
that
they
are
the
legal
heirs
of
the
deceased
marriage
of
the
deceased
to
a
Chinese
woman,
hence,
couple.
entitled
to
inherit
his
one-‐half
share
of
the
conjugal
properties
acquired
during
his
marriage
to
Marcosa
Rivera,
Petitioners
interposed
a
motion
for
reconsideration
but
it
was
the
trial
court
in
the
civil
case
declared
that
the
plaintiffs-‐
denied.
Hence,
the
present
petition.
Petitioners
contended
that
the
appellants
were
not
children
of
the
deceased,
that
the
respondent
court
acted
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
in
ruling
properties
in
question
were
paraphernal
properties
of
his
that
the
issue
of
heirship
should
first
be
determined
before
the
wife,
Marcosa
Rivera,
and
that
the
latter
was
his
only
heir.
trial
of
the
case
could
proceed.
It
is
petitioners'
submission
that
On
appeal
to
this
Court,
we
ruled
that
'such
declarations
(that
Marcosa
Rivera
was
the
only
heir
of
the
decedent)
is
improper,
in
Civil
Case
No.
2071,
it
being
within
the
exclusive
competence
of
the
court
in
Special
Proceedings
No.
1537,
in
which
it
is
not
as
yet,
in
issue,
and,
will
not
be,
ordinarily,
in
issue
until
the
presentation
of
the
project
of
partition.'
(p.
378)."
The
trial
court
cannot
make
a
declaration
of
heirship
in
the
civil
action
for
the
reason
that
such
a
declaration
can
only
be
made
in
a
special
proceeding.
Under
Section
3,
Rule
1
of
the
1997
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
a
civil
action
is
defined
as
"one
by
which
a
party
sues
another
for
the
enforcement
or
protection
of
a
right,
or
the
prevention
or
redress
of
a
wrong"
while
a
special
proceeding
is
"a
remedy
by
which
a
party
seeks
to
establish
a
status,
a
right,
or
a
particular
fact."
It
is
then
decisively
clear
that
the
declaration
ofheirship
can
be
made
only
in
a
special
proceeding
inasmuch
as
the
petitioners
here
are
seeking
the
establishment
of
a
status
or
right.
NOTES:
Intestate
–
the
description
of
a
person
who
dies
without
making
a
valid
will
“The
trial
court
cannot
make
a
declaration
of
heirship
in
the
civil
action
for
the
reason
that
such
a
declaration
can
only
be
made
in
a
special
proceeding.
Under
Section
3,
Rule
1
of
the
1997
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
a
civil
action
is
defined
as
"one
by
which
a
party
sues
another
for
the
enforcement
or
protection
of
a
right,
or
the
prevention
or
redress
of
a
wrong"
while
a
special
proceeding
is
"a
remedy
by
which
a
party
seeks
to
establish
a
status,
a
right,
or
a
particular
fact."
Case
No.
7
LOWER
COURT:
Ruled
in
favor
of
petitioner
Raymundo.
Issued
an
Valente
Raymundo
(Petitioner)
vs.
Teofista
Isagon
Vda.
De
Order
directing
Teofista:
(1)
to
vacate
the
subject
properties,
(2)
Suarez
,
Danilo
I.
Suarez,
Eufrocina
Suarez,
Marcelo
I.
Suarez,
to
desist
from
despoiling,
dismantling,
removing
or
alienating
the
Jr.,
Evelyn
Suarez,
et
al.
(Respondents)
improvements
thereon,
and
(4)
to
surrender
to
them
the
owners’s
G.R.
No.
149017
duplicate
copy
of
the
torrens
title
and
other
pertinent
documents.
November
28,
2008
Nachura,
J.
Undaunted,
Teofista
and
herein
respondents
filed
a
petition
for
certiorari
before
the
CA
to
annul
the
foregoing
orders.
FACTS:
Marcelo
and
Teofista
Isagon
Suarez’
marriage
was
blessed
with
both
material
wealth
and
progeny
in
herein
respondents,
COURT
OF
APPEALS:
dismissed
Teofista’s
and
herein
namely,
Danilo,
Eufrocina,
Marcelo
Jr.,
Evelyn,
and
Reggineo,
all
respondents’
petition.
surnamed
Suarez.
During
their
marriage,
governed
by
the
conjugal
partnership
of
gains
regime,
they
acquired
numerous
properties.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
respondents
must
first
be
declared
heirs
of
Marcelo
Sr.
before
they
can
file
action
to
annul
the
judicial
sale
of
In
1955,
Marcelo
Sr.
died,
and
Teofista,
herein
respondents,
as
well
what
is
the
conjugal
property
of
Teofista
and
Marcelo,
Sr.
as
Elpidio
Suarez,
executed
an
Extrajudicial
Settlement
of
Estate,
partitioning
Marcelo
Sr.’s
estate.
Curiously,
despite
the
partition,
RATIO:
NO,
it
is
no
longer
needed.
SC
reversed
the
decision
of
RTC
title
to
the
foregoing
properties,
explicitly
identified
in
the
and
Court
of
Appeals.
Extrajudicial
Settlement
of
Estate
as
forming
part
of
Marcelo’s
and
Isagon’s
property
regime,
remained
in
the
couple’s
name.
In
Heirs
of
Yaptichay,
the
complaint
for
annulment
and/or
declaration
of
nullity
of
certain
TCT’s
was
dismissed
for
failure
of
In
1975,
Rizal
Realty
Corporation
(Rizal
Realty)
and
Teofista,
were
the
petitioners
to
demonstrate
“any
proof
or
even
a
semblance
of
sued
by
petitioner
Valente
Raymundo,
his
wife
Violeta,
and
it”
that
they
had
been
declaredthe
legal
heirs
of
the
deceased
Virginia
Banta
and
Maria
Concepcion
Vito
in
consolidated
cases
for
couple,
the
spouses
Yaptinchay.
Rescission
of
Contract
and
Damages,
docketed
as
Civil
Case
Nos.
21736
to
21739.
In
stark
contrast,
the
records
of
this
case
reveal
a
document,
an
Extrajudicial
Settlement
of
Marcelo
Sr.’s
estate,
which
Petitioner’s
contention:
Petitioner
Valente
insists
that,
following
explicitlyrecognizes
herein
respondentsas
Marcelo
Sr.’s
legitimate
our
ruling
in
Heirs
of
Yaptinchay
v.
Del
Rosario,
herein
respondents
children
and
heirs.
The
same
document
settles
and
partitions
the
must
first
be
declared
heirs
of
Marcelo
Sr.
before
they
can
file
an
estate
of
Marcelo
Sr.
specifying
Teofista’s
paraphernal
properties,
action
to
annul
the
judicial
sale
of
what
is,
undisputably,
conjugal
and
separates
the
properties
she
owns
in
common
with
her
property
of
Teofista
ad
Marcelo
Sr.
childrem,
herein
respondents.
There
is
no
need
to
re-‐declare
respondents
as
heirs
of
Marcelo
Sr.,
and
prolong
this
case
Respondent’s
contention:
Article
777
of
the
Civil
Code,
tha
law
interminably.
applicable
at
the
time
of
the
institution
of
the
case:
“The
rights
to
the
succession
are
transmitted
from
the
moment
of
the
death
of
Petitioner
Valente,
along
with
Violeta,
Virginia
and
Maria
the
decedent.”
Concepcion,
became
owners
of
the
subject
properties
only
by
virtue
of
an
exception
sale
to
recover
Teofista’s
judgment
obligation.
This
judgment
obligation
is
solely
Teofista’s,
and
payment
cannot
be
made
through
an
execution
sale
of
properties
not
absolutely
owned
by
her.
The
subject
properties
were
conjugal
properties
and
were,
in
fact,
even
titled
in
the
name
of
Marcelo,
Sr/
married
to
Teofista.
Thus,
upon
Marcelo
Sr.’s
death,
by
virtue
of
compulsory
succession,
Marcelo
Sr.’s
share
in
the
conjugal
partnership
was
transmitted
by
operation
of
law
to
his
complusory
heirs.
Case
No.
8
new
TCT
had
in
fact
been
issued
to
him.
Thus,
the
property
Development
Bank
of
the
Philippines
(Petitioner)
vs.
Ella
mortgaged
to
it
was
no
longer
covered
by
a
free
patent
but
by
a
Gagarani,
Isagani,
Adrian,
Nathaniel,
Nieva,
Jonathan,
TCT.
DBP
also
argues
that
respondents
are
not
the
legal
heirs
of
Dionesio,
Florence,
and
Jeremias,
all
surnamed
Asok
the
patentees
because
respondents
are
merely
their
daughter-‐in-‐
(Respondents)
law
and
grandchildren.
G.R.
No.
172248
September
17,
2008
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
respondents
are
the
legal
heirs
of
the
Corona,
J.
patentees.
FACTS:
Spouses
Dionesio
and
Matea
Asok
owned
several
parcels
RATIO:
YES.
It
was
held
in
the
case
of
Madarcos
vs.
de
la
Merced
of
land.
Upon
the
Spouses’
death,
their
eleven
children
inherited
that,
the
term
"legal
heirs"
is
used
in
Section
119
in
a
generic
the
properties.
One
of
the
lands
inherited
was
covered
by
a
free
sense.
It
is
broad
enough
to
cover
any
person
who
is
called
to
the
patent.
The
children
executed
an
Extrajudicial
Settlement
of
the
succession
either
by
provision
of
a
will
or
by
operation
of
law.
Estate
with
Quitclaim.
Denison
Asok
(Asok)
inherited
the
subject
Thus,
legal
heirs
include
both
testate
and
intestate
heirs
property.
As
a
result,
the
OCT
was
cancelled
and
a
TCT
was
issued
depending
upon
whether
succession
is
by
the
will
of
the
testator
in
Asok’s
name.
or
by
law.
Legal
heirs
are
not
necessarily
compulsory
heirs
but
they
may
be
so
if
the
law
reserves
a
legitime
for
them.
Asok
and
his
wife,
respondent
Ella
Gagarani
Asok,
borrowed
P100,000
from
petitioner
DBP.
They
mortgaged
the
subject
lot
as
Respondents
inherited
the
property
from
Asok,
their
husband
and
collateral
to
guarantee
payment
of
the
loan.
On
due
date,
Asok
and
father,
who
in
turn
inherited
it
from
his
parents.
Respondent
Ella
Ella
failed
to
pay
the
loan
and
the
mortgage
was
extrajudicially
Gagarani
Asok,
as
daughter-‐in-‐law
of
the
patentees,
can
be
foreclosed.
DBP
was
the
highest
bidder.
considered
as
among
the
legal
heirs
who
can
repurchase
the
land.
A
certificate
of
sale
was
issued
in
favor
of
DBP.
DBP’s
ownership
over
the
property
was
consolidated
and
a
TCT
was
issued
in
its
name.
Asok
died.
He
was
succeeded
by
his
surviving
spouse
and
children,
the
respondents.
Respondents
filed
a
Complaint
for
repurchase
against
DBP.
They
invoked
their
right
to
repurchase
the
property
under
Sec.
119
of
CA
141,
as
amended:
Sec.
119.
Every
conveyance
of
land
acquired
under
the
free
patent
or
homestead
provisions,
when
proper,
shall
be
subject
to
repurchase
by
the
applicant,
his
widow,
or
legal
heirs,
within
a
period
of
five
years
from
date
of
the
conveyance.
DBP
contends
that
respondents
cannot
claim
the
right
under
Sec.
119
which
covers
homesteads
and
free
patents
because
the
free
patent
issued
to
Asok's
parents
had
already
been
cancelled
and
a
REQUISITES
OF
A
FORMAL
WILL
pages
A,
B,
and
C
of
the
will
were
not
the
same.
This,
to
the
Petitioner,
indicated
that
they
were
not
signed
on
the
same
day.
Case
No.
9
Samaniego-‐Celada
(Petitioner)
vs.
Abena
(Respondent)
For
her
part,
Respondent
counters
that
the
Petitioner
raises
G.R.
No.
145545
questions
of
fact
which
were
already
settled
by
the
CA,
and
such
June
30,
2008
finding
by
the
CA
were
final
and
conclusive
thus
not
subject
to
Quisimbing,
J.
review
on
appeal
with
the
SC.
FACTS:
Margarita
S.
Mayores
died
on
April
27
1987,
leaving
no
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Margarita’s
will
complied
with
the
ascending
nor
descending
heirs.
She
was
survived
only
by
her
first
formalities
required
by
Art.
805
of
the
Civil
Code.
cousins
Catalina
Samaniego-‐Bombay,
Manuelita
Samaniego
Sajonia,
Feliza
Samaniego,
and
Petitioner
Paz
Samaniego-‐Celada.
RATIO:
YES,
the
will
complied
the
formalities
required
by
Art.
Respondent
Lucia
D.
Abena,
who
was
the
decedent’s
lifelong
805.
The
Court,
citing
the
ruling
of
the
RTC
as
affirmed
by
the
CA,
companion
since
1929,
was
the
recipient
of
not
only
all
the
held
that
the
Petitioner
had
no
basis
with
which
to
anchor
her
personal
property
belonging
to
the
decedent
but
also
one-‐half
of
arguments.
Citing
Art.
809
of
the
Civil
Code,
absent
a
showing
of
her
undivided
share
in
real
properties
located
in
Singalong,
Manila
bad
faith,
forgery
or
fraud,
or
undue
and
improper
pressure
and
and
San
Antonio
Village,
Makati.
Aside
from
this,
she
was
also
influence,
defects
and
imperfections
in
the
form
of
attestation
or
in
made
the
sole
executor
of
the
will
which
was
executed
by
the
the
language
used
therein
shall
not
render
the
will
invalid
if
it
is
decedent
on
February
2,
1987.
proved
that
the
will
was
in
fact
executed
and
attested
in
substantial
compliance
with
all
the
requirements
of
Article
805.
On
August
11,
1987,
Petitioner
Paz
Samaniego-‐Celada
filed
a
Petition
for
Letters
of
Administration
of
the
Estate
of
Margarita
Thus,
even
if
the
attestation
clause
stated
that
the
will
was
before
the
66th
Branch
of
the
RTC
of
Makati.
Two
months
after,
on
composed
of
three
pages
when
in
fact
it
was
only
composed
of
October
27,
1987,
Respondent
Lucia
D.
Abena
then
filed
a
Petition
two,
since
the
page
where
the
attestation
was
found
does
not
form
for
Probate
of
the
Will
of
Margarita
before
the
same
court.
Both
part
of
the
will,
such
an
irregularity,
to
the
Court’s
considered
petitions
were
consolidated.
By
March
2,
1993
however,
the
RTC
view,
was
not
material
enough
to
invalidate
the
will.
Even
the
rendered
a
decision
favorable
to
the
Respondent,
declaring
the
last
difference
in
size,
texture,
and
appearance
of
the
testator’s
will
and
testament
of
Margarita
probated,
with
the
Respondent
as
signature
did
not
convince
the
Court
that
the
same
indicated
that
the
sole
executor.
the
signatures
were
obtained
on
different
occasions.
A
picture
submitted
as
evidence
before
the
RTC
as
Exhibit
H-‐3
readily
Petitioner
appealed
the
Decision
of
the
RTC
to
the
CA
but
the
latter
showed
the
testator
affixing
her
signature
in
the
presence
of
the
affirmed
the
decision
in
toto
hence
this
case.
Petitioner
contends
instrumental
witnesses
and
the
notary.
Most
glaringly,
the
Court
that
the
decedent’s
will
failed
to
comply
with
the
formalities
noted
that
the
Petitioner
did
not
present
any
evidence
which
required
by
Art.
805
of
the
Civil
Code.
Specifically,
she
points
at
would
substantiate
her
claim.
the
fact
that
the
subject
will
was
not
signed
by
the
testator
in
the
presence
of
the
instrumental
witnesses
and
in
the
presence
of
one
Finding
no
valid
ground
with
which
to
disturb
the
findings
of
the
another.
She
also
contends
that
the
signature
of
the
testator
on
RTC,
as
well
as
the
CA,
the
Court
maintained
the
validity
of
the
will
in
question.
Case
No.
10
or
more
credible
witnesses
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
of
Manuel
L.
Lee
(Complainant)
vs.
Atty.
Regino
B.
Tambago
one
another.
(Respondent)
A.C.
No.
5281
Only
two
witnesses,
Noynay
and
Grajo,
attested
the
will
in
February
12,
2008
question.
On
this
circumstance
alone,
the
will
must
be
considered
Corona,
J.
void.
The
Civil
Code
likewise
requires
that
a
will
must
be
acknowledged
before
a
notary
public
by
the
testator
and
the
FACTS:
Complainant
Manuel
L.
Lee
charged
respondent
Atty.
witnesses.
Regino
B.
Tambago
with
violation
of
the
Notarial
Law
and
the
ethics
of
the
legal
profession
for
notarizing
a
spurious
last
will
and
An
acknowledgment
is
the
act
of
one
who
has
executed
a
deed
in
testament.
In
his
complaint,
complainant
averred
that
his
father,
going
before
some
competent
officer
or
court
and
declaring
it
to
be
the
decedent
Vicente
Lee,
Sr.,
never
executed
the
contested
will.
his
act
or
deed.
In
examining
the
acknowledgement
in
the
will,
the
Furthermore,
the
spurious
will
contained
the
forged
signatures
of
Supreme
Court
found
that
there
was
the
conspicuous
absence
of
a
Cayetano
Noynay
and
Loreto
Grajo,
the
purported
witnesses
to
its
notation
of
the
residence
certificates
of
the
notarial
witnesses
execution.
Noynay
and
Grajo.
The
will
was
purportedly
executed
and
acknowledged
before
Similarly,
the
notation
of
the
testators
old
residence
certificate
in
respondent
on
June
30,
1965.
Complainant,
however,
pointed
out
the
same
acknowledgment
was
a
clear
breach
of
the
law.
These
that
the
residence
certificate
of
the
testator
noted
in
the
omissions
by
respondent
invalidated
the
will.
As
the
acknowledgment
of
the
will
was
dated
January
5,
1962.
acknowledging
officer
of
the
contested
will,
respondent
was
Furthermore,
the
signature
of
the
testator
was
not
the
same
as
his
required
to
faithfully
observe
the
formalities
of
a
will
and
those
of
signature
as
donor
in
a
deed
of
donation,
which
contained
his
notarization.
The
Supreme
Court
found
that
he
acted
very
purported
genuine
signature.
Complainant
averred
that
the
irresponsibly
in
notarizing
the
will
in
question.
signatures
of
his
deceased
father
in
the
will
and
in
the
deed
of
donation
were,
in
all
aspects,
different
from
each
other.
Respondent
in
his
comment
alleged
that
the
last
will
and
testament
was
validly
executed
and
actually
notarized
by
respondent
per
affidavit
of
Gloria
Nebato,
common-‐law
wife
of
Vicente
Lee,
Sr.
and
corroborated
by
the
joint
affidavit
of
the
children
of
Vicente
Lee,
Sr.,
namely
Elena
N.
Lee
and
Vicente
N.
Lee,
Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Atty.
Tambago
violated
the
Notarial
Law.
RATIO:
YES.
A
notarial
will,
as
the
contested
will
in
this
case,
is
required
by
law
to
be
subscribed
at
the
end
thereof
by
the
testator
himself.
In
addition,
it
should
be
attested
and
subscribed
by
three
Case
No.
11
Possession
of
Lot
Nos.
674
and
676,
and
Damages
against
Danilo
ALuad,
Leonora
ALuad,
Divina
ALuad,
Prospero
Aluad,
Respondent.
and
Connie
Aluad
(Petitioners)
vs.
Zenaido
Aluad
(Respondent)
In
the
Complaint,
they
alleged
that
they
were
in
prior
possession
G.R.
No.
176943
of
the
two
parcels
of
land
given
and
sold
to
Respondent
until
October
17,
2008
January
1991
when
Respondent
entered
and
possessed
the
two
Carpio-‐Morales,
J.
parcels
of
land,
claiming
that
he
was
the
adopted
son
of
Crispin
Aluad.
Respondent
refused
to
give
back
possession
until
Matilde
FACTS:
Petitioners’
mother,
Maria
Aluad
(Maria),
and
Respondent
Aluad
died
in
1994
and
then
retained
possession
thereof
up
to
and
Zenaido
Aluad
were
raised
by
the
childless
spouses
Matilde
Aluad
until
the
present
time,
thus,
depriving
them
of
the
enjoyment
of
and
Crispin
Aluad.
Crispin
was
the
owner
of
six
lots
identified
as
said
parcels
of
land.
They
claimed
that
with
the
death
of
Matilde,
Lot
Nos.
674,
675,
676,
677,
680,
and
682
of
the
Pilar
Cadastre,
the
Petitioners
succeeded
by
inheritance
by
right
of
Capiz.
After
Crispin
died,
his
wife
Matilde
adjudicated
the
lots
to
representation
from
their
deceased
mother,
Maria
Aluad
who
was
herself.
the
sole
and
only
daughter
of
Matilde
Aluad.
On
November
14,
1981,
Matilde
executed
a
document
entitled
Respondent
countered
by
stating
that
he
was
the
owner
of
Lot
No.
Deed
of
Donation
of
Real
Property
Inter
Vivos
(Deed
of
Donation)
674,
claiming
that
the
lot
in
question
was
adjudicated
to
him
in
the
in
favor
of
petitioners’
mother
Maria
covering
all
the
six
lots
which
Last
Will
and
Testament
of
Matilde
Aluad.
Lot
No.
676,
on
the
Matilde
inherited
from
her
late
husband
Crispin.
other
hand,
was
purchased
by
him
from
Matilde
Aluad.
He
claimed
that
these
two
lots
were
in
his
possession
as
true
owners
thereof.
The
Deed
of
Donation
provided
that
it
would
become
effective
upon
the
death
of
the
DONOR
(Matilde),
but
should
the
DONEE
On
September
20,
1996,
the
RTC
rendered
its
Decision
ruling
in
(Maria)
die
before
the
DONOR,
the
said
donation
shall
be
deemed
favor
of
the
Petitioners.
It
held
that
Matilde
could
not
have
rescinded.
The
Deed
also
provided
that
anytime
during
the
transmitted
any
right
over
Lot
Nos.
674
and
676
to
respondent,
lifetime
of
the
DONOR
or
anyone
of
them
who
should
survive,
they
she
having
previously
alienated
them
to
Maria
via
the
Deed
of
could
use,
encumber,
or
even
dispose
of
any
or
even
all
of
the
Donation
inter
vivos.
The
Petitioners
were
therefore
the
rightful
parcels
of
land
herein
donated.
owners
of
the
subject
lots.
On
August
26,
1991,
Matilde
then
sold
Lot
No.
676
to
Respondent
On
appeal,
the
CA
reversed
the
RTC’s
Decision,
holding
that
the
by
a
Deed
of
Absolute
Sale
of
Real
Property.
Subsequently
or
on
Deed
of
Donation
was
actually
a
donation
mortis
causa,
not
inter
January
14,
1992,
Matilde
executed
a
last
will
and
testament
vivos,
and
as
such
it
had
to,
but
did
not,
comply
with
the
devising
Lot
Nos.
675,
677,
682,
and
680
to
Maria,
and
her
formalities
of
a
will.
With
their
MR,
denied
the
Petitioners
filed
a
remaining
properties
including
Lot
No.
674
to
Respondent.
Petition
for
Review
with
the
SC,
hence
this
case.
Matilde
died
on
January
25,
1994
while
Maria
died
on
September
Petitioners
contend
that
the
CA
was
in
error
when
it
held
that
the
24
of
the
same
year.
After
Matilde
and
Maria's
death,
Maria's
heirs,
Deed
of
Donation
executed
by
Matilde
on
November
14,
1981
was
herein
Petitioners,
filed
before
the
15th
Branch
of
the
RTC
of
Roxas
a
donation
mortis
causa,
not
inter
vivos
City
a
Complaint
for
Declaration
and
Recovery
of
Ownership
and
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
Deed
of
Donation
is
a
donation
mortis
The
Deed
of
Donation,
which
is
one
of
mortis
causa,
not
having
causa.
followed
the
formalities
of
a
will,
is
void
and
transmitted
no
right
to
petitioners
mother.
But
even
assuming
arguendo
that
the
RATIO:
YES.
The
Supreme
Court
found
the
donation
to
formalities
were
observed,
since
it
was
not
probated,
no
right
to
Petitioners’
mother
one
of
mortis
causa,
since:
Lot
Nos.
674
and
676
was
transmitted
to
Maria.
1) It
conveys
no
title
or
ownership
to
the
transferee
before
the
Matilde
thus
validly
disposed
of
Lot
No.
674
to
respondent
by
her
death
of
the
transferor,
or
what
amounts
to
the
same
thing,
last
will
and
testament,
subject
of
course
to
the
qualification
that
that
the
transferor
should
retain
the
ownership
(full
or
her
(Matildes)
will
must
be
probated.
With
respect
to
Lot
No.
676,
naked)
and
control
of
the
property
while
alive;
the
same
had,
as
mentioned
earlier,
been
sold
by
Matilde
to
respondent
on
August
26,
1991.
2) That
before
the
death
of
the
transferor,
the
transfer
should
be
revocable
by
the
transferor
at
will,
but
revocability
may
be
provided
for
indirectly
by
means
of
a
reserved
power
in
the
donor
to
dispose
of
the
properties
conveyed;
and
finally,
3) That
the
transfer
should
be
void
if
the
transferor
should
survive
the
transferee.
The
phrase
in
the
Deed
of
Donation
to
become
effective
upon
the
death
of
the
DONOR
admits
of
no
other
interpretation
than
to
mean
that
Matilde
did
not
intend
to
transfer
the
ownership
of
the
six
lots
to
petitioners
mother
during
her
(Matildes)
lifetime.
As
such,
the
formalities
of
a
will
should
have
been
observed
but
they
were
not,
as,
first,
it
was
witnessed
by
only
two,
not
three
or
more
witnesses
following
Article
805
of
the
Civil
Code.
Second,
the
witnesses
did
not
even
sign
the
attestation
clause
the
execution
of
which
clause
is
a
requirement
separate
from
the
subscription
of
the
will
and
the
affixing
of
signatures
on
the
left-‐hand
margins
of
the
pages
of
the
will.
Third,
the
witnesses
did
not
acknowledge
the
will
before
the
notary
public,
which
is
not
in
accordance
with
the
requirement
of
Article
806
of
the
Civil
Code
that
every
will
must
be
acknowledged
before
a
notary
public
by
the
testator
and
the
witnesses.
And
fourth,
the
requirement
that
all
the
pages
of
the
will
must
be
numbered
correlatively
in
letters
placed
on
the
upper
part
of
each
page
was
not
also
followed.
TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY
sign
as
one
of
the
witnesses.
Ira
also
did
not
sign
as
a
witness.
In
the
end
three
persons
served
as
witnesses,
all
of
whom
were
in
Case
No.
12
friendly
relations
with
the
lawyer,
and
two
relatives
of
his
wife.
Estate
of
the
deceased
Victorina
Villaranda.
Eusebia
The
intended
testatrix
was
not
able
to
affix
her
signature
to
the
(Petitioner-‐Appellant)
vs.
Juliana
Chinco
(Oppositor-‐ document,
and
it
was
signed
for
her
by
the
attorney.
Appellee)
G.R.
No.
33592
The
trial
court
disallowed
the
will
on
the
ground
that
Villaranda
March
31,
1931
did
not
have
testamentary
capacity
at
the
time
the
instrument
was
Street,
J.
to
have
been
executed
by
her.
FACTS:
On
the
morning
of
June
2,
1929,
Victoria
Villaranda,
a
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Victoria
Villaranda
has
the
testamentary
resident
of
Meycauayan,
Bulacan
was
afflicted
with
apoplexy,
capacity
at
the
time
the
paper
referred
to
was
signed
incident
to
cerebral
hemorrhage
and
was
unconscious,
seated
in
a
chair
and
was
taken
to
her
room.
Doctor
Geronimo
Z.
Ganaan,
a
RATIO:
NO.
At
the
time
the
will
was
made,
the
proof
showed
that
local
physician,
visited
Villaranda,
whom
he
knew
very
well.
His
Villaranda
was
in
a
comatose
condition
and
devoid
of
the
power
of
first
visit
occurred
between
6
and
7
pm
of
June
3,
and
he
found
her
articulate
speech.
She
was
incapable
of
performing
any
conscious
insensible
and
incapable
of
talking
or
controlling
her
movements.
and
valid
act
and
thus,
lacking
testamentary
capacity.
On
the
same
day,
the
parish
priest
called
for
the
purpose
of
The
first
of
these
witnesses
was
the
one
who
chiefly
cared
for
the
administering
the
last
rights
of
the
church,
but
was
unable
to
take
deceased
during
her
last
illness
in
Meycauayan
until
she
was
her
confession.
He
performed
the
office
of
extreme
unction
only.
carried
away
to
the
hospital
in
Manila;
and
the
second
was
a
Another
doctor,
Doctor
Isidoro
Lim,
was
called
to
visit
and
neighbor,
who
was
called
in
when
the
stroke
of
apoplexy
first
examine
Villaranda,
and
it
was
upon
his
approval
that
she
was
occurred
and
who
visited
the
patient
daily
until
she
was
removed
taken
to
the
hospital
of
San
Juan
De
Dios
Manila
on
the
morning
of
from
Meycauayan.
June
5,
1929.
She
died
four
days
later
at
the
age
of
80.
The
testimony
of
these
witnesses
is
convincing
to
the
effect
that
The
purported
will
subject
of
this
proceeding
was
prepared
by
an
the
patient
was
in
a
continuous
state
of
coma
during
the
entire
attorney
of
Manila,
Perfecto
Gabriel,
whose
wife
appears
to
be
period
of
her
stay
in
Meycauayan,
subsequent
to
the
attack,
and
related
to
the
beneficiaries
named
in
the
will.
Gabriel
arrived
at
that
on
the
forenoon
of
June
5,
1929,
she
did
not
have
sufficient
9’oclock
on
the
forenoon
of
June
5,
1929.
He
went
into
a
room
command
of
her
faculties
to
enable
her
to
do
any
valid
act.
adjacent
to
that
occupied
by
the
patient
and,
taking
a
sheet
from
an
exercise
book,
wrote
the
instrument
in
question.
Gabriel
suggested
to
Doctor
Lopez
del
Castillo
that
he
wanted
Doctor
Castillo
sign
as
a
witness,
but
the
latter
refused
because
he
considered
Villaranda
lacking
testamentary
capacity.
Marcos
Ira,
a
first
cousin
of
the
deceased,
was
also
present,
and
attorney
Gabriel
asked
him
also
whether
or
not
he
was
willing
to
Case
No.
13
right
to
make
a
will
provided
conditions
are
met)
to
execute
her
Agustin
Barrera
et
al.
(Proponents-‐Appellants)
vs.
Tampoco
will.
et
al.
(Oppositors-‐Appellees)
G.R.
No.
L-‐5263
RATIO:
YES.
The
argument
that
the
will
was
not
read
to
Oliva
was
February
17,
1954
premised
on
the
alleged
contradiction
of
Atty.
Puno
and
Lacson
Paras,
J.
regarding
the
sequence
of
the
reading
of
the
will
and
the
placing
of
lines
for
signatures,
and
regarding
the
question
whether
a
copy
or
FACTS:
Oliva
Villapena
died
in
1948
leaving
properties
worth
Php
the
original
was
handed
to
the
testatrix.
As
already
observed,
the
94,
852.96
and
a
will
instituting
nephews
and
nieces
and
discrepancy
pertained
to
an
insignificant
matter
which
could
grandchildren
in
the
collateral
line
as
heirs.
Jose
Tampoco
et
al.,
overcome
the
credibility
of
Atty.
Puno’s
testimony
that
he
read
the
alleged
grandchildren
of
the
testatrix
in
the
direct
line,
opposed
will
to
her
with
a
view
to
finding
whether
she
was
agreeable
the
probate
proceeding
in
the
CFI
Tarlac
claiming
that
the
will
was
thereto.
It
was
not
necessary
that
said
will
be
read
upon
its
signing
not
executed
in
accordance
with
law,
that
Oliva
lacked
and
in
the
presence
of
the
witnesses.
testamentary
capacity,
that
there
was
undue
influence,
and
that
Oliva’s
signature
was
obtained
through
fraud
and
trickery.
The
trial
court
also
concluded
that
the
testatrix
could
not
have
Consortia
Lintang
et
al.,
alleged
nephews
and
niece,
also
filed
the
furnished
the
names
of
the
heirs
instituted
under
the
will
because
same
opposition
based
essentially
on
the
mentioned
grounds.
(1)
Salvador
Tañedo,
one
of
such
heirs,
was
long
dead
and
(2)
Marcelo
Villapaña,
another
instituted
heir,
was
non-‐
existent,
since
The
CFI
rendered
a
decision
disallowing
the
will.
The
trial
court
Oliva
did
not
have
a
grandson
by
such
name.
Salvador
Tañedo
was
held
that
the
will
was
not
Oliva’s
because
it
was
not
read
to
her,
already
dead,
and
the
testatrix
knew
about
it,
but
it
was
common
and
she
did
not
institute
any
specific
names
as
heirs
(resulting
to
for
a
woman
of
old
age,
confused
by
the
big
number
of
her
lack
of
testamentary
capacity);
that
attesting
witness
Laureano
relatives,
to
commit
the
mistake
of
unwittingly
mentioning
a
dead
Antonio
was
not
present
when
Oliva
and
attesting
witness
one.
Honorio
Lacson
signed
the
will;
and
that
Antonio
only
partially
saw
the
signing
by
attesting
witness
Atty.
Modesto
Puno.
Moreover,
with
respect
to
the
instituted
heir,
Marcelo
Villapaña,
while
it
appeared
that
Oliva
did
not
have
a
grandson
answering
to
Barrera
et
al.
appealed
and
narrated
this
version:
Atty.
Puno,
a
that
name,
there
was
evidence
tending
to
show
that
Pioquinto
justice
of
the
peace
in
Tarlac,
went
to
Oliva’s
residence
in
Manila
to
Villapaña,
a
child
of
Ruperta
Pineda,
must
have
been
referred
to
prepare
the
latter’s
will.
Upon
approval,
Atty.
Puno
asked
the
because
Oliva,
who
was
the
child's
god-‐
mother,
originally
wanted
presence
of
Lacson
and
Antonio
to
become
attesting
witnesses.
said
child
to
be
baptized
as
Marcelo,
after
his
father.
The
lawyer
again
read
the
will
aloud;
Oliva,
Lacson,
Atty.
Puno,
and
Antonio
subsequently
and
successively
signed
the
document.
They
even
ate
“merienda”
afterwards.
On
October
17,
Oliva
delivered
the
will
to
Barrera
for
safekeeping,
and
on
November
7,
Oliva
passed
away.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Oliva
had
the
testamentary
capacity
(the
Case
No.
14
already
become
final
and
executory,
it
is
not
longer
within
the
The
Heirs
of
the
late
Matilde
Montinola-‐Sanson
(Petitioner)
province
of
this
Court
to
review
it.
This
being
so,
the
findings
of
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Eduardo
F.
Hernandez
(Respondents)
the
probate
court
as
to
the
due
execution
of
the
will
and
the
G.R.
No.
76648
testamentary
capacity
of
the
testatrix
are
now
conclusive.
February
16,
1988
Gancayco,
J.
During
the
hearing
before
the
probate
court,
not
only
were
there
three
close
relatives
of
the
testatrix
presented
but
also
two
expert
FACTS:
A
petition
was
filed
by
private
respondent
Atty.
Hernandez
witnesses
who
declared
that
the
contested
will
and
signature
are
with
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Manila
seeking
the
probate
of
in
the
handwriting
of
the
testatrix.
These
satisfy
the
requirements
the
holographic
will
of
the
late
Herminia
Montinola
executed
on
of
Art.
811
of
the
Civil
Code,
in
conjunction
with
Sec.
11
of
Rule
76
January
28,
1980.
The
testatrix
died
single,
parentless
and
for
the
probate
of
holographic
wills.
childless
on
March
29,
1981
at
the
age
of
70
years
old,
and
devised
several
of
her
real
properties
to
specified
persons.
In
addition,
by
virtue
of
Art.
841,
the
fact
that
in
the
testatrix’
holographic
will,
she
disposed
only
eleven
of
her
real
properties
Matilde
Sanson,
petitioner,
the
only
surviving
sister
of
the
does
not
invalidate
the
will,
or
is
it
an
indication
that
the
testatrix
deceased
but
who
was
not
named
in
the
said
will,
filed
her
was
of
unsound
mind.
The
portion
of
the
estate
undisposed
of
Opposition
to
Probate
of
the
Will
alleging
that
the
subject
will
was
shall
pass
on
the
heirs
of
the
deceased
in
intestate
successor.
not
entirely
written,
dated
and
signed
by
the
testatrix
herself
and
Neither
is
there
undue
influence
present
just
because
blood
the
same
was
falsely
dated
or
antedated,
that
the
testatrix
was
not
relatives,
other
than
compulsory
heirs
have
been
omitted,
because
in
full
possession
of
her
mental
faculties
to
make
testamentary
it
is
the
testator’s
rights
to
disregard
non-‐compulsory
heirs.
dispositions,
that
undue
influence
was
exerted
upon
the
person
and
mind
of
the
testatrix
by
the
beneficiaries
named
in
the
will,
and
that
the
will
failed
to
institute
a
residual
heir
to
the
remainder
of
the
estate.
The
probate
court
allowed
the
probate
of
the
disputed
will,
which
caused
the
petitioner
to
appeal
this
decision
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
who
affirmed
the
decision.
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
new
trial,
attached
thereto
was
an
affidavit
of
merit
alleging
that
witnesses
have
been
located
whose
testimonies
could
shed
light
as
to
the
ill
health
of
the
testator
as
well
as
undue
influence
exerted.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
there
are
sufficient
grounds
to
move
for
a
new
trial
for
the
probate
of
the
holographic
will.
RATIO:
NO.
The
evidence
sought
to
be
presented
by
the
petitioner,
having
only
been
discovered
after
the
trial,
is
not
sufficient
ground
for
a
new
trial.
Since
the
questioned
decision
has
HOLOGRAPHIC
WILL
On
appeal,
the
Court
of
Appeals
dismissed
the
petition
for
probate
on
the
ground
that
the
will
failed
to
meet
the
requirements
for
Case
No.
15
validity,
as
it
did
not
comply
with
Articles
813
and
814
of
the
New
Spouses
Roberto
and
Thelma
Ajero
(Petitioners)
vs.
CA
and
Civil
Code.
As
a
result,
an
appeal
by
certiorari
from
the
Decision
of
Clemente
Sand
(Respondents)
the
Court
of
Appeals
was
filed.
G.R.
No.
106720
September
15,
1994
ISSUE:
Whether
the
holographic
will
may
be
admitted
to
probate.
Puno,
J.
RATIO:
YES.
Sec.
9,
Rule
76
of
the
Rules
of
Court
and
Article
839
of
FACTS:
In
the
holographic
will
executed
by
the
late
Annie
Sand,
the
New
Civil
Code
provide
the
grounds
for
disallowance
of
wills.
the
following
were
named
as
devisees:
petitioners
Roberto
and
These
lists
are
exclusive
and
no
other
grounds
can
serve
to
Thelma
Ajero,
private
respondent
Clemente
Sand,
Meriam
Arong,
disallow
a
will.
Thus,
in
a
petition
to
admit
a
holographic
will
to
Leah
Sand,
Lilia
Sand,
Edgar
Sand,
Fe
Sand,
Lisa
Sand,
and
Dr.
Jose
probate,
the
only
issues
to
be
resolved
are:
(a)
whether
the
Ajero,
Sr.,
and
their
children.
Almost
two
months
after
the
instrument
is
indeed
the
decedent’s
last
will
and
testament;
(b)
decedent’s
death,
petitioners
instituted
a
special
proceeding
for
whether
said
will
was
executed
in
accordance
with
the
formalities
the
allowance
of
decedent’s
holographic
will
–
alleging
that
at
the
prescribed
by
law;
(c)
whether
the
decedent
had
the
necessary
time
of
execution,
the
decedent
was
of
sound
and
disposing
mind,
testamentary
capacity
at
the
time
the
will
was
executed;
and
(d)
not
acting
duress,
fraud
or
undue
influence,
and
was
in
every
whether
execution
of
the
will
and
its
signing
were
the
voluntary
respect
capacitated
to
dispose
of
her
estate
by
will.
acts
of
the
decedent.
Private
respondent
opposed
the
petition
on
the
grounds
that:
(1)
In
the
case
of
holographic
wills,
what
assures
authenticity
is
the
neither
the
testament’s
body
nor
the
signature
therein
were
in
the
requirement
that
they
be
totally
autographic
or
handwritten
by
decendent’s
handwriting;
(2)
it
contained
alterations
and
the
testator
himself,
as
provided
under
Article
810.
corrections
which
were
not
duly
signed
by
decedent;
and
(3)
the
will
was
procured
by
petitioners
through
improper
pressure
and
Article
813
and
814
are
requirements
that
affect
the
validity
of
the
undue
influence.
dispositions
contained
in
the
holographic
will,
but
not
its
probate
–
these
requirements
of
changes
and
signing
and
dating
of
The
petition
was
likewise
opposed
by
Dr.
Jose
Ajero,
who
dispositions
are
separate
form
that
which
provides
for
the
contested
the
disposition
in
the
will
of
a
house
and
lot
located
in
necessary
conditions
for
the
validity
of
the
holographic
will
(in
Art.
Cabadbaran,
Agusan
del
Norte,
claiming
that
the
property
could
810).
If
the
testator
fails
to
sign
and
date
some
of
the
dispositions,
not
be
conveyed
in
its
entirety
as
decedent
was
not
the
sole
owner
these
dispositions
cannot
be
effectuated,
but
such
failure
does
not
thereof.
The
RTC
admitted
the
holographic
will
in
question
to
render
the
whole
testament
void.
Furthermore,
unless
probate
on
the
ground
that
(1)
three
witnesses
convincingly
unauthenticated
alterations,
cancellations
or
insertions
were
showed
knowledge
of
and
identified
the
handwriting
and
made
on
the
date
of
the
holographic
will
or
on
the
testator’s
signature
of
the
testatrix
to
be
genuine,
and
(2)
no
evidence
was
signature,
their
presence
does
not
invalidate
the
will
itself.
The
presented
to
show
that
the
will
in
question
is
different
from
the
lack
of
authentication
will
only
result
in
the
disallowance
of
such
will
actually
executed
by
the
testatrix.
changes.
Re:
Cabadbaran
property
–
As
a
general
rule,
courts
in
probate
Art.
813,
NCC
–
When
a
number
of
dispositions
appearing
in
a
proceedings
are
limited
to
pass
only
upon
the
extrinsic
validity
of
holographic
will
are
signed
without
being
dated,
and
the
last
the
will
sought
to
be
probated.
However,
in
exceptional
instances,
disposition
has
a
signature
and
date,
such
date
validates
the
courts
are
not
powerless
to
do
what
the
situation
constrains
them
dispositions
preceding
it,
whatever
be
the
time
of
prior
to
do,
and
pass
upon
certain
provisions
of
the
will.
In
the
case
at
dispositions.
bench,
decedent
herself
stated
in
the
will
that
the
property
is
in
the
name
of
her
late
father,
John
Sand.
Thus,
she
cannot
validly
Art.
814,
NCC
–
In
case
of
insertion,
cancellation,
erasure
or
dispose
of
the
whole
property,
which
she
shares
with
her
father’s
alteration
in
a
holographic
will,
the
testator
must
authenticate
the
other
heirs.
same
by
his
full
signature.
NOTES:
Sec.
9,
Rule
76,
ROC
–
Wills
shall
be
disallowed
in
any
of
the
following
cases:
(a)
If
not
executed
and
attested
as
required
by
law;
(b)
If
the
testator
was
insane
or
otherwise
mentally
incapable
to
make
a
will
at
time
of
execution;
(c)
If
it
was
executed
under
duress,
or
the
influence
of
fear
or
threats;
(d)
If
it
was
procured
by
undue
and
improper
pressure
and
influence
on
the
part
of
the
beneficiary,
or
of
some
other
person
for
his
benefit;
(e)
If
the
signature
of
the
testator
was
procured
by
fraud
or
trick,
and
he
did
not
intend
that
the
instrument
should
be
his
will
at
the
time
of
fixing
his
signature
thereto.
Art.
839,
NCC
–
The
will
shall
be
disallowed
in
any
of
the
following
cases:
(a)
If
the
formalities
required
by
law
have
not
been
complied
with;
(b)
If
the
testator
was
insane,
or
otherwise
mentally
incapable
of
making
a
will,
at
the
time
of
its
execution;
(c)
If
it
was
executed
through
force
or
under
duress,
or
the
influence
of
fear,
or
threats;
(d)
If
it
was
procured
by
undue
and
improper
pressure
and
influence,
on
the
part
of
the
beneficiary
or
of
some
other
person;
Art.
810,
NCC
–
"A
person
may
execute
a
holographic
will
which
must
be
entirely
written,
dated,
and
signed
by
the
hand
of
the
testator
himself.
It
is
subject
to
no
other
form,
and
may
be
made
in
or
out
of
the
Philippines,
and
need
not
be
witnessed."
INTRINSIC
AND
EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY
RATIO:
YES.
Article
16
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that
the
intrinsic
Case
No.
16
validity
of
testamentary
dispositions
are
governed
by
the
national
In
the
matter
of
the
Testate
Estate
of
Edward
E.
Christensen,
law
of
the
decedent,
in
this
case,
California
law.
The
provision
in
Deceased.
Adolfo
C.
Aznar,
Executor,
and
Lucy
Christinsen,
the
laws
of
California
giving
a
testator
absolute
freedom
in
Heir
of
Deceased.
(Appellees)
vs.
Helen
Christensen
Garcia
disposing
of
his
estate
is
the
internal
law
which
applies
only
to
(Oppositor-‐Appellant)
persons
domiciled
within
the
said
estate.
G.R.
No.
L-‐16749
January
31,
1963
On
the
other
hand,
the
provision
in
the
laws
of
California
stating
Labrador,
J.
that
personal
property
is
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
domicile
of
its
owner
is
the
conflict
of
laws
rule
that
applies
to
persons
not
FACTS:
Edward
S.
Christensen,
though
born
in
New
York,
domicile
in
the
said
state.
migrated
to
California
where
he
resided
and
consequently
was
considered
a
California
Citizen
for
a
period
of
nine
years
to
1913.
Accordingly,
the
laws
of
the
Philippines,
in
which
the
testator
is
He
came
to
the
Philippines
where
he
became
a
domiciliary
until
domiciled
governs
the
succession
and
the
regime
of
legitimes
must
the
time
of
his
death.
However,
during
the
entire
period
of
his
be
respected.
residence
in
this
country,
he
had
always
considered
himself
as
a
citizen
of
California.
In
his
will,
executed
on
March
5,
1951,
he
instituted
an
acknowledged
natural
daughter,
Maria
Lucy
Christensen
as
his
only
heir
but
left
a
legacy
of
some
money
in
favor
of
Helen
Christensen
Garcia
who,
in
a
decision
rendered
by
the
Supreme
Court
had
been
declared
as
an
acknowledged
natural
daughter
of
his.
Counsel
of
Helen
claims
that
under
Art.
16
(2)
of
the
civil
code,
California
law
should
be
applied,
the
matter
is
returned
back
to
the
law
of
domicile,
that
Philippine
law
is
ultimately
applicable,
that
the
share
of
Helen
must
be
increased
in
view
of
successional
rights
of
illegitimate
children
under
Philippine
laws.
On
the
other
hand,
counsel
for
daughter
Maria,
in
as
much
that
it
is
clear
under
Art,
16
(2)
of
the
New
Civil
Code,
the
national
of
the
deceased
must
apply,
our
courts
must
apply
internal
law
of
California
on
the
matter.
Under
California
law,
there
are
no
compulsory
heirs
and
consequently
a
testator
should
dispose
any
property
possessed
by
him
in
absolute
dominion.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
succession
is
governed
by
Philippine
laws.
Case
No.
17
MARIA
CRISTINA
BELLIS
and
MIRIAM
PALMA
BELLIS
however
Testate
Estate
of
Amos
G.
Bellis,
Deceased.
opposed
the
project
of
partition
on
the
ground
that
they
were
People’s
Bank
&
Trust
Co.,
Executor,
Maria
Cristina
Bellis
and
deprived
of
their
legitime
as
illegitimate
children
and,
therefore,
Miriam
Palma
Bellis
(Oppositors-‐Appellants)
vs.
Edward
A.
compulsory
heirs
of
the
deceased.
Bellis,
et
al.
(Heirs-‐Appellees)
G.R.
No.
L-‐23678
On
April
30,
1964,
the
CFI
of
Manila
issued
the
now
assailed
Order,
June
6,
1967
overruling
the
opposition
of
both
Maria
and
Miriam
Bellis
and
Bengzon,
J.P.,
J.
approving
the
executor’s
final
account,
report
and
administration,
and
project
of
partition.
Relying
upon
Article
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
FACTS:
Amos
G.
Bellis
was
a
citizen
and
resident
of
Texas
at
the
it
applied
the
national
law
of
the
decedent,
which
in
this
case
is
time
of
his
death.
He
executed
a
will
in
the
Philippines,
in
which
he
which
did
not
provide
for
legitimes.
directed
that
after
all
taxes,
obligations,
and
expenses
of
administration
are
paid
for,
his
distributable
estate
should
be
With
their
MR
denied
on
June
11,
1964,
Appellants
appealed
to
the
divided,
in
trust,
in
the
following
order
and
manner:
SC
hence
this
case.
They
insist
that
the
Philippine
law
on
legitimes
must
be
applied
to
the
testacy
of
Amos
G.
Bellis.
They
rely
on
Art.
a)
$240,000.00
to
his
first
wife
MARY
E.
MALLEN
17,
par.
3
as
the
exception
to
Art.
16,
par.
2
which
holds
that
the
national
law
of
the
decedent
prevails
in
intestate
or
testamentary
b)
$120,000.00
to
his
three
illegitimate
children
AMOS
succession.
BELLIS,
JR.,
MARIA
CRISTINA
BELLIS,
MIRIAM
PALMA
BELLIS,
or
$40,000.00
each,
and
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
law
on
legitimes
as
provided
for
in
Philippine
law
can
be
applied
to
Amos
G.
Bellis’
will.
c)
After
foregoing
the
two
items
have
been
satisfied,
the
remainder
shall
go
to
his
seven
surviving
children
by
his
RATIO:
NO,
Art.
17,
par.
3
is
not
an
exception
to
Art.
16,
paragraph
first
and
second
wives
EDWARD
A.
BELLIS,
HENRY
A.
2
and
Art.
1039
of
the
Civil
Code.
The
Court,
in
ruling
that
the
BELLIS,
ALEXANDER
BELLIS,
and
ANNA
BELLIS-‐ALLSMAN,
Appellants
are
not
entitled
to
their
legitime
since
the
national
law
EDWARD
G.
BELLIS,
WA
LTER
S.
BELLIS,
and
DOROTHY
E.
of
Amos
G.
Bellis
does
not
provide
for
one,
held
that,
pursuant
to
BELLIS
in
equal
shares.
the
legislative
intent
of
Congress,
the
national
law
of
the
decedent
controls
in
both
intestate
and
testamentary
succession
with
Subsequently,
sometime
in
July,
1958,
Amos
died
while
residing
in
regard
to:
San
Antonio
Texas,
U.S.
His
will
was
later
admitted
to
probate
by
the
CFI
of
Manila
on
September
15,
1958.
1) The
order
of
succession;
Prior
to
closing
its
administration,
the
executor,
herein
People’s
2) The
amount
of
successional
rights;
Bank
&
Trust
Co.,
filed
its
Executor’s
Final
Account,
Report
of
Administration
and
Project
of
Partition
wherein
it
reported
the
3) The
intrinsic
validity
of
the
provisions
of
the
will;
and
satisfaction
of
the
disposition
of
the
late
Amos
G.
Bellis
property
in
accordance
with
the
will.
4) The
capacity
to
succeed.
Art.
16,
par.
2
and
Art.
1039,
being
specific
provisions
regarding
succession,
prevail
over
general
provisions
such
as
Art.
17
of
the
Civil
Code.
Thus,
by
admitting
that
Amos
G.
Bellis
himself
was
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
Texas,
U.S.A.,
what
governs
the
disposition
of
his
will
therefore
is
his
national
law.
With
Texas
law
silent
on
the
matter
of
forced
heirs
or
legitimes,
Philippine
law
on
legitimes
cannot
be
made
to
apply.
Case
No.
18
fraud,
menace
or
undue
influence
and
that
the
will
is
genuine
and
Lourdes
L.
Dorotheo
(Petitioner)
vs.
CA,
Nilda
D.
Quintana,
for
not
a
forgery,
that
he
was
of
the
proper
testamentary
age
and
that
Herself
and
as
Attorney-‐in-‐Fact
of
Vicente
Dorotheo
and
Jose
he
is
a
person
not
expressly
prohibited
by
law
from
making
a
will.
Dorotheo
(Respondents)
On
the
other
hand,
the
questions
regarding
the
intrinsic
validity
of
G.R.
No.
108581
a
will
may
still
be
raised
even
after
the
will
has
been
December
8,
1999
authenticated.
Even
the
will
was
validly
executed
but
the
Ynares-‐Santiago,
J.
dispositions
in
the
will
deprives
or
impairs
the
lawful
heirs
of
the
legitimate
or
rightful
inheritance,
the
unlawful
disposition
cannot
FACTS:
Private
Respondents
were
the
legitimate
children
of
be
given
any
effect,
specially
when
the
court
had
already
Alejandro
Dorotheo
and
Aniceta
Reyes.
When
Aniceta
died
in
1960
determined
a
final
and
executory
decision
that
the
will
is
her
estate
were
not
settled.
Thereafter,
Alejandro
died.
Petitioner,
intrinsically
void.
Lourdes
Dorotheo,
who
claimed
that
she
took
care
of
the
decedent
before
he
died,
filed
a
special
proceeding
for
the
probate
of
Also,
the
court
finds
that
decedents
disposition
on
his
will
includes
Alejandro’s
last
will
and
testament.
The
will
was
admitted
for
the
alleged
share
in
the
conjugal
properties.
Testamentary
probate,
private
respondents
did
not
appeal
until
2
years
after,
dispositions
of
properties
not
belonging
exclusively
to
the
testator
they
filed
a
"Motion
to
Declare
the
Will
Intrinsically
Void".
or
properties
which
are
part
of
the
conjugal
regime
cannot
be
given
effect.
The
properties
owned
by
the
decedent
and
his
spouse
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
the
private
respondents.
The
trial
court
must
be
properly
ventilated
and
determined.
declared
that
Petitioner
is
not
the
wife
of
the
decedent,
the
provisions
of
the
last
will
and
testament
of
Alejandro
Dorotheo
as
Therefore,
the
will
is
extrinsically
valid
but
the
intrinsic
provisions
intrinsically
void
and
declaring
the
only
heirs
are
the
legitimate
were
void.
children
of
the
decedent.
The
estates
of
the
decedent
will
be
liquidated
and
distributed
according
to
the
laws
on
intestacy.
Petitioner
moved
for
reconsideration
arguing
that
she
is
entitled
to
some
compensation
because
she
took
care
of
Alejandro
prior
to
his
death.
The
MR
was
denied.
CA
dismissed
the
appeal
filed
by
the
petitioner
for
failure
to
file
appellant’s
brief
within
the
extended
period
granted.
Hence,
the
decision
on
probate
became
final
and
executory.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
last
will
and
testament
of
the
decedent
is
intrinsically
valid.
RATIO:
NO,
the
will
is
not
intrinsically
valid.
Under
the
Civil
Code,
due
execution
includes
a
determination
of
whether
the
testator
was
of
sound
and
disposing
mind
at
the
time
of
its
execution,
that
he
had
freely
executed
the
will
and
was
not
acting
under
duress,
NOTARIAL
WILL
The
CA
reversed
the
trial
court’s
decision
and
ordered
the
dismissal
of
the
petition
for
probate.
It
noted
that
the
attestation
Case
No.
19
clause
failed
to
state
the
number
of
pages
used
in
the
will,
thus
Felix
Azuela
(Petitioner)
vs.
CA,
Geralda
Aida
Castillo
rendering
the
will
void
and
undeserving
of
probate.
substituted
by
Ernesto
G.
Castillo
(Respondents)
G.R.
No.
122880
Petitioner
argues
that
the
requirement
under
Article
805
of
the
April
12,
2006
Civil
Code
that
“the
number
of
pages
used
in
a
notarial
will
be
Tinga,
J.
stated
in
the
attestation
clause”
is
merely
directory,
rather
than
mandatory,
and
thus
susceptible
to
what
he
termed
as
“the
FACTS:
Petitioner
Azuela
filed
a
petition
with
the
trial
court
for
substantial
compliance
rule.”
the
probate
of
a
notarial
will
executed
by
Igsolo
and
notarized
on
the
same
day.
The
will
consisted
of
two
(2)
pages
and
was
written
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
subject
will
complied
with
the
in
Filipino.
The
attestation
clause
did
not
state
the
number
of
requirements
of
the
law
and,
hence,
should
be
admitted
to
pages
and
it
was
not
signed
by
the
attesting
witnesses
at
the
probate.
bottom
thereof.
The
said
witnesses
affixed
their
signatures
on
the
left-‐hand
margin
of
both
pages
of
the
will
though.
RATIO:
NO.
The
failure
of
the
attestation
clause
to
state
the
number
of
pages
on
which
the
will
was
written
remains
a
fatal
Geralda
Castillo,
attorney-‐in-‐fact
of
"the
12
legitimate
heirs,
flaw,
despite
Art.
809.
This
requirement
aims
at
safeguarding
the
opposed
the
petition,
claiming
that
the
will
was
a
forgery.
She
also
will
against
possible
interpolation
or
omission
of
one
or
some
of
argued
that
the
will
was
not
executed
and
attested
to
in
its
pages
and
thus
preventing
any
increase
or
decrease
in
the
accordance
with
law.
She
pointed
out
that
the
decedent’s
pages.
signature
did
not
appear
on
the
second
page
of
the
will,
and
the
will
was
not
properly
acknowledged.
The
provision
requires
that
the
testator
and
the
instrumental
witnesses
sign
each
and
every
page
of
the
will
on
the
left
margin,
The
trial
court
held
the
will
to
be
authentic
and
to
have
been
except
the
last;
and
that
all
the
pages
shall
be
numbered
executed
in
accordance
with
law
and,
thus,
admitted
it
to
probate,
correlatively
in
letters
placed
on
the
upper
part
of
each
page.
calling
to
fore
“the
modern
tendency
in
respect
to
the
formalities
in
the
execution
of
a
will…with
the
end
in
view
of
giving
the
In
this
case,
the
decedent,
unlike
the
witnesses,
failed
to
sign
both
testator
more
freedom
in
expressing
his
last
wishes.”
According
to
pages
of
the
will
on
the
left
margin,
her
only
signature
appearing
the
trial
court,
the
declaration
at
the
end
of
the
will
under
the
sub-‐ at
the
so-‐called
"logical
end"
of
the
will
on
its
first
page.
Also,
the
title,
“Patunay
Ng
Mga
Saksi,”
comprised
the
attestation
clause
and
will
itself
is
not
numbered
correlatively
in
letters
on
each
page,
but
the
acknowledgement,
and
was
a
substantial
compliance
with
instead
numbered
with
Arabic
numerals.
There
is
a
line
of
thought
the
requirements
of
the
law.
It
also
held
that
the
signing
by
the
that
has
disabused
the
notion
that
these
two
requirements
be
subscribing
witnesses
on
the
left
margin
of
the
second
page
of
the
construed
as
mandatory.
will
containing
the
attestation
clause
and
acknowledgment,
instead
of
at
the
bottom
thereof,
substantially
satisfied
the
There
is
substantial
compliance
with
this
requirement
if
the
will
purpose
of
identification
and
attestation
of
the
will.
states
elsewhere
in
it
how
many
pages
it
is
comprised
of.
In
this
case,
however,
there
could
have
been
no
substantial
compliance
with
the
requirements
under
Art.
805
of
the
Civil
Code
since
there
is
no
statement
in
the
attestation
clause
or
anywhere
in
the
will
itself
as
to
the
number
of
pages
which
comprise
the
will.
There
was
an
incomplete
attempt
to
comply
with
this
requisite,
a
space
having
been
allotted
for
the
insertion
of
the
number
of
pages
in
the
attestation
clause.
Yet
the
blank
was
never
filled
in.
The
subject
will
cannot
be
considered
to
have
been
validly
attested
to
by
the
instrumental
witnesses.
While
the
signatures
of
the
instrumental
witnesses
appear
on
the
left-‐hand
margin
of
the
will,
they
do
not
appear
at
the
bottom
of
the
attestation
clause.
An
unsigned
attestation
clause
results
in
an
unattested
will.
Even
if
the
instrumental
witnesses
signed
the
left-‐hand
margin
of
the
page
containing
the
unsigned
attestation
clause,
such
signatures
cannot
demonstrate
these
witnesses’
undertakings
in
the
clause,
since
the
signatures
that
do
appear
on
the
page
were
directed
towards
a
wholly
different
avowal.
BLIND
TESTATOR
ISSUES:
-‐ Whether
or
not
the
decedent
was
blind
for
purposes
of
Art.
Case
No.
20
808
at
the
time
his
will
and
its
codicil
were
executed.
In
the
Matter
of
the
Probate
of
the
Last
Will
and
Testament
of
the
Deceased
Brigido
Alvarado,
Cesar
Alvarado
(Petitioner)
-‐ Whether
or
not
the
double-‐reading
requirement
of
said
vs.
Hon.
Ramon
G.
Gaviola,
Jr.,
Presiding
Justice,
Hon.
Ma.
article
complied
with.
Rosario
Quetulio
Losa,
and
Hon.
Leonor
Ines
Luciano,
Associate
Justices,
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,
First
RATIO:
As
to
the
first
issue,
YES.
Garcia
vs.
Vasquez,
provides
the
Division
(Civil
Cases),
and
Bayani
Ma.
Rino
(Respondents)
rationale
behind
the
requirement
of
reading
the
will
to
the
G.R.
No.
74695
testator
if
he
is
blind
or
incapable
of
reading
the
will
himself
(as
September
14,
1993
when
he
is
illiterate),
is
to
make
the
provisions
thereof
known
to
Bellosillo,
J.
him,
so
that
he
may
be
able
to
object
if
they
are
not
in
accordance
with
his
wishes
.
.
."
From
the
foregoing,
Art.
808
applies
not
only
FACTS:
Brigido
Alvarado
executed
a
notarial
will
wherein
he
to
blind
testators
but
also
to
those
who,
for
one
reason
or
another,
disinherited
an
illegitimate
son
(Petitioner)
and
expressly
revoked
are
"incapable
of
reading
their
will."
Since
Brigido
Alvarado
was
a
previously
executed
holographic
will.
After
which,
a
codicil
was
incapable
of
reading
his
will
and
codicil
due
to
his
"poor,"
executed
changing
some
dispositions
in
the
notarial
will
to
"defective,"
or
"blurred"
vision,
Brigido
Alvarado
comes
within
the
generate
cash
for
the
testator's
eye
operation,
who
was
then
scope
of
the
term
"blind"
as
it
is
used
in
Art.
808.
suffering
from
glaucoma
but
the
disinheritance
and
revocatory
clauses
were
unchanged.
As
testified
to
by
the
three
instrumental
As
to
the
second
issue,
YES.
Art.
808
provides
that
“If
the
testator
witnesses,
the
notary
public
and
by
Private
Respondent,
the
is
blind,
the
will
shall
be
read
to
him
twice;
once,
by
one
of
the
testator
did
not
read
the
final
draft
of
the
will
himself.
subscribing,
witnesses,
and
again,
by
the
notary
public
before
whom
the
will
is
acknowledged."
This
Court
has
held
that
Instead,
Private-‐Respondent,
as
the
lawyer
who
drafted
the
substantial
compliance
is
acceptable
where
the
purpose
of
the
law
document,
read
the
same
aloud
in
the
presence
all
of
them
which
has
been
satisfied.
they
followed
the
reading
with
their
own
respective
copies
previously
furnished
them.
A
petition
for
the
probate
of
the
In
the
case
at
bar,
private
respondent
read
the
testator's
will
and
notarial
will
and
codicil
was
filed
by
Private-‐Respondent
as
codicil
aloud
in
the
presence
of
the
testator,
his
three
instrumental
executor.
Petitioner,
in
turn,
filed
an
Opposition
interposing
the
witnesses,
and
the
notary
public,
the
latter
four
persons
following
defense
that
the
deceased
was
blind
within
the
meaning
of
the
law
the
reading
word
for
word
with
their
own
copies.
Prior
and
at
the
time
his
will
and
the
codicil
were
executed
and
that
since
subsequent
thereto,
the
testator
affirmed,
upon
being
asked,
that
the
reading
required
by
Art.
808
was
not
complied
with,
probate
the
contents
read
corresponded
with
his
instructions.
Only
then
of
the
will
and
codicil
should
have
been
denied.
did
the
signing
and
acknowledgement
take
place.
It
can
be
concluded
that
the
testator
was
assured
that
what
was
read
to
him
RTC:
Allowed
the
will.
were
the
terms
actually
appearing
on
the
documents.
CA:
Affirm.
The
spirit
behind
the
law
was
served
though
the
letter
was
not.
Although
there
should
be
strict
compliance
with
the
substantial
requirements
of
the
law
in
order
to
insure
the
authenticity
of
the
will,
the
formal
imperfections
should
be
brushed
aside
when
they
do
not
affect
its
purpose
and
which,
when
taken
into
account,
may
only
defeat
the
testator's
will.
HEIRS
reprobate
court
already
issued
an
order,
disallowing
the
wills
Judge
de
la
Llana
reasoned
out
that
petitioner
failed
to
prove
the
Case
No.
21
law
of
New
York
on
procedure
and
allowance
of
wills
and
the
Salud
Teodo
Vda.
De
Perez
(Petitioner)
vs.
Hon.
Zotico
Tolete,
court
had
no
way
of
telling
whether
the
wills
were
executed
in
in
his
capacity
as
Presiding
Judge,
Branch
18,
RTC
of
Bulacan
accordance
with
the
law
of
New
York.
In
the
absence
of
such
(Respondent)
evidence,
the
presumption
is
that
the
law
of
succession
of
the
G.R.
No.
76714
foreign
country
is
the
same
as
the
law
of
the
Philippines.
However,
June
2,1994
he
noted,
that
there
were
only
two
witnesses
to
the
wills
of
the
Quiason,
J.
Cunanan
spouses
and
the
Philippine
law
requires
three
witnesses
and
that
the
wills
were
not
signed
on
each
and
every
page,
a
FACTS:
Dr.
Jose
Cunanan
and
his
wife,
Dr.
Evelyn
Perez-‐Cunanan,
requirement
of
the
Philippine
law.
who
became
American
citizens
and
residents
of
New
York,
each
executed
a
will
also
in
New
York,
containing
provisions
on
Petitioner
filed
MR
of
the
Order
where
she
had
sufficiently
proven
presumption
of
survivorship
(in
the
event
that
it
is
not
known
the
applicable
laws
of
New
York
governing
the
execution
of
last
which
one
of
the
spouses
died
first,
the
husband
shall
be
presumed
wills
and
testaments.
to
have
predeceased
his
wife).
Later,
the
entire
family
perished
in
a
fire
that
gutted
their
home.
Thus,
Rafael,
who
was
named
trustee
Judge
de
la
Llana
denied
the
motion
of
petitioner
for
the
in
Jose’s
will,
filed
for
separate
probate
proceedings
of
the
wills
in
suspension
of
the
proceedings
but
gave
her
15
days
upon
arrival
NYC
which
was
admitted
to
probate
and
letters
testamentary
were
in
the
country
within
which
to
act
on
the
other
order
issued
that
issued
in
his
favor.
same
day.
Contending
that
the
second
portion
of
the
second
order
left
its
finality
to
the
discretion
of
counsel
for
petitioner,
the
Later,
Evelyn’s
mother,
Salud
Perez,
filed
a
petition
for
reprobate
Cunanans
filed
a
motion
for
the
reconsideration
of
the
in
Bulacan
of
the
two
wills
ancillary
to
the
probate
proceedings
in
objectionable
portion
of
the
said
order
so
that
it
would
conform
New
York
and
asked
that
she
be
appointed
the
special
with
the
pertinent
provisions
of
the
Judiciary
Reorganization
Act
administratrix
of
the
estate
of
the
deceased
couple
consisting
of
1980
and
the
Interim
Rules
of
Court.
primarily
of
a
farm
land
in
San
Miguel,
Bulacan
to
which
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
petitioner
upon
her
filing
of
a
P10,000.00
bond.
The
Judge
of
Branch
18
of
RTC
Malolos,
to
which
the
reprobate
case
was
reassigned,
issued
an
order
stating
that
"(W)hen
the
last
Rafael
opposed,
arguing
that
Salud
was
not
an
heir
according
to
will
and
testament
.
.
.
was
denied
probate,"
the
case
was
New
York
law.
He
contended
that
since
the
wills
were
executed
in
terminated
and
therefore
all
orders
theretofore
issued
should
be
New
York,
New
York
law
should
govern.
He
further
argued
that,
by
given
finality.
New
York
law,
he
and
his
brothers
and
sisters
were
Jose’s
heirs
and
as
such
entitled
to
notice
of
the
reprobate
proceedings,
which
Respondent
Judge
to
which
the
case
was
reassigned
denied
the
Salud
failed
to
give.
motion
for
reconsideration
holding
that
the
documents
submitted
by
petitioner
proved
"that
the
wills
of
the
testator
domiciled
Salud
said
she
was
the
sole
heir
of
her
daughter,
Evelyn,
and
that
abroad
were
properly
executed,
genuine
and
sufficient
to
possess
the
two
wills
were
in
accordance
with
New
York
law.
But
before
real
and
personal
property;
that
letters
testamentary
were
issued;
she
could
present
evidence
to
prove
the
law
of
New
York,
the
and
that
proceedings
were
held
on
a
foreign
tribunal
and
proofs
taken
by
a
competent
judge
who
inquired
into
all
the
facts
and
Philippines.
.
.
.
Thus,
proof
that
both
wills
conform
with
the
circumstances
and
being
satisfied
with
his
findings
issued
a
decree
formalities
prescribed
by
New
York
laws
or
by
Philippine
laws
is
admitting
to
probate
the
wills
in
question.
"However,
respondent
imperative.
The
evidence
necessary
for
the
reprobate
or
allowance
Judge
said
that
the
documents
did
not
establish
the
law
of
New
of
wills
which
have
been
probated
outside
of
the
Philippines
are
as
York
on
the
procedure
and
allowance
of
wills.”
follows:
Petitioner
filed
a
motion
to
allow
her
to
present
further
evidence
1) the
due
execution
of
the
will
in
accordance
with
the
foreign
on
the
foreign
law.
However,
without
waiting
for
petitioner
to
laws;
adduce
the
additional
evidence,
respondent
Judge
ruled
in
his
order
that
he
found
"no
compelling
reason
to
disturb
its
ruling
of
2) the
testator
has
his
domicile
in
the
foreign
country
and
not
March
31,
1986"
but
allowed
petitioner
to
"file
anew
the
in
the
Philippines;
appropriate
probate
proceedings
for
each
of
the
testator".
3) the
will
has
been
admitted
to
probate
in
such
country;
Second
MR
praying
that
she
be
granted
"the
opportunity
to
present
evidence
on
what
the
law
of
the
State
of
New
York
has
on
4) the
fact
that
the
foreign
tribunal
is
a
probate
court,
and
the
probate
and
allowance
of
wills"
but
respondent
Judge
denied
the
motion
holding
that
to
allow
the
probate
of
two
wills
in
a
5) the
laws
of
a
foreign
country
on
procedure
and
allowance
single
proceeding
"would
be
a
departure
from
the
typical
and
of
wills.
established
mode
of
probate
where
one
petition
takes
care
of
one
will."
Except
for
the
first
and
last
requirements,
the
petitioner
submitted
all
the
needed
evidence.
Respondent
Judge
denied
the
MR
filed
by
petitioner
on
the
grounds
that
"the
probate
of
separate
wills
of
two
or
more
This
petition
cannot
be
completely
resolved
without
touching
on
a
different
persons
even
if
they
are
husband
and
wife
cannot
be
very
glaring
fact
—
petitioner
has
always
considered
herself
the
undertaken
in
a
single
petition"
sole
heir
of
Dr.
Evelyn
Perez
Cunanan
and
because
she
does
not
consider
herself
an
heir
of
Dr.
Jose
F.
Cunanan,
she
noticeably
Hence,
petitioner
instituted
the
instant
petition,
arguing
that
the
failed
to
notify
his
heirs
of
the
filing
of
the
proceedings.
Thus,
even
evidence
offered
at
the
hearing
sufficiently
proved
the
laws
of
the
in
the
instant
petition,
she
only
impleaded
respondent
Judge,
State
of
New
York
on
the
allowance
of
wills,
and
that
the
separate
forgetting
that
a
judge
whose
order
is
being
assailed
is
merely
a
wills
of
the
Cunanan
spouses
need
not
be
probated
in
separate
nominal
or
formal
party.
proceedings.
The
rule
that
the
court
having
jurisdiction
over
the
reprobate
of
a
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
reprobate
of
the
wills
should
be
will
shall
"cause
notice
thereof
to
be
given
as
in
case
of
an
original
allowed.
will
presented
for
allowance"
(Revised
Rules
of
Court,
Rule
27,
Section
2)
means
that
with
regard
to
notices,
the
will
probated
RATIO:
The
respective
wills
of
the
Cunanan
spouses,
who
were
abroad
should
be
treated
as
if
it
were
an
"original
will"
or
a
will
American
citizens,
will
only
be
effective
in
this
country
upon
that
is
presented
for
probate
for
the
first
time.
compliance
with
the
following
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Accordingly,
compliance
with
Sections
3
and
4
of
Rule
76,
which
require
publication
and
notice
by
mail
or
personally
to
the
"known
heirs,
legatees,
and
devisees
of
the
testator
resident
in
the
Philippines"
and
to
the
executor,
if
he
is
not
the
petitioner,
are
required.
The
brothers
and
sisters
of
Dr.
Jose
F.
Cunanan,
contrary
to
petitioner's
claim
are
entitled
to
notices
of
the
time
and
place
for
proving
the
wills.
Under
Section
4
of
Rule
76
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
the
"court
shall
also
cause
copies
of
the
notice
of
the
time
and
place
fixed
for
proving
the
will
to
be
addressed
to
the
designated
or
other
known
heirs,
legatees,
and
devisees
of
the
testator,
.
.
."
In
the
case
at
bench,
the
Cunanan
spouses
executed
separate
wills.
Since
the
two
wills
contain
essentially
the
same
provisions
and
pertain
to
property
which
in
all
probability
are
conjugal
in
nature,
practical
considerations
dictate
their
joint
probate.
As
this
Court
has
held
a
number
of
times,
it
will
always
strive
to
settle
the
entire
controversy
in
a
single
proceeding
leaving
no
root
or
branch
to
bear
the
seeds
of
future
litigation.
Respondent
Judge's
view
that
the
Rules
on
allowance
of
wills
is
couched
in
singular
terms
and
therefore
should
be
interpreted
to
mean
that
there
should
be
separate
probate
proceedings
for
the
wills
of
the
Cunanan
spouses
is
too
literal
and
simplistic
an
approach.
Such
view
overlooks
the
provisions
of
Section
2,
Rule
1
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court,
which
advise
that
the
rules
shall
be
"liberally
construed
in
order
to
promote
their
object
and
to
assist
the
parties
in
obtaining
just,
speedy,
and
inexpensive
determination
of
every
action
and
proceeding."
A
literal
application
of
the
Rules
should
be
avoided
if
they
would
only
result
in
the
delay
in
the
administration
of
justice.
EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY
CA:
Reversed
the
judgment
of
CFI
of
Ilocos
Norte.
Ruled
that
attestation
clause
failed:
Case
No.
22
(1)
To
certify
That
said
testator
has
written
a
cross
at
the
In
the
Matter
of
the
Will
of
Antero
Mercado,
Deceased.
end
of
his
name;
and
Rosario
Garcia
(Petitioner)
vs.
Juliana
Lacuesta,
et
al.
(Respondents)
(2) To
certify
that
the
will
was
signed
on
all
the
left
margins
G.R.
No.
L-‐4067
of
the
three
pages
and
at
the
end
of
the
will
by
Atty.
November
29,
1951
Florentino
Javier
at
the
express
request
of
the
testator
Paras,
C.J.
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
each
and
every
one
of
the
witnesses.
FACTS:
The
will
of
Antonio
Mercado
(testator),
dated
January
3,
1943,
is
written
in
the
Ilocano
dialect
and
contains
in
the
Petitioner
Garcia
appealed
to
the
SC
by
way
of
certiorari
from
the
attestation
clause:
Decision
of
CA.
(1) Declaration
that
the
testament
of
Antero
Mercado
was
signed
by
himself
and
by
the
witnesses
below
the
Petitioner’s
contention:
There
is
no
need
for
such
recital
because
attestation
clause;
the
cross
written
by
the
testator
after
his
name
is
a
sufficient
signature
and
the
signature
of
Atty.
Florentino
Javier
is
a
(2) That
the
signing
is
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
surplusage.
That
the
cross
is
as
much
a
signature
as
a
thumbmark.
witnesses,
and
the
witnesses
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
each
other;
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
attestation
clause
is
fatally
defective
for
failing
to
state
that
Antero
Mercado
caused
Atty.
Florentino
Javier
(3) That
it
was
signed
at
the
left
margin
of
the
3
pages
of
to
write
the
testator's
name
under
his
express
direction
the
will;
RATIO:
YES,
attestation
clause
is
fatally
defective.
(4) That
the
will
is
written
in
the
Ilocano
dialect,
which
is
spoken
and
understood
by
the
testator;
and
As
to
the
cross
-‐
It
cannot
be
shown
that
the
cross
appearing
on
the
will
is
the
usual
signature
of
Antero
Mercado
or
even
one
of
(5) That
it
bears
the
corresponding
number
in
letter
which
the
ways
by
which
he
signed
his
name.
Also,
it
cannot
be
likened
to
compose
of
the
3
pages
of
the
will.
a
thumbmark,
because
the
cross
cannot
and
does
not
have
the
trustworthiness
of
a
thumbmark
The
will
likewise
appears
to
be
signed
by
Atty.
Florentino
Javier
who
wrote
the
name
of
Antero
Mercado,
followed
below
by
“A
As
to
the
signing
of
Atty.
Florentino
-‐
When
the
testator
expressly
ruego
del
testador
(to
beg
the
testator)”
and
the
name
of
caused
another
to
sign
the
former's
name,
this
fact
must
be
recited
Florentino
Javier.
Antero
Mercado
is
alleged
to
have
written
a
in
the
attestation
clause.
cross
immediately
after
his
name.
CFI:
Allowed
the
will
Case
No.
23
"(a)
Because
the
same
had
not
been
authorized
nor
signed
Yap
Tua
(Petitioner-‐Appellee)
vs.
Yap
Ca
Kuan
and
Yap
Ca
Llu
by
the
witnesses
as
the
law
prescribes.
(Objectors-‐Appellants)
G.R.
No.
6845
"(b)
Because
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will,
the
said
September
1,
1914
Tomasa
Elizaga
Yap
Caong
was
not
then
mentally
JOHNSON,
J.
capacitated
to
execute
the
same,
due
to
her
sickness.
FACTS:
One
Perfecto
Gabriel,
representing
the
petitioner,
Yap
Tua,
"(c)
Because
her
signature
to
the
will
had
been
obtained
presented
a
petition
in
the
CFI
of
the
city
of
Manila,
asking
that
the
through
fraud
and
illegal
influence
upon
the
part
of
persons
will
of
Tomasa
Elizaga
Yap
Caong
be
admitted
to
probate.
It
who
were
to
receive
a
benefit
from
the
same,
and
because
appears
that
the
said
Tomasa
Elizaga
Yap
Caong
died
in
the
city
of
the
said
Tomasa
Elizaga
Yap
Caong
had
no
intention
of
Manila
on
the
11th
day
of
August,
1909.
Accompanying
said
executing
the
same."
petition
and
attached
thereto
was
the
alleged
will
of
the
deceased.
Second.
That
before
the
execution
of
the
said
will,
which
they
It
appears
that
the
will
was
signed
by
deceased,
as
well
as
Anselmo
alleged
to
be
null,
the
said
Tomasa
Elizaga
Yap
Caong
had
executed
Zacarias,
Severo
Tabora,
and
Timoteo
Paez.
After
hearing
the
another
will,
with
all
the
formalities
required
by
law,
upon
the
6th
foregoing
witnesses,
the
Honorable
A.
S.
Crossfield,
judge,
ordered
day
of
August,
1909.
that
the
last
will
and
testament
of
Tomasa
Elizaga
Yap
Caong
be
allowed
and
admitted
to
probate.
The
court
further
ordered
that
Upon
the
foregoing
facts
the
court
was
requested
to
annul
and
set
one
Yap
Tua
be
appointed
as
executor
of
the
will.
aside
the
order
of
the
29th
day
of
September,
1909,
and
to
grant
to
said
minors
an
opportunity
to
present
new
proof
relating
to
the
On
the
28th
of
February,
1910,
Yap
Ca
Kuan
and
Yap
Ca
Llu
due
execution
of
said
will.
appeared
and
presented
a
petition,
alleging
that
they
were
interested
in
the
matters
of
the
said
will
and
desired
to
intervene
The
Judge
granted
the
motion
for
rehearing.
At
the
rehearing,
a
asked
that
a
guardian
ad
litem
be
appointed
to
represented
them
number
of
witnesses
were
examined.
At
the
close
of
the
rehearing,
in
the
cause.
the
court
reached
the
conclusion
that
the
will
was
the
last
will
and
testament
of
Tomasa
and
admitted
it
to
probate.
The
court
appointed
Gabriel
La
O
as
guardian
ad
litem
of
said
parties.
Gabriel
La
O
accepted
said
appointment,
took
the
oath
of
ISSUES:
office
and
entered
upon
the
performance
of
his
duties
as
-‐ Whether
or
not
the
will
was
duly
executed
in
accordance
guardian
ad
litem
of
said
parties.
Gabriel
La
O
appeared
in
court
with
law.
and
presented
a
motion
in
which
he
alleged,
in
substance:
-‐ Whether
or
not
the
will
was
executed
in
the
presence.
First.
That
the
will
dated
the
11th
day
of
August,
1909,
and
admitted
to
probate
by
order
of
the
court
on
the
29th
day
of
RATIO:
As
to
the
first
issue,
YES.
Several
witnesses
testified
that
September,
1909,
was
null,
for
the
following
reasons:
they
saw
her
write
the
name
"Tomasa."
One
of
the
witnesses
testified
that
she
had
written
her
full
name.
We
are
of
the
opinion,
and
we
think
the
law
sustains
our
conclusion,
that
if
Tomasa
Elizaga
Yap
Caong
signed
any
portion
of
her
name
in
the
will,
with
are
made
where
it
is
possible
for
each
of
the
necessary
parties,
if
the
intention
to
sign
the
same,
that
it
will
amount
to
a
signature.
It
they
so
desire,
to
see
the
signatures
placed
upon
the
will.
has
been
held
time
and
time
again
that
one
who
makes
a
will
may
sign
the
same
by
using
a
mark,
the
name
having
been
written
by
others.
If
writing
a
mark
simply
upon
a
will
is
sufficient
indication
of
the
intention
of
the
person
to
make
and
execute
a
will,
then
certainly
the
writing
of
a
portion
or
all
of
her
name
ought
to
be
accepted
as
a
clear
indication
of
her
intention
to
execute
the
will.
It
has
been
held
time
again
that
one
who
makes
a
will
may
sign
the
same
by
the
use
of
a
mark,
the
name
having
been
written
by
others.
If
the
writing
of
a
mark
simply
upon
a
will
is
sufficient
indication
of
the
intention
of
the
person
to
make
and
execute
it,
then
certainly
the
writing
of
a
portion
or
all
of
the
name
ought
to
be
accepted
as
a
clear
indication
of
intention
to
execute
it.
The
man
who
cannot
write
and
who
is
obliged
to
make
his
mark
simply
therefore
upon
the
will,
is
held
to
"sign"
as
effectually
as
if
he
had
written
his
initials
or
his
full
name.
It
would
seem
to
be
sufficient,
under
the
law
requiring
a
signature
by
the
person
making
a
will
to
make
his
mark,
to
place
his
initials
or
all
or
any
part
of
his
name
thereon.
As
to
the
second
issue,
YES.
An
effort
was
made
to
show
that
the
will
was
signed
by
the
witnesses
in
one
room
and
by
Tomasa
in
another.
A
plan
of
the
room
or
rooms
in
which
the
will
was
signed
was
presented
as
proof
and
it
was
shown
that
there
was
but
one
room;
that
one
part
of
the
room
was
one
or
two
steps
below
the
floor
of
the
other;
that
the
table
on
which
the
witnesses
signed
the
will
was
located
upon
the
lower
floor
of
the
room.
It
was
also
shown
that
from
the
bed
in
which
Tomasa
was
lying,
it
was
possible
for
her
to
see
the
table
on
which
the
witnesses
signed
the
will.
While
the
rule
is
absolute
that
one
who
makes
a
will
must
sign
the
same
in
the
presence
of
the
witnesses
and
that
the
witnesses
must
sign
in
the
presence
of
each
other,
as
well
as
in
the
presence
of
the
one
making
the
will,
yet,
nevertheless,
the
actual
seeing
of
the
signature
made
is
not
necessary.
It
is
sufficient
if
the
signatures
Case
No.
24
Applying
the
foregoing
to
the
will
in
question,
where
the
latter
Gestrudis
Abangan
(Executrix-‐Appellee)
vs.
Anastacia
consists
entirely
of
two
sheets,
the
first
containing
all
of
the
Abangan
et
al.
(Opponents-‐Appellant)
disposition
of
the
testatrix
duly
signed
at
the
bottom
by
a
certain
G.R.
No.
13431
Martin
Montalban,
in
the
name
and
under
the
direction
of
the
November
12,
1919
testatrix,
and
by
three
witnesses,
and
the
second
containing
only
Avancena,
J.
the
attestation
clause
duly
signed
at
the
bottom
by
the
three
instrumental
witnesses,
the
Court
concluded
that:
FACTS:
On
September
19,
1917,
the
CFI
of
Cebu
admitted
to
probate
Ana
Abangan’s
will
duly
executed
sometime
in
July,
1916.
1) The
signature
of
the
testatrix
and
the
instrumental
Appellants
however
contend
that
such
will
had
defects
which
witnesses
need
not
appear
on
the
margins
since
the
would
necessarily
prevent
the
will
from
being
probated.
signature
found
in
the
first
page
already
guarantees
its
Specifically,
appellants
contend
that
the
two
sheets
consisting
of
authenticity;
the
will
were
neither
signed
on
the
left
margin
by
the
testatrix
and
the
three
witnesses
nor
numbered
by
letters.
2) The
numbering
of
the
pages
may
be
dispensed
with
since
all
the
dispositive
parts
of
the
will
are
found
on
one
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
omission
of
the
signature
of
the
sheet
only,
the
objective
of
the
numbering
therefore
testatrix
and
the
three
witnesses
on
the
left
margin
is
fatal
to
the
disappears
since
the
removal
of
that
singular
sheet,
validity
of
the
will.
although
unnumbered,
cannot
be
hidden.
RATIO:
NO,
the
omission
of
the
signature
as
well
as
the
failure
to
The
Court
therefore
sustained
the
decision
of
the
CFI
of
Cebu
in
number
each
page
was
not
fatal
to
the
validity
of
the
will.
Under
favor
of
the
appellee.
R.A.
2645,
the
object
of
the
solemnities
surrounding
the
execution
of
wills
is
to
close
the
door
against
bad
faith
and
fraud,
thereby:
1)
avoiding
substitution
of
wills
and
testaments;
and
2)
guarantee
their
truth
and
authenticity.
Thus,
when
an
interpretation
of
the
law
already
assures
such
ends,
any
other
interpretation
whatsoever
that
adds
nothing
but
demands
more
requisites
entirely
unnecessary,
useless,
and
frustrates
the
exercise
of
the
right
to
make
a
will,
such
an
interpretation
must
be
discarded.
The
Court
noted
that
the
law,
in
requiring
the
signature
on
the
margin,
took
into
consideration
the
case
of
a
will
written
on
several
sheets
and
must
have
referred
to
the
sheets
which
the
testator
and
the
witnesses
do
not
have
to
sign
at
the
bottom.
Further,
the
object
of
the
law
in
requiring
that
each
and
every
page
of
the
will
must
be
numbered
correlatively
in
letters
was
to
know
whether
any
sheet
of
the
will
has
been
removed.
Case
No.
25
While
another
in
testator's
place
might
have
directed
someone
Testacy
of
Sixto
Lopez.
Jose
S.
Lopez
(Petitioner-‐Appellee)
vs.
else
to
sign
for
him,
as
appellant
contends
should
have
been
done,
Agustin
Liboro
(Oppositor-‐Appellant)
there
is
nothing
curious
or
suspicious
in
the
fact
that
the
testator
G.R.
No.
L-‐1787
chose
the
use
of
mark
as
the
means
of
authenticating
his
will.
It
August
27,
1948
was
a
matter
of
taste
or
preference.
Both
ways
are
good.
A
statute
Tuason,
J.
requiring
a
will
to
be
"signed"
is
satisfied
if
the
signature
is
made
by
the
testator's
mark.
(De
Gala
vs.
Gonzales
and
Ona,
53
Phil.,
FACTS:
The
appellant
opposed
unsuccessfully
in
the
Court
of
First
108;
28
R.
C.
L.,
117.)
Instance
of
Batangas
the
probate
of
what
purports
to
be
the
last
will
and
testament
(Exhibit
A)
of
Don
Sixto
Lopez,
who
died
at
the
As
to
the
second
issue,
NO.
The
purpose
of
the
law
in
prescribing
age
of
83
in
Balayan,
Batangas,
on
March
3,
1947,
almost
six
the
paging
of
wills
is
guard
against
fraud,
and
to
afford
means
of
months
after
the
document
in
question
was
executed.
preventing
the
substitution
or
of
defecting
the
loss
of
any
of
its
pages.
(Abangan
vs.
Abangan,
40
Phil.,
476.)
In
the
present
case,
The
present
appellant
specified
grounds
(pertinent
to
the
case
the
omission
to
put
a
page
number
on
the
first
sheet,
if
that
be
topic)
for
his
opposition,
to
wit:
necessary,
is
supplied
by
other
forms
of
identification
more
trustworthy
than
the
conventional
numerical
words
or
characters.
1) That
his
signature
appearing
in
said
will
was
a
forgery;
The
unnumbered
page
is
clearly
identified
as
the
first
page
by
the
internal
sense
of
its
contents
considered
in
relation
to
the
contents
2) That
the
signature
of
the
testator
was
procured
by
fraud
or
of
the
second
page.
By
their
meaning
and
coherence,
the
first
and
trick.
second
lines
on
the
second
page
are
undeniably
a
continuation
of
the
last
sentence
of
the
testament,
before
the
attestation
clause,
In
addition,
the
appellant
believes
that
there
is
a
fatal
defect
which
starts
at
the
bottom
of
the
preceding
page.
because
the
two-‐paged
will
in
question,
each
of
which
is
written
on
one
side
of
a
separate
sheet,
but
the
first
sheet
is
not
paged
Furthermore,
the
unnumbered
page
contains
the
caption
either
in
letters
or
in
Arabic
numerals.
"TESTAMENTO,"
the
invocation
of
the
Almighty,
and
a
recital
that
the
testator
was
in
full
use
of
his
testamentary
faculty,
—
all
of
ISSUES:
which,
in
the
logical
order
of
sequence,
precede
the
direction
for
-‐ Whether
or
not
the
use
of
a
thumbmark
in
signing
the
will
the
disposition
of
the
marker's
property.
Again,
as
page
two
is
already
substantial
compliance.
contains
only
the
two
lines
above
mentioned,
the
attestation
clause,
the
mark
of
the
testator
and
the
signatures
of
the
-‐ Whether
or
not
the
will
not
paged
in
letters
or
in
Arabic
witnesses,
the
other
sheet
can
not
by
any
possibility
be
taken
for
numerals
is
a
fatal
defect
other
than
page
one.
Abangan
vs.
Abangan,supra,
and
Fernandez
vs.
Vergel
de
Dios,
46
Phil.,
922
are
decisive
of
this
issue.
RATIO:
As
to
the
first
issue,
YES.
The
testator
affixed
his
thumbmark
to
the
instrument
instead
of
signing
his
name.
The
reason
for
this
was
that
the
testator
was
suffering
from
"partial
paralysis."
Case
No.
26
Florentino
Javier
to
write
the
testator's
name
under
his
express
In
the
Matter
of
the
Will
of
Antero
Mercado,
Deceased.
direction,
as
required
by
section
618
of
the
Code
of
Civil
Rosario
Garcia
(Petitioner)
vs.
Juliana
Lacuesta,
et
al.
Procedure.
(Respondents)
G.R.
No.
L-‐4067
The
herein
petitioner
argues,
however,
that
there
is
no
need
for
November
29,
1951
such
recital
because
the
cross
written
by
the
testator
after
his
Paras,
C.J.
name
is
a
sufficient
signature
and
the
signature
of
Atty.
Florentino
Javier
is
a
surplusage.
FACTS:
The
will
of
Antero
Mercado
is
written
in
the
Ilocano
dialect.
It
appears
to
have
been
signed
by
Atty.
Florentino
Javier
Petitioner's
theory
is
that
the
cross
is
as
much
a
signature
as
a
who
wrote
the
name
of
Antero
Mercado,
followed
below
by
"A
thumbmark,
the
latter
having
been
held
sufficient
by
the
Court
in
reugo
del
testator"
and
the
name
of
Florentino
Javier.
Antero
several
cases.
It
is
not
here
pretended
that
the
cross
appearing
on
Mercado
is
alleged
to
have
written
a
cross
immediately
after
his
the
will
is
the
usual
signature
of
Antero
Mercado
or
even
one
of
name.
the
ways
by
which
he
signed
his
name.
The
Court
of
Appeals,
reversing
the
judgement
of
the
Court
of
First
After
examination,
the
Court
stated
that
the
mere
sign
of
the
cross
Instance
of
Ilocos
Norte,
ruled
that
the
attestation
clause
failed
to:
is
not
similar
to
a
thumbmark
since
the
cross
cannot
and
does
not
have
the
trustworthiness
of
a
thumbmark.
With
this,
it
is
1) First,
to
certify
that
the
will
was
signed
on
all
the
left
unnecessary
to
determine
if
there
is
a
sufficient
recital
in
the
margins
of
the
three
pages
and
at
the
end
of
the
will
by
attestation
clause
as
to
the
signing
of
the
will
by
the
testator
in
the
Atty.
Florentino
Javier
at
the
express
request
of
the
testator
presence
of
the
witnesses,
and
by
the
latter
in
the
presence
of
the
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
each
and
every
one
of
testator
and
of
each
other.
the
witnesses;
2) Second,
to
certify
that
after
the
signing
of
the
name
of
the
testator
by
Atty.
Javier
at
the
former's
request
said
testator
has
written
a
cross
at
the
end
of
his
name
and
on
the
left
margin
of
the
three
pages
of
which
the
will
consists
and
at
the
end
thereof;
and
3) Third,
to
certify
that
the
three
witnesses
signed
the
will
in
all
the
pages
thereon
in
the
presence
of
the
testator
and
of
each
other.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
attestation
clause
is
valid.
RATIO:
YES,
The
Court
held
that
the
attestation
clause
is
fatally
defective
for
failing
to
state
that
Antero
Mercado
caused
Atty.
Case
No.
27
still
pending
resolution
when
respondent
Judge
Avelino
S.
Rosal
In
the
Matter
of
the
Petition
for
the
Probate
of
the
Will
of
assumed
the
position
of
presiding
judge
of
the
respondent
court.
Dorotea
Perez,
Deceased.
Apolonia
Taboada
(Petitioner)
vs.
Hon.
Avelino
S.
Rosal,
Judge
of
the
Third
Branch
of
the
CFI
of
Subsequently,
the
new
judge
denied
the
motion
for
Maasin,
Southern
Leyte
(Respondent)
reconsideration,
the
manifestation
and/or
motion
filed
ex
parte
G.R.
No.
L-‐36033
because
of
the
petitioner’s
failure
to
comply
with
the
order
November
5,
1982
requiring
him
to
submit
the
names
of
the
intestate
heirs
and
their
addresses.
FACTS:
Petitioner
Apolonio
Taboada
filed
with
the
respondent
Court
a
petition
for
probate
of
the
will
of
Dorotea
Perez,
attaching
The
respondent
Judge
interprets
the
above-‐quoted
provision
of
the
alleged
last
will
and
testament
of
the
latter.
It
was
written
in
law
to
require
that,
for
a
notarial
will
to
be
valid,
it
is
not
enough
the
Cebuano-‐Visayan
dialect
and
consisted
of
two
pages,
the
first
that
only
the
testatrix
signs
at
the
"end"
but
an
the
three
of
which
contained
the
entire
testamentary
dispositions
and
was
subscribing
witnesses
must
also
sign
at
the
same
place
or
at
the
signed
at
the
end
of
the
page
by
the
testator
alone
and
at
the
left
end,
in
the
presence
of
the
testatrix
and
of
one
another
because
the
hand
margin
by
the
three
instrumental
witnesses.
The
second
attesting
witnesses
to
a
will
attest
not
merely
the
will
itself
but
page
contained
the
attestation
clause
by
the
three
attesting
also
the
signature
of
the
testator.
It
is
not
sufficient
compliance
to
witnesses
and
was
signed
at
the
left
hand
margin
by
the
testatrix.
sign
the
page,
where
the
end
of
the
will
is
found,
at
the
left
hand
margin
of
that
page.
No
opposition
was
filed
after
the
publication,
and
the
trial
court
commissioned
the
branch
clerk
of
court
to
receive
the
petitioner's
The
petitioner
maintains
that
Article
805
of
the
Civil
Code
does
not
evidence.
Vicente
Timkang,
one
of
the
subscribing
witnesses
to
the
make
it
a
condition
precedent
or
a
matter
of
absolute
necessity
for
will,
testified
on
the
genuineness
and
due
execution
of
the
will.
the
extrinsic
validity
of
the
wig
that
the
signatures
of
the
The
trial
court
denied
the
probate
of
the
will
for
lack
of
a
formality
subscribing
witnesses
should
be
specifically
located
at
the
end
of
in
its
execution,
and
petitioner
was
ordered
to
submit
the
names
the
wig
after
the
signature
of
the
testatrix.
He
contends
that
it
of
the
intestate
heirs
with
their
corresponding
addresses
so
that
would
be
absurd
that
the
legislature
intended
to
place
so
heavy
an
they
could
be
properly
notified
and
could
intervene
in
the
import
on
the
space
or
particular
location
where
the
signatures
summary
settlement
of
the
estate.
are
to
be
found
as
long
as
this
space
or
particular
location
wherein
the
signatures
are
found
is
consistent
with
good
faith
and
the
Petitioner
instead
filed
a
manifestation
and/or
motion,
ex
parte
honest
frailties
of
human
nature.
praying
for
a
thirty-‐day
period
within
which
to
deliberate
on
any
step
to
be
taken
as
a
result
of
the
disallowance
of
the
will.
He
also
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Article
805
of
the
Civil
Code
requires
that
asked
that
the
ten-‐day
period
required
by
the
court
to
submit
the
the
testatrix
and
all
the
three
instrumental
and
attesting
witnesses
names
of
intestate
heirs
with
their
addresses
be
held
in
abeyance.
sign
at
the
end
of
the
will
and
in
the
presence
of
the
testatrix
and
The
petitioner
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration
of
the
order
of
one
another.
denying
the
probate
of
the
will.
However,
the
motion
together
with
the
previous
manifestation
and/or
motion
could
not
be
acted
RATIO:
NO.
The
law
is
to
be
liberally
construed.
According
to
the
upon
by
the
Honorable
Ramon
C.
Pamatian
due
to
his
transfer
to
Code
Commission,
"the
underlying
and
fundamental
objective
his
new
station
at
Pasig,
Rizal.
The
said
motions
or
incidents
were
permeating
the
provisions
on
the
law
on
wills
in
this
project
consists
in
the
liberalization
of
the
manner
of
their
execution
with
entire
wig
that
it
is
really
and
actually
composed
of
only
two
pages
the
end
in
view
of
giving
the
testator
more
freedom
in
expressing
duly
signed
by
the
testatrix
and
her
instrumental
witnesses.
his
last
wishes
but
with
sufficient
safeguards
and
restrictions
to
prevent
the
commission
of
fraud
and
the
exercise
of
undue
and
As
earlier
stated,
the
first
page
which
contains
the
entirety
of
the
improper
pressure
and
influence
upon
the
testator.
This
objective
testamentary
dispositions
is
signed
by
the
testatrix
at
the
end
or
at
is
in
accord
with
the
modern
tendency
in
respect
to
the
formalities
the
bottom
while
the
instrumental
witnesses
signed
at
the
left
in
the
execution
of
a
will."
margin.
While
perfection
in
the
drafting
of
a
will
may
be
desirable,
The
other
page
which
is
marked
as
"Pagina
dos"
comprises
the
unsubstantial
departure
from
the
usual
forms
should
be
ignored,
attestation
clause
and
the
acknowledgment.
The
acknowledgment
especially
where
the
authenticity
of
the
will
is
not
assailed.
itself
states
that
"This
Last
Will
and
Testament
consists
of
two
(Gonzales
v.
Gonzales,
90
Phil.
444,
449).
pages
including
this
page".
It
must
be
noted
that
the
law
uses
the
terms
attested
and
subscribed.
Attestation
consists
in
witnessing
the
testator's
execution
of
the
will
in
order
to
see
and
take
note
mentally
that
those
things
are,
done
which
the
statute
requires
for
the
execution
of
a
will
and
that
the
signature
of
the
testator
exists
as
a
fact.
On
the
other
hand,
subscription
is
the
signing
of
the
witnesses'
names
upon
the
same
paper
for
the
purpose
of
Identification
of
such
paper
as
the
will
which
was
executed
by
the
testator.
(Ragsdale
v.
Hill,
269
SW
2d
911).
Insofar
as
the
requirement
of
subscription
is
concerned,
it
is
our
considered
view
that
the
will
in
this
case
was
subscribed
in
a
manner
which
fully
satisfies
the
purpose
of
Identification.
The
objects
of
attestation
and
of
subscription
were
fully
met
and
satisfied
in
the
present
case
when
the
instrumental
witnesses
signed
at
the
left
margin
of
the
sole
page
which
contains
all
the
testamentary
dispositions,
especially
so
when
the
will
was
properly
Identified
by
subscribing
witness
Vicente
Timkang
to
be
the
same
will
executed
by
the
testatrix.
There
was
no
question
of
fraud
or
substitution
behind
the
questioned
order.
The
Supreme
Court
have
examined
the
will
in
question
and
noticed
that
the
attestation
clause
failed
to
state
the
number
of
pages
used
in
writing
the
will.
This
would
have
been
a
fatal
defect
were
it
not
for
the
fact
that,
in
this
case,
it
is
discernible
from
the
Case
No.
28
witness
been
proven
to
have
been
in
the
outer
room
at
the
time
Beatriz
Nera,
et
al.
(Plaintiff-‐Appellees)
vs.
Narcisa
Rimando
when
the
testator
and
the
other
subscribing
witnesses
attached
(Defendant-‐Appellant)
their
signatures
to
the
instrument
in
the
inner
room,
it
would
have
G.R.
No.
L-‐5971
been
invalid
as
a
will,
the
attaching
of
those
signatures
under
February
27,
1911
circumstances
not
being
done
"in
the
presence"
of
the
witness
in
Carson,
J.
the
outer
room.
This
because
the
line
of
vision
from
this
witness
to
the
testator
and
the
other
subscribing
witnesses
would
necessarily
FACTS:
The
only
question
raised
by
the
evidence
in
this
case
as
to
have
been
impeded
by
the
curtain
separating
the
inner
from
the
the
due
execution
of
the
instrument
propounded
as
a
will
in
the
outer
one
"at
the
moment
of
inscription
of
each
signature."
court
below,
is
whether
one
of
the
subscribing
witnesses
was
present
in
the
small
room
where
it
was
executed
at
the
time
when
In
the
case
just
cited,
on
which
the
trial
court
relied,
we
held
that:
the
testator
and
the
other
subscribing
witnesses
attached
their
“The
true
test
of
presence
of
the
testator
and
the
witnesses
signatures;
or
whether
at
that
time
he
was
outside,
some
eight
or
in
the
execution
of
a
will
is
not
whether
they
actually
saw
ten
feet
away,
in
a
large
room
connecting
with
the
smaller
room
by
each
other
sign,
but
whether
they
might
have
been
seen
a
doorway,
across
which
was
hung
a
curtain
which
made
it
each
other
sign,
had
they
chosen
to
do
so,
considering
their
impossible
for
one
in
the
outside
room
to
see
the
testator
and
the
mental
and
physical
condition
and
position
with
relation
to
other
subscribing
witnesses
in
the
act
of
attaching
their
signatures
each
other
at
the
moment
of
inscription
of
each
signature.”
to
the
instrument.
But
it
is
especially
to
be
noted
that
the
position
of
the
parties
with
A
majority
of
the
members
of
the
court
is
of
opinion
that
this
relation
to
each
otherat
the
moment
of
the
subscription
of
each
subscribing
witness
was
in
the
small
room
with
the
testator
and
signature,
must
be
such
that
they
may
see
each
other
sign
if
they
the
other
subscribing
witnesses
at
the
time
when
they
attached
choose
to
do
so.
their
signatures
to
the
instrument,
and
this
finding,
of
course,
disposes
of
the
appeal
and
necessitates
the
affirmance
of
the
This,
of
course,
does
not
mean
that
the
testator
and
the
decree
admitting
the
document
to
probate
as
the
last
will
and
subscribing
witnesses
may
be
held
to
have
executed
the
testament
of
the
deceased.
instrument
in
the
presence
of
each
other
if
it
appears
that
they
would
not
have
been
able
to
see
each
other
sign
at
that
moment,
The
trial
judge
does
not
appear
to
have
considered
the
without
changing
their
relative
positions
or
existing
conditions.
determination
of
this
question
of
fact
of
vital
importance
in
the
determination
of
this
case,
as
he
was
of
opinion
that
under
the
The
evidence
in
the
case
relied
upon
by
the
trial
judge
discloses
doctrine
laid
down
in
the
case
of
Jaboneta
vs.
Gustilo
(5
Phil.
Rep.,
that
"at
the
moment
when
the
witness
Javellana
signed
the
541)
the
alleged
fact
that
one
of
the
subscribing
witnesses
was
in
document
he
was
actually
and
physically
present
and
in
such
the
outer
room
when
the
testator
and
the
other
describing
position
with
relation
to
Jaboneta
that
he
could
see
everything
that
witnesses
signed
the
instrument
in
the
inner
room,
had
it
been
took
place
by
merely
casting
his
eyes
in
the
proper
direction
and
proven,
would
not
be
sufficient
in
itself
to
invalidate
the
execution
without
any
physical
obstruction
to
prevent
his
doing
so."
of
the
will.
And
the
decision
merely
laid
down
the
doctrine
that
the
question
But
we
are
unanimously
of
opinion
that
had
this
subscribing
whether
the
testator
and
the
subscribing
witnesses
to
an
alleged
will
sign
the
instrument
in
the
presence
of
each
other
does
not
depend
upon
proof
of
the
fact
that
their
eyes
were
actually
cast
upon
the
paper
at
the
moment
of
its
subscription
by
each
of
them,
but
that
at
that
moment
existing
conditions
and
their
position
with
relation
to
each
other
were
such
that
by
merely
casting
the
eyes
in
the
proper
direction
they
could
have
seen
each
other
sign.
To
extend
the
doctrine
further
would
open
the
door
to
the
possibility
of
all
manner
of
fraud,
substitution,
and
the
like,
and
would
defeat
the
purpose
for
which
this
particular
condition
is
prescribed
in
the
code
as
one
of
the
requisites
in
the
execution
of
a
will.
The
decree
entered
by
the
court
below
admitting
the
instrument
propounded
therein
to
probate
as
the
last
will
and
testament
of
Pedro
Rimando,
deceased,
is
affirmed
with
costs
of
this
instance
against
the
appellant.
SUBSTANTIVE
OR
INTRINSIC
VALIDITY
Regional
Trial
Court,
a
petition
for
probate
and
allowance
of
his
own
will
and
testament,
wherein
Lorenzo
moved
that
Alicia
be
Case
No.
29
appointed
Special
Administratix
of
his
estate.
The
trial
court
Paula
T.
Llorente
(Petitioner)
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Alicia
admitted
the
will
to
probate
and
subsequently
Lorenzo
died.
F.
Llorente
(Respondents)
G.R.
No.
124371
Paula
Llorente
filed
with
the
same
court
a
petition
for
letters
of
November
23,
2000
administration
over
Lorenzo’s
estate
in
her
favor
contending
that
Pardo,
J.
she
was
Lorenzo’s
surviving
spouse,
that
the
various
property
were
acquired
during
their
marriage,
and
that
Lorenzo’s
will
FACTS:
The
deceased
Lorenzo
N.
Llorente
was
an
enlisted
disposed
of
all
his
property
in
favor
of
Alicia
and
her
children
serviceman
of
the
United
States
Navy.
He
was
married
to
encroaching
on
their
legitime.
Alicia
also
filed
a
petition
for
letters
petitioner
Paula
Llorente
in
Camarines
Sur.
Before
the
outbreak
of
testamentary.
the
war,
Lorenzo
departed
for
the
United
States
while
Paula
stayed
in
their
conjugal
home
in
Camarines
Sur.
Subsequently,
Lorenzo
RTC:
Denied
Alicia’s
petition
and
ruled
that
the
divorce
decree
was
admitted
as
an
American
citizen.
Upon
the
liberation
of
the
granted
to
Lorenzo
was
void
and
inapplicable
in
the
Philippines,
Philippines
by
the
American
Forces
in
1945,
Lorenzo
came
home
therefore,
her
marriage
to
Lorenzo
was
likewise
void.
to
find
out
that
Paula
has
been
“living
in”
with
his
brother,
CA:
Affirmed
the
decision
of
the
trial
court
and
declared
Alicia
as
Ceferino
Llorente
and
were
expecting
a
baby.
co-‐owner
of
whatever
properties
she
and
the
deceased
acquired
during
their
marriage.
Lorenzo
refused
to
forgive
Paula
and
live
with
her
so
they
entered
into
a
written
agreement
to
the
effect
that,
(1)
all
the
family
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Paula
Llorente
is
entitiled
to
inherit
from
allowances
allotted
by
the
United
States
Navy
would
be
the
late
Lorenzo
Llorente.
suspended,
(2)
that
they
would
dissolve
their
marital
union
in
accordance
with
judicial
proceedings,
(3)
they
would
make
a
RATIO:
YES.
The
Supreme
Court
reversed
and
set
aside
the
ruling
separate
agreement
regarding
their
conjugal
property
acquired
of
the
trial
court
and
recognized
as
valid
as
a
matter
of
comity
the
during
their
marital
life,
and
(4)
Lorenzo
would
not
prosecute
decree
of
divorce
granted
in
favor
of
the
deceased
by
the
Supreme
Paula
for
her
adulterous
life.
Court
of
the
State
of
California.
Lorenzo
returned
back
to
the
United
States
and
filed
for
divorce
The
clear
intent
of
Lorenzo
to
bequeath
his
property
to
Paula
and
with
the
Superior
Court
of
the
State
of
California
and
subsequently
their
children
together
is
shown
in
the
will
executed.
Whether
the
became
final.
will
is
intrinsically
valid
and
who
shall
inherit
from
Lorenzo
are
issues
best
proven
by
foreign
law
which
must
be
pleaded
and
Lorenzo
came
back
to
the
Philippines
and
married
Alicia
Llorente,
proved.
Whether
the
will
was
executed
in
accordance
with
the
and
lived
together
as
husband
and
wife
for
twenty-‐five
years
and
formalities
required
is
answered
by
referring
to
Philippine
law.
In
produced
three
children,
Raul,
Luz,
and
Beverly
Llorente.
fact,
the
will
was
duly
probated.
Lorenzo
executed
a
Last
Will
and
Testament
bequeathing
all
his
Given
this
ruling,
the
Court
found
it
unnecessary
to
pass
upon
the
property
to
Alicia
and
their
three
children.
He
filed
with
the
other
issues
raised.
Case
No.
30
Over
a
week
later,
two
of
his
illegitimate
children,
Maria
Cristina
Testate
Estate
of
Amos
G.
Bellis,
Deceased.
and
Miriam
Palma
Bellis,
filed
their
respective
oppositions
to
the
People’s
Bank
&
Trust
Co.,
Executor,
Maria
Cristina
Bellis
and
project
of
partition
on
the
ground
that
they
were
deprived
of
their
Miriam
Palma
Bellis
(Oppositors-‐Appellants)
vs.
Edward
A.
legitimes
as
illegitimate
children
and
therefore,
compulsory
heirs
Bellis,
et
al.
(Heirs-‐Appellees)
of
deceased.
G.R.
No.
L-‐23678
June
6,
1967
The
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Manila
issued
an
order
overruling
Bengzon,
J.P.,
J.
the
oppostions
and
approving
the
executor’s
final
account,
report
and
administration
and
project
of
partition.
The
oppositors-‐
FACTS:
Amos
Bellis
was
a
citizen
of
the
State
of
Texas
and
of
the
appellants
filed
their
respective
motions
for
reconsideration,
but
United
States,
who
died
a
resident
of
San
Antonio,
Texas,
USA.
By
the
lower
court
denied
the
same.
his
first
wife,
Mary
Mallen,
whom
he
divorced,
he
had
five
legitimate
children.
By
his
second
wife,
Violet
Kennedy,
who
They
subsequently
appealed
to
the
Supreme
Court,
raising
the
survived
him,
he
had
three
legitimate
children;
and
he
also
had
issue
of
which
law
is
to
be
applied,
on
the
ground
that
the
case
three
illegitimate
children.
allegedly
falls
under
the
circumstances
mentioned
in
Art.
17
in
relation
to
Art.
16
of
the
Civil
Code,
which
provides
that
the
Amos
Bellis
executed
a
will
in
the
Philippines,
in
which
he
directed
national
law
of
the
decedent
is
applicable
in
intestate
or
that
after
all
taxes,
obligations
and
expenses
of
administration
are
testamentary
succession
with
regard
to:
(1)
the
order
of
paid
for,
his
distributable
estate
should
be
divided
in
trust
in
the
succession;
(2)
amount
of
successional
rights;
(3)
intrinsic
validity
following
manner
and
order:
(1)
USD
240,000
to
his
1st
wife;
(2)
of
the
provisions
of
the
will;
and
(4)
capacity
to
succeed.
PHP
120,000
to
his
3
illegitimate
children;
(3)
the
remainder,
to
be
divided
in
equal
shares,
and
given
to
his
7
surviving
children.
ISSUE:
Whether
Texas
Law,
the
national
law
of
decedent,
which
does
not
provide
for
legitimes,
applies
to
the
case
at
bar
Following
Amos’
death,
his
will
was
admitted
to
probate
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Manila.
People’s
Bank
and
Trust
Co.,
as
RULING:
YES.
Despite
the
fact
that
two
wills
were
executed
by
the
executor
of
the
will,
paid
all
the
bequests
therein,
including:
(1)
decedent
(Texas
will,
Philippine
will),
assuming
that
his
intention
USD
240,000
to
the
1st
wife
in
the
form
of
shares
of
stock;
(2)
was
for
Philippine
law
to
govern
his
Philippine
estate,
it
would
not
Amounts
totaling
PHP40,000
each
/
a
total
of
PHP
120,000
to
the
3
alter
the
law,
because
a
provision
in
a
foreigner’s
will
to
the
effect
illegitimate
children.
Preparatory
to
closing
its
administration,
the
that
his
properties
are
to
be
distributed
in
accordance
with
executor
submitted
and
filed
its
“Executor’s
Final
Account,
Report
Philippine
law
and
not
his
national
law,
is
illegal
and
void,
for
his
of
Administration
and
Project
of
Partition”
wherein
it
reported
national
law
cannot
be
ignored
in
regard
to
those
matters
wherein
satisfaction
of
the
legacies
of
the
1st
wife
and
3
illegitimate
Art.
16
states
that
national
law
should
govern.
children.
In
the
project
of
partition,
the
executor,
pursuant
to
the
will,
divided
the
residuary
estate
into
7
equal
portions
for
the
The
doctrine
of
renvoi
does
not
apply,
because
such
doctrine
is
benefit
of
the
testator’s
legitimate
children
by
his
1st
and
2nd
usually
pertinent
where
decedent
is
a
national
of
one
country
and
marriages.
a
domicile
of
another.
In
the
present
case,
the
decedent
was
both
a
national
and
domicile
of
Texas
at
the
time
of
his
death.
So
even
assuming
that
Texas
has
a
conflict
of
law
rule
providing
that
the
domiciliary
system
should
govern,
the
same
would
not
result
in
a
reference
back
to
Philippine
law
(renvoi),
but
would
still
refer
to
Texas
law.
Since
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
provision
of
the
will
and
the
amount
of
successional
rights
are
to
be
determined
under
Texas
law,
the
Philippine
law
on
legitimes
cannot
be
applied
to
the
testacy
of
Amos
Bellis.
Case
No.
31
admitting
a
will
to
probate
in
which
no
provision
is
made
for
the
Polly
Cayetano
(Petitioner)
vs.
Hon.
Tomas
T.
Leonidas,
in
his
forced
heir
in
complete
disregard
of
Law
of
Succession.
capacity
as
the
Presiding
Judge
of
the
Thirty
Eighth
Branch
of
the
CFI
of
Manila,
and
Nenita
Campos
Paguia
(Respondents)
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
a
forced
heir
is
entitled
to
his
legitime
in
G.R.
No.
54919
case
the
testator
was
a
citizen
of
another
country.
May
30,
1984
Gutierrez,
Jr.,
J.
RATIO:
As
a
general
rule,
the
probate
court's
authority
is
limited
only
to
the
extrinsic
validity
of
the
will,
the
due
execution
thereof,
FACTS:
Adoracion
C.
Campos
was
a
citizen
of
the
United
States
of
the
testatrix's
testamentary
capacity
and
the
compliance
with
the
America
and
a
permanent
resident
of
Philadelphia.
She
executed
a
requisites
or
solemnities
prescribed
by
law.
The
intrinsic
validity
Last
Will
and
Testament
in
the
county
of
Philadelphia,
normally
comes
only
after
the
court
has
declared
that
the
will
has
Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.,
according
to
the
laws
thereat,
and
that
while
been
duly
authenticated.
However,
where
practical
considerations
in
temporary
sojourn
in
the
Philippines,
Adoracion
C.
Campos
died
demand
that
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will
be
passed
upon,
even
in
the
City
of
Manila,
leaving
property
both
in
the
Philippines
and
before
it
is
probated,
the
court
should
meet
the
issues.
in
the
United
States
of
America.
In
this
case,
it
was
sufficiently
established
that
Adoracion
was
an
The
Last
Will
and
Testament
of
the
late
Adoracion
C.
Campos
was
American
citizen
and
the
law
which
governs
her
will
is
the
law
of
admitted
and
granted
probate
by
the
Orphan's
Court
Division
of
Pennsylvania,
USA,
which
is
the
national
law
of
the
decedent.
It
is
a
the
Court
of
Common
Pleas,
the
probate
court
of
the
settled
rule
that
as
regards
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
provisions
Commonwealth
of
Pennsylvania,
County
of
Philadelphia,
U.S.A.,
of
the
will,
the
national
law
of
the
decedent
must
apply.
and
letters
of
administration
were
issued
in
favor
of
Clement
J.
McLaughlin
all
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
the
said
foreign
country
on
procedure
and
allowance
of
wills.
Nenita
C.
Paguia,
daughter
or
the
testator,
was
appointed
Administratrix
of
the
estate
of
said
decedent.
This
was
opposed
by
Adoracion’s
father,
Hermogenes
Campos,
who
earlier
filed
an
Affidavit
of
Self-‐adjudication
not
being
aware
that
Adoracion
had
left
a
will.
He
later
died
and
was
substituted
by
Polly
Cayetano
as
petitioner
in
the
instant
case.
A
motion
to
dismiss
the
petition
on
the
ground
that
the
rights
of
the
petitioner
Hermogenes
Campos
merged
upon
his
death
with
the
rights
of
the
respondent
and
her
sisters,
only
remaining
children
and
forced
heirs
was
denied
on
September
12,
1983.
Cayetano
alleged
that
the
trial
court
erred
in
ruling
that
the
right
of
a
forced
heir
to
his
legitime
can
be
divested
by
a
decree
JOINT
WILLS
Before
Don
Jesus
died
he
cancelled
his
holographic
will
in
the
presence
of
his
bookkeeper
and
secretary
and
instructed
his
Case
No.
32
lawyer
to
draft
a
new
will.
This
was
a
notarial
will
and
testament
Francisca
Alsua-‐Betts,
Joseph
O.
Betts,
Jose
Madareta,
Esteban
of
3
essential
features
as
follows;
P.
Ramirez,
and
the
Register
of
Deeds
for
Albay
Province
1.
It
expressly
cancelled
revoked
and
annulled
all
the
provisions
(Petitioners)
vs.
CA,
Amparo
Alsua-‐Buenviaje,
Fernando
of
his
holographic
will
and
codicil.
Buenviaje,
Fernando
Alsua,
represented
by
his
guardian,
2.
It
provided
for
the
collation
of
all
his
properties
donated
to
his
Clotilde
S.
Alsua
and
Pablo
Alsua
(Respondents)
four
living
children
by
virtue
of
the
Escritura
de
Partition
Extra
G.R.
Nos.
L-‐46430-‐31
judicial”.
July
30,
1979
3.
It
instituted
his
children
as
legatees
/
devisees
of
specific
Guerrero,
J.
properties,
and
as
to
the
rest
of
the
properties
and
whatever
may
be
subsequently
acquired
in
the
future,
before
his
death,
were
to
FACTS:
Don
Jesus
Alsua
and
his
wife,
Doña
Tinay,
together
with
be
given
to
Francisca
and
Pablo
naming
Francisca
as
executor
to
all
their
living
children,
entered
into
a
duly
notarized
agreement,
serve
without
a
bond.
(escritura
de
particion
extrajudicial/extra
judicial
partition)
for
the
inventory
and
partition
of
all
the
spouses
present
and
existing
properties.
In
the
provision
of
said
extra
judicial
partition,
each
of
ISSUES:
the
four
children
was
allotted
with
the
properties
considered
as
-‐ Whether
or
not
oppositors
to
the
probate
of
the
will,
are
in
their
share
in
the
estate
or
as
inheritance
left
by
the
deceased
estoppel
to
question
the
competence
of
testator
Don
Jesus
where
they
will
be
the
absolute
owner
of
the
properties
assigned
Alsua.
in
case
of
death
of
one
of
the
spouses.
-‐ Whether
testator
Don
Jesus
can
revoke
his
previous
will.
Don
Jesus
and
Doña
Tinay
also
separately
executed
holographic
will
with
exactly
the
same
terms
and
conditions
in
conformity
with
RATIO:
As
to
the
first
issue,
NO.
The
principle
of
estoppel
is
not
the
executed
extra
judicial
partition
naming
each
other
as
an
applicable
in
probate
proceedings.
Probate
proceedings
involve
executor
without
having
to
post
any
bond.
That
in
case
new
public
interest,
and
the
application
therein
of
the
rule
of
estoppel,
properties
be
acquired
same
shall
be
partitioned
one
half
to
the
when
it
will
block
the
ascertainment
of
the
truth
as
to
the
surviving
spouse
and
the
other
half
to
children
of
equal
parts.
circumstances
surrounding
the
execution
of
a
testament,
would
seem
inimical
to
public
policy.
Over
and
above
the
interest
of
Spouses
subsequently
executed
separately
a
codicil
of
exactly
the
private
parties
is
that
of
the
state
to
see
that
testamentary
same
terms
and
conditions,
amending
and
supplementing
their
dispositions
be
carried
out
if,
and
only
if,
executed
conformably
to
holographic
wills
stating
that
they
reserved
for
themselves
the
law.
other
half
not
disposed
of
to
their
legitimate
heirs
under
the
agreement
of
partition
and
mutually
and
reciprocally
bequeathed
As
to
the
second
issue,
YES.
The
court
ruled
that
Don
Jesus
was
each
other
their
participation
as
well
all
properties
which
might
be
not
forever
bound
of
his
previous
holographic
will
and
codicil
as
acquired
subsequently.
Doña
Tinay
died
in
effect
Don
Jesus
by
such,
would
remain
revocable
at
his
discretion.
Art.
828
of
the
new
order
of
the
probate
court
was
name
as
executor.
Civil
Code
is
clear:
"A
will
may
be
revoked
by
the
testator
at
any
time
before
his
death.
Any
waiver
or
restriction
of
this
right
is
void."
There
can
be
no
restriction
that
may
be
made
on
his
absolute
freedom
to
revoke
his
holographic
will
and
codicil
previously
made.
This
would
still
hold
true
even
if
such
previous
will
had
as
in
the
case
at
bar
already
been
probated
(Palacios
v.
Palacios,
106
Phil.
739).
For
in
the
first
place,
probate
only
authenticates
the
will
and
does
not
pass
upon
the
efficacy
of
the
dispositions
therein.
And
secondly,
the
rights
to
the
succession
are
transmitted
only
from
the
moment
of
the
death
of
the
decedent
(Article
777,
New
Civil
Code).
In
fine,
Don
Jesus
retained
the
liberty
of
disposing
of
his
property
before
his
death
to
whomsoever
he
chose,
provided
the
legitime
of
the
forced
heirs
are
not
prejudiced,
which
is
not
herein
claimed
for
it
is
undisputed
that
only
the
free
portion
of
the
whole
Alsua
estate
is
being
contested.
WITNESSES
TO
WILLS
RATIO:
NO.
Under
the
law,
there
is
no
mandatory
requirement
that
the
witnesses
testify
initially
at
any
time
during
the
trial
as
to
Case
No.
33
whether
they
are
of
good
standing
of
reputation
in
the
community
Rizalina
Gabriel
Gonzales
(Petitioner)
vs.
CA
and
Lutgarda
for
trustworthiness,
honesty
and
uprightness
in
order
that
his
Santiago
(Respondents)
testimony
is
believed
and
accepted
in
court.
It
is
enough
that
the
G.R.
No.
L-‐37453
qualifications
enumerated
in
Article
820
of
the
Civil
Code
are
May
25,
1979
complied
with.
The
attestation
clause
where
the
attesting
Guerrero,
J.
witnesses
signed
is
the
best
evidence
as
to
date
of
signing
because
it
preserves
in
permanent
form
a
recital
of
all
the
material
facts
FACTS:
Isabel
Gabriel
a
widow
executed
a
5
page
will
two
months
attending
the
execution
of
the
will.
prior
to
her
death.
Both
petitioner,
Rizalina
Gabriel
Gonzales
and
private
respondents
are
nieces
of
the
deceased.
Private
respondent
were
named
as
universal
heir
and
executor
while
the
petitioner
and
certain
persons
were
named
as
legacies.
The
will
was
typewritten
in
Tagalog
and
was
executed
in
Manila.
The
signatures
of
the
testator
appear
at
the
end
of
the
will
on
page
4
and
at
the
left
margin
of
all
the
pages
while
the
three
witnesses’
signatures
appeared
at
the
bottom
of
the
attestation
clause
and
on
the
left
margin
of
all
the
other
pages.
Private-‐Respondents
filed
a
petition
for
the
probate
of
the
will
but
it
was
opposed
by
the
petitioner
stating
that
the
will
is
not
genuine,
was
not
executed
and
attested
as
required
by
the
law,
the
decedent
lacked
testamentary
capacity
due
to
her
old
age
and
sickness
and
lastly
the
will
was
procured
through
undue
and
improper
pressure
and
influence
on
the
part
of
the
principal
beneficiary.
RTC
rendered
its
judgment
to
disallow
the
last
will
and
testament
of
Isabel
Gabriel.
CA
reversed
the
decision
of
the
RTC.
They
find
that
the
will
in
question
was
signed
and
executed
by
the
deceased
in
the
presence
of
three
attesting
witnesses.
Hence
allowed
the
probate.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
credibility
of
the
subscribing
witnesses
is
material
in
the
validity
of
a
will.
REVOCATION
OF
WILLS
AND
TESTAMENTARY
proven.
DISPOSITION
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
there
was
valid
revocation
of
the
will.
Case
No.
34
RATIO:
NO.
Under
Art.
830,
the
physical
act
of
destruction
of
a
Testate
Estate
Of
The
Late
Adriana
Maloto,
et
al.
(Petitioners)
will,
like
burning
in
this
case,
does
not
per
se
constitute
an
vs.
CA,
Panfilo
Maloto
and
Felino
Maloto
(Respondents)
effective
revocation,
unless
the
destruction
is
coupled
with
animus
G.R.
No.
76464
revocandi
on
the
part
of
the
testator.
February
29,
1988
Sarmiento,
J.
It
may
be
performed
by
another
person
but
under
the
express
direction
and
in
the
presence
of
the
testator.
It
is
not
imperative
FACTS:
Adriana
Maloto
died
leaving
as
heirs
her
niece
and
that
the
testator
himself
does
the
physical
destruction.
It
may
be
nephews,
the
petitioners
Aldina
Maloto-‐Casiano
and
Constancio
performed
by
another
person
but
under
the
express
direction
and
Maloto,
and
the
private
respondents
Panfilo
Maloto
and
Felino
in
the
presence
of
the
testator.
Of
course,
it
goes
without
saying
Maloto.
Believing
that
Adriana
not
leave
behind
a
will,
these
four
that
the
document
destroyed
must
be
the
will
itself.
heirs
commenced
an
intestate
proceeding
for
the
settlement
of
their
aunt's
estate.
In
this
case,
while
animus
revocandi,
or
the
intention
to
revoke,
may
be
conceded,
for
that
is
a
state
of
mind,
yet
that
requisite
While
the
case
was
still
in
progress,
the
4
heirs
executed
an
alone
would
not
suffice.
"Animus
revocandi
is
only
one
of
the
agreement
of
extrajudicial
settlement
of
Adriana's
estate
dividing
necessary
elements
for
the
effective
revocation
of
a
last
will
and
the
estate
into
four
equal
parts
which
the
trial
court
testament.
The
intention
to
revoke
must
be
accompanied
by
the
approved.Atty.
Palma
discovered
a
Will
dated
January
3,1940.
overt
physical
act
of
burning,
tearing,
obliterating,
or
cancelling
While
Panfilo
and
Felino
are
still
named
as
heirs
in
the
said
will,
the
will
carried
out
by
the
testator
or
by
another
person
in
his
Aldina
and
Constancio
have
much
bigger
and
more
valuable
shares
presence
and
under
his
express
direction.
than
in
the
extrajudicial
settlement.
The
will
also
gives
devises
and
legacies
to
Asilo
de
Molo,
the
Roman
Catholic
Church
of
Molo,
and
Purificacion
Miraflor.
Aldina
and
Constancio,
joined
by
the
other
petitioners
named
in
the
will,
filed
motion
for
reconsideration
and
annulment
of
the
previous
proceedings
and
for
allowance
of
the
will.
The
trial
court
denied
their
motion,
Significantly,
the
appellate
court
(CA)
while
finding
as
inconclusive
the
matter
on
whether
or
not
the
document
or
papers
allegedly
burned
by
the
househelp
of
Adriana,
Guadalupe,
upon
instructions
of
the
testatrix
was
indeed
the
contradicted
itself
and
found
that
the
will
had
been
revoked.
The
respondent
court
stated
that
the
presence
of
animus
revocandi
in
the
destruction
of
the
will
had,
nevertheless,
been
sufficiently
Case
No.
35
the
preceding
paragraph,
and
if
the
court
deem
it
necessary,
Testate
Estate
of
Felicidad
Esguerra
Alto-‐Yap,
Deceased.
expert
testimony
may
be
resorted
to.
Fausto
E.
Gan
(Petitioner-‐Appellant)
vs.
Ildefonso
Yap
(Oppositor-‐Appellee)
And
the
court,
may
use
its
own
visual
sense,
and
decide
in
the
face
G.R.
No.
L-‐12190
of
the
document,
whether
the
will
submitted
to
it
has
indeed
been
August
30,
1958
written
by
the
testator.
When
the
will
itself
is
not
submitted,
these
Bengzon,
J.
means
of
opposition,
and
of
assessing
the
evidence
are
not
available.
And
then
the
only
guaranty
of
authenticity
—
the
FACTS:
Fausto
Gan,
nephew
of
the
decedent,
initiated
the
petition
testator's
handwriting
—
has
disappeared.
of
the
probate
of
a
holographic
will
allegedly
executed
by
the
deceased.
Opposing
the
petition,
the
deceased
surviving
husband,
herein
Oppositor-‐Appellee,
asserted
that
the
deceased
had
not
left
any
will,
nor
executed
any
testament.
The
will
itself
was
not
presented
but
Petitioner
presented
testimonies
of
alleged
witnesses.
Felina
Esguerra,
niece
of
the
deceased,
alleged
that
she
witnessed
the
execution
of
the
will
and
that
when
the
deceased
was
confined
for
her
last
illness,
she
entrusted
said
will,
which
was
contained
in
a
purse,
to
her.
But
a
few
hours
later,
Oppositor-‐Appellee,
asked
for
the
purse
and
being
afraid
of
him
because
of
his
well-‐known
violent
temper,
she
delivered
it
to
him
but
not
before
she
had
taken
the
purse
to
the
toilet,
opened
it
and
read
the
will
for
the
last
time.
RTC:
Denied
probate.
CA:
Affirm
RTC.
ISSUE:
WON
a
holographic
will
be
probated
upon
the
testimony
of
witnesses
who
have
allegedly
seen
it
and
who
declare
that
it
was
in
the
handwriting
of
the
testator.
RATIO:
NO.
Article
811.
In
the
probate
of
a
holographic
will,
it
shall
be
necessary
that
at
least
one
witness
who
knows
the
handwriting
and
signature
of
the
testator
explicitly
declare
that
the
will
and
the
signature
are
in
the
handwriting
of
the
testator.
If
the
will
is
contested,
at
least
three
of
such
witnesses
shall
be
required.I
n
the
absence
of
any
competent
witness
referred
to
in
Case
No.
36
Following
the
consolidation
of
the
cases,
the
appellees
moved
In
the
Matter
of
the
Petition
to
Approve
the
Will
of
Ricardo
B.
again
to
dismiss
the
petition
for
the
probate
of
the
will.
They
Bonilla,
Deceased.
Marcela
Rodelas
(Petitioner-‐Appellant)
vs.
argued
that:
Amparo
Aranza
,
et
al.
(Oppositors-‐Appellees),
Atty.
Lorenzo
Sumulong
(Intervenor)
1) The
alleged
holographic
was
not
a
last
will
but
merely
an
G.R.
No.
L-‐58509
instruction
as
to
the
management
and
improvement
of
the
December
7,
1982
schools
and
colleges
founded
by
decedent
Ricardo
B.
Relova,
J.
Bonilla;
and
FACTS:
Appellant
filed
a
petition
with
the
CFI
of
Rizal
for
the
2) Lost
or
destroyed
holographic
wills
cannot
be
proved
by
probate
of
the
holographic
will
of
Ricardo
B.
Bonilla
and
the
secondary
evidence
unlike
ordinary
wills.
issuance
of
letters
testamentary
in
her
favor.
The
petition
was
opposed
by
the
appellees
Amparo
Aranza
Bonilla,
Wilferine
Upon
opposition
of
the
appellant,
the
motion
to
dismiss
was
Bonilla
Treyes,
Expedita
Bonilla
Frias
and
Ephraim
Bonilla
on
the
denied
by
the
court.
following
grounds:
The
appellees
then
filed
a
MR
on
the
ground
that
the
order
was
1) Appellant
was
estopped
from
claiming
that
the
contrary
to
law
and
settled
pronouncements
and
rulings
of
the
deceased
left
a
will
by
failing
to
produce
the
will
Supreme
Court,
to
which
the
appellant
in
turn
filed
an
opposition.
within
twenty
days
of
the
death
of
the
testator
as
required
by
Rule
75,
section
2
of
the
Rules
of
Court;
The
court
set
aside
its
order
and
dismissed
the
petition
for
the
probate
of
the
will
of
Ricardo
B.
Bonilla
ruling
that:
2) The
alleged
copy
of
the
alleged
holographic
will
did
'.
.
.
It
is
our
considered
opinion
that
once
the
original
copy
not
contain
a
disposition
of
property
after
death
and
of
the
holographic
will
is
lost,
a
copy
thereof
cannot
stand
was
not
intended
to
take
effect
after
death,
and
in
lieu
of
the
original.
therefore
it
was
not
a
will;
'In
the
case
of
Gan
vs.
Yap,
104
Phil.
509,
522,
the
Supreme
Court
held
that
'in
the
matter
of
holographic
wills
the
law,
it
3) The
alleged
holographic
will
itself,
and
not
an
alleged
is
reasonable
to
suppose,
regards
the
document
itself
as
the
copy
thereof,
must
be
produced,
otherwise
it
would
material
proof
of
authenticity
of
said
wills.
The
Court
notes
produce
no
effect,
as
held
in
Gan
v.
Yap,
104
Phil.
509;
that
the
alleged
holographic
will
was
executed
on
January
and
25,
1962
while
Ricardo
B.
Bonilla
died
on
May
13,
1976.
In
view
of
the
lapse
of
more
than
14
years
from
the
time
of
the
4) The
deceased
did
not
leave
any
will,
holographic
or
execution
of
the
will
to
the
death
of
the
decedent,
the
fact
otherwise,
executed
and
attested
as
required
by
law.
that
the
original
of
the
will
could
not
be
located
shows
to
our
mind
that
the
decedent
had
discarded
before
his
death
The
appellees
likewise
moved
for
the
consolidation
of
the
case
his
allegedly
missing
Holographic
Will.
with
another
case
Their
motion
was
granted
by
the
court.
Appellant's
motion
for
reconsideration
was
denied.
Hence,
an
appeal
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
which
it
is
contended
that
the
dismissal
of
appellant's
petition
is
contrary
to
law
and
well-‐settled
The
law
regards
the
document
itself
as
material
proof
of
jurisprudence.
authenticity."
But,
in
Footnote
8
of
said
decision,
it
says
that
"Perhaps
it
may
be
proved
by
a
photographic
or
photostatic
copy.
Hence
this
petition.
Even
a
mimeographed
or
carbon
copy;
or
by
other
similar
means,
if
any,
whereby
the
authenticity
of
the
handwriting
of
the
deceased
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
a
holographic
will
which
was
lost
or
can
may
be
exhibited
and
tested
before
the
probate
court."
Evidently,
not
be
found
can
be
proved
by
means
of
a
photostatic
copy.
the
photostatic
or
xerox
copy
of
the
lost
or
destroyed
holographic
will
may
be
admitted
because
then
the
authenticity
of
the
HELD:
YES.
The
Supreme
Court,
in
setting
aside
the
lower
court's
handwriting
of
the
deceased
can
be
determined
by
the
probate
order
of
dismissal,
held
that
a
photostatic
or
xerox
copy
of
a
lost
or
court.
destroyed
holographic
will
may
be
admitted
because
the
authenticity
of
the
handwriting
of
the
deceased
can
he
determined
by
the
probate
court,
as
comparison
can
be
made
with
the
standard
writings
of
the
testator.
Assailed
order
of
dismissal,
set
aside.
Pursuant
to
Article
811
of
the
Civil
Code,
probate
of
holographic
wills
is
the
allowance
of
the
will
by
the
Court
after
its
due
execution
has
been
proved.
The
probate
of
holographic
wills
may
be
uncontested
or
not.
If
uncontested,
at
least
one
identifying
witness
is
required
and,
if
no
witness
is
available,
experts
may
be
resorted
to.
If
contested,
at
least
three
identifying
witnesses
are
required.
If
the
holographic
will
has
been
lost
or
destroyed
and
no
other
copy
is
available,
the
will
cannot
be
probated
because
the
best
and
only
evidence
is
the
handwriting
of
the
testator
in
said
will.
It
is
necessary
that
there
be
a
comparison
between
sample
handwritten
statements
of
the
testator
and
the
handwritten
will.
A
photostatic
copy
or
xerox
copy
of
the
holographic
will
may
be
allowed
because
comparison
can
be
made
with
the
standard
writings
of
the
testator.
In
the
case
of
Gan
vs.
Yap,
104
Phil.
509,
the
Court
ruled
that
"the
execution
and
the
contents
of
a
lost
or
destroyed
holographic
will
may
not
be
proved
by
the
bare
testimony
of
witnesses
who
have
seen
and/or
read
such
will.
The
will
itself
must
be
presented;
otherwise,
it
shall
produce
no
effect.
Case
No.
37
ISSUE:
W/N
there
was
a
valid
revocation
of
the
will.
Estate
of
Miguel
Mamuyac,
Deceased.
Francisco
Gago
(Petitioner-‐Appellant)
vs.
Cornelio
Mamuyac,
et
al.
HELD:
Yes,
there
was
a
valid
revocation
of
the
will.
The
will
was
(Opponent-‐Appellees)
already
cancelled
in
1920.
This
was
inferred
when
after
due
G.R.
No.
26317
search,
the
original
will
cannot
be
found.
January
29,
1927
Johnson,
J.
Where
a
will
which
cannot
be
found
is
shown
to
be
in
the
possession
of
the
testator
when
last
seen,
the
presumption
is
that
FACTS:
The
purpose
of
this
action
was
to
obtain
the
probation
of
a
in
the
absence
of
other
competent
evidence,
the
same
was
deemed
last
will
and
testament
of
Miguel
Mamuyac,
who
died
on
January
2,
cancelled
or
destroyed.
The
same
presumption
arises
where
it
is
1922
shown
that
the
testator
has
ready
access
to
the
will
and
it
can
no
longer
be
found
after
his
death.
On
July
27,
1918,
Miguel
Mamuyac
(deceased)
executed
a
last
will
and
testament.
On
January
1922,
Mamuyac
died
and
Francisco
NOTES:
Gago
presented
a
petition
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
the
The
law
does
not
require
any
evidence
of
the
revocation
or
Province
of
La
Union
for
the
probation
of
that
will.
This
was
cancellation
of
the
will
to
be
preserved.
It
therefore
becomes
opposed
by
Cornelio
Mamuyac,
Ambrosio
Lariosa,
Feliciana
difficult
at
times
to
prove
the
cancellation
or
revocation
of
wills.
Bauzon
and
Catalina
Mamuyac.
The
fact
that
such
cancellation
or
revocation
has
taken
place
must
either
remain
unproved
or
be
inferred
from
evidence
showing
that
CFI:
Denied
the
petition
for
probation
on
the
ground
that
the
after
due
search
the
original
will
cannot
be
found.
deceased
executed
a
new
will
and
testament
on
April
16,
1919
(second
will)
On
February
1925,
another
petition
was
filed
to
seek
the
probate
of
the
second
will
executed
on
April
16,
1919.
The
oppositors,
however,
alleged
that
the
presented
will:
(a)
is
a
mere
copy
of
the
actual
second
will
and
testament
executed
by
the
said
Miguel
Mamuyac
;
(b)
that
the
actual
second
will
had
been
cancelled
and
revoked
during
the
lifetime
of
Miguel
Mamuyac;
and
(c)
that
such
second
will
was
not
even
the
last
will
and
testament
of
the
deceased
Miguel
Mamuyac.
CFI:
Again
denied
the
probation
on
the
ground
that
it
had
been
cancelled
and
revoked
in
1920.
This
is
evidenced
by
testimonies
of
Jose
Tenoy,
one
of
the
witnesses
who
typed
the
document,
and
Carlos
Bejar,
who
saw
on
December
30,
1922
the
will
actually
cancelled
by
the
testator.
ALLOWANCE
AND
DISALLOWANCE
OF
WILLS
Due
to
the
destruction
of
the
court
and
property
record
of
Iloilo
as
a
result
of
the
last
war,
as
attested
by
the
Clerk
of
Court,
no
will
or
Case
No.
38
probate
order
was
produce
and
neither
were
attested
copies
Romulo
Lopez,
et
al.
(Plaintiffs-‐Appellants)
vs.
Luis
Gonzaga
registered
with
the
Office
of
the
Register
of
Deeds
of
Negros
and
Asuncion
Gonzaga
(Defendants-‐Appellees).
Occidental
leave
little
room
for
doubt
that
Doña
Soledad
Gonzaga
G.R.
No.
L-‐18788
died
leaving
a
will
instituting
her
nephew
the
appellee
Luis
January
31,
1964
Gonzaga
y
Jesena,
as
her
sole
testamentary
heir.
A
certain
Atty.
Reyes,
J.B.L.,
J.
Hortillas
testified
twice
that
deceased
Dona
Soledad
made
Luis
the
sole
heir.
FACTS:
Herein
Plaintiffs
filed
a
Petition
for
Partition
and
Cancellation
of
Titles
of
Registered
Lands
before
the
CFI
of
Negros
The
lower
court
denied
the
petition
hence
this
case.
There
was
a
Occidental
on
October
6,
1958.
In
it
they
alleged
the
following:
joint
appeal
by
both
the
plaintiffs
and
the
defendants
straight
to
the
SC
because
the
properties
involved
was
valued
at
more
than
1) That
Soledad
Gonzaga
Vda.
de
Ferrer
died
intestate
without
P200,000.
any
issue
and
leaving
real
and
personal
properties
worth
P400,000.00;
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Luis
Gonzaga
may
be
declared
as
the
sole
testamentary
heir
despite
the
absence
of
a
will.
2) That
she
was
survived
by
the
Plaintiffs,
who
are
her
nearest
of
kin,
being
her
brothers,
sisters,
nephews,
and
nieces;
RATIO:
YES.
the
deceased
Doña
Soledad,
in
her
probated
will,
made
Luis
Gonzaga
y
Jesena
the
sole
heir
to
her
properties.
These
3) That
during
the
lifetime
of
the
deceased,
she
expressed
the
manifestations
are
nigh
conclusive,
for
the
reason
that
attorney
wish
that
as
long
as
her
brother,
Luis
Gonzaga,
the
Principal
Hortillas
was
himself
married
to
Monserrat
Gonzaga,
a
sister
of
Defendant,
was
engaged
in
his
coconut
oil
experimentation
Soledad,
who
would
have
been
one
of
the
latter's
intestate
heirs
he
could
use
the
products
and
rentals
of
her
properties
in
had
it
not
been
for
the
testament
in
favor
of
the
appellee.
The
furtherance
of
his
experiments;
authenticity
of
the
sworn
petitions
of
the
late
attorney
Hortillas
are
not
impugned,
and
they
were
actually
acted
upon
and
granted
4) That
the
said
scientific
venture
by
the
said
Defendant
was
by
the
two
CFI
to
which
he
addressed
his
petitions.
discontinued
when
he
became
totally
blind,
in
view
of
which
the
plaintiffs
now
ask
a
partition
of
the
estate
and
Coupled
with
his
undoubted
possession
as
owner
and
with
his
the
cancellation
of
titles
of
lands
allegedly
fraudulently
own
dominical
acts
exercised
over
the
former
properties
of
Doña
transferred
by,
and
in
the
name
of,
the
Defendant.
Soledad
Gonzaga
for
22
yrs.,
the
exhibits
constitute
practically
conclusive
proof
of
the
truth
of
appellee's
defenses,
as
found
by
Defendants
filed
their
answer
repleading
a
denial
as
to
the
the
court
below,
despite
the
destruction
of
the
original
will
and
intestacy
of
the
deceased,
and
alleging,
among
others,
that
a
will
of
decree
of
probate.
Soledad
Gonzaga
Vda.
de
Ferrer
instituted
Luis
Gonzaga
as
the
sole
heir
to
her
entire
estate,
and
that
the
will
was
duly
allowed
and
probated.
Case
No.
39
will
cannot
be
the
basis
of
the
Private-‐Respondents’
claim
to
the
The
Incompetent,
Carmen
Caniza,
represented
by
her
legal
property
unless
and
until
it
has
been
probated,
it
is
still
indicative
guardian,
Amparo
Evangelista
(Petitioner)
vs.
CA,
Spouses
of
the
intent
and
desire
of
Petitioner
to
have
Private-‐Respondents
Pedro
and
Leonora
Estrada
(Respondents)
to
remain
and
to
continue
in
their
occupancy
and
possession
of
the
G.R.
No.
110427
subject
house.
February
24,
1997
Narvasa,
CJ.
Hence,
this
case
before
the
Supreme
Court.
Before
finding
any
resolution
on
the
matter
however,
Petitioner
Carmen
Caniza
died
FACTS:
On
September
17,
1990,
Carmen
Caniza,
judicially
and
was
subsequently
substituted
by
her
guardian
Amparo
A.
declared
incompetent
by
the
107th
Branch
of
the
RTC
of
Quezon
Evangelista
City
and
placed
under
the
guardianship
of
her
niece
Amparo
A.
Evangelista,
instituted
with
the
help
of
her
guardian
an
ejectment
Petitioner
maintains
that
the
supposed
holographic
will
cannot
be
suit
against
Spouses
Pedro
and
Leonora
Estrada
before
the
35th
given
weight
and
is
irrelevant
to
the
case.
Private-‐Respondents
Branch
of
the
MetroTC
of
Quezon
City.
maintain
however
that
the
devise
of
the
house
to
them
by
Petitioner
Caniza,
as
evidenced
by
the
holographic
will,
denotes
In
the
complaint,
Petitioner
Caniza
alleged
that
as
the
absolute
her
intention
that
they
remain
in
possession
thereof.
This,
Private-‐
owner
of
a
house
and
lot
located
at
No.
61
Tobias
St.,
Quezon
City,
Respondents’
maintain,
effectively
bars
Petitioner’s
judicial
she
allowed
Private-‐Respondent
Spouses
Estrada
to
occupy
the
guardian
from
evicting
them
since
that
would
run
counter
to
said
home
along
with
their
family
rent-‐free.
But
because
of
her
Petitioner
Caniza’s
will.
advanced
age
and
medical
needs,
Petitioner
requested
the
Private-‐
Respondent
to
vacate
the
same
so
that
she
could
then
rent
out
the
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Petitioner
Caniza,
as
represented
and
house
to
fund
her
expenses.
This
request,
Petitioner
contends,
was
substituted
by
her
legal
guardian,
can
recover
the
subject
house
unheeded
by
the
Private-‐Respondents
and
by
their
repeated
and
lot
refusal
enriched
themselves
at
the
expense
of
Petitioner.
RATIO:
YES,
Petitioner
Caniza,
as
represented
and
substituted
by
Private-‐Respondent
Spouses
however
denied
the
allegations,
her
legal
guardian
can
recover
the
subject
house
and
lot.
Under
claiming
that
the
Petitioner
bequeathed
to
them
in
a
holographic
Art.
838
of
the
Civil
Code,
no
will
shall
pass
either
real
or
personal
will
executed
on
September
4,
1988
the
house
and
lot
in
question.
property
unless
it
is
proved
and
allowed
in
accordance
with
the
Rules
of
Court.
While
the
MetTC
of
Quezon
City
ruled
in
favor
of
Petitioner
on
April
13,
1992,
said
Decision
was
reversed
by
the
96th
Branch
of
Noting
the
abovementioned
provision,
the
Court
noted
that
a
will
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Quezon
City
on
October
21,
1992.
is
essentially
ambulatory—that
is,
it
can
be
altered
at
any
time
prior
to
the
testator’s
death.
Further,
the
Court
added
that
until
On
appeal
with
the
CA,
the
Respondent
Court
affirmed
the
RTC
the
same
is
admitted
in
probate,
it
has
no
effect
whatever
and
no
decision
holding
that:
1)
the
proper
remedy
was
an
accion
right
can
be
claimed
thereunder.
publiciana
before
the
RTC
since
the
Respondent
Spouses
have
been
in
the
subject
premises
as
a
sort
of
adopted
family
of
Noting
that
the
“holographic
will”
presented
had
not
yet
been
Petitioner
as
evidenced
by
the
holographic
will;
and
2)
while
the
probated
even
during
the
proceedings
before
the
lower
courts,
the
Court
held
that
the
Private-‐Respondent
Spouses
cannot
claim
ownership
under
the
same.
Therefore
Petitioner,
through
her
legal
guardian,
can
take
back
the
subject
house
and
lot.
Case
No.
40
Cancellation
of
Transfer
Certificate
[of
Title]
and
Damages."
Spouses
Ricardo
Pascual
and
Consolacion
Sioson
(Petitioners)
REMEDIOS
claimed
that
she
is
the
owner
of
Lot
Nos.
2-‐A
and
2-‐E
vs.
CA
and
Remedios
S.
Eugenio-‐Gino
(Respondents)
because
CATALINA
devised
these
lots
to
her
in
CATALINA's
last
G.R.
No.
115925
will
and
testament
("LAST
WILL")
dated
29
May
1964.
REMEDIOS
August
15,
2003
added
that
CONSOLACION
obtained
title
to
these
lots
through
Carpio,
J.
fraudulent
means
since
the
area
covered
is
twice
the
size
of
CANUTO's
share
in
Lot
2.
REMEDIOS
prayed
for
the
cancellation
of
FACTS:
Petitioner
Consolacion
Sioson
("CONSOLACION")
and
CONSOLACION's
title,
the
issuance
of
another
title
in
her
name,
respondent
Remedios
S.
Eugenio-‐Gino
("REMEDIOS")
are
the
niece
and
the
payment
to
her
of
damages.
and
granddaughter,
respectively,
of
the
late
Canuto
Sioson
("CANUTO").
CANUTO
and
11
other
individuals,
including
his
Petitioners'
Contention:
Dismiss
the
complaint
on
the
ground
of
sister
Catalina
Sioson
("CATALINA")
and
his
brother
Victoriano
prescription.
The
basis
of
the
action
is
fraud,
and
REMEDIOS
Sioson
("VICTORIANO"),
were
co-‐owners
of
a
parcel
of
land
in
should
have
filed
the
action
within
four
years
from
the
registration
Tanza,
Navotas,
Metro
Manila
with
an
area
of
9,347
sq.m
(Lot
2).
of
CONSOLACION's
title
on
28
October
1968
and
not
some
19
CATALINA,
CANUTO,
and
VICTORIANO
each
owned
an
aliquot
years
later
on
4
February
1988.
10/70
share
or
1,335
sq.m.
of
the
lot.
Respondent's
Contention:
She
became
aware
of
CONSOLACION's
In
1951,
CANUTO
had
the
lot
surveyed
and
subdivided
into
eight
adverse
title
only
in
February
1987.
She
maintained
that
she
had
lots
(Lot
Nos.
2-‐A
to
2-‐H.)
Lot
No.
2-‐A,
with
an
area
of
670
sq.m.,
timely
filed
her
complaint
within
the
four-‐year
prescriptive
on
4
and
Lot
No.
2-‐E,
with
an
area
of
2,000
sq.m,
were
placed
under
February
1988.
CANUTO's
name.
Three
other
individuals
took
the
remaining
lots.
RTC
Ruling:
Dismissed.
The
action
filed
by
REMEDIOS
is
based
on
In
1956,
CANUTO
and
CONSOLACION
executed
a
Kasulatan
ng
fraud,
covered
by
the
four-‐year
prescriptive
period.
The
trial
court
Bilihang
Tuluyan
("KASULATAN").
Under
the
KASULATAN,
also
held
that
REMEDIOS
knew
of
petitioners'
adverse
title
on
19
CANUTO
sold
his
10/70
share
in
Lot
2
in
favor
of
CONSOLACION
November
1982
when
REMEDIOS
testified
against
petitioners
in
for
P2,250.00.
CONSOLACION
immediately
took
possession
of
Lot
an
ejectment
suit
petitioners
had
filed
against
their
tenants
in
Lot
Nos.
2-‐A
and
2-‐E.
She
later
declared
the
land
for
taxation
purposes
Nos.
2-‐A
and
2-‐E.
Thus,
the
complaint
of
REMEDIOS
had
already
and
paid
the
corresponding
real
estate
taxes.
prescribed
when
she
filed
it
on
4
February
1988.
In
1968,
the
surviving
children
of
CANUTO,
namely,
Felicidad
and
The
trial
court
further
ruled
that
REMEDIOS
has
no
right
of
action
Beatriz,
executed
a
joint
affidavit
("JOINT
AFFIDAVIT")
affirming
against
petitioners
because
CATALINA's
LAST
WILL
from
which
the
KASULATAN
in
favor
of
CONSOLACION.
CONSOLACION
then
REMEDIOS
claims
to
derive
her
title
has
not
been
admitted
to
registered
the
KASULATAN
and
the
JOINT
AFFIDAVIT
with
the
probate.
Under
Article
838
of
the
Civil
Code,
no
will
passes
real
or
Office
of
the
Register
of
Deeds
of
Rizal.
RD
issued
titles
under
the
personal
property
unless
it
is
allowed
in
probate
in
accordance
name
of
CONSOLACION.
with
the
Rules
of
Court.
In
1988,
REMEDIOS
filed
a
complaint
against
CONSOLACION
and
CA
Ruling:
Reversed.
The
appellate
court
held
that
what
her
spouse
Ricardo
Pascual
in
the
RTC
for
"Annulment
or
REMEDIOS
filed
was
a
suit
to
enforce
an
implied
trust
allegedly
created
in
her
favor
when
CONSOLACION
fraudulently
registered
of
the
rightful
owner
of
the
property.
Clearly,
the
applicable
her
title
over
Lot
Nos.
2-‐A
and
2-‐E.
Consequently,
the
prescriptive
prescriptive
period
is
ten
years
under
Article
1144
and
not
four
period
for
filing
the
complaint
is
ten
years,
not
four.
The
CA
years
under
Articles
1389
and
1391.
counted
this
ten-‐year
period
from
19
November
1982.
Thus,
when
REMEDIOS
filed
her
complaint
on
4
February
1988,
the
ten-‐year
REMEDIOS
filed
her
complaint
on
4
February
1988
or
more
than
prescriptive
period
had
not
yet
expired.
19
years
after
CONSOLACION
registered
her
title
over
Lot
Nos.
2-‐A
and
2-‐E
on
28
October
1968.
Unquestionably,
REMEDIOS
filed
the
The
appellate
court
held
that
CATALINA's
unprobated
LAST
WILL
complaint
late
thus
warranting
its
dismissal.
does
not
preclude
REMEDIOS
from
seeking
reconveyance
of
Lot
Nos.
2-‐A
and
2-‐E
as
the
LAST
WILL
may
subsequently
be
admitted
to
probate.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
REMEDIOS
has
a
right
over
the
land.
RATIO:
NO.
Article
838
of
the
Civil
Code
states
that
"[N]o
will
shall
pass
either
real
or
personal
property
unless
it
is
proved
and
allowed
in
accordance
with
the
Rules
of
Court."
This
provision
means,
"until
admitted
to
probate,
[a
will]
has
no
effect
whatever
and
no
right
can
be
claimed
thereunder."
REMEDIOS
anchors
her
right
in
filing
this
suit
on
her
being
a
devisee
of
CATALINA's
LAST
WILL.
However,
since
the
probate
court
has
not
admitted
CATALINA's
LAST
WILL,
REMEDIOS
has
not
acquired
any
right
under
the
LAST
WILL.
REMEDIOS
is
thus
without
any
cause
of
action
either
to
seek
reconveyance
of
Lot
Nos.
2-‐A
and
2-‐E
or
to
enforce
an
implied
trust
over
these
lots.
The
appellate
court
tried
to
go
around
this
deficiency
by
ordering
the
reconveyance
of
Lot
Nos.
2-‐A
and
2-‐E
to
REMEDIOS
in
her
capacity
as
executrix
of
CATALINA's
LAST
WILL.
This
is
inappropriate
because
REMEDIOS
sued
petitioners
not
in
such
capacity
but
as
the
alleged
owner
of
the
disputed
lots.
On
the
issue
of
prescription:
REMEDIOS'
action
is
based
on
an
implied
trust
under
Article
1456
since
she
claims
that
the
inclusion
of
the
additional
1,335
sq.m.
was
without
basis.
In
effect,
REMEDIOS
asserts
that
CONSOLACION
acquired
the
additional
1,335
sq.m.
through
mistake
or
fraud
and
thus
CONSOLACION
should
be
considered
a
trustee
of
an
implied
trust
for
the
benefit
Case
No.
41
Garnishment,
resolving
the
question
of
ownership
of
the
royalties
Spuses
Alvaro
Pastor,
Jr.
and
Ma.
Elena
Achaval
de
Pastor
payable
by
ATLAS
and
ruling
in
effect
that
the
legacy
to
Quemada
(Petitioners)
vs.
CA,
Juan
Y.
Reyes,
Judge
of
the
First
Branch
of
was
not
inofficious.
the
CFI
of
Cebu
and
Lewellyn
Barlito
Quemada
(Respondents)
G.R.
No.
L-‐56340
The
Spouses
Pastor
filed
with
the
Court
of
Appeals
a
Petition
for
June
24,
1983
certiorari
and
Prohibition,
assailing
the
Order
and
the
writ
of
Plana,
J.
execution
and
garnishment
issued
pursuant
thereto.
The
petition
was
denied
as
well
as
the
motion
for
reconsideration
holding
that
FACTS:
Alvaro
Pastor
Sr.,
a
Spanish
citizen,
has
two
legitimate
the
questions
of
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will
and
of
the
ownership
children
with
his
wife
Sofia
Bossio,
who
died
months
after
his
over
the
mining
claims
had
been
finally
adjudicated
by
final
and
death,
and
one
illegitimate
child
named
Lewellyn
Barlito
Quemada
executory
order
of
the
lower
court.
(Quemada).
ISSUE:
Whether
the
Probate
Order
resolved
with
finality
the
Four
years
after
Pastor
S.'s
death,
Quemada
filed
a
petition
for
the
questions
of
ownership
and
intrinsic
validity.
probate
and
allowance
of
an
alleged
holographic
will
of
Pastor
Sr.
with
the
RTC.
The
will
contained
only
one
testamentary
RATIO:
NO.
The
question
of
ownership
is
an
extraneous
matter
disposition:
a
legacy
in
favor
of
Quemada
consisting
of
30%
of
which
the
Probate
Court
cannot
resolve
with
finality.
Thus,
for
the
Pastor
Sr.'s
42%
share
in
the
operation
by
Atlas
Consolidated
purpose
of
determining
whether
a
certain
property
should
or
Mining
and
Development
Corporation
(ATLAS)
of
some
mining
should
not
be
included
in
the
inventory
of
estate
properties,
the
claims
in
Pina-‐Barot,
Cebu.
Probate
Court
may
pass
upon
the
title
thereto,
but
such
determination
is
provisional,
not
conclusive,
and
is
subject
to
the
The
probate
court
appointed
her
as
the
special
administrator
of
final
decision
in
a
separate
action
to
resolve
title.
Also,
nowhere
in
the
entire
estate
of
Pastor
Sr,
whether
it
was
covered
by
the
the
dispositive
portion
of
the
assailed
order
is
there
a
declaration
holographic
will
or
not.
As
special
administrator,
Quemada
of
ownership
of
specific
properties.
On
the
contrary,
it
is
manifest
instituted
against
Pastor,
Jr.
and
his
wife
an
action
for
therein
that
ownership
was
not
resolved.
For
it
confined
itself
to
reconveyance
of
alleged
properties
of
the
estate,
which
included
the
question
of
extrinsic
validity
of
the
win,
and
the
need
for
and
the
properties
subject
of
the
legacy
and
which
were
in
the
names
propriety
of
appointing
a
special
administrator.
of
the
spouses
Pastor,
Jr.
and
his
wife,
Maria
Elena
Achaval
de
Pastor,
who
claimed
to
be
the
owners
thereof
in
their
own
rights,
As
to
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will,
when
Pastor,
Sr.
died,
he
was
and
not
by
inheritance.
survived
by
his
wife,
aside
from
his
two
legitimate
children
and
one
illegitimate
son.
There
is
therefore
a
need
to
liquidate
the
The
RTC
allowed
the
will
to
probate
and
it
was
affirmed
by
the
CA.
conjugal
partnership
and
set
apart
the
share
of
Pastor
Sr.'s
wife
in
On
petition
for
review,
the
Supreme
Court
dismissed
the
petition
the
conjugal
partnership
preparatory
to
the
administration
and
in
a
minute
resolution
and
remanded
the
same
to
the
PROBATE
liquidation
of
the
estate
of
Pastor
Sr.
When
the
disputed
Probate
COURT
after
denying
reconsideration.
order
was
issued
on
December
5,
1972,
there
had
been
no
liquidation
of
the
community
properties
of
PASTOR,
SR.
and
his
While
the
reconveyance
suit
was
still
being
litigated
in
the
RTC,
wife,
there
had
been
no
prior
definitive
determination
of
the
the
Probate
court
issued
the
assailed
Order
of
Execution
and
assets
of
the
estate
of
PASTOR,
SR.,
there
was
no
appropriate
determination,
much
less
payment,
of
the
debts
of
the
decedent
and
his
estate
nor
had
the
estate
tax
been
determined
and
paid,
or
at
least
provided
for.
The
net
assets
of
the
estate
not
having
been
determined,
the
legitime
of
the
forced
heirs
in
concrete
figures
could
not
be
ascertained.
All
the
foregoing
deficiencies
considered,
it
was
not
possible
to
determine
whether
the
legacy
of
Quemada
-‐
a
fixed
share
in
a
specific
property
rather
than
an
aliquot
part
of
the
entire
net
estate
of
the
deceased
-‐
would
produce
an
impairment
of
the
legitime
of
the
compulsory
heirs.
There
actually
was
no
determination
of
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will
in
other
respects.
It
was
obviously
for
this
reason
that
more
than
7
years
after
the
Probate
Order
was
issued
the
Probate
Court
scheduled
a
hearing
on
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will.
Without
a
final,
authoritative
adjudication
of
the
issue
as
to
what
properties
compose
the
estate
of
Pastor,
Sr.
in
the
face
of
conflicting
claims
made
by
heirs
and
a
non-‐heir
involving
properties
not
in
the
name
of
the
decedent,
and
in
the
absence
of
a
resolution
on
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will
here
in
question,
there
was
no
basis
for
the
Probate
Court
to
hold
in
its
Probate
Order
of
1972,
which
it
did
not,
that
private
respondent
is
entitled
to
the
payment
of
the
questioned
legacy.
Therefore,
the
Order
of
Execution
of
August
20,
1980
and
the
subsequent
implementing
orders
for
the
payment
of
QUEMADA's
legacy,
in
alleged
implementation
of
the
dispositive
part
of
the
Probate
Order
of
December
5,
1972,
must
fall
for
lack
of
basis.
The
ordered
payment
of
legacy
would
be
violative
of
the
rule
requiring
prior
liquidation
of
the
estate
of
the
deceased.
Case
No.
42
first
marriage
of
the
deceased,
who
allegedly
have
the
document
In
Re:
Testate
Estate
of
the
Deceased
Jose
B.
Suntay.
Silvino
contained
in
the
envelope
which
is
the
will
of
the
deceased,
be
SUntay
(Petitioner-‐Appellant)
vs.
Federico
C.
Suntay
ordered
to
present
it
in
court,
that
a
day
be
set
for
the
reception
of
(Administrator-‐Appellee)
evidence
on
the
will,
and
that
the
Petitioner
be
appointed
G.R.
Nos.
L-‐3087
and
L-‐3088
executrix
pursuant
to
the
designation
made
by
the
deceased
in
the
November
5,
1954
will.
Padilla,
J.
In
answer
to
the
court's
order
to
present
the
alleged
will,
the
FACTS:
On
May
14,
1934,
Jose
B.
Suntay
died
in
the
City
of
Amoy,
brothers
Apolonio,
Angel,
Manuel
and
Jose
Suntay
stated
that
they
China.
He
married
twice,
the
first
time
to
Manuela
T.
Cruz
with
did
not
have
the
said
will
and
denied
having
snatched
it
from
Go
whom
he
had
several
children
now
residing
in
the
Philippines,
and
Toh.
the
second
time
to
Maria
Natividad
Lim
Billian
with
whom
he
had
a
son.
In
view
of
the
allegations
of
the
petition
and
the
answer
of
the
brothers
Apolonio,
Angel,
Manuel
and
Jose
Suntay,
the
questions
On
the
same
date,
May
14,
1934,
Apolonio
Suntay,
eldest
son
of
the
raised
herein
are:
The
loss
of
the
alleged
will
of
the
deceased,
deceased
by
his
first
marriage,
filed
the
latter's
intestate
in
the
whether
Exhibit
B
accompanying
the
petition
is
an
authentic
copy
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Manila
(Civil
Case
No.
4892).
thereof,
and
whether
it
has
been
executed
with
all
the
essential
and
necessary
formalities
required
by
law
for
its
probate.
On
October
15,
1934,
and
in
the
same
court,
Maria
Natividad
Lim
Billian
also
instituted
the
present
proceedings
for
the
probate
of
a
At
the
trial
of
the
case
on
March
26,
1934,
the
Petitioner
put
two
will
allegedly
left
by
the
deceased.
witnesses
upon
the
stand,
Go
Toh
and
Tan
Boon
Chong,
who
corroborated
the
allegation
that
the
brothers
Apolonio
and
Angel
According
to
the
Petitioner,
before
the
deceased
died
in
China
he
appropriated
the
envelope
in
the
circumstances
above-‐mentioned.
left
with
her
a
sealed
envelope
(Exhibit
A)
containing
his
will
and,
also
another
document
(Exhibit
B
of
the
petitioner)
said
to
be
a
The
oppositors
have
not
adduced
any
evidence
counter
to
the
true
copy
of
the
original
contained
in
the
envelope.
The
will
in
the
testimony
of
these
two
witnesses.
The
court,
while
making
no
envelope
was
executed
in
the
Philippines,
with
Messrs.
Go
Toh,
express
finding
on
this
fact,
dismissed
the
petition
believing
that
Alberto
Barretto
and
Manuel
Lopez
as
attesting
witnesses.
the
evidence
is
insufficient
to
establish
that
the
envelope
seized
from
Go
Toh
contained
the
will
of
the
deceased,
and
that
the
said
On
August
25,
1934,
Go
Toh,
as
attorney-‐in-‐fact
of
the
Petitioner,
will
was
executed
with
all
the
essential
and
necessary
formalities
arrived
in
the
Philippines
with
the
will
in
the
envelope
and
its
required
by
law
for
its
probate.
copy
Exhibit
B.
While
Go
Toh
was
showing
this
envelope
to
Apolonio
Suntay
and
Angel
Suntay,
children
by
first
marriage
of
On
June
18,
1947,
Silvino
Suntay,
the
herein
petitioner,
filed
a
the
deceased,
they
snatched
and
opened
it
and,
after
getting
its
petition
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Bulacan
praying,
among
contents
and
throwing
away
the
envelope,
they
fled.
others:"(c)
that
such
other
necessary
and
proper
orders
be
issued
which
this
Honorable
Court
deems
appropriate
in
the
premises."
Upon
this
allegation,
the
Petitioner
asks
in
this
case
that
the
brothers
Apolonio,
Angel,
Manuel
and
Jose
Suntay,
children
by
the
While
this
petition
was
opposed
by
Federico
C.
Suntay,
son
of
the
In
the
pleading
copied
in
the
dissent,
which
the
appellant
has
deceased
Jose
B.
Suntay
with
his
first
wife,
Manuela
T.
Cruz,
the
owned
and
used
as
argument
in
the
motion
for
reconsideration,
other
children
of
the
first
marriage,
namely,
Ana
Suntay,
Aurora
there
is
nothing
that
may
bolster
up
his
contention.
Even
if
all
the
Suntay,
Concepcion
Suntay,
Lourdes
Guevara
Vda.
de
Suntay,
children
were
agreeable
to
the
probate
of
said
lost
will,
still
the
Manuel
Suntay
and
Emiliano
Suntay,
filed
the
following
answer
due
execution
of
the
lost
will
must
be
established
and
the
stating
that
they
had
no
opposition
thereto;
provisions
thereof
proved
clearly
and
distinctly
by
at
least
two
"Come
now
the
heirs
Concepcion
Suntay,
Ana
Suntay,
credible
witnesses,
as
provided
for
in
section
6,
Rule
77.
The
Aurora
Suntay,
Lourdes
Guevara
Vda.
de
Suntay,
Manuel
appellant's
effort
failed
to
prove
what
is
required
by
the
rule.
Suntay,
and
Emiliano
Suntay,
through
their
undersigned
attorney,
and,
in
answer
to
the
alternative
petition
filed
in
Even
if
the
children
of
the
deceased
by
the
first
marriage,
out
of
these
proceedings
by
Silvino
Suntay,
through
counsel,
generosity,
were
willing
to
donate
their
shares
in
the
estate
of
dated
June
18,
1947,
to
this
Honorable
Court
respectfully
their
deceased
father
or
parts
thereof
to
their
step
mother
and
her
state
that,
since
said
alternative
petition
seeks
only
to
put
only
child,
the
herein
appellant,
still
the
donation,
if
validly
made,
into
effect
the
testamentary
disposition
and
wishes
of
their
would
not
dispense
with
the
proceedings
for
the
probate
of
the
late
father,
they
have
no
opposition
thereto."
will
in
accordance
with
Section
6,
Rule
77,
because
the
former
may
convey
by
way
of
donation
their
shares
in
the
state
of
their
The
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Bulacan,
on
September
29,
1948,
deceased
father
or
parts
thereof
to
the
latter
only
after
the
decree
promulgated
the
following
resolution
disallowing
the
wills
sought
disallowing
the
will
shall
have
been
rendered
and
shall
have
to
be
probated
by
the
petitioner
in
his
alternative
petition
filed
on
become
final.
June
18,
1947.
If
the
lost
will
is
allowed
to
probate
there
would
be
no
room
for
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
lack
of
opposition
to
the
will
relieve
the
such
donation
except
of
their
respective
shares
in
the
probated
party
interested
in
its
probate
from
establishing
its
due
execution
will.
RATIO:
NO.
As
Justice
Padilla
states,
“Does
that
mean
that
they
NOTES:
were
consenting
to
the
probate
of
the
lost
will?
Of
course
not.”
If
the
lost
will
sought
to
be
probated
in
the
alternative
petition
was
According
to
Justice
Paras’s
dissenting
opinion,
it
is
very
really
the
will
of
their
late
father,
they,
as
good
children,
naturally
noteworthy
that
out
of
the
nine
children
of
the
first
marriage,
only
had,
could
have,
no
objection
to
its
probate.
That
is
all
that
their
Angel,
Jose
and
Federico
Suntay
had
opposed
the
probate
of
the
answer
implies
and
means.
will
in
question;
the
rest,
namely,
Ana,
Aurora,
Concepcion,
Lourdes,
Manuel
and
Emiliano
Suntay,
having
expressly
But
such
lack
of
objection
to
the
probate
of
the
lost
will
does
not
manifested
in
their
answer
that
they
had
no
opposition
thereto,
relieve
the
proponent
thereof
or
the
party
interested
in
its
probate
since
the
petitioner's
alternative
petition
"seeks
only
to
put
into
from
establishing
its
due
execution
and
proving
clearly
and
effect
the
testamentary
disposition
and
wishes
of
their
late
father."
distinctly
the
provisions
thereof
at
least
two
credible
witnesses.
It
does
not
mean
that
they
accept
the
draft
Exhibit
B
as
an
exact
and
This
attitude
is
significantly
an
indication
of
the
justness
of
true
copy
of
the
lost
will
and
consent
to
its
probate.
Far
from
it.
petitioner's
claim,
because
it
would
have
been
to
their
greater
advantage
if
they
had
sided
with
oppositor
Federico
Suntay
in
his
theory
of
equal
inheritance
for
all
the
children
of
Jose
B.
Suntay.
Under
the
lost
will
or
its
draft
Exhibit
"B",
each
of
the
Suntay
children
would
receive
only
some
P
25,000.00,
whereas
in
case
of
intestacy
or
under
the
alleged
will
providing
for
equal
shares,
each
of
them
would
receive
some
P100,000.00.
And
yet
the
Suntay
children
other
than
Angel,
Jose
and
Federico
had
chosen
to
give
their
conformity
to
the
alternative
petition
in
this
case.
Case
No.
43
ground
that
to
be
appointed
they
must
first
prove
their
respective
In
the
Matter
of
the
Estate
of
the
Deceased
Chung
Liu,
Ngo
The
relationship
to
the
deceased
Chung
Li
and
prayed
that
he
be
Hua
(Petitioner-‐Appellant)
vs.
Chung
Kiat
Kung,
Lily
Chung
appointed
administrator.
Cho,
Bonifacio
Chung
Siong
Pek
and
Chung
Ka
Bio
(Oppositors-‐Appellee).
Chung
Kiat
Kang
(Oppositor-‐ RTC
Ruling:
Ngo
The
Hua
and
the
deceased
were
validly
divorced
Appellant).
Philippine
Trust
Co.
(Special
Administrator)
by
the
aforementioned
Taipei
District
Court,
and
that
Chung
Kiat
G.R.
No.
L-‐17091
Hua,
Lily
Chung
Cho,
Bonifacio
Chung
Siong
Pek
and
Chung
Kiat
September
30,
1963
Bio
are
children
of
the
deceased.
So
it
issued
the
order
appointing
Labrador,
J.
Chung
Kiat
Hua
as
administrator
of
the
estate
of
Chung
Liu.
FACTS:
On
December
7,
1957,
Ngo
The
Hua,
claiming
to
be
From
this
order,
both
the
petitioner
and
Chung
Kiat
Kang
surviving
spouse
of
the
deceased
Chung
Liu,
filed
a
petition
to
be
appealed.
However,
petitioner
Ngo
The
Hua
filed
a
petition
to
appointed
administratrix
of
the
estate
of
aforementioned
withdraw
her
appeal
stating
that
she
had
entered
into
an
amicable
deceased.
Her
petition
was
opposed
Chung
Kiat
Hua,
Lily
Chung
settlement
with
the
oppositors-‐appellees.
Her
petition
was
Cho,
Bonifacio
Chung
Sio
Pek
and
Chung
Ka
Bio,
all
claiming
to
be
granted
by
this
Court.
children
of
the
deceased
Chung
Liu
by
his
first
wife,
Tan
Hua.
Hence
only
the
appeal
of
oppositor
Chung
Kiat
Kang
remains
for
The
petition
was
heard
and
evidence
presented
by
both
petitioner
the
consideration
of
this
Court.
Ngo
The
Hua
and
Chung
Kiat
Hua,
et
al.
When
Chung
Kiat
Kang's
turn
to
present
his
evidence
came,
he
manifested,
through
his
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Chung
Kiat
Kang
may
intervene
on
the
counsel,
that
he
was
waiving
his
right
to
present
evidence
in
so
far
administration
proceeding.
as
the
appointment
of
administrator
of
the
estate
is
concerned.
RATIO:
NO.
It
is
well-‐settled
that
for
a
person
to
be
able
to
Oppositors-‐Appellees’
Contention:
They
claim
that
Ngo
The
intervene
in
an
administration
proceeding
concerning
the
estate
of
Hua
is
morally
and
physically
unfit
to
execute
the
duties
of
the
a
deceased,
it
is
necessary
for
him
to
have
interest
in
such
estate.
trust
as
administratrix,
and
that
she
and
the
deceased
have
An
interested
party
has
been
defined
in
this
connection
as
one
secured
an
absolute
divorce
in
Taiwan,
both
being
Chinese
who
would
be
benefited
by
the
estate
such
as
an
heir,
or
one
who
citizens,
confirmed
a
legalized
by
the
Taipei
District
Court,
Taipei,
has
a
certain
claim
against
the
estate,
such
as
a
creditor.
Appellant
Taiwan.
In
this
same
opposition
they
prayed
the
Chung
Kiat
Hua,
Chung
Kiat
Kang
does
not
claim
of
to
be
a
creditor
of
Chung
Liu's
allegedly
the
eldest
child
of
the
deceased,
be
appointed
estate.
Neither
is
he
an
heir
in
accordance
with
the
Civil
Code
of
administrator
instead.
the
Republic
of
China,
the
law
that
applies
in
this
case,
Chung
Liu
being
a
Chinese
citizen.
The
appellant
not
having
any
interest
in
Petitioner-‐Appellants’
Contention:
Ngo
The
Hua
who
claim
that
Chung
Liu's
estate,
either
as
heir
or
creditor,
he
cannot
be
the
oppositors
are
not
children
of
Chung
Liu.
appointed
as
co-‐administrator
of
the
estate,
as
he
now
prays.
Oppositor-‐Appellants’
Contention:
Chung
Kiat
Kang,
claiming
WHEREFORE,
the
order
appealed
from
is
hereby
affirmed,
with
be
a
nephew
of
the
deceased,
filed
his
opposition
to
the
costs
against
appellants.
appointment
of
either
Ngo
The
Hua
or
Chung
Kiat
Hu
on
the
Case
No.
44
testamentary
disposition
of
the
property
of
Isabel
Cuntapay
Heirs
of
Rosendo
Lasam,
Represented
by
Rogelio
Lasam
and
should
be
respected,
and
that
the
heirs
of
Rosendo
Lasam
have
a
Atty.
Edward
Llonillo
(Petitioners)
vs.
Vicenta
Umengan
better
right
to
possess
the
subject
lot.
(Respondent)
G.R.
No.
168156
However,
the
CA
declared
that
then
RTC
erred
in
ruling
that,
by
December
6,
2006
virtue
of
the
purported
last
will
and
testament
of
Isabel
Cuntapay,
Callejo,
Sr.,
J.
heirs
of
Rosendo
Lasam
ave
a
better
right
to
the
subject
lot
over
Vicenta
Umangan,
explaining
that
the
said
last
will
and
testament
FACTS:
The
lot
subject
of
this
case
is
located
in
Tuguegarao
City,
did
not
comply
with
the
formal
requirements
of
the
law
on
wills.
Cagayan,
originally
owned
by
spouses
Pedro
Cuntapay
and
Leon
Bunagan.
The
heirs
of
the
said
spouses
conveyed
the
ownership
of
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
petitioner
has
a
better
right
to
the
subject
the
lots
to
their
two
children
Irene
Cuntapay
and
Isabel
Cuntapay.
property.
The
heirs
of
petitioner,
Rosendo
Lasam,
who
was
the
son
of
Isabel
RATIO:
NO.
The
purported
last
will
and
testament
of
Isabel
Cuntapay
filed
with
the
MTCC
a
complaint
for
unlawful
detainer
Cuntapay
could
not
be
properly
relied
upon
to
establish
against
respondent,
Vicenta
Umengan,
who
is
likewise
an
heir
of
petitioner’s
right
to
possess
the
subject
lot,
because,
without
Isabel
Cuntapay
by
another
marriage,
was
then
occupying
the
having
been
probated,
the
said
last
will
and
testament
could
not
be
subject
lot.
In
their
complaint,
the
heirs
of
Rosendo
Lasam
alleged
the
source
of
any
right.
that
they
are
the
owners
of
the
subject
lot.
During
his
lifetime,
Rosendo
Lasam
allegedly
temporarily
allowed
Vicenta
Umengan
to
occupy
the
subject
lot
sometime
in
1955
allegedly
promising
that
they
would
vacate
the
subject
lot
upon
demand.
However,
despite
written
notice
and
demand
by
the
heirs
of
Rosendo
Lasam,
Vicenta
Umengan
allegedly
unlawfully
refused
to
vacate
the
subject
lot
and
continued
to
possess
the
same.
Thus,
instituting
the
action
for
ejectment.
In
contrast,
Vicenta
Umengan
denied
the
material
allegations
stating
that
the
subject
lot
was
inherited
by
her
children
through
intestate
sucession,
and
further,
her
father
purchased
shares
in
the
subject
lot
as
evidenced
by
Deeds
of
Sale.
The
MTCC
rendered
judgement
in
favor
of
the
heirs
of
Rosendo
Lasam
and
directed
the
ejectment
of
Vicenta
Umangan
giving
credence
to
the
newly
discovered
last
will
and
testament
purportedly
executed
by
Isabel
Cuntapay,
as
opposed
to
Vicenta
Umengan’s
contention
on
intestate
succession
and
legal
conveyances.
The
RTC
echoed
the
reasoning
of
the
MTCC
that
the
Case
No.
45
Subsequently,
a
petition
for
probate
of
the
holographic
will
of
Dy
Yieng
Seangio,
Barbara
D.
Seangio
and
Virgina
D.
Seangio
Segundo
was
filed
by
petitioners
before
the
RTC.
Upon
petitioner’s
(Petitioners)
vs.
Hon.
Amor
A.
Reyes,
in
her
capacity
as
motion,
the
probate
proceedings
and
testate
proceedings
were
Presiding
Judge,
RTC,
NCR,
Branch
21,
Manila
et
al.
consolidated.
(Respondents)
G.R.
Nos.
140371-‐72
Private
respondents
later
moved
for
the
dismissal
of
the
probate
November
27,
2006
proceedings
on
the
ground
that
the
document
purporting
to
be
the
Azcuna,
J.
holographic
will
of
Segundo
does
not
meet
the
definition
of
a
will
under
Article
783
of
the
Civil
Code,
as
it
only
shows
an
alleged
act
FACTS:
Private
respondents
filed
a
petition
for
the
settlement
of
of
disinheritance
by
the
decedent
of
his
eldest
son,
Alfredo,
and
the
intestate
estate
of
the
late
Segundo
Seangio
@
the
RTC,
an
nothing
else.
prayed
for
the
appointment
of
private
respondent
Elisa
Seangio-‐
Santos
as
special
administrator
and
guardian
ad
litem
of
petitioner
Petitioners,
on
the
other
hand,
filed
their
motion
to
dismiss,
Dy
Yieng
Seangio.
contending
that:
Petitioners
Dy
Yieng,
Barbara
and
Virginia
Seangio
opposed
the
1) The
authority
of
the
probate
court
is
limited
only
to
a
petition
on
the
ff.
grounds:
determination
of
extrinsic
validity
of
the
will;
1) Dy
Yieng
is
in
full
command
of
her
faculties;
2) Disinheritance
constitutes
a
disposition
on
the
estate
of
the
decedent;
and
2) Deceased
executed
a
general
power
of
attorney
in
favor
of
Virginia,
giving
her
the
power
to
manage
and
exercise
3) The
rule
on
preterition
does
not
apply
because
Segundo’s
control
and
supervision
over
his
business
in
the
will
does
not
constitute
a
universal
heir
or
heirs
to
the
Philippines;
exclusion
of
one
or
more
compulsory
heirs.
3) Virginia
is
the
most
competent
and
qualified
to
serve
as
The
RTC
issued
an
order
dismissing
the
petition
for
probate
administrator
of
the
estate
because
she
is
a
certified
public
proceedings
because
of
preterition,
as
the
only
heirs
mentioned
accountant;
and
thereat
are
Alfredo
and
Virginia.
The
other
heirs
being
omitted,
Article
854
of
the
New
Civil
Code
thus
applies.
However,
insofar
as
4) Segundo
left
a
holographic
will
executed
in
1995,
the
widow
Dy
Yieng
Seangio
is
concerned,
Article
854
does
not
disinheriting
one
of
the
private
respondents,
Alfredo
apply,
she
not
being
a
compulsory
heir
in
the
direct
line.
Seangio,
for
cause.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
compulsory
heirs
in
the
direct
line
In
view
of
the
purported
holographic
will,
petitioners
averred
that
were
preterited
in
the
will.
in
the
event
the
decedent
is
found
to
have
left
a
will,
the
intestate
proceedings
are
to
be
automatically
suspended
and
replaced
by
RATIO:
NO.
The
compulsory
heirs
in
the
direct
line
were
not
proceedings
for
the
probate
of
the
will.
preterited
in
the
will.
According
to
the
SC,
it
was
Segundo’s
last
expression
to
bequeath
his
estate
to
all
his
compulsory
heirs
with
the
sole
exception
of
Alfredo.
Also,
Segundo
did
not
institute
an
heir
to
the
exclusion
of
his
other
compulsory
heirs.
The
mere
mention
of
the
name
of
one
of
the
petitioners,
Virginia,
in
the
document
did
not
operate
to
institute
her
as
the
universal
heir.
Her
name
was
included
only
as
a
witness
to
the
altercation
between
Segundo
and
his
son,
Alfredo.
Case
No.
46
acknowledged
her
as
his
natural
daughter
and,
aside
from
certain
Ernesto
M.
Guevara
(Petitioner-‐Appellant)
vs.
Rosario
legacies
and
bequests,
devised
to
her
a
portion
of
21.6171
Guevara
and
her
husband
Pedro
Buison
(Respondents-‐ hectares
of
the
large
parcel
of
land
described
in
the
will.
But
a
little
Appellees)
over
four
years
after
the
testator's
demise,
she
commenced
the
G.R.
No.
48840
present
action
against
Ernesto
M.
Guevara
alone
for
the
purpose
December
29,
1943
hereinbefore
indicated;
and
it
was
only
during
the
trial
of
this
case
Ozaeta,
J.
that
she
presented
the
will
to
the
court,
not
for
the
purpose
of
having
it
probated
but
only
to
prove
that
the
deceased
Victorino
L.
FACTS:
Victorino
Guevara
executed
a
will
in
1931
wherein
he
Guevara
had
acknowledged
her
as
his
natural
daughter.
made
various
bequests
to
his
wife,
stepchildren,
wife
in
the
2nd
marriage.
He
has
a
legitimate
son
Ernesto
and
a
natural
daughter
Upon
that
proof
of
acknowledgment
she
claimed
her
share
of
the
Rosario.
Therein,
he
acknowledged
Rosario
as
his
natural
inheritance
from
him,
but
on
the
theory
or
assumption
that
he
daughter.
died
intestate,
because
the
will
had
not
been
probated,
for
which
reason,
she
asserted,
the
betterment
therein
made
by
the
testator
Victorino
L.
Guevara
executed
a
deed
of
sale
in
favor
of
Ernesto
M.
in
favor
of
his
legitimate
son
Ernesto
M.
Guevara
should
be
Guevara
conveying
to
him
the
southern
half
of
a
large
parcel
of
disregarded.
Both
the
trial
court
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
land
in
consideration
of
the
sum
of
P1
and
other
valuable
sustained
that
theory.
considerations.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
probate
of
a
will
can
be
dispensed
with
Victorino
L.
Guevara
died.
His
last
will
and
testament,
however,
was
never
presented
to
the
court
for
probate,
nor
has
any
RATIO:
NO.
Rosario's
contention
violates
procedural
law
and
administration
proceeding
ever
been
instituted
for
the
settlement
considered
an
attempt
to
circumvent
the
last
will
and
testament
of
of
his
estate.
the
decedent.
The
proceeding
for
the
probate
of
a
will
is
one
in
rem,
with
notice
by
publication
to
the
whole
world
and
with
Whether
the
various
legatees
mentioned
in
the
will
have
received
personal
notice
to
each
of
the
known
heirs,
legatees,
and
devisees
their
respective
legacies
or
have
even
been
given
due
notice
of
the
of
the
testator.
execution
of
said
will
and
of
the
dispositions
therein
made
in
their
favor,
does
not
affirmatively
appear
from
the
record
of
this
case.
Although
not
contested,
the
due
execution
of
the
will
and
the
fact
that
the
testator
at
the
time
of
its
execution
was
of
sound
and
Ever
since
the
death
of
Victorino
L.
Guevara,
his
only
legitimate
disposing
mind
and
not
acting
under
duress,
menace,
and
undue
son
Ernesto
M.
Guevara
appears
to
have
possessed
the
land
influence
or
fraud,
must
be
proved
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
court,
adjudicated
to
him
in
the
registration
proceeding
and
to
have
and
only
then
may
the
will
be
legalized
and
given
effect
by
means
disposed
of
various
portions
thereof
for
the
purpose
of
paying
the
of
a
certificate
of
its
allowance,
signed
by
the
judge
and
attested
by
debts
left
by
his
father.
the
seal
of
the
court;
and
when
the
will
devises
real
property,
attested
copies
thereof
and
of
the
certificate
of
allowance
must
be
Rosario
Guevara,
who
had
her
father's
last
will
and
testament
in
recorded
in
the
register
of
deeds
of
the
province
in
which
the
land
her
custody,
did
nothing
judicially
to
invoke
the
testamentary
lies.
dispositions
made
therein
in
her
favor,
whereby
the
testator
The
presentation
of
a
will
to
the
court
for
probate
is
mandatory
and
its
allowance
by
the
court
is
essential
and
indispensable
to
its
efficacy.
To
assure
and
compel
the
probate
of
a
will,
the
law
punishes
a
person
who
neglects
his
duty
to
present
it
to
the
court.
If
the
decedent
left
a
will
and
no
debts
and
the
heirs
and
legatees
desire
to
make
an
extrajudicial
partition
of
the
estate,
they
must
first
present
that
will
to
the
court
for
probate
and
divide
the
estate
in
accordance
with
the
will.
They
may
not
disregard
the
provisions
of
the
will
unless
those
provisions
are
contrary
to
law.
Neither
may
they
do
away
with
the
presentation
of
the
will
to
the
court
for
probate,
because
such
suppression
of
the
will
is
contrary
to
law
and
public
policy.
The
law
enjoins
the
probate
of
the
will
and
public
policy
requires
it,
because
unless
the
will
is
probated
and
notice
thereof
given
to
the
whole
world,
the
right
of
a
person
to
dispose
of
his
property
by
will
may
be
rendered
nugatory,
as
is
attempted
to
be
done
in
the
instant
case.
Absent
legatees
and
devisees,
or
such
of
them
as
may
have
no
knowledge
of
the
will,
could
be
cheated
of
their
inheritance
thru
the
collusion
of
some
of
the
heirs
who
might
agree
to
the
partition
of
the
estate
among
themselves
to
the
exclusion
of
others.
Case
No.
47
Octavio
S.
Maloles
II,
(Petitioner)
vs.
CA,
Hon.
Fernando
V.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Octavio
Maloles
II
has
the
right
to
Gorospe,
J.r,
in
his
Official
Capacity
as
Presiding
Judge
of
RTC-‐ intervene
in
the
probate
proceeding.
Makati,
Branch
61,
and
Pacita
Phillips
as
the
alleged
executrix
of
the
alleged
will
of
the
late
Dr.
Arturo
de
Santos,
RATIO:
No.
The
Supreme
Court
first
clarified
that
the
probate
of
(Respondents)
will
filed
in
Branch
61
has
already
terminated
upon
the
allowance
G.R.
No.
133359
of
the
will.
Hence
when
Pacita
filed
a
motion
with
Branch
65,
the
January
31,
2000
same
is
already
a
separate
proceeding
and
not
a
continuance
of
Mendoza,
J.
the
now
concluded
probate
in
Branch
61.
There
is
therefore
no
reason
for
Branch
65
to
refer
back
the
case
to
Branch
61
as
it
FACTS:
In
1995,
Dr.
Arturo
De
Los
Santos
filed
a
petition
for
initially
did.
Further
even
if
the
probate
was
terminated,
under
probate
of
his
will.
He
declared
that
he
has
no
compulsory
heirs
Rule
73
of
the
Rules
of
Court
concerning
the
venue
of
settlement
of
and
that
he
is
naming
as
sole
devisee
and
legatee
the
Arturo
de
estates,
it
is
provided
that
when
a
case
is
filed
in
one
branch,
Santos
Foundation,
Inc.
(ASF).
The
named
executrix
is
Pacita
De
jurisdiction
over
the
case
does
not
attach
to
the
branch
or
judge
Los
Reyes
Phillips.
The
petition
was
filed
in
RTC
Makati
Branch
61.
alone,
to
the
exclusion
of
the
other
branches.
Judge
Fernando
Gorospe
of
said
court
determined
that
Arturo
is
of
sound
mind
and
was
not
acting
in
duress
when
he
signed
his
last
Anent
the
issue
of
Octavio
being
an
heir,
such
contention
has
no
will
and
testament
and
so
Branch
61
allowed
the
last
will
and
merit.
He
is
not
an
heir.
Arturo
died
testate.
Next
of
kins
may
only
testament
on
February
16,
1996.
inherit
if
a
person
dies
intestate.
In
this
case,
Arturo
left
a
valid
will
which
expressly
provided
that
ASF
is
the
sole
legatee
and
devisee
Ten
days
from
the
allowance,
Arturo
died.
Thereafter,
Pacita,
as
of
his
estate.
executrix,
filed
a
motion
for
the
issuance
of
letters
of
testamentary
with
Branch
61.
She
however
withdrew
the
motion
but
later
on
refilled
it
with
RTC
Makati
Branch
65.
Meanwhile,
a
certain
Octavio
Maloles
II
filed
a
motion
for
intervention
with
Branch
61
claiming
that
as
a
next
of
kin
(him
being
the
full
blooded
nephew
of
Arturo)
he
should
be
appointed
as
the
administrator
of
the
estate
and
that
he
is
an
heir.
Judge
Abad
Santos
of
Branch
65
issued
an
order
transferring
the
motion
filed
by
Pacita
to
Branch
61.
Judge
Santos
ratiocinated
that
since
the
probate
proceeding
started
in
Branch
61,
then
it
should
be
the
same
court
which
should
hear
Pacita’s
motion.
Branch
61
however
refused
to
consolidate
and
referred
the
case
back
to
Branch
65.
Branch
65
subsequently
consolidated
the
case
per
refusal
of
Branch
61.
Eventually,
Branch
65
allowed
the
motion
for
intervention
filed
by
Octavio.
GROUNDS
FOR
DISALLOWANCE
OF
WILLS
was
dismissed
because
if
failed
to
meet
the
requirements
under
Article
813
and
814
of
the
NCC
and
the
house
and
lot
located
in
Case
No.
48
Cabadbaran,
Agusan
del
Norte
could
not
validly
dispose.
Spouses
Roberto
and
Thelma
Ajero
(Petitioners)
vs.
CA
and
Clemente
Sand
(Respondents)
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
holographic
will
is
valid.
G.R.
No.
106720
September
15,
1994
RATIO:
YES,
it
is
valid.
According
to
the
Supreme
Court,
in
the
Puno,
J.
case
of
holographic
wills,
it
must
be
totally
autographic
or
handwritten
by
the
testator
himself
as
provided
under
Article
810
FACTS:
Decedent
Annie
Sand
executed
a
holographic
will
and
of
the
NCC.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
testator
fails
to
sign
and
date
named
the
petitioners
and
private
respondents
as
devisees.
some
of
the
dispositions,
such
dispositions
cannot
be
effectuated
Petitioners
instituted
a
special
proceedings
for
allowance
of
but
does
not
render
the
whole
testament
void.
In
this
case,
the
decedent’s
holographic
will.
Petitioners
alleged
that
the
decedent
holographic
will
can
still
be
admitted
to
probate.
Unless
the
was
of
sound
mind
and
disposing
mind
during
the
time
of
its
authenticated
alterations,
cancellations
or
insertions
were
made
execution
and
not
acting
under
duress,
fraud
or
undue
influence
on
the
date
of
the
holographic
will
or
on
testator’s
signature,
their
and
was
in
capacity
to
dispose
her
estate
by
will.
presence
does
not
invalidate
the
will
itself.
It
will
only
result
in
disallowance
of
those
changes
due
to
lack
of
authentication.
However,
private
respondents
opposed
the
petition
on
the
grounds
that
the
testament’s
body
and
signature
was
not
in
In
the
case
of
the
house
and
lot
located
in
Cabadbaran,
Agusan
del
decedent’s
handwriting
and
it
contained
alterations,
corrections
Norte,
it
cannot
be
validly
dispose
of
the
whole
property
because
which
were
not
duly
signed
by
the
decedent
and
lastly
the
will
was
such
property
is
in
the
name
of
her
late
father,
John
H.
Sand
which
procured
by
petitioners
through
improper
pressure
and
undue
means
that
other
heirs
of
her
father
has
also
rights
over
the
said
influence.
house
and
lot.
On
the
other
hand,
the
petition
was
opposed
by
Dr.
Jose
Ajero
in
regard
to
the
disposition
in
the
will
of
a
house
and
lot
located
in
Cabadbaran,
Agusan
Del
Norte.
Such
property
cannot
be
conveyed
because
she
was
not
the
sole
owner.
RTC
admitted
the
decedent’s
holographic
will
to
probate.
The
court
finds
that
there’s
no
evidence
to
show
that
the
will
in
question
is
different
from
the
will
actually
executed
by
Sand.
Also,
the
decedent
is
of
sound
mind
during
the
execution
of
the
will.
There
were
three
(3)
witnesses
presented
and
were
able
to
identify
the
handwriting
of
the
decedent
and
it
was
written
to
be
the
genuine
handwriting
and
signature.
CA
reversed
the
decision
of
the
RTC
and
the
petition
for
probate
INSTITUTION
OF
HEIRS
CASE
NO.
50
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
there
is
preterition
in
this
case.
J.L.T.
AGRO,
INC.,
represented
by
its
Manager,
JULIAN
L.
TEVES,
petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO
BALANSAG
and
HILARIA
RATIO:
NO.
Article
854
provides
that
the
preterition
or
omission
CADAYDAY,
respondents.
of
one,
some,
or
all
of
the
compulsory
heirs
in
the
direct
line,
G.R.
NO.
141882
whether
living
at
the
time
of
the
execution
of
the
will
or
born
after
MARCH
11,
2005
the
death
of
the
testator,
shall
annul
the
institution
of
heir;
but
the
J.
TINGA
devises
and
legacies
shall
be
valid
insofar
as
they
are
not
inofficious.
Manresa
defines
preterition
as
the
omission
of
the
heir
FACTS:
Decedent,
Don
Julian
L.
Teves,
contracted
two
marriages,
in
the
will,
either
by
not
naming
him
at
all
or,
while
mentioning
first,
with
Antonia
which
they
had
two
children,
Josefa
and
Emilio.
him
as
father,
son,
etc.,
by
not
instituting
him
as
heir
without
After
Antonia’s
death,
he
married
Milagros
Donio
which
he
had
4
disinheriting
him
expressly,
nor
assigning
to
him
some
part
of
the
children,
Maria
Evelyn,
Jose,
Milagros
Reyes
and
Pedro.
Upon
the
properties.
It
is
the
total
omission
of
a
compulsory
heir
in
the
death
of
Antonia,
the
conjugal
properties
of
her
and
Don
Julian
direct
line
from
inheritance.
was
partitioned.
Thereafter,
the
parties
entered
into
a
Compromise
Agreement
which
embodied
the
partition
of
all
the
In
the
case
at
bar,
Don
Julian
did
not
execute
a
will
since
what
he
properties
of
Don
Juan.
On
the
basis
of
the
agreement,
Hacienda
resorted
to
was
a
partition
inter
vivos
of
his
properties,
as
Madalla
Milagrosa
was
owned
in
common
by
Don
Julian,
Josefa
evidenced
by
the
court
approved
Compromise
Agreement.
Thus,
it
and
Emilio.
The
remainder
of
the
properties
was
retained
by
Don
is
premature
if
not
irrelevant
to
speak
of
preterition
prior
to
the
Julian,
including
Lot.
No.
63.
Don
Julian,
Emilio
and
Josefa
then
death
of
Don
Julian
in
the
absence
of
a
will
depriving
a
legal
heir
of
executed
a
Supplemental
Deed
of
Assignment
in
favor
of
petitioner
his
legitime.
Besides,
there
are
other
properties
which
the
heirs
which
transferred
ownership
over
Lot
No.
63
among
other
from
the
second
marriage
could
inherit
from
Don
Julian
upon
his
properties
and
thereafter,
petitioner
caused
a
TCT
be
issued
in
its
death.
A
couple
of
provisions
in
the
Compromise
Agreement
are
name.
Meanwhile,
unaware
that
Lot.
No.
63
was
already
in
the
indicative
of
Don
Julian's
desire
along
this
line.
Hence,
the
total
name
of
the
petitioner,
respondents
bought
the
same
from
omission
from
inheritance
of
Don
Julian's
heirs
from
the
second
Milagros
Donio.
Hence,
the
seek
the
annulment
of
TCT
issued
in
marriage,
a
requirement
for
preterition
to
exist,
is
not
present.
favor
of
petitioner.
RTC:
Denied
annulment
of
title.
There
is
a
valid
transfer
of
ownership.
• At
the
time
of
Don
Julian's
death,
Lot
No.
63
was
no
longer
a
part
of
his
estate
since
he
had
earlier
assigned
it
to
petitioner
by
virtue
of
the
Supplemental
Deed
of
Assignment.
Consequently,
Milagros
Donio
and
not
being
the
owners
they
could
not
have
sold
it.
CA:
Petitioner’s
title
null
and
void.
There
is
preterition.
Case
No.
51
RATIO:
YES.
In
a
proceeding
for
the
probate
of
a
will,
the
court's
Remedios
Nuguid
(Petitioner-‐Appellant)
vs.
Felix
Nuguid
and
area
of
inquiry
is
limited
to
an
examination
of,
and
resolution
on,
Paz
Salonga
Nuguid
(Oppositors-‐Appellee)
the
extrinsic
validity
of
the
will;
the
due
execution
thereof;
the
G.R.
No.
L-‐23445
testatrix's
testamentary
capacity;
and
the
compliance
with
the
June
23,
1966
requisites
or
solemnities
prescribed
the
by
law.
Sanchez,
J.
In
the
case
at
bar,
however,
a
peculiar
situation
exists.
The
parties
FACTS:
Rosario
Nuguid,
a
resident
of
Quezon
City,
died
on
shunted
aside
the
question
of
whether
or
not
the
will
should
be
December
30,
1962,
single,
without
descendants,
legitimate
or
allowed
probate.
They
questioned
the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will.
illegitimate.
Surviving
her
were
her
legitimate
parents,
Felix
Normally,
this
comes
only
after
the
court
has
declared
that
the
will
Nuguid
and
Paz
Salonga
Nuguid,
and
six
(6)
brothers
and
sisters.
has
been
duly
authenticated.
But
if
the
case
were
to
be
remanded
for
probate
of
the
will,
nothing
will
be
gained.
In
the
event
of
Petitioner
Remedios
Nuguid,
one
of
Rosario’s
sisters,
filed
in
the
probate
or
if
the
court
rejects
the
will,
probability
exists
that
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Rizal
a
holographic
will
allegedly
case
will
come
up
once
again
before
this
Court
on
the
same
issue
executed
by
Rosario
Nuguid.
Petitioner
prayed
that
said
will
be
of
the
intrinsic
validity
or
nullity
of
the
will.
The
result
would
be
admitted
to
probate
and
that
letters
of
administration
with
the
waste
of
time,
effort,
expense,
plus
added
anxiety.
These
practical
will
annexed
be
issued
to
her.
considerations
induce
this
Court
to
meet
head-‐on
the
issue
of
the
nullity
of
the
provisions
of
the
will
in
question,
there
being
a
Felix
Nuguid
and
Paz
Salonga
Nuguid,
concededly
the
legitimate
justiciable
controversy
awaiting
solution.
father
and
mother
of
the
deceased
Rosario
Nuguid,
entered
their
opposition
to
the
probate
of
her
will.
The
deceased
left
no
descendants,
legitimate
or
illegitimate.
But
she
left
forced
heirs
in
the
direct
ascending
time
—
her
parents.
Ground
therefor,
inter
alia,
is
that
by
the
institution
of
petitioner
Her
will
does
not
explicitly
disinherit
them
but
simply
omits
their
Remedios
Nuguid
as
universal
heir
of
the
deceased,
oppositors
—
names
altogether.
Said
will
rather
than
he
labelled
ineffective
who
are
compulsory
heirs
of
the
deceased
in
the
direct
ascending
disinheritance
is
clearly
one
in
which
the
said
forced
heirs
suffer
line
—
were
illegally
preterited
and
that
in
consequence
the
from
preterition.
institution
is
void.
Preterition
"consists
in
the
omission
in
the
testator's
will
of
the
The
court's
order
of
November
8,
1963,
held
that
"the
will
in
forced
heirs
or
anyone
of
them,
either
because
the
are
not
question
is
a
complete
nullity
and
will
perforce
create
intestacy
of
mentioned
therein,
or,
though
mentioned,
they
are
neither
the
estate
of
the
deceased
Rosario
Nuguid"
and
dismissed
the
instituted
as
heirs
nor
are
expressly
disinherited."
(Neri,
et
al.
vs.
petition.
Akutin,
at
al.,
72
Phil.,
p.
325.)
Disinheritance;
in
turn,
"is
a
testamentary
disposition
depriving
any
compulsory
heir
of
heir
The
Motion
for
Reconsideration
was
also
denied.
share
in
the
legitime
for
a
cause
authorized
by
law."
(Justice
J.B.L.
Reyes
and
R.C.
Puno,
"An
Outline
of
Philippine
Civil
Law,"
1956
ed.,
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
the
institution
of
Remedios
as
the
sole
and
Vol.
III,
p.
8,
citing
cases.)
Disinheritance
is
always
"voluntary";
universal
heir
preterited
the
compulsory
heirs.
preterition
upon
the
other
hand,
is
presumed
to
be
"involuntary."
(Sanchez
Roman,
Estudios
de
Derecho
Civil,
2nd
edition,
Volume
reduction
of
inofficious
legacies
or
betterments
would
be
a
20,
p.
1131.)
surplusage
because
they
would
be
absorbed
by
Article
817
of
the
same
Code.
The
effects
flowing
from
preterition
are
totally
different
from
those
of
disinheritance.
Preterition
under
Article
854
of
the
Civil
Code
"shall
annul
the
institution
of
heir.
"This
annulment
is
in
toto,
unless
in
the
will
there
are,
in
addition,
testamentary
dispositions
in
the
form
of
devises
or
legacies.
In
ineffective
disinheritance
under
Article
918
of
the
same
Code,
such
disinheritance
shall
also
"annul
the
institution
of
heirs,"
but
only
"insofar
as
it
may
prejudice
the
person
disinherited,"
which
last
phrase
was
omitted
in
the
case
of
preterition.
(III
Tolentino,
Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines,
1961.
Edition,
p.
172.)
Better
stated
yet,
in
disinheritance
the
nullity
is
limited
to
that
portion
of
the
estate
of
which
the
disinherited
heirs
have
been
illegally
deprived.
Legacies
and
devises
merit
consideration
only
when
they
are
so
expressly
given
as
such
in
a
will.
Nothing
in
Article
854
of
the
Civil
Code
suggests
that
the
mere
institution
of
a
universal
heir
in
a
will
—
void
because
of
preterition
—
would
give
the
heir
so
instituted
a
share
in
the
inheritance.
As
to
him,
the
will
is
inexistent.
There
must
he,
in
addition
to
such
institution,
a
testamentary
disposition
granting
him
bequests
or
legacies
apart
and
separate
from
the
nullified
institution
of
heir.
Petitioner
insists
that
the
compulsory
heirs
ineffectively
disinherited
are
entitled
to
receive
their
legitimes,
but
that
the
institution
of
heir
"is
not
invalidated,"
although
the
inheritance
of
the
heir
so
instituted
is
reduced
to
the
extent
of
said
legitimes.
This
theory,
if
adopted,
will
result
in
a
complete
abrogation
of
Articles
814
and
851
of
the
Civil
Code.
If
every
case
of
institution
of
heirs
may
be
made
to
fall
into
the
concept
of
legacies
and
betterments
reducing
the
bequest
accordingly,
then
the
provisions
of
Articles
814
and
851
regarding
total
or
partial
nullity
of
the
institution
would
be
absolutely
meaningless
and
will
never
have
any
application
at
all.
And
the
remaining
provisions
contained
in
said
articles
concerning
the
SUBSTITUTION
OF
HEIRS
ISSUE:
Whether
the
testatrix's
will
orders
a
simple
substitution.
Case
No.
52
Carmen
G.
de
Perez,
trustee
of
the
estate
of
Ana
Maria
RATIO:
NO,
the
will
provides
for
a
fideicommissary
substitution
Alcantara
(Plaintiff-‐Appellee)
vs.
Mariano
Garchitorena,
and
of
heirs.
Jose
Casimiro,
Sheriff
of
the
CFI
of
Manila
(Defendants-‐
Appellants)
Requirement
of
a
fideicommissary
substitution
according
to
G.R.
No.
31703
Manresa:
February
13,
1930
1) A
first
heir
called
primarily
to
the
enjoyment
of
the
estate;
Romualdez,
J.
2) An
obligation
clearly
imposed
upon
him
to
preserve
and
FACTS:
Ana
Maria
Alcantara,
prior
to
her
death,
executed
a
will
transmit
to
a
third
person
the
whole
or
a
part
of
the
estate;
instituting
her
niece-‐in-‐law,
plaintiff
Carmen
De
Perez,
as
sole
and
universal
heiress
to
the
remainder
of
her
estate.
3) A
second
heir;
and
P21,428.58
is
on
deposit
in
the
plaintiff's
name
with
an
association
4) That
the
fideicommissarius
be
entitled
to
the
estate
from
called
La
Urbana
as
the
final
payment
of
the
liquidated
credit
of
the
time
thetestator
dies,
since
he
is
to
inherit
from
the
Ana
Maria
Alcantara
against
Andres
Garchitorena,
also
deceased,
latter
and
not
from
the
fiduciary"
represented
by
his
son,
the
defendant
Mariano
Garchitorena.
All
of
such
requirements
were
present
in
the
will
of
Ana
Maria
As
said
Mariano
Garchitorena
held
a
judgment
for
P7,872.23
Alcantara
which
states
that:
against
Joaquin
Perez
Alcantara,
Carmen’s
husband,
the
sheriff
pursuant
to
a
writ
of
execution
levied
an
attachment
on
the
said
"IX…I
institute
Carmen
Garchitorena
as
my
sole
and
deposited
amount.
universal
heiress
to
the
remainder
of
my
estate…
she
will
receive
from
my
executrix
the
properties
composing
my
The
plaintiff
secured
a
preliminary
injunction
restraining
the
hereditary
estate,
that
she
may
enjoy
them
with
God's
execution,
alleging
that
said
deposit
belongs
to
the
blessing
and
my
own."
fideicommissary
heirs
of
the
decedent
Ana
Maria
Alcantara,
and
cannot
be
subject
to
a
levy
on
attachment
"X.
Should
my
heiress
Carmen
Garchitorena
die,
I
order
that
my
whole
estate
shall
pass
unimpaired
to
her
surviving
LOWER
COURT:
held
that
said
La
Urbana
deposit
belongs
to
the
children;
and
should
any
of
these
die,
his
share
shall
serve
plaintiff's
children
as
fideicommissary
heirs
of
Ana
Maria
to
increase
the
portions
of
his
surviving
brothers
(and
Alcantara
sisters)
by
accretion,
in
such
wise
that
my
estate
shall
never
pass
out
of
the
hands
of
my
heiress
or
her
children
in
so
far
Defendant's
contention:
That
lower
court
erred
in
their
as
it
is
legally
possible."
declaration.
That
as
per
the
clauses
of
the
Ana
Maria's
will,
what
is
ordered
by
Ana
Maria
Alcantara
is
a
simple
substitution,
not
a
fideicommissary
substitution
The
foregoing
leads
us
to
the
conclusion,
based
on
Manresa's
quotation:
1. A
first
heir
primarily
called
to
the
enjoyment
of
the
estate.
-‐ In
this
case
the
plaintiff
was
instituted
an
heiress,
called
to
the
enjoyment
of
the
estate,
according
to
clause
IX
of
the
will.
2. An
obligation
clearly
imposed
upon
the
heir
to
preserve
and
transmit
to
a
third
person
the
whole
or
a
part
of
the
estate.
-‐ Such
an
obligation
is
imposed
in
clause
X
which
provides
that
the
"whole
estate
shall
pass
unimpaired
to
her
(heiress's)
surviving
children;"
thus,
instead
of
leaving
the
heiress
at
liberty
to
dispose
of
the
estate
by
will,
or
of
leaving
the
law
to
take
its
course
in
case
she
dies
intestate,
said
clause
not
only
disposes
of
the
estate
in
favor
of
the
heiress
instituted,
but
also
provides
for
the
disposition
thereof
in
case
she
could
die
after
the
testatrix.
Note
also
that
clause
IX
vests
in
the
heiress
only
the
right
to
enjoy
and
not
the
right
to
dispose
of
the
state.
3. A
second
heir.
-‐ Such
are
the
children
of
the
heiress
instituted.
4. That
the
Fideicommissarius
or
second
heir
should
be
entitled
to
the
estate
from
the
time
of
the
testator's
death.
-‐ In
this
case,
is,
rather
than
a
requisite,
a
necessary
consequence
derived
from
the
nature
of
the
fideicommissary
substitution,
in
which
the
second
heir
does
not
inherit
from
the
heir
first
instituted,
but
from
the
testator
Case
No.
53
obligation
is
imposed
thereby
upon
Hodges
to
preserve
the
estate
Philippine
Commercial
&
Industrial
Bank,
Administrator
or
any
part
thereof
for
anyone
else.
of
the
Testate
Estate
of
Charles
Newton
Hodges
(Petitioner)
vs.
The
Hon.
Venicio
Escolin,
Presiding
Judge
The
brothers
and
sisters
of
Mrs.
Hodges
are
not
substitutes
for
C.N.
of
the
CFI
of
Iloilo,
2nd
Branch,
and
Avelina
A.
Magno
Hodges
because,
under
her
will,
they
are
not
to
inherit
what
(Respondents)
Hodges
cannot,
would
not
or
may
not
inherit,
but
what
he
would
G.R.
Nos.
L-‐27860
&
L-‐27896
not
dispose
of
from
his
inheritance;
rather,
therefore,
they
are
also
March
29,
1974
heirs
instituted
simultaneously
with
Hodges,
subject,
however,
to
Barredo,
J.
certain
conditions,
partially
resolutory
insofar
as
Hodges
was
concerned
and
correspondingly
suspensive
with
reference
to
his
FACTS:
Linnie
Jane
Hodges
died
in
Iloilo
City
leaving
a
will.
She
brothers
and
sisters-‐in-‐law.
It
is
partially
resolutory,
since
it
bequeathed
all
of
her
properties
to
her
husband,
Charles
Newton
bequeaths
unto
Hodges
the
whole
of
her
estate
to
be
owned
and
Hodges,
during
his
natural
lifetime.
She
also
gave
her
husband
the
enjoyed
by
him
as
universal
and
sole
heir
with
absolute
dominion
right
to
manage,
control,
use
and
enjoy
said
estate.
However,
her
over
them
only
during
his
lifetime,
which
means
that
while
he
husband
cannot
sell
or
otherwise
dispose
their
property
in
Texas.
could
completely
and
absolutely
dispose
of
any
portion
thereof
There
is
also
a
provision
in
her
will
that
upon
death
of
her
inter
vivos
to
anyone
other
than
himself,
he
was
not
free
to
do
so
husband,
her
brothers
and
sisters
shall
have
the
rest
or
remainder
mortis
causa,
and
all
his
rights
to
what
might
remain
upon
his
of
her
estate.
C.N.
Hodges
died.
Magno
was
appointed
as
the
death
would
cease
entirely
upon
the
occurrence
of
that
administratix
of
both
spouse’s
estate,
later
she
was
replaced
by
contingency,
inasmuch
as
the
right
of
his
brothers
and
sisters-‐in-‐
PCIB
for
Charles’
estate.
There
was
no
liquidation
of
Mrs.
Hodges’
law
to
the
inheritance,
although
vested
already
upon
the
death
of
estate
so
when
Mr.
Hodges
died,
the
brothers
and
sisters
of
the
Mrs.
Hodges,
would
automatically
become
operative
upon
the
former
wanted
to
determine
the
extent
of
their
sister’s
estate
that
occurrence
of
the
death
of
Hodges
in
the
event
of
actual
existence
they
can
inherit.
of
any
remainder
of
her
estate
then.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
there
was
fideicommissary
substitution.
RATIO:
NO.
There
are
generally
only
two
kinds
of
substitution
provided
for
and
authorized
by
our
Civil
Code
(Articles
857-‐870),
namely,
(1)
simple
or
common
substitution,
sometimes
referred
to
as
vulgar
substitution
(Article
859),
and
(2)
fideicommissary
substitution
(Article
863).
Mrs.
Hodges'
will
provides
neither
for
a
simple
or
vulgar
substitution
under
Article
859
of
the
Civil
Code
nor
for
a
fideicommissary
substitution
under
Article
863
thereof.
There
is
no
vulgar
substitution
therein
because
there
is
no
provision
for
either
(1)
predecease
of
the
testator
by
the
designated
heir
or
(2)
refusal
or
(3)
incapacity
of
the
latter
to
accept
the
inheritance,
as
required
by
Article
859;
and
neither
is
there
a
fideicommissary
substitution
therein
because
no
CONDITIONS,
MODES,
AND
TERMS
testator’s
wish
to
have
his
property
disposed
of
in
accordance
with
Philippine
laws
and
not
by
the
law
of
his
nationality
is
void.
Case
No.
54
Testate
Estate
of
Joseph
G.
Brimo.
Juan
Miciano,
Under
Art.
792
of
the
Civil
Code,
impossible
conditions
as
well
as
Administrator(Petitioner-‐Appellee)
vs.
Andre
Brimo
those
contrary
to
law
or
good
customs,
such
as
the
condition
(Respondent-‐Appellant)
imposed
by
the
will,
are
considered
not
imposed
and
not
G.R.
No.
22595
prejudicial
to
legatees.
November
1,
1924
Romualdez,
J.
The
condition
in
question,
found
in
the
second
clause
of
the
will
of
Joseph
Brimo,
requests
his
heirs
to
respect
his
decision
to
have
his
FACTS:
Upon
the
death
of
Joseph
Brimo,
a
Turkish
citizen,
Juan
property
disposed
of
in
accordance
with
Philippine
laws
or
else
be
Miciano,
the
administrator
of
the
former’s
estate,
filed
a
scheme
of
prevented
from
claiming
their
inheritance—a
condition
which
the
partition
before
the
lower
court.
Andre
Brimo,
the
brother
of
the
Appellant
could
not
abide
by.
This
condition
is
contrary
to
law
deceased,
subsequently
opposed
this.
The
lower
court
however
because
Art.
10
of
the
Civil
Code
provides
that,
“testamentary
approved
of
the
same.
successions
shall
be
regulated
by
the
national
law
of
the
person
whose
succession
is
in
question…”
and
is
therefore
deemed
Aggrieved,
Andre
Brimo
then
appealed
the
ruling
before
the
Court.
written
in
every
will.
Aside
from
opposing
the
approval
of
the
scheme
of
partition
by
the
court
as
well
as
its
declaration
that
Turkish
laws
cannot
be
made
Based
on
the
above
findings
of
the
Court,
it
moved
to
modify
the
to
apply
in
the
case
of
Joseph
Brimo’s
estate,
Respondent-‐ ruling
of
the
lower
court,
directing
that
the
distribution
of
the
Appellant
Brimo
also
opposed
the
denial
of
his
participation
in
the
estate
of
Joseph
Brimo
be
made
in
such
a
manner
as
to
include
inheritance.
Appellant
Andre
Brimo.
Appellee
on
the
otherhand
based
the
exclusion
of
Andre
Brimo,
as
legatee
in
the
will,
on
the
second
clause
found
in
Joseph
Brimo’s
will
expressing
his
wish
to
have
his
property
disposed
of
in
accordance
with
Philippine
laws
and
not
Turkish
laws
thereby
annulling
any
favorable
disposition
to
such
a
person
who
refuses
to
honor
his
wish.
Hence
this
case.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Andre
Brimo
can
be
excluded
from
the
estate
partition.
RATIO:
NO,
Andre
Brimo
cannot
be
excluded
from
the
estate
partition.
Applying
Art.
792
(now
Art.
873)
along
with
Art.
10
of
the
Civil
Code,
the
condition
requiring
legatees
to
respect
the
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