Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 100 Filed 12/01/20 Page 1 of 15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

AUSTIN TROUT, CASE NO: 3:17-1953-PAD

Plaintiff,

vs. VIOLATION OF THE MUHAMMAD ALI

ACT; BREACH OF CONTRACT; FRAUD;
ORGANIZACION MUNDIAL DE DAMAGES
BOXEO, INC.,
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY
Defendant.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION SUBMITTING BRIEF IN COMPLIANCE

WITH ORDER

TO THE HONORABLE PEDRO A. DELGADO-HERNÁNDEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

COMES NOW, Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc. (hereinafter, “WBO”, by its English

acronym), by and through its undersigned counsel and very respectfully states, alleges and prays

as follows:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On November 9, 2020, Plaintiff Austin Trout (“Trout”) filed a Brief in Compliance with

Order (“Plaintiff’s Brief”). (Docket No. 94) In it, he argues that an arbitrator selection provision

in WBO’s Appeal Regulations is not severable from the rest of the arbitration clauses because it

does not contain a savings clause. According to Trout, this absence of a savings clause in the

Appeal Regulations forecloses the arbitration of the case. As discussed below, Trout’s position is

mistaken for two main reasons.

First, Trout’s analysis is extremely narrow. As discussed in detail below, he only focuses

on the absence of a savings clause in the WBO’s Appeal Regulations, but turns a blind eye to the

WBO’s Championship Regulations. Even though he argues that the arbitrator selection provision
 Case 3:17-cv-01953-PAD Document 100 Filed 12/01/20 Page 2 of 15

is not severable from the Appeal Regulations because they do not contain a savings clause, Trout

fails to consider that the WBO’s Championship Regulations have their own arbitration clause

and―as explained by the First Circuit―contain a savings clause. In this respect, Trout fails to

address the relationship between the Championship Regulations and the Appeal Regulations.

Indeed, there is an interplay between the two sets of applicable regulations, both of which have

their own arbitration provisions. As explained in WBO’s brief (Docket No. 93), the arbitration

clause in Section 35(e) the Championship Regulations is supplemented by the auxiliary arbitration

provisions incorporated by reference from the Appeal Regulations. Because there are two sets of

regulations―one incorporated by reference into the other―they can operate jointly (or even

separately) as warranted. Because of such incorporation by reference, any invalidated provision

from the auxiliary Appeal Regulations is severable pursuant to: a) the savings clause in Section 36

of the Championship Regulations, and b) the vast caselaw cited by the WBO in its brief supporting

the severability of the arbitrator selection provisions within arbitration clauses, with or without a

savings clause.1

Second, Trout’s analysis is not only erroneous, but his brief is devoid of relevant and

applicable case law. Indeed, this Honorable Court’s Order issued on October 7, 2020 required each

party to file a brief, including relevant caselaw, discussing whether the arbitrator selection clause

contained in the WBO’s Appeal Regulations is severable from the remainder of the arbitration

agreement between the parties. (Docket No. 92 and 94). Plaintiff’s Brief failed to cite relevant

caselaw regarding the severability of an arbitrator selection clause. Instead, Plaintiff’s Brief is

1
In the alternative, even if the auxiliary arbitrator selection provision is not severable from the rest of the Appeal
Regulations (which we deny) and the whole Appeal Regulations is deemed invalid, the main arbitration clause from
Section 35(e) the Championship Regulations is still enforceable by itself, pursuant to the savings clause from its
Section 36.

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based on: 1) inapplicable, out-of-context, and distorted arguments based on caselaw regarding

covenants not to compete; 2) a judgment without a majority opinion from the Puerto Rico Supreme

Court that has no binding precedential value and is inapplicable to the controversy at hand; 3) the

caselaw he cited was drafted in Spanish language and without providing a certified English

translation, thereby, violating this District’s Local Rules; and 4) a law journal article that is actually

detrimental to Trout’s contention as it supports WBO’s position that the Court has authority to

modify the arbitration agreement and name arbitrators.

None of the legal authorities cited by Trout deal with the severability of arbitrator-selection

clauses. Instead, the caselaw he cites discusses the validity and requirements of covenants not to

compete in employment agreements. In other words, the caselaw cited by Trout is framed within

the context of employee-employer relationships, which are governed by particular public policy

considerations. Trout is not a WBO employee and the controversy at hand is not based on a

covenant not to compete. Therefore, contrary to Trout’s contention, Plaintiff’s Brief fails to cite

on-point authorities on the severability of an arbitrator-selection clause. In sum, Trout’s brief is

ungrounded as the handful of authorities cited in Plaintiff’s Brief do not support his conclusion.

In contrast, the WBO’s brief (Docket No. 93) is supported by on-point caselaw and other

supporting authorities that establish that, pursuant to Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9

U.S.C. § 5, and its local counterpart, this Honorable Court has authority to sever an invalid

arbitrator-selection clause and appoint arbitrators if parties are unable to agree on the panel

selection process. Trout failed to address the ample on-point caselaw regarding the severability of

an arbitrator-selection clause simply because it is not favorable to him.

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II. ARGUMENT

A. The Relationship Between the WBO’s Arbitration Clauses

The main argument in Plaintiff’s Brief is based on the existence of provisions “located in

two (2) separate WBO regulatory documents.” Plaintiff Brief, p. 4. These two regulatory

documents are the Appeal Regulations and the Championship Regulations. Trout argues that, since

the Appeal Regulations do not contain a savings clause, the arbitrator selection provision

invalidated by the First Circuit is not severable. He contends that the savings clause in the

Championship Regulations should not be extended to the Appeal Regulations. He reasons that if

the arbitrator selection clause is not severable from the rest of the arbitration provisions, arbitration

becomes unavailable to the parties.

Trout is mistaken. In his brief, he failed to discuss the interplay between the Championship

Regulations and the Appeal Regulations. First, the WBO’s Championship Regulations contain a

total of 36 sections that govern a wide array of matters applicable to different aspects of the WBO’s

operations and fights, such as: the appointment of the World Championship Committee (Sec. 1);

weight categories (Sec. 3); title defenses (Sec. 5); purse bids (Sec. 11); sanctions (Sec. 16); ring

specifications (Sec. 22); referees (Sec. 24); count on fallen contestants (Sec. 25); weight of the

gloves (Sec. 30); and insurance (Sec. 33). It also contains a savings clause on Section 36 that states

that “[i]f any of these Rules are determined to be unenforceable, the balance of these Rules shall

remain in full force and effect.”

Additionally, the Championship Regulations contain an arbitration provision in its Section

35(e), which provides the following:

All WBO participants acknowledge and agree that the mandatory resort to
the WBO Appeals Regulation is the sole and exclusive remedy for any claim,
appeal, grievance or contest that arises from any right or status that is or could
be subject to these Regulations or which results or could result from or relate

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to the interpretation or application of these Regulations. These WBO Grievance

Committee determinations are Arbitrations within the contemplation of the
Arbitration Law of Puerto Rico, 32 LPRA Section 3201 et. seq. and the US
Arbitration Act, Title 9 of the United States Code and the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of July 30, 1975 and the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of
June 10, 1958. All WBO participants stipulate and agree that the nature of the sport
requires a prompt, final and uniform resolution of all disputes concerning
application of these Regulations by a tribunal experienced with the application of
these Regulations and with special knowledge and experience in world
championship professional boxing.

(emphasis added).

Pursuant to the first sentence of Section 35(e), the Championship Regulations are

supplemented by the auxiliary Appeal Regulations, which were incorporated by reference into the

Championship Regulations. The Appeal Regulations provide a series of articles that are mostly

procedural, regarding various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Its Article 1 includes the

arbitrator selection provision that was invalidated by the First Circuit. Similar to the Championship

Regulations, the Appeal Regulations also contain its own arbitration clause on its Article 7, which

provides:

The decision of the Grievance Committee is a final Arbitrations within the

contemplation of 32 LPRA Section 3201 et. seq. and the US Arbitration Act, Title
9 of the United States Code, and the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration of July 30, 1975 and the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of June 10, 1958. All WBO
participants stipulate and agree that the nature of the sport requires a prompt, final
and uniform resolution of all disputes concerning application of these Regulations
by a tribunal experienced with the application of these Regulations and with special
knowledge and experience in world championship professional boxing.

By incorporating by reference the Appeal Regulations, it is clear that its provisions are auxiliary

or supplemental to the main Championship Regulations, and, for that reason, both regulations can

operate either jointly or separately, as warranted or applicable to a particular situation.

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In this case, there is no question that, as mentioned in the First Circuit’s Opinion, Section

35(e) of the Championship Regulations requires the arbitration of the disputes and Section 36

contains a savings clause. The governing Section 35(e) is supplemented by the auxiliary Appeal

Regulations, which were incorporated by reference. Thus, pursuant to savings clause in the

Championship Regulations, if any provision of the main Championship Regulations is found

unenforceable, including the Appeal Regulations incorporated by reference, it is severable. Here,

since the arbitrator selection process of the Appeal Regulations is an auxiliary portion of the

Championship Regulations (incorporated by reference from the Appeal Regulations) was found

unenforceable, it is severable pursuant to Section 36 of the Championship Regulations.

Although the discussion above is enough to sever the arbitrator selection provision from

the Appeal Regulations and order arbitration, there is another reason why arbitration is required.

Because each of the two regulations contains their own arbitration clauses, arbitration is required

by both (and either) of them. In other words, arbitration is required by Article 7 of the Appeal

Regulations and Section 35(e) of the Championship Regulations. Thus, even if the arbitrator

selection clause contained in Article 1 of the Appeal Regulations is unenforceable and non-

severable, which it is not, arbitration must still proceed pursuant to Section 35(e) of the

Championship Regulations by itself, pursuant to the savings clause in Section 36 of the

Championship Regulations.

B. Plaintiff’s Brief is Based on Inapplicable Caselaw and Unsupported Arguments.

On October 7, 2020, this Honorable Court ordered the parties to file a brief, including

relevant caselaw, discussing whether the arbitrator selection clause contained in the WBO’s rules

is severable from the remainder of the arbitration agreement between the parties. (Docket No. 92).

This Order was issued after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded the case to

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this Honorable Court to determine whether the savings clause in the WBO’s Championship

Regulations, Sec. 36, allows the arbitrator selection provision contained within Article 1 of the

WBO’s Appeal Regulations to be severed from the rest of the arbitration agreement between the

parties. Opinion, p. 21-23. The First Circuit explained that “[i]n determining whether ‘the

[arbitration agreement] should be enforced absent the invalid arbitrator selection-mechanism and,

if it should, how to select an arbitrator,’ however, we must consider ‘the parties’ intent,’ the

‘[f]ederal policy favoring arbitration,’ and ‘the interplay between state law and that federal

policy.’” Opinion, p. 22, quoting McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 495 (6th Cir. 2004).

With this criteria in mind, the WBO filed its brief explaining and providing relevant

caselaw showing that―pursuant to the written regulations accepted by the parties and the federal

policy favoring arbitration―the parties’ intention was to promptly resolve their disputes in

arbitration, before a panel with knowledge and experience in world professional championship

boxing, following the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or its analogous counterpart, the

Arbitration Law of Puerto Rico. In its brief, the WBO argued inter alia that because the

unenforceable arbitrator selection clause is auxiliary or supplemental to the arbitration agreement

and not central to the arbitration provisions, it is severable from the WBO’s arbitration clauses.

See Khan v. Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012) (concluding that, to invalidate an

arbitration agreement, “the parties must have unambiguously express[] their intent not to arbitrate

their disputes in the event that the designated arbitral forum is unavailable.”); Ruiz v. Millennium

Square Residential Ass'n, 156 F. Supp. 3d 176, 183 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that the

unenforceability of the arbitrator selection provision is severable, thus, does not doom the

arbitration agreement in its entirety). In fact, as discussed above, the arbitration provisions of the

WBO’s Championship Regulations can be invoked from the arbitrator selection provisions to

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compel arbitration and, therefore, can operate with or without the auxiliary arbitrator selection

clause incorporated by reference from Article 1 of the WBO’s Appeal Regulations. See Zechman

v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359, 1365-1366 (N.D. Ill. 1990)

(granting motion to compel arbitration before a substitute arbitrator(s) to be mutually selected by

the parties ‒or, in the alternative, by the Court‒ after finding that the unenforceable arbitrator

selection provision incorporated from another regulation is severable).

Instead of addressing the issues head on with relevant caselaw regarding the severability

of arbitrator selection clauses, Trout’s brief opts for a bob and weave approach with inapposite

arguments and inapplicable caselaw. First, Trout argued that the doctrine of adhesion contracts

requires that any ambiguity in the interpretation of the WBO’s regulations should be interpreted

in favor of the party that did not participate in its drafting. Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 8, citing Santiago v.

Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 129 D.P.R. 114 (1993). However, after searching for the case through its

citation, no Santiago case from 1993 was found at 129 D.P.R. 114. If, however, Trout refers to the

1992 decision of Santiago v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 129 D.P.R. 763 (1992), Trout failed to

provide a certified English translation of the document and, thus, his argument should be discarded.

See L.Cv.R. 5(g).

Nevertheless, the doctrine of adhesion contracts to which Trout refers is unavailing. Under

Article 1233 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, “[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no

doubt as to the intentions of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be

observed.” 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 3471. The doctrine of adhesion contracts in which the language

is interpreted against the drafter of the agreement is only available when the contractual provisions

in questions are unclear or ambiguous. See Torres v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 130

D.P.R. 640, P.R. Offic. Trans., 1992 WL 811282 (1992) (holding that courts are not compelled to

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interpret clear and unambiguous clauses in an adhesion contracts in favor of a party.) In his brief,

Trout has conceded that “there is no ambiguity here” (Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 8), and he is not arguing

that there is any ambiguity in the arbitration clauses in question. Thus, the doctrine of adhesion

contracts is unavailable to Trout. Moreover, even if there were any doubts regarding arbitrability,

which there are none, the federal policy in favor of arbitration requires that courts interpret “‘any

doubts’ in contractual language in favor of arbitration.” Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co.,

992 F.2d 386, 389 (n.3) (1st Cir. 1993), citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). Consequently, Trout cannot invoke the doctrine of adhesion of

contracts to trump the federal policy in favor of arbitration.

Second, Trout moves on to argue that in Arthur Young v. Vega III, 159 D.P.R. 157 (1994),

the Puerto Rico Supreme Court “ruled on controversies like the one at hand” and “rejected

adopting the ‘blue pencil’ rule in Puerto Rico” to suggest that the severability of an unenforceable

contractual provision is not allowed in Puerto Rico. (Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 9). This statement misses

the mark. The Court in Arthur Young did not address the issue at hand which is the severability of

an arbitrator-selection clause. Instead, it addressed the completely different issue of whether

covenants not to compete in employment agreements are valid in Puerto Rico and established the

requisites for such covenants to be valid.2 In doing so, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court discussed

how this issue was addressed in the mainland common law jurisdictions and other civil law

jurisdictions such as Spain, Argentina, and Belgium. Id. at 168-174. In doing so, it mentioned the

2
In its Opinion, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court took into consideration particular public policy considerations of
protecting employee’s freedom of contract and the general public's freedom of choice to select a professional
accountant. Arthur Young & Co. v. Vega III, 136 D.P.R. 157, P.R. Offic. Trans. (n.20), 1994 WL 909262 (1994).

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blue pencil approach3 as well as other alternatives provided in common law. However, the Arthur

Young Court neither adopted nor rejected the blue pencil common law approach, as it relied on

civil law principles to issue its Opinion. Id. at 169-176.

Most importantly, Arthur Young deals with an entirely different controversy that has no

relevance to the case at hand. First, unlike Mr. Vega with regards to Arthur Young, Trout is not a

WBO employee and there is no employment agreement between them. Also, the controversy in

this case has nothing do with a covenant not to compete, which was the issue in Arthur Young.

And, there was no savings clause in play in the Arthur Young. Therefore, the Arthur Young Court

did not address whether a savings clause would have an effect on its decision. In contrast, the issue

at hand is based on the severability of an arbitrator selection clause with a savings clause, agreed

between parties that are not in an employee-employer relationship.

This is not the first time that this Honorable Court has the opportunity to address whether

the Arthur Young decision applies beyond non-compete covenants disputes. In Cherena v. Coors

Brewing Co., 20 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (D.P.R. 1998), this Honorable Court, in an opinion and

order by voice of then U.S. Magistrate Judge Justo Arenas, clarified that, while a non-competition

covenant is null and void pursuant to the Arthur Young precedent, only such clause is invalid,

while the non-disclosure clause is severable pursuant to a savings clause. See also Jiménez v.

Island Oasis Frozen Cocktail Co., Inc., CIV. 09-1748 GAG, 2010 WL 3719216, at *7 (D.P.R.

Sept. 14, 2010) (same). The First Circuit agreed with this Honorable Court’s decisions in Cherena

and Jiménez, and has rejected expanding―by analogy―the scope of the Arthur Young precedent.

See Soto v. State Indus. Products, Inc., 642 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s

3
“A blue pencil approach allows modification of an unreasonable restrictive covenant and enforcement (at least
prospectively) of the modified version; however, the court may not draft its own language; it may only strike out
language included in the parties' written agreement.” 3 Callmann on Unfair Comp., Tr. & Mono. § 16:9 (4th Ed.)

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“invitation to expand the scope of Arthur Young to hold that continued employment cannot

constitute valid consideration for an arbitration agreement.”)

The reason for not expanding the principle further is simple. None of the requisites

established in Arthur Young for non-compete covenants would apply to other contexts such as the

severability of arbitrator selection clauses. See Arthur Young, 136 D.P.R. 157, P.R. Offic. Trans.

(1994) (Explaining that “[i]n order to be reasonable, a noncompetition clause must meet the

following requirements: (1) it must be necessary to protect a legitimate interest of the employer,

(2) it must not impose undue hardship on the employee, (3) and it must not be exceedingly injurious

to the public. The following should also be considered: the area where the employee is prohibited

from competing, the duration of said restriction, the sort of clients he may not offer services to,

and the type of services he is barred from offering. It is also assumed that the noncompetition

agreement is incidental to an employment contract and that there was adequate consideration.”)

Therefore, the Arthur Young case is inapplicable to the controversy at hand.

In addition, in Plaintiff’s Brief, Trout cited PACIV v. Pérez Rivera, 159 D.P.R. 523 (2003),

but failed to discuss or explain how it applies to the case. In any event, PACIV is also inapplicable

to the case at hand because it dealt with a covenant not to compete, not with the severability of

arbitration provisions. Also, in PACIV, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court issued a judgment

(sentencia) without a majority opinion, therefore, it does not have precedential value. See Rivera

Maldonado v. E.L.A., 119 D.P.R. 74, 19 P.R. Offic. Trans. 88, 94–95, 1987 WL 448304 (1987).

(“A judgment without a Court opinion, the publication of which has not been ordered by the Court,

but which has been published because one of the justices has certified a concurring, dissenting or

separate opinion, has no precedential value”.)4

4
The PACIV decision was published because former Associate Justice Rebollo López issued a dissenting opinion.

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Then, Trout cited the State of Georgia Supreme Court decision of Rita v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314,

317 (1972), to again argue the application of the blue pencil doctrine in the context of covenants

not to compete. As explained above, the controversy at hand has nothing to do with a covenant not

to compete, therefore, Rita is inapplicable and irrelevant to this case. Even if Rita had any

relevancy to this case, which we deny, the majority of the Court failed to consider the application

of a savings clause. For that reason, Justice Jordan issued a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief

Justice Mobley and Presiding Justice Grice, explaining that “[t]he contract here contains a

severability clause and this court should not declare the entire agreement to be illegal merely

because one part of the agreement is overly broad with regard to geographic limits.” Id. at 319.

This supports the argument that, when there is a savings clause, even non-compete clauses can be

saved if a portion is invalid.

In sum, all three cases cited by Trout are inapplicable and, at best, distinguishable from the

case at hand as they all deal with the entirely different controversy of the validity of covenants not

to compete and not on the severability of an arbitrator selection provision with a savings clause.

In this regard, Trout failed to abide by this Honorable Court’s order that the parties cite to relevant

case law in their briefs.

Devoid of supporting caselaw and in a last ditch attempt to avoid the severability of an

arbitration provision, Trout attempts to cites to a law journal article, namely: Imre S. Szalai, A

New Legal Framework for Employee and Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 19 Cardozo J.

Conflict Resol. 653 (2018). This Article fails to support Trout’s theory for two main reasons. First,

the Article discusses employment and consumer arbitration agreements and, since Trout is not an

employee or a consumer of the WBO, the Article in general is inapplicable. Second, the Article

does not mention nor discuss the effect of a savings clause on the severability of an arbitration

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provision and, therefore, provides no guidance on the effect of the savings clause in the

Championship Regulations.

In contrast, the Article cited by Trout actually supports the WBO’s argument that Section

5 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 5, authorizes this Honorable Court to supplement the arbitration clause

by designating arbitrators to fill the gap left by the unenforceable Article 1 of the Appeal

Regulations.

Section 5 comes closest to an example of textual authority within the FAA for
a judge to rewrite or change the terms of the original agreement. However, the
circumstances triggering section 5 are very limited, and section 5 still does not
explicitly authorize severance of harsh terms. Suppose that a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement names a particular person, Arbitrator Art, to serve as an arbitrator, but
the arbitrator is deceased at the time a dispute arises in the future. In this situation,
if the parties cannot decide on an arbitrator to replace the deceased arbitrator, one
party may petition a court to designate and appoint a replacement arbitrator. In
effect, the court would sever the original term of the parties' agreement and
fill in the gap with the appointment of a different arbitrator pursuant to
section 5 of the FAA. Similarly, if the parties' original agreement failed to provide
a method for selecting an arbitrator, and if the parties cannot agree on a method
once a dispute arises, section 5 authorizes a judge to fill in the gap through the
appointment of an arbitrator. Section 5 appears to come the closest out of all the
Sections of the FAA to authorizing a court to change the terms of the parties, but it
is limited to the very specific context regarding the selection of an arbitrator.

I.S. Szalai, supra, at 694–95 (emphasis added).

It is clear that Section 5 of the FAA authorizes this Honorable Court to fill the gap in the

WBO’s regulations through the designation and appointment of arbitrators. The severability of the

arbitrator selection provision, by virtue of the savings clause and the caselaw, allows this

Honorable Court’s to enforce the arbitration clause following the parties’ unequivocal intent to

promptly arbitrate their disputes before knowledgeable and experienced individuals from the

boxing industry, pursuant to the local and federal arbitration acts. See Section 35(e) of the

Championship Regulations. This is particularly important because in the boxing industry, where

rankings and championships are at stake, it is essential for parties (and even for non-parties

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contestants) to solve the disputes in a prompt manner to avoid the uncertainty that a lengthy trial

may carry. Therefore, pursuant to the federal policy favoring arbitration, this case should be

dismissed and arbitration ordered. See Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226

(1987) (explaining that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) establishes a federal policy favoring

arbitration, which requires the courts to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”); World

Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352, 358-361, P.R. Offic. Trans., 1990 WL

657504 (1990) (explaining that there is a presumption of arbitrability and any doubt regarding the

scope of the arbitrability of the controversies must be resolved in favor of arbitration.).

WHEREFORE, the WBO respectfully requests that this Honorable Court to order the

parties to arbitrate the disputes at hand after each party provides a list of qualified arbitrators, each

party selects an arbitrator from those lists, and those arbitrators select a qualified and experienced

third arbitrator from an mutually agreeable list that would serve as the chairperson. In the

alternative or if the parties are unable to timely select the arbitrators, the WBO requests this

Honorable Court to name the panel members, pursuant to Sec. 5 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 5. Lastly,

the WBO requests that the parties be bound by any and all enforceable and applicable portions of

the arbitration provisions contained in the WBO’s regulations that operate independently from the

invalidated arbitrator selection supplemental provision.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that on this same date we electronically filed the foregoing with

the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the

attorneys of record.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 1st day of December 2020.

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PIETRANTONI MENDEZ & ALVAREZ LLC LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW W. HORN, P.A.
Popular Center, 19th Floor 2665 S. Bayshore Drive
208 Ponce de León Avenue Suite 800
San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918 Miami, FL 33131
Tel. 787-274-1212 Tel. 305-373-7789
Fax. 787-274-1470 Fax. 305-372-9180

/s/ Oreste R. Ramos /s/ Andrew W. Horn

Oreste R. Ramos Andrew W. Horn
USDC No. 216801 admitted pro hac vice
oramos@pmalaw.com lawofficehorn@msn.com

/s/ Christian A. Muñoz Lugo

Christian A. Muñoz Lugo
USDC No. 305813
cmunoz@pmalaw.com

JOSEPH C. LAWS, JR.

Post Office Box 10143
San Juan, Puerto Rico
Tel. 787-754-7777
Fax. 787-763-5223
/s/ Joseph C. Laws, Jr.
Joseph C. Laws, Jr.
USDC No. 120306
lawofficesofjosephlaws@gmail.com
Attorneys for Organización Mundial de Boxeo, Inc.

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