G.R. No.

L-8151        December 16, 1955

VIRGINIA CALANOC, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., respondents.

FACTS: Melencio Basilio was a watchman of the Manila Auto Supply located at the corner of
Avenida Rizal and Zurbaran. He secured a life insurance policy from the Philippine American Life
Insurance Company in the amount of P2,000 to which was attached a supplementary contract
covering death by accident.

While he was on duty as watchman of the Manila Auto Supply, Basilio had accompanied Atty. Ojeda
and a traffic policeman in checking the house of Atty. Ojeda under the suspicion that there were
robbers Atty. Ojeda’s house. The three approached the Ojeda residence and stood in front of the
main gate which was covered with galvanized iron, the fence itself being partly concrete and partly
adobe stone, a shot was fired. Melencio Basilio was hit in the abdomen, the wound causing his
instantaneous death; the shot must have come from inside the yard of Atty. Ojeda, the bullet passing
through a hole waist-high in the galvanized iron gate.

Virginia Calanoc, the widow, was paid the sum of P2,000, face value of the policy, but when she
demanded the payment of the additional sum of P2,000 representing the value of the supplemental
policy, the company refused alleging, as main defense, that the deceased died because he was
murdered by a person who took part in the commission of the robbery and while making an arrest as
an officer of the law which contingencies were expressly excluded in the contract and have the effect
of exempting the company from liability.

The defense raised by Philippine American Life Insurance Company is that the death of Basilio,
though unexpected, cannot be considered accidental, for his death occurred because of the
voluntary and intentional act on the part of the one who robbed, or one of those who robbed, the
house of Atty. Ojeda and Basilio therefore should have realized the danger to which he was
exposing himself.

ISSUE: WON Philippine American Life Insurance Co. is liable for the additional sum representing the
supplemental policy.

HELD: YES. We take note that these defenses are included among the risks excluded in the
supplementary contract which enumerates the cases which may exempt the company from liability.
While as a general rule "the parties may limit the coverage of the policy to certain particular
accidents and risks or causes of loss, and may expressly except other risks or causes of loss
therefrom", however, it is to be desired that the terms and phraseology of the exception clause be
clearly expressed so as to be within the easy grasp and understanding of the insured, for if the terms
are doubtful or obscure the same must of necessity be interpreted or resolved against the one who
has caused the obscurity. (Article 1377, new Civil Code) And so it has bene generally held that the
"terms in an insurance policy, which are ambiguous, equivocal, or uncertain . . . are to be construed
strictly and most strongly against the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the
dominant purpose of indemnity or payment to the insured, especially where a forfeiture is involved",
and the reason for this rule is that he "insured usually has no voice in the selection or arrangement
of the words employed and that the language of the contract is selected with great care and
deliberation by experts and legal advisers employed by, and acting exclusively in the interest of, the
insurance company."
Moreover, it cannot be said that the killing was intentional for there is the possibility that the
malefactor had fired the shot merely to scare away the people around for his own protection and not
necessarily to kill or hit the victim. In any event, while the act may not exempt the triggerman from
liability for the damage done, the fact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of
the victim.

In volunteering to extend help under the situation, he might have thought, rightly or wrongly, that to
know the truth was in the interest of his employer it being a matter that affects the security of the
neighborhood. No doubt there was some risk coming to him in pursuing that errand, but that risk
always existed it being inherent in the position he was holding. He cannot therefore be blamed solely
for doing what he believed was in keeping with his duty as a watchman and as a citizen. And he
cannot be considered as making an arrest as an officer of the law, as contended, simply because he
went with the traffic policeman, for certainly he did not go there for that purpose nor was he asked to
do so by the policeman.

G.R. No. L-25579 March 29, 1972

EMILIA T. BIAGTAN, JUAN T. BIAGTAN, JR., MIGUEL T. BIAGTAN, GIL T. BIAGTAN and
GRACIA T. BIAGTAN, plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., defendant-appellant.

FACTS: Juan S. Biagtan was insured with defendant InsularLife Assurance Company under Policy
No. 398075 for the sum of P5,000.00 and, under a supplementary contract denominated "Accidental
Death Benefit Clause, for an additional sum of P5,000.00 if "the death of the Insured resulted directly
from bodily injury effected solely through external and violent means sustained in an accident ... and
independently of all other causes." The clause, however, expressly provided that it would not apply
where death resulted from an injury" intentionally inflicted by another party."

While the said life policy and supplementary contract were in full force and effect, the house of
insured Juan S. Biagtan was robbed by a band of robbers. Juan S. Biagtan received thrusts from the
sharp-pointed instruments of one of the robbers, causing wounds on the body of said Juan S.
Biagtan resulting in his death.

Plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the insured, filed a claim under the policy. The insurance company paid
the basic amount of P5,000.00 but refused to pay the additional sum of P5,000.00 under the
accidental death benefit clause, on the ground that the insured's death resulted from injuries
intentionally inflicted by third parties and therefore was not covered. Plaintiffs filed suit to recover,
and after due hearing the court a quo rendered judgment in their favor. Hence the present appeal by
the insurer.

ISSUE: WON Insular Life is liable.

HELD: NO.

Whether the robbers had the intent to kill or merely to scare the victim or to ward off any defense he
might offer, it cannot be denied that the act itself of inflicting the injuries was intentional. It should be
noted that the exception in the accidental benefit clause invoked by the appellant does not speak of
the purpose — whether homicidal or not — of a third party in causing the injuries, but only of the fact
that such injuries have been "intentionally" inflicted — this obviously to distinguish them from injuries
which, although received at the hands of a third party, are purely accidental. This construction is the
basic idea expressed in the coverage of the clause itself, namely, that "the death of the insured
resulted directly from bodily injury effected solely through external and violent means sustained in
an accident ... and independently of all other causes." A gun which discharges while being cleaned
and kills a bystander; a hunter who shoots at his prey and hits a person instead; an athlete in a
competitive game involving physical effort who collides with an opponent and fatally injures him as a
result: these are instances where the infliction of the injury is unintentional and therefore would be
within the coverage of an accidental death benefit clause such as thatin question in this case. But
where a gang of robbers enter a house and coming face to face with the owner, even if
unexpectedly, stab him repeatedly, it is contrary to all reason and logic to say that his injuries are not
intentionally inflicted, regardless of whether they prove fatal or not. As it was, in the present case
they did prove fatal, and the robbers have been accused and convicted of the crime of robbery with
homicide.

The case of Calanoc vs. Court of Appeals, 98 Phil. 79, is relied upon by the trial court in support of
its decision. The facts in that case, however, are different from those obtaining here. The insured
there was a watchman in a certain company, who happened to be invited by a policeman to come
along as the latter was on his way to investigate a reported robbery going on in a private house. As
the two of them, together with the owner of the house, approached and stood in front of the main
gate, a shot was fired and it turned out afterwards that the watchman was hit in the abdomen, the
wound causing his death. Under those circumstances this Court held that it could not be said that
the killing was intentional for there was the possibility that the malefactor had fired the shot to scare
people around for his own protection and not necessarrily to kill or hit the victim. A similar possibility
is clearly ruled out by the facts in the case now before Us. For while a single shot fired from a
distance, and by a person who was not even seen aiming at the victim, could indeed have been fired
without intent to kill or injure, nine wounds inflicted with bladed weapons at close range cannot
conceivably be considered as innocent insofar as such intent is concerned. The manner of execution
of the crime permits no other conclusion.

While the assassination of the insured was as to him an unforeseen event and therefore accidental,
"the clause of the proviso that excludes the (insurer's) liability, in case death or injury is intentionally
inflicted by another person, applies to this case."

G.R. No. 100970 September 2, 1992

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA SURPOSA, respondents.

FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation under
Finman General Teachers Protection Plan Master Policy No. 2005 and Individual Policy No. 08924
with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa, and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and
Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries.

While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie Surposa, died on October
18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three (3) unidentified men without
provocation and warning on the part of the former as he and his cousin, Winston Surposa, were
waiting for a ride on their way home along Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after attending the
celebration of the "Maskarra Annual Festival."

Thereafter, private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written
notice of claim with the petitioner insurance company which denied said claim contending that
murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy.
ISSUE: WON the refusal of the insurer to pay is proper.

HELD: NO.

The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not result from accident or accidental means
within the terms of an accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured's voluntary act,
unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or injury. There is no accident when a
deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen
happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. In other words, where
the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if something
unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the
protection of the policies insuring against death or injury from accident.  5

In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the course of an assault or
murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of these crimes. In the first place,
the insured and his companion were on their way home from attending a festival. They were
confronted by unidentified persons. The record is barren of any circumstance showing how the stab
wound was inflicted. Nor can it be pretended that the malefactor aimed at the insured precisely
because the killer wanted to take his life. In any event, while the act may not exempt the unknown
perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the
part of the victim. The insured died from an event that took place without his foresight or expectation,
an event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected.
Neither can it be said that where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his
life to danger considering that he was just going home after attending a festival.  6

Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy involved herein specifically enumerated only ten
(10) circumstances wherein no liability attaches to petitioner insurance company for any injury,
disability or loss suffered by the insured as a result of any of the stimulated causes. The principle of
" expresso unius exclusio alterius" — the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing
— is therefore applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly
included in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy
cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for,
any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance
company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited risks leads
inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, the interpretation of obscure words or
stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.

Moreover, it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should
be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. 
7

G.R. No. 85296 May 14, 1990

ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LAWRENCE FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS: Private respondent Lawrence Fernandez insured his car for "own damage" under private
car Policy No. 50459 with petitioner Zenith Insurance Corporation. On July 6, 1983, the car figured in
an accident and suffered actual damages in the amount of P3,640.00. After allegedly being given a
run around by Zenith for two (2) months, Fernandez filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu for sum of money and damages resulting from the refusal of Zenith to pay the amount claimed.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Fernandez ordering Zenith to pay the amount of
P3,640.00 representing the damage incurred plus interest at the rate of twice the prevailing interest
rates; f P20,000.00 by way of moral damages; and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

Now petitioner, asserts before this court the error made by the lower court in awarding actual
damages of P3,460.00 instead of only P1,927.50 which was arrived at after deducting P250.00 and
P274.00 as deductible franchise and 20% depreciation on parts as agreed upon in the contract of
insurance.

Petitioner also contends that while the complaint of private respondent prayed for P10,000.00 moral
damages, the lower court awarded twice the amount, or P20,000.00 without factual or legal basis;
while private respondent prayed for P5,000.00 exemplary damages, the trial court awarded
P20,000.00; and while private respondent prayed for P3,000.00 attorney's fees, the trial court
awarded P5,000.00.

ISSUE: WON the award for the actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is proper.

HELD:

ACTUAL damages. YES.

It is clear that under the Insurance Code, in case of unreasonable delay in the payment of the
proceeds of an insurance policy, the damages that may be awarded are: 1) attorney's fees; 2) other
expenses incurred by the insured person by reason of such unreasonable denial or withholding of
payment; 3) interest at twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board of the amount of the claim
due the injured; and 4) the amount of the claim.

The actual damages incurred by private respondent, in the amount of P3,640.00 had been
established before the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. Respondent appellate court
correctly ruled that the deductions of P250.00 and P274.00 as deductible franchise and 20%
depreciation on parts, respectively claimed by petitioners as agreed upon in the contract, had no
basis. Respondent court ruled:

Under its second assigned error, defendant-appellant puts forward two arguments,
both of which are entirely without merit. It is contented that the amount recoverable
under the insurance policy defendant-appellant issued over the car of plaintiff-
appellee is subject to deductible franchise, and . . . .

The policy, does not mention any deductible franchise, . . . 

MORAL damages.

"The purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a
defendant, they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the
defendant's culpable action."
While it is true that no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
adjudicated, the assessment of which is left to the discretion of the court according to the
circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code), it is equally true that in awarding moral
damages in case of breach of contract, there must be a showing that the breach was wanton and
deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

In the instant case, there was a finding that private respondent was given a "run-around" for two
months, which is the basis for the award of the damages granted under the Insurance Code for
unreasonable delay in the payment of the claim. However, the act of petitioner of delaying payment
for two months cannot be considered as so wanton or malevolent to justify an award of P20,000.00
as moral damages, taking into consideration also the fact that the actual damage on the car was
only P3,460. In the pre-trial of the case, it was shown that there was no total disclaimer by
respondent. The reason for petitioner's failure to indemnify private respondent within the two-month
period was that the parties could not come to an agreement as regards the amount of the actual
damage on the car. The amount of P10,000.00 prayed for by private respondent as moral damages
is equitable.

EXEMPLARY damages. NO.

On the other hand, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good (Art. 2229, New Civil Code of the Philippines). In the case of Noda v. Cruz-
Arnaldo, exemplary damages were not awarded as the insurance company had not acted in wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner. The same is true in the case at bar.

ATTORNEY’S fees. YES.

The amount of P5,000.00 awarded as attomey's fees is justified under the circumstances of this
case considering that there were other petitions filed and defended by private respondent in
connection with this case.

Therefore, the award of moral damages is reduced to P10,000.00 and the award of exemplary
damages is hereby deleted. The awards due to private respondent Fernandez are as follows:

1) P3,640.00 as actual claim plus interest of twice the ceiling prescribed by the
Monetary Board computed from the time of submission of proof of loss;

2) P10,000.00 as moral damages;

3) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;

4) P3,000.00 as litigation expenses; and

5) Costs.

G.R. No. 92383 July 17, 1992

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., petitioner, 

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NERISSA LIM, respondents.
FACTS: The Sun Insurance issued Personal Accident Policy No. 05687 to Felix Lim, Jr. with a face
value of P200,000.00. Two months later, he was dead with a bullet wound in his head. As
beneficiary, his wife Nerissa Lim sought payment on the policy but her claim was rejected. The
petitioner agreed that there was no suicide. It argued, however that there was no accident either.

Pilar Nalagon, Lim's secretary, was the only eyewitness to his death. It happened on October 6,
1982, at about 10 o'clock in the evening, after his mother's birthday party. According to Nalagon, Lim
was in a happy mood (but not drunk) and was playing with his handgun, from which he had
previously removed the magazine. As she watched television, he stood in front of her and pointed
the gun at her. She pushed it aside and said it might he loaded. He assured her it was not and then
pointed it to his temple. The next moment there was an explosion and Lim slumped to the floor. He
was dead before he fell.  The widow sued the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
1

City and was sustained. 

Sun Insurance cites one of the four exceptions provided for in the insurance contract and contends
that the private petitioner's claim is barred by such provision. It is there stated:

Exceptions —

The company shall not be liable in respect of

1. Bodily injury

xxx xxx xxx

b. consequent upon

i) The insured person attempting to commit suicide or willfully exposing himself to

needless peril except in an attempt to save human life.

ISSUE: WON Lim had willfully exposed himself from peril and is therefore barred from any claims of
the policy.

HELD: NO. To repeat, the parties agree that Lim did not commit suicide. Nevertheless, the petitioner
contends that the insured willfully exposed himself to needless peril and thus removed himself from
the coverage of the insurance policy.

It should be noted at the outset that suicide and willful exposure to needless peril are in pari
materia because they both signify a disregard for one's life. The only difference is in degree, as
suicide imports a positive act of ending such life whereas the second act indicates a reckless risking
of it that is almost suicidal in intent. To illustrate, a person who walks a tightrope one thousand
meters above the ground and without any safety device may not actually be intending to commit
suicide, but his act is nonetheless suicidal. He would thus be considered as "willfully exposing
himself to needless peril" within the meaning of the exception in question.

The petitioner maintains that by the mere act of pointing the gun to hip temple, Lim had willfully
exposed himself to needless peril and so came under the exception. The theory is that a gun is per
se dangerous and should therefore be handled cautiously in every case.

That posture is arguable. But what is not is that, as the secretary testified, Lim had removed the
magazine from the gun and believed it was no longer dangerous. He expressly assured her that the
gun was not loaded. It is submitted that Lim did not willfully expose himself to needless peril when he
pointed the gun to his temple because the fact is that he thought it was not unsafe to do so. The act
was precisely intended to assure Nalagon that the gun was indeed harmless.

On the second assigned error, however, the Court must rule in favor of the petitioner. The basic
issue raised in this case is, as the petitioner correctly observed, one of first impression. It is evident
that the petitioner was acting in good faith then it resisted the private respondent's claim on the
ground that the death of the insured was covered by the exception. The issue was indeed debatable
and was clearly not raised only for the purpose of evading a legitimate obligation. We hold therefore
that the award of moral and exemplary damages and of attorney's fees is unjust and so must be
disapproved.

G.R. No. L-54171 October 28, 1980

JEWEL VILLACORTA, assisted by her husband, GUERRERO VILLACORTA, petitioner, 

vs.
THE INSURANCE COMMISSION and EMPIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, respondents.

FACTS: Villacorta was the owner of a Colt Lancer, Model 1976, insured with respondent company
under Private Car Policy No. MBI/PC-0704 for P35,000.00 — Own Damage; P30,000.00 — Theft;
and P30,000.00 — Third Party Liability, effective May 16, 1977 to May 16, 1978. On May 9, 1978,
the vehicle was brought to the Sunday Machine Works, Inc., for general check-up and repairs. While
it was in the custody of the Sunday Machine Works, the car was allegedly taken by six (6) persons
and driven out to Montalban, Rizal. While travelling the car figured in an accident, hitting and
bumping a gravel and sand truck parked at the right side of the road going south. As a consequence,
the gravel and sand truck veered to the right side of the pavement going south and the car veered to
the right side of the pavement going north. The car, suffered extensive damage. Complainant,
thereafter, filed a claim for total loss with the respondent company but the claim was denied.

Insurance Commission upheld private respondent's contention on the "Authorized Driver" clause in
this wise: "It must be observed that under the above-quoted provisions, the policy limits the use of
the insured vehicle to two (2) persons only, namely: the insured himself or any person on his
(insured's) permission.

ISSUE: WON Empire Insurance’s refusal to pay is proper.

HELD: NO.

Since when a car is unlawfully taken, it is the theft clause, not the "authorized driver" clause, that
applies, where a car is admittedly as in this case unlawfully and wrongfully taken by some people, be
they employees of the car shop or not to whom it had been entrusted, and taken on a long trip to
Montalban without the owner's consent or knowledge, such taking constitutes or partakes of the
nature of theft as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, viz. "Who are liable for theft. —
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation
of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's
consent," for purposes of recovering the loss under the policy in question.

The Court rejects respondent commission's premise that there must be an intent on the part of the
taker of the car "permanently to deprive the insured of his car" and that since the taking here was for
a "joy ride" and "merely temporary in nature," a "temporary taking is held not a taking insured
against."
The evidence does not warrant respondent commission's findings that it was a mere "joy ride". From
the very investigator's report cited in its comment,   the police found from the waist of the car driver
3

Benito Mabasa Bartolome who smashed the car and was found dead right after the incident "one
cal. 45 Colt. and one apple type grenade," hardly the materials one would bring along on a "joy ride".
Then, again, it is equally evident that the taking proved to be quite permanent rather than temporary,
for the car was totally smashed in the fatal accident and was never returned in serviceable and
useful condition to petitioner-owner.

Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a "joy
ride", the Court sustains as the better view that which holds that when a person, either with the
object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession
of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by
taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is
evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. 

G.R. No. L-36480 May 31, 1988

ANDREW PALERMO, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
PYRAMID INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant- appellant.

FACTS: After having purchased a brand new Nissan Cedric de Luxe Sedan car Palermo insured the
said car with the defendant Pyramid Insurance Inc. against any loss or damage for P 20,000.00 and
against third party liability for P 10,000.00. Plaintiff paid the defendant P 361.34 premium for one
year, March 12, 1968 to March 12, 1969, for which defendant issued Private Car Comprehensive
Policy No. MV-1251.

On April 17, 1968, while driving the automobile in question, the plaintiff met a violent accident. The
defendant was immediately notified of the occurrence.  However, it refused to take either of the
above-mentioned alternatives for the reason as alleged, that the insured himself had violated the
terms of the policy when he drove the car in question with an expired driver's license. 

Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in interpreting the following provision of the Private Car
Comprehensive Policy MV-1251:

AUTHORIZED DRIVER:

Any of the following:

(a) The Insured.

(b) Any person driving on the Insured's order or with his permission. Provided that
the person driving is permitted in accordance with the licensing or other laws or
regulations to drive the Motor Vehicle and is not disqualified from driving such motor
vehicle by order of a Court of law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that
behalf.

ISSUE: WON the disallowance of the claim under the policy is proper.

HELD: NO. There is no merit in the appellant's allegation that the plaintiff was not authorized to drive
the insured motor vehicle because his driver's license had expired. The driver of the insured motor
vehicle at the time of the accident was, the insured himself, hence an "authorized driver" under the
policy.

While the Motor Vehicle Law prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle on the highway
without a license or with an expired license, an infraction of the Motor Vehicle Law on the part of the
insured, is not a bar to recovery under the insurance contract. It however renders him subject to the
penal sanctions of the Motor Vehicle Law.

The requirement that the driver be "permitted in accordance with the licensing or other laws or
regulations to drive the Motor Vehicle and is not disqualified from driving such motor vehicle by order
of a Court of Law or by reason of any enactment or regulation in that behalf," applies only when the
driver" is driving on the insured's order or with his permission." It does not apply when the person
driving is the insured himself.

This view may be inferred from the decision of this Court in Villacorta vs. Insurance Commission,
100 SCRA 467, where it was held that:

The main purpose of the "authorized driver" clause, as may be seen from its text, is
that a person other than the insured owner, who drives the car on the insured's
order, such as his regular driver, or with his permission, such as a friend or member
of the family or the employees of a car service or repair shop, must be duly licensed
drivers and have no disqualification to drive a motor vehicle.