G.R. No.

159357             April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid,
decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive
requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench and
the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and
requirements.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision 2 and July 29, 2003 Order 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49). 4

The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory

Relief5 filed before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice
Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together
with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo,
Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents.
The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act
of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the
candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the
members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter
or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."6

Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts
and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and
Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-
respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration. In
response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:

"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to

do, was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare
whether acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a
dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required only in
coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit
that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these
movants have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
 Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to
the Supreme Court."7

The Antecedent Proceedings

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS
Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-
respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of
several constitutional provisions,8 specifically on the separation of church
and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of
religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or
requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in

these words:

"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to
file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive
Minister Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to
Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment
and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and
similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the
dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state
a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They
were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was
closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss.
Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister
Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime
Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro.
Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his
Memorandum. x x x.

"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for
Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and
Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which raised no new arguments
other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss x x x." 9

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had
jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in praying for a determination as to
whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II,
Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question
of law."10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the
Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some extent,
the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the
court a quo opined at some point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific
candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the
separation clause."11
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a
dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were
denied by the lower court.

Hence, this Petition for Review.12

This Court, in a Resolution 13 dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective
comments. In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties --
impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the opportunity to
comment, if they so desired.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument. 14

The Issues

In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this
Court’s resolution:

"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the
court a quo was proper and valid;

"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein

respondent’s Petition for declaratory relief;

"3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the
Petition for declaratory relief;

"4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved

by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination;

"5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the

declaratory relief; and,

"6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition
for declaratory relief of herein respondent."15

During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as
follows:

"A. Procedural Issues

"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?

Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing
to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

"B. Substantive Issues

 "1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance
required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?

"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike

Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public
office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning
against said candidates?"

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.

Procedural Issues:

Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief

Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for
declaratory relief, provides in part:

"Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by
a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties thereunder."

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a

person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to
determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial
declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder. 16 The essential
requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue is ripe for judicial determination.17

Justiciable Controversy

Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much
less establish before the trial court, that there existed a justiciable
controversy or an adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS had a
legal right that was being violated or threatened to be violated by petitioner.
On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere
speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet
ripened into an actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief
must fail.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory.18 The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this
test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between
the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did
not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated
by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were
in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.

As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment, 19 what exactly

has he done that merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does
not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed
Decision of the RTC) "yields nothing in this respect." His Eminence, Jaime
Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28,
2003, the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event,
he has not been actively involved in partisan politics.

An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain "a
plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim x x x." 20 Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate
facts.

Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that,

as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had
endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective
offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable [them]
to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their
leaders, enabling them to control the government"[;] 21 and "pos[ing] a clear
and present danger of serious erosion of the people’s faith in the electoral
process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the
ultimate result of elections,"22 which would then be violative of the
separation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least.
Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The
Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of
any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge
their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is
a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an
actionable right.

Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being subjected
to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be
prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of
the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable23 cannot be exercised when there is no actual
or threatened violation of a legal right.
All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question raised in
paragraph 9 hereof be resolved." 24 In other words, it merely sought an
opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders
endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional
principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a
declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of
any threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are
proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.25

Cause of Action

Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory

relief, a cause of action need not be alleged or proven. Supposedly, for such
petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty
or actual wrong committed by one party against the other.

Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for
declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other written
instrument), a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. But
the subject matter of the SJS Petition is "the constitutionality of an act of a
religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or
to urge or require the members of the flock to vote for a specified
candidate."26 According to petitioner, this subject matter is "beyond the
realm of an action for declaratory relief." 27 Petitioner avers that in the
absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition fails to state a cause of action
and, hence, should have been dismissed outright by the court a quo.

A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the

legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. 28 Its essential
elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former
to the latter.29

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its

outright dismissal.30 However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief,
the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly
apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of rights arising thereunder. 31 Nevertheless, a breach or violation
should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit
allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to
protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare
allegation that it "has thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-
registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of
the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in
Philippine politics and in the process to insure adherence to the
Constitution by everyone x x x."32

Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right
or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain. 33 The Rules require
that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or
incidental interest in the question raised.34

To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that
the "[p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a
claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights
of the parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future conduct, and the
essential distinction between a ‘declaratory judgment action’ and the usual
‘action’ is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have
occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there
must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights
will be invaded."35

SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference – that there
must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will
be invaded. Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein
petitioner (and his co-respondents below) might actively participate in
partisan politics, use "the awesome voting strength of its faithful flock [to]
enable it to elect men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to control the
government."36

During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-
respondents below all strongly asserted that they had not in any way
engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics. They all firmly
assured this Court that they had not done anything to trigger the issue
raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought.

Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single
allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named
respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal
right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right
would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of
the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003)
would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be
jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

Legal Standing

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. 37 Interest means a
material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question
involved.38

Petitioner alleges that "[i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the

constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse, or require the
members of the religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein
Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy"; 39 it has failed to
establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure
it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a

statute must show "not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that
[they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [they]
suffer thereby in some indefinite way."40 They must demonstrate that they
have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they
are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 41

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have

sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation.42 A taxpayer’s action may be properly brought only when there is
an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. 43 In the present
case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers’
money is being illegally disbursed.

Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS
as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely
affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue
was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be
deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither
did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or
the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are

citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general 44 and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the
presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. 45

Transcendental Importance

In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even
sans legal standing, considering that "the issues raised are of paramount
public interest."

In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement
when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount
importance to the people. 46 Recently, after holding that the IBP had no locus
standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP v. Zamora47 nevertheless
entertained the Petition therein. It noted that "the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents." 48

Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue
raised in the SJS Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people.
The issue did not simply concern a delineation of the separation between
church and state, but ran smack into the governance of our country. The
issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in nature, since it
had never been decided before.

The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty
whether it could resolve the constitutional issue despite the barren
allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the
court below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the parties --
particularly for Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or
clarifications that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove discussed.
Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case from the stringent locus
standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the
transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court

To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and
for the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates
the elementary procedure49 that must be followed by trial courts in the
conduct of civil cases.50

Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the
defendant -- dismiss a complaint 51 (or petition, in a special civil action) that
does not allege the plaintiff’s (or petitioner’s) cause or causes of action. 52 A
complaint or petition should contain "a plain, concise and direct statement
of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense."53 It should likewise clearly specify the relief sought.54

Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite
legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
summons to the defendants or the respondents, with a directive that the
defendant answer55 within 15 days, unless a different period is fixed by the
court.56 The summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not
filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default and may be
granted the relief applied for. 57 The court, however, may -- upon such terms
as may be just -- allow an answer to be filed after the time fixed by the
Rules.58

If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered

within ten (10) days from service. 59 A reply may be filed within ten (10) days
from service of the pleading responded to.60
When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations
of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage or for legal separation). 61 Meanwhile, a party
seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain
a declaratory relief -- may, at any time after the answer thereto has been
served, move for a summary judgment in its favor. 62 Similarly, a party
against whom a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a
declaratory relief sought -- may, at any time, move for a summary judgment
in its favor.63 After the motion is heard, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 64

Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or
petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on any of the
grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. During the
hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the
questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact. 65 After the
hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or
order the amendment of the pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the
motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. In
every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor.66

If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of
the period originally prescribed to file an answer, but not less than five (5)
days in any event, computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If
the pleading is ordered to be amended, the defendant shall file an answer
within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the amended pleading,
unless the court provides a longer period. 67

After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for
pretrial,68 which is a mandatory proceeding.69 A plaintiff’s/ petitioner’s (or its
duly authorized representative’s) non-appearance at the pretrial, if without
valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the action with prejudice, unless
the court orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the defendant
shall be a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex
parte, and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. 70

The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have
the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial. 71 Upon the termination
thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up
at the conference; the action taken on them, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by the parties
regarding any of the matters considered. 72 The parties may further avail
themselves of any of the modes of discovery,73 if they so wish.
Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial, 74 in which the parties shall adduce
their respective evidence in support of their claims and/or defenses. By their
written consent or upon the application of either party, or on its own
motion, the court may also order any or all of the issues to be referred to a
commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the
parties.75 The trial or hearing before the commissioner shall proceed in all
respects as it would if held before the court.76

Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with
the court a written report on the matters referred by the parties. 77 The report
shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting,
modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or recommitting it with
instructions; or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the
commissioner or the court.78

Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be
rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared
by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. 79

Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before

the trial court in the instant case.

First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory

perusal of the Petition immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It contained
no statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner relied for its claim.
Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought from the court, but merely
asked it to answer a hypothetical question.

Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive

measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a
petitioner.80 As already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial court
had no allegations of fact81 or of any specific violation of the petitioner’s
rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency
amounted to a failure to state a cause of action; hence, no coercive relief
could be sought and adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive
requirements and, we repeat, should have been dismissed at the outset.

Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to
file their respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and
Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano,
within a priorly granted extended period, an Answer in which he likewise
prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. 82 SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion
of Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were
"several scheduled settings, in which the "[c]ourt was apprised of the
respective positions of the parties." 83 The nature of such settings -- whether
pretrial or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in the records. Before ruling on
the Motions to Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order 84 dated May 8, 2003,
directing the parties to submit their memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter
was another Order85 dated May 14, 2003, denying all the Motions to
Dismiss.

In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:

"The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all
the memoranda are submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as
submitted for resolution."86

Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules

of Court, the Motions were not heard. Worse, the Order purportedly
resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all for their
denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16. There was not even
any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the
legal findings and conclusions of the trial court.

Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending

the resolution of these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a
Motion to suspend the filing of the parties’ memoranda. But instead of
separately resolving the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trial court
again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to
issue its Decision, even before tackling the issues raised in those Motions.

Furthermore, the RTC issued its "Decision" without allowing the parties to
file their answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues. If only
it had allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court would have known,
as the Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner and his co-respondents
below had not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed to them
(endorsing candidates) -- the act that was supposedly the factual basis of
the suit.

Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition

to the OSG, which was entitled to be heard upon questions involving the
constitutionality or validity of statutes and other measures. 87

Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the

trial court was utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.

All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial
court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the law --
or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with grave
abuse of discretion.

Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for
declaratory relief must still follow the process described above -- the petition
must state a cause of action; the proceedings must undergo the procedure
outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision must adhere to
constitutional and legal requirements.
First Substantive Issue:

Fundamental Requirements of a Decision

The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any

court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the basis therefor."88

Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the

Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides:

"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. – A judgment or final

order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally
and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with
the clerk of court."

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure reads as follows:

"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be

written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.

"x x x           x x x           x x x."

Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988,
Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all judges "to make complete
findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of
the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the
tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced."

In many cases,89 this Court has time and time again reminded "magistrates
to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution." The
Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of
Appeals,90 discussed at length the implications of this provision and strongly
exhorted thus:

"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the

Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair
play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution.
The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of
X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever
for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may
appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision
should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to
how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor
the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for
sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision."

In People v. Bugarin,91 the Court also explained:

"The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and

that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among
other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the
appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with
which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning. x x x."

Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be

given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. 92

In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had instructed magistrates to

exert effort to ensure that their decisions would present a comprehensive
analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially
address the issues raised by the parties.

In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains
no statement of facts -- much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or of
the court’s findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins
with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue
presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions
involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing
procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision
proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final
conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the
trial judge ends her "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."
What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What
exactly were the distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be
resolved by SJS? More important, what were the factual findings and
analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings and conclusions?
None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTC’s Decision cannot be upheld
for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was
based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.

The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a

precedent. How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar
circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown?
Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no
point of factual comparison?

Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion
in its so-called Decision. The importance of such portion was explained in
the early case Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards,94 from which we quote:

"The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the

dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling
factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the
questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of
statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be
confusing."

The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final
resolution of the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was for declaratory
relief. So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny? What rights of the
parties did it conclusively declare? Its final statement says, "SO ORDERED."
But what exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to label its
issuance a "Decision," when nothing was in fact decided.

Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body
of the assailed Decision. It claims that the issue is disposed of and the
Petition finally resolved by the statement of the trial court found on page 10
of its 14-page Decision, which reads: "Endorsement of specific candidates in
an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." 95

We cannot agree.

In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,96 the obligation of the party imposed by

the Court was allegedly contained in the text of the original Decision. The
Court, however, held:

"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies
in the dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule
is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part
and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory
 that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is
merely a statement ordering nothing." (Italics in the original)

Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted

by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-
page Decision. If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical
legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not
conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition.
Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the
circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders
issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent
nullity and must be struck down as void.97

Parts of a Decision

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1)
statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of
errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately
considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion.
The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as
an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are
involved.98

An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of

the principal factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases --
particularly those concerning public interest; or involving complicated
commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- a longer
introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific
nature of the controversy and the issues involved. An epilogue may be a
summation of the important principles applied to the resolution of the
issues of paramount public interest or significance. It may also lay down an
enduring philosophy of law or guiding principle.

Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the
essential parts of a good decision.

1. Statement of the Case

The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the

action. At the first instance, this part states whether the action is a civil
case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and
so on; or, if it is a criminal case, this part describes the specific charge --
quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information -- and the
plea of the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the case is being
decided on appeal or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case
number in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of the assailed
decision.

In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information

serves as a guide in determining the nature and the gravity of the offense for
which the accused may be found culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime different from or graver than that charged.

Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important

when there is a question on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether
qualifying and modifying circumstances have been adequately alleged
therein.

To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short

description of the proceedings regarding the plea of the accused. Absence of
an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment
void, and further consideration by the appellate court would be futile. In
some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be useful to
mention the fact of the appellants’ detention, in order to dispose of the
preliminary query -- whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by
absconding or jumping bail.

Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned
helps in facilitating the consolidation of the records of the case in both the
trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.

Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision

informs the reader of how the appealed case was decided by the court a quo.

2. Statement of Facts

There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the
objective or reportorial method, the judge summarizes -- without comment --
the testimony of each witness and the contents of each
exhibit. Second, under the synthesis method, the factual theory of the
plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is
summarized according to the judge’s best light. Third, in the subjective
method, the version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated
without explaining what the parties’ versions are. Finally, through a
combination of objective and subjective means, the testimony of each
witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version of
the facts.

In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution

and that of the defense, in the interest of fairness and due process. A
detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow. The
resolution of most criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases, depends to a
large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence. The
plausibility or the implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially
drawn from a reading of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in
arriving at its findings and conclusions should be explained.

On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully,
intelligently and correctly resolved all factual and legal issues involved may
partly explain why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the
findings and conclusions of the former. Conversely, the lower court’s patent
misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a
better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.

In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be

presented. Issues for resolution usually involve questions of law, grave
abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are
often undisputed by the parties. With few exceptions, factual issues are not
entertained in non-criminal cases. Consequently, the narration of facts by
the lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced; otherwise, the
material factual antecedents should be restated in the words of the
reviewing magistrate.

In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under
review should be laid out, in order that the parties may clearly understand
why the lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court
either finds no reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.

3. Issues or Assignment of Errors

Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of
errors, as mentioned in the appellant’s brief, may be reproduced in toto and
tackled seriatim, so as to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final
decision on the ground that the court failed to consider all assigned errors
that could affect the outcome of the case. But when the appellant presents
repetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the main issue,
these may be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.

Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also
be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered. Note
that appealed criminal cases are given de novo review, in contrast to
noncriminal cases in which the reviewing court is generally limited to issues
specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are errors of
jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision
on the case; or unassigned errors that are closely related to those properly
assigned, or upon which depends the determination of the question properly
raised.

4. The Court’s Ruling

This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in
the complaint, petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of other
issues the court deems essential to a just disposition of the case. Where
there are several issues, each one of them should be separately addressed,
as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the parties should
also be mentioned here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to
substantive ones, it is better to resolve the former preliminarily.

5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion

In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or

guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty imposed, the participation of
the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and
costs. In case an acquittal is decreed, the court must order the immediate
release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held for another
cause) and order the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the
accused is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from
notice, the exact date when the accused were set free.

In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state
whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief
granted, and the costs. The following test of completeness may be
applied. First, the parties should know their rights and
obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the decision under
alternative contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further
proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated
by according the proper relief. The "proper relief" usually depends upon
what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their rights and
duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to
abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.

The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they
should all be present and plainly identifiable in the decision. Depending on
the writer’s character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and
free-flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed form; much less
highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious. At all times, however, the decision
must be clear, concise, complete and correct.

Second Substantive Issue:

Religious Leaders’ Endorsement

of Candidates for Public Office

The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER

ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As
stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount
interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our
country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions
by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so
as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose
of the SJS Petition on the merits.

Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there
are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the
other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner
insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed
Decision.

We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts
that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS
candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for
Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed
Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical
question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of
which was beyond the court’s constitutional mandate and jurisdiction. 99

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the

Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition.
Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is
nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.

Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits,
the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-
honored rule that "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed
upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in
a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned."100

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED.

The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL
AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief
is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court

Administrator to evaluate and recommend whether the trial judge may, after
observing due process, be held administratively liable for rendering a
decision violative of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
circulars of this Court. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.