SJS Vs Lim PDF

CASES REPORTED
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
____________________
G.R. No. 187836. November 25, 2014.*

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS,
namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR
ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO
S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of the City of
Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. 187916. November 25, 2014.*

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M.
ABANTE, MA. LOURDES M. ISIP-GARCIA,
RAFAEL P. BORROMEO,
_______________
* EN BANC.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers vs. Lim
JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION, minors MARIAN

REGINA B. TARAN, MACAILA RICCI B. TARAN,
RICHARD KENNETH B. TARAN, represented and
joined by their parents RICHARD and MARITES
TARAN, minors CZARINA ALYSANDRA C. RAMOS,
CEZARAH ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, and CRISTEN
AIDAN C. RAMOS, represented and joined by their
mother DONNA C. RAMOS, minors JAZMIN
SYLLITA T. VILA and ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV,
represented and joined by their mother MAUREEN
C. TOLENTINO, petitioners, vs. MAYOR ALFREDO
S. LIM, VICE MAYOR FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO,
COUNCILORS ARLENE W. KOA, MOISES T. LIM,
JESUS FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA,
VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN MARVIN C.
NIETO, ROLANDO M. VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO
R. YUPANGCO, EDWARD VP MACEDA,
RODERICK D. VALBUENA, JOSEFINA M. SISCAR,
SALVADOR PHILLIP H. LACUNA, LUCIANO M.
VELOSO, CARLO V. LOPEZ, ERNESTO F.
RIVERA,1 DANILO VICTOR H. LACUNA, JR.,
ERNESTO G. ISIP, HONEY H. LACUNA-PANGAN,
ERNESTO M. DIONISIO, JR. and ERICK IAN O.
NIEVA, respondents.
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON
CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, intervenors.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition;

Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper
remedy, and that the petitions should have been filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the Supreme Court (SC)
has, time and again, resolved to treat such a petition as one
for prohibition, provided that the case has far-reaching
implications and transcendental issues that need to be
resolved, as in these present petitions.—Assuming that a
petition for
_______________
1 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the
motion to drop respondent Ernesto Rivera as a party-respondent on
the ground that he actually voted against the enactment of the
assailed ordinance. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper
pagination, should be pp. 148-149).
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 3

declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the

petitions should have been filed with the Regional Trial
Court, we have, time and again, resolved to treat such a
petition as one for prohibition, provided that the case has
far-reaching implications and transcendental issues that
need to be resolved, as in these present petitions. On a
related issue, we initially found convincing the argument
that the petitions should have been filed with the Regional
Trial Court, it having concurrent jurisdiction with this
Court over a special civil action for prohibition, and original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. However,
as we have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of
transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Locus Standi; Parties; Social Justice Society (SJS), now
represented by SJS Officer Alcantara, has been recognized
by the Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal standing to
sue in connection with the same subject matter herein
considered. The rest of the petitioners are residents of
Manila. Hence, all of them have a direct interest in the
prohibition proceedings against the enforcement of the
assailed ordinance.—No different are herein petitioners
who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed
ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that
concerns a public right. Necessarily, the people who are
interested in the nullification of such an ordinance are
themselves the real parties-in-interest, for which reason,
they are no longer required to show any specific interest
therein. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that SJS, now
represented by SJS Officer Alcantara, has been recognized
by the Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal standing to
sue in connection with the same subject matter herein
Manila. Hence, all of them have a direct interest in the
prohibition proceedings against the enforcement of the
assailed ordinance.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari;
Prohibition; Statutes; The writs of certiorari and prohibition
are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes.
—It is pointless to discuss the matter at length in these
instant cases of transcendental importance in view of the
Court’s pronouncement, in Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA
476 (2011). There it held that the writs of certiorari and
prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality
of statutes, notwithstanding the following defects: In
praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary
grounds, respondents seek a strict obser-

vance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and

prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
powers on the part of respondents and resulting
prejudice on the part of petitioners. Respondents’
submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When
this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial
review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of
certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to
test the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts
of other branches of government. Issues of
constitutional import x x x carry such relevance in
the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds
itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and
pass upon the issues raised, noncompliance with the
letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The
statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
Same; Judicial Review; Requisites for a Valid Exercise
of the Power of Judicial Review.—For a valid exercise of the
power of judicial review, the following requisites shall
concur: (1) the existence of a legal controversy; (2) legal
standing to sue of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) a plea that judicial review be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case.
Same; Verification; Certification Against Forum
Shopping; The verification and certification against forum
shopping are governed specifically by Sections 4 and 5, Rule
7 of the Rules of Court.—The verification and certification
against forum shopping are governed specifically by
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Section 4
provides that a pleading, when required to be verified, shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading if it lacks a proper
verification while Section 5 requires that the certification to
be executed by the plaintiff or principal party be under
oath. These sections, in turn, should be read together with
Sections 6 and 12, Rule 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Section 6 of the latter Rules, specifically, likewise
provides that any competent evidence of identity specified
under Section 12 thereof may now be presented before the
notary public, to wit: SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of
Identity.—The phrase “competent evidence of identity”
refers to the identification of an individual based on: (a) at
least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
indi-
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 5

vidual, such as but not limited to passport, driver’s

license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal
ID, voter’s ID, Barangay certification, Government Service
and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security
System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card,
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID,
OFW ID, seaman’s book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
government office ID, certification from the National
Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
certification.
Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Words and
Phrases; Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom
an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari.—In Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos, 521
SCRA 510 (2007), the Court expounded on the nature of
forum shopping. Thus: Forum shopping is an act of a party,
against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. The established
rule is that for forum shopping to exist, both actions must
involve the same transactions, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of actions,
subject matter, and issues.
Same; Same; Same; It bears reiterating that a judgment
on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.
—Here, it should be noted that this Court denied the said
Manifestation and Urgent Motion, and refused to act on the
succeeding pleadings, for being moot. Clearly, the merits of
the motion were not considered by the Court. The following
disquisition of the Court in Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos
is further enlightening: The judgment of dismissal in Civil
Case No. 95-1387 does not constitute res judicata to
sufficiently bar the refiling thereof in Civil Case No. 96-
0225. As earlier underscored, the dismissal was one without
prejudice. Verily, it was not a judgment on

the merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on

the merits is one rendered after a determination of
which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal
or merely technical point. The dismissal of the case
without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the
merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a
subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not
been commenced. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Considering that there is definitely no forum shopping in
the instant cases, we need not discuss in detail the
elements of forum shopping.
Local Government Code of 1991; Zoning; The Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991 expressly provides that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to
“reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city” subject to
the pertinent provisions of the Code.—The Local
Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to
“reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city” subject to
the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that
an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another
ordinance. These have been properly applied in G.R. No.
156052, where the Court upheld the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of
the Ordinance, and declared that the mayor has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has not been
repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise
annulled by the courts. In the same case, the Court also
used the principle that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is in
the best position to determine the needs of its constituents
— that the removal of the oil depots from the Pandacan
area is necessary “to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals.”
Supreme Court; Judicial Power; When the judiciary
mediates it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.—In its Comment, the 7th Council
(2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was
enacted to alleviate the economic condition of its
constituents. Expressing the
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 7

same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the

extent of detailing the steps he took prior to the signing of
the Ordinance, if only to show his honest intention to make
the right decision. The fact remains, however, that
notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the
operations of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment
of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to this
day, as would later be discussed, the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice
changed, largely depending on the new composition of the
council and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus,
shows that its determination of the “general welfare” of the
city does not after all gear towards the protection of the
people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or
another, dependent on the personal preference of the
members who sit in the council as to which particular
sector among its constituents it wishes to favor. Now that
the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city
councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring the
city’s economic-related benefits, through the continued stay
of the oil terminals, over the protection of the very lives and
safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to
make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the
table as to which specific right of the inhabitants of Manila
should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history
reveals that there is truly no such thing as “the will of
Manila” insofar as the general welfare of the people is
concerned. If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), by Justice
Laurel, we say when the judiciary mediates we do not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila
Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.
Oil Depots; Pandacan Terminal; The issue of whether or
not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist
attacks has already been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052.
Based on the assessment of the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila
and the then position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the
Supreme Court (SC) was convinced that the threat of
terrorism is imminent.—The issue of whether or not the
Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks
has already been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based on
the assess-

ment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and

Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then
position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Court was
convinced that the threat of terrorism is imminent. It
remains so convinced. Even assuming that the respondents
and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the depots
where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly
volatile products, regardless of whether or not the
composition may cause explosions, has no place in a densely
populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil
depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever origin or
otherwise, would definitely cause not only destruction to
properties within and among the neighboring communities
but certainly mass deaths and injuries.
Same; Same; It is the removal of the danger to life not
the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in and
made us favor Ordinance No. 8027.—It is the removal of
the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of
catastrophe, that we saw in and made us favor Ordinance
No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187,
compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
Same; Same; The Pandacan oil depot remains a
terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened.—The
same best interest of the public guides the present decision.
The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if
the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any
convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no
longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold
that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
Same; Same; The oil companies shall be given a fresh
non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days from notice
within which to submit to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and
relocation schedule. The relocation, in turn, shall be
completed not later than six (6) months from the date of
their submission.—The periods were given in the Decision
in G.R. No. 156052 which became final on 23 April 2009.
Five years have passed, since then. The years of
noncompliance may be excused by the swing of local
legislative leads. We now stay the sway and begin a final
count. A comprehensive and well-coordinated plan within a
specific time-frame shall, therefore, be observed in the
relocation of
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 9

the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies shall be

given a fresh non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days
from notice within which to submit to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan
and relocation schedule. The relocation, in turn, shall be
completed not later than six months from the date of their
submission.
Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Statutes; View that all laws, including ordinances,

enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.—All laws,
including ordinances, enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality. The reason behind this presumption has
been discussed by this court as follows: This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the
idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to
encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it
has been said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch — the legislature.
Oil Depots; Pandacan Terminal; View that no
convincing evidence was presented to show why oil depots
are inherently risky or why oil depots are targets of terrorist
attacks.—The arguments raised by petitioners are
hypothetical. No convincing evidence was presented to show
why oil depots are inherently risky or why oil depots are
targets of terrorist attacks. The examples of fire incidents
in other fuel facilities located in Puerto Rico and India are
insufficient to give us a scientific basis for concluding that
the risks of simply having an oil depot are unmanageably
high. The examples do not relate to the number of oil depots
that have operated continuously without any safety
problems. To decide a controversy on the basis of
hypothetical facts would have the effect of barring litigation
between real parties with real causes of action.
Same; Same; Police Power; View that Social Justice
Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 545 SCRA 92
(2008), has the authority to hold that Ordinance No. 8027
was enacted in the exercise of police power.—Social Justice
Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 545 SCRA 92
(2008), has the authority to hold that Ordinance No. 8027
was enacted in the exercise of police power. It did not
discriminate against the Pandacan terminal and the oil
depots found therein. Neither did the ordinance contravene
Republic Act No. 7638
10

and Republic Act No. 8479. Further, Ordinance No.

8027 does not prohibit the oil businesses from conducting
their business in Manila, but they are no longer allowed to
have an oil depot in the Pandacan terminal.
Same; Same; View that risks are inherent in all human
activity.—Risks are inherent in all human activity. The
questions properly addressed to policy makers are whether
the risks are properly proven and understood, the measures
that are proposed are sufficient to mitigate the risks in
relation to the beneficial effects or objective of the activity,
and whether the measures can be implemented given the
institutions in place and the resources available.
Governance cannot proceed from imagined fears. Therefore,
insofar as judicial review is concerned, it is not our duty to
second-guess political branches or local government units.
They are in a better position to understand risks, decide on
measures, and pursue these measures’ implementation.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of
Courts; Jurisdiction; View that the concurrence of
jurisdiction does not mean that parties are free to choose
which court to seek redress from. The Supreme Court (SC) is
the court of last resort, and observance of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is necessary to prevent “(1) inordinate
demands upon the time and attention of the court, which is
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the court’s
docket.”—In accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution, this court has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. The same jurisdiction is granted to the
Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. Thus, there is concurrence of
jurisdiction among this court, the Court of Appeals, and the
Regional Trial Court with regard to petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
However, the concurrence of jurisdiction does not mean
that parties are free to choose which court to seek redress
from. This court is the court of last resort, and observance
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is necessary to prevent
“(1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the
court, which is better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the
court’s docket.”
11
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 11

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme

Court (SC) has, from time to time, relaxed its rules and
allowed the direct filing of petitions before it.—
Nevertheless, this court has, from time to time, relaxed its
rules and allowed the direct filing of petitions before it. The
exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts include: (1)
when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement
of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest
of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the immediate and
direct handling of the case. None of these exceptions were
sufficiently shown to be present in this case so as to
convince this court that it should relax its rules of
procedure.
Same; Same; Locus Standi; Parties; View that the basic
question in determining if one has locus standing is
“whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”—In cases involving issues of constitutionality,
the party raising the issue of constitutionality must have
locus standi. Locus standi has been defined as “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” The
basic question in determining if one has locus standing is
“whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable” means that the party who
seeks relief from this court must suffer, or is in imminent
danger of suffering, an injury.—“Rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable” means that the party who
seeks relief from this court must suffer, or is in imminent
danger of suffering, an injury. In Tolentino v. COMELEC,
420 SCRA 438 (2004), this court held that “direct injury”
may be determined using the following guidelines: Thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1)
he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
12

Issues of Transcendental Importance; View that

whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter
determined by this court on a case-to-case basis.—Whether
an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter
determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An
allegation of transcendental importance must be supported
by the proper allegations.
Writs of Kalikasan; View that petitioners could have
availed themselves of the remedy of a writ of kalikasan if
they could properly and clearly show grave danger to the
environment.—Petitioners could have availed themselves of
the remedy of a writ of kalikasan if they could properly and
clearly show grave danger to the environment. Petitioners
may argue that their petitions were filed ahead of the
promulgation of the rules of procedure for environmental
cases. However, procedural rules are generally given
retroactive effect since there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Same; Temporary Environmental Protection Order;
View that a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
may include a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
environmental protection order (TEPO).—The application
for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan is commenced by
filing a verified petition, stating the personal circumstances
of petitioner and respondent, the environmental laws
violated, the acts or omissions complained of, and the
environmental damage “as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.”
The petition must be supported by relevant evidence such
as affidavits or documents. A petition for the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan may include a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary environmental protection order (TEPO).
Republic Act No. 6969; View that if petitioners had
evidence to support their allegation that Ordinance No. 8187
by its simple existence actually causes pollution and hazard
to communities in Manila, they could avail themselves of
remedies under Republic Act (RA) No. 6969.—If petitioners
had evidence to support their allegation that Ordinance No.
8187 by its simple existence actually causes pollution and
hazard to communities in Manila, they could avail
themselves of remedies under Republic Act No. 6969.
Judicial Review; View that judicial pronouncements on
the validity and constitutionality of laws must be narrowly
tailored to
13
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 13

actual facts and issues in order to prevent judicial

overreach and ensure that the remedy sought is appropriate
to the cause of action.—This court is mindful that the power
of judicial review should be exercised with caution. Judicial
pronouncements on the validity and constitutionality of
laws must be narrowly tailored to actual facts and issues in
order to prevent judicial overreach and ensure that the
remedy sought is appropriate to the cause of action. Actual
facts that have been duly proven provide the limits to the
scope of judicial review that this court may exercise in a
particular case. In view of these principles, this court must
refrain from ruling upon the validity of Ordinance No.
8187.
Precautionary Principle in International
Environmental Law; View that the precautionary principle
applies when it can be shown that there is plausible risk,
and its causes cannot be determined with scientific
certainty.—The precautionary principle applies when it can
be shown that there is plausible risk, and its causes cannot
be determined with scientific certainty. It is not available
simply on the basis of imagined fears or imagined causes.
Otherwise, it will be absurd. Rather than a reactive
approach to fear, the precautionary principle is evolving as
a proactive approach in protecting the environment.
Furthermore, being only a principle, it does not trump the
requirements for proper invocation of remedies or act to
repeal existing laws.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Monsod, Enriquez, Barrios-Taran, Lucido,
Tolentino, Ramos, Meritt Law Office for petitioners in
G.R. No. 187916.
Samson S. Alcantara for petitioner in G.R. No.
187836.
Estelito P. Mendoza for Petron Corporation.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for
Chevron Philippines.
14
Luch R. Gempis, Jr. for then Vice Mayor

Francisco Domagoso and respondent Councilors.
Cruz, Marcelo & Tenefrancia for Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.

PEREZ, J.:

Challenged in these consolidated petitions2 is the
validity of Ordinance No. 81873 entitled “AN
ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ‘THE MANILA
COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND
ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006,’ BY CREATING A
MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3), AND PROVIDING FOR
ITS ENFORCEMENT” enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila (Sangguniang Panlungsod) on
14 May 2009.
The creation of a medium industrial zone (1-2) and
heavy industrial zone (1-3) effectively lifted the
prohibition against owners and operators of
businesses, including herein intervenors Chevron
Philippines, Inc. (Chevron), Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (Shell), and Petron Corporation (Petron),
collectively referred to as the oil companies, from
operating in the designated commercial zone — an
industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance
No. 80274 entitled
_______________
2 Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. I, pp. 3-20. Petition (for

Prohibition) filed on 1 June 2009; Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I,
pp. 11-115. Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Certiorari (with Application for an Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order) filed on 5 June 2009. Id., at p. 116. Resolution
dated 9 June 2009 consolidating G.R. No. 187916 with G.R. No.
187836.
3 Approved by former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim on 28 May 2009.
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 70-75. Annex “A” of the Urgent
Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
4 Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 28
November 2001. Id., at pp. 76-77. Annex “B” of the Urgent Petition
for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
15
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 15

“AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND

USE OF THAT PORTION OF LAND BOUNDED BY
THE PASIG RIVER IN THE NORTH, PNR
RAILROAD TRACK IN THE EAST, BEATA ST. IN
THE SOUTH, PALUMPONG ST. IN THE
SOUTHWEST AND ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN
THE WEST, PNR RAILROAD IN THE
NORTHWEST AREA, ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN
THE NORTHEAST, PASIG RIVER IN THE
SOUTHEAST AND DR. M. L. CARREON IN THE
SOUTHWEST, THE AREA OF PUNTA, STA. ANA
BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER, MARCELINO
OBRERO ST., MAYO 28 ST. AND THE F. MANALO
STREET FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO COMMERCIAL
I,” and Ordinance No. 81195 entitled “AN
ORDINANCE ADOPTING THE MANILA
COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND
ZONING REGULATIONS OF 2006 AND
PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND AMENDMENT THERETO.”

The Parties

Petitioners allege the parties’ respective capacity
to sue and be sued, viz.:

alt

_______________
5 Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 16 June

2006. Id., at pp. 78-115. Annex “C” of the Urgent Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
16

alt
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014


* The allegation is inaccurate. SJS Officer
Alcantara is actually one of the counsels for petitioner
SJS in G.R. No. 156052. The petitioners in that case
are the SJS itself, Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon (Tumbokon).

G.R. No. 187916

alt
17
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 17

alt
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014

18

alt

The following intervenors, all of which are
corporations organized under Philippine laws,
intervened:7

alt
_______________
6 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the

motion to drop respondent Ernesto Rivera as a party-respondent on
the ground that he actually voted against the enactment of the
assailed ordinance. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper
pagination, should be pp. 148-149).
7 Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. III, pp. 917-1065, Motion for
Leave to Intervene filed by Petron on 1 December 2009; pp. 1234-
1409, Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Comment-in-Intervention filed by Shell on 15 December 2009;
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 367-373, Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Admit Attached Consolidated Comment-in-
Intervention filed by Chevron on 25 November 2009.
19
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 19

alt
They claim that their rights with respect to the oil
depots in Pandacan would be directly affected by the
outcome of these cases.

The Antecedents

These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social
Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.8 (hereinafter
referred to as G.R. No. 156052), where the Court
found: (1) that the ordinance subject thereof —
Ordinance No. 8027 — was enacted “to safeguard the
rights to life, security and safety of the inhabitants of
Manila”;9 (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid
ordinance; and (3) that it is not superseded by
Ordinance No. 8119.10 Declaring that it is
constitutional and valid,11 the Court accordingly
ordered its immediate enforcement with a specific
directive on the relocation and transfer of the
Pandacan oil terminals.12
Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the
Pandacan oil depots should leave, herein petitioners
now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187,
which contains provisions contrary to those embodied
in Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of violation of the
right to health and the right to a healthful and
balanced environment are also included.
_______________
8 546 Phil. 485; 517 SCRA 657 (2007). Decision and Resolution,
568 Phil. 658; 545 SCRA 92 (2008).
9 Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., id., at p. 703; p. 139.
10 Id., at p. 684; p. 135.
11 Id., at p. 699; p. 135.
12 Id., at p. 723; p. 161.
20
For a better perspective of the facts of these cases,

we again trace the history of the Pandacan oil
terminals, as well as the intervening events prior to
the reclassification of the land use from Industrial II
to Commercial I under Ordinance No. 8027 until the
creation of Medium Industrial Zone and Heavy
Industrial Zone pursuant to Ordinance No. 8187.

History of the Pandacan Oil Terminals

We quote the following from the Resolution of the
Court in G.R. No. 156052:
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is

situated along the banks of the Pasig [R]iver. At the turn of
the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially
designated as the industrial center of Manila. The area,
then largely uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging
industries as the nearby river facilitated the transportation
of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was classified as an
industrial zone. Among its early industrial settlers were the
oil companies. x x x
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached
the shores of the Philippine Islands. x x x [I]n their zealous
attempt to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United
States Army took control of the Pandacan Terminals and
hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to
deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable
logistics weapon. The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum,
causing a frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin
recounted the events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December
1941, all army fuel storage dumps were set on fire. The
flames spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even
the rivers ablaze, endangering bridges and all riverside
buildings. … For one week longer, the
21
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 21

“open city” blazed — a cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of

fire by night.
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals
and rendered its network of depots and service stations
inoperative.
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed.
Pandacan changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The three major
oil companies resumed the operation of their depots. But
the district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial
zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge
community. Today, Pandacan has become a densely
populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority
of whom are urban poor who call it home. Aside from
numerous industrial installations, there are also small
businesses, churches, restaurants, schools, daycare centers
and residences situated there. Malacañan Palace, the
official residence of the President of the Philippines and the
seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers away.
There is a private school near the Petron depot. Along the
walls of the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers.
More than 15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and
high schools situated near these facilities. A university with
a student population of about 25,000 is located directly
across the depot on the banks of the Pasig [R]iver.
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil
companies’ distribution terminals and depot facilities. The
refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan,
both in Batangas, respectively, are connected to the
Pandacan Terminals through a 114-kilometer underground
pipeline system. Petron’s refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the
other hand, also services the depot. The terminals store fuel
and other petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel
requirements of Metro Manila, 50% of Luzon’s consumption
and 35% nationwide. Fuel can also be transported through
barges along the Pasig
22

[R]iver or tank trucks via the South Luzon

Expressway.13 (Citations omitted)

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated 12
October 2001 between the oil companies and the
Department of Energy (DOE)

On 12 October 2001, the oil companies and the
DOE entered into a MOA14 “in light of recent
international develop-
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 673-676; pp. 106-109.

14 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 428-432. Annex “I” of
the Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
The MOA reads:
x x x x
1. Immediately upon the execution of this Agreement,
CALTEX, PETRON and SHELL shall jointly undertake a
comprehensive and comparative study of the various alternatives
to minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity
of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil
terminals and to respond to such risks and hazards to the
satisfaction of the relevant stakeholders. The study shall include
the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the
scope and timing of the feasible relocation of the Pandacan oil
terminals and all associated facilities and infrastructure including
government support essential for the relocation such as the
necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way
acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental
and social acceptability which shall be based on mutual benefit of
the Parties and the public.
The study and Master Plan shall also take into full
consideration (i) the integrity, reliability and security of supply and
distribution of petroleum products to Metro Manila and the rest of
Luzon as well as the interest of consumers and users of such
petroleum products; (ii) the impact of relocation on the other
depots/terminals similarly situated in other parts of the country;
(iii) the security, safety and welfare of the inhabitants around the
current site and those of the proposed sites;
23
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 23

ments involving acts of terrorism on civilian and

government landmarks,”15 “potential new security
risks relating to the Pandacan oil terminals and the
impact on the surrounding community which may be
affected,”16 and “to address the perceived risks posed
by the proximity of communities, businesses and
offices to the Pandacan oil terminals, consistent with
the principle of sustainable development.”17 The
stakeholders acknowledged that “there is a need for a
comprehensive study to address the economic, social,
environmental and security concerns with the end in
view of formulating a Master Plan to address and
minimize the potential risks and
_______________
and (iv) the incremental investment, operating and other related

costs for the proposed relocation.
The study and Masterplan shall be completed within twelve (12)
months from the date of execution of this Agreement.
2. The DOE shall participate in the presentation of the study
and Master Plan by, among others, providing the policy framework
and recommending the necessary infrastructure, fiscal and non-
fiscal, investment incentives and other support measures as
enumerated in paragraph 1 above including the promotion of
appropriate legislative proposals, coordination with other
government agencies, identification of the necessary governmental
resources and the provision of other measures that would facilitate
the attainment of objectives of this Agreement.
3. Subject to paragraphs 1 & 2 hereof, the Master Plan shall
be implemented in phases to be completed within a period of no
more than five (5) years from the date of execution of this
Agreement; provided, that the commencement of the first phase
shall occur within 2003.
4. The relocation of the Pandacan liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG), facilities of CALTEX, PETRON and SHELL shall form part
of the first phase of relocation.
x x x x
15 Id., at p. 429.
16 Id.
17 Id.
24

hazards posed by the proximity of communities,

businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals
without adversely affecting the security and
reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum
products to Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon, and
the interests of consumers and users of such
petroleum products in those areas.”18

The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 against
the continued stay of the oil depots

The MOA, however, was short-lived.
On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of
former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Mayor Atienza) —
now one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 187916 — the
Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No.
802719 reclassifying the use of the
_______________
18 Id.
19 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 76.
The Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8027
AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF
THAT PORTION OF LAND BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER
IN THE NORTH, x x x FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO
COMMERCIAL I
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, THAT:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of
the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining
areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in
the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de
Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area,
Estero de Pandacan in the northeast, Pasig River in the southeast
and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta.
Ana bounded by the Pasig
25
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 25

land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas

from Industrial II to Commercial I.
The owners and operators of the businesses thus
affected by the reclassification were given six months
from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within
which to stop the operation of their businesses.
Nevertheless, the oil companies were granted an
extension of until 30 April 2003 within which to
comply with the Ordinance pursuant to the following:
(1) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)20
dated 26 June 2002 between the City of Manila and
the Department of Energy (DOE), on the one hand,
and the oil companies, on the other, where the parties
agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable
option”21 and committed to adopt specific measures22
consistent with
_______________
River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street,

are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
x x x x
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other
businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under
Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from
the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and
desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.
20 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 434-440. Annex “2” of
the Consolidated Comment-in-Intervention.
21 Id., at p. 435.
22 Id., at pp. 435-436.
The oil companies undertook to do the following:
Section 1.—Consistent with the objectives stated above, the
OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a
program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall
include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning
process of TWENTY-EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG
spheres and the commencing of works for the creation
26

the said objective;
_______________
of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan

Terminals. x x x
Section 2.—Consistent with the scale down program
mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint
operations and management, including the operation of common,
integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international
and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic
considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of
the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited
to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate
agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and
conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL
COMPANIES.
Section 3.—The development and maintenance of the safety
and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken
from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the
surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the
OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and DOE, on the other hand, tasked
themselves to:
Section 1.—The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council
this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing
the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2.—The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent
with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL
COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal
requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint
operations and the scale down program.
Section 3.—The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the
OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4.—The CITY OF MANILA and the national
government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and
shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or
encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.
27
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 27

(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 200223 of the

Sangguniang Panlungsod, which ratified the 26 June
2002 MOU but limited the extension of the period
within which to comply to six months from 25 July
2002; and
(3) Resolution No. 13 dated 30 January 200324 of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which extended the
validity of Resolution No. 97 to 30 April 2003,
authorized then Mayor Atienza to issue special
business permits to the oil companies, and called for a
reassessment of the ordinance.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza (G.R. No.
156052): The filing of an action for mandamus
before the Supreme Court to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027

In the interim, an original action for mandamus
entitled Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. docketed
as G.R. No. 15605225 was filed on 4 December 2002 by
Tumbokon and herein petitioners SJS and Cabigao
against then Mayor Atienza. The petitioners sought
to compel former Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and cause the immediate removal of the
terminals of the oil companies.26

Issuance by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction, and status
quo order in favor of the oil companies
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 580-581. Annex “6” of the Consolidated Comment-
in-Intervention.
24 Id., at p. 582.
25 Supra note 8.
26 Id., at p. 490; p. 663.
28

Unknown to the Court, during the pendency of

G.R. No. 156052, and before the expiration of the
validity of Resolution No. 13, the oil companies filed
the following actions before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila: (1) an action for the annulment of
Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction — by Chevron; (2) a petition for
prohibition and mandamus also for the annulment of
the Ordinance with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction — by Shell; and (3) a petition
assailing the validity of the Ordinance with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) — by Petron.27
Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in
favor of Chevron and Shell on 19 May 2003. Petron,
on the other hand, obtained a status quo order on 4
August 2004.28

The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 defining
the Manila land use plan and zoning
regulations

On 16 June 2006, then Mayor Atienza approved
Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An Ordinance Adopting
the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the
Administration, Enforcement and Amendment
thereto.”29
Pertinent provisions relative to these cases are the
following:
(a) Article IV, Sec. 730 enumerating the existing
zones or districts in the City of Manila;
_______________
27 Supra note 8 at p. 671; p. 103.

28 Id.
29 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 78-115. Annex “C” of the
Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
30 Id., at pp. 79-80.
29
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 29


(b)Article V, Sec. 2331 designating the Pandacan
oil depot area as a “Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone” (O-PUD); and
_______________
SEC. 7. Division into Zones or Districts.—To effectively carry

out the provisions of this Ordinance, the City of Manila is hereby
divided into the following zones or districts as shown in the Official
Zoning Maps.
A. General Residential Zone:
1. High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)
B. Commercial Zones:
2. Medium Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone
(C-2/MXD)
3. High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone
(C-3/MXD)
C. Industrial Zone:
4. Light Industrial Zone (I-1)
D. Institutional Zones:
5. General Institutional Zone (INS-G)
6. University Cluster Zone (INS-U)
E. Public Open Space Zones:
7. General Public Open Space Zone (POS-GEN)
7.a Parks and Plazas (POS-PP)
7.b Playground and Sports Field/Recreation Zone (POS-PSR)
8. Cemetery Zone (POS-CEM)
F. Others
9. Utility Zone (UTL)
10. Water Zone (WTR)
11. Overlay Zones:
11.1 Histo-Cultural Heritage Overlay Zone (O-HCH)
11.2 Planned Unit Development Overlay Zone (O-PUD)
11.3 Buffer Overlay Zone (O-BUF) (Emphasis supplied)
31 Id., at p. 92.
30

(c) the repealing clause, which reads:
SEC. 84. Repealing Clause.—All ordinances, rules,

regulations in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance
are hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are
vested upon the effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be
impaired.32

7 March 2007 Decision in G.R. No. 156052; The
mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan terminals
_______________
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD).—O-PUD Zones are identified
specific sites in the City of Manila wherein the project site is
comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan which
permits flexibility in planning/design, building siting,
complementarily of building types and land uses, usable open
spaces and the preservation of significant natural land features,
pursuant to regulations specified for each particular PUD.
Enumerated below are identified PUD:
x x x x
6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area
x x x x
Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located;
2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones
are located shall, in all instances be complied with;
3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded]
by the development controls and regulations specified for each
PUD as provided for each PUD as provided for by the masterplan
of respective PUDs. (Emphasis supplied)
32 Id., at p. 114.
31
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 31

On 7 March 2007, the Court granted the petition

for mandamus, and directed then respondent Mayor
Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.33
Confined to the resolution of the following issues
raised by the petitioners, to wit:
1. whether respondent [Mayor Atienza] has the

mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.34
the Court declared:
x x x [T]he Local Government Code imposes upon

respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of
these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled
by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial
duty to do so. x x x
x x x x
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the
respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful,
unclear or uncertain. x x x
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms
of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the
City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only
until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there
_______________
33 Supra note 8 at p. 494; p. 667.

34 Id., at pp. 490-491; p. 663.
32

is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing

Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the
Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the
horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The
objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents
of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will
surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed.35 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional

The oil companies and the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the DOE, filed their
motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration
of the 7 March 2007 Decision. During the oral
arguments, the parties submitted to the power of the
Court to rule on the constitutionality and validity of
the assailed Ordinance despite the pendency of the
cases in the RTC.36
On 13 February 2008, the Court granted the
motions for leave to intervene of the oil companies
and the Republic of the Philippines but denied their
respective motions for reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, x x x
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with
the appropriate agencies and other parties involved,
respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 493-494; pp. 665-667.

36 Supra note 8 at p. 673; p. 105.
33
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 33


the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals

out of its present site.37

13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed
by Ordinance No. 8119

The Court also ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was
not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119. On
this score, the Court ratiocinated:
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an

irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances. There is
no conflict between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027
reclassified the Pandacan area from Industrial II to
Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, Section 23, designated
it as a “Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD).”
In its Annex “C” which defined the zone boundaries, the
Pandacan area was shown to be within the “High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD).” x x x [B]oth
ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift
the zoning classification from industrial to commercial
(Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119)
x x x x
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals
specifically with a certain area described therein (the
Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can
be considered a general law as it covers the entire city of
Manila.
x x x x
x x x The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot
be taken to indicate the legislative intent to repeal all prior
inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including
Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment, since
_______________
37 Id., at p. 723; pp. 160-161.
34

the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the

discussions in the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear
intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.38

Filing of a draft Resolution amending
Ordinance No. 8027 effectively allowing the oil
depots to stay in the Pandacan area;
Manifestation and Motion to forestall the
passing of the new Ordinance filed in G.R. No.
156052

On 5 March 2009, respondent then Councilor
Arlene W. Koa, filed with the Sangguniang
Panlungsod a draft resolution entitled “An Ordinance
Amending Ordinance No. 8119 Otherwise Known as
‘The Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Ordinance of 2006’ by Creating a Medium
Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3)
and Providing for its Enforcement.”39 Initially
numbered as Draft Ordinance No. 7177, this was
later renumbered as Ordinance No. 8187, the assailed
Ordinance in these instant petitions.
Considering that the provisions thereof run
contrary to Ordinance No. 8027, the petitioners in
G.R. No. 156052 filed a “Manifestation and Motion to:
a) Stop the City Council of Manila from further
hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance No.
8027; [and] b) Transfer the monitoring of the
enforcement of the Resolution of the Honorable Court
on this case dated 13 February 2008 from Branch 39,
Manila Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court.”40

28 April 2009 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Second Motion
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 1792-1793; pp. 131-134.

39 Rollo in G.R. No. 156052, p. 1793. Manifestation and Motion
filed on 18 March 2009.
40 Id., at pp. 1792-1803.
35
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 35

for Reconsideration denied with finality;

succeeding motions likewise denied or otherwise
noted without action

On 28 April 2009, pending the resolution of the
Manifestation and Motion, the Court denied with
finality the second motion for reconsideration dated
27 February 2008 of the oil companies.41 It further
ruled that no further pleadings shall be entertained
in the case.42
Succeeding motions were thus denied and/or noted
without action. And, after the “Very Urgent Motion to
Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing
Draft Ordinance No. 7177 and to Cite Him for
Contempt if He Would Do So” filed on 19 May 2009
was denied on 2 June 2009 for being moot,43 all
pleadings pertaining to the earlier motion against the
drafting of an ordinance to amend Ordinance No.
8027 were noted without action.44

The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8187 allowing
the continued stay of the oil depots

_______________
41 Id., at pp. 1813-1816. Resolution dated 28 April 2009.

42 Id., at p. 1816.
43 Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 1844-1845).
Resolution dated 2 June 2009.
44 Id. (no proper pagination, should be p. 1846). Resolution
dated 9 June 2009 with respect to the City Legal Office’s Motion to
Excuse from Filing Comment (on Petitioners’ Manifestation and
Motion and on Petitioners’ Very Urgent Motion to Cite the
Members of the City Council in Direct Contempt of Court), and the
Comment. Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 1880-1881).
Resolution dated 23 June 2009 with respect to the Reply to the
Comment filed by the counsel for the petitioners.
36

On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former

Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who succeeded
Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Ordinance No. 8187.45
_______________
45 Rollo, in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 70-74.

The Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8187
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE
LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006,” BY
CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3), AND PROVIDING FOR ITS
ENFORCEMENT.
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session,
assembled, THAT:
SECTION 1. Ordinance No. 8119, otherwise known as the
“Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of
2006” is hereby amended by creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-
2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) to read as follows:
1. Use Regulations in Medium Industrial Zone (1-2)
The Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) shall be for Pollutive/Non-
Hazardous and Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing
establishments. Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
a. Pollutive/Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture and canning of ham
2. Poultry processing and canning
3. Large-scale manufacture of ice cream
4. Corn Mill/Rice Mill
5. Chocolate and Cocoa Factory
6. Candy Factory
7. Chewing Gum Factory
8. Peanuts and other nuts factory
9. Other chocolate and confectionary products
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 37

_______________
10. Manufacture of flavoring extracts

11. Manufacture of food products n.e.c. (vinegar, vetsin)
12. Manufacture of fish meal
13. Oyster shell grading
14. Manufacture of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations
15. Manufacture of stationary, art goods, cut stone and marble
products
16. Manufacture of abrasive products
17. Manufacture of miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral products
n.e.c.
18. Manufacture of cutlery, except table flatware
19. Manufacture of hand tools
20. Manufacture of general hardware
21. Manufacture of miscellaneous cutlery hand tools and general
hardware n.e.c.
22. Manufacture of household metal furniture
23. Manufacture of office, store and restaurant metal furniture
24. Manufacture of metal blinds, screens and shades
25. Manufacture of miscellaneous furniture and fixture
primarily of metal n.e.c.
26. Manufacture of fabricated structural iron and steel
27. Manufacture of architectural and ornamental metal works
28. Manufacture of boiler, tanks and other structural sheet
metal works
29. Manufacture of other structural products n.e.c.
30. Manufacture of metal cans, boxes and containers
31. Manufacture of stamped coated and engraved metal
products
32. Manufacture of fabricated wire and cable
33. Manufacture of heating, cooking and lighting equipment
except electrical
38

_______________
34. Metal sheet works generally of manual operation

35. Manufacture of other fabricated metal products except
machinery and equipment n.e.c.
36. Manufacture or assembly of agricultural machinery and
equipment
37. Native plow and harrow factory
38. Repair of agricultural machinery
39. Manufacture or assembly of service industry machines
40. Manufacture or assembly of elevators or escalators
41. Manufacture or assembly of sewing machines
42. Manufacture or assembly of cooking ranges
43. Manufacture or assembly of water pumps
44. Refrigeration industry
45. Manufacture or assembly of other machinery and equipment
except electrical n.e.c.
46. Manufacture and repair of electrical apparatus
47. Manufacture and repair of electrical cables and wires
48. Manufacture of cables and wires
49. Manufacture of other electrical industrial machinery and
apparatus n.e.c.
50. Manufacture or assembly of electric equipment such as
radio, television, tape, tape recorders and stereo
51. Manufacture or assembly of radio and television
transmitting, signaling and detection equipment
52. Manufacture or assembly of telephone and telegraphic
equipment
53. Manufacture of other electronic equipment and apparatus
n.e.c.
54. Manufacture of industrial and commercial electrical
appliances
55. Manufacture of household cooking, heating and laundry
appliances
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 39

_______________
56. Manufacture of other electrical appliances n.e.c.

57. Manufacture of electrical lamp fixtures
b. Pollutive/Hazardous (sic) Industries
1. Flour Mill
2. Cassava Flour Mill
3. Manufacturing of coffee
4. Manufacturing of unprepared animal feeds, other grain
milling n.e.c.
5. Production prepared feed for animals
6. Cigar and cigarette Factory
7. Curing and redrying tobacco leaves
8. Miscellaneous processing tobacco leaves n.e.c.
9. Weaving hemp textile
10. Jute spinning and weaving
11. Miscellaneous spinning and weaving mills n.e.c.
12. Hosiery mill
13. Underwear and outwear knitting mills
14. Fabric knitting mills
15. Miscellaneous knitting mills n.e.c.
16. Manufacture of mats and mattings
17. Manufacture of carpets and rugs
18. Manufacture of cordage, rope and twine
19. Manufacture of related products from abaca, sisal,
henequen, hemp, cotton, paper, etc.
20. Manufacture of linoleum and other surface coverings
21. Manufacture of machines for leather and leather products
22. Manufacture of construction machinery
23. Manufacture of machines for clay, stove and glass industries
24. Manufacture, assembly, repair, rebuilding of miscellaneous
special industrial machinery and equipment n.e.c.
25. Manufacture of dry cells, storage battery and other batteries
26. Boat building and repairing
27. Ship repairing industry, dock yards, dry dock, shipways
40

_______________
28. Miscellaneous shipbuilding and repairing n.e.c.

29. Manufacture of locomotive and parts
30. Manufacture of railroads and street cars
31. Manufacture of assembly of automobiles, cars, buses, trucks
and trailers
32. Manufacture of wood furniture including upholstered
33. Manufacture of rattan furniture including upholstered
34. Manufacture of box beds and mattresses
2. Use Regulations in Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3)
The Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) shall be for highly
Pollutive/Non-Hazardous; Pollutive/Hazardous; Highly
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; Non-Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing
and processing establishments. Enumerated below are the
allowable uses:
a. Highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous Industries
1. Meat processing, curing, preserving except processing of ham,
bacon, sausage and chicharon
2. Milk processing plants (manufacturing filled, reconstituted or
recombined milk, condensed or evaporated)
3. Butter and cheese processing plants
4. Natural fluid milk processing (pasteurizing, homogenizing,
vitaminizing bottling of natural animal milk and cream related
products)
5. Other dairy products n.e.c.
6. Canning and preserving of fruits and fruit juices
7. Canning and preserving of vegetables and vegetable juices
8. Canning and preserving of vegetable sauces
9. Miscellaneous canning and preserving of fruits and
vegetables, n.e.c.
10. Fish canning
11. Patis factory
12. Bagoong factory
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 41

_______________
13. Processing, preserving and canning of fish and other
seafoods, n.e.c.
14. Manufacture of desiccated coconut
15. Manufacture of starch and its by-products
16. Manufacture of wines from juices of local fruits
17. Manufacture of malt and malt liquors
18. Manufacture of soft drinks carbonated water
19. Manufacture of instant beverages and syrups
20. Other nonalcoholic beverages, n.e.c.
21. Other slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat
products, n.e.c.
b. Highly Pollutive/Hazardous Industries
1. Vegetable oil mills, including coconut oil
2. Manufacturing of refined cooking oil and margarine
3. Manufacture of fish, marine and other animal oils
4. Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats, n.e.c.
5. Sugar cane milling (centrifugal refined)
6. Sugar refining
7. Muscovado Sugar Mill
8. Distilled, rectified and blended liquors, n.e.c.
9. Cotton textile mill
10. Ramie textile mill
11. Rayon and other man-made fiber textile mill
12. Bleaching and drying mills
13. Manufacture of narrow fabrics
14. Tanneries and leather finishing plants
15. Pulp mills
16. Paper and paperboard mills
17. Manufacture of fiberboard
18. Manufacture of inorganic salts and compounds
19. Manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations
20. Manufacture of hydraulic cement
21. Manufacture of lime and lime kilns
22. Manufacture of plaster
23. Products of blast furnace, steel works and rolling mills
42

_______________
24. Product of iron and steel foundries

25. Manufacture of smelted and refined nonferrous metals
26. Manufacture of rolled, drawn or astruded nonferrous metals
27. Manufacture of nonferrous foundry products
c. Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of industrial alcohols
2. Other basic industrial chemicals
3. Manufacture of fertilizers
4. Manufacture of pesticides
5. Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-
made fibers except glass
6. Petroleum refineries and oil depots
7. Manufacture of reclaimed, blended and compound petroleum
products
8. Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal
d. Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of paints
2. Manufacture of varnishes, shellac and stains
3. Manufacture of paint removers
4. Manufacture of other paint products
5. Manufacture of matches
6. Manufacture of tires and inner tubes
7. Manufacture of processed natural rubber not in rubber
plantations
8. Manufacture of miscellaneous rubber products, n.e.c.
e. Non-Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of compressed and liquefied gases
SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are
located, the operation of which are permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby classified as Industrial Zone.
43
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 43

The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded
or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23
of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or
provisions inconsistent therewith46 thereby allowing,
once again, the operation of “Pollutive/Non-
Hazardous and Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing
and processing establishments” and “Highly
Pollutive/Non-Hazardous[,] Pollutive/Hazardous[,]
Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous[,] Non-
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Ex-
tremely Hazardous manufacturing and processing
establishments” within the newly created Medium
Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3)
in the Pandacan area.
_______________
The City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) shall

prepare an amended Zoning Map and Zoning Boundaries which
shall be submitted to the City Council for review.
SEC. 3. The Zoning Fees shall be P10/sq. m. of total floor area
for MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) and P10/sq. m. of total
floor area for HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3).
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause.—Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23
of Ordinance No. 8119 and all other Ordinances or provisions
therein inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are
hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or modified accordingly.
SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause.—This Ordinance shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after its publication in accordance with law.
x x x x.
46 Id., at p. 74.
Sec. 4 of Ordinance No. 8187 reads:
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause.—Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23
of Ordinance No. 8119 and all other Ordinances or provisions
therein inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are
hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified
accordingly.
44


Thus, where the Industrial Zone under Ordinance
No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone (I-1),
Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium
Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy Industrial Zone (I-
3), where petroleum refineries and oil depots are now
among those expressly allowed.
Hence these petitions.

The Petitions

G.R. No. 187836

To support their petition for prohibition against
the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187, the petitioner
Social Justice Society (SJS) officers allege that:
1. The enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not
a valid exercise of police power because the measures
provided therein do not promote the general welfare
of the people within the contemplation of the
following provisions of law:
a) Article III, Section 18(kk)47 of Republic Act No.
409 otherwise known as the “Revised Charter of the
City of Manila,” which provides that the Municipal
Board
_______________
47 Section 18. Legislative powers.—The Municipal Board

shall have the following legislative powers:
x x x x
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper
for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and
the promotion of the morality, peace good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants,
and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to
fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed
to two hundred pesos fine or six months’ imprisonment, or both
such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
45
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 45

shall have the legislative power to enact all

ordinances it may deem necessary and proper;
b) Section 1648 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as
the Local Government Code, which defines the scope
of the general welfare clause;
2. The conditions at the time the Court declared
Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional in G.R. No. 156052
exist to this date;
3. Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No.
156052, and notwithstanding that the conditions and
circumstances warranting the validity of the
Ordinance remain the same, the Manila City Council
passed a contrary Ordinance, thereby refusing to
recognize that “judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of
the legal system of the Philippines”;49 and
4. Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15
and 16, Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines on the duty of the State “to protect and
promote the right to health of the
_______________
48 SECTION 16. General Welfare.—Every local government

unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation
and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
49 Article 8, Civil Code.
46

people”50 and “protect and advance the right of the

people to a balanced and healthful ecology.”51
Petitioners pray that Ordinance No. 8187 of the
City of Manila be declared null and void, and that
respondent, and all persons acting under him, be
prohibited from enforcing the same.

G.R. No. 187916

The petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Injunction against the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8187 of former Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
and then Mayor Atienza, together with other
residents and taxpayers of the City of Manila, also
alleges violation of the right to health of the people
and the right to a healthful and balanced
environment under Sections 15 and 16 of the
Constitution.
Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in
violation of the following health and environment-
related municipal laws, and international
conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a
state party:
1. Municipal Laws —
_______________
50 Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
51 Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
47
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 47

(a) Sections 4,52 12,53 1954 and 3055 of Republic

Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the Philippine
Clean Air Act;
_______________
52 SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights.—Pursuant to the above

declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby
sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their
enjoyment:
[a] The right to breathe clean air;
[b] The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources
according to the principles of sustainable development;
[c] The right to participate in the formulation, planning,
implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and
programs and in the decision-making process;
[d] The right to participate in the decision-making process
concerning development policies, plans and programs projects or
activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and
public health;
[e] The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the
potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be
served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution
and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of
harmful or hazardous substances;
[f] The right of access to public records which a citizen may
need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;
[g] The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to
enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws and
regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected
area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against
violators of environmental laws; and
[h] The right to bring action in court for compensation of
personal damages resulting from the adverse environmental and
public health impact of a project or activity.
53 SEC. 12. Ambient Air Quality Guideline Values and
Standards.—The Department, in coordination with other
concerned agencies, shall review and or revise and publish
annually a list of hazardous air pollutants with corresponding
ambient guideline values and/or standard necessary to protect
health and safety, and general welfare. The initial list and values
of the hazardous air pollutants shall be as follows:
48

a) For National Ambient Air Quality Guideline

for Criteria Pollutants:
alt

alt
49
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 49

b) For National Ambient Air Quality Standards

for Source Specific Air Pollutants from Industrial
Sources/Operations:
alt
alt
The basis in setting up the ambient air quality guideline

values and standards shall reflect, among others, the latest
scientific knowledge including information on:
50

_______________
a) Variable, including atmospheric conditions, which of

themselves or in combination with other factors may alter the
effects on public health or welfare of such air pollutant;
b) The other types of air pollutants which may interact with
such pollutant to produce an adverse effect on public health or
welfare; and
c) The kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public
health or welfare which may be expected from presence of such
pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities.
The Department shall base such ambient air quality standards
on World Health Organization (WHO) standards, but shall not be
limited to nor be less stringent than such standards.
54 SEC. 19. Pollution From Stationary Sources.—The
Department shall, within two (2) years from the effectivity of this
Act, and every two (2) years thereafter, review, or as the need
therefore arises, revise and publish emission standards, to further
improve the emission standards for stationary sources of air
pollution. Such emission standards shall be based on mass rate of
emission for all stationary source of air pollution based on
internationally accepted standards, but not be limited to, nor be
less stringent than such standards and with the standards set
forth in this section. The standards, whichever is applicable, shall
be the limit on the acceptable level of pollutants emitted from a
stationary source for the protection of the public’s health and
welfare.
With respect to any trade, industry, process and fuel-burning
equipment or industrial plant emitting air pollutants, the
concentration at the point of emission shall not exceed the
following limits:
alt
51
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 51

_______________
alt
52

_______________
alt

53
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 53

_______________
alt

54

_______________
alt
These average values cover also gaseous and the vapor forms of
the relevant heavy metal emission as well as their compounds:
Provided, That the emission of dioxins and furans into the air shall
be reduced by the most progressive techniques: Provided, further,
That all average of dioxin and furans measured over the sample
period of a minimum of 5 hours and maximum of 8 hours must not
exceed the limit value of 0.1 nanogram/m3.
Pursuant to Sec. 8 of this Act, the Department shall prepare a
detailed action plan setting the emission standards or standards of
55
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 55


(b) Environment Code (Presidential Decree No.
1152);
(c) Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic
Act No. 6969); and
(d) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human
relations;
2. International Conventions and Treaties to
which the Philippines is a state party —
a. Section 1 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which states that “[e]veryone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person”;
b. Articles 6,56 2457 and 2758 of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, summarized by the
petitioners in the following manner:
_______________
performance for any stationary source the procedure for testing

emissions for each type of pollutant, and the procedure for
enforcement of said standards.
Existing industries, which are proven to exceed emission rates
established by the Department in consultation with stakeholders,
after a thorough, credible and transparent measurement process
shall be allowed a grace period of eighteen (18) months for the
establishment of an environmental management system and the
installation of an appropriate air pollution control device: Provided,
That an extension of not more than twelve (12) months may be
allowed by the Department on meritorious grounds.
55 SEC. 30. Ozone-Depleting Substances.—Consistent with
the terms and conditions of the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer and other international agreements
and protocols to which the Philippines is a signatory, the
Department shall phase out ozone-depleting substances.
Within sixty (60) days after the enactment of this Act, the
Department shall publish a list of substances which are known to
cause harmful effects on the stratospheric ozone layer.
56 Article 6
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent
right to life.
56

_______________
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible
the survival and development of the child.
57 Article 24
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to
facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.
States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his
or her right of access to such health care services.
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right
and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and
health care to all children with emphasis on the development of
primary health care;
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the
framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the
application of readily available technology and through the
provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water,
taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental
pollution;
(d) To ensure appropriate prenatal and postnatal health care
for mothers;
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents
and children, are informed, have access to education and are
supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and
nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and
environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents;
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and
family planning education and services.
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate
measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial
to the health of children.
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage
international cooperation with a view to achieving progressively
the full realization of the right recognized in the present article. In
this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of
developing countries.
57
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 57
1. the human right to safe and healthy environment[;]

2. human right to the highest attainable standard of
health[;]
3. the human right to ecologically sustainable
development[;]
4. the human right to an adequate standard of living,
including access to safe food and water[;]
5. the human right of the child to live in an
environment appropriate for physical and mental
development[; and]
6. the human right to full and equal participation for
all persons in environmental decision-making and
development planning, and in shaping decisions and
policies af-
_______________
58 Article 27
1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard
of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral
and social development.
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the
primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial
capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child’s
development.
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and
within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist
parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right
and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support
programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and
housing.
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure
the recovery of maintenance for the child from the parents or other
persons having financial responsibility for the child, both within
the State Party and from abroad. In particular, where the person
having financial responsibility for the child lives in a State
different from that of the child, States Parties shall promote the
accession to international agreements or the conclusion of such
agreements, as well as the making of other appropriate
arrangements.
58

fecting one’s community, at the local, national and

international levels.59

Petitioners likewise posit that the title of
Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually intends to
repeal Ordinance No. 8027. According to them,
Ordinance No. 8027 was never mentioned in the title
and the body of the new ordinance in violation of
Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that every bill passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
Also pointed out by the petitioners is a specific
procedure outlined in Ordinance No. 8119 that should
be observed when amending the zoning ordinance.
This is provided for under Section 81 thereof, which
reads:
SEC. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance.—The

proposed amendments to the Zoning Ordinance as reviewed
and evaluated by the City Planning and Development
Office (CPDO) shall be submitted to the City Council for
approval of the majority of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
members. The amendments shall be acceptable and
eventually approved: PROVIDED, That there is sufficient
evidence and justification for such proposal; PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That such proposal is consistent with the
development goals, planning objectives, and strategies of
the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Said
amendments shall take effect immediately upon approval
or after thirty (30) days from application.
Petitioners thus pray that:
1. upon filing of [the] petition, [the] case be referred to

the Court [E]n Banc, and setting (sic) the case for oral
argument;
_______________
59 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 44. Urgent Petition for

59
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 59

2. upon the filing of [the] petition, a temporary

restraining order be issued enjoining the respondents from
publishing and posting Manila City Ordinance No. 8187
and/or posting of Manila City Ordinance No. 8187; and/or
taking any steps to implementing (sic) and/or enforce the
same and after due hearing, the temporary restraining
order be converted to a permanent injunction;
3. x x x Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as
null and void for being repugnant to the Constitution and
existing municipal laws and international covenants;
4. x x x the respondents [be ordered] to refrain from
enforcing and/or implementing Manila City Ordinance No.
8187;
5. x x x respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be
enjoined] from issuing any permits (business or otherwise)
to all industries whose allowable uses are anchored under
the provisions of Manila Ordinance No. 8187; and
6. x x x respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be
ordered] to comply with the Order of the Honorable Court
in G.R. 156052 dated February 13, 2008.60

The Respondents’ Position
on the Consolidated Petitions

Respondent former Mayor Lim

In his Memorandum,61 former Mayor Lim, through
the City Legal Officer, attacks the petitioners’ lack of
legal standing to sue. He likewise points out that the
petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy
of courts.
Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and
constitutional, he expounds on the following
arguments:
On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is
the function of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact
zoning
_______________
60 Id., at pp. 58-59.

61 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1846-1926.
60

ordinances, for which reason, it may proceed to

amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119 without prior
referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment
and Appeals (MZBAA) as prescribed under Section 80
(Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) pursuant to Section 81
(Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance) of Ordinance
No. 8119, especially when the action actually
originated from the Sangguniang Panlungsod itself;
(2) the Sangguniang Panlungsod may, in the later
ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the zoning
ordinance sought to be modified; and (3) the provision
repealing Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 is not
violative of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which requires that every bill must
embrace only one subject and that such shall be
expressed in the title.
On the substantive issues, he posits that the
petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the
assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police power;
that it is consistent with the general welfare clause
and public policy, and is not unreasonable; that it
does not run contrary to the Constitution, municipal
laws, and international conventions; and that the
petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of
validity of the assailed ordinance.

Respondents Vice Mayor Domagoso and the City
Councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
ordinance

On 14 September 2012, after the Court gave the
respondents several chances to submit their
Memorandum,62 they,
_______________
62 Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, Rollo in G.R. No.

187916, Vol. I (no proper pagination, should be pp. 319-320); 15
June 2010, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1979-1980; 31
August 2010, Rollo in G.R. No. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2002-2003;
31 May 2011, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, pp. 2347-2348; and
17 July 2012, Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp. 2746-2747.
61
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 61
through the Secretary of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod, prayed that the Court dispense with the
filing thereof.
In their Comment,63 however, respondents offered
a position essentially similar to those proffered by
former Mayor Lim.

The Intervenors’ Position
on the Consolidated Petitions

On the other hand, the oil companies sought the
outright dismissal of the petitions based on alleged
procedural infirmities, among others, incomplete
requisites of judicial review, violation of the principle
of hierarchy of courts, improper remedy, submission
of a defective verification and certification against
forum shopping, and forum shopping.
As to the substantive issues, they maintain, among
others, that the assailed ordinance is constitutional
and valid; that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is in
the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents; that it is a valid exercise of legislative
power; that it does not violate health and
environment-related provisions of the Constitution,
laws, and international conventions and treaties to
which the Philippines is a party; that the oil depots
are not likely targets of terrorists; that the scaling
down of the operations in Pandacan pursuant to the
MOU has been followed; and that the people are safe
in view of the safety measures installed in the
Pandacan terminals.
Incidentally, in its Manifestation dated 30
November 2010,64 Petron informed the Court that it
will “cease [the] operation of its petroleum product
storage facilities”65 in the Pandacan oil terminal not
later than January 2016 on account of the following:
_______________
63 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 282-300.

64 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 2128-2132.
65 Id., at p. 2129.
62

2.01. Environmental issues, many of which are

unfounded, continually crop up and tarnish the Company’s
image.
2.02. The location of its Pandacan terminal is
continually threatened, and made uncertain preventing
long-term planning, by the changing local government
composition. Indeed, the relevant zoning ordinances have
been amended three (3) times, and their validity subjected
to litigation.66
Intervening Events

On 28 August 2012, while the Court was awaiting
the submission of the Memorandum of respondents
Vice Mayor Domagoso and the councilors who voted
in favor of the assailed Ordinance, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, which composition had already
substantially changed, enacted Ordinance No. 828367
entitled “AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2
_______________
66 Id.
67 Id., Vol. V, pp. 2661-2662.
The new Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8283
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE
NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE
PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS ARE LOCATED
FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL
(1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE
(C3/MXD)
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session,
assembled, THAT:
SEC. 1. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 shall be amended to
read as follows:
“SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are
located, the operation of which are permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby classified as

63
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 63

OF ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING

THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES
AND OIL DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY
INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY
COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD).
The new ordinance essentially amended the
assailed ordinance to exclude the area where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from
the Industrial Zone.
_______________
Industrial Zone except the area where petroleum

refineries and oil depots are located, which shall be
classified as High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone
(C3/MXD).”
SEC. 2. Owners or operators of petroleum refineries and oil
depots, the operation of which are no longer permitted under
Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period until the end of January
2016 within which to relocate the operation of their businesses.
SEC. 3. The City Planning and Development Office shall
prepare an amended zoning map and zoning boundaries which
shall be submitted to the City Council for review.
SEC. 4. All ordinances or provisions which are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed,
amended, rescinded or modified accordingly.
SEC. 5. This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its publication in accordance with law.
This Ordinance was finally enacted by the City Council of
Manila on August 28, 2012.
PRESIDED BY:
FRANCISCO “Isko Moreno” DOMAGOSO
Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer
City Council, Manila
64

Ordinance No. 8283 thus permits the operation of

the industries operating within the Industrial Zone.
However, the oil companies, whose oil depots are
located in the High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use
Zone (C3/MXD), are given until the end of January
2016 within which to relocate their terminals.
Former Mayor Lim, who was then the incumbent
mayor, did not support the amendment. Maintaining
that the removal of the oil depots was prejudicial to
public welfare, and, on account of the pending cases
in the Supreme Court, he vetoed Ordinance No. 8283
on 11 September 2012.68
On 28 November 2012, former Mayor Lim filed a
Manifestation informing this Court that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod voted to override the veto,
and that he, in turn, returned it again with his veto.
He likewise directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
append his written reasons for his veto of the
Ordinance, so that the same will be forwarded to the
President for his consideration in the event that his
veto is overridden again.69
On 11 December 2012, Shell also filed a similar
Manifestation.70
Meanwhile, three days after former Mayor Lim
vetoed the new ordinance, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr.
(Atty. Gempis), Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, writing on behalf of respondents Vice
Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors of Manila
who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, finally
complied with this Court’s Resolution dated 17 July
2012
_______________
68 Id., at p. 2662.
The bottom portion of Ordinance No. 8283 reads:
BY HIS HONOR, THE MAYOR ON 11 Sept. 2012,
I veto this Ordinance for being prejudicial to public welfare and
in view of the pending cases in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 187836
and G.R. No. 187916)
69 Id., at pp. 2516-2518.
70 Id., at pp. 2526-2534.
65
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 65

reiterating its earlier directives71 to submit the said

respondents’ Memorandum.
In his Compliance/Explanation with Urgent
Manifestation72 dated 13 September 2012, Atty.
Gempis explained that it was not his intention to
show disrespect to this Court or to delay or prejudice
the disposition of the cases.
According to him, he signed the Comment
prepared by respondents Vice Mayor and the City
Councilors only to attest that the pleading was
personally signed by the respondents. He clarified
that he was not designated as the legal counsel of the
respondents as, in fact, he was of the impression that,
pursuant to Section 481(b)(3) of the Local
Government Code,73
_______________
71 Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, Rollo in G.R. No.

187916, Vol. I (no proper pagination, should be pp. 319-320); 15
June 2010, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1979-1980; 31
August 2010, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2002-2003; 31
May 2011, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, pp. 2347-2348; and 17
July 2012, Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp. 2746-2747.
73 SECTION 481. Qualifications, Term Powers and
Duties.—x x x
x x x x
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local
government unit, shall take charge of the office for legal services
and shall:
x x x x
(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal
officer shall:
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and
special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any
official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in
actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to another
component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be
employed to represent the adverse party.
66

it is the City Legal Officer who is authorized to

represent the local government unit or any official
thereof in a litigation. It was for the same reason that
he thought that the filing of a Memorandum may
already be dispensed with when the City Legal
Officer filed its own on 8 February 2010. He further
explained that the Ordinance subject of these cases
was passed during the 7th Council (2007-2010); that
the composition of the 8th Council (2010-2013) had
already changed after the 2010 elections; and that
steps were already taken to amend the ordinance
again. Hence, he was in a dilemma as to the position
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time he
received the Court’s Resolution of 31 May 2011.
Atty. Gempis, thus, prayed that the Court
dispense with the filing of the required memorandum
in view of the passing of Ordinance No. 8283.

Issue

The petitioners’ arguments are primarily anchored
on the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 156052
declaring Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and
valid after finding that the presence of the oil
terminals in Pandacan is a threat to the life and
security of the people of Manila. From thence, the
petitioners enumerated constitutional provisions,
municipal laws and international treaties and
conventions on health and environment protection
allegedly violated by the enactment of the assailed
Ordinance to support their position.
The resolution of the present controversy is, thus,
confined to the determination of whether or not the
enactment of the assailed Ordinance allowing the
continued stay of the oil companies in the depots is,
indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.
67
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 67

Our Ruling

We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should
not be stricken down insofar as the presence of the oil
depots in Pandacan is concerned.

I

We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the
respondents and the oil companies.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court,
in G.R. No. 156052, has already pronounced that the
matter of whether or not the oil depots should remain
in the Pandacan area is of transcendental importance
to the residents of Manila.74
We may, thus, brush aside procedural infirmities,
if any, as we had in the past, and take cognizance of
the cases75 if only to determine if the acts complained
of are no longer within the bounds of the Constitution
and the laws in place.76
_______________
74 Supra note 8 at p. 679; p. 112.

In that case, the Court held:
x x x [The DOE] seeks to intervene in order to represent the
interests of the members of the public who stand to suffer if the
Pandacan Terminals’ operations are discontinued. x x x Suffice it to
say at this point that, for the purpose of hearing all sides and
considering the transcendental importance of this case, we
will also allow DOE’s intervention. (Emphasis supplied)
75 Santiago v. COMELEC, 336 Phil. 848, 880; 270 SCRA 106,
135 (1997), citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, 5
May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 134, further citing the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368
[1949]).
76 Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 274
Phil. 323, 335; 197 SCRA 52, 60 (1991), citing Kapatiran ng mga
68

Put otherwise, there can be no valid objection to

this Court’s discretion to waive one or some
procedural requirements if only to remove any
impediment to address and resolve the serious
constitutional question77 raised in these petitions of
transcendental importance, the same having far-
reaching implications insofar as the safety and
general welfare of the residents of Manila, and even
its neighboring communities, are concerned.

Proper Remedy

Respondents and intervenors argue that the
petitions should be outrightly dismissed for failure on
the part of the petitioners to properly apply related
provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court,
and/or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available to
them.
To begin with, questioned is the applicability of
Rule 6578 of the Rules of Court to assail the validity
and constitutionality of the Ordinance.
_______________
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 246 Phil.

380, 385; 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).
77 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 798; 175 SCRA 343,
365 (1989).
78 Sections 1 to 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
69
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 69


… there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law…

Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may
be availed of only when “there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.”79
_______________
x x x x
Section 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x
Section 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be
done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
79 Id.
70

Shell argues that the petitioners should have

sought recourse before the first and second level
courts under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases,80 which govern “the
enforcement or violations of environmental and other
related laws, rules and regulations.”81 Petron
additionally submits that the most adequate remedy
available to petitioners is to have the assailed
ordinance repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
In the alternative, a local referendum may be had.
And, assuming that there were laws violated, the
petitioners may file an action for each alleged
violation of law against the particular individuals
that transgressed the law.
It would appear, however, that the remedies
identified by the intervenors prove to be inadequate
to resolve the present controversies in their entirety
owing to the intricacies of the circumstances herein
prevailing.
The scope of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases is embodied in Sec. 2, Part I,
Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern
the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil
actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the
Regional Trial Courts involving enforcement or
violations of environmental and other related laws,
rules and regulations such as but not limited to the
following:
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and

Hazardous Waste Act;
x x x x
(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
x x x x
(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, x x x; and other
existing laws that relate to the conservation,
develop-
_______________
80 Resolution dated 13 April 2010 in A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.

81 Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.
71
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 71

ment, preservation, protection and utilization of

the environment and natural resources.82 (Emphasis
supplied)
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope.
While, indeed, there are allegations of violations of
environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve
as collateral attacks that would support the other
position of the petitioners — the protection of the
right to life, security and safety.
Moreover, it bears emphasis that the promulgation
of the said Rules was specifically intended to meet
the following objectives:
SEC. 3. Objectives.—The objectives of these Rules are:

(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology;
(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive
procedure for the enforcement of environmental rights and
duties recognized under the Constitution, existing laws,
rules and regulations, and international agreements;
(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices
ensuring the effective enforcement of remedies and redress
for violation of environmental laws; and
(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance
with orders and judgments in environmental cases.83

Surely, the instant petitions are not within the
contemplation of these Rules.
_______________
82 Id.
83 Sec. 3, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.
72

Relative to the position of Petron, it failed to
consider that these petitions are already a sequel to
G.R. No. 156052, and that there are some issues
herein raised that the remedies available at the level
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod could not address.
Neither could the filing of an individual action for
each law violated be harmonized with the essence of a
“plain, speedy, and adequate” remedy.
From another perspective, Shell finds fault with
the petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court when,
pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises only
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance.84 Thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:
x x x x
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Emphasis supplied)

To further support its position, it cites the case of
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of
Manila,85 where the petitioners sought the
nullification of the mayor’s executive order and the
council’s ordinance concerning certain functions of
the petitioners that are vested in them by law. There,
the Court held:
_______________

Memorandum of Shell, citing Ortega v. Quezon City Government,
506 Phil. 373; 469 SCRA 388 (2005).
85 465 Phil. 529; 420 SCRA 562 (2004).
73
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 73

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a

petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by
this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the
questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.86 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides: x x x
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court
does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved.87

Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is
the proper remedy, and that the petitions should have
been filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have,
time and again, resolved to treat such a petition as
one for prohibition, provided that the case has far-
reaching implications and transcendental issues that
need to be resolved,88 as in these present petitions.
On a related issue, we initially found convincing
the argument that the petitions should have been
filed with the Regional Trial Court, it having
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a special
civil action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction
over petitions for declaratory relief.
However, as we have repeatedly said, the petitions
at bar are of transcendental importance warranting a
relaxation of
_______________
86 Id., at p. 541; p. 571, citing Philnabank Employees

Association v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104209, 16 November 1993, 227
SCRA 804, 811.
87 Id., at p. 542; p. 572, citing Tano v. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670,
698; 278 SCRA 154, 172 (1997); Macasiano v. National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 243.
88 Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617
SCRA 623, 638, citing Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming
Corp., 400 Phil. 307; 346 SCRA 485 (2000) and Fortich v. Corona,
352 Phil. 461; 298 SCRA 679 (1998).
74

the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.89 In the case of

Jaworski v. PAGCOR,90 the Court ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be

properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the
petition at bar. x x x This is in accordance with the
well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
…persons aggrieved thereby…

As to who may file a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, Petron posits that
petitioners are not among the “persons aggrieved”
contemplated under Sections 1 to 3 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Chevron argues that petitioners, whether as
“citizens,” taxpayers,” or legislators,” lack the legal
standing to assail the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 8187. It further claims that petitioners
failed to show that they have suffered any injury
and/or threatened injury as a result of the act
complained of.91
_______________
89 Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., id.;

Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 464 Phil. 375,
384; 419 SCRA 317, 323 (2004).
90 Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., id., at p.
385; pp. 323-324.
91 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2100. Memorandum of
Chevron.
75
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 75

Shell also points out that the petitions cannot be

considered taxpayers’ suit, for then, there should be a
claim that public funds were illegally disbursed and
that petitioners have sufficient interest concerning
the prevention of illegal expenditure of public
money.92 In G.R. No. 187916, Shell maintains that
the petitioners failed to show their personal interest
in the case and/or to establish that they may
represent the general sentiments of the constituents
of the City of Manila so as to be treated as a class
suit. Even the minors, it argues, are not numerous
and representative enough for the petition to be
treated as a class suit. As to the city councilors who
joined the petitioners in assailing the validity of
Ordinance No. 8187, Shell posits that they cannot
invoke the ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-
Arroyo,93 where the Court held that legislators may
question the constitutionality of a statute, if and
when it infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators, because of the absence of the allegation
that the assailed ordinance indeed infringes upon
their prerogatives.
Former Mayor Lim submitted a similar position
supported by a number of cases on the concept of
locus standi,94 the di-
_______________
Chevron relied on the ruling in Automotive Industry Workers

Alliance v. Romulo, 489 Phil. 710, 718; 449 SCRA 1, 10 (2005),
where the Court held:
For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
92 Id., at p. 2222. Memorandum of Shell, citing Velarde v.
Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA
283 and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171; 246 SCRA 540
(1995).
93 522 Phil. 705; 489 SCRA 160 (2006).
94 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 1859; citing Francisco,
Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003).
76

rect injury test,95 an outline of the stringent

requirements of legal standing when suing as a
citizen,96 as a taxpayer,97 as a legislator and in cases
where class suits are filed in behalf of all citizens.98
Their arguments are misplaced.
In G.R. No. 156052, we ruled that the petitioners
in that case have a legal right to seek the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the
subject of the petition concerns a public right, and
they, as residents of Manila, have a direct interest in
the implementation of the ordinances of the city.
Thus:
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear

legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner
SJS states that it is a political party registered with the
Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It
claims to have many members who are residents of Manila.
The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are
allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in
previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns
a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties-in-interest and they need not
show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila,
petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the
city’s ordinances.99 x x x (Citations omitted)
_______________
95 Id., citing Tolentino v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 385; 420 SCRA

438 (2004).
96 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1858-1859, citing
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 94.
97 Id.; Velarde v. Social Justice Society, supra note 92.
98 Id., at p. 1863, citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No.
101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
99 Supra note 8 at pp. 492-493; p. 665.
77
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No different are herein petitioners who seek to

prohibit the enforcement of the assailed ordinance,
and who deal with the same subject matter that
concerns a public right. Necessarily, the people who
are interested in the nullification of such an
ordinance are themselves the real parties-in-interest,
for which reason, they are no longer required to show
any specific interest therein. Moreover, it is worth
mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS Officer
Alcantara, has been recognized by the Court in G.R.
No. 156052 to have legal standing to sue in
connection with the same subject matter herein
Manila. Hence, all of them have a direct interest in
the prohibition proceedings against the enforcement
of the assailed ordinance.
In the case of Initiatives for Dialogue and
Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services,
Inc. (IDEALS, Inc.) v. Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM),100
involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
permanently enjoin PSALM from selling the Angat
Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water
Resources Corporation (K-Water), the Court ruled:
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging
more than a generalized grievance. x x x This Court,
however, has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi
of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people, as when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.
Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of
a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
_______________
100 G.R. No. 192088, 9 October 2012, 682 SCRA 602.
78

There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring

adequate water supply for domestic use is one of paramount
importance to the public. That the continued availability of
potable water in Metro Manila might be compromised if
PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric
power plant in the Angat Dam Complex confers upon
petitioners such personal stake in the resolution of legal
issues in a petition to stop its implementation.101
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In like manner, the preservation of the life,
security and safety of the people is indisputably a
right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly,
the petitioners, as residents of Manila, have the
required personal interest to seek relief from this
Court to protect such right.
… in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction…
Petron takes issue with the alleged failure of the
petitioners to establish the facts with certainty that
would show that the acts of the respondents fall
within the parameters of the grave abuse of
discretion clause settled by jurisprudence, to wit:
x x x “[G]rave abuse of discretion” means such

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to per-
_______________
101 Id., at pp. 633-634.
79
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form the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation

of law.102

It is pointless to discuss the matter at length in
these instant cases of transcendental importance in
view of the Court’s pronouncement, in Magallona v.
Ermita.103 There it held that the writs of certiorari
and prohibition are proper remedies to test the
constitutionality of statutes, notwithstanding the
following defects:
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on

preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance
of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition,
noting that the writs cannot issue absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on
the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the
part of petitioners.
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil
proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional
power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition,
viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper
remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of
statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of
government. Issues of constitutional import x x x
carry such relevance in the life of this nation that
the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues
raised, noncompliance with the letter of pro-
_______________
102 Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. V, pp. 2144-2145.

Memorandum of Petron, citing Aduan v. Chong, G.R. No. 172796,
13 July 2009, 592 SCRA 508; see also Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil.
546; 272 SCRA 18 (1997); Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12;
373 SCRA 11 (2002); D.M. Consunji v. Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168;
260 SCRA 74 (1996); and Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 271 Phil. 592; 193 SCRA 563 (1991), citing Carson v.
Pantanosas, Jr., 259 Phil. 628; 180 SCRA 151 (1989).
103 G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011, 655 SCRA 476.
80

cedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to

be reviewed here is one such law.104 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

Requisites of judicial review

For a valid exercise of the power of judicial review,
the following requisites shall concur: (1) the existence
of a legal controversy; (2) legal standing to sue of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) a plea
that judicial review be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the
lis mota of the case.105
Only the first two requisites are put in issue in
these cases.
On the matter of the existence of a legal
controversy, we reject the contention that the
petitions consist of bare allegations based on
speculations, surmises, conjectures and hypothetical
grounds.
The Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 valid and
constitutional and ordered its implementation. With
the passing of the new ordinance containing the
contrary provisions, it cannot be any clearer that here
lies an actual case or controversy for judicial review.
The allegation on this, alone, is sufficient for the
purpose.
The second requisite has already been
exhaustively discussed.
_______________
104 Id., at pp. 487-488.

105 IBP v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632; 338 SCRA 81, 99 (2000),
citing Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos.
113105, 113174, 113766 and 113888, 19 August 1994, 235 SCRA
506, citing Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51; Dumlao
v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 369; 95 SCRA 392 (1980);
and People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
81
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Proof of identification required in the

notarization of the verification and certification
against forum shopping in G.R. No. 187916

At the bottom of the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping of the petition in G.R. No.
187916 is the statement of the notary public to the
effect that the affiant, in his presence and after
presenting “an integrally competent proof of
identification with signature and photograph,”106
signed the document under oath.
Citing Sec. 163 of the Local Government Code,107
which provides that an individual acknowledging any
document before a notary public shall present his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC), Chevron posits
that the petitioner’s failure to present his CTC
rendered the petition fatally defective warranting the
outright dismissal of the petition.
We disagree.
_______________
106 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 62. Urgent Petition for
107 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2097.
Sec. 163. Presentation of Community Tax Certificate on
Certain Occasions.—(a) When an individual subject to the
community tax acknowledges any document before a
notary public, takes the oath of office upon election or
appointment to any position in the government service; receives
any license, certificate, or permit from any public authority; pays
any tax or fee; receives any money from any public fund; transacts
other official business; or receives any salary or wage from any
person or corporation, it shall be the duty of any person, officer or
corporation with whom such transaction is made or business done
or from whom any salary or wage is received to require such
individual to exhibit the community tax certificate. x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring in the Memorandum of Chevron)
82

The verification and certification against forum

shopping are governed specifically by Sections 4 and
5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Section 4 provides that a pleading, when required
to be verified, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading if it lacks a proper verification while Section
5 requires that the certification to be executed by the
plaintiff or principal party be under oath.
These sections, in turn, should be read together
with Sections 6 and 12, Rule 2 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
Section 6108 of the latter Rules, specifically,
likewise provides that any competent evidence of
identity specified under Section 12 thereof may now
be presented before the notary public, to wit:
SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.—The phrase

“competent evidence of identity” refers to the identification
of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by
an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of
the individual, such as but not limited to passport, driver’s
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal
ID, voter’s ID,
_______________
108 Sec. 6. Jurat.—“Jurat” refers to an act in which an

individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by
the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to
such instrument or document.
83
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 83

Barangay certification, Government Service and

Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System
(SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID,
seaman’s book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant
certificate of registration, government office ID,
certification from the National Council for the Welfare of
Disable Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) certification; or
(b) x x x.109

Forum shopping

Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R. No.
187836 violated the rule against forum shopping
allegedly because all the elements thereof are present
in relation to G.R. No. 156052, to wit:
1. “identity of parties, or at least such parties
who represent the same interests in both actions” —
According to Shell, the interest of petitioner SJS in
G.R. No. 156052 and the officers of SJS in G.R. No.
187836 are clearly the same. Moreover, both actions
implead the incumbent mayor of the City of Manila
as respondent. Both then respondent Mayor Atienza
in G.R. No. 156052 and respondent former Mayor
Lim in G.R. No. 187836 are sued in their capacity as
Manila mayor.
2. “identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same fact(s)” —
Shell contends that, in both actions, petitioners
assert the same rights to health and to a balanced
and healthful ecology
_______________
109 As amended by Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M.

No. 02-8-13-SC.
84

relative to the fate of the Pandacan terminal, and

seek essentially the same reliefs, that is, the removal
of the oil depots from the present site.
3. “the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other” —
Relative to the filing of the Manifestation and
Motion to: a) Stop the City Council of Manila from
further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance
No. 8027 x x x (Manifestation and Motion) and Very
Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila
from Signing Draft Ordinance No. 7177 [now
Ordinance No. 8187] and to Cite Him for Contempt if
He Would Do So (Urgent Motion) both in G.R. No.
156052, Shell points out the possibility that the Court
would have rendered conflicting rulings “on cases
involving the same facts, parties, issues and reliefs
prayed for.”110
We are not persuaded.
In Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos,111 the Court
expounded on the nature of forum shopping. Thus:
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an

adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum,
of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. The established rule is that for forum
shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions, same essential facts and circumstances and
must raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and
issues. x x x 112 (Citations omitted)
_______________
110 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2216.

111 550 Phil. 98; 521 SCRA 510 (2007).
112 Id., at p. 107; pp. 520-521.
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It bears to stress that the present petitions were

initially filed, not to secure a judgment adverse to the
first decision, but, precisely, to enforce the earlier
ruling to relocate the oil depots from the Pandacan
area.
As to the matter of the denial of the petitioners’
Manifestation and Urgent Motion in G.R. No. 156052,
which were both incidental to the enforcement of the
decision favorable to them brought about by the
intervening events after the judgment had become
final and executory, and which involve the same
Ordinance assailed in these petitions, we so hold that
the filing of the instant petitions is not barred by res
judicata.
In the same case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses
Caraos involving the refiling of a complaint, which
had been earlier dismissed without qualification that
the dismissal was with prejudice, and which had not
been decided on the merits, the Court declared that
such refiling did not amount to forum shopping. It
ratiocinated:
It is not controverted that the allegations of the

respective complaints in both Civil Case No. 95-1387 and
Civil Case No. 96-0225 are similarly worded, and are
identical in all relevant details, including typographical
errors, except for the additional allegations in support of
respondents’ prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 95-1387. It is similarly not
disputed that both actions involve the same transactions;
same essential facts and circumstances; and raise identical
causes of actions, subject matter, and issues.
x x x x
x x x The dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was
without prejudice. Indeed, the Order dated 20 November
1995, dismissing Civil Case No. 95-1387 was an unqualified
dismissal. More significantly, its dismissal was not based
on grounds under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which dismissal shall bar the
refiling of the same action or claim as crystallized in
Section 5 of Rule 16 thereof, thus:
86

SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal.—Subject to the right of

appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on
paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the
refiling of the same action or claim.
From the foregoing, it is clear that dismissals under
paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court constitute res judicata, to wit:
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations;
x x x x
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds.
Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which
holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally
and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent
litigation between the same parties and for the same cause.
Res judicata exists when the following elements are
present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court
which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter; (3) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) and there must be, between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.113 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Here, it should be noted that this Court denied the
said Manifestation and Urgent Motion, and refused to
act on the
_______________
113 Id., at pp. 108-110; pp. 524-525.
87
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 87

succeeding pleadings, for being moot.114 Clearly,

the merits of the motion were not considered by the
Court. The following disquisition of the Court in
Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos is further
enlightening:
The judgment of dismissal in Civil Case No. 95-1387

does not constitute res judicata to sufficiently bar the
refiling thereof in Civil Case No. 96-0225. As earlier
underscored, the dismissal was one without prejudice.
Verily, it was not a judgment on the merits. It bears
reiterating that a judgment on the merits is one
rendered after a determination of which party is
right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates
the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the
parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as
though the dismissed action had not been commenced.115
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Considering that there is definitely no forum
shopping in the instant cases, we need not discuss in
detail the elements of forum shopping.
II
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly
provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested
with the power to “reclassify land within the
jurisdiction of the city”116 subject to the pertinent
provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an
ordinance may be modified or repealed by another
ordinance.117 These have been properly applied in
G.R. No.
_______________
114 Rollo in G.R. No. 156052 (no proper pagination, should be

p. 1844). Resolution dated 2 June 2009.
115 Supra note 111 at pp. 110-111; p. 525.
116 Section 458(a)(2)(viii), Local Government Code.
117 Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, 21 August 1992,
212 SCRA 739, 747.
88

156052, where the Court upheld the position of the

Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land
subject of the Ordinance,118 and declared that the
mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027,
provided that it has not been repealed by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by
the courts.119 In the same case, the Court also used
the principle that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is in
the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents120 — that the removal of the oil depots
from the Pandacan area is necessary “to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals.”121
Do all these principles equally apply to the cases at
bar involving the same subject matter to justify the
contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance?
We answer in the negative.
We summarize the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter subject of these petitions.
In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the
Pandacan oil depots necessary. Hence, the enactment
of Ordinance No. 8027.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian
had already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed
in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012,
again when some of the previous members were no
longer reelected, but with the Vice Mayor still holding
the same seat, and pending the resolution of these
petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the
oil depots until the end of January 2016 within which
to transfer to another site. Former Mayor Lim stood
his ground and vetoed the last ordinance.
_______________
118 Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., applying Section

458(a)(2)(viii) of the Local Government Code.
119 Supra note 8 at p. 493; pp. 665-666, citing supra note 116.
120 Id., at p. 703; p. 139.
121 Id., at p. 702; p. 138.
89
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 89
In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010)

alleged that the assailed Ordinance was enacted to
alleviate the economic condition of its constituents.122
Expressing the same position, former Mayor Lim
even went to the extent of detailing the steps123 he
took prior to the signing of the Ordinance, if only to
show his honest intention to make the right decision.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding
that the conditions with respect to the operations of
the oil depots
_______________
122 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 296. Comment of

respondents Vice Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors who
voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance.
123 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 1852-1857. Memorandum of former Mayor
Lim.
Former Mayor Lim narrated that when he received the draft
Ordinance for his approval, he did not readily act upon it but took
the time to seriously study the pros and cons of enacting the
Ordinance; that he issued Executive Order No. 18 creating an ad
hoc panel to conduct a study thereon; that the Assistant City
Treasurer of Manila submitted to him a list of properties that
would be affected by the proposed ordinance and the real property
taxes they paid from 2007 to 2009; that he conducted a
stakeholders’ consultative meeting composed of some Cabinet
Secretaries and other officials, including the Joint Foreign
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines; that Engr. Rodolfo H.
Catu (Engr. Catu), Officer in Charge of the City Planning and
Development Office, together with the ad hoc panel earlier created,
conducted an ocular inspection of the Pandacan Terminal, and
submitted a favorable recommendation; that he also sought
guidance from His Eminence, Gaudencio Cardinal Rosales; that he
received a profile of the safety and security features installed at the
Pandacan oil depots from Shell; that he likewise personally
conducted an ocular inspection where he was assured by then
President Arroyo and her cabinet secretaries, who happened to
visit the site on the same day, that they interpose no objection to
the proposed ordinance; and that the European Chamber of
Commerce expressed support to the ordinance. It was only then
that he made a decision to approve the Ordinance.
90

existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027

do not substantially differ to this day, as would later
be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely
depending on the new composition of the council
and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus,
shows that its determination of the “general welfare”
of the city does not after all gear towards the
protection of the people in its true sense and
meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on
the personal preference of the members who sit in the
council as to which particular sector among its
constituents it wishes to favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor
and the city councilors, has changed its view on the
matter, favoring the city’s economic-related benefits,
through the continued stay of the oil terminals, over
the protection of the very lives and safety of its
constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a
final determination on the basis of the facts on the
table as to which specific right of the inhabitants of
Manila should prevail. For, in this present
controversy, history reveals that there is truly no
such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the
general welfare of the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara124 by
Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary mediates
we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the
Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
to them.

III

The measures taken by the intervenors to lend
support to their position that Manila is now safe
despite the presence of
_______________
124 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
91
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 91

the oil terminals remain ineffective. These have

not completely removed the threat to the lives of the
inhabitants of Manila.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared
as a guarantee for the protection of the constitutional
right to life of the residents of Manila. There, the
Court said that the enactment of the said ordinance
was a valid exercise of police power with the
concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject —
“to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of
all the inhabitants of Manila”;125 and a lawful method
— the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying
the land use from industrial to commercial, which
effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in
Pandacan.126
In the present petitions, the respondents and the
oil companies plead that the Pandacan Terminal has
never been one of the targets of terrorist attacks;127
that the petitions were based on unfounded fears and
mere conjectures;128 and that the possibility that it
would be picked by the terrorists is nil given the
security measures installed thereat.129
The intervenors went on to identify the measures
taken to ensure the safety of the people even with the
presence of the Pandacan Terminals. Thus:
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and
Petron, continues to enhance the safety and security
features of the terminals. They likewise adopt fire
and product spill prevention measures in accordance
with the local standards set by the Bureau of Fire
Protection, among others, and with the
_______________
125 Supra note 8.

126 Id., at pp. 704-707; p. 140.
Memorandum of Chevron; Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. V, pp.
2220-2225. Memorandum of Petron.
128 Id., at p. 1883. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.
129 Id., at pp. 2285-2310. Memorandum of Shell.
92

international standards of the American

Petroleum Industry (“API”) and the National Fire
Prevention and Safety Association (“NFPSA”); that
since 1914, the oil depots had not experienced “any
incident beyond the ordinary risks and
expectations”130 of the residents of Manila; and that
it received a passing grade on the safety measures
they installed in the facilities from the
representatives of the City of Manila who conducted
an ocular inspection on 22 May 2009; and
2. Referring to the old MOU entered into between
the City of Manila and the DOE, on the one hand,
and the oil companies, on the other, where the parties
thereto conceded and acknowledged that the scale
down option for the Pandacan Terminal operations is
the best alternative to the relocation of the terminals,
Shell enumerates the steps taken to scale down its
operations.
As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire
Pandacan Terminal has already decommissioned
twenty-eight out of sixty-four tanks. Speaking for
Shell alone, its LPG Spheres, which it claims is the
only product that may cause explosion, was part of
those decommissioned, thereby allegedly removing
the danger of explosion. Safety buffer zones and
linear/green parks were likewise created to separate
the terminal from the nearest residential area. Shell’s
portion of the oil depot is likewise allegedly equipped
with the latest technology to ensure air quality
control and water quality control, and to prevent and
cope with possible oil spills with a crisis management
plan in place in the event that an oil spill occurs.
Finally, Shell claims that the recommendations of
EQE International in its Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) study, which it says is one of the
leading independent risk assessment providers in the
world and largest risk management consultancy,
were sufficiently complied with; and that, on its own
initiative, it adopted additional measures for the
_______________
130 Id., at p. 2112. Memorandum of Chevron. Emphasis

supplied.
93
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 93

purpose, for which reason, “the individual risk

level resulting from any incident occurring from the
Pandacan Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty
(20) times lower compared to the individual risk
level of an average working or domestic
environment.”131
We are not persuaded.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan
Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has
already been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based
on the assessment of the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of
Manila and the then position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod,132 the Court was convinced that the
threat of terrorism is imminent. It remains so
convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and
intervenors were correct, the very nature of the
depots where millions of liters of highly flammable
and highly volatile products, regardless of whether or
not the composition may cause explosions, has no
place in a densely populated area. Surely, any
untoward incident in the oil depots, be it related to
terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would
definitely cause not only destruction to properties
within and among the neighboring communities but
certainly mass deaths and injuries.
With regard to the scaling down of the operations
in the Pandacan Terminals, which the oil companies
continue to insist to have been validated and
recognized by the MOU, the Court, in G.R. No.
156052, has already put this issue to rest. It
specifically declared that even assuming that the
terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were
inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying the MOU gave
it full force and effect only until 30 April 2003.133
_______________
131 Id., at p. 2280. Memorandum of Shell.

132 Supra note 8 at pp. 702-703; p. 138.
133 Id., at p. 494; p. 666.
94

The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore,

remain insufficient to convince the Court that the
dangers posed by the presence of the terminals in a
thickly populated area have already been
completely removed.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented
may strike at one point or another, no matter how
remote it is as perceived by one or some, we cannot
allow the right to life to be dependent on the
unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of
probability have no place in situations where the very
life of not just an individual but of residents of big
neighborhoods is at stake.
IV
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere
subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in and
made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason,
unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187, compels the
affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the
assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay of
the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning
used in G.R. No. 156052, to wit:
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted “for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public
safety and general welfare” of the residents of Manila. The
Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of
a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this
objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in
the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City
of Manila which recommended the approval of the
ordinance:
95
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 95

(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of

highly flammable and highly volatile products which
include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation
fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near
Malacañan Palace; and
(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot,
the fire could spread to the neighboring communities.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to
life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and
not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly
or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it (sic) there is
such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not
safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these
terminals to dissipate the threat. According to respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11
incident which showed that what was perceived to be
impossible to happen, to the most powerful country in the
world at that, is actually possible. The destruction of
property and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful
day became the impetus for a public need. In the aftermath
of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued
[such] that it became imperative for governments to take
measures to combat their effects.
x x x x
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality
and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there
are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation.
Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of
96

the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically

expressed their desire for the relocation of the terminals.
Their power to chart and control their own destiny and
preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by
the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and
threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.134

The same best interest of the public guides the
present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a
terrorist target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to
persuade this Court that the life, security and safety
of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk
by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that
Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
There is, therefore, no need to resolve the rest of
the issues.
Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test
of police power against the assailed ordinance. Suffice
it to state that the objective adopted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to promote the
constituents’ general welfare in terms of economic
benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life,
security and safety of the people.
In. G.R. No. 156052, the Court explained:
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right

to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of
pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the
state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.135
_______________
134 Supra note 8 at pp. 702-720; pp. 138-157.

135 Id., at p. 720; p. 157.
97
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 97

We thus conclude with the very final words in G.R.

No. 156052:
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker

containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000 liters of diesel
exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from
the exit gate of the Pandacan Terminals, causing death,
extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in the
vicinity of the incident. Need we say anything about what
will happen if it is the estimated 162 to 211 million liters
[or whatever is left of the 26 tanks] of petroleum products
in the terminal complex will blow up?136

V

As in the prequel case, we note that as early as
October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with
the DOE obliging themselves to:
... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ...

[which] shall include the preparation of a Master Plan,
whose aim is to determine the scope and timing of the
feasible location of the Pandacan oil terminals and all
associated facilities and infrastructure including
government support essential for the relocation such as the
necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of
way acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and
environmental and social acceptability which shall be based
on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.
such that:
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their

operations in the Pandacan Terminals, they cannot feign
unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for
this eventuality.137
_______________
136 Id., at pp. 722-723; p. 160.

137 Id., at p. 721; p. 159.
98

On the matter of the details of the relocation, the

Court gave the oil companies the following time
frames for compliance:
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation

of assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron
Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation shall, within a non-extendible
period of ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 39, the comprehensive plan and
relocation schedule which have allegedly been prepared.
The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor
the strict enforcement of this resolution.138

The periods were given in the Decision in G.R. No.
156052 which became final on 23 April 2009. Five
years have passed, since then. The years of
noncompliance may be excused by the swing of local
legislative leads. We now stay the sway and begin a
final count.
A comprehensive and well-coordinated plan within
a specific time-frame shall, therefore, be observed in
the relocation of the Pandacan Terminals. The oil
companies shall be given a fresh non-extendible
period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which
to submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39,
Manila an updated comprehensive plan and
relocation schedule. The relocation, in turn, shall be
completed not later than six months from the date of
their submission.
Finally, let it be underscored that after the last
Manifestation filed by Shell informing this Court that
respondent former Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No.
8283 for the second time, and was anticipating its
referral to the President for the latter’s consideration,
nothing was heard from any of the parties until the
present petitions as to the status of the approval or
disapproval of the said ordinance. As it is, the fate of
_______________
138 Id., at p. 723; p. 161.
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 99

the Pandacan Terminals remains dependent on

this final disposition of these cases.
VI
On the matter of the failure of Atty. Gempis to
immediately comply with the directives of this Court
to file the Memorandum for the Vice Mayor and the
city councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
Ordinance, the records do not bear proof that he
received a copy of any of the resolutions pertaining to
the filing of the Memorandum.
A narration of the events from his end would show,
however, that he was aware of the directive issued in
2009 when he stated that “when the City Legal
Officer filed its Memorandum dated 8 February 2010,
[he] thought the filing of a Memorandum for the other
respondent city officials could be dispensed with.”139
There was also a categorical admission that he
received the later Resolution of 31 May 2011 but that
he could not prepare a Memorandum defending the
position of respondents vice mayor and the city
councilors who voted in favor of Ordinance No. 8187
in view of the ongoing drafting of Ordinance No.
8283, which would change the position of the
Sanggunian, if subsequently approved.
The reasons he submitted are not impressed with
merit.
That he was not officially designated as the
counsel for the vice mayor and the city councilors is
beside the point. As an officer of the court, he cannot
feign ignorance of the fact that “a resolution of this
Court is not a mere request but an order which
should be complied with promptly and completely.”140
As early as 2009, he should have immediately
responded and filed a Manifestation and therein set
forth his reasons why he cannot represent the vice
mayor and the city councilors. And,
_______________
139 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, p. 2496. Compliance/Ex-

planation with Urgent Manifestation of Atty. Gempis, Jr.
140 Gone v. Ga, A.C. No. 7771, 6 April 2011, 647 SCRA 243,
250.
100

even assuming that the 31 May 2011 Resolution

was the first directive he personally received, he had
no valid excuse for disregarding the same. Worse, the
Court had to issue a show cause order before he
finally heeded.
Atty. Gempis should “strive harder to live up to his
duties of observing and maintaining the respect due
to the courts, respect for law and for legal processes
and of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession in order to perform his responsibilities as a
lawyer effectively.”141
In Sibulo v. Ilagan,142 which involves a lawyer’s
repeated failure to comply with the directives of the
Court, the penalty recommended by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines was reduced from suspension
to reprimand and a warning. The Court ratiocinated:
Considering, however, that respondent was absolved of

the administrative charge against him and is being taken to
task for his intransigence and lack of respect, the Court
finds that the penalty of suspension would not be
warranted under the circumstances.
x x x x
To the Court’s mind, a reprimand and a warning are
sufficient sanctions for respondent’s disrespectful
actuations directed against the Court and the IBP. The
imposition of these sanctions in the present case would be
more consistent with the avowed purpose of disciplinary
case, which is “not so much to punish the individual
attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by
sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct
or inefficiency of officers of the court.”143
_______________
141 Sibulo v. Ilagan, 486 Phil. 197, 204; 444 SCRA 1, 8 (2004),
citing Canons 1, 7, and 11, Code of Professional Responsibility.
142 Id.
143 Id., at pp. 204-205; pp. 8-9, citing Gamilla v. Mariño, Jr.,
447 Phil. 419; 399 SCRA 308 (2003).
101
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 101

We consider the participation of Atty. Gempis in

this case and opt to be lenient even as we reiterate
the objective of protecting the dispensation of justice.
We deem it sufficient to remind Atty. Gempis to be
more mindful of his duty as a lawyer towards the
Court.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing,
Ordinance No. 8187 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with respect
to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is
hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8187. In coordination with
the appropriate government agencies and the parties
herein involved, he is further ordered to oversee the
relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the
Pandacan area.
As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the
intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation shall,
within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days,
submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39,
Manila an updated comprehensive plan and
relocation schedule, which relocation shall be
completed not later than six (6) months from the date
the required documents are submitted. The presiding
judge of Branch 39 shall monitor the strict
enforcement of this Decision.
For failure to observe the respect due to the Court,
Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, is REMINDED of his
duties towards the Court and WARNED that a
repetition of an act similar to that here committed
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,

Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,
Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
102

Sereno, CJ., I join J. Leonen in his Concurring &

Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio, J., No part, one of the counsels is in my
former law firm.
Brion, J., On Leave.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part. Intervenor part of former
employer group.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

The Pandacan oil depots must go, not because
Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional, but because
of Ordinance No. 8283. Due to its proposed doctrine, I
regret that I am unable to bring myself to agree with
the wellwritten ponencia of an esteemed colleague.
The petitions should be dismissed for being moot
and academic in view of the manifestations1 filed by
respondents when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila enacted City Ordinance No. 8283 entitled “An
Ordinance Amending Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187
by Reclassifying the Area where
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 2757-2765 (respondent’s

manifestation) and pp. 2813-2820 (respondentintervenor Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation’s manifestation). The
compliance/explanation with urgent manifestation dated
September 13, 2012 of respondent was filed by Luch R. Gempis,
Jr., Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila. The
manifestation with motion to dismiss dated September 2, 2013 of
respondent-intervenor Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
likewise informed this court of the enactment of Ordinance No.
8283.
103
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 103

Petroleum Refineries and Oil Depots are Located

from Heavy Industrial (I-3) to High Intensity
Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD).”2
Considering that the petitions are now moot and
academic, this court should have exercised judicial
restraint and refrained from making any
determination with regard to the validity of
Ordinance No. 8187.
Even assuming that the petition is not yet moot,
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916 should
be dismissed on procedural and substantive grounds.

Prefatory

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila has the
power to amend or repeal its zoning ordinances. A
determination by this court in an earlier petition for
mandamus denying challenges to the validity of an
earlier ordinance on constitutional grounds does not
necessarily render such ordinance as irrepealable.
That earlier ordinance may still be repealed should
the local government decide to change its policy. In
fact, the local government has changed its policy by
enacting Ordinance No. 8283, which amends Section
2 of Ordinance No. 8187.
Ordinance No. 8187 is entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality. This presumption cannot be
discharged with petitioners’ broad factual allegations
properly challenged by respondents. This special civil
action is not the proper forum to determine questions
of fact.
The spectre of terrorism and the dangers of
ecological destruction are easy to foist. But our fears
should not be given such privilege so as to numb us to
the possibility that the facts may not be as petitioners
present them. The reality is that the ordinance now
in question is the product of the po-
_______________
2 Id., at p. 2760.
104

litical will of the citizens of Manila exercised
through their duly elected representatives.
The Constitution entrusts us with the power of
judicial review. We do not have the power to veto an
ordinance.
There are other remedies available to petitioners
more adequate for their purposes. The fields of
environment and health law have progressed to allow
the proper causes of action to be laid in the proper
forum. Proper evidence needs to be received before we
conclude with finality at the level of this court that
businesses of private respondents actually destroy
the environment and that they do so with impunity.
The precautionary principle certainly does not
sanction a suspension of judicial rules with respect to
evidence, reason, and legal interpretation.

The Case

The Pandacan terminal is located by the banks of
the Pasig River.3 It was constructed in 1914 and
serves as the main artery for the storage and
distribution of fuel to Metro Manila and the rest of
Luzon.4 It is linked to a permanent underground
pipeline5 that connects it to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation’s (Shell) refinery in Tabangao and
Chevron’s finished products import terminal in San
Pascual, both in the province of Batangas.6
Apart from the use of a pipeline, the location of the
Pandacan terminal enables the delivery of fuel
through barges. This is the mode of transportation
utilized by Petron since its refinery is located in
Limay, Bataan. When the terminal is
_______________
3 Id., at p. 2031.
4 Id., at pp. 2029-2030.
5 Id., at p. 2032. The pipeline was inaugurated in 1969.
6 Id., at p. 2031.
105
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 105

located elsewhere, delivery of fuel may have to

contend with traffic and other challenges.7
The Pandacan terminal is the focal point of this
country’s fuel supply system. It provides 95% of the
fuel supply in Metro Manila, 70% of the country’s
shipping needs, 90% of the country’s demand for
lubricants, and 75% of the country’s need for aviation
fuel.8
The importance of the Pandacan terminal is also
felt in the business sector because it provides
livelihood to more than 3,000 retail stations in
Regions I to IV and the National Capital Region.9
During the 1970s, the Philippines experienced fuel
shortages. The shortage peaked in 1974, reaching a
point where the country was almost paralyzed. Long
queues at fuel stations were seen and, most of the
time, the fuel stations ran out of fuel.10
Fortunately, the national government anticipated
the fuel shortage. Republic Act No. 617311 was passed
in 1971, creating the Oil Industry Commission. The
Oil Industry Commission was mandated to perform
the following:
_______________
7 Id.
8 Id., at pp. 2030 and 2526. The data supplied by Chevron and
Shell in their memoranda does not indicate the specific years when
the data was collected.
9 Id., at p. 2030.
10 Id., at p. 2032.
11 An Act Declaring a National Policy on the Petroleum
Industry, Regulating the Activities and Relations of Persons and
Entities Engaged therein, Establishing an Oil Industry
Commission to Effectuate the Same, and Defining its Functions,
Powers and Objectives, and for Other Purposes (1971). Rep. Act
No. 6173 was subsequently amended by Pres. Decrees numbered
56, 102, 389-A, 429-A, 456 and 1128.
106

SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy and Purposes.—. . . .

(a) To assure that the country shall have a proper
adequate and continuous supply of crude oil and refined
petroleum products under the most economic and
competitive terms possible considering all available sources
of supply;
(b) To assure that the petroleum industry, as a
business vital to the national interest, operates under
conditions of orderly and economic competition;
(c) To assure the public of reasonable prices for
petroleum products considering the international price
levels of crude oil and petroleum products and after
allowing for proper and reasonable cost of importing,
shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing,
distributing, marketing, and selling crude oil and
petroleum products in the Philippines, and for a fair and
reasonable return; and to prevent collusive practices in the
industry, particularly as to prices[.]

In 1977, the Oil Industry Commission was
replaced by the Department of Energy.12 This
department was created to make certain that there is
an adequate supply of energy for the country.13
Additional functions were granted to the Department
of Energy upon the passage of Republic Act No.
8479.14
On October 12, 2001, the Department of Energy
entered into a memorandum of agreement with
Chevron, Shell, and Petron to address the safety
concerns brought about by the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks in the United States.
_______________
12 Pres. Decree No. 1206 (1977), otherwise known as Creating

the Department of Energy.
13 Pres. Decree No. 1206 (1977), Sec. 1.
14 An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for
Other Purposes (1998).
107
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 107

The parties agreed to conduct a study regarding

the feasibility of relocating the Pandacan terminal.15
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.16
Ordinance No. 8027, which took effect on December
28, 2001,17 reclassified the area where the Pandacan
terminal is located from Industrial II to Commercial
I.18
Foreseeing that the effect of Ordinance No. 8027
could lead to a fuel shortage, then Manila Mayor Jose
L. Atienza, Jr. (petitioner in G.R. No. 187916),
Chevron, Shell, Petron, and then Department of
Energy Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr., conducted
dialogues.19 On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila, the
Department of Energy, Chevron, Shell, and Petron
executed a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
where the parties agreed to scale down the operations
in the Pandacan terminal by decommissioning
storage tanks and constructing buffer zones around
the Pandacan terminal.20
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila ratified
the MOU in Resolution No. 97, Series of 2002. The
MOU would be valid from July 25, 2002 until
December 31, 2002. Business permits valid until
December 31, 2002 were issued to Shell, Chevron,
_______________
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2035.

16 Ordinance Reclassifying the Land Use of that Portions of
Land Bounded by the Pasig River in the North, PNR railroad track
in the East, Beata St. in the South, Palumpong St. in the
Southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the West, PNR railroad in
the Northwest Area, Estero de Pandacan in the Northeast, Pasig
River in the Southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the Southwest; The
area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St. and the F. Manalo Street from Industrial
II to Commercial I (2001).
17 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658,
668; 545 SCRA 92, 100-101 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 2034-2035.
19 Id., at p. 2036.
20 Id., at p. 2037.
108

and Petron. Resolution No. 13, Series of 2003,

extended the MOU’s validity until April 30, 2003.
Again, business permits were issued with the same
validity period as the MOU.21
Meanwhile, Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a
petition for mandamus before this court on December
4, 2002. They prayed for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus to compel Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr.
(Mayor Atienza) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This
was docketed as G.R. No. 156052.22
Toward the end of the MOU’s validity in April
2003, Mayor Atienza refused to issue new business
permits to Shell, Chevron, and Petron. This prompted
Chevron to file a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for injunction, annulment of Manila
City Ordinance No. 8027, specific performance and
damages, with application for a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction. This case was filed on
April 25, 2003 and docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
106377.23
On the same day, Shell filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with application for a
temporary restraining order and writs of preliminary
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. It
assailed the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 and
prayed for the enforcement of the MOU. This case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106380.24
The cases filed by Chevron and Shell were
consolidated and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. The trial court granted
applications for the writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction and preliminary prohibitory injunction.25
_______________
21 Id., at p. 2038.

22 Id., at p. 2040.
23 Id., at pp. 2040-2041.
24 Id., at p. 2041.
25 Id.
109
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 109

Petron later filed a petition assailing the validity
of Ordinance No. 8027 and alleging violations of the
Department of Energy law, deregulation law, the
memorandum of agreement dated October 12, 2001,
and the MOU dated June 28, 2002.26
On June 16, 2006, then Manila Mayor Atienza
approved Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the
Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006.27 Ordinance No. 8119
reclassified the Pandacan terminal area from
Industrial II to High Density Residential/Mixed Use
Zone.28
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 triggered
the filing of another complaint by Shell and Chevron
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They filed
a complaint for injunction and nullification of
Ordinance No. 8119 with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, praying that Ordinance No.
8119 be declared unconstitutional. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. 06-115334.29
Petron filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No.
06-115334 but was denied. Hence, Petron filed its
own complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 07-116700.
A temporary restraining order was issued in favor of
Petron, enjoining the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8119.30
On March 7, 2007, this court, through the First
Division, granted the petition filed by SJS and
directed that the mayor of the City of Manila
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.31 Shell,
Chevron, and Petron filed motions for leave to
intervene and motions for reconsideration in
intervention. They argued that there were legal
impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No.
8027 because of the cases they
_______________
26 Id., at p. 2042.

27 Supra note 17 at p. 671; p. 119.
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2043.
29 Id.
30 Id., at pp. 2043-2044.
31 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 546 Phil. 485,
494; 517 SCRA 657, 667 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
110

filed before the lower courts. On February 13,

2008, the First Division, through Chief Justice
Corona, granted the motions to intervene, but denied
the motions for reconsideration. The First Division
also ordered the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 03-
106377 and 03-106380.32
Shell, Chevron, and Petron filed another motion
for reconsideration on February 28, 2008.33 This was
denied with finality on April 28, 2009 in an En Banc
resolution34 on the ground that it was a second
motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading
under Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.35
On May 28, 2009, then Manila Mayor Alfredo S.
Lim (Mayor Lim) signed Ordinance No. 8187, “An
Ordinance Amending City Ordinance No. 8119
Otherwise Known as ‘The Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006’ By
Creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy
Industrial Zone (1-3) and Providing for its
Enforcement.”36
In essence, Ordinance No. 8187, a zoning
ordinance, allows the continued stay of the oil depots
in the Pandacan area. Ordinance No. 8187 also
repeals the relevant portions of Ordinance No. 8027.
Petitioner SJS went directly to this court and filed
a petition37 for prohibition on June 1, 2009. This was
docketed as G.R. No. 187836. Petitioners Mayor
Atienza and the other parties followed suit on June 5,
2009 and filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus,
and certiorari with application for an
_______________
32 Supra note 17 at p. 723; p. 160.

33 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2046.
34 Id.
35 Rule 52, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration.—No second motion
for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same
party shall be entertained.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2047.
37 Id., at pp. 3-10.
111
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 111

injunction and temporary restraining order.38 This

was docketed as G.R. No. 187916. These petitions
were consolidated by this court.
The issues in this case are the following:
(a) Procedural issue: Whether petitioners in
G.R. No. 187836 and G.R. No. 187916 have standing
to file this case.
(b) Substantive issue: Whether Ordinance No.
8187, otherwise known as “An Ordinance Amending
Ordinance No. 8119, Otherwise Known as ‘The
Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006’ By Creating a Medium Industrial
Zone (I-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (I-3), and
Providing for Its Enforcement,” is valid and
constitutional.
This dissent will focus on the substantive issue
first.
I
The presumption of constitutionality

All laws, including ordinances, enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality.39 The reason behind
this presumption has been discussed by this court as
follows:
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its

bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of
the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is
based on the deference the judicial
_______________
38 Rollo (G.R. No. 187916), pp. 11-67.

39 Tano v. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 700; 278 SCRA 154, 174
(1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], citing La Union Electric
Cooperative v. Yaranon, 259 Phil. 457, 466; 179 SCRA 828, 836
(1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division] and Francisco v. Permskul,
255 Phil. 311, 322; 173 SCRA 324, 333 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En
Banc].
112

branch accords to its coordinate branch — the

legislature.40

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association v. City of Manila41 explains the reasons
behind the presumption of validity of ordinances:
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: “The

presumption is all in favor of validity. . . . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The
local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in
effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the
well being of the people. . . . The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.”42

In order to overcome this presumption of
constitutionality, petitioners must be able to prove
beyond any doubt how the challenged statute violates
the Constitution.43 Hypothetical arguments will not
suffice.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and other
local government units have the statutory power to
enact zoning ordinances. Thus, Republic Act No. 7160
or the Local Government Code of 1991 grants the
following powers to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila:
_______________
40 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 342; 369 SCRA

394, 430 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
41 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City
of Manila, 127 Phil. 306; 20 SCRA 849 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En
Banc].
42 Id., at pp. 314-315; pp. 856-857, citing U.S. v. Salaveria, 39
Phil. 102, 111 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
43 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 343; p. 446.
113
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 113

SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation.—The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:
....
(2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and
revenues for the development plans, program objectives and
priorities of the city as provided for under Section 18 of this
Code, with particular attention to agro-industrial
development and city-wide growth and progress, and
relative thereto, shall:
....
(vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the city:
Provided, That in the case of component cities, the
formulation, adoption or modification of said plan shall be
in coordination with the approved provincial comprehensive
land use plan;
(viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city,
subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code;
(ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance
with the approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to
existing laws, rules and regulations; establish fire limits or
zones, particularly in populous centers; and regulate the
construction, repair or modification of buildings within said
fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of the
Fire Code[.] (Emphasis supplied)
114

The Revised Charter of the City of Manila or

Republic Act No. 409 also provides:44

ARTICLE III. The Municipal Board
....
SEC. 18. Legislative powers.—The Municipal Board
shall have the following legislative powers:
....
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances which shall not exceed to two
hundred pesos fine or six months’ imprisonment, or both
such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

With regard to the seeming overlap between
Republic Act No. 7160 and Republic Act No. 409, this
court, in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,45 held
that:
The rule is that the City Council has only such
powers as are expressly granted to it and those which
are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise
thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the
nature thereof, said powers are to be construed
strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising
out of the terms used in
_______________
44 Rep. Act No. 409 (1949), otherwise known as An Act to

Revise the Charter of the City of Manila, and for Other Purposes.
45 495 Phil. 289; 455 SCRA 308 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
This case involved an ordinance, classified by the city council as a
zoning ordinance, which prohibited the establishment or operation
of certain businesses in the Ermita-Malate area.
115
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 115
granting said powers must be construed against the City

Council.
....
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code
being a later expression of the legislative will must
necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised
Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are
repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same
subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that
which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest
expression of legislative will. If there is an inconsistency or
repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same
subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair and
reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest
expression of the legislative will which must prevail and
override the earlier.
....
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that “All
general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.” Thus, submitting to petitioners’
interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila
empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion
of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed by
the Code as it is at variance with the latter’s provisions
granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.46

For purposes of this case, there appears to be no
repugnance between Republic Act No. 7160 and
Republic Act No. 409. Both provide for the statutory
basis for the conclusion that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila was well within its powers
when it enacted Ordinance No. 8187. This ordi-
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 332-334; pp. 353-355.
116

nance was also enacted in accordance with the

process for enacting zoning guidelines.
The Local Government Code does not provide for a
special procedure with regard to the passage of a
zoning ordinance. However, Republic Act No. 792447
provides that:
SEC. 3. Scope of MMDA Services.—Metro-wide

services under the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those
services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local
political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it
would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual local government units (LGUs) comprising
Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:
....
e. Urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and
shelter services which include the formulation, adoption
and implementation of policies, standards, rules and
regulations, programs and projects to rationalize and
optimize urban land use and provide direction to urban
growth and expansion, the rehabilitation and development
of slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter and
housing facilities and the provision of necessary social
services thereof.

Rule V, Section 15 of the implementing rules and
regulations of Republic Act No. 792448 provides:
Sec. 15. Linkage with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA,

LGUs and Other National Government Agencies
Concerned on Urban Renewal, Zoning and Land
_______________
47 An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development

Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds
therefor and for Other Purposes (1995).
48 The Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7924
became effective on June 8, 1996.
117
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 117

Use Planning and Shelter Services.—Within the

context of the National Housing and Urban Development
Framework, and pursuant to the national standards,
guidelines and regulations formulated by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] on land use planning
and zoning, the Authority shall prepare a metropolitan
physical framework plan and regulations which shall
complement and translate the socio-economic development
plan for Metro Manila into physical or spatial terms, and
provide the basis for the preparation, review, integration
and implementation of local land use plans and zoning
ordinances of cities and municipalities in the area.
Said framework plan and regulations shall contain,
among others, planning and zoning policies and procedures
that shall be observed by local government units in the
preparation of their plans and ordinances pursuant to
Sections 447 and 458 of RA 7160, as well as the
identification of sites and projects that are considered to be
of national or metropolitan significance.
Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective
land use plans and zoning ordinances and submit the same
for review and integration by the Authority and indorsement
to HLURB in accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and
other pertinent laws.
In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical
framework plan and regulations, the Authority shall
coordinate with the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council, HLURB, the National Housing
Authority, Intramuros Administration, and all other
agencies of the national government which are concerned
with land use and zoning, urban renewal and shelter
services. (Emphasis supplied)
OP Executive Order No. 7249 then provides:
_______________
49 Providing for the Preparation and Implementation of the

Comprehensive Land Use Plans of Local Government Units
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other
Pertinent Laws (1993).
118

SECTION 1. Plan formulation or Updating.—(a) Cities

and municipalities shall continue to formulate or update
their respective comprehensive land use plans, in
conformity with the land use planning and zoning
standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLRB pursuant
to national policies.
....
The comprehensive land use plan prepared by the
CDC/MDC shall be submitted to the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, for
enactment into a zoning ordinance. Such ordinance shall be
enacted and approved in accordance with Articles 107 and
108 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the
LGC.
....
c. Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila
shall continue to formulate or update their respective
comprehensive land use plans, in accordance with the land
use planning and zoning standards and guidelines
prescribed by the HLRB pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1990,
and other pertinent national policies.

None of the petitioners question whether
Ordinance No. 8187 followed these requirements.
Instead, petitioner Mayor Atienza argues that the
passage of Ordinance No. 8187 was in violation of the
procedure stated in Ordinance No. 8119, specifically:
Sec. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance.—The

proposed amendments to the Zoning Ordinance as reviewed
and evaluated by the City Planning and Development
Office (CPDO) shall be submitted to the City Council for
approval of the majority of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
members. The amendments shall be acceptable and
eventually approved; PROVIDED, That there is sufficient
evidence and justification for such proposal; PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That such proposal is consistent with the
development goals, planning objectives and
119
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 119

strategies of the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan.

Said amendments shall take effect immediately upon
approval or after thirty (30) days from application.50

Respondent Mayor Lim points out that Section 81
of Ordinance No. 8119 is better understood if taken
together with Section 80, which states:
Sec. 80. Procedure for Re-Zoning.—Any association or

group of persons who wishes to prepare a rezoning of a
certain area, may file a petition with the Manila Zoning
Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) for initial
evaluation.
The MZBAA shall then endorse the proposal together
with its preliminary findings to the City Planning &
Development Office (CPDO) for further evaluation.
Whenever necessary, site inspection of the vicinity subject
to rezoning shall be made, the CPDO shall then recommend
for approval the rezoning of the subject area to the City
Council.51

Respondent Mayor Lim points out that the
procedure provided under Sections 80 and 81 of
Ordinance No. 8119 is not a condition precedent for
the enactment of Ordinance No. 8187. He reasons
that it would be absurd for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila to submit its rezoning plans to
the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals
or MZBAA for review, after which the review would
be subject to the approval by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila.52
We agree with respondent Mayor Lim.
Furthermore, none of the petitioners presented clear
basis to conclude that Ordinance No. 8187 violated
any of the provisos in Section 81.
_______________
50 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1810.

51 Id.
52 Id., at pp. 1810-1812.
120
No clear basis and compelling reasons

This court must be presented with clear basis and
compelling reasons so as to overcome the
presumption of statutory validity and
constitutionality. We explained in Smart
Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar,
Batangas53 that:
To justify the nullification of the law or its

implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not
a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in
the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the
Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a
law] based on . . . baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of
the executive which approved it.” This presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached
by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged
act must be struck down.54

In Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,55 we
reiterated the test to determine the validity of an
ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well-established. A long

line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed
_______________
53 G.R. No. 204429, February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 677 [Per J.
Carpio, En Banc], citing LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and
Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373 [Per
J. Mendoza, En Banc].
54 Id., at p. 696.
55 G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 141 [Per J.
Mendoza, En Banc].
121
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 121

by law, it must also conform to the following substantive

requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.56 (Citation
omitted)

The reason for the first requirement — that an
ordinance should not contravene the Constitution or
any statute — was explained in City of Manila v.
Hon. Laguio57 as follows:
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid

when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the
laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it
must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and
the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That
ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of
the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that
the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to
the precept that local government units are able to legislate
only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a
delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal
or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.58
(Citations omitted)

In relation to the constitutional requirement of due
process, we further clarified that:
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the

rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests
have been used by the Court — the rational relationship
test and the strict scrutiny test:
_______________
56 Id., at p. 157, citing White Light Corporation v. City of

Manila, 596 Phil. 444; 576 SCRA 416 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc].
57 Supra note 45.
58 Id., at p. 308; p. 327.
122

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test

mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus
is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest.59 (Citation omitted)

We then recalled the rational relationship test in
this manner:
As with the State, local governments may be considered

as having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there
must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method.60 (Citation omitted)

In White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,61
this court clarified that heightened or immediate
scrutiny is used “for evaluating classifications based
on gender and legitimacy.”62
_______________
59 Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107,

March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 141, 157 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
60 Id., at p. 158, citing Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza,
Jr., supra note 17 at p. 493; p. 138.
61 Supra note 56.
62 Id., at p. 462; p. 436.
123
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 123

This standard is still sparingly used in substantive

due process cases.
Unfortunately, the ponencia does not use these
standards but instead anchors its conclusion on the
existence of the prior case of Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. or G.R. No. 156052.
Thus:
It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially

filed, not to secure a judgment adverse to the first decision,
but, precisely, to enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the oil
depots from the Pandacan area.
....
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that
the conditions with respect to the operations of the oil
depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No
8027 do not substantially differ to this day, as would later
be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the
new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
“general welfare” of the city does not after all gear towards
the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning,
but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal
preference of the members who sit in the council as to
which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the
city councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring
the city’s economic-related benefits, through the continued
stay of the oil terminals, over the protection of the very
lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this
Court to make a final determination on the basis of the
facts on the table as to which specific right of the
inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present
controversy, history reveals that there is
124

truly no such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the

general welfare of the people is concerned.63

On the contrary, the pleadings show that the
factual milieu may have changed. Furthermore,
Ordinance No. 8027 cannot be an irrepealable
ordinance. Its repeal cannot be a basis for illegality or
unconstitutionality.

II
Unresolved questions of fact
defeat a challenge to the legal or constitutional
validity of an ordinance

Petitioners make the following factual assertions:
First: Oil depots are inherently risky and pose a
threat to the security of its surrounding community.64
Second: There is the confirmed presence of Jemaah
Islamiyah in the country.65 If the Philippines is not a
target of terrorist attacks, then why did Congress
pass Republic Act No. 9372, also known as the
Human Security Act of 2007?66
Third: Ordinance No. 8187 allows the entry of
pollutive and hazardous industries in Manila. This
violates Article II, Sections 15 and 16 of the 1987
Constitution. It also violates Presidential Decree No.
1151, also known as the Philippine Environmental
Policy.67
Fourth: The enactment of Ordinance No. 8187 was
in bad faith because it was passed and signed into
law a month after the denial with finality of the
motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 156052.68
_______________
63 Ponencia, pp. 85 and 89-90.

64 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1761.
65 Id., at p. 1768.
66 Id., at p. 1770.
67 Id., at pp. 1773-1774.
68 Id., at p. 1772.
125
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 125

SJS attached a committee report69 to its

memorandum, to convince this court why its petition
for prohibition should be granted. However, that
committee report pertains to Ordinance No. 8027. It
is irrelevant. The circumstances that led to the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 are different from
more contemporary considerations that led
respondents to the promulgation of Ordinance No.
8187. Contrary to the stance of petitioners, we cannot
presume that the world always remains at status quo,
that it is static, and it does not change.
In the ponencia:
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that

the conditions with respect to the operations of the oil
depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No.
8027 do not substantially differ to this day, as would later
be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the
new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
“general welfare” of the city does not after all gear towards
the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning,
but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal
preference of the members who sit in the council as to
which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor.70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Intervenor Chevron points out that out of the 52
storage tanks in the Pandacan terminal, 26 tanks
have been decommissioned.71 Buffer zones and green
parks now exist in order to protect both the terminal
and the nearby residential area.72
Intervenor Shell manifests that its area in the
Pandacan terminal will eventually become a mere
distribution point. At
_______________
69 Id., at p. 1767.

70 Ponencia, pp. 89-90.
71 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2039.
72 Id.
126

present, it is in the process of transferring its fuel

to the Shell terminals in Batangas, Bataan, La
Union, and Muntinlupa.73 As for its supply of
aviation fuel, it will be delivered directly to the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport.74 Petron’s transfer and
Shell’s reduction of their operations in Pandacan will
reduce the terminal’s environmental footprint by
more than 50%.75
Even the ponencia recognizes that the conditions
have changed when it stated that:
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and

Petron, continue to enhance the safety and security
features of the terminals. They likewise adopt fire and
product spill prevention measures in accordance with the
local standards set by the Bureau of Fire Protection, among
others, and with the international standards of the
American Petroleum Industry (“API”) and the National Fire
Prevention and Safety Association (“NFPSA”); that since
1914, the oil depots have not experienced “any incident
beyond the ordinary risks and expectations” of the
residents of Manila; and that it received a passing grade on
the safety measures they installed in the facilities from the
representatives of the City of Manila who conducted an
ocular inspection on 22 May 2009; and
....
. . . . Shell’s portion of the oil depot is likewise allegedly
equipped with the latest technology to ensure air quality
control and water quality control, and to prevent and cope
with possible oil spills with a crisis management plan in
place in the event that an oil spill occurs. Finally, Shell
claims that the recommendations of EQE International in
its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which it
says is one of the leading independent
_______________
73 Id., at p. 2368.

74 Id., at p. 2369.
75 Id.
127
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 127

risk assessment providers in the world and largest risk

management consultancy, were sufficiently complied with;
and that, on its own initiative, adopted additional measures
for the purpose, for which reason, “the individual risk level
resulting from any incident occurring from the Pandacan
Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty (20) times lower
compared to the individual risk level of an average working
or domestic environment.”
....
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain
insufficient to convince the Court that the dangers posed by
the presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area
have already been completely removed.76 (Emphasis in
the original)

With regard to highly flammable substances, Shell
manifested that liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is no
longer stored in the Pandacan terminal. Among the
fuel products, only LPG can cause an explosion.
Diesel, fuel oil, and lubricating engine oil will not
explode even if a lit match or anything with fire is
thrown at any of these fuel products because these
products do not easily vaporize and require more
energy to burn. For gasoline, kerosene, and jet fuel,
Shell also utilizes special containers to prevent
explosions. All of these products are stored below
their flashpoint temperature.77
With respect to terrorist organizations such as
Jemaah Islamiyah being in this country, intervenor
Petron rebuts by stating that it is extremely difficult
to ascertain the objectives of terrorists.78 Further, a
survey of terrorist attacks from 2003 to 2009 reveals
that the following areas have been the targets:
48 buses and trains
_______________
76 Ponencia, pp. 91-92, 92-93, 94.

77 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 2487-2488.
78 Id., at p. 2222.
128

31 marketplaces
28 churches and mosques
13 police stations
20 restaurants and cafes
18 hotels79

An oil terminal in Yemen was the target of a
terrorist attack, but it was foiled and the small fire in
a gas tank, caused by shrapnel from an explosion,
was easily extinguished.80 Based on this data, Petron
makes the assumption that oil refineries and oil
depots may have the same degree of risk as any other
business establishment when it comes to terrorist
attacks.81
Shell alleged that safety measures are in place in
the Pandacan terminal. The terminal employs around
300 security personnel, working round the clock in
three shifts. Checkpoints and security outposts are
located at the entrance and exits of the terminal. The
area is equipped with closed circuit television
cameras, capable of zooming and panning to get a
bird’s eye view of all activities inside the terminal
and its surrounding areas.82
In addition, the Pandacan terminal is in close
proximity to Malacañan Palace. It is included in the
“no-fly zone.” Any aircraft flying near the area can be
“neutralized” by Malacañan Palace’s anti-aircraft gun
batteries.83
With regard to the argument that Ordinance No.
8187 allows the entry of pollutive and hazardous
industries in the City of Manila, Shell points out that
Ordinance No. 8187 simply followed the
classifications provided in the Housing
_______________
79 Id., at p. 2223.

80 Id., at pp. 2224-2225.
81 Id., at p. 2222.
82 Id., at p. 2370.
83 Id., at p. 2371.
129
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 129

and Land Use Regulatory Board Model Zoning
Ordinance.84 It does not necessarily mean that they
are actually pollutive or hazardous. Thus, intervenor
Shell states:
It bears noting that while petroleum refineries and oil

depots are classified as “highly pollutive/extremely
hazardous” industries, they are nonetheless allowable
classifications even under the Model Zoning Ordinance. To
reiterate, contrary to petitioners’ simplistic and misleading
argument, such classification does not mean that highly
essential industries which are classified as “highly
pollutive/extremely hazardous” have a license to cause
pollution. It only recognizes that these industries have the
possibility to cause pollution if no environmental
safeguards and/or standards are in place.85

Under Ordinance 8187, medium industrial zones
would allow the operation of “pollutive/hazardous
industries” while heavy industrial zones would allow
the operation of “highly pollutive/nonhazardous
industries”; “highly pollutive/hazardous industries”;
“highly pollutive/extremely hazardous industries”;
“pollutive/extremely hazardous industries”; and “non-
pollutive/extremely hazardous industries.”86
However, these are mere classifications that should
not, in any way, lead to the conclusion that the
industries classified under any of these categories are
automatically polluters.
The arguments raised by petitioners are
hypothetical. No convincing evidence was presented
to show why oil depots are inherently risky or why oil
depots are targets of terrorist attacks. The examples
of fire incidents in other fuel facilities located in
Puerto Rico and India87 are insufficient to give us a
scientific basis for concluding that the risks of simply
having an oil depot are unmanageably high. The
examples do not
_______________
84 Id., at p. 2462.

85 Id., at pp. 2462-2463.
86 Id., at pp. 2115-2122.
87 Id., at pp. 1760-1761.
130

relate to the number of oil depots that have

operated continuously without any safety problems.
To decide a controversy on the basis of
hypothetical facts would have the effect of barring
litigation between real parties with real causes of
action.88

III
The earlier case of
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon.
Atienza, Jr.,
G.R. No. 156052

Although dealing with a different ordinance with a
different treatment of the Pandacan oil depots, the
earlier doctrinal pronouncements in Social
Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.89
or G.R. No. 156052 support this dissent.
This earlier case was a petition for mandamus
filed directly before this court. It sought to compel the
mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No.
8027.
With the petition being an original one, it is wrong
to conclude that this court made definitive factual
findings that are binding in this case when it granted
the writ of mandamus against respondent Mayor
Lim. The petition was granted on the ground that
since the validity of the memorandum of
understanding executed between Chevron, Shell,
Petron, and the City of Manila had expired, there was
no more hindrance to the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 8027.90
_______________
88 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.

204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
89 Supra note 31. The 2008 Social Justice Society (SJS) v.
Atienza, Jr. case is a resolution on the interventions of Chevron
Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.
90 Supra note 31 at p. 494; pp. 662-663.
131
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 131

After the decision had been promulgated, motions

for leave to intervene and motions for reconsideration
were filed. In a resolution, this court granted the
motions for leave to intervene but denied the motions
for reconsideration.91
In denying the motion for reconsideration, this
court ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not
unconstitutional based on the challenge raised by
Chevron, Shell, and Petron.92 This court did not make
the pronouncement that the ordinance cannot be
repealed. This court certainly did not even make
definitive findings of fact that would have prevented
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila to change its
policy. In this case, it appears that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
reconsidered its interpretation of the factual
basis of the earlier ordinance, examined the
viability of its policy in relation to the interests
of its constituents, and passed Ordinance No.
8187. It is also clear that there were changes in
the elected representatives of the City of Manila.
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
Jr. has the authority to hold that Ordinance No. 8027
was enacted in the exercise of police power.93 It did
not discriminate against the Pandacan terminal and
the oil depots found therein.94 Neither did the
ordinance contravene Republic Act No. 763895 and
Republic Act No. 8479.96 Further, Ordinance No.
8027 does not prohibit the oil businesses from
conducting their business in Manila, but they are no
longer allowed to have an oil depot in the Pandacan
terminal.97
_______________
91 Supra note 17 at p. 723; p. 160.

92 Id., at p. 720; p. 157.
93 Id., at pp. 702-705; p. 136.
94 Id., at pp. 708-709; p. 144.
95 An Act Creating the Department of Energy Rationalizing the
Organization and Functions of Government Agencies Related to
Energy, and for Other Purposes (1992).
96 Supra note 17 at pp. 709-715; p. 100.
97 Id., at p. 706; p. 142.
132

This court denied the second motion for

reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.

No res judicata

Certainly, Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v.
Hon. Atienza, Jr. is not res judicata insofar as the
present original petition is concerned.
The procedural vehicle is no longer mandamus in
this case. Petitioner SJS filed a petition for
prohibition. Petitioner Mayor Atienza now files a
petition for prohibition, mandamus and certiorari.
The earlier case sought to enforce an ordinance. SJS,
in this case, seeks to enjoin the enforcement of an
ordinance because:
[T]he same is illegal and unconstitutional, thus, without

force and effect. Further, it is a circumvention of this
Honorable Court’s decision on [sic] GR 156052 which
mandates the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 by the
mayor of the City of Manila which effectively removes the
Pandacan oil depot.98

Clearly, the decision in Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. dealt with Ordinance
No. 8027. This petition now deals with Ordinance No.
8187. The subject matter and the issues are totally
different.

No allegation and clear basis for a finding that
a law was violated in enacting the ordinance

The petition filed by petitioner SJS in this case
and its memorandum are extraordinary in that these
are bereft of any substantial argument that clearly
shows that Ordinance No. 8187 violates any law. The
closest mention of any law is
_______________
98 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1758.
133
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 133

Section 458 of the Local Government Code of 1991
that grants the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
the power to enact ordinances for the general welfare.
Petitioner SJS recommends that we rule that:
“General welfare” means the enjoyment of health and

the common blessings of life, and this could only be
achieved if there would be [a] guarantee against risk in
health and the common blessings of life of the people.99
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Explaining its argument that general welfare can
only be present if there is absolutely no risk to health,
petitioner SJS continues to cite Villanueva v.
Castañeda,100 where this court held that a talipapa
(small public market) can endanger public health and
public safety.101 Thus, in the sole view of petitioner
SJS:
If this Honorable Court could consider a talipapa to be

hazardous to public health and safety, there is more reason
for this Honorable Court to consider the Pandacan oil depot
to be hazardous to the community surrounding it. The
comparison may not be apple to apple and orange to orange
but the logic and common sense behind this comparison is
to point out the far greater danger that an oil depot may
bring compared to that of a talipapa. The detrimental
impact of the mere presence of the oil depot in the
Pandacan community outweighs the beneficial impact that
it gives, if it has any.102

Such arguments are superficially seducing but
dangerous because these ask that legal decisions be
the outcome of homespun fear rather than based on
more critical analysis.
_______________
99 Id., at p. 1765.
100 238 Phil. 136; 154 SCRA 142 (1987) [Per J. Cruz, First
Division].
101 Id., at p. 146; p. 151.
102 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1767.
134


The fallacy of the argument of petitioner SJS is
obvious.
To begin with, not all talipapa are hazardous to
public health and safety. In the case cited by
petitioner SJS, the talipapa was “in the vicinity of the
public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along
Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77
meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors
stalls.”103 The vendors wanted to assert their right to
remain in the area due to a previous authorization by
the municipal government. The municipal
government denied this right, insisting on the
demolition of their structures because they were
illegal constructions on public property. In deciding to
uphold the municipal government, this court noted
that the occupants proliferated under filthy
conditions that added to the basis of the municipal
government to assert its powers over the public
space.104 That case certainly did not denigrate all
talipapa. Its reiteration of the findings of the
municipal government certainly only applied to that
specific set of vendor stalls.
Not all talipapa are the same. Not all are
hazardous to public health and safety. It depends on
the condition of the talipapa. These conditions can be
found only upon the presentation of evidence in the
proper judicial forum. Only after the presentation of
evidence can the degree of risk and hazard be
assessed in relation to the standards contained in law
and corresponding regulations. Only after all these
can courts rule whether to remove or demolish a
talipapa.
The same considerations apply to oil depots. In
this case, upon reassessing the facts and weighing the
risks in relation to the necessity of the Pandacan oil
depot, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila found
it proper to reverse its policy through a validly issued
ordinance. Except for superficial arguments based on
fallacies masquerading as common sense, petitioners
here do not present us with facts that can be taken
_______________
103 Villanueva v. Castañeda, supra note 100 at p. 139; p. 145.

104 Id., at p. 146; p. 151.
135
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 135

judicial notice of. Rather, petitioners present to us

the same city council report that was submitted for
the passage of Ordinance No. 8027, and not the
report that served as basis for Ordinance No. 8187,
which is the subject of this case.
The failure to discharge the burden of clearly
showing the illegality of the ordinance is enough to
dismiss the petition. However, the static view of the
world presented by petitioners merits further
attention.
The challenges and controversies surrounding the
passage of the various ordinances relating to the
Pandacan oil depot certainly also impel the
corporations and the local government officials to
install measures to further assure its public. We
cannot accept the implied assumption of the
petitioners that nothing in relation to the Pandacan
oil depot has changed since this court’s decision and
resolution in the earlier case of Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.105
For instance, the ponencia in Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. (2008 resolution)
pointed out that:
The ordinance [Ordinance No. 8027] was intended to

safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The
depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of
western interests which means that it is a terrorist target.
As long as there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became
necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.
According to respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11
incident which showed that what was perceived to be
impossible to happen, to the most powerful country in the
world at that, is actually possible. The destruction of
property and the loss of thousand of lives on
_______________
105 Supra notes 31 and 17.

136

that fateful day became the impetus for a public need. In

the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism
continued [such] that it became imperative for governments
to take measures to combat their effects.106

In this petition, SJS repeats the same argument
with the same certainty that the Pandacan terminal
is a target of terrorist attacks because it represents
Western interest in the Philippines. In its
memorandum, SJS randomly listed acts of terrorism
in the Philippines and in Asia. In its own
enumeration, bombs attributed to terrorists exploded:
in cars near the official residence of ambassadors, on
a packed parking deck beneath a stock exchange
building, inside a luggage, outside a bar, in a bus
terminal, in an embassy, in hotels, and inside a light
rail transit coach.107
In the Philippines, terrorists have targeted
government buildings, public utility buses, fastfood
outlet, beach resort, markets, and churches.108 At the
international level, terrorists have chosen trains,
churches, mosques and other places where the
faithful gather, police stations, hotels, embassies, and
markets.109 Not once has an oil depot been attacked.
“Western interests,” if such concept can be
accepted despite its obvious ambiguity and potential
to encompass much of modern life, are simply too
omnipresent. To accept SJS’ theory would mean that
it would be illegal and unconstitutional not to close
down or isolate cars, residences of ambassadors,
parking buildings, lounges, bars, restaurants, bus
terminals, embassy buildings, hotels, and light rail
transit coaches.
The panic does not end there. SJS expands even
further to almost everything. Thus:
_______________
106 Id., at p. 703; p. 139.

107 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 1768-1770.
108 Id., at p. 2224.
109 Id., at p. 2223.
137
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 137

All of us should not forget the so-called Rizal Day

bombings where innocent ordinary people were targeted by
J[emaah] I[slamiyah] on Light Rail Transit coaches which
had claimed many lives. The Light Rail Transit did not
represent Western interest and had no symbolic value as
far as Western target is concerned and yet it was struck by
those heartless terrorists.110

Risks are inherent in all human activity. The
questions properly addressed to policy makers are
whether the risks are properly proven and
understood, the measures that are proposed are
sufficient to mitigate the risks in relation to the
beneficial effects or objective of the activity, and
whether the measures can be implemented given the
institutions in place and the resources available.
Governance cannot proceed from imagined fears.
Therefore, insofar as judicial review is concerned, it is
not our duty to second-guess political branches or
local government units. They are in a better position
to understand risks, decide on measures, and pursue
these measures’ implementation.

Doctrine in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al.
v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.

This much was recognized in Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.111
Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and

until the courts declare the contrary in clear and
unequivocal terms. The mere fact that the ordinance is
alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a
party to have its enforcement enjoined. The presumption is
all in favor of validity. The reason for this is obvious:
_______________
110 Id., at p. 1770.

111 Supra note 17.
138

The action of the elected representatives of the people

cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate
action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations
are essential to the well being of the people . . . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation.
x x x x x x x x x
[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary[,] in the determination of actual cases and
controversies[,] must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
The oil companies argue that this presumption must be
set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears
on the face of the ordinance itself. We see no reason to set
aside the presumption. The ordinance, on its face, does not
at all appear to be unconstitutional. It reclassified the
subject area from industrial to commercial. Prima facie,
this power is within the power of municipal corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their
territory into industrial, commercial and residential zones
is recognized in almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is
derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the
protection and benefit of their inhabitants.
x x x x x x x x x
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the
power to divide its territory into residential and industrial
zones, and to prescribe that offensive and un-
139
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 139

wholesome trades and occupations are to be established

exclusively in the latter zone.
x x x x x x x x x
Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has
the authority, derived from the police power, of forbidding
the appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the
zone where it is now situated, which has been declared
residential....
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly
appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such
showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the
Manila RTC’s May 19, 2003 order had no leg to stand on.112
(Citations omitted)

IV
No ordinance is irrepealable

Petitioners assail Ordinance No. 8187 because the
ordinance effectively allows the oil depots to remain
in the Pandacan terminal, allegedly contrary to this
court’s decision in G.R. No. 156052. It, thus,
concludes that the ordinance is illegal or
unconstitutional.
Petitioners are mistaken.
Ordinance No. 8187 repealed Ordinance No. 8027.
G.R. No. 156052 had Ordinance No. 8027 as its
subject matter. There is no circumvention of the
decision in G.R. No. 156052 simply because
Ordinance No. 8027 no longer exists upon its valid
repeal by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila.
Both ordinances were the result of the determination
of policy by the City of Manila. Certainly, there is
nothing in our decision in
_______________
112 Id., at pp. 683-684; pp. 117-118. Supra note 41 at p. 325; p.

857; US v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102, 110 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, En
Banc]; Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936)
[Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
140

G.R. No. 156052 that categorically prevents the

repeal of Ordinance No. 8027.
As this court has categorically stated, “there is no
such thing as an irrepealable law.”113 As explained in
Duarte v. Dade:114
It is fundamental that what legislators have the power

to enact they have the power to repeal. In speaking of the
powers of legislative bodies, it is said in Lewis’ Southerland
on Statutory Construction, Section 244: “A state legislature
has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether
pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old,
unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot
bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative body may
modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its
predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the
same session at which the original act was passed; and
even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a
law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a
particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the
intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.”115 (Emphasis supplied)

In The City of Davao, et al. v. Regional Trial Court,
Branch XII, Davao City, et al.,116 this court stated
that:
_______________
113 Atitiw v. Zamora, 508 Phil. 321, 341; 471 SCRA 329, 345
(2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
114 32 Phil. 36 (1915) [Per J. Trent, En Banc].
115 Id., at p. 49.
116 504 Phil. 543; 467 SCRA 280 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second
Division].
141
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 141

It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive

limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition
against the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws
deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best
senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the
operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy
stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic
democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times. As
Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed,
“[t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there
are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate
of progress and we should not fear change.”
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind
the actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as
they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is
not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a
legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments
or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.117 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Even the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
implement Ordinance No. 8027 cannot mean that it
becomes irrepealable. This was a live and existing
ordinance when this court dealt with it in Social
Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.
Today, it has been validly repealed. This court made
it clear in G.R. No. 156052 (2007) that the city mayor
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 “as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts.”118
_______________
117 Id., at p. 558; p. 295.

118 Supra note 31 at p. 493; pp. 665-666.
142

V
Violation of the doctrine of respect
for the hierarchy of courts

Respondents argue that the petitions should be
dismissed because direct recourse to this court is
improper. The allegations in the petitions involve
factual issues that require the presentation of
evidence. Also, Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed.—. . . .

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

Chevron argues that since the act complained of
was done in the City of Manila, then the petition
should have been filed before the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila.119 As a consequence, the petitions
in G.R. No. 187836 and G.R. No. 187916 should be
dismissed.
In accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the
1987 Constitution, this court has jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. The same jurisdiction is
granted to the Court of Appeals120 and Regional Trial
Courts121 under Batas Pambansa
_______________
119 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2053.

120 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), Sec. 9.
121 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), Sec. 21.
143
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 143

Blg. 129.122 Thus, there is concurrence of

jurisdiction among this court, the Court of Appeals,
and the Regional Trial Court with regard to petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
However, the concurrence of jurisdiction does not
mean that parties are free to choose which court to
seek redress from. This court is the court of last
resort, and observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts is necessary to prevent “(1) inordinate
demands upon the time and attention of the court,
which is better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of
the court’s docket.”123
In Anillo v. COSLAP,124 this court explained that:
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct

recourse to this Court is highly improper for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts. While we have concurrent jurisdiction
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of
certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an
unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the
application for the writ will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. This Court is a court of last resort and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary
writs is allowed only when there are special and impor-
_______________
122 An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds

Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
123 De Castro v. Carlos, G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013, 696
SCRA 400, 407 [Per CJ. Sereno, En Banc].
124 560 Phil. 499; 534 SCRA 228 (2007) [Per J. Tiñga, Second
Division].
144

tant reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in

the petition.
....
The doctrines of judicial hierarchy and res judicata are
not meaningless procedural rules because they are
grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice. Procedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like
all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. Procedural law has its own rationale
in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure
the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing
for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism
or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.125

Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Nevertheless, this court has, from time to time,
relaxed its rules and allowed the direct filing of
petitions before it. The exceptions to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts include:
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the

advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the
broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders
were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional
and compelling circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.126
_______________
125 Id., at pp. 505-506 and 509; pp. 239-240.

126 Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013,
705 SCRA 613, 622 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing
Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013, 691
SCRA 306 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
145
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 145

None of these exceptions were sufficiently shown

to be present in this case so as to convince this court
that it should relax its rules of procedure.

VI
Petitioners have no legal standing

In its memorandum, SJS alleges that it is suing
not as taxpayers, but in pursuance of a public right.
Since its members are Filipino citizens, it has the
standing to pursue the public right without need to
allege any specific interest in the public right. SJS
also claims that Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao resides
in Pandacan and lives 300 meters away from the
Petron oil depot and, as such, has a substantial
interest.127
In G.R. No. 187916, some of the petitioners are
minors claiming to represent their own generation
and future generations. However, unlike Oposa v.
Factoran,128 the minors in this case do not appear to
be representative enough of the interests of their
generation as to consider their petition to be a class
suit.
On the contrary, Shell, Chevron, and Petron point
out that petitioners neither alleged any particular
injury suffered nor did they allege any imminent
injury brought about by Ordinance No. 8187.
In cases involving issues of constitutionality, the
party raising the issue of constitutionality must have
locus standi. Locus standi has been defined as “a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.”129 The basic question in
_______________
127 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 1761-1762.

128 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792 [Per J.
Davide, Jr., En Banc].
129 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R.
No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 491 [Per J. Perlas-
Bernabe, En Banc], citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil.
705, 755; 489 SCRA 160, 216 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En
Banc].
146

determining if one has locus standing is “whether

a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.”130
The requirement that one must have locus standi
comes from Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, which states that:
Article VIII. Judicial Department

Section 1. . . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The requirement that a party must have standing
in court is not a mere procedural rule that this court
can brush aside on the mere invocation of
“transcendental importance,” “taxpayers’ suit,” and
“filing as Filipino citizens.” Then Associate Justice
Reynato Puno, in his dissenting opinion in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona,131 explained the importance
of locus standi:
The requirement of standing to sue inheres from the

definition of judicial power. It is not merely a technical rule
of procedure which we are at liberty to disregard. Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
....
_______________
130 Id., citing Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, February
28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 170 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
131 J. Puno, Dissenting Opinion in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,
G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110 [Per J. Davide, Jr.,
En Banc].
147
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 147

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice

to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Italics
in the original)
....
Stated otherwise, courts are neither free to decide all
kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to
open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a
grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement
of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is intended “to
assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and,
perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary’s
overruling the determination of a coordinate,
democratically elected organ of government.”
....
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the
standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional
issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our
resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial
service to our people is severely limited. For courts to
indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and
suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and
ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of
justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our
judiciary today.132

“Rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable” means that the party who seeks relief
from this court must suffer, or is in imminent danger
of suffering, an injury. In
_______________
132 Id., at pp. 166, 169 and 170-171.

148

Tolentino v. COMELEC,133 this court held that

“direct injury” may be determined using the following
guidelines:
Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only

when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.134

In a previous case,135 this court held that SJS had
no standing to file a petition for declaratory relief
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on the
following grounds:
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove

that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. A taxpayer’s
action may be properly brought only when there is an
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the
present case, there is no allegation, whether express or
implied, that taxpayers’ money is being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its
members as registered voters would be adversely affected
by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question
at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS
had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts
imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that
any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or
the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.
_______________
133 465 Phil. 385; 420 SCRA 438 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc].
134 Id., at p. 402; p. 452.
135 Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28,
2004, 428 SCRA 283 [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
149
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 149

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its “thousands of

members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters” is
too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards
set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest
impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of
standing.136 (Citations omitted)

This should have guided SJS in determining
whether it had the standing to file the petition for
prohibition before this court. Unfortunately, SJS did
not heed this court’s advice.

Transcendental importance

Petitioners try to justify its direct recourse to this
court by arguing that the issues raised in their
petitions are of “transcendental importance.”137
To determine if an issue is of transcendental
importance, this court is guided by the parameters
set forth in Francisco v. House of Representatives:138
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental

importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.139
_______________
136 Id., at pp. 296-297.

137 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1764.
138 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales,
En Banc].
139 Id., at p. 899; p. 139.
150

A mere allegation of transcendental importance

will not suffice to convince this court to take
cognizance of a case. Petitioner SJS, in its
memorandum, point out that since this court had
taken cognizance of G.R. No. 156052, there is no more
need to present other arguments to convince this
court that the matter at hand is of transcendental
importance.140
Petitioners are mistaken. Whether an issue is of
transcendental importance is a matter determined by
this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of
transcendental importance must be supported by the
proper allegations.
Petitioners, however, merely stated:
This Honorable Court, again in the prequel case of Social

Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, 13
February 2008, made the following statements —
The importance of settling this controversy as fully and
as expeditiously as possible was emphasized, considering
its impact on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of
this issue here. The parties were after all given ample
opportunity to present and argue their respective positions.
By so doing, we will do away with the delays concomitant
with litigation and completely adjudicate an issue which
will most likely reach us anyway as the final arbiter of all
legal disputes.
The foregoing was an undeniable recognition by this
Honorable Court of the importance of this case as it
mentioned “its impact on public interest” that justified its
taking cognizance of the original petition because the issue
would most likely reach it anyway “as the final arbiter of all
legal disputes.” Thus, petitioners need not stretch its
argumentation to convince this Honorable Court about the
transcendental importance of this case.141
_______________
140 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1764.

141 Id.
151
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 151

For this court to brush aside the rules of procedure

in view of the “transcendental importance” of a case,
petitioners must be able to show that “the imminence
and clarity of the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence.”142 This they failed to do.

VII
There are other remedies available

Respondents and intervenors point out that more
appropriate remedies are available to petitioners. As
petitioners’ allegations relate to the environment,
they could have filed civil, criminal, or special civil
actions before the lower courts, and prayed for the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan, or environment
protection orders, as provided by the rules of
procedure for environmental cases. Chevron raised
the argument that since petitioners allege that the
Pandacan terminal is hazardous and pollutive, then
the proper remedy is not to enjoin the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8187 but to enjoin the hazardous and
pollutive activities inside the terminal.143
I agree with respondents.
Petitioners could have availed themselves of the
remedy of a writ of kalikasan if they could properly
and clearly show grave danger to the environment.
Petitioners may argue that their petitions were
filed ahead of the promulgation of the rules of
procedure for environmental cases. However,
procedural rules are generally given retroactive effect
since there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.144
_______________
142 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, supra

note 129 at p. 493.
143 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 2065-2066.
144 De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, 561 Phil. 512; 535
SCRA 411 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
152

Rule 7, Section 1 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC145

provides:
SEC. 1. Nature of the writ.—The writ is a remedy
available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized
by law, people’s organization, nongovernmental
organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.

The application for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan is commenced by filing a verified petition,
stating the personal circumstances of petitioner and
respondent, the environmental laws violated, the acts
or omissions complained of, and the environmental
damage “as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.”146 The
petition must be supported by relevant evidence such
as affidavits or documents. A petition for the issuance
of a writ of kalikasan may include a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary environmental protection
order (TEPO).147
If petitioners had evidence, they could also file an
action for abatement of nuisance, considering that in
their memorandum, they characterized the oil depot
as a nuisance per accidens. Their memorandum
states:
No self-respecting government would allow its people to

be exposed to health and safety risk by allowing a nuisance
per accidens, just like the Pandacan oil depot, to
_______________
145 Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (2010).

146 A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 7, Sec. 2.
147 A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 7, Sec. 2(f).
153
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 153

sit side by side with a densely populated community.148

(Emphasis from the original removed)

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as:
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission,

establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

Another option available to petitioners was to file a
complaint under the provisions of the Clean Air
Act.149 Thus, the law provides:
SEC. 40. Administrative Action.—Without prejudice to

the right of any affected person to file an administrative
action, the Department shall, on its own instance or upon
verified complaint by any person, institute administrative
proceedings against any person who violates:
a. Standards or limitation provided under this Act; or
b. Any order, rule or regulation issued by the
Department with respect to such standard or limitation.
_______________
148 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1775.
149 Rep. Act No. 8749 (1999), otherwise known as An Act
Providing for a Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy and for
Other Purposes.
154

SEC. 41. Citizen Suits.—For purposes of enforcing the

provisions of this Act or its implementing rules and
regulations, any citizen may file an appropriate civil,
criminal or administrative action in the proper courts
against:
a. Any person who violates or fails to comply with the
provisions of this Act or its implementing rules and
regulations; or
b. The Department or other implementing agencies with
respect to orders, rules and regulations issued inconsistent
with this Act; and/or
c. Any public officer who willfully or grossly neglects the
performance of an act specifically enjoined as a duty by this
Act or its implementing rules and regulations; or abuses his
authority in the performance of his duty; or, in any manner,
improperly performs his duties under this Act or its
implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however,
That no suit can be filed until after thirty-day (30) notice
has been given to the public officer and the alleged violator
concerned and no appropriate action has been taken
thereon.
The court shall exempt such action from the payment of
filing fees, except fees for actions not capable of pecuniary
estimations, and shall, likewise, upon prima facie showing
of the nonenforcement or violation complained of, exempt
the plaintiff from the filing of an injunction bond for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Within thirty (30) days, the court shall make a
determination if the compliant herein is malicious and/or
baseless and shall accordingly dismiss the action and award
attorney’s fees and damages.
SEC. 42. Independence of Action.—The filing of an
administrative suit against such person/entity does not
preclude the right of any other person to file any criminal or
civil action. Such civil action shall proceed independently.
155
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 155

If petitioners had evidence to support their

allegation that Ordinance No. 8187 by its simple
existence actually causes pollution and hazard to
communities in Manila, they could avail themselves
of remedies under Republic Act No. 6969,150 whose
pertinent portions state:
SEC. 13. Prohibited Acts.—The following acts and

omissions shall be considered unlawful:
a. Knowingly use a chemical substance or mixture which
is imported, manufactured, processed or distributed in
violation of this Act or implementing rules and regulations
or orders;
b. Failure or refusal to submit reports, notices or other
information, access to records as required by this Act, or
permit inspection of establishment where chemicals are
manufactured, processed, stored or otherwise held;
c. Failure or refusal to comply with the premanufacture
and pre-importation requirements; and
d. Cause, aid or facilitate, directly or indirectly, in the
storage, importation, or bringing into Philippine territory,
including its maritime economic zones, even in transit,
either by means of land, air or sea transportation or
otherwise keeping in storage any amount of hazardous and
nuclear wastes in any part of the Philippines.
SEC. 14. Criminal Offenses and Penalties.—
a. (i) The penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months
and one day to six (6) years and one day and a fine ranging
from Six hundred pesos (P600.00) to Four thousand pesos
(P4,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
violate Section 13(a) to (c) of this Act and shall not be
covered by the Probation
_______________
150 An Act to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and

Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for
Other Purposes (1990).
156

Law. If the offender is a foreigner, he or she shall be

deported and barred from any subsequent entry into the
Philippines after serving his or her sentence;
(ii) In case any violation of this Act is committed by a
partnership, corporation, association or any juridical
person, the partner, president, director or manager who
shall consent to or shall knowingly tolerate such violation
shall be directly liable and responsible for the act of the
employees and shall be criminally liable as a coprincipal;
(iii) In case the offender is a government official or
employee, he or she shall, in addition to the above
penalties, be deemed automatically dismissed from office
and permanently disqualified from holding any elective or
appointive position.
b. (i) The penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one day to twenty (20) years, shall be imposed upon
any person who shall violate Section 13(d) of this Act. If the
offender is a foreigner, he or she shall be deported and
barred from any subsequent entry into the Philippines after
serving his or her sentence;
(ii) In the case of corporations or other associations, the
above penalty shall be imposed upon the managing partner,
president or chief executive in addition to an exemplary
damage of at least Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00). If it is a foreign firm, the director and all
officers of such foreign firm shall be barred from entry into
the Philippines, in addition to the cancellation of its license
to do business in the Philippines;
(iii) In case the offender is a government official or
employee, he or she shall in addition to the above penalties
be deemed automatically dismissed from office and
permanently disqualified from holding any elective or
appointive position.
157
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 157

c. Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation,

entry, transport, manufacture, processing, sale or
distribution of chemical substances or mixtures into or
within the Philippines shall carry with it the confiscation
and forfeiture in favor of the Government of the proceeds of
the unlawful act and instruments, tools or other
improvements including vehicles, sea vessels, and aircrafts
used in or with which the offense was committed. Chemical
substances so confiscated and forfeited by the Government
at its option shall be turned over to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for safekeeping and
proper disposal;
d. The person or firm responsible or connected with the
bringing or importation into the country of hazardous or
nuclear wastes shall be under obligation to transport or
send back said prohibited wastes.
Any and all means of transportation, including all
facilities and appurtenances that may have been used in
transporting to or in the storage in the Philippines of any
significant amount of hazardous or nuclear wastes shall at
the option of the government be forfeited in its favor.

There is also a nonjudicial remedy available to
petitioners: that of local initiative and local
referendum.
Section 120 and Section 126 of Republic Act No.
7160 define local initiative and local referendum as:
SECTION 120. Local Initiative Defined.—Local

initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters
of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or
amend any ordinance.
....
SECTION 126. Local Referendum Defined.—Local
referendum is the legal process whereby the registered
voters of the local government units may approve, amend or
reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
158

The local referendum shall be held under the control and

direction of the COMELEC within sixty (60) days in case of
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The COMELEC shall certify and proclaim the results of
the said referendum.

Petron alleges that a petition for referendum
regarding Ordinance No. 8187 was initiated on June
23, 2009.151 The petition was entitled “Petisyon ng
mga mamamayan ng Maynila sa Sangguniang
Panglungsod ng Maynila na kaagad pawalang bisa
ang City Ordinance No[.] 8187 na may pamagat na
‘An Ordinance Amending Ordinance No. 8119,’
otherwise known as ‘The Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006,’ by
creating a Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy
Industrial Zone (1-3) and Providing for its
Enforcement.”152
Two of the signatories in the petition for
referendum, Vladimir Cabigao and Rafael Borromeo,
are petitioners in this case.153
Petitioners definitely had other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedies. On this ground alone, the petition
should have been dismissed.

VIII
Enactment of Ordinance No. 8283
renders this case moot and academic

Intervenor Shell filed a manifestation with motion
to dismiss dated September 2, 2013, informing this
court that Ordinance No. 8283 was published in The
Manila Times154 and
_______________
151 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2142.

152 Id., at p. 2143.
153 Id.
154 Id., at p. 2815.
159
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 159

took effect on September 30, 2012.155 Shell prays

that the petitions be dismissed for being moot and
academic.156 In the same manifestation, Shell stated
that it filed a petition for declaratory relief docketed
as Case No. 131034 questioning Ordinance No. 8283
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.157
Respondent Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila, filed a
compliance/explanation with urgent manifestation
dated September 13, 2012, informing this court that
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8283 on August 28, 2012.158 The
relevant portions of Ordinance No. 8283 provides:
ORDINANCE NO. 8283

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF
ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA
WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS
ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (I-3) TO
HIGH INTENSITY COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE
(C3/MXD)
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session
assembled, THAT:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 shall be
amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are
located, the operation of which are permitted under Section
1 hereof, are hereby classified as Industrial Zone except the
area where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located,
which shall be classified
_______________
155 Id., at p. 2814.

156 Id., at p. 2816.
157 Id.
158 Id., at p. 2760.
160

as High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone
(C3/MXD).” (Emphasis from the original removed)
SEC. 2. Owners or operators of petroleum refineries
and oil depots, the operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period
until the end of January 2016 within which to relocate the
operation of their businesses.159

Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No. 8283.160
However, the members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila overrode Mayor Lim’s veto by
more than two-thirds (2/3) vote during a regular
session on September 13, 2012.161 Mayor Lim filed a
manifestation162 dated November 26, 2012, informing
this court that he vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 for a
second time, pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act
No. 409.163
Whether Mayor Lim’s second veto was overridden
does not appear on record. However, considering this
court’s pronouncement in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr.,164 the appli-
_______________
159 Id., at pp. 2766-2767.

160 Id., at p. 2760.
161 Id., at p. 2761.
162 Id., at pp. 2781-2783.
163 Id., at p. 2782.
164 Supra note 45. This court held that:
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later
expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and
override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals
prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on
the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that
which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of
legislative will.
....
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that “All general
and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, ex-
161
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 161

cable law in this case is Republic Act No. 7160 and

not Republic Act No. 409. Section 55(c) of Republic
Act No. 7160 provides:

SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive.

—. . . .
....
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or
resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto
of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its
members, thereby making the ordinance effective even
without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.
(Emphasis supplied)

Following Section 55(c) of Republic Act No. 7160,
Mayor Lim’s second veto can be presumed to be of no
effect. For this reason, the enactment, publication,
and enforcement of Ordinance No. 8283 render the
petitions moot and academic. In David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,165 this court defined “moot and academic” in
the following manner:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a

justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.166

In the same case, this court discussed the moot
and academic principle as:
_______________
ecutive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or

part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.” (pp. 333-334; pp. 354-355)
165 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 129.
166 Id., at p. 753; pp. 213-214.
162

The ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical

formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.167

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP168 discussed
another exception to the moot and academic principle:
the “voluntary cessation of the activity complained of
by the defendant or doer.”169 This exception was
illustrated as follows:
Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases

the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive
the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and
does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff
seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the
possible recurrence of the violation.170

None of the parties have been able to show that
the exceptions to the moot and academic principle are
present. A review of the records reveals that after
Shell and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
filed their manifestations, petitioners SJS and Mayor
Atienza did not file any opposition to the motions to
dismiss.
In any case, to rule upon the validity of Ordinance
No. 8187 would be of no use since the ordinance has
been amended and, thus, conditions may have
changed.
_______________
167 Id., at p. 754; pp. 214-215.

168 589 Phil. 387; 568 SCRA 402 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-Morales,
En Banc].
169 Id., at p. 490; p. 461.
170 Id.
163
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 163

This court is mindful that the power of judicial

review should be exercised with caution. Judicial
pronouncements on the validity and constitutionality
of laws must be narrowly tailored to actual facts and
issues in order to prevent judicial overreach171 and
ensure that the remedy sought is appropriate to the
cause of action.172 Actual facts that have been duly
proven provide the limits to the scope of judicial
review that this court may exercise in a particular
case.173 In view of these principles, this court must
refrain from ruling upon the validity of Ordinance
No. 8187.

Final note

Mayor Atienza argues that Ordinance No. 8187
violates the precautionary principle in international
environmental law.174 Intervenor Shell refutes this by
arguing that the precautionary principle only applies
“when scientific investigation has found a plausible
risk.”175
The precautionary principle applies when it can be
shown that there is plausible risk, and its causes
cannot be determined with scientific certainty. It is
not available simply on the basis of imagined fears or
imagined causes. Otherwise, it will be absurd. Rather
than a reactive approach to fear, the precautionary
principle is evolving as a proactive approach in
_______________
171 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino III,

G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, 728 SCRA 1, 402-403 [Per J.
Bersamin, En Banc].
172 J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Disini,
Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014, 716
SCRA 237 [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
173 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 731 [Per J.
Mendoza, En Banc].
174 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2466.
175 Id., at p. 2467.
164

protecting the environment.176 Furthermore, being

only a principle, it does not trump the requirements
for proper invocation of remedies or act to repeal
existing laws.
Petitioners’ fears with regard to the prolonged stay
of the oil companies in the Pandacan terminal should
be assuaged by the execution of the MOU in 2002
among the Department of Energy, City of Manila,
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation, and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.177 Although it
appears that the validity of the MOU expired on April
30, 2003,178 the oil companies continued to fulfill
their responsibilities under the MOU. Several tanks
have been decommissioned and dismantled,179
including Shell’s LPG spheres.180 Petron filed a
manifestation,181 informing this court that within five
years, or not later than January 2016, it will cease
the operations of its petroleum storage facilities in
Pandacan due to environmental concerns and the
frequent changes in the zoning ordinances.182 Buffer
zones were constructed to protect both the terminal
and the nearby residential area.183 The oil companies
intend to continuously scale down its operations in
the Pandacan terminal, lessening operations by
around 80% in five years.184
Further, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 8283 on August 28, 2012,185
which reclassifies the Pandacan terminal from a
heavy industrial zone to a high
_______________
176 R. B. Deloso, The Precautionary Principle: Relevance in

International Law and Climate Change, 80 PHIL. L. J. 644 (2006).
177 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 331-334.
178 As per the decision in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v.
Atienza, Jr., supra note 31 at pp. 490 and 494; p. 662.
179 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2474.
180 Id., at p. 2475.
181 Id., at pp. 2315-2317.
182 Id., at p. 2316.
183 Id., at p. 2039.
184 Id., at p. 2517.
185 Id., at p. 2760.
165
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 165

intensity commercial/mixed use zone.186 According

to news reports,187 Mayor Joseph Estrada is enforcing
Ordinance No. 8283 and has informed the oil
companies that they should relocate by January 2016.
Petitioners’ aggressive vigilance to protect the
community’s security and its environment is
laudable. However, the resources that they deployed
would have been best used in the political forum. This
court’s jurisdiction is limited by the rule of law. The
policy decision to remove or gradually phase out the
Pandacan oil depot is left to the representatives of the
people of the City of Manila. We cannot replace their
political decision with our own no matter how
convinced we are of our own policy positions.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the petitions
in G.R. No. 187836 and G.R. No. 187916 for being
moot and academic.
Ordinance No. 8187 declared unconstitutional and

invalid with respect to continued stay of Pandacan Oil
Terminals.
_______________
186 Id., at pp. 2766-2767.

187 Philippine Information Agency, April 3, 2014
<http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/231396509958/estrada-orders-
big-3-to-remove-oil-depots-in-pandacan> (visited November 11,
2014); A. R. Remo and E. Sauler, “Mayor Estrada to ‘Big 3’ oil
firms: Submit relocation plans,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3,
2014, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/591385/mayor-estrada-to-big-3-
oil-firms-submitrelocation-plans> (visited November 11, 2014); B.
Cupin, “Erap to oil firms: Shut down Pandacan depot by 2016,”
Rappler, April 3, 2014 (last updated April 4, 2014) <http://www.
rappler.com/nation/54618-erap-estrada-close-pandacan-oil-depot>
(visited November 11, 2014).
166

Notes.—Since the issuance of an Executive Order

(EO) is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act,
a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse. (Galicto vs.
Aquino III, 667 SCRA 150 [2012])
Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise
the power of judicial review, the following must be
extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be
ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging
must have the “standing.” (Corales vs. Republic, 703
SCRA 623 [2013])
——o0o——
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CASES REPORTED

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 187836. November 25, 2014.*

G.R. No. 187916. November 25, 2014.*

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION, minors MARIAN

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition;

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 3

declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

vance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 5

vidual, such as but not limited to passport, driver’s

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 7

same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 9

the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies shall be

Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Statutes; View that all laws, including ordinances,

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and Republic Act No. 8479. Further, Ordinance No.

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 11

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Issues of Transcendental Importance; View that

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 13

actual facts and issues in order to prevent judicial

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

Luch R. Gempis, Jr. for then Vice Mayor

2 Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. I, pp. 3-20. Petition (for

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 15

“AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND

5 Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 16 June

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 17

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

6 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 19

For a better perspective of the facts of these cases,

Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 21

“open city” blazed — a cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of

22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

[R]iver or tank trucks via the South Luzon

13 Id., at pp. 673-676; pp. 106-109.

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 23

ments involving acts of terrorism on civilian and

and (iv) the incremental investment, operating and other related

24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

hazards posed by the proximity of communities,

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 25

land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas

River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street,

26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan

VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 27

(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 200223 of the