Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cases For Constitutional Law I PDF
Cases For Constitutional Law I PDF
De Leon v Esguerra
153 SCRA 602
August 31, 1987
FACTS:
Alfredo De Leon was elected as Barangay Captain in the May 1982 Elections. On
February 9, 1987, designating Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioners seek that the memorandum be null and void in
accordance to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982. Petitioners further argue
that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer
has authority to designate successors and replace them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal order of De Leon et al by respondent OIC Governor valid?
HELD:
The Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the
Provisional Constitution has been superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor could
no longer rely on Section 2, Article III of the said Constitution. The memoranda was
declared to be of no legal force and the unit of prohibition enjoining respondents from
proceeding with the take-over was granted.
FACTS:
In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly in the first district of Tayabas. The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for
the said district for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in
office. A motion of protest was filed by Ynsue against the election of the petitioner. The
petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the protest which was denied by the
Electoral Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy; and
Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election herein petitioner
HELD:
The National Assembly operates as a check on the executive in the sense that its consent
through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the
assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The assembly also exercises
the judicial power of trying impeachments. The judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence, to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution. This power has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly”. In view of the deliberations of
the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within
the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of
the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua. The petition of Writ of Prohibition against the
Electoral Commission is hereby denied.
BACAM v NACOCO
100 Phil 468
GR No L-9657
November 29, 1956
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Bacani and Matolo are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI
of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the pendency of the civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip v
NACOCO, Assistant Corporate Counsel Fredriko Alikpal, counsel for defendant,
requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their
bills for the payment of their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of Php 564 to
Leopoldo Bacani and Php 150 to Mateo Matolo for the transcript with a rate of Php 1 per
page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts through
salary deduction, by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that
NACOCO was a government entity, therefore, it is exempted from the payment of fees in
question.
The petitioners filed an action in court, countering that NACOCO is not a
government entity within the purview of Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
HELD;
PVTA v CIR
65 SCRA 416
FACTS:
On December 20, 1966, private respondents filed a petition to seek relief for their
alleged overtime services in accordance with the Commonwealth Act No 444.
Respondent court sustained the claims of private respondents hence the Petition of
Certiorari and Plea for Reversal from PVTA. Petitioner contends that they are exercising
governmental functions thus they are exempt from the Eight-Hour Labor Law and
respondent court have no jurisdiction over them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PVTA, while discharging governmental functions and not proprietary
functions thus exempting it from Commonwealth Act No 447.
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank.
HELD:
Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad,
this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the
protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws
that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right
hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money
intended for the people.
FACTS:
Plaintiff Co filed motions in a Japanese-controlled court in Manila to recover
property from the defendant. Although Manila was still under Japanese control, the
Commonwealth government had been reestablished a month ago, and plaintiff was surely
aware that the liberation of Manila was imminent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judicial processes during the Japanese occupation are valid after
the Commonwealth government was already reinstated.
HELD:
Yes. Under international law, specifically the Hague Conventions, the functioning
of courts and municipal laws remain valid during occupation. The acts of a de facto
government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.
This reduces the harm done to the people of the occupied territory, and reversing judicial
processes strips parties, without due process, of vested rights acquired under these
processes. Only legislative, constitutional and administrative processes are affected, and
these are the “processes” MacArthur’s proclamation was construed to refer to. Motion for
reconsideration denied.
PEOPLE v GOZO
53 SCRA 476
October 26, 1973
RELATED TOPIC:
FACTS:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales,
requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a
building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She
questions its validity on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base
leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it
does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to emasculate the
State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein
administrative jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the naval
base leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces.
HELD:
The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as
part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior
or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the
United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The
first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of such a view
in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its
terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it
sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It
is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a
power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which,
in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it
chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence."
16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most
diminution of jurisdictional rights, not it appearance. The words employed follow: "Its
laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the
matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain
their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American
armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot
be foreign territory."
LAUREL v MISA
77 Phil 856
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government and
the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that there was a change of
sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied
by the enemy of their legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by
the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred to the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government
does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an
offense to the same government and same sovereign people.
RUFFY v CHIEF OF STAFF
75 Phil 857
FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak
of war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February
27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla outfit
known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for
prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further proceedings in
the trial of the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law
at the time of offense.
ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War
(2d). The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been
recognized by the United States army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the
Constitution which provides that “National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts martial are agencies of
executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits
and is dismissed with costs.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the
Philippines was to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her
marriage with co-plaintiff, a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes on the ground that
the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the
latter Philippine citizenship, because record shows that the same does not posses all the
qualifications required of applicants for naturalization (CA 473), even if she has proven
that she does not suffer any disqualification there under.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully
naturalized.
HELD:
Yes, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
(Sec. 15 and 4, CA 473).
PO XO BI v REP
GR NO 32398
January 27, 1992
RELATED TOPIC:
MAGALONA v ERMITA
Aug 16, 2011
655 SCRA 476
FACTS:
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of
the Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was
meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines
hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a.) the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary
treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b.) the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as “archipelagic”
waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c.) the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a
means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with
the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls
when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it.
Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular
lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical
miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic
zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below
for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights.
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
2. Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was
the people that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the
Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
VILLAVICENCIO v LUKBAN
39 PHIL 778
FACTS:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women closed. One
hundred and seventy women were deported to Davao without their knowledge and
consent. The women were received as laborers in a banana plantation. Some of the
women were able to escape and return to Manila. The attorney for the relatives and
friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for heabes
corpus to the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to
Davao
HELD:
The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no matter how high,
is above the law. The courts are the forum which function to safeguard liberty and to
punish official transgressors. The essential object and purpose of writ of habeas corpus is
to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. If the mayor and the chief of police could deport the women, they
must have the means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile
and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great writ of liberty may not be
easily evaded. No one of the defense offered constituted a legitimate bar to the granting
of the writ of habeas corpus.
PERALTA v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75 PHIL 285
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the
Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that
the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was
a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the
aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs
the constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from the time of
the restoration of the Commonwealth?
HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in
the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered,
likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of
the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as
such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion
must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were
assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went
to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a
guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and
fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority
vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus
allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the
offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since
members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of
War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a
gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to
military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them
even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.
REAGAN v CIR
30 SCRA 968
GR # L-26379
December 27, 1969
FACTS:
Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public
respondent on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the
US Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base.
Petitioner contends that the base is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond the
jurisdictional power to tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is excluded from tax.
HELD:
No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes
of income tax legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are
preserved.
FACTS:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality.
This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace
Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and
the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
ISSUE:
When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of
its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the
Court?
HELD:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into
effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now
nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the
source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all
other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an
actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because
of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law,
and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real
and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on
supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not
committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.
Republic Act No. 5446 September 18, 1968
as amended by R.A. 9522
"SECTION 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are
hereby defined and described specifically as follows:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.
WHEREAS, all the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of
the Philippines archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, have always
been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of
the inland or internal waters of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but
within the limits of the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise
the territorial sea of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is
determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost
islands of the archipelago; and
WHEREAS, the said baselines should be clarified and specifically defined and
described for the information of all concerned; Now, therefor,
Section 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are hereby defined
and described specifically as follows:
Distance in
N. Latitude E. Longitude Asimuth
Meters
Section 2. All waters within the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are
considered inland or internal waters of the Philippines.
Section 2. Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over it
territorial sea and continental shelf, it shall have and exercise in the exclusive
economic zone established herein the following;
(a) Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation, conservation
and management of the natural resources, whether living or non-living, both
renewable and non-renewable, of the sea-bed, including the subsoil and the
superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation
and exploration of the resources of the zone, such as the production of energy from
the water, currents and winds;
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization
of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and structures, the preservation
of the marine environment, including the prevention and control of pollution, and
scientific research;
(c) Such other rights as are recognized by international law or state practice.
Section 3. Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement entered into with the
Republic of the Philippines or of any license granted by it or under authority by the
Republic of the Philippines, no person shall, in relation to the exclusive economic
zone:
(a) explore or exploit any resources;
(d) construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore terminal, installation
or other structure or device; or
(e) perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of,
the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein provided.
Section 4. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with
respect to navigation and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and
communications.
Section 5. (a) The President may authorize the appropriate government office/agency
to make and promulgate such rules and regulations which may be deemed proper and
necessary for carrying out the purposes of this degree.
(b) Any person who shall violate any provision of this decree or of any rule or
regulation promulgated hereunder and approved by the President shall be subject to
a fine which shall not be less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) nor be more than
one hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months to ten (10) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court. Vessels and other equipment or articles used in connection therewith shall be
subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Section 6. This Decree shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in the Official
Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-eight.
Republic Act No. 9522 March 10, 2009
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines
of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and
described specifically as follows:
Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands"
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596;
and
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion,
sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in
the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation,
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as
amended.
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps
indicating the aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary
General of the United Nations.
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA)
shall forthwith produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly
representing the delineation of basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.
Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be
provided in a supplemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of
the year of its enactment into law.
Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No.
5446, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent
with this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation.