FLORES-PINTO, MA. SARAH S.

JD-2C

AGRARIAN LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS

CASE DIGESTS (BATCH 2)

1LUZ FARMS VS. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF DAR

192 SCRA 51
1990

FACTS:

• RA 6657 which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage was approved by the President of the Philippines.
• Herein Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business, avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of
sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the
said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law
provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in
livestock and poultry business.
• Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with
crop or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments of
commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the
principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should
not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the said
law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.

RULING:
NO. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under

Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).The intention of the Committee is to limit the
application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the
word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as
commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall
under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however,
was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands
are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian
reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and
poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

2PNR VS. DEL VALLE

G.R. NO. L-29381
SEPTEMBER 30, 1968

FACTS:

• A government-owned corporation, Philippine National Railways is the

registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30 meters
adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of
way running from Manila to Legazpi.
• These strips of land lie within the municipalities of Oas and Polangui, Province
of Albay. At the center thereof is a track measuring ten (10) to twelve (12)
meters in width where railroad ties are placed and rails built for running
locomotives. On both sides of the track, or about two (2) to five (5) meters away
 from the embankment of the track, are telegraph and telephone posts fifty (50)
meters apart from each other, which maintain communication wires necessary in
the operation of PNR trains. PNR draws earth from these sides to fill up the
railroad track whenever it is destroyed by water during rainy days; and uses
them as depository of railroad materials for the repair of destroyed lines, posts,
bridges during washouts. or other damaged parts of the line occasioned by
derailments or other calamities. The portions of these lands not actually
occupied by the railroad track had been a source of trouble. People occupied
them; they reap profits therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy
them cropped up. It is on the face of all these that, with adequate provisions to
safeguard railroad operations, PNR adopted temporary rules and
regulations.
• Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of said land
which are on both sides of the track, after a competitive public bidding, to
petitioner Bingabing for a period of three (3) years. A civil law lease contract in
printed form was then entered into by and between PNR and Bingabing. That
contract expressly stipulates that Bingabing was "to occupy and use
the property . . . temporarily for agriculture." Bingabing, however, failed to take
possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land, had a
house thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant of previous awardees, and later, of
Bingabing himself.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine National Railways (PNR)

which are on both sides of its railroad track, and are part of its right of way for its
railroad operations but temporarily leased, are agricultural lands within the
purview of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
such as would come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

2. Whether or not CAR has jurisdiction over the present case.

RULING:

NO to both issues.

According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is

the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or
legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the
former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of
which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price
certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both." The term
"agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code is not as
broad in meaning as it is known in the constitutional sense. The phrase
"agricultural land," constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither
mineral nor timber lands and embraces within its wide sweep not only lands
strictly agricultural or devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes but also
commercial, industrial, residential lands and lands for other purposes. On the other
hand, by Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code," '[a]gricultural
Land means land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands,
salt beds, fishponds,
idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this
section, respectively.” It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in
controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it
to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage
in agriculture. The entire width of 30 meters is important to PNR's railroad
operations which should not be hampered. And, communication lines must not be
disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track. Because, it is
not so easy to prevent people from walking along the track; animals, too, may stray
into the area; obstructions there could be along the track itself which might cause
derailment. All of these could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the
necessary precautions on time to avert accidents which may cause damage to the
trains, injury to its passengers, and even loss of life.

The use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is
inconsistent with agricultural activities. The contract of lease authorizes the
railroad company to enter upon the premises to make repairs, place its materials on
the land. It may even take soil from the land to fill up any part of the railroad track
destroyed by water during rainy days. What if PNR should decide to construct
another parallel track on the land leased? The occupant of the land cannot prevent
or stop PNR from doing any of these. Security of tenure so important in landlord-
tenant relationship may not thus be attained. In an ejectment suit brought by the
landowner against said third person in the CAR, this Court held that the CAR had
no jurisdiction over the case because no tenancy relationship existed between the
parties, as the third person was, in reality, an unlawful squatter or intruder.

Correlating Pabustan to the present case, the lessee here had no power to sublet.
There is also thus ho legally cognizable relationship of tenancy between the
parties. The court, accordingly, ruled that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the
case at bar and the proceedings below are therefore null and void.
3KRIVENKO VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS
79 PHIL 461
NOVEMBER 15, 1947

FACTS:

• In December 1941, Alenxander A. Kriventor, an alien, bought a residential lot

from the Magdalena Estate, Inc.,
• The registration of the said residential lot was interrupted by the war, thus, in
May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the
register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire
land in this jurisdiction.
• Thereafter, Krivenko brought the case to the fourth branch of the CFI of Manila
by means of a consulta.
• The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:  

Whether or not an alien may acquire residential lots in the Philippines.

RULING:

No, the Court held that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including residential lands

Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the conservation and utilization of
natural resources. The said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public
domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the nation. Although it
mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in determining
whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually
agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
Hence, “public agricultural land” was construed as referring to those lands that
were not timber or mineral. Therefore, it includes residential lands.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of
Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure
the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore,
be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It
must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section
5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified “to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.” And the subject matter of both
sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of “agricultural land” to
aliens. Since “agricultural land” under section 1 includes residential lots, the same
technical meaning should be attached to “agricultural land under section 5. It is a
rule of statutory construction that “a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear
the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears.” (II
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between
“agricultural land” under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter
private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The
lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national
patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of
whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.

4MORTA VS. OCCIDENTAL

G.R. NO. 123417
JUNE 10, 1999

FACTS:

• A complaint for allegedly gathering pili nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from
their respective land and destroying their banana and pineapple plants was filed
by Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla against Jaime Occidental, Atty.
Mariano Baranda, and Daniel Corral.
• However, Occidental claimed that he was a tenant of the actual owner of the
land, Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla were not actually the owners
of the land in question.
• The trial court ruled in favor of Morta and Padilla.
• Contending that the case was cognizable by the DAR Adjudicatory Board
(DARAB), Occidental, et al. appealed, Thus, the RTC reversed the MTC’s
decision ruling in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a tenancy-related
problem which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB in which the
CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject cases are cognizable by the DARAB.

RULING:

NO. Considering that there is a dispute in this case as to who is the rightful owner
of the land, The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is
definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB
regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter.

At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case
cannot be considered tenancy related for it still fails to comply with the other
requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina is the owner, then the case is not
between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental
cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him
and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the requisites, the issue involved is not
tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over
a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:

1. That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2. The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4. That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5. That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and
6. That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.

5THE HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 138016
JANUARY 30, 2002

FACTS:

• Spouses Edilberto and Felisa Romero owned a piece of agricultural land in

Alegria, Surigao del Norte.
• Separate portions of the said land was sold by the spouses on different dates to
certain Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonson.
• Claiming to be the agricultural tenants of the land in question, deceased Jose
Juanite and his wife, Nicolasa O. Juanite, filed a complaint before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), against spouses Romero and their aforementioned
vendees for the cancellation of the sales adverted to and for the Juanites to
exercise their right of redemption pursuant to R.A. No. 3844.
• Thereafter, the defendants, Edilberto, et.al., filed their answer alleging that the
Romeros, being the owners of the property, had the perfect right to sell any
portion thereof to any person. They strongly denied the allegation of the
Juanites that the latter were their tenants.
• The PARAD rendered a decision declaring the Juanite spouses as tenants,
directing the MARO to prepare the leasehold contract in their favor, declaring
the aforementioned Deed of Sale executed by the parties null and void and
directing the latter to vacate the premises.
• On Appeal, the DARAB reversed the decision and declared that the Juanites
were not tenants of the land, thus, had no right of redemption which the herein
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA, however, dismissed the
petition. Hence, this Appeal.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioners were tenants of Sps. Romero as to entitle them to the
right of redemption.

RULING:

The court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship are the following:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between
the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor
is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing
tenancy laws.

However, the court agreed with the petitioners that with the landowners' admission
that petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element of "sharing
harvest" is assumed as a factual element in that admission.

The court noted that petitioners alleged in the complaint filed with the PARAB
that:

"6. That in the year 1971, the herein defendants, informed plaintiffs that
the land which, Hermogena Mercado-Mondonedo and which is hereto
described, as follows, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

and that the land was sold to her and husband, Edilberto Romero by
Hermogena Mercado- Mondonedo and that since then, plaintiffs
continued in possession and cultivation of the land above described, as
tenant and sharing the fruits and products of the land to defendants,
spouses Edilberto and Felisa Romero.”

In their answer to the complaint, respondents denied the tenant and landlord
relationship, but failed to rebut the evidence adduced by petitioners that they were
tenants.

Accordingly, the DARAB erred in reversing the finding of the PARAB .

6HON. ANTONIO M. NUESA VS. CA

G.R. No. 132046
MARCH 6, 2002

FACTS:

• The then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an "Order of Award" in favor

of one Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural land on condition
that within a period of six (6) months the awardee shall personally cultivate or
otherwise develop at least one fourth of the area, occupy and construct his/her
house in case of residential lot and pay at least the first installment xxxx
 failure on his/her part to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient
cause for cancellation of this Order.
• After twenty-one years, private respondent Verdillo filed before the Regional
Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots
claiming that he had complied with the conditions of the said Order.
• A letter of protest was then filed by petitioner Rivera against said private
respondent claiming that he is the one in possession of the land and cultivating
the same.
• An investigation on the conflicting claims was conducted by a representative
of the DAR Regional Office and found that the subject landholdings were in
the possession/cultivation of other persons other than Jose Verdillo and that it
was crystal clear that Jose Verdillo had culpably violated the terms and
conditions of the Order of Award.
• DAR Regional Director Antonio Nuesa promulgated an Order canceling the
Order of Award issued in favor of Jose Verdillo, declaring the lots vacant and
open for disposition and allowing the processing of Restituto Rivera's
application to purchase the said lots.
• Aggrieved, private respondent then filed a Petition with the PARAD which
the petitioners countered by filing a Motion to Dismiss the Petition instead of
an Answer on the ground that the proper remedy in the case at bar is to file an
Appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform under DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 5-87 and not by a petition with the DARAB.
• The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator chose to resolve the case on the merits,
denied the Motion to Dismiss the Petition and reversed the Order of the
Regional Director.
• Petitioner Rivera filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. He
then interposed an appeal with the DARAB, however, the Board affirmed the
Decision of the PARAD.
• Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals but it
was denied due course and was ordered dismissed. Hence, this petition for
review.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners' claim that in this
case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:
The court agreed with petitioners that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the DARAB and its officials have not committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in this case.

P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the
transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and
related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively
cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: . . . (5) issuance, recall
or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D.
No. 816.

The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by
the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR.
The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted
erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case,
then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the case
on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case.

As held by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno, "the DAR is vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as
amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.

Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is defined to
include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or
any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy
between them within the ambit of the abovecited provision. Consequently, the
DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken
cognizance of private respondent's petition in the first place.

While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have

acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, due care should be taken
that administrative actions are not done without regard to the jurisdictional
boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent
DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal
boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and
private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of
the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining DARAB's
unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of
its jurisdiction.

7ALMUETE VS. ANDRES

G.R. No. 122276
NOVEMBER 20, 2001

FACTS:

• Herein petitioner owns an agricultural land awarded to him by the National

Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA).
• Almuete and his family farmed the subject land for 22 years.
• Respondent, thru the assistance of Agrarian Reform Technologist, was able to
cause the land awarded to him. He also claimed that petitioner waived all his
rights as NARRA settler because of his poor health, that Almuete sold the
subject property to one Victor Masiglat who in turn transferred the said
property to Andres in exchange for one (1) carabao and the sum of Six Hundred
Pesos (P600.00).
• The DAR transferred the subject property to Andres.
• Shortly thereafter, Andres, accompanied by ten (10) persons, armed with bolos
and bladed implements, entered the property, claiming exclusive right of
ownership and possession.
• A complaint was thereafter filed by the petitioner with the DAR authorities and
it was only then that he learned that the land in question was already transferred
to Andres.
• Consequently, Almuete filed an action for conveyance and recovery of
possession before the RTC and the latter ruled in favor of the former.
• Andres then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that the
subject property is an agricultural land, hence, RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case.
• Andres filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was subsequently
granted.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari and held that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject case.

RULING:

Yes. The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of
possession and reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who between
petitioner Rodrigo Almuete and respondent Marcelo Andres has a better right to
the subject property considering that both of them are awardees of the same
property. It was thus a controversy relating to ownership of the farmland, which is
beyond the ambit of the phrase agrarian dispute. No juridical tie of landowner and
tenant was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would
so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and
respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.

Agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, as:

(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial

arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this

Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to
cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements
are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, gravely erred when it granted the petition for
certiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by petitioners was
cognizable by the regular courts. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela was competent to try and decide the civil case. Its decision was,
thus, valid and can no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality. Nothing
more can be done with the decision except to enforce it.

8SPS. ATUEL, ET.AL., VS. SPS. BERNABE VALDEZ

G.R. NO. 139561
JUNE 10, 2003

FACTS:

• Atty. Manuel D. Cab is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Agusan
del Sur where Federico Atuel was appointed then as the administrator of the
thereto.
• Cab and Valdez entered into a “Lease of Improved Agricultural Land” under
which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property.
• Cab allowed Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel and Spouses George and Eliada
Galdiano to occupy a 2,000-square meter portion of the Cab Property.
• Spouses Atuel and Spouses Galdiano constructed their respective houses on the
subject lot.
• In September 1985, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur,
approved the town plan of the Municipality of Sibagat which classified the Cab
Property as residential.
• On June 25, 1988, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already
expired, and demanded that Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-hectare portion of
the Cab Property and vacate the same.
• Responding to Cab’s letter, the MARO of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur informed
Cab that Valdez was properly identified as a tenant, and thus deemed to be the
owner of the land he cultivated and an emancipation patent was issued to
Valdez in pursuant to P.D. No. 27 covering the subject lot of spouses Valdez
and spouses Galdiano.
• Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for cancellation of Valdez’s
emancipation patent.
• The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (“HLURB”) approved the Town
Plan.
• Thereafter, Spouses Valdez filed a complaint for “Recovery of Possession with
Damages” with the DARAB against Spouses Atuel and Spouses Galdiano.
• In their complaint, Spouses Valdez alleged that Spouses Atuel and Spouses
Galdiano “stealthily and through fraud entered and occupied a portion of the
above-described property with an area of 2,000 sq. m. more or less.”
Said spouses likewise maintained that the entire Cab Property, which is covered
by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has already been classified as residential,
hence, no longer covered by P.D. No. 27.
• The DAR Agusan del Sur ordered the segregation of the Two Thousand (2,000)
square meters, more or less, from the land of the complainants, which is
covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-159969, and awarded the same to the
respondents. The case was also ordered dismissed.
• Dissatisfied with the decision, Spouses Atuel and Spouses Galdiano appealed to
the DARAB Central Office. The latter reversed the decision of the DARAB
Provincial Adjudicator enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing
acts of intrusion and maintain the possessory rights of the complainants over the
EP covered land.
• Aggrieved by the decision, Spouses Atuel and Spouses Galdiano filed a
petition for review with the CA.
• Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central Office and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
• Spouses Atuel and Spouses Galdiano then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the CA denied.
• While the case was pending in the CA, Spouses Valdez sold 5,000 square
meters out of the P.D. No. 27 Land to the Municipality of Sibagat. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses
Valdez’s complaint for recovery of possession of the Subject Lot.

RULING:

No, the DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdez’s
complaint for recovery of possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do
not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider
the issue of jurisdiction. The Court has discretion to determine whether the
DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or
waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action. The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of
tenancy relations, if any, between them and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court
has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the
allegations made in the complaint.

The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
registered emancipation patents. However, the Spouses Valdez’s complaint for
recovery of possession does not involve or seek the cancellation of any
emancipation patent. It was the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano who
attacked the validity of the emancipation patent as part of their affirmative
defenses in their answer to the complaint. The rule is well settled that the
jurisdiction of the court (or agency in this case) cannot be made to depend on the
defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were
the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the
defendant.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any
act or omission of the parties. The active participation of the parties in the
proceedings before the DARAB does not vest jurisdiction on the DARAB, as
jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The courts or the parties cannot disregard
the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. The failure of the
parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent this Court
from addressing the issue, as the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the
face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not subject to the whims of the
parties.

9CHICO VS. CA
348 PHIL. 37
(1998)

FACTS:

• Herein petitioner claims to be the lawful owner of a lot located in Sta. Barbara,
Baliuag, Bulacan, pursuant to a final court verdict, hence, he filed an action for
the recovery of possession of the property with the RTC against private
respondents.
• Petitioner averred that private respondents were occupying a portion of the
adjudicated lot which he would need for his own personal use and that of his
family but that because private respondents, despite repeated demands, had
refused to vacate the premises, he was constrained to initiate the case.
• In their answer, private respondents disputed petitioners cause of action. They
assert that the true owners of the property in question, namely, Don Rafael and
Doña Salud Chico, were succeeded upon their death by their son Delfin Chico;
that private respondents had long been in lawful possession of the subject parcel
of land as tenants of the deceased spouses and their son to whom rentals had
been paid; and that, in any case, petitioner's action had already prescribed.
• The RTC rendered its decision sustaining the complaint and ordering private
respondents to vacate the subject lot and to surrender its possession to
petitioner.
• Private respondents initiated with the CA a petition for certiorari to annul and
set aside the RTC decision for allegedly being void Private respondents claimed
that their tenancy relationship with the original owner was an agrarian dispute
cognizable exclusively by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board ("DARAB"), pursuant to E.O No. 229 and No. 129-A and R.A. No.
6657, and that, consequently, the decision of the trial court was a complete
nullity for want of jurisdiction.
• The CA promulgated its judgment granting the petition. The appellate court
viewed the dispute between petitioner and private respondents to be an agrarian
reform matter; it thus held that the DAR, not the trial court a quo, had lawful
 jurisdiction over the case. A motion for a reconsideration of the decision proved
to be futile.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the dispute between the parties is
agrarian in nature.

RULING:

Yes. The complaint filed by petitioner before the trial court is one for recovery of
possession, also known as accion publiciana, and it is this averment of the
complaint that has conferred jurisdiction on that court. In order for a tenancy
relation to take serious hold over the dispute, it would be essential to first establish
all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) That the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. It is not enough that these requisites are alleged; these requisites must be
shown in order to divest the regular court of its jurisdiction in proceedings lawfully
began before it. These conditions have not been met in the case at bar.

The records of the case would fail to show any juridical tie binding between
private respondents and petitioner or their predecessors-in-interest, let alone that
which would so characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. It would
appear that the owner of the land, Don Rafael Chico, gave the property to
petitioner Pedro Chico in 1954 and, since then, the latter or his representative had
taken over the land and had exercised acts of ownership thereover. There was no
evidence adduced that any tenancy agreement had been concluded between Pedro
Chico and private respondent Martin Mananghaya. Indeed, the latter admitted that
he only dealt with Delfin Chico, the son of the late Don Rafael Chico. Worse, the
land subject matter of the controversy was not shown to be an agricultural land; to
the contrary, the land would appear to be located within a residential area, in
Barangay Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan, adjacent to the National Highway. On
the disputed parcel, a mere 3,865 square meters, was the old residential house of
petitioner, as well as the portion occupied by private respondents consisting of an
area of 500 square meters, and a few mango trees. numbering about seven or eight.
Compounding the matter, no receipt, or any other evidence, was presented by
private respondents to prove their claim that the harvest was shared between
petitioners and private respondents.

10LAGUNA ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. CA

G.R. NO. 119357
JULY 5, 2002

FACTS:

• In December 1989, some 234.76 hectares of agricultural land situated in

Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna belonging to the Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation (SRRDC) was placed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), through its adjudicatory arm, public respondent DARAB, under
the compulsory acquisition scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP)
• Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA’s) were subsequently issued and
award to farmers-beneficiaries, private respondents herein, to wit: Rosa T.
Amante, et al., Rogelio O. Ayende, et al. and Juan T. Amante, et al.,
respectively.
• It appears that the aforesaid agricultural lands in the said barangay are isolated
and/or separated from the rest of the municipality of Cabuyao, and the only
passage way or access road leading to said private respondents’ agricultural
lands is the privately owned road network situated within the premises of
petitioners CSE and LEDC.
• Subject to reasonable security regulations, the subject road network is open to
the public. But after private respondents were awarded the aforesaid agricultural
lands under the CARP Law, petitioners CSE and LEDC prohibited and denied
private respondents from utilizing the subject road network, thereby preventing
the ingress of support services under the CARP Law, provisions for daily
subsistence to, and egress of farm produce from, Brgy. Casile where the
farmlands awarded to private respondent are located.
• On motion of the private respondents, DARAB issued an Order directing the
unhampered entry and construction of support services coming from the
national government, and other provisions for the use and benefit of private
respondents in Brgy. Casile, and giving private respondents a right of way over
the subject road network owned by petitioners.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to grant private respondents who are
beneficiaries of an agrarian reform program or tenants of adjoining landholdings a
right of way over petitioners network of private roads intended for their exclusive
use

RULING:

No. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over such issue. For DARAB to have
jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties.
Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without
tenancy relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian
issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.

Moreover, in order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be
essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.”

Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without
tenancy relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian
issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.