La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc.

Vs Ramos

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules
and regulations and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
dated March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining
Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract
and is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources,
because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources,
to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either
Technical or Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical
agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor,
provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside,
reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is
similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation,
the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions
may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the
board retains full residual control of the business.
 Pearson vs Intermediate Appellate Court

This petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Preliminary Injuction and Prayer for

Restraining Order seeks to annul the following:
1. Decision dated September 30, 1983 of respondent Intermidiate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. No. 15439 which in effect upheld
herein private respondent's mining claims and directed respondent Regional
Trial Court to resolve the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 45053.[1]
2. Order dated July 31, 1984 of the Court of First Instance, Branch X (now
Regional Trial Court, Branch 155), Pasig, Metro Manila, dismissing Civil
Case No. 45053 on the basis of an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals
upholding the findings of fact of the Minister of Natural Resources;[2]
3. Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President, upholding the
finding of the Minister that petitioners had abandoned their "BAROBO"
mining claims and accordingly dismissed their appeal;[3]
4. Decision dated October 29, 1979 of the Minister of Natural Resources,
affirming the decision of the Director of Mines;[4]
5. Consolidated Decision dated May 12, 1976 of the Director of Minis in Mines
Administrative Case Nos. V-817 and V-818, upholding the preferential rights
of private respondents to lease, possess, explore and develop their
respective "DIAMOND" AND "MARTIN" mining claims in question;[5]
The petitioners also pray that their mining claims be declared valid and that private
respondents' mining claims be declared null and void.
The petitioners Alfred Pearson, et al. (hereinafter "Pearsons") claims to have
inherited the benificial interest of the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. (hereinafter
"Tambis Gold") upon its dissolution, owing to the fact that the biggest stockholder of said
company and the sole owner of the claims was their ancestor, William F. Pearson, Sr.[6]
Private respondents Diamond Mining Corporation, Rosario Mining Development
Corporation and their assignee A. Soriano Corporation (hereinafter "Mining Companies")
are domestic corporations organized and existing under Philippine laws.
The public respondent are the Director of Mines, the Minister of Natural Resources,
the Presidential Executive Assistant, the Court of First Instance (CFI), and the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).[7]Each of them had ruled in favor of the Mining
Companies.
The facts as found by the respondent Minister of Natural Resources and confirmed
by the respondents Presidential Executive Assistant and the IAC are as follows:

"From the records and the documentary evidence at hand, it appears that the Tambis
Gold Dredging Co., Inc. filed in 1919, under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
declarations of location covering the "BAROBO-1" to "BAROBO-5" placer claims located
at the barrio of Bahi, municipality of Lianga, province of Surigao del Sur. These
declarations of locations were destroyed or lost during the war.

In 1948, the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Mines affidavits to
reconstitute the declarations of location for the "BOROBO" placer claims. The affidavits
were recorded with the mining recorder on January 19, 1949.

On February 29, 1960, the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc. was dissolved. Appellants
(herein petitioners) were at the time stockholdres of the corporation.

From May 10, to June 11, 1970, appellee (now respondent) Rosario Mining through its
agent Marcelino Manabat, discovered and located the "MARTIN-1", "MARTIN-2",
"MARTIN-5", "MARTIN-6" and "MARTIN-27" placer claims in the barrio of Bahi,
municipality of Barobo, province of Surigao del Sur. On June 25, 1970, the declarations
of locations therefor, and the Special Power and (sic) Attorney appointing Marcelino
Manabat as attorney-in-fact, were registered with the Mining Recorder of Surigao del
Sur.

On August 31, 1970, the application for the survey of the "MARTIN" claims were filed,
and, on March 13, 1973 and December 18, 1973, the corresponding orders for survey
were issued.

On June 22, 1973, appellee (now respondent) Rosario Mining filed the lease application
covering the "MARTIN" placer claims. After the survey returns of said placer claims were
approved on January 3, 1975, the notice of lease was published in February 20 and 27,
1975 issues of the "Mindanao Times" and in the February 25 and March 4, 1975 issues
of the "Times Journal".

Meanwhile, from February 24 to March 5, 1974, appellee (now also respondent)

Diamond Mining, through its agent Justiniano Deloso, discovered and located the
"DIAMOND-1" to "DIAMOND-7" placer claims in the barrio of Bahi, minicipality of
Barobo, province of Surigao del Sur. On March 25, 1974, the declarations of location
therefor, including the Special Power of Attorney in favor of Justiniano Deloso, were
registered with the Mining Recorder of Surigao del Sur.

On April 17, 1973, the application for survey of the "DIAMOND" placer claims were filed,
and, on May 21, 1974, the order for survey was issued.

On April 22, 1974, appellee Diamond Mining filed the lease applications covering the
"DIAMOND" placer claims. Subsequently, after the survey returns of said claims were
approved on December 24, 1974 and January 3, 1975, the notice of lease application
was published in the February 25 and March 4, 1975 issues of the "Times Jornal" and in
the February 27 and March 6, 1975 issues of the "Mindanao Times".

On 10 March 1975, appellants (petitioners herein) filed the adverse claims against
appellees (now private respondents).

After the case was heard by the Panel of Investigators of the Bureau of Mines, the
Director of Mines rendred (sic) the decision appealed from.

In his decision, the Director held that appellants (petitioners) failed to establish the
existence of the conflict among the placer claims involved; that the "BAROBO" placer
claims are null and void because their tie points, as described in the affidavits to
reconstitute the declarations of location therefor, are not the natural objects or
permanent monuments prescribed under the law and their geographical positions cannot
be accurately determined; that, even if said "BAROBO" claims were validly located, the
same have been abandoned due to the failure of the original locators threof to perform
assessment works therein, to file the corresponding affidavits of annual work obligations,
and to pay the real estate taxes thereon; and that appellants (petitioners) are not the
successors-in-interest of the Tambis Gold Dredging Co., Inc., hence they have no legal
personality to institute the adverse claims."[8]

On appeal, the Minister of Natural Resources in a Decision dated October 29, 1979,
affirmed the judgment of the Director of Mines[9] He agreed with the Director's finding on
the issue of abandonment.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, the Pearsons
appealed to the Office of the President. They filed a Manifestation requesting the Office
to require the Mining Companies to file a bond in such amount as may be necessary to
protect the interest of the Pearsons during the pendency of the case before it. Also, they
prayed for an order for immediate ocular inspection of the area to determine the
fundamental issue of the correct tie point of the controverted mining claims.[10]
In an Order dated June 23, 1981, the Office of the President granted the motion
concerning the bond but denied the request for ocular inspection. In the order, it was
stated that "the investigation conducted by the Presidential Investigating Committee of
Bureau of Mines has already considered and determined the issue which require no
more (sic) further verification and clarification."[11] The Pearsons and the Mining
Companies separately moved for reconsideration.[12]
Subsequently, the Office of the President granted the motion for ocular inspection,
and ordered the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee on June 23, 1989.
[13]
 The Mining Companies moved for reconsideration of this order.[14]
In a Decision dated August 31, 1981, the Office of the President revoked the order
allowing ocular inspection, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, and released all
monies that might have been deposited by the Mining Companies. The pertinent
grounds of its dismissal are hereunder quoted:[15]

"xxx We agree with the findings of the Ministry of Natural Resources that Appellant's
mining claims are abandoned, if not null and void. Evidence on record clearly
establishes the fact that appellants failed annual work obligations, and to pay the real
estate taxes. These ommissions (sic) by appellants constitute abandonment of their
claims. Executive Order No. 141 dated August 1, 1968, explicitly states that unpatented
mining claims which were located more than thirty years ago under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, as amended, and which have not complied with the annual
assessment requirement are considered abandoned and their declaration of location
cancelled. On this score, this Office finds no legal justification to modify, much less
reverse, the appealed decision."

On January 18, 1982, the Office of the President issued a Resolution denying the
Pearsons' motion for reconsideration.[16]
After said denial, the Pearsons filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with a writ of preliminary injuction, before Branch X of the CFI of Pasig to
annul the aforementioned decisions of public respondents and to restrain private
respondents from entering and developing the mining claims involved. [17] This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 45053. The Mining Companies filed their joint motion to
dismiss and opposition to the preliminary injuction alleging, among other, that the
Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President is already final and
executory pursuant to Presidential Decree no. 463, Section 50 which states that:

"Appeals- Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director, may, within
five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decision of the Secretary are
likewise appealable within five (5) days receipt thereof by the affected party to the
President of the Philippines whose decision shall be final and executory.

xxx xxx xxx"
Instead of expressly resolving and said motion to dismiss, the CFI ordered on
October 15, 1982 the creation of an Ad Hoc Ocular Inspection Committee "to determine
the correct tie-point of private respondents' mineral claim". Both the public and private
respondents moved for reconsideration of said order.[18] The CFI denied both motions
and issued the Order dated December 21, 1982 scheduling the ocular inspection for
January 3, 1983.
In view of this last order, the Mining Companies filed with the IAC their Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition, assailing the abovementioned orders dated October 15,
1982 and December 21, 1982 allowing the creation of and setting the schedule for
ocular inspection by the Ad Hoc Committee, and praying that the latter court be
prohibited from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 45053. The Mining Companies
argued that when P.D. Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463 were promulgated, it became
unquestionable that the procedure of adjudicating mining claims was made completely
administrative with the President as the Final authority. [19] In their Answer, the Pearsons
assailed the propriety of the petition since its subjects are two interlocutory orders.[20]
The IAC issued a Restrating Order dated January 31, 1983, restraining the CFI
judge from implementing his order directing the Ad Hoc Committee to conduct an ocular
inspection.[21] Later on, the IAC granted the writ of certiorari, set aside the orders of the
CFI with regard to the Ad Hoc Committee and ocular inspection, and directed the CFI "to
resolve the joint motion to dismiss filed by the private respondents in said case in light of
what has been stated in this decision." The decision of the IAC was promulgated on
September 30, 1983, and the same became final and executory with an entry of
judgment issued by the said IAC on February 17, 1984.
As directed by the IAC, the CFI issued an Order on July 31, 1984 dismissing the
petition of the Pearsons before it.
Hence, the petitioners now come before this Court raising in their petition the
following issues:[22]
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT IN CA-G.R. NO. 15439 IS NULL AND VOID FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE;
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT
GAVE DUE COURSE TO AND DECIDED SAID PETITION DESPITE THE
CLEAR SHOWING BY HEREIN PETITIONER THAT THE ORDERS IN
QUESTION ARE MERELY INTERLOCUTORY AND ARE, THEREFORE,
NOT PROPER SUBJECT MATTER OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT; AND
III. ASSUMING AGAIN ARGUENDO THAT THE QUESTIONED
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS ARE PROPER SUBJECT OF CERTIORARI,
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1983 OF
RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS A PATENT
NULLITY FOR BEING DEVOID OF ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS.
Petitioners maintain that the Supreme Court that the Supreme Court has the
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases where the jurisdiction of a lower court is in issue, as
well as all cases decided by lower courts involving pure questions of law, [23] pursuant to
paragraph 2 (c) Section 5, Art X of the present Constitution which states that:

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in -

xxx xxx xxx

( c ) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior courts is in issue

xxx xxx xxx"
Like wise, they assert that the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296), as amended,
also clearly provides that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case,
pursuant to Paragraph (3), Sec 17 thereof, to wit:

"Sec. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.-

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgement
and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided in -

xxx xxx xxx

(2) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court in the issue.

xxx xxx xxx
 Consequently, they argue that the IAC Decision dated September 30, 1983 is a
patent nullity for utter want of jurisdiction.
They further argue that the questioned orders of the CFI dated October 15, 1982
and December 21, 1982 allowing the creation of and setting the schedule for ocular
inspection by the Ad Hoc Committee were merely interlocutory, and therefore, cannot be
subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC.[24]
Lastly, they claim that the IAC, in its September 30, 1984 decision sustaining the
Decision dated August 31, 1981 of the Office of the President dismissing the appeal of
petitioners, had no factual and legal bases. They stress that they have lived in their
ancestral home in the mining area up to the filing of this petition; they continued
performing the assessment work on their mineral claims up to 1975 when this case
arose, and they were enjoined to stop their operations by respondent Bureau of Mines;
that they have performed assessment work constinously up to 1975; that they filed
religiously their affidavits of assessment work; and that they paid their realty taxes due,
although they admitted that certain affidavits were filed and certain taxes were also paid
in later years.[25]
Private respondents, in their Comment dated June 26, 1986, allege that the IAC has
jurisdiction to entertain the original petition for ceriorari filed by them against respondent
CFI and the Pearsons under Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court. They argue that under
P.D. Nos. 99-A, 309 and 463 governing the procedures of adjudicating conflicting mining
claims which were made completely administrative, the decision of the President on
appeal to his Office is final and executory, and therefore, not subject to judicial review.[26]
The different issues raised in the instant petition may be subsumed in two principal
issues:
1. Whether or not respondent IAC committed reversible error in assuming
jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for certiorari assailing the
trial court's interlocutory orders?
2. Assuming the IAC had validly assumed jurisdiction, whether or not it
committed reversible errors of law in its decision now before us?
We find the petition entirely devoid of merit. Thus we see, in regard to the first
principal issue, no reversible error committed by the IAC when it assumed jurisdiction
over private respondents' petition for certiorari involving interlocutory order of the trial
court.
The petitioners launch a two-pronged attack against the jurisdiction of the
respondent appeallate court, to wit: first, the IAC could not adjudicate cases where the
jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue; and second, the orders of the CFI, being merely
interlocutory, could not be the subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC.
The petitioners err on both counts.
Firstly, the IAC correctly invoked the ruling of this Court in Uytiepo vs. Aggabao[27],
the wit:

"As regards the claim that the issues raised by Aggabao in her action filed with the
respondent Court of Appeals involve only questions of law and are therefore exclusively
reviewable by this Court, the petitioners apparently confuse the remedy of special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 30 of the
Judiciary Act as amended and an appeal by certiorari under Rule 42 also of the Rules of
Court in relation to the court fourth paragraph of section 17 of the same Act. The first is a
remedy available in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, essentially to
correct errors of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
second lies within the competence of this Court for the review of errors of inferior courts
involving only questions of law. x x x ."

What private respondents availed of was the first remedy, placing in issue the
jurisdiction of the trial court to create an Ad Hoc Committee and Schedule an ocular
inspection.
 Considered in relation to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980), now incorporated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which vested the then IAC with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
and prohibition, among other auxillary writs, "whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction", we find that respondent appellate court correctly assumed jurisdiction over
CA-G.R. No. 15439.
It has also been emphasized in a number of cases [28] that while this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts (for writs
enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition
or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court.
Instead,they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last
resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
competence of the CA or RTC, litigants must observe the principle of heirarchy of courts.
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary, or where serious and important reasons therefor exist.
Secondly, petitioner's contention that the lower court's orders of October 15, 1982
and December 21, 1982, being merely interlocutory, are not correctible by certiorari,
ignores this Court's consistent ruling, to wit:

"On the procedural issues raised, we hold that where an interlocutory order was
allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such order may be questioned before the Court on a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. To delay the review of the order until the
appeal from the decision of the main case would not afford the party adversely affected
by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate remedy."[29]

In Marcelo vs. De Guzman,[30] we held that although, as a general rule, an

interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the
merits, an exception is made where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate
and expeditious relief. In such exception, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress
to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party. We further held that where the order
complained of is a patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be
entertained despite the existence of the remedy of appeal. [31] This we reiterated in
Salcedo-Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals[32]
Does the controversy at hand fall under the exception where interlocutory orders
may be the subject of a petition for certiorari in the IAC? In our view, it does. For the trial
court clearly acted outside of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders creating
the Ad Hoc Committee and scheduling the ocular inspection.
To begin with the lower court did not have jurisdiction over the mining dispute. With
the issuance of Presidential Decree Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463, [33] the procedure of
adjudicating conflicting mining claims has been made completely administrative in
character, with the president as the final appeal authority.[34] Section 50 of P.D. 463,
providing for a modernized system of administration and disposition of mineral lands, to
promote and encourage the development and exploitation thereof, mandates on the
matter of "Protests, Adverse Claims and Appeals," the following procedure:

"Appeals - Any party not statisfied with the decision or order of the Director may, within
five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are
likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the
President of the Phillippines whose decision shall be final and executory."

It should be noted that before its amendment, the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137)
required that after the filing of adverse claim with the Bureau of Mines, the adverse
claimant had to go to a court of competent jurisdiction for the settlement of the claim.
With the amendment seeking to expedite the resolution of mining conflicts, the Director
of Mines became the mandatory adjudicator of adverse claims, instead of the Court of
first Instance.[35] Thus, it cannot escape notice that under Section 61 of the Mining Law,
as amended by Republic Act Nos. 746 and 4388, appeals from the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (then Minister of Natural Resources) on
conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations may be made to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case may be. In contrast, under the decrees
issued at the onset of martial law, it has been expressly provided that the decision of the
same Secretary in mining cases are appealable to the President of the Philippines under
Section 50 of the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. No. 463) and
Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 in relation to P.D. No. 309.[36]
The trend at present is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely
administrative matter.[37] This does not mean that administrative bodies have complete
rein over mining disputes. The very terms of Section 73 of the Mining Law, as amended
by R.A. No. 4388, in requiring that the adverse claim must "state in full detail the nature,
boundaries and extent of the adverse claim" show that the conflicts to be decided by
reason of such adverse claim refer primarily to questions of fact. The controversies to be
submitted and resolved by the Director of Mines under the sections referred only to the
overlapping of claims and administrative matters incidental thereto [38] Question and
controversies that are judicial, not administrative, in nature can be resolved only by the
regular counts in whom is vested the judicial power to resolve and adjudicate such civil
disputes and controversies between litigants in accordance with the established norms
of law and justice.[39] Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have
recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions
of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau
directors) of an executive or administrative nature, such as "granting of lisence, permits,
lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling applications, or
deciding conflicting applications," and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or
contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be
adjudicated only by the courts of justice.[40]
This distinction is carried on even under the present law. [41] Findings of fact by the
Mines Adjudiction Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders
of the panel of arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding on the parties, and its
decision or order shall be final and executory.[42] But resort to the appropriate court,
though a petition for review by certiorari, involving question of law, may be made within
thirty days from the receipt of the order or decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.[43]
With regard to the second issue, the query boils down to whether the IAC committed
reversible error in concluding that petitioners had abandoned their mining claims.
As found by IAC:

"It will not be amiss to state here that the basis of abandonment of the Pearsons of their
mining claims is well established by the evidence already presented to the Bereau of
Mines and to the Ministry of Natural Resources. We need only to refer to the following
reasons found in the decision of the Ministry of Natural Resources, dated October 29,
1975, to wit:

'x x x assuming, in gratia argumentis, that the 'BAROBO' placer claims were validly
located, said claims have been abandoned for failure of the claim owners thereof to
conduct works therein, to file the affidavits of annual work obligations, and to pay the real
estate taxes.

The evidence that affidavits of annual assessment works have been filed for the
'BAROBO-2' to 'BAROBO-5' placer claims from 1946 to 1951. However, the affidavits for
the years 1957 to 1974, respectively were all filed only on April 8, 1975. Thus, during the
latter years, no proof was submitted to show compliance with the annual assessment
works. So, at the time the 'DIAMOND' and 'MARTIN' placer claims were located and
registered, the 'BAROBO' claims had already been deemed abandoned and the areas
covered thereby open to relocation.'

"Said decision also took into account Executive Order No. 141, dated August 1, 1968,
which provides:
'NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, president of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare unpatented mining claims
which were located more than thirty years ago under the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902, as amended, and which had not complied with the annual assessment
requirement, as abandoned and their declaration of cancelled."'[44]

Well established is the rule that findings of fact made in the decision of the Minister
of Natural Resources (then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) appealed
from will not be reviewed by this Court unless there has been a grave abuse of
discretion in making said findings by reason of the total absence of competent evidence
in support thereof.[45] As shown above, the public officials' judgments are well supported
by substantial evidence. Moreover, by the Pearsons' own admission, they failed to file
the affidavit of annual assessment works and to pay the real estate taxes from 1957-
1974, which were filed and paid only later in 1974[46]
In Santa Rosa Mining Co. vs. Hon Minister of Natural Resources Jose Leido, Jr.
And Directors of Mines Juanito Fernandez[47], this Court held that while it is recognized
that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right, such right is not absolute.
It is merely a possessory right, more so where petitioner's claims are still unpatented.
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or located claim.
It merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other
would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals
found therein. To rule otherwise would imply the location is all that is needed to acquire
and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This cannot be approved or sanctioned
because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully
and consistently comply with the requirement for annual works and improvements in the
located mining claims.[48] Not only should there be a valid and subsisting location of the
mineral land but also there should be, thereafter, continuous compliance with all the
requirements of law such as the performance of annual assessment works and payment
ofreal estate taxes.[49]
While it is understandable that petitioners would want this Court to reassess the
evidence presented before the mining officials to support their plea of not having
abandoned the mining claim involved, this cannot be done now in this proceeding, for
this Court is not atrier of facts. Moreover, we find no cogent, much less compelling,
reason to depart from established practice and precedents. For where, as in the case at
bar, there is no showing that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake on the part of the Office of the President or a department head in
rendering a questioned decision; nor a total lack of substantial evidence to support their
administrative decisions, their factual findings and conclusion are entitled to great weight
and respect, and will not be interfered with.[50]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the assiled Orders and
Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 15439, including the Order
of dismissal of Civil Case No 45053, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs CA and Dela Rosa

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on
February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet
Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the
application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by
Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5,
Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-
9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired
the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from
her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9
in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime
and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was
enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old
at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio
presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
1964. 7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was
sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who
located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the
date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession
of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of
annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts,
and its payment of taxes on the land. 8

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by
the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December
25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of
Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by
Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring
of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:

SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was
not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove
their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The
applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and
recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok
respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-
surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of
ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument
that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim
to the land because it is not alienable and registerable.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet
and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:

There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of
Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral
claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American
and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and
the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the
Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's
evidence is that it had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of
mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment.
After World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and
also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948,
Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.

The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in
1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6
to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of
Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of
1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of
Benguet and Atok.

It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected
prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was
inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by
this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining
claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The
moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted
from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands
cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a
valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation,
such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as
against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet,
160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area
from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim
and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining &
Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of
the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment
of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except
as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right
before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee
remains in the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the
Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not
required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining
laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though
secured by patent.

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of
the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the
government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is
obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be
deprived thereof without due process of law. 13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature
for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was
categorically provided that:

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
government established under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of
public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary

notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands
set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which
would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby
declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their respective locations.

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the
laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators
acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of
any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15As
the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer
the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the
private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by
the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of
ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its
registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-
interest. 16The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand
and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced.
We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave
abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had

really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the
concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was
not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They
were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them
as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she
was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much
less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral
underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is
also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land
while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well
because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel
lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner,
go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the
surface and the sub-surface rights?

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot
be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as
already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so
and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were
perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so,
because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing
as follows:

Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the
time of the inauguration of government established under the Constitution.

SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface.

SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such patents.

SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from all
such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for
the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all
minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership
of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the
land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The
correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use
to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to
enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The
land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party,
including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of
course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the
Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land
was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of
acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the
mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE
and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
PNOC Energy Development Corporation vs Veneracion

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the Order, dated 21 May 1997 issued by the Mines Adjudication Board
(MAB) of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR), 1 declaring
that the respondent Emiliano Veneracion has a preferential right over the contested
Block 159.

This case involves the conflicting claims of the petitioner Philippine National Oil
Corporation-Energy Development Corporation and the respondent over the mining rights
over Block 159 of the Malangas Coal Reservation, Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.

On 31 January 1989, respondent applied with the Mines and Geo-Sciences

Development Services, DENR, Region IX, Zamboanga City for a Declaration of Location
(DOL) over Block 159 of the Malangas Coal Reservation, situated at Barangays
Payongan and Kauswagan, Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur. On 18 May 1989, the Office of
the Regional Executive Director (RED) of the DENR informed the respondent that his
DOL cannot be registered since Block 159 was part of the Malangas Coal Reservation,
as provided under Proclamation No. 284, issued by the President on 19 July 1938. 2 With
the endorsement of the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) and the DENR Secretary, the
respondent petitioned the Office of the President for the withdrawal of Block 159 from
the coal reservation and its conversion into a mineral reservation.3

The petitioner applied for a mineral prospecting permit over Block 159 (and Blocks 120
and 160) with the OEA, which the latter granted on 4 September 1989. The Malangas
Coal Reservation was, at that time, under the administration of the OEA. 4 When it had
initially applied for a mineral prospecting permit over lands within the Malangas Coal
Reservation, the OEA advised it to obtain the permission of the Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences (BMGS).5

On 18 October 1991, petitioner submitted to the DENR an application/proposal for a

Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) over Blocks 120, 159 and 160 of the
Malangas Coal Reservation.6

On 21 February 1992, the Officer-In-Charge Regional Technical Director Dario R.

Miñoza of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Developmental Service (MGDS) advised the
petitioner to amend its application for MPSA by excluding Block 159 as the same is
covered by the application of the respondent.7Nevertheless, the petitioner did not
exclude Block 159 from its MPSA. Records also show that it had not applied for nor was
it able to obtain an Exploration Permit from the BMGS over Block 159.

On 13 April 1992, Presidential Proclamation No. 890 was issued, which effectively
excluded Block 159 from the operation of Proclamation No. 284, and declared Block No.
159 as government mineral reservation open for disposition to qualified mining
applicants, pursuant to Executive Order No. 279.8

On 26 May 1992, petitioner's application for MPSA covering Coal Block Nos. 120, 159
and 160 was accepted for filing.9 Respondent immediately filed, on 28 May 1992, a
protest to the petitioner's inclusion of Block 159 in its application for MPSA before the
RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City.10

After the parties were heard, the RED, in an Order, dated 12 April 1993, ruled in favor of
the respondent and ordered the petitioner to amend its MPSA by excluding therefrom
Block 159.11 On 18 May 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 12 April 1993,12 which the RED denied in an Order dated 5 July 1993.13

On 30 July 1993, petitioner filed an appeal with the DENR Secretary questioning the
Orders issued by the RED.14

While the case was pending, respondent applied for a MPSA. On 31 July 1992, he paid
the processing fee for a MPSA covering Block 159 and was able to comply with all other
requirements of the MPSA application.15

On 4 October 1994, the Office of the Secretary dismissed the appeal on the ground that
petitioner's right to appeal had already prescribed.16 Section 50 of Presidential Decree
No. 463 provides therefore for a five-day reglementary period from the receipt of the
order or decision of the Director. 17 Petitioner received its copy of the assailed Order
dated 12 April 1993 on 7 May 1993, but filed its Motion for Reconsideration only on 18
May 1993, or eleven days after its receipt thereof. Thereafter, petitioner received a copy
of the Order dated 5 July 1993 on 16 July 1993, but filed its appeal only on 30 July 1993
or nine days after the allowable period to appeal.

On 25 October 1994, petitioner, through a letter addressed to the DENR Secretary,

sought the reconsideration of the Decision, dated 4 October 1994. 18 In a Resolution,
dated 21 December 1994, the then DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala reversed the
Decision, dated 4 October 1994, and gave due course to the MPSA of the petitioner.19

On 1 February 1995, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution,

dated 21 December 1994.20 The now DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued an Order,
dated 5 August 1996, reversing the Resolution, dated 21 December 1994 and reinstating
the Decision, dated 4 October 1994. It ruled that the Orders issued by the RED have
already become final and executory when the petitioner failed to file its appeal five days
after it had received the Orders. As a result, the DENR Secretary no longer had the
jurisdiction to issue the assailed Resolution, dated 21 December 1994. It added that
after looking into the merits of the case, the Orders of the RED were in accordance with
the evidence on record and the pertinent laws on the matter.21

On 20 August 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, dated 5
August 1996. On 21 May 1997, the MAB resolved the motion in favor of the respondent
and affirmed the assailed Order, dated 5 August 1996. 22 It took cognizance of the appeal
filed by petitioner, in accordance with Section 78 of Republic Act No 7942, otherwise
known as The Philippine Mining Act of 1995. 23 The MAB ruled that the petitioner filed its
appeal beyond the five-day prescriptive period provided under Presidential Decree No.
463, which was then the governing law on the matter.

The MAB also decreed that the respondent had preferential mining rights over Block
159. It ruled that the proper procedure with respect to the mining rights application over
Block 159 when it was still part of the Malangas Coal Reservation required the following:
(1) application for prospecting permit with the OEA or other office having jurisdiction over
said reservation; (2) application for exploration permit; (3) application for exclusion of the
land from such reservation; (4) Presidential Declaration on exclusion as recommended
by the Secretary; and (5) application for Lease thereof with priority given to holder of
exploration Permit.

The MAB noted that petitioner did not file for an exploration permit nor applied for the
exclusion of Block 159. Moreover, petitioner filed a MPSA on 18 October 1991, or almost
six (6) months prior to the issuance of Proclamation No. 890 excluding Block 159 from
the Malangas Coal Reservation and allowing its disposition. Thus, the application for a
MPSA over Block 159, while it was still part of a government reservation other than a
mineral reservation, was erroneous and improper and could not have been legally
accepted. And, since the records show that only one MPSA was filed after the issuance
of Proclamation 890 - that of the respondent's, the preferential right over Block 159 was
acquired by the respondent. The MAB, nevertheless, pointed out that the said
preferential right does not necessarily lead to the granting of the respondent's MPSA, but
merely consists of the right to have his application evaluated and the prohibition against
accepting other mining applications over Block 159 pending the processing of his MPSA.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The correct mode of appeal would have been to file a Petition for Review under Rule 43,
before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's reliance on Section 79 of the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 is misplaced.24Republic Act No. 7902 expanded the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals to include:

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions x x x except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

With the enactment of Republic Act No. 7902, this Court issued Circular No. 1-95 dated
16 May 1995 governing appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals by
Petition for Review, regardless of the nature of the question raised. Said circular was
incorporated in Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 In addition, this Court held in a
line of cases that appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial bodies are
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals, under the requirements and conditions
set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 26 Nevertheless, this Court has taken
into account the fact that these cases were promulgated after the petitioner filed this
appeal on 4 August 1997, and decided to take cognizance of the present case.

There are two main issues that need to be resolved in this case: (1) whether or not the
petitioner has already lost its right to appeal the RED's Order dated 12 April 1993; and
(2) whether or not the petitioner acquired a preferential right on mining rights over Block
159.

This Court finds no merit in this Petition.

Petitioner alleges that Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137 27 governs the
petitioner's appeal of the Orders, dated 12 April 1993 and 5 July 1993, and not Section
50 of Presidential Decree No. 463. He further adds that even if Presidential Decree No.
463 was applicable in this case, his appeal should have been allowed on grounds of
substantial justice.

When Presidential Decree No. 463 was enacted in 1974, Section 50 of the law had
clearly intended to repeal the corresponding provision found in Section 61 of
Commonwealth Act No. 137, and to shorten the 30-day period within which to file an
appeal from the Decision of the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences to five days.
Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended, provides that:

SEC. 61. - Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the
Director of Mines for decision: Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of
Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within
thirty days from receipt of such decision or order. In case any one of the parties should
disagree from the decision or order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the matter may be taken to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as
the case may be, within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order, otherwise
the said decision or order shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned. x x x.

Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463 reads:

Sec. 50. Appeals. - Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director,
may, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Minister [now Secretary].
Decisions of the Minister [now Secretary] are likewise appealable within five (5) days
from receipt thereof by the affected party to the President whose decision shall be final
and executory.

Petitioner's insistence that the 30-day reglementary period provided by Section 61 of

Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended, applies, cannot be sustained by this Court.
By providing a five-day period within which to file an appeal on the decisions of the
Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences, Presidential Decree No. 463 unquestionably
repealed Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137.

In Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate Court,28 this Court extensively discussed the

development of the law on the adjudication of mining claims, as seen in the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 137, Presidential Decree No. 463, until its present state under
Republic Act No. 7942. It was noted that there was a clear effort to modernize the
system of administration and disposition of mineral lands and that the procedure of
adjudicating mining claims had become increasingly administrative in character.

[W]ith the issuance of Presidential Decree Nos. 99-A, 309, and 463, the procedure of
adjudicating conflicting mining claims has been made completely administrative in
character, with the President as the final appeal authority. Section 50 of P.D. 463,
providing for a modernized system of administration and disposition of mineral lands, to
promote and encourage the development and exploitation thereof, mandates on the
matter of "Protests, Adverse Claims and Appeals," the following procedure:

Appeals - Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may, within
five (5) days from receipt thereof appeal, to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are
likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the
President of the Philippines whose decision shall be final and executory.

It should be noted that before its amendment, the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) required
that after the filing of adverse claim with the Bureau of Mines, the adverse claimant had
to go to a court of competent jurisdiction for the settlement of the claim. With the
amendment seeking to expedite the resolution of mining conflicts, the Director of Mines
became the mandatory adjudicator of adverse claims, instead of the Court of First
instance. Thus, it cannot escape notice that under Section 61 of the Mining Law, as
amended by Republic Act Nos. 746 and 4388, appeals from the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (then Minister of Natural Resources) on
conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations may be made to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case may be. In contrast, under the decrees
issued at the onset of martial law, it has been expressly provided that the decisions of
the same Secretary in mining cases are appealable to the President of the Philippines
under Section 50 of the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. No. 463)
and Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 in relation to P.D. No. 309.

The trend at present is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative
matter. This does not mean that administrative bodies have complete rein over mining
disputes. The very terms of Section 73 of the Mining Law, as amended by R.A. No.
4388, in requiring that the adverse claim must "state in full detail the nature, boundaries
and extent of the adverse claim" show that the conflicts to be decided by reason of such
adverse claim refer primarily to questions of fact. The controversies to be submitted and
resolved by the Director of Mines under the sections referred only to the overlapping of
claims and administrative matters incidental thereto. Questions and controversies that
are judicial, not administrative, in nature can be resolved only by the regular courts in
whom is vested the judicial power to resolve and adjudicate such civil disputes and
controversies between litigants in accordance with the established norms of law and
justice. Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a
distinction between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an
executive or administrative nature, such as "granting of license, permits, lease and
contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or cancelling applications, or deciding
conflicting applications," and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual
nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated
only by the courts of justice.

This distinction is carried on even under the present law. Findings of fact by the Mines
Adjudication Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions or orders of the
panel of arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding on the parties, and its decision or
order shall be final and executory. But resort to the appropriate court, through a Petition
for Review by certiorari, involving questions of law, may be made within thirty days from
the receipt of the order or decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.

Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader
interest of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a
mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction over the appeal. The right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a
mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law.29

Petitioner invokes the judicial policy of allowing appeals, although filed late, when the
interest of justice so requires. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive
rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the
rules.30 In the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing
its appeal within the mandated period. Instead, the records show that after failing to
comply with the period within which to file their motion for reconsideration on time, they
again failed to file their appeal before the Office of the DENR Secretary within the time
provided by law.

Even if petitioner had not lost its right to appeal, it cannot claim any mining rights over
Block 159 for failure to comply with the legal requirements. Petitioner applied for an
MPSA with the DENR on 18 October 1991, prior to the release of Block 159 from the
Malangas Coal Reservation under Proclamation No. 890 on 13 April 1992. Thus, the
provisions on the acquisition of mining rights within a government reservation other than
a mineral reservation under Presidential Decree No. 463 and the Consolidated Mines
Administrative Order (CMAO) should apply.

As a general rule, prospecting and exploration of minerals in a government reservation is

prohibited under Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 463. However, the same rule
provides an exception involving instances when the government agency concerned
allows it.

Section 13. Areas Closed to Mining Location. - No prospecting and exploration shall be
allowed:

(a) In military, and other Government reservations except when authorized by the proper
Government agency concerned.

Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463 reiterates the rule and clarifies it further by
stating that prospecting, exploration and exploitation of minerals on reserved lands other
than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the proper government agency. As an
exception to this rule, qualified persons may undertake the said prospecting, exploration
and exploitation when the said agencies cannot undertake them.

Section 8. Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation of Minerals in Reserved Lands. -

Prospecting, exploration and exploitation of minerals in reserved lands other than
mineral reservations may be undertaken by the proper government agency. In the event
that the said agencies cannot undertake the prospecting, exploration and exploitation of
minerals in reserved lands, qualified persons may be permitted to undertake such
prospecting, exploration and exploitation in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary [Minister]. The right to exploit the minerals found therein
shall be awarded by the President under such terms and conditions as recommended by
the Director and approved by the Secretary [Minister]: Provided, That the party who
undertook prospecting, exploration and exploitation of said are shall be given priority.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a special permit may be

issued by the Director to the exploration permitee to extract, remove and dispose of
minerals in limited quantities as verified by the Bureau of Mines [Director of Mines and
Geo-Sciences].

Section 15 of the CMAO is more straightforward when it states that government

reserved lands are open for prospecting, subject to the rules and regulations provided
therein.

SEC. 15. Government Reserved Land. - Lands reserved by the Government for

purposes other than mining are open to prospecting. Any interested party may file an
application therefore with the head of the agency administering said land, subject always
to compliance with pertinent laws and rules and regulations covering such reserved land.
Such application shall be acted upon within thirty (30) days. In such cases, the
compensation due the surface owner shall accrue equally to the agency administering
the reserved land and the Bureau of Mines.

The law enumerates the following requirements: (1) a prospecting permit from the
agency that has jurisdiction over the area, in this case, the OEA; 31 (2) an exploration
permit from the BMGS;32 (3) if the exploration reveals the presence of commercial
deposit, the permitee applies before the BMGS for the exclusion of the area from the
reservation;33 (4) granting by the president of the application to exclude the area from the
reservation;34 and (5) a mining agreement approved by the DENR Secretary.

In this case, petitioner complied with the first requirement and obtained a prospecting
permit from the OEA.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In its correspondence with the petitioner, the OEA, however, advised the petitioner on
two separate occasions to obtain a "prospecting permit" from the BMGS, although the
OEA was probably referring to an exploration permit. 35 The petitioner did not apply for an
exploration permit with the BMGS, nor would the BMGS have granted petitioner an
exploration permit because when petitioner wrote to the BMGS informing the latter of its
intention to enter into an MPSA with the DENR over Block 159, the BMGS informed the
petitioner that the respondent's claim over Block 159 had already preceded that of the
petitioner.36 The advice given by the BMGS was justified since at that time, the
respondent already had a pending application for the exclusion of Block 159 from the
Malangas Coal Reservation. Thereafter, the petitioner filed his MPSA application,
without complying with the second, third and fourth requisites. Since it ignored the sound
advice of the OEA and the BMGS, the government agencies concerned, and stubbornly
insisted on its incorrect procedure, petitioner cannot complain now that its MPSA was
revoked for failure to comply with the legal requirements.

In contrast, the respondent applied for a DOL as early as 30 January 1989. The DENR
Regional Office refused to register the respondent's DOL since Block 159 was still part
of the Malangas Coal Reservation and advised the respondent to apply for the exclusion
of the area from the reservation. The respondent followed this advice. The BMGS then
treated the respondent's application for a DOL as an application for an exploration permit
and caused a verification report of the area applied for, as provided under Section 99 of
the CMAO.37 Upon the application of the respondent, the OEA and thereafter the DENR
Secretary endorsed the respondent's application for the exclusion of the area from the
reservation.38 This application was granted by the President, through Proclamation No.
890, which provided that the mining rights to Block 159 will be disposed of in accordance
with Executive Order No. 279. On 30 July 1992, respondent filed his MPSA. 39 On 12
April 1993, the RED of Zamboanga City ordered that the respondent's MPSA be given
due course.40 Although the respondent's applications may not follow the strict letter of
the law, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Hence, the
respondent was able to acquire a preferential right on the mining claims over Block 159,
as provided under Section 101 of the CMAO.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ

Even if it were to be assumed that the respondent failed to comply with these
requirements, this would not be fatal to his cause since he filed his MPSA on 31 July
1992, after the issuance of Proclamation No. 890; therefore, the provisions on the
application of mining rights over government reservations would no longer apply to him
because Block 159 was already converted into a mineral reservation, wherein a different
set of rules would apply. The only effect of his failure to comply with the requirements
CMAO on government reservations is that he loses the preferential right over the area
involved. In this case, the respondent was the only applicant to the mining rights over
Block 159, apart from the petitioner who was not qualified for failure to comply with the
legal requirements. Proclamation No. 890 specifically provides that Executive Order No.
279 should be applied. Records indicate that the provisions of Executive Order No. 279
have been complied with.41

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
of the Mines Adjudication Board is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the
exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the
processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization
of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279
authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production,
or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order
Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-
sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.” and
Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining,
quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining
prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their
validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue : 
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as

amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of
location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease"
which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order
No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license,
concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased
to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and
management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No.
279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining
laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and
effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining
leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being
co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest;
extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to
carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Republic vs Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation

The Facts

The CA narrated the facts as follows:

The four (4) petitioners, namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha,
Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, after having been granted permission
to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan,
succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in
Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and as a result of their tedious
efforts and substantial expenses, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now
Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit
said marble deposits.

x x x x x x x x x

After compliance with numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by the
Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners.

x x x x x x x x x

Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the Department
of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by
him through his letter to ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
dated September 6, 1986 for the reasons stated therein. Because of the aforesaid
cancellation, the original petition was filed and later substituted by the petitioners
AMENDED PETITION dated August 21, 1991 to assail the same.

Also after due hearing, the prayer for injunctive relief was granted in the Order of this
Court dated February 28, 1992. Accordingly, the corresponding preliminary writs were
issued after the petitioners filed their injunction bond in the amount of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00).

x x x x x x x x x

On September 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the herein questioned decision.[6]
 The trial court ruled that the privilege granted under respondents license had
already ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due process clause
of the Constitution. Such right was supposedly violated when the license was cancelled
without notice and hearing. The cancellation was said to be unjustified, because the area
that could be covered by the four separate applications of respondents was 400
hectares. Finally, according to the RTC, Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the
cancellation of the license, was an ex post facto law; as such, it violated Section 3 of
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners asked whether PD 463 or the
Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 had been violated by the award of the
330.3062 hectares to respondents in accordance with Proclamation No. 2204. They also
questioned the validity of the cancellation of respondents Quarry License/Permit (QLP)
No. 33.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Sustaining the trial court in toto, the CA held that the grant of the quarry license
covering 330.3062 hectares to respondents was authorized by law, because the license
was embraced by four (4) separate applications -- each for an area of 81
hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation under Presidential Decree No. 463 -- that a
quarry license should cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province -- was
supplanted by Republic Act No. 7942,[7] which increased the mining areas allowed under
PD 463.
It also ruled that the cancellation of respondents license without notice and hearing
was tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. It added that
under the clause in the Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of obligations and
contracts, respondents license must be respected by the State.
Hence, this Petition.[8]

Issues

Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration:

(1) [W]hether or not QLP No. 33 was issued in blatant contravention of Section 69, P.D.
No. 463; and (2) whether or not Proclamation No. 84 issued by then President Corazon
Aquino is valid. The corollary issue is whether or not the Constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto law applies to Proclamation No. 84[9]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has merit.

First Issue:
Validity of License

Respondents contend that the Petition has no legal basis, because PD 463 has
already been repealed.[10] In effect, they ask for the dismissal of the Petition on the
ground of mootness.
PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources through licenses, concessions or leases. [11] While these
arrangements were provided under the 1935[12] and the 1973[13] Constitutions, they have
been omitted by Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.[14]
 With the shift of constitutional policy toward full control and supervision of the State
over natural resources, the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran
Jr. [15] declared the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to or violative of the express
mandate of the 1987 Constitution. The said provisions dealt with the lease of mining
claims; quarry permits or licenses covering privately owned or public lands; and other
related provisions on lease, licenses and permits.
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional
mandate. It has repealed or amended all laws, executive orders, presidential decrees,
rules and regulations -- or parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with any of its provisions.
[16]

It is relevant to state, however, that Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
does not apply retroactively to a license, concession or lease granted by the government
under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February
2, 1987.[17] As noted in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr., the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission [18] emphasized the intent to apply the said
constitutional provision prospectively.
While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are
inconsistent with its own, it nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing
licenses, as follows:

SECTION 5. Mineral Reservations. When the national interest so requires, such as

when there is a need to preserve strategic raw materials for industries critical to national
development, or certain minerals for scientific, cultural or ecological value, the President
may establish mineral reservations upon the recommendation of the Director through the
Secretary. Mining operations in existing mineral reservations and such other
reservations as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the Department or
through a contractor: Provided, That a small scale-mining cooperative covered by
Republic Act No. 7076 shall be given preferential right to apply for a small-scale mining
agreement for a maximum aggregate area of twenty-five percent (25%) of such mineral
reservation, subject to valid existing mining/quarrying rights as provided under Section
112 Chapter XX hereof. All submerged lands within the contiguous zone and in the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines are hereby declared to be mineral
reservations.

x x x x x x x x x

SECTION 7. Periodic Review of Existing Mineral Reservations. The Secretary shall

periodically review existing mineral reservations for the purpose of determining whether
their continued existence is consistent with the national interest, and upon his
recommendation, the President may, by proclamation, alter or modify the boundaries
thereof or revert the same to the public domain without prejudice to prior existing rights.

SECTION 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations. Subject to any existing rights or

reservations and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in public or private
lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall be open to
mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any
conflict that may arise under this provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of
arbitrators.

SECTION 19. Areas Closed to Mining Applications. -- Mineral agreement or financial or

technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed:

(a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written clearance by
the government agency concerned;

(b) Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries, archeological and historic sites,
bridges, highways, waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams or other infrastructure
projects, public or private works including plantations or valuable crops, except upon
written consent of the government agency or private entity concerned;
(c) In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights;

(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;

(e) In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by law unless with prior consent of
the small-scale miners, in which case a royalty payment upon the utilization of minerals
shall be agreed upon by the parties, said royalty forming a trust fund for the
socioeconomic development of the community concerned; and

(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness areas,
mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks,
greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law and in areas expressly
prohibited under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under
Republic Act No. 7586, Department Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and
other laws.

SECTION 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/ Quarrying Rights. All valid and

existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending renewal, mineral
production-sharing agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at the date of
effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid, shall not be impaired, and shall be recognized
by the Government: Provided, That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share
in mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act
shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor unless the mining
lessee or contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said
provisions: Provided, further, That no renewal of mining lease contracts shall be made
after the expiration of its term: Provided, finally, That such leases, production-sharing
agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements shall comply with the
applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

SECTION 113. Recognition of Valid and Existing Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry

Application. Holders of valid and existing mining claims, lease/quarry applications shall
be given preferential rights to enter into any mode of mineral agreement with the
government within two (2) years from the promulgation of the rules and regulations
implementing this Act. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 3(p) of RA 7942 defines an existing mining/quarrying right as a valid and

subsisting mining claim or permit or quarry permit or any mining lease contract or
agreement covering a mineralized area granted/issued under pertinent mining
laws. Consequently, determining whether the license of respondents falls under this
definition would be relevant to fixing their entitlement to the rights and/or preferences
under RA 7942. Hence, the present Petition has not been mooted.
Petitioners submit that the license clearly contravenes Section 69 of PD 463,
because it exceeds the maximum area that may be granted. This incipient violation,
according to them, renders the license void ab initio.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the license was validly granted,
because it was covered by four separate applications for areas of 81 hectares each.
The license in question, QLP No. 33,[19] is dated August 3, 1982, and it was issued
in the name of Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation. The terms of the license
allowed the corporation to extract and dispose of marbleized limestone from a 330.3062-
hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license is, however, subject to the terms and
conditions of PD 463, the governing law at the time it was granted; as well as to the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder.[20] By the same token, Proclamation No. 2204 --
which awarded to Rosemoor the right of development, exploitation, and utilization of the
mineral site -- expressly cautioned that the grant was subject to existing policies, laws,
rules and regulations.[21]
The license was thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463, which reads:

Section 69. Maximum Area of Quarry License Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
14 hereof, a quarry license shall cover an area of not more than one hundred (100)
hectares in any one province and not more than one thousand (1,000) hectares in the
entire Philippines. (Italics supplied)

The language of PD 463 is clear. It states in categorical and mandatory terms that a
quarry license, like that of respondents, should cover a maximum of 100 hectares in any
given province. This law neither provides any exception nor makes any reference to the
number of applications for a license. Section 69 of PD 463 must be taken to mean
exactly what it says.Where the law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[22]
Moreover, the lower courts ruling is evidently inconsistent with the fact that QLP No.
33 was issued solely in the name of Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation,
rather than in the names of the four individual stockholders who are respondents
herein. It likewise brushes aside a basic postulate that a corporation has a separate
personality from that of its stockholders.[23]
The interpretation adopted by the lower courts is contrary to the purpose of Section
69 of PD 463. Such intent to limit, without qualification, the area of a quarry license
strictly to 100 hectares in any one province is shown by the opening proviso that
reads: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof x x x. The mandatory nature
of the provision is also underscored by the use of the word shall. Hence, in the
application of the 100-hectare-per-province limit, no regard is given to the size or the
number of mining claims under Section 14, which we quote:

SECTION 14. Size of Mining Claim. -- For purposes of registration of a mining claim

under this Decree, the Philippine territory and its shelf are hereby divided into meridional
blocks or quadrangles of one-half minute (1/2) of latitude and longitude, each block or
quadrangle containing area of eighty-one (81) hectares, more or less.

A mining claim shall cover one such block although a lesser area may be allowed if
warranted by attendant circumstances, such as geographical and other justifiable
considerations as may be determined by the Director: Provided, That in no case shall
the locator be allowed to register twice the area allowed for lease under Section 43
hereof. (Italics supplied)

Clearly, the intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license
may cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several
applications.Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the
law.

Second Issue:
Validity of Proclamation No. 84

Petitioners also argue that the license was validly declared a nullity and
consequently withdrawn or terminated. In a letter dated September 15, 1986,
respondents were informed by then Minister Ernesto M. Maceda that their license had
illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no
more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The
latter reason, they added, was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No.
84. According to this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land
that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of
the Biak-na-Bato national park.
They also contend that Section 74 of PD 463 would not apply, because Minister
Macedas letter did not cancel or revoke QLP No. 33, but merely declared the latters
nullity. They further argue that respondents waived notice and hearing in their
application for the license.
On the other hand, respondents submit that, as provided for in Section 74 of PD
463, their right to due process was violated when their license was cancelled without
notice and hearing. They likewise contend that Proclamation No. 84 is not valid for the
following reasons: 1) it violates the clause on the non-impairment of contracts; 2) it is
an ex post facto law and/or a bill of attainder; and 3) it was issued by the President after
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
This Court ruled on the nature of a natural resource exploration permit, which was
akin to the present respondents license, in Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation v. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative,[24] which held:

x x x. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133
merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or
rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are
matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration
permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview
of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the
State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in
accordance with the demands of the general welfare.[25]

This same ruling had been made earlier in Tan v. Director of Forestry[26] with regard
to a timber license, a pronouncement that was reiterated in Ysmael v. Deputy Executive
Secretary,[27] the pertinent portion of which reads:

x x x. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].[28] (Italics supplied)

In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents license may be revoked or

rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.[29] Respondents themselves acknowledge this condition of the grant under
paragraph 7 of QLP No. 33, which we quote:

7. This permit/license may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines
and Geo-Sciences when, in his opinion public interests so require or, upon failure of the
permittee/licensee to comply with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, as well as with
the terms and conditions specified herein; Provided, That if a permit/license is cancelled,
or otherwise terminated, the permittee/licensee shall be liable for all unpaid rentals and
royalties due up to the time of the termination or cancellation of the permit/license[.][30]
(Italics supplied)

The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State
as owner of all mineral resources. That determination was based on policy
considerations formally enunciated in the letter dated September 15, 1986, issued by
then Minister Maceda and, subsequently, by the President through Proclamation No.
84. As to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice it to say that while the
cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the director of mines and geo-
sciences, the latter is subject to the formers control as the department head. We also
stress the clear prerogative of the Executive Department in the evaluation and the
consequent cancellation of licenses in the process of its formulation of policies with
regard to their utilization. Courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion
without any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.[31]
Moreover, granting that respondents license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by
the State in the exercise of police power. [32] The exercise of such power through
Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State
ownership of all natural resources.[33] This Regalian doctrine is an exercise of its
sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and of the patrimony of the
nation, the mineral deposits of which are a valuable asset.[34]
Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. As pointed out earlier, respondents license is not a contract to which the
protection accorded by the non-impairment clause may extend.[35] Even if the license
were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and a reservation of police power are
deemed read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed with public welfare.[36] As it
is, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.[37]
We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that
is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. [38] Its declaration that
QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity[39] is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the
cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional
proscription against bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post
facto law. There are six recognized instances when a law is considered as such: 1) it
criminalizes and punishes an action that was done before the passing of the law and that
was innocent when it was done; 2) it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when it was committed; 3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is greater than
that imposed by the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; 4) it alters the
legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a less or different testimony than
that required by the law at the time of the commission of the offense; 5) it assumes the
regulation of civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a
deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that was considered lawful
when it was done; and 6) it deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he or she become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or an acquittal or the proclamation of an amnesty. [40] Proclamation No. 84
does not fall under any of the enumerated categories; hence, it is not an ex post
facto law.
It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in
nature.[41] Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-
Bato national park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in character.
Finally, it is stressed that at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84
on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution of 1986.[42] Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which
promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature
is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also
explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.[43]
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby GRANTED and the appealed Decision of the
Court of Appeals SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.