Daf Ditty Pesahim 21: Benefit from Chametz

MISHNAH: Guidelines are presented concerning the timing of the prohibition against eating
and benefiting from chometz on erev Pesach.

A dispute is recorded whether chometz must be burnt or could be destroyed using any effective
method.1

1
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Pesachim%20021.pdf

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Clarifying the Mishnah

Rabbah bar Ulla explains how the language of the Mishnah reflects the opinion of R’ Gamliel who
permits terumah but prohibits Chullin during the fifth hour. The Gemara explains why the Mishnah
specified domesticated animals, undomesticated animals and birds. The Gemara explains the
necessity of what seems to be a number of obvious statements made by the Mishnah.

Identifying the source that prohibits chometz from benefit

Chizkiyah and R’ Avahu disagree about the source that prohibits chometz from benefit. According
to Chizkiyah it is the unique wording ‫ יאכל לא‬whereas according to R’ Avahu any form of the word
‫אוכל‬implies a prohibition against benefit unless otherwise indicated.

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Chizkiyah said: From where is it derived in the mishna that it is prohibited to derive benefit
from leavened bread on Passover? As it is stated:

-‫ ָזכוֹר ֶאת‬,‫ָהָﬠם‬-‫שׁה ֶאל‬ ֶ ‫ג ַויּ ֹאֶמר ֹמ‬ 3 And Moses said unto the people: 'Remember this day, in
‫שׁר ְיָצאֶתם ִמִמְּצ ַר ִים‬ ֶ ‫ַהיּוֹם ַהֶזּה ֲא‬ which ye came out from Egypt, out of the house of
‫ הוִֹציא‬,‫ ִכּי ְבֹּחֶזק ָיד‬,‫ִמֵבּית ֲﬠָבִדים‬ bondage; for by strength of hand the LORD brought you
.‫ ָחֵמץ‬,‫ְיהָוה ֶאְתֶכם ִמֶזּה; ְול ֹא ֵיָאֵכל‬ out from this place; there shall no leavened bread be
eaten.

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 Ex13:3

“Leavened bread shall not be eaten”

Since the verse uses the passive, it should be understood as follows: There shall be no permitted
consumption of it at all, even deriving benefit, as benefit could be exchanged for money, which
could be used to buy food.

The Gemara reads precisely: The reason deriving benefit is prohibited is that the Merciful One
writes in the Torah: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten.”

Had the Torah not written: “Shall not be eaten,” and instead used the active form: You shall not
eat, I would have said that the prohibition of eating is implied but that the prohibition of
deriving benefit is not implied.

RASHI

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The Gemara comments: And this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, as
Rabbi Abbahu said that wherever it is stated: “It shall not be eaten,” “You, singular, shall
not eat,” or “You, plural, shall not eat,” both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of

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deriving benefit are implied, unless the verse specifies that one may benefit, in the manner
that it specified with regard to an unslaughtered animal carcass.

6
This allowance was written specifically for ‫טריפה‬, but elsewhere ‫ איסור הנאה‬.‫ לא‬AND ‫איסור‬
‫ אכילה‬both includes ‫תאכל‬

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As it was taught in a baraita:

-‫ ְנֵבָלה ַלֵגּר ֲאֶשׁר‬-‫כא ל ֹא ת ֹאְכלוּ ָכל‬
‫ אוֹ ָמֹכר‬,‫ ִתְּתֶּנָנּה ַוֲאָכָלהּ‬b‫ִבְּשָׁﬠֶרי‬
‫ ַליהָוה‬,‫ִכּי ַﬠם ָקדוֹשׁ ַאָתּה‬--‫ְלָנְכ ִרי‬
‫ ַבֲּחֵלב‬,‫ְתַבֵשּׁל ְגִּדי‬-‫; ל ֹא‬b‫ֶהי‬m‫ֱא‬
{‫ }פ‬.‫ִאמּוֹ‬
21 Ye shall not eat of anything that dieth of itself; thou mayest
give it unto the stranger that is within thy gates, that he may
eat it; or thou mayest sell it unto a foreigner; for thou art a holy
people unto the LORD thy God. Thou shalt not seethe a kid in
its mother's milk.
Deut 14:21

“You shall not eat of any unslaughtered animal; you may give it to the resident alien who is
within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people
to the Lord your God”

I have derived only that it is permitted to a resident alien through giving and to a gentile
through selling. From where do I derive that it is permitted to a resident alien through selling?

The verse states: “You may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates…or you may
sell it,” meaning that one has the option to do either of these.

From where is it derived that it is permitted to a gentile through giving and one is not required
to sell it to him?

The verse states: “You may give it…that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a foreigner.”
Therefore, you may say that he may transfer it to both a resident alien and a gentile, both
through giving and through selling.

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

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The baraita concludes: Rabbi Yehuda says: These matters are meant to be understood as they
are written; he may transfer an unslaughtered animal carcass to a resident alien only through
giving and to a gentile only through selling.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers:
If it could enter your mind to understand the verse in accordance with that which Rabbi Meir
said, then let the Merciful One write: You may give it to the resident alien who is within your
gates that he may eat it and sell it to a foreigner.

Why do I need the word “or” between these two options?

Learn from it that the matters are to be understood as they are written.

THE SOURCE FOR THE "ISUR HANA'AH" OF CHAMETZ

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2

Rebbi Avahu and Chizkiyah argue about the source for the prohibition against deriving benefit
(Hana'ah) from Chametz on Pesach. Rebbi Avahu says that the verse, "Do not eat Chametz,"
includes both a prohibition against eating and against deriving benefit from Chametz. Rebbi Avahu
maintains that every prohibition against eating in the Torah ("Do not eat...") includes a prohibition
against deriving benefit as well (he derives this principle from the verses that prohibit Neveilah).

Chizkiyah argues and maintains that, normally, when the Torah says, "Do not eat...," it
forbids only eating and not Hana'ah. With regard to Chametz, though, the Torah alters its normal
phraseology and says "Lo Ye'achel" -- "Chametz shall not be eaten," instead of, "Lo Tochlu" --
"you shall not eat Chametz." This change in terminology implies an additional prohibition, that
against deriving benefit from Chametz. (The Gemara concludes that Chizkiyah’ s source for this
way of understanding the verse is another verse which discusses the prohibition against eating
Sheratzim, as mentioned on 23a).

2
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/pesachim/insites/ps-dt-021.htm

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The Gemara explains at length the sources for each opinion and why they disagree with each other.
However, two important points seem to be left unaddressed.

(a) The Gemara cites an argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah in order to demonstrate
the source for Rebbi Avahu's principle. Rebbi Meir says that any type of benefit may be derived
from a Neveilah (that is, it may even be sold in exchange for money, as well as given to a Ger
Toshav (who does not worship idols) or to a Nochri (who does worship idols)). The verse that
permits one to derive benefit from a Neveilah is unnecessary (because we would have known,
without a verse, that one may derive benefit from Neveilah, since no verse forbids it). The Gemara
explains that according to Rebbi Avahu, the verse teaches that one is permitted to have benefit
only from Neveilah, but not from any other item which is forbidden to be eaten.
According to Chizkiyah, who disagrees with this premise and maintains that one is not forbidden
from deriving benefit from any item that he may not eat, why is the verse (that permits one to
derive benefit from Neveilah) necessary according to Rebbi Meir?

(b) Chizkiyah derives the Isur Hana'ah of Chametz from the fact that the Torah uses an unusual
terminology. According to Rebbi Avahu, why does the Torah alter its normal terminology in the
case of Chametz? There are other places where Halachos are derived from similar changes (see
Chagigah 3a, "Yir'eh" and "Yera'eh") and no one argues.

RASHI and TOSFOS disagree about how Chizkiyah understands the view of Rebbi Meir.

1. RASHI (22b, DH l'Mai) explains that according to Chizkiyah, the verse that Rebbi Meir
cites teaches that it is preferable to give the Neveilah to a Ger than to sell it to a Nochri.

Accordingly, the verse is necessary to teach the order of preference (and not that one
is permitted to derive benefit from Neveilah, which we would know without the verse).

2. TOSFOS (21b, DH b'Shleima) disagrees with Rashi, because Rebbi Avahu also agrees that
Rebbi Meir derives the order of preference from the verse.

‫תוס' ד"ה בשלמא לרבי מאיר‬

Tosfos explains why there is no Kashya according to Rebbi Meir.

?‫ דהא איצטריך לאקדומי נתינה דגר‬,‫ לר"מ נמי יקשה‬,‫תימה‬

Question: Why does the Gemara not also query Rebbi Meir, since it is necessary to give
precedence to the Nesinah to a Ger?

... ‫ הוה ידעינן מסברא לאקדומי‬,‫ דודאי אי לא הוה כתב קרא כל עיקר‬,‫ותי' ר"י‬

Answer: The Ri answers that to be sure, had there been no Pasuk at all, we would have said from
a logical standpoint, that one should give the Ger precedence.

‫ ה"א דאתא למידרש שאין‬,"‫ אי לא הוה כתב "או‬,("‫אבל השתא דכתב 'נתינה ומכירה' )"תתננה ואכלה ומכור‬
.‫צריך להקדים‬

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But now that the Torah writes both 'Nesinah' and 'Mechirah' ("Titnenah va'Achalah O Machor"),
had it omitted "O", we would have thought that it comes to teach us that it is not necessary to do
so.
... "‫וצריך ליכתב נמי "גר" "ונכרי‬

Conclusion: And it is also necessary to insert both "Ger" and "Nochri" ...

‫ הוה אמינא‬,‫ ואי הוה כתוב נכרי לחודיה‬,‫ הוה אמינא דאתא למעוטי נתינה דנכרי‬,"‫דאי לא הוה כתב אלא "גר‬
.‫דאתא למעוטי מכירה דגר‬

This is because, had it only written "Ger", we would have thought that it comes to preclude giving
it to a Nochri; and had it mentioned only "Nochri", we would have thought that it comes to
preclude selling it to a Ger.

If Rebbi Avahu also learns the order of preference from the verse (and he still uses the verse to
teach that only Hana'ah of Neveilah is permitted, but not Hana'ah of other forbidden items), then
the order of preference apparently does not entirely "use up" the verse, so to speak. Consequently,
Rashi's answer does not suffice to explain why the verse is necessary according to Chizkiyah.

Therefore, Tosfos (22a, DH Rebbi Shimon) suggests that Chizkiyah admits that Rebbi Meir
follows the opinion of Rebbi Avahu and maintains that every prohibition against eating an object
includes a prohibition against deriving benefit from that object as well. Chizkiyah, however, argues
about what Rebbi Yehudah holds. Rebbi Avahu asserts that even Rebbi Yehudah agrees with his
principle that whenever the Torah says, "Do not eat," it also intends to prohibit Hana'ah, while
Chizkiyah claims that Rebbi Yehudah learns the prohibition of Hana'ah of Chametz from the word
"Ye'achel."

(The answer to the second question may be as follows. Other teachings that are derived from a
change that the Torah makes in a certain phrase are subject to unanimity, because in those cases
(such as "Yir'eh" and "Yera'eh" in Chagigah), both words use the same number of letters.

The fact that the Torah uses one word and not the other indicates its intention to teach a new
Halachah. Here, however, the standard terminology ("Lo Tochlu") requires an extra letter, and
therefore Rebbi Avahu asserts that the Torah uses the phrase "Lo Ye'achel" in order to shorten the
word and not to indicate any new Halachah.

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Deriving Benefit from Hametz on Pesach

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:3

The second chapter of Massekhet Pesahim opens with a discussion of the completion of the
process of bi’ur hametz; after having searched for the hametz, one must destroy it. The main issue
in this perek, however, is the definition of the prohibition of hametz itself. The Torah clearly
forbids eating hametz, and even prohibits having hametz in one’s house. What is less clear is
whether someone can derive benefit from hametz in other ways. Does the ban on
eating hametz imply that there is a larger prohibition attached that will forbid all benefit from it,
or, perhaps, an issur hana’ah (a prohibition against deriving benefit) is a separate matter?

Our Mishna teaches that one is permitted to derive benefit from hametz – one can sell it to a non-
Jew, feed it to his animals, etc. – as long as it can be eaten. Once the time comes when hametz is
forbidden, no benefit can be derived from it, not even using it as fuel.

Chizkiyah said: From where is it derived in the mishna that it is prohibited to derive benefit from
leavened bread on Passover? As it is stated: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten” (Ex 13:3).
Since the verse uses the passive, it should be understood as follows: There shall be no permitted
consumption of it at all, even deriving benefit, as benefit could be exchanged for money, which
could be used to buy food. The Gemara reads precisely: The reason deriving benefit is
prohibited is that the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten.”
Had the Torah not written: “Shall not be eaten,” and instead used the active form: You shall not
eat, I would have said that the prohibition of eating is implied but that the prohibition
of deriving benefit is not implied.

3
https://steinsaltz.org/daf/pesahim21/

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The Mishna specifically says that neither a behema (domesticated animal) nor a hayya (wild
animal) can be fed once the issur hana’ah begins, but either of them can be fed until that time. The
Gemara explains that the Mishna needs to teach both, as each case has a uniqueness that would
not be covered by the other.

For example, had the Mishna only taught us the case of hayya, we would have thought that a wild
animal can be fed just before Pesah because such an animal will hide anything left over. A
domesticated animal, however, may leave over food that will not be noticed until Pesah begins.

The Mikhtam explains this distinction by pointing out that someone who gives food to a wild
animal knows that such an animal will hide leftover food, so at the time that he feeds the animal
he already makes a conscious decision to rid himself of this hametz. Someone who feeds a
domesticated animal, however, assumes that he will see if there is any leftover food and will
destroy it, leaving open the possibility that hametz will be left in his possession
when Pesah begins.

The Prohibitions of Chametz

Rav David Brofsky writes:4

The prohibition of chametz is unique. Chametz is different from other prohibited foods
both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The Rambam enumerates the various mitzvot and prohibitions relevant to Pesach in
the Mishneh Torah. Aside from the sixteen mitzvot associated with the Korban Pesach (see the
introduction to Hilkhot Korban Pesach), he lists another six commandments that relate to chametz:

1) the prohibition of eating chametz from midday of the fourteenth of

Nissan (Devarim 16:3);
2) the prohibition of eating chametz for all seven days of Pesach (Shemot 13:3);
3) the prohibition of eating a mixture (ta’arovet) containing chametz for all seven days
of Pesach (Shemot 12:20) [the Ramban, in his comments on the Rambam’s Sefer Ha-
mitzvot (negative commandment 198), disagrees, arguing that there is no separate
prohibition of a ta’arovet chametz];
4) the prohibition of “seeing” chametz in one’s possession during the seven days
of Pesach (Shemot 13:7);
5) the prohibition of having chametz “found” in one’s procession during the seven days
of Pesach (Shemot 12:19). The Rabbis understand this and the previous prohibition as
referring to owning chametz during Pesach.
4
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/prohibitions-chametz

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In addition, the Rambam lists a related negative commandment:

1) the obligation to dispose of (tashbitu) leaven (se’or) on the fourteenth of Nissan.

Unlike other prohibited foods, the Torah not only forbids eating chametz, it prohibits
owning it. This is articulated by two separate prohibitions, known as “bal yeira’e” and “bal
yimatzei.” Furthermore, unlike other prohibited foods, regarding which a mixture (ta’arovet) of
the issur with heter may not be forbidden by the original prohibition, the Torah explicitly prohibits
a mixture containing chametz (according to the Rambam). In addition, we are commanded to
dispose (tashbitu) of our chametz: to search our houses (bedikat chametz), locate and destroy
any chametz left in our houses (bi’ur chametz), and even declare null (bitul chametz)
any chametz we may not have found.

Moreover, the Talmud (Pesachim 21b) teaches that in addition to the prohibition to
eat chametz, it is also prohibited to derive benefit from it (issur hana’ah). The Amoraim argue
regarding the source of this prohibition.

Chizkiyah states: What is the source from which we learn that it is forbidden to derive
benefit from chametz? The Torah states (Shemot 13:3): "And chametz should not be
eaten;" that is, it is not permitted [to be used to derive benefit that leads to] eating. The
reason is because the Torah says, “And chametz should not be eaten,” and not, “And he
should not eat chametz.” Had it said that I might have thought that it is [only] prohibited to
eat, but one may derive benefit from it. R. Abahu states: Wherever the Torah states, “He
should not eat” or “Do not eat,” a prohibition against eating and deriving benefit is implied,
unless the Torah instructs otherwise.

Regarding other prohibited foods, the Rambam (Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot, 8:15) cites
the view of R. Abahu, who teaches that whenever the Torah states, “Do not eat,” it includes the
prohibition of deriving benefit from prohibited foods unless instructed otherwise. It is therefore
curious that in Hilkhot Chametz U-Matza (1:2), the Rambam seems to cite the position of
Chizkiyah.

On Pesach, it is forbidden to derive any benefit from chametz, as the Torah

states (Shemot 13:3) states, "Do not eat chametz;" that is, it is not permitted [to be used to
derive benefit that leads to] eating.

The Acharonim discuss this issue at great depth; it is sufficient to point out that the
Rambam felt it necessary to enlist a separate, independent source to prohibit benefiting
from chametz. A similar situation is found when the Rambam (Hilkhot Chametz U-
Matza 1:7) records the prohibition of eating less than a kezayit of chametz, known as “chatzi
shi’ur:”

Eating even the slightest amount of chametz itself on Pesach is forbidden by the Torah, as
it states (Shemot 13:3), "Do not eat [leaven]." Nevertheless, [a person who eats chametz]

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 is not liable for karet, nor must he bring a sacrifice for anything less than the specified
measure, which is the size of an olive.

Here, too, the Acharonim note that the Rambam did not need to cite an independent source for this
prohibition, as R. Yochanan (Yoma 73b) already prohibits eating an amount less than a kezayit of
all prohibited foods.

One last distinction between chametz and other prohibited foods is that unlike the latter,
the punishment incurred for eating chametz is karet. As the Rambam (Hilkhot Chametz U-
Matza 1:1) rules:

Anyone who intentionally eats a kezayit of chametz on Pesach from the beginning of the
night of the fifteenth [of Nissan] until the conclusion of the day of the twenty-first [of
Nissan] is liable for karet, as the Torah states (Shemot 12:15) states, "Whoever eats
leaven... will have his soul cut off."

Thus, a unique (and stringent) picture of the prohibition of chametz emerges. Apparently,
in contrast to other prohibited foods, the Torah demands that one separate completely from and
sever all ties to one’s chametz. Chametz is portrayed as an “evil” entity, which one may not eat
even in small quantities or in a mixture, nor derive benefit from, nor maintain with it any legal
relationship. One must search for it and destroy it.

What is so evil about chametz? This question has occupied Jewish thinkers for two
thousand years.

Interestingly, the prohibition of chametz is not limited to Pesach. The Torah also forbids
bringing chametz with one’s korbanot:

No meal offering that you offer to the Lord shall be with leaven (chametz), for you shall
burn no leaven (se'or) or honey in any fire offering to the Lord. (Vayikra 2:11)

And that which is left thereof shall Aharon and his sons eat; it shall be eaten without leaven
in a holy place; in the court of the tent of meeting they shall eat it. It shall not be baked
with leaven. I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire; it is most holy,
as the sin-offering and as the guilt-offering (Vayikra 6:9-10).

The Sefer Ha-Chinukh seems to distinguish between these two prohibitions.

Regarding chametz on Pesach, the Chinukh (mitzva 11) insists that all of the mitzvot of Pesach,
including the obligation to eat matza and the prohibitions of chametz, serve to remind us of the
exodus from Egypt.

In order that we remember forever the miracles which were done for us at the time of the
Exodus, as well as what happened to us. Due to the rushed departure, we baked the dough
into matza because we could not wait for it to rise.

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He views the issurei chametz as corollaries to the hasty manner in which the Jews left Egypt,
which we also commemorate through the eating of matzot.

Regarding the prohibition of bringing se’or and chametz as a korban, however, he explains
(mitzva 117) that the rejection of chimutz (leavening), which occurs through a delay in the process
of making the dough, emphasizes the centrality of “zerizut” (alacrity or enthusiastic diligence) in
the service of God. The mizbei’ach (altar) cannot tolerate anything that symbolizes sluggishness
and laziness.

Many, however, connect the two prohibitions and suggest overarching reasons for the
rejection of chametz. Some, for example, view chametz as a symbol of idolatry (avoda zara), one
of the most severe sins of the Torah. R. Menachem Kasher (1895-1983), in his Torah
Sheleima (19, appendix 20; see also Hagadda Sheleima, appendix 7), observes that the details of
the prohibition of chametz resemble the laws of avoda zara in at least six ways.

1) Both chametz and avoda zara share the unique prohibition against possession.
2) Both chametz and avoda zara must be destroyed.
3) Both chametz and avoda zara are issurei hana’ah (one may not derive benefit from
them).
4) Both chametz and avoda zara cannot be nullified in a ta’arovet, a mixture of permissible
and prohibited foods.
5) Both chametz and avoda zara (in certain circumstances) may be “nullified” through an
oral declaration (bittul).
6) Just as we check our houses for chametz (bedikat chametz) before Pesach, the Jewish
People were commanded to search the Land of Israel for remnants of idolatry
(Rambam, Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim 7:1).

Some draw a historical connection between chametz and ancient pagan worship.
The Yerushalmi (Avoda Zara 1:1) derives this from a verse in Amos (4:5). Furthermore, the
Rambam (Moreh Nevukhim 3:46) writes:

Due to the fact that the idolaters would sacrifice only leavened bread and they would offer
up all manner of sweet food and would smear their animal sacrifices with honey ...
therefore, God warned us not to offer to Him any of these things, leaven or honey.

According to these sources, the Jewish People confirm their absolute rejection of pagan worship
as they commemorate leaving Egypt and becoming a nation by not eating, owning, or benefiting
from chametz, and even destroying it.

While the Rambam draws a historical connection between ancient pagan worship
and chametz, the Zohar (2:182) hints to a spiritual connection: "Whoever
eats chametz on Pesach is as if he prayed to an idol.” This may relate to another interpretation of
the prohibition of chametz, as we shall see.

Others compare se’or, a leavening agent, to the yetzer ha-ra, the evil inclination. The
Talmud (Berakhot 17a) teaches:

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 R. Alexandri would end his daily prayers with the following supplication: “Master of the
Universe, you know full well that it is our desire to act according to Your will; but what
prevents us from doing so? The yeast in the dough (se’or she-be-issa).

R. Alexandri views “se’or,” a leavening agent added to flour and water that causes the
mixture to rise (such as sourdough or yeast) as a metaphor for the evil inclination, which rises
within us, similar to the leavening of the dough.

Indeed, the Sefer Ha-Chinukh cited above (mitzva 117) offers a second reason why the
Torah prohibits bringing se’or as a korban.

And I heard another reason behind the prohibition of se’or and honey. Since se’or causes
[the dough] to rise… therefore, we should distance ourselves from it, alluding to [the
verse], “Every haughty person is an abomination to the Lord” (Mishlei 16:5).

Similarly, R. David ben Solomon ibn Avi Zimra (the Radbaz; 1479-1573) discusses the
many stringencies of chametz. After attempting to attribute these stringencies to the similarity
between chametz and idolatry, he writes:

Therefore, I rely upon that which the Rabbis taught that chametz symbolizes the “evil
inclination,” the “se’or she-be-issa.” Therefore, a person should utterly banish it from his
midst and search for it in all of the inner chambers of his consciousness, as even the smallest
amount is not nullified. And this is true and correct.

What is the relevance of the evil inclination, as represented by chametz, to Pesach, the
festival that commemorates our redemption from the bonds of Egyptian slavery?

Some suggest that upon attaining freedom from the physical slavery of Egypt, we reject
the “fleshpots of Egypt” (Shemot 16:3). We reject the emphasis on physicality, and embrace, as
servants of the Lord, a life of simplicity. Our lives are now “theocentric;” God is at the center, and
not our own will and desires. We eat, therefore, not chametz, but matza, “lechem oni,” the simple,
poor-man’s bread.

The Torah does not prohibit chametz during the entire year. Only in the presence of God
at the altar or as we commemorate our freedom do we shun all traces of chametz. We are well
aware that without the yetzer ha-ra, man would not build, procreate, or develop. On Shavu’ot,
when we commemorate the giving of the Torah, a spiritual event, we are commanded to offer
the shetei ha-lechem, two loaves of bread, in the Beit Ha-Mikdash (Shemot 23:17). The Torah is
intended to be fulfilled in this world, entailing a lifelong personal and national struggle. We are to
incorporate our “self,” including our desires and aspirations, into the fulfillment of the Torah.
On Pesach we commemorate freedom from the evil inclination and our ability to worship God;
on Shavuot we commemorate the giving of the Torah and the challenge of its fulfillment.

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Owning Stock in a Company that Possesses Chametz During Pesach

Rabbi Dr. Asher Meir5 writes:6

Definition of the Problem

The halakhic discussion regarding shares in a chametz-owning business during Pesach revolves
around three distinct prohibitions:
1. “Bal Yera’eh u-val yimatzeh:” the Torah prohibition to own chametz during Pesach – even
if we do not derive any benefit from it.
2. Issur hana’a: the Torah prohibition against deriving benefit from chametz on Pesach – even
if the chametz does not belong to us.
3. Chametz she-avar alav ha-Pesach: the rabbinic prohibition against deriving benefit from
chametz which belonged to a Jew during Pesach and was not properly disposed of.
We will discuss each problem in a separate section.

1. “Bal Yera’eh” – Prohibition of Owning Chametz

The Torah commands us (Shemot 12:19), “For seven days no leavened matter shall be found in
your houses.” This commandment has a “twin” (Shemot 13:7): “And no leavened matter shall be
seen by you, nor shall any leaven [itself] be seen by you, in all your borders, for seven days.”
Although according to some opinions there may be cases where chametz is “found” without it
being “seen,” as a rule these prohibitions overlap and they are generally referred to as a single
prohibition, “bal Yera’eh u-val yimatzeh” – “[chametz] may not be seen and not be found.”

The properties of being “found” and “seen” are qualified by the phrase “by YOU,” making this
prohibition, for all practical purposes, basically one of OWNING chametz. Chametz not belonging
to a Jew is NOT part of the prohibition, and chametz which DOES belong to a Jew is subject to
the prohibition even when it is not in the Jew’s house. (There were, however, Geonim who ruled
that a Jew’s chametz in gentile’s domain is not forbidden – see Rosh Pesachim I:4. This view is
rejected by the Rishonim.)

5
Rabbi Dr. Asher Meir is one of the Jewish world's best-known lecturers and educators in the area of business ethics. Rabbi Dr
Meir is known by a wide audience from his Ethics@Work column in the Jerusalem Post, through the popular syndicated column
"The Jewish Ethicist," and through his lectures and books. His extensive background includes being educated at Harvard, and
obtaining a Ph.D. in economics from MIT. He has worked on the staff of the Council of Economic Advisers in the Regan
Administration.
6
https://www.ou.org/holidays/author/rabbi_dr-_asher_meirou-org/

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The definition of ownership as regards chametz differs slightly from the definition of ownership
regarding other laws, being both more stringent, and in one aspect (for a related reason) more
lenient.

Here are three stringencies regarding the characterization of “ownership” as it relates to chametz:

i. In many cases, an object’s status as an “issur hana’a – something forbidden to benefit from
– in effect expropriates it, making it no longer the property of the supposed owner. However, the
gemara tells us (Pesachim 6b, Bava Kama 29b): “Two things are not in a person’s possession, yet
Scripture rendered them as if they were in his possession: a pit in the public domain, and chametz
from noon [on Erev Pesach – when the prohibition of benefit begins] onward.”

ii. Mere responsibility for an object is not always considered to be like ownership; regarding
chametz, however, a Jew’s responsibility IS considered like ownership.7

iii. The Jew’s partial ownership is considered total ownership, and expropriates the ownership
interest of the non-Jewish partner. “Rava said: Hekdesh (dedication), chametz and manumission
expropriate liens” (Yevamot 46a).

However, some authorities perceive an associated LENIENCY. The Chatam Sofer writes (OC
63),

“Since chametz is not really in a person’s possession and Scripture made it as if it were in his
possession, [therefore] it is sufficient for him to merely demonstrate [gilui da’at] that he doesn’t
want it.”

And the Mishna Berura (448:17) writes, “Since chametz after the time it becomes forbidden is in
any case not in his possession, except that Scripture made it as if it were in his possession to
transgress the prohibition, even a minimal conveyance (kinyan) is sufficient, since at any rate he
has demonstrated that he doesn’t want it and has removed it from his domain.” 8

When we examined the applicability of the prohibition of interest to the modern corporation in the
second installment of this series, we found many different approaches to the question. While some
lenient views were based on a particular way of looking at corporations, many others were based
on novel ways of looking at the interest prohibition in general. On the whole, we find fewer
innovative approaches to the prohibition of owning chametz on Pesach. Most of the discussions

7
Regarding chametz, responsibility is considered like ownership “le-chumra.” Thus, both ownership without responsibility and
responsibility without ownership are forbidden – see Shulchan Arukh OC 440:1. For cases where responsibility is NOT considered
full ownership, see Shulchan Arukh OC 649 (lulav) and EH 28:1 (kiddushin). For a case where it is considered ownership only as
a leniency, see YD 320:7 (bekhor). For a case where it is considered ownership in both directions – stringent and lenient – see YD
168:1-169:21 (interest). For a disputed case, see OC 246:4. Chametz is the most stringent of these cases.

8
These leniencies are ultimately based on our ability to nullify our chametz. See Ran’s commentary on the Rif at the beginning of
Pesachim, s.v. U-mahu.

19
boil down to the GENERAL question of whether a shareholder is a partner (in which case the
company’s assets belong to the shareholders) or whether he is a mere creditor.

As was the case with interest, a pioneering – and lenient – responsum was written by Rav Yitzchak
Izaak HaLevi Ettinga (Mahari HaLevi II:124). Rav Ettinga begins by discussing the question of
chametz that belonged to a Jew during Pesach, but later on he asserts: “It seems that [the
shareholders] are guilty of no wrongdoing if they did not sell their shares.”

Rav Ettinga then goes on to liken the company’s chametz to chametz in the mouth of a snake,
which one need not go to lengths to destroy (Pesachim 10b). We can understand this halakha in
one of two ways:
1. Chametz in the mouth of the snake still belongs to the owner, but even so he need not
destroy it since currently he has no access to it. This is similar to the approach outlined by
the Ramban (Shemot 12:19).
2. Chametz in the mouth of the snake is already destroyed, since the owner will not be able
to recover it.

According to the first understanding, the Mahari HaLevi would be saying that even if the chametz
really does belong to the shareholders, this ownership is of no consequence for the prohibition of
“bal yiraeh” since this prohibition requires some degree of access or control.

According to the second understanding, Rav Ettinga would be saying that just as the difficulty of
recovering the chametz in the snake’s mouth demonstrates that it is no longer in the ownership of
the erstwhile owner, likewise the legal impossibility of shareholder getting a hold of “his” chametz
in the company’s inventory convincingly shows that company assets don’t belong to the
shareholder at all.9

Rav David Zvi Hoffmann (Melamed LeHo’il, OC 91) was asked the same question, again
regarding chametz AFTER . He revealed that this question was asked on an exam in the
Hildesheimer Seminary, that all of the students ruled leniently, and that Rav Hildesheimer wrote
on all the exams that the final ruling was proper. Rav Hoffmann mentions all of the different
leniencies which were cited by the students, but unfortunately, we do not know which ones Rav
Hildesheimer considered decisive. This is a very significant question, since most of the reasons
are relevant only for the issue of chametz after Pesach, whereas Rav Hoffmann sought to use this
incident as a basis for a lenient ruling concerning even chametz DURING Pesach.

In the end, the ruling is that there is no need to sell the shares of a brewery before Pesach if a loss
will be involved.
A later seminary student named Rav Shaul Weingort, who went on to become a charismatic
Torah leader in Switzerland after the Holocaust until he perished in a tragic accident, wrote a long
article on the subject of the limited liability corporation in Halakha, which was later printed in a
memorial volume entitled “Yad Shaul.” This article, in which Rav Weingort concludes that
corporate assets do NOT belong to the shareholders, was a seminal piece of halakhic research cited
by many other authorities.

9
Regarding interest, the Mahari HaLevi explicitly writes that the bank funds do not belong to the shareholders.

20
It would be interesting to research corporate law in 19th century Germany to see if the extent of
shareholder participation was similar to what it is in contemporary Israel, Europe or the United
States. Certainly, regarding banks, which are highly regulated and in which the shareholders may
only have been depositors, there is a basis for distinguishing. However, it does seem from Rav
Hoffmann’s responsum in particular that shareholders had a genuine stake in the business.

One attempt to relate our question to a more fundamental study of the nature of the chametz
prohibition is found in She’elat David of Rav David Karlin. In his responsum, the author
examines the ruling of the Geonim, mentioned above, which exempts chametz which belongs to
the Jew but which is not on his property, and wonders if this may not be an additional lenient
consideration. But in the end, he does not find sufficient grounds to be lenient.

Rav Weiss (Minchat Yitzchak III:1) and Rav Sternbuch (Mo’adim U-zemanim III:269), both
reach the conclusion that a shareholder is a partner and therefore it is forbidden to own shares in a
publicly traded company which owns chametz. However, both are lenient to allow selling the
shares as part of the customary sale of chametz.

This is a significant leniency because regarding shares, which are extremely liquid and whose price
is widely publicized, the evident subterfuge of the sale of chametz is very great. Unlike whiskey,
which is certainly worth a lot of money, but which may require special knowledge to assess and
to market, the gentile who buys the chametz can easily evaluate if it will pay for him to sell the
shares of the stock, he acquired instead of selling them back to the Jew. Even so, the lenient
considerations which led some other authorities to permit owning shares altogether influenced
these poskim to allow this evident subterfuge.

Rav Sternbuch expresses worry that such a sale may not be valid according to securities laws.
While it is true that these laws require registration of every sale of securities, an expert to whom I
spoke confirmed that failure to report does NOT void the sale, so that it seems this worry is
unfounded.10

2. Prohibited Benefit – “Issur Hana’ah”

It may be argued that although the chametz does not belong to the shareholder, the shareholder
certainly benefits from it. In the case of a brewery or a bakery, it is a primary source of revenue.11

However, it seems that this also does not add any stringency. If the shareholder does not own the
chametz, then the change in the value of his shares is not due to the chametz itself but rather to the
change in the price of chametz. We could use the parallel of someone who owns an option to buy
a stock, or a future on some commodity. The value of the option or the future is directly influenced
by the price of the company or commodity, but it is clear that the holder of one of these financial
instruments does not own anything beyond their value.

10
This question recalls the famous dispute between the Chatam Sofer and the Barukh Ta’am – Rav Barukh Frenkel – regarding the
“stempel” or tax stamp. Rav Frenkel was concerned that the sale of chametz was void since no tax stamp was placed on the liquor.
The Chatam Sofer (I:113) replied that this did not mean that the Kaiser failed to recognize the validity of the sale, but merely that
he was willing to exempt this particular sale from the stamp.
11
We could be lenient regarding benefit in the case of a company cafeteria and the like – which WOULD be a problem for the
ownership prohibition.

21
We might object that in this case we still run into the rabbinical prohibition of “rotzeh be-kiyumo”
– desiring the existence of chametz. Some Rishonim forbid this, and the Shulchan Arukh seems to
rule like them.12 However, this prohibition is violated only when the benefit is from the chametz
directly, not when the chametz will help the Jew indirectly by helping him to collect his loan (OC
441:2) or to hire out his draft animal (OC 450:7).

It seems that regarding this prohibition, the benefit from the chametz’s existence needs to be quite
direct.

Conclusion
Regarding chametz on Pesach, the halakhic authorities more or less follow their fundamental
opinions regarding their approach to stock ownership in general. Those who view the shareholder
as a mere creditor are lenient, and are not concerned by ancillary prohibitions such as the benefit
prohibition or “desiring the existence” of the chametz. Those who view the shareholders as a full
partner forbid owning shares of companies which own chametz during Pesach, but it seems that
we may be lenient and allow one to include these shares in his customary sale of chametz, and that
it is prudent to do so.

Rabbi Soloveitchik on the Destruction of Chametz

Rabbi Menachem Genack writes:13

The Mishnah (Temurah 33b) divides issurei hana’ah, objects from which benefit is prohibited and
thus must be disposed of, into two categories: nikbarin, those which are to be buried, and nisrafin,
those which are to be burned.

Nikbarin includes any such prohibited object that the Torah does not require us to eliminate
through burning. The Mishnah then states that the method of disposal of these two kinds of objects
may not be reversed: one may neither bury nisrafin nor burn nikbarin.

According to the Rabbis, our daf (Mishnah, Pesachim 21a), bi’ur Chametz, the elimination of
Chametz, may be done in any fashion. Chametz would thus seem to belong to the category of
nikbarin. How then, asks Magen Avraham (Orach Chayyim 445:1), is it permissible to burn
Chametz? The Gra (Orach Chayyim 445:1) maintains that even the Rabbis are of the view that
ideally one should burn the Chametz. In fact, this is implied by the language in the Mishnah, which

12
See Shulchan Arukh OC 450:7 and Mishna Berura there.
13
ps://www.yutorah.org/togo/5769/pesach/articles/Pesach_To-Go_-_5769_Rabbi_Genack.pdf

22
states that one may even (“af”) eliminate the Chametz through other means, implying that it is a
secondary option; furthermore, there is frequent mention at the beginning of Pesachim of the rules
regarding the burning of the Chametz without any indication that the majority opinion does not
specifically require burning at all.

Evidently, then, Chametz is different from other nikbarin in that it is preferable to burn it, even
though secondary options certainly exist. Chametz, therefore, not only may be burned but should
be burned. We can utilize this idea to explain another halakhah as well. Our Daf states that
Chametz that is singed before it becomes prohibited on Erev Pesach is permitted on Pesach.

Some of the Rishonim (Tosafot, Pesachim 21b, s.v. ĥorkho kodem zemano) are of the view that
the statement of the Gemara deals with the case where the Chametz has been rendered inedible;
only then is it permitted to eat this Chametz on Pesach; others (Rashi, Pesachim 21b, s.v. lo
tzerikha) require the Chametz to have been transformed to the point that it no longer appears or
tastes like Chametz. Rambam, however, does not specify any of these requirements.

He might very well believe that since it is preferable for one to fulfill the mitzvah of tashbitu,
eliminating the Chametz, by burning the Chametz, as opposed to other methods of destruction, it
becomes permitted after it has been burned sufficiently, even if it is still edible and recognizable.
This is due to the principle of na’aseit mitzvato: once one performs the specific mitzvah that is
applicable to a particular prohibited item (if there is one), the prohibition is no longer in effect.

It would be for this reason that Rambam records this halakhah in his discussion of the details of
the mitzvah of bi’ur Chametz (Hilkhot Chametz u-Matztzah 3:11) and not while discussing the
halakhot of inedible and ruined Chametz (ibid. 4:8–12). There is, however, one caveat which must
be added. It is explicit in the same Gemara that according to the Rabbis, this burning is effective
in permitting the Chametz to be eaten only if it is done before the onset of the prohibition of
Chametz on Erev Pesach; if it is done afterwards, the Chametz remains prohibited.

According to Rabbi Judah, however, it becomes permitted if burned at any time. Now, if the Rabbis
indeed apply the principle of na’aseit mitzvato, and allow the burned Chametz to be eaten, because
they agree that ideally one must burn the Chametz, then they should allow the Chametz – no matter
when it was burned. We must, therefore, conclude that according to Rambam (see Hilkhot
Chametz u-Matztzah 2:1), since the mitzvah of tashbitu, destroying one’s Chametz, is in effect
only before the Chametz becomes prohibited, only then is there a preference to eliminate it
specifically through burning.

After it becomes prohibited, one is required to dispose of the Chametz simply so as not to violate
bal yera’eh (the prohibition of possessing Chametz on Pesach) – but there is no longer a
requirement to specifically burn the Chametz, because there is no kiyum aseh of tashbitu, to destroy
the Chametz. Since there is no preference to destroy the Chametz by burning, no permissibility to
consume the Chametz is created by na’aseit mitzvato. Rabbi Judah, however, derives the
obligation to burn Chametz from the mitzvah of burning notar (sacrificial meat that was not eaten
during its allotted time), and therefore, the mitzvah applies specifically after the prohibition sets
in; he thus maintains that when one burns the Chametz, even at that point it becomes permitted.

23
Rama (Orach Chayyim 445:1) writes that the custom is specifically to burn the Chametz and not
use other means of destruction. The Gra comments that the reason why this is only a custom is
that even Rabbi Judah actually requires burning only after the time that Chametz is prohibited
(except according to Rashi), and since our practice is to eliminate the Chametz earlier, there is no
real obligation to burn it according to any opinion in the Gemara. Yet the Gra himself maintains,
as noted above, that before the Chametz becomes prohibited, everyone agrees that at least ideally
one must burn it!

We must perforce conclude that even though one indeed fulfills a mitzvah by specifically burning
the Chametz on Erev Pesach while it is still permitted, and that is why one may derive benefit from
the burnt Chametz even on Pesach, it is still not in any sense obligatory to do so. Therefore, it is
only a custom to burn the Chametz.

Is There a Mitzvah of Tashbitu?

The punishment of lashes is not imposed for violation of a prohibition that is nitak la-aseh, that is,
associated with and mitigated by fulfilling a positive commandment. The Gemara (Pesachim 95a)
states that a person who did not remove his Chametz from his possession before Pesach is not
liable for lashes, because the negative prohibitions of bal yera’eh – “lo yera’eh lekha se’or, no
leaven shall be found in all your territory” (Ex. 13:7) and bal yimmatze – “se’or lo yimmatze
bebateikhem, no leaven shall be found in your houses” (Ex. 12:19) are each considered nitak to
the positive commandment of “tashbitu se’or mi-bateikhem, eliminate leavening from your
property” (Ex. 12:15). The ruling of Rambam (Hilkhot Chametz u-Matztzah 1:3), that a person
who purchases Chametz on Pesach is punished with lashes, seems to be inconsistent with the
Gemara.

To resolve this inconsistency, Rav Hayim of Brisk explained that in this case the positive
commandment actually acts as an implied prohibition. Although the mitzvah of tashbitu is phrased
in the active form, it does not, according to Rav Hayim, constitute a ma’aseh mitzvah. Rather, the
verse implies an injunction against owning Chametz, with the requirement to destroy it being
merely a preventive measure (issur aseh). Consequently, the aforementioned prohibitions are not
considered nitak la-aseh, because the positive commandment of tashbitu is not an ordinary aseh.

The Mishnah (Pesachim 2:1) records a dispute between Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis as to the
correct method of eliminating Chametz from one’s possession. Rabbi Judah states that the only
acceptable method for destroying Chametz is with fire.

The Rabbis are of the opinion that any method may be employed, including grinding the Chametz
and casting it to the wind. According to Rabbi Judah, burning Chametz is more than just a means
to ensure that one will not violate the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimmatze, for if that were
the case, he should agree that any method of destruction would suffice.

Rather, burning Chametz, according to Rabbi Judah, must be considered a kiyum mitzvah, and as
such, mitigates the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimmatze, and lashes would not be
administered for their violation. According to the Rabbis, however, the desired result is the
elimination of the Chametz.

24
The purpose of destroying the Chametz is to preclude one from being in violation of the negative
prohibitions and not to facilitate a kiyum mitzvah; the method of destruction is thus immaterial. As
such, according to the Rabbis, there is no positive commandment to offset the negative
commandments, and a violator would thus be liable for lashes.

The ruling of the Gemara (Pesachim 95a) that one does not receive lashes for either of these
prohibitions is based upon the opinion of Rabbi Judah, while Rambam (Hilkhot Chametz u-
Matztzah 3:11), who states that one is liable for lashes if he commits these transgressions, accepts
the ruling of the Rabbis.

If, however, according to Rav Hayim, tashbitu is only an implied prohibition, one may ask why it
is that on Erev Pesach we recite a blessing on bedikat Chametz, the act which is a prelude to
destroying the Chametz, as this would appear to violate the principle that one does not recite a
blessing on a mitzvah that is designed to avoid a prohibition. The answer lies in the important
distinction between the nature of the mitzvah of tashbitu before midday of the fourteenth of Nisan,
when Chametz is still permitted to be in one’s possession, and after that time.

Ramban (beginning of Pesachim) explains that just as we learn from the word “akh-however” (Ex.
12:15) that we are to split the day in terms of the prohibition of owning Chametz, meaning that it
is permissible to own Chametz until midday and only forbidden after that time, so, too, we learn
that we are obligated to remove Chametz from our possession before midday.

Therefore, until midday, tashbitu is a kiyum aseh, representing a fulfilllment of the mitzvah, and
hence, it is appropriate to recite a blessing on this kiyum, because the bedikah and bi’ur are done
before midday. However, the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimmatze, and hence the
possibility of considering them nitak la-aseh, came into force only on Pesach, and at that point the
mitzvah of tashbitu has already been transformed into an issur aseh, a prohibition derived from a
positive commandment.

Alternatively, even if we were to assume that the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimmatze are
nitak la-aseh, it is possible to suggest another reason why one would receive lashes for owning
Chametz, despite the fact that this prohibited act can be mitigated by a positive commandment.

Rambam (Hilkhot Temurah 1:1) writes that one receives lashes for violating the prohibition of
temurah, transferring the kedushah from an animal designated as a korban to another animal. He
explains that one gets lashes even though temurah can be rectified by fulfillment of the positive
commandment that the sanctity devolves on both animals “ve-hayah hu u-temurato yihyeh kodesh”
(Lev. 27:10), because temurah actually constitutes two negative commandments, “lo yah’alifennu,
you shall not change it” (Lev. 27:10) and “ve-lo yamir oto, you shall not replace it” (Lev. 27:10).
The positive commandment can rectify only one negative commandment; thus, one receives lashes
for violating the second negative commandment.

Owning Chametz also entails two negative commandments, lo yera’eh and lo yimmatze. Since the
positive commandment of tashbitu can mitigate only one prohibition, one receives lashes for
purchasing Chametz.

25
This approach is still difficult, because the Gemara (Pesachim 95a) clearly states that one is not
liable for lashes for either prohibition, as they are associated with a positive commandment.

Rabbenu Hananel presents an alternative text for this Gemara. His text reads, “One does not
receive lashes for owning Chametz on Pesach, because this violation does not involve an activity.”
This undoubtedly was the text that Rambam had as well. This text implies that a person who does
take an active role in the violation of the prohibitions of bal yera’eh and bal yimmatze, such as by
purchasing Chametz on Pesach, would indeed be liable to receive lashes.

26