II.

JUDICIAL NOTICE & ADMISSIONS

1. G.R. No. L-12449             May 30, 1961

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ESPIRIDION ALIDO, ET AL., 

INOCENCIO HERVAS and MARCELO HERVAS

FACTS:

Francisco Hervas, his wife and their children were living in their house on a land situated in the
barrio of Dagami, Municipality of Maasin, Province of Iloilo. At about 6:00 in the evening of that day,
Francisco seemed to have heard some noise coming from his cornfield near their house, so he went
to the batalan adjacent to their house to find out what was the noise about, but suddenly a shotgun
exploded from the neighboring field, and the shot from it hit Francisco on the chest and he fell down
dead.

The following morning, the widow, Concepcion Laserna sent her eldest child, Ofelia, to the house of
Inocencio Hervas, one of the accused, which was nearest their house, and to the house of the
brother of the deceased, Proceso Hervas, to inform them of the incident. Ofelia passed by the house
of Inocencio Hervas, informing him that the brother of the deceased could not come, so Inocencio
went to the house of the victim, accompanied by three individuals who helped him dig the grave
some distance away from the house and there interred him.

No steps were taken by the family or by relatives of the deceased to Investigate who the
author of the crime was. But news of the killing came to the ears of the Philippine
Constabulary. So one day the Philippine Constabulary had the remains of the deceased exhumed.
Those present at the exhumation were the investigator of the Constabulary, Sgt. Agraviador the
Chief of Police, the sanitary inspector and the municipal mayor. The grave was dug and the dead
body was brought out. They found out that there were nine pellet holes.

the Constabulary began questioning the widow, Concepcion. Her statement was taken at the
municipal building and she declared that she was able to recognize Espiridion Alido as the one
who shot her husband, accompanied at the time of the shooting by two persons whom she
could not recognize. A similar statement was made by her daughter, Ofelia, and to the same effect.

Alido surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary at Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He surrendered to Sgt.
Balmaceda at the barracks. Alido's statement was taken down in writing and was presented in court
during the trial as According to this statement, Inocencio Hervas invited him to the house of one
Carlos Camral, on the occasion of the killing of a pig that in the afternoon of that day,
Inocencio, he and Marcelo proceeded to the house of Francisco Hervas, armed as follows:
Inocencio, with a shot gun (paltik), Marcelo with a rifle, and he with a bolo; that once near the
house of Francisco Hervas, he heard one shot and upon hearing it he ran away, returning to the
house of Carlos Camral that about 9:00 that evening, Inocencio Hervas came back to the house
of Camral with a shotgun, boasting that they could now live in peace because the arrogant
man is already dead (referring to the deceased Francisco)

As a result of this affidavit of Alido further investigation petitions were made. Concepcion
Laserna was again examined this time before the Justice of the Peace of Maasin, and she
then, declared in her affidavit that it was Inocencio Hervas who fired the shot that killed her
husband, and that Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido were with Inocencio at the time of the
shooting. the information was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Maasin, charging the three
accused with the murder of the deceased. The information charges the accused with having
committed the crime with treachery and evident premeditation.

Concepcion testified at the trial that three persons had approached their house namely, Inocencio
Hervas, Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido that Inocencio was provided with a paltik, Espiridion
had a rifle and Marcelo had a bolo; that she actually saw that it was Inocencio who fired the shot that
killed her husband; and that as soon as her husband had fallen down after the shot, the three
persons ran away. She further declared that she saw the assailant because she was at the time
of the shooting at the window of their house. Demetrio Hervas, a son of the deceased, also
testified and declared that when his father went to the batalan attracted by a noise in the cornfield,
he was at the door of the house; that when he heard the shot which felled his father, he immediately
directed his eyes towards the place where the explosion had come and saw the aggressor,
Inocencio Hervas, and his companions, Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido.

Upon being asked why in her statement made before the Municipal Mayor, she declared that
she saw Espiridion Alido fired the shot that killed her husband and that she did not recognize
Alido's companions, she explained that at that time she was under the influence of fear of
Inocencio Hervas. Explaining this, she declared that the morning after the shooting she sent her
daughter Ofelia to the house of Inocencio Hervas to tell him that she should bury her husband; that
Inocencio Hervas threatened to kill her if she should disclose or point to him as the author of the
death; that he just suggested to her that she should explain that the cause of her husband's death
was his having bolo wounds, instead of gunshot wounds. Upon being asked the probable reason
why her husband was killed by the accused, she declared that it was because the accused had
taken away bamboos from the land which the deceased was taking care of, and her husband
had denounced them to the owner of the land, namely, Eugenio Maquiling.

The Constabulary investigator, Sgt. Agraviador, who had seen the exhumation, corroborates this
alleged fear of Inocencio Hervas of Concepcion Laserna. He testified that at the time he was
investigating Concepcion, Inocencio was present, and that every time Concepcion was asked a
question she would first look at Inocencio before answering the question. Further elaborating on the
matter, this witness declared that when the investigation was being made in the building of the
puericulture center, the persons who were present were Concepcion Laserna, her daughter Ofelia
Hervas, Inocencio Hervas, a policeman and himself, and that he observed that every time a question
was directed to Concepcion, she would look at Inocencio who, in turn would look at her with sharp
eyes; that he noticed such interest on the part of Inocencio that in the middle part of the questioning
of Concepcion, he had to ask Inocencio to go out. He also declared that when Ofelia was
investigated, Inocencio again went inside the room where the investigation was being conducted and
again he had to ask him to go out of the room, because he wanted to have secrecy in the
investigation.

All of the three accused denied having participated in the commission of the crime, including
Espiridion Alido, who did not appeal from the decision.

A consideration of the circumstances brought out at trial both by the prosecution as well as by the
defense, indicate that the probable cause of the killing is, as indicated by the widow,
Concepcion Laserna, that is, Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas resented the act of
Francisco Hervas in denouncing them for cutting bamboos on the land of Maquiling. The land
on which the house of Francisco Hervas is erected belonged to Eugenio Maquiling. Both accused-
appellants Inocencio and Marcelo, both surnamed Hervas, admitted that the relationship between
them and the deceased and his family was cordial. There is, therefore, no reason why the widow
should point out to Marcelo and to Inocencio as the authors of the death of her husband, unless she
and her children had actually seen them do the criminal act.
Her statement when she was brought to the municipal building for investigation pointing to Espiridion
Alido as the one who killed her husband and that his companions could not be recognized by her
must have been due to the fact that she was then under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas.
The conduct of Inocencio Hervas, a first cousin of the deceased, in not initiating the move to have
the authors of the death of his cousin investigated and his advice of a prompt burial, in locate a guilty
conscience — he must have had part therein and he wanted to be saved from being held to account
for he murder.

His advice that the widow should declare that the deceased had been killed by a bolo wound, also
attests to his interest in suppressing the truth, certainly to save himself. Both of them, Inocencio and
Marcelo, must have thought of pretending that the death of Francisco Hervas was due to a bolo
wound, not from a gunshot wound, to suppress or prevent the investigation of the crime. Marcelo
Hervas was the barrio lieutenant. Why did he not take steps to have the matter reported to the
authorities for investigation? His only excuse was that the widow supposedly told him that he died
of a bolo wound. If he was satisfied with this false explanation, it must have been because he
wanted to shelter he culprits from investigation, which fact in turn shows also a guilty mind.

We are satisfied with the above circumstances and explanation of the widow that her statement was
induced by her fear of Inocencio. Proceeding now to the consideration of the direct evidence, we find
that both Demetrio Hervas, 15 years old, and his mother, Concepcion Laserna, positively asserted
that they saw the three accused Espiridion Alido, Marcelo Hervas and Inocencio Hervas near their
house on May 29, 1955 and that they recognized the latter as the one who fired the shot from the
"Paltik", that killed Francisco Hervas.

ISSUE: WNOT THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES BE GIVEN CREDENCE

Demetrio testified that it was in the afternoon when the assault was made. The statement of the
widow before the mayor on June 13, 1955 placed the time of the assault at 6:10 in the afternoon.

We take judicial notice of the fact that in the month of May and June, the days are long and
the sun sets after 6:00 in the afternoon, for which reason even though it was actually 6:00 in
the afternoon, when the assault was made, both Demetrio and his mother could easily see
and recognize the assailants of the deceased because it was not yet dark. The assailants are
well known to them, two of them being first cousins of the deceased; so was Alido known to
them. It is not that their faces were clearly seen a person can necessary easily be recognized
from his stature, by the way he stands and moves. We are, therefore, satisfied that the two
witnesses, — the widow and her son, actually recognized the assailants as Espiridion Alido,
Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. The testimony of the boy, Demetrio, could not be
impeached on the cross-examination. His testimony was positive and direct, leaving absolutely no
doubt as to the circumstances under which he saw the shooting and the certainty of his identification
of the accused. As to the widow, to the fact that she was under the influence of fear of Inocencio
Hervas, sufficiently explains why in her statement before the mayor, she pretended not to have
recognized the companions of Espiridion Alido on the evening of May 29, 1955.

There was one other last incident which proves the consciousness of guilt of Marcelo Hervas. This is
the fact that he pretended to be away and was not in his house when Ofelia went to notify him of the
death of her father. When the Constabulary also went to his house, when the matter was
investigated, after the surrender of Alido, he again was not at home. As a barrio lieutenant, he
should have been the first to make steps to report the crime, but he pretended to be away.
These are the circumstances which show consciousness of guilt on his part.
With the above circumstances and the testimony of two witnesses identifying the two accused and
the finding of the trial judge who heard the witnesses and the appellants testify, that the appellants
are guilty, we are forced to the conclusion that the said accused-appellants participated in the
commission of the offense charged, jointly with Espiridion Alido and are guilty thereof. The crime
committed is that of murder, qualified by the circumstance of alevosia, as the attack was
unexpected and the victim was even no opportunity to defend himself. As to the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, it is true that the confession of Espiridion Alido, is to the
effect that Inocencio had invited Alido, to go with them to kill the deceased, and that he provided his
companions with requisite arms. However, this confession of Alido is not admissible in evidence
against Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. We therefore had no sufficient evidence of the
evident premeditation.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of the court below finding the appellants guilty of murder and
the sentence imposed upon each of them with costs of this appeal against the appellants.

2. G.R. No. L-16664             March 30, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

vs. JUAN AYONAYON and GASPAR ACERADOR.

FACTS:

while Florentino Lazo and members of his family, namely, his wife, Juana Resuello, his children,
Jose, Pergentino, Genoveva, Samuel and Juan were taking their supper around a low table in the
bamboo kitchen of their house at barrio Namalpalan, Municipality of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, their two
dogs suddenly started barking and running to and from, below and near the house. Genoveva Lazo
called the attention of her father to the unusual behaviour of the dogs and commented that there
must be some persons on the ground. So she stood up and peeped thru the window of the kitchen
and saw a man dressed in dark green fatigue clothes, standing on the ground on the opposite end of
the kitchen, peeping at the southwestern part thereof in a semi-stooping position, with his gun
pointed thru the corner of the kitchen. She heard a burst of gunfire and she felt that she was hit
on her left shoulder. She fell to the floor of the kitchen wounded, and lying flat on the floor
hid herself near the stove.

With the first burst of the gunfire, Jose was also hit and he fell dead on the floor of the kitchen.
Pergentino upon observing the gunfire and what had happened to his brother and sister, promptly
ran away from the kitchen, behind the wardrobe, he hid himself. From this position, he heard gunfire
from the batalan near the stairs of the house, and, directed his eyes to the place where the gunfire
came from, he saw through the opening of the window just above the stairs, the accused Juan
Ayonayon and his companion, the other accused Gaspar Acerador. From the top of the stairs, the
accused fired at his father who had run to the sala, but who fell down on the other side opposite the
wardrobe. 1äwphï1.ñët

Juana Resuello, got her two minor sons in her arms, Juan and Samuel, and tried to run away from
the kitchen also. It so happened, however, that her husband Florentino was already ahead of her
and was already crossing the batalan , running to escape from the gunfire.

she saw the two accused Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador. At that time, Ayonayon was already
on top of the stairs, while his companion was on the last rung of the stairs.
that same evening, upon receipt of news of the murders in the barrio, a group of
Constabulary soldiers stationed in the poblacion, together with the municipal health officers
and others, went to the scene of the murders. The soldiers found 30-calibre empty shells on
the ground near the kitchen, also on the batalan above the stairs. They also found that the walls
of the kitchen and a wall of the sala was pierced by bullet holes. The dead body of Florentino Lazo
was found lying on the floor of the sala, and that of Jose Lazo also in the kitchen, both of them
riddled with bullets. Genoveva Lazo was found near the stove. Pergentino upon being questioned
by the Constabulary sergeant, gave details of the incident, also already described by the
witnesses for the prosecution, and pointed to the two accused herein as the ones
responsible for the assault.

It is also shown that paraffin casts were taken of the hands of both accused and the casts, upon
examination in the National Bureau of Investigation, had positive traces of nitrate.

Various slugs were extracted from the body of the deceased Jose Lazo and another was also
extracted from that of Genoveva Lazo, and these, upon examination, were found to have been fired
from a semi-automatic or an automatic .30-caliber carbine, from the same gun firing the empty
shells.

upon learning who the assailants were, as per information by Pergentino, two soldiers went to the
house of accused Gaspar Acerador. The constabulary men who accompanied him to his house
saw that a green fatigue suit and poncho were hanging on the wall. On the other hand, Juan
Ayonayon was arrested by a Constabulary captain and his company that same evening in the house
of Marcelino Uberita in Santo Domingo, about seven kilometers from Magsingal.

As possible motive for the crime, it was shown that accused Gaspar Acerador had been accused of
the murder of Pablo Resuello, the brother of Juana Resuello. On the other hand, Florentino Lazo
used to drive a carromata where Hipolito Peralta, who was accused of the murder of a relative of a
cousin of Ayonayon, usually rode in going to court. While nobody could testify as to the motive of the
murder, it is apparent from these circumstances that enmity must have existed between Florentino
Lazo and his wife Juana Resuello on one hand, and the accused Gaspar Acerador and Juan
Ayonayon, on the other.

The defenses presented by the accused are alibis testified to by their respective relatives. Juan
Ayonayon stated that at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the day in question, he was in the house
of his cousin Engineer Uberita in Santo Domingo, with whom he was living then. But the barrio of
Santo Domingo is only seven kilometers from the house of the Lazos, the victims, and he could
easily have gone from his place of residence to the house of the Lazos in 10 minutes by jeepney.

For his part, Acerador was living in a barrio of Panay, which is only a kilometer away from the scene
of the crime. The fact, therefore, that the relatives of the accused stated that they were in their
respective houses around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the day of the crime, does not discount the
possibility that the accused themselves had actually gone to the house of their victims at about the
time of 6: 00 o'clock in the evening. It must be noted that the time given was merely a calculation,
and what may have been considered by one witness as six o'clock may actually have been 5:30, etc.
So that the defenses of alibis appear to Us as of very little weight or value, especially in view of the
fact that the witnesses for the prosecution clearly identified the accused, such identification being
positive and immediate because given as soon as the officers of the Constabulary arrived.
ISSUE:

whether the three witnesses who testified to having identified the accused were really in a position to
and did actually identify them.

The first witness was Genoveva who said that she peeped out of the window and saw the face
and figure of a man who later she identified as Gaspar Acerador. The description that she gave at
the trial coincides with the physical features that the court saw in the person of the said accused at
the time of the trial. Gaspar Acerador was also identified by, Juana Resuello, who declared that
Acerador was seen by her on the last rung of the stairs leading to their batalan. Pergentino Lazo
also identified both accused when, looking thru the window near the stairs, he saw them firing their
guns at the deceased Florentino Lazo.

With respect to Juan Ayonayon, his identification by Juana Resuello is beyond question. As Juana
was going to cross the batalan, she saw Juan Ayonayon already on the batalan and was about to
speak to him. He, Ayonayon, was known to her, consequently, the identification was prompt and
immediate. It is a fact that when one meets a person known to him, identification takes place
at first sight, so the testimony of Juana Resuello that she identified Ayonayon, who was
known to her, should be accepted. The same fact of identification is true as to the accused
Gaspar Acerador, also known to Juana Resuello..

As to the testimony of Pergentino Lazo, which testimony is being attacked, it is to be noted

that he saw the two accused while the latter were already on the batalan. From a diagram of the
house, We note that place where the accused were standing, while firing at the decease Florentino
Lazo, was visible through a window from the place beside the aparador where Pergentino Lazo, had
stationed himself. But the fact that Pergentino Lazo, when the officers came in the same evening,
declared to the Constabulary officers that the assailants were Ayonayon and Acerador, this
readiness, shows that he was able positively identify them at the time of the assault, the accused
being known to him.

Counsel for Acerador argues that since at the time of the assault, which was 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, it was already dark, the accused could not have been identified by Genoveva Lazo, Juana
Resuello or Pergentino Lazo.

We checked the time when the sun set on August 5, 1959 and We have been informed that the sun
set on that date at about 6:38 in the evening, which shows that at 6:00 o'clock, the surrounding of
the house where the victims were shot, were not yet dark. The use of a kerosene lamp inside a
house does not mean that outside the house, where the assailants were seen, was also dark. The
inside of a house is necessarily darker than the outside; so the use of a kerosene lamp while THEY
are taking supper, does not mean that persons outside cannot be identified from within the house.

witness Genoveva Lazo said that during the day there were stars. She did not say that during the
daytime there were stars; she must have meant that during the time when the assault was made
there were stars in the sky at night. Beside we take judicial notice of the fact that while it is true
that the month of August is characterized by showers or rains, after which the atmosphere
becomes clear.

But as the most compelling reason why the witnesses for the prosecution must be believed as to the
identification of the accused by them, is the fact that they had no cause or reason to charge or point
out the accused as the ones responsible for the offense, there being no strong reason why they
should violate their oaths and declare falsely.
After a review of all the evidence, We are convinced that the two accused were really the ones who
assaulted and fired at Genoveva, Florentino and Jose Lazo, and killed Florentino Lazo and Jose
Lazo, and that their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty that was imposed
by the lower court is that of death for the murders of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo. There is no
question that the murders were committed with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation,
and with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling of the offended party. But while
the penalty imposed appears justified by the aggravating circumstances, there is no sufficient
number of votes to affirm the penalty of death for the reason that it does not appear from the
evidence that the accused-appellants were so perverse as to deserve the supreme penalty. Hence,
no sufficient number of Justices voted to affirm the imposition of the death penalty.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by imposing upon each of the
accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Florentino Lazo and Jose
Lazo, but the judgment is hereby affirmed in all other respects. The judgment and sentence imposed
upon them for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo is affirmed, with costs against accused-appellants.
So ordered.

3. G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  vs.

RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES
@ "Ross",

about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the
house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman,
standing on the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at
Elino Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot
wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the abdominal
region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his
brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The victim's wife fetched Conrado; but
when they returned, the wounded man was no longer at home for he was already brought to the
Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the
assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General
Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.

JuanitO Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and saw the
appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm. He
also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at
a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw
Raymundo as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants Marianito
Andres and Generoso Andres were then with Madera.

In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented the dying,
declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal
Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman Feliciano from
Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look
into the shooting incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana
that he would have to take down his written statement regarding the shooting incident, and the latter
agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock in the morning. In said dying
declaration, he was asked who shot him and the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom
he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Patrolman
Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that
he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator in the
police force since 1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration
in the Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman
Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco
Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.

The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the identities of the
appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not
militate against their credibility. There is no evidence on record that they were asked by their
relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed
appellants' identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few
hours after the fateful incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of
Police when and where they executed their respective sworn statements.

In their respective written statements, subscribed and sworn on the same date before the Mayor of
Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by
Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.

Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their house. He testified on
direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On cross examination, he said that he
slept inside their house. That does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on further
questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that
after he heard the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The falsity
of this statement has not been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which apparently
show that there was no such opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall grasses could
obscure the back portion of the house where the kitchen door was located.

Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of gunfire. But that
would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.

The appellants asserted in their briefs  that "the evidence on record does not show that there was a
3

moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it
was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized
the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?

The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"  and, under this rule, of the time when the
4

moon rises or sets on a particular day. This not withstanding and for certainty, We took it unto
Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather Bureau  which shows that the moon was bright at
6

the time of the shooting incident. It reads:

To whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following
astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:

1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April
20, at 4:27 A.M.;
 2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees
above the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West;

3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon
having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22,1970.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez, Associate
Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.

It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants for there is no
doubt as to their identities.

It is true that, according to, the forensic chemist of the NBI, Raymundo Madera was found negative
in a paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted
fourteen days after the incident, the test could have given a negative result even if the
appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his hands
could have been washed off by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.

The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of Raymundo Madera is just
about 400 meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana.

We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We agree.

The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter fired shots
at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever of any
conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help Madera.
Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as co-
principals or accomplices.

the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His finest
hour is still when, overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the
Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble
task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I.
Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the appellant
Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is hereby
reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross",
who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate
release from confinement is hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.

4. G.R. No. L-45857 October 27, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES

Complainant Violeta Begino, a native of Cabcab Catanduanes, was about 15 years old on July 15,
1973, a Sunday. About 4 feet and 7 inches tall and weighing about 93 lbs., she was the housemaid
of Jose Baruela of Galas, Quezon City.

Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, July 15, 1973, Violeta was standing at the
corner of Luzon Avenue and Union Civica St., Galas, Quezon City, waiting for a ride to Quiapo,
Manila to buy slippers for her employer. Ernesto Sison, then about 23 years old, who was courting
her, approached her and invited her to take the tricycle. When she refused, appellant allegedly drew
7-inch knife and poked it at her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she did not board his tricycle. He
allegedly seized her and forced her to get into the tricycle.

This is quite incredible because on such Sunday afternoon, with many people passing by or walking
in the vicinity, as Galas is thickly populated by low-income and middle-class groups - of which fact
the Supreme Court can take judicial notice - she could have resisted and shouted for help. It was not
easy for appellant to grab her and force her into the tricycle without being noticed by passersby and
bystanders. She claims that after she was seated inside the tricycle, appellant drove his tricycle to
the España Rotonda, a busy intersection of España St., Manila, Quezon Avenue, España Extension
(now E. Rodriguez Ave.), Mayon St., and Pulog St. going towards Galas, Quezon City. Said rotonda
is over one kilometer from Galas, with several street corners to pass along the way.

With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could have shouted for help while seated in the rear
compartment for passengers behind him, since as aforestated, from the corner where she was
allegedly forced to board the tricycle up to España Rotonda is quite a distance, with so many houses
and several persons along the way. And children would be playing on the streets. Or she could have
jumped out of the tricycle for a tricycle does not run fast and the tricycle is always open at its right
side just behind appellant who was on the driver's seat. Appellant could not be poking a knife with
one hand at Violeta and driving the tricycle with the other hand.

From the España Rotonda, they took a passenger jeepney for Balintawak, Quezon City. They were
allegedly the only passengers of the jeepney, with appellant holding her hands and telling her that he
would kill her if she tried to go home. From España Rotonda to Balintawak is a distance of about five
kilometers. Being a passenger jeepney, it presumably took the usual passenger jeepney routes. It
would be unbelievable that all throughout the distance of about five kilometers, a Sunday afternoon,
no other passenger boarded the jeepney between España Rotonda and Balintawak. The route of
said jeepney must pass through Mayon St. towards North Cemetery beside Balintawak. But even
assuming that they were the lone passengers of the jeepney throughout the distance she could have
shouted for help or created a commotion to alert the jeepney driver. It is also possible that she must
have seen policemen along the route, especially near the gate of the North Cemetery. The various
jeepney routes from Quezon City to North Cemetery include Mayor Norberto Amoranto St. (formerly
Retiro), Del Monte Avenue, Dapitan, Laong-Laan St., and from Manila to the North Cemetery then to
Balintawak, via Dimasalang St., and coming from Rizal Avenue Extension and passing the Chinese
General Hospital via Blumentritt. Upon reaching the busy intersection in front of the North Cemetery
gate, with a lot of people around, including employees of the gas station just across the gate of the
North Cemetery, she could have screamed for help, but she did not.

At Balintawak, appellant allegedly brought her to the house of his aunt, to whom he allegedly
introduced her as his girlfriend. After talking to her aunt, he and complainant left the house and rode
in a passenger jeepney bound for Novaliches. There were other pass but she did not make any
outcry nor ask help from the other passengers during that long trip from Balintawak to Novaliches,
which is a lot farther than from España Rotonda to Balintawak. Balintawak is also a busy street all
the way to Clover Leaf (the hub connecting to Novaliches) and there are many houses' and shops
along the way - more so upon reaching the busy market near the Clover Leaf. And then from Clover
Leaf through Quirino Avenue towards Novaliches, there must have been numerous persons that
Sunday afternoon, because Quirino Avenue is likewise a busy avenue, being the only route to
Novaliches from the Clover Leaf and the traffic along that thoroughfare is heavy at all hours of the
day because of the numerous passenger buses, jeepneys, cargo trucks, and private cars on the
road. But she did not cry for help.

At Novaliches, appellant led her to the house of another aunt, Maria Aviles Reyes and took her
purse containing P12.00. After eating their supper, appellant allegedly brought her to a room and
ordered her to lie down. She resisted and appellant slapped her repeatedly. She became
unconscious and upon regaining consciousness, she found herself naked with appellant on top of
her and his penis inside her vagina "up to her stomach." If she resisted as she claimed, there should
have been some commotion and maybe pieces of furniture like chairs and tables being pushed or
the sound of shuffling feet, accompanied by her cries or screaming indicating resistance. When he
slapped her repeatedly, she must have shouted in pain and even cursed him aloud with the usual
commotion, screaming, cries of pain and vulgar. it is unthinkable that the aunt and the rest of the
inmates of the house would not have heard the same. They could have been curious about the
commotion and could have frustrated whatever criminal Intention appellant might have towards her.

She alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her three times that July 15 even as she was
experiencing pain. The following day (July 16), he had sexual intercourse with her four times. Then
on the third day (July 17), he did the same to her. They stayed in Novaliches from July 15 to July
21, 1973. .Never did she complain to his aunt or to the other inmates of the house about what
appellant did to her. During those six days, she must have gone out of the room to eat or to
attend to personal necessities in the bathroom. During those six days too, his aunt and the
other members of the family would have noticed her painful expression or her moaning in
pain and would have asked her the cause of the same.

In the afternoon of July 21, 1973, appellant, with his mother and his aunt Maria, brought
Violeta to his house in Sampaloc, Manila, and from there, to Violeta's mother at 11-B Luzon
Avenue, Galas, Quezon City. All the mother did was to slap her.

that this Court sitting in Metro Manila, can take judicial notice of the geography of said metropolis,
and the approximate distance from Galas to España Rotonda, from España Rotonda to Balintawak,
and from Balintawak to Novaliches, the passenger routes to said place, the nature of traffic along
said routes, the heavy population in Metropolitan Manila, and the habits of the residents therein.

There is nothing in the record to indicate as to why her mother and her employer did not look for her
during the six days that she was missing from the house of her employer and why they did not report
to the police authorities said fact of her being missing for almost a week. Neither is there any
intimation that her employer inquired about the money he gave to her to purchase slippers, which is
quite unnatural.

All the foregoing circumstances not only negate the conclusion that she was sexually assaulted by
appellant against her will, but also affirm that she went willingly with the appellant and submitted to
his lewd design.

Consequently, the only possible conclusion is that she voluntarily went with appellant on that six-day
tryst with him. for which appellant could have been convicted of consented abduction as Violeta was
then over 12 but under 18 years of age (Art. 343, R.P.C.), if the complaint included the essential
elements of abduction with consent. Unfortunately, the complaint as aforequoted does not allege
that the offended party was a virgin, over 12 years and under 18 years of age . Hence, the appellant
should be acquitted of the charge.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES IS HEREBY ACQUITTED. WITH COSTS
DE OFICIO.

HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS HELD FOR SOME OTHER
VALID CHARGES.

5. G.R. No. 159467 December 9, 2005

SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P. SAGUID, vs. SECURITY FINANCE, INC

On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with Alternative
Prayer for Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners and one John Doe in whose possession
and custody the mortgaged property may be found. It alleged that petitioners, for value, jointly and
3 

severally executed in its favor a Promissory Note in the amount of ₱508,248.00, payable in monthly
4 

installments per schedule indicated therein. To secure payment of the Promissory Note, petitioners
executed a Chattel Mortgage over a motor vehicle
5 

Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying with the terms and conditions of the
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage by failing to pay several monthly installments on the
Promissory Note. As provided for in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage, the failure of the
petitioners to pay any installment when due shall make the entire balance of the obligation
immediately due and payable. The total obligation of petitioners amounted to ₱756,634.64 as of 15
May 1998. 6

Despite demand for payment or the surrender, if in good order and condition, of the mortgaged
7 

motor vehicle, petitioners failed and refused to comply with the demand. Thus, respondent was
constrained to file the instant case praying that (1) a Writ of Replevin be issued ordering the seizure
of the afore-described vehicle, complete with all its accessories, and that same be delivered to it; or
(2) in the event that manual delivery thereof cannot be effected, order the petitioners to pay the
amount of ₱756,634.64 exclusive of accruing interest and penalty charges thereon at the rate of five
percent (5%) per month until fully paid.

, RTC, Makati City, issued an Order directing the branch sheriff to seize the aforementioned vehicle
upon filing of a bond in the amount of ₱1,513,270.00 which is double the value of the property to be
seized, and to take it into his custody upon further orders from the court.8

Upon being informed by respondent in a Motion for Clarification that the reasonable estimated value
9 

of the vehicle involved is ₱150,000.00, the RTC lowered the Replevin Bond to be filed to
₱300,000.00 which respondent filed.
10 

RTC issued a Writ of Seizure ordering the Branch Sheriff to seize the vehicle, to keep it in his
possession for five (5) days, and then to deliver it to respondent. 11

after service upon petitioners of the copy of the summons with the complaint and annexes, affidavit,
writ of seizure and bond, the vehicle subject of this case was repossessed by the sheriff upon
issuance of the corresponding receipt. the vehicle was delivered to respondent. 12

In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the
13 

Complaint. They maintained they, whether individually or as spouses, did not and never executed
a Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage in favor of respondent. They claimed they bought
the car subject of the case in cash as evidenced by the Vehicle Sales Invoice of Toyota
14 
Balintawak, Inc.. Petitioner Nora Saguid alleged that she could not have physically executed the
Promissory Note on 23 April 1996 as she was in Australia when the same was supposedly executed.
On the part of petitioner Rolando Saguid, he admitted that he signed the promissory note in
preparation for an application for loan upon the request of one Sonny Quijano who promised
to facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor vehicle to be converted into a
taxicab, but not with respondent.

After pre-trial, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing the following stipulation of facts:

1. The personal and corporate personalities of the parties;

2. That the promissory note dated April 23, 1996 in the amount of P508,248.00 in favor of
plaintiff was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; and

3. That the chattel mortgage was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; . . . 15

the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, ordering SECURITY FINANCE, INCORPORATED to pay
defendant-spouses ROLANDO and NORA SAGUID:

1. The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle computed from the date of its
seizure on October 28, 1998 up to its return to the defendants, at the rate of P750.00 daily;

In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory note and the deed of mortgage were not
valid contracts and were not binding on petitioners. It explained that respondent failed to show with
convincing evidence that petitioners LOANED the money used in the purchase of the subject motor
vehicle. On the contrary, it found that there was preponderance of evidence showing that the motor
vehicle was purchased in cash by petitioners from Toyota Balintawak, Inc.

Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC
and ruled in favor of respondent. It disposed of the case as follows:

The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that there was no valid contract entered into
between the parties on the ground there was no cause or consideration when they executed the
same, and that respondent failed to show with convincing evidence that it loaned the money to
petitioners which was used to purchase the subject motor vehicle, to be bereft of factual and legal
basis. It relied heavily on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid during pre-trial and during his
direct-examination that he signed the promissory note dated 23 April 1996 and the chattel mortgage
dated 03 September 1996. It did not give weight to petitioners’ bare denial that they never transacted
with respondent for the subject loan and that they never executed the promissory note and the deed
of chattel mortgage because it belied the admission made by petitioner Rolando Saguid.

Hence, the instant petition, contending that:

Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is a valid Contract of Loan between it and
petitioners, and that the proceeds of the loan were used to buy the vehicle involved in this case. In
support thereof, it offered, among other things, a Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage over the
subject vehicle which served as security for the payment of the amount indicated in the former. On
the other hand, petitioners contend that they neither entered into any contract with respondent nor
did they receive any money from it that was used to buy the subject car. Though petitioner Rolando
Saguid admitted that the signatures in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage are his, he
clarified that when he signed said documents upon the prodding of Sonny Quijano, he signed them
in blank. Petitioner Nora Saguid, on her part, denied signing said documents. She claimed that the
signatures purporting to be hers are forgeries since she was in Australia when said documents were
executed.

Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they entered into a transaction
with respondent based on the promissory note and chattel mortgage despite petitioner Rolando
Saguid’s explanation of the circumstances surrounding his signing thereof, and in not holding that
these documents are not valid and binding on them.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with respondent and are bound by the
promissory note and chattel mortgage they signed. It anchored its ruling on the admission of
petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed said documents. Citing Section 4, Rule 129 of the 27 

Rules of Court, it reasoned out that petitioner Rolando Saguid’s bare denial cannot qualify the
admission he made during pre-trial and during trial that they transacted with respondent and
executed the aforesaid documents. It brushed aside the explanation made by petitioner Rolando
Saguid that he signed the same in blank and only as preparation for a loan application presented to
him by Sonny Quijano.

ISSUE: WNOT PET ARE BOUND by the promissory note and chattel mortgage they signed

RULING: NO

From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted was only his signatures in
the aforementioned documents and not the contents thereof. In petitioners’ Answer, Rolando Saguid
admitted signing the promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the request of
Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor vehicle to be
converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent. During trial, Rolando Saguid explained the
circumstances under which he signed the documents with emphasis that he signed them in blank.

We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it closed its eyes to the clarification made
by petitioner Rolando Saguid on the ground that same belied his admission. The rule that an
admission cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made will not apply under the circumstances obtaining in this case.

It does not follow that the admission of the signatures carries with it the admission of the contents of
the documents especially when the person who affixed his signatures thereon questions its
execution and the veracity of the details embodied therein. Petitioners could have been bound by the
terms and conditions of the promissory note and chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando Saguid
admitted not only his signatures but also as to what are contained therein. This is not to be in the
case before us. Petitioners can therefore adduce evidence that would nullify or invalidate both the
promissory note and the chattel mortgage. In other words, they can show that the elements of the
contract of loan are wanting.

The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position to entangle itself in resolving the matter
as regards the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on his admission because whatever
the documents he signed in favor of Mr. Quijano is not the concern of the court as the same is not
one of the issues presented before it, and that Mr. Quijano is not a party in the case. Petitioners
claim that if only the Court of Appeals ruled on the matter, it could have ruled in their favor and
sustained the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being the primal defense of petitioners. It
should not have wholly disregarded the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid considering
that said defense can easily be supported by other competent evidence. Instead of relying heavily on
the admitted signatures, it should have evaluated other evidence that could have either bolstered or
disproved the defense of petitioners.

This did not happen in this case. The Court of Appeals conveniently did not mention in its decision
the testimony of Zenaida M. Maralit, an employee of Toyota Balintawak, Inc., who testified as to the
circumstances on how the subject car was bought, and the documentary evidence that originated
from Toyota Balintawak, Inc. We consider her to be an impartial witness whose testimony is vital in
the proper resolution of this case.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ruling of the trial court that the
promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are not valid contracts and are not binding on
them on the ground that the contracts did not contain the essential element of cause. The Court of
Appeals said the trial court did not clearly declare in categorical terms the absence of cause in the
aforesaid contracts and that petitioners failed to disprove that they are debtors of respondent since it
is presumed that the cause exists in the contract.

Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration exists and is lawful unless the
28 

debtor proves the contrary. Moreover, under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is
29 

presumed that there is a sufficient consideration for a contract. The presumption that a contract has
sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration. To30 

overcome the presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by
preponderance of evidence. 31

In proving that there is no consideration for the aforementioned documents, petitioners proffered in
evidence the following documents that showed that they bought the subject vehicle in cash and not
in installment basis: (a) Vehicle Sales Invoice No. 7104; (b) Vehicle Delivery Note; (c) Official
32  33 

Receipts No. 208646 and No. 208648; (d) Certificate of Registration No. 32862328; and (e) Official
34  35  36 

Receipt No. 40459605. In addition, Ms. Zenaida Maralit of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. confirmed that
37 

the subject car was indeed paid in cash and not through financing for the reasons that the originals
of the Certificate of Registration and the Official Receipt of the subject vehicle have not been marked
as encumbered by the Land Transportation Office and are in the possession of the buyer. She
added that respondent is not accredited in Toyota Balintawak, Inc. She testified:

It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and not through financing via respondent. We
find the evidence presented by respondent to be unreliable and erratic. The testimony of Rosauro
Maghirang, Jr. that respondent paid Toyota Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated by competent
evidence. If respondent truly paid the dealer how come it never presented the checks it used to pay
Toyota Balintawak, Inc.? Even assuming arguendo that respondent released the loan proceeds to
petitioners, the same would be inconsistent with its allegation that it was the one that paid the dealer.
Furthermore, another telltale sign that strengthens the claim of petitioners that they did not transact
with respondent for a loan was the fact that the alleged loan/credit application was not signed by
40 

any or both of them.

Respondent’s contention that petitioners did not deny drawing postdated checks in its favor is
untenable. Petitioner Rolando Saguid categorically denied issuing the check and claimed that the
signatures appearing thereon were not his. 41

As to the alleged signature of petitioner Nora Saguid in the promissory note, evidence points that
she could not have signed the document she being in Australia when she allegedly executed said
document on 23 April 1996 as established by a certification from the Bureau of Immigration that she
42 

left for Sydney, Australia, on 30 September 1995 and returned to the country on 15 June 1996.

From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that petitioners’ allegation of absence of consideration
has been substantiated and the presumption of consideration disproved and overcome. We are of
the mind that petitioners bought the car with their own money. There being no cause or
consideration in the contract of loan allegedly entered into by the parties, the promissory note is not
binding on the petitioners.

As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage is a mere accessory contract and its
validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it. The chattel mortgage constituted over
43 

the subject vehicle is an accessory contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the promissory
note. It cannot exist as an independent contract since its consideration is the same as that of the
principal contract. A principal obligation is an indispensable condition for the existence of an
accessory contract. Since it has been sufficiently established that there was no cause or
44 

consideration for the promissory note, it follows that the chattel mortgage has no leg to
stand on. Hence, it must be extinguished and cannot have any legal effect on petitioners.

Having ruled that both promissory note and chattel mortgage are not binding on petitioners, the
return of the subject vehicle to petitioners is in order. In case the vehicle can no longer be delivered
in the condition when it was seized, respondent shall pay petitioners the amount of
₱150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per annum to be computed from 13 October 1998, the date when
45  46 

said vehicle was seized, until finality of judgment after which interest rate shall become 12% per
annum until actual payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Security Finance, Inc. is ordered to deliver the
possession of the subject vehicle to petitioners, or, in the alternative if such delivery can no longer
be made, to pay petitioners the amount of ₱150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per annum to be
computed from 13 October 1998 until finality of judgment after which interest rate shall become 12%
per annum until actual payment. Respondent is also ordered to pay petitioners ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱20,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. NO. 148273             April 19, 2006

MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO, vs.GUIA W. CANLAS, 

Facts:

(Edgar) filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage against Milagros Simon
(Milagros) and her husband, Liborio Balatico (petitioners). In the complaint, Edgar alleges that:
Milagros obtained a loan from him in the amount of P220,000.00 secured by a real estate
mortgage2 over her paraphernal property, a 748-square meter parcel of land located at San Nicolas,
Victoria, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139884; the loan was payable
within a period of three years or until September 18, 1990; Milagros defaulted in the payment of the
loan and repeated demands for payment went unheeded, prompting the filing of a case in court.3

petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that Milagros never transacted any
business with Edgar and she did not receive the consideration of the alleged mortgage.4
Edgar filed his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, reiterating validity and due execution of the real
estate mortgage.5

 petitioners filed a Third-Party Complaint against Virginia Canlas (Virginia) and Aurelia Delos Reyes
(Aurelia), claiming that they duped Milagros to part with her title and sign the mortgage documents
without giving her the consideration and refusing to return her title when demanded.7

Virginia and Aurelia filed their Answer with Counterclaim to Third-Party Complaint, alleging that the
complaint states no cause of action against them since they are not privies to the real estate
mortgage and Aurelia is only a witness to the mortgage document.

Edgar died during the pendency of the case. upon proper motion, the RTC ordered that Edgar be
substituted by his wife, Guia W. Canlas.

the RTC issued a pre-trial order stating that the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. However, they
agreed to stipulate on the following: "[t]hat the defendant executed a deed of real estate
mortgage in favor of the plaintiff involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 139884
located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac."

petitioner’s counsel, Atty. De Jesus, filed an Ex-Parte Urgent Motion for Postponement since he is
busy campaigning as a candidate in the coming elections.13 There being no objection from
respondent, the RTC reset the hearing to May 28, 1998.

On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to appear in court. The RTC reset the
hearing on June 17, 1998 with a warning that if the petitioners will still fail to appear on said date,
they will be considered to have waived their right to present further evidence.15

On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court but petitioners were present. Milagros
informed the RTC that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel. In view thereof,
the RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of another counsel and the hearing was reset to
June 24, 1998 with a warning that should petitioners still fail to present evidence at said hearing,
they will be considered to have waived their right to present further evidence.

On June 24, 1998, Milagros informed the RTC that they have retained Atty. Alejo Y. Sedico18 as new
counsel. The hearing was again reset to July 2, 1998 with the final warning that should petitioners’
witnesses fail to appear at the said hearing, they would be considered to have waived their right to
present further evidence.19

On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Reset, praying that the hearing scheduled on July 2, 1998 be reset to August 12, 1998 due to
conflict of schedule and his trial calendar for July is fully occupied, as well as to give him more time
to study the case since he had just been retained.20

On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice, the resetting of the hearing for
presentation of petitioners’ evidence for the last time on July 15, 1998. The RTC directed petitioners
to secure the services of a counsel of their choice to represent them in the said hearing considering
that it postponed motu propio the hearing in the interest of justice over the vigorous objection of the
respondent due to failure of petitioners’ counsel to appear for three successive times. It warned
petitioners that in case they would be unable to present evidence in the next scheduled hearing, they
would be deemed to have waived their right to present further evidence.21
On July 9, 1998, Atty. Sedico filed an Urgent Motion to Reset the scheduled hearing on July 15,
1998 due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date of Criminal Case Nos. 6463 to 6510
for Estafa entitled "People of the Philippines v. Eddie Sentero" before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 172, Valenzuela. He reiterated that his trial calendar for the whole month of July is fully
occupied and requested the hearing be reset to August 10 or 19, 1998.22

At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was apprised of the Urgent Motion to Reset
filed by petitioners’ counsel. In view of the vigorous objection of respondent’s counsel on the
ground that the case has been postponed several times at petitioners’ instance, the RTC
denied the motion to reset and petitioners were deemed to have waived their right to present
evidence. The case was then considered submitted for decision.

The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of Edgar and
she received the consideration for the mortgage in the amount of P220,000.00; that
petitioners’ inaction for three years before the filing of the complaint against them to protest
the alleged non-receipt of the consideration for the mortgage casts serious doubts on their
claim; and that the deed of real estate mortgage was duly notarized and assumed the
character of a public instrument.

petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that they were denied due process when the
RTC decided the case without petitioners’ evidence. the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,
holding that petitioners were given ample opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for trial and adduce
evidence, which they took for granted and they should bear the fault.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.27 The CA ruled that petitioners were not denied due process
since they were duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and present evidence to substantiate
their defense but they forfeited their right for not appearing in court together with their counsel at the
scheduled hearings; that since Milagros admitted the existence, due execution, authenticity
and validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage during the Pre-Trial Conference, absence of
consideration is no longer an issue; that, in any case, the amount of P220,000.00 was actually
received by Milagros per the testimony of Aurelia; that petitioners slept on their rights, if they had
any, since they never lifted a finger to protect and preserve their alleged rights and interests; and
that the mortgaged property is not conjugal property but the exclusive property of Milagros which she
could validly dispose of or encumber without her husband’s consent.

Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was fraudulently executed and there was lack of
consideration but material facts relating thereto were not fully ventilated because the RTC denied
petitioners’ motion to reset the hearing. They maintain that they never admitted the due execution of
the real estate mortgage, but only its execution or existence. They further insist that the mortgaged
property is conjugal, not paraphernal, and therefore, Milagros could not dispose of or encumber
without her husband’s consent; and the CA disregarded Article 9930 of the Family Code which
provides that all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or
acquired thereafter forms part of the community property. Lastly, they submit that while they were
given the opportunity to secure the services of a new counsel to defend them, the RTC’s apathy to
the plight of petitioners’ counsel on the latter’s conflict of schedule amounted to stripping such right
to counsel and denial of due process.

In any event, even if these procedural defects are disregarded, respondent argues that petitioners
were not denied due process when the RTC denied their motion for postponement since they were
duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present their evidence to substantiate their
defense but they forfeited this right for not appearing in court together with their counsel at the
scheduled hearings. They also aver that the real estate mortgage is valid and duly executed and the
mortgaged property is the paraphernal property of Milagros such that she can validly dispose of or
encumber it without her husband’s consent.

In the present case, there are circumstances that justify postponement of the July 15, 1998 hearing.
Atty. Sedico had only been formally retained as petitioners’ new counsel as of July 1, 1998, or
merely two weeks before July 15, 1998. Atty. Sedico also had a previously intransferable hearing in
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela scheduled on the same
date of July 15, 1998. The distance factor, from Valenzuela to Tarlac, is enough consideration to call
for postponement. Moreover, Atty. Sedico twice informed the RTC that his entire calendar for July is
already full such that he requested specific dates in August for the hearing.44 The motion to reset the
hearing has not been shown to be manifestly dilatory. Besides, except for the May 28, 1998
scheduled hearing,45 petitioners have always been present in court. They cannot be said to have lost
interest in fighting the civil case to the end; only that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their
counsel and petitioners had to look for new counsel to take their case on short notice. Absolutely
wanting from the records is any evidence that the change of counsel was intended to delay the
proceedings. In fact, only 48 days have lapsed from the time Atty. De Jesus failed to appear on May
28, 199846 to the time when Atty. Sedico’s motion to reset was denied on July 15, 1998.47 Such
intervening time cannot be said to have greatly impaired the substantial rights of respondent. Thus,
absent unreasonable delay and manifest intent to employ dilatory tactic prejudicial to the respondent
and trifling court processes, Atty. Sedico’s request for resetting should have been granted.

It cannot be disputed that the case has been pending since February 11 1991,48 or more than seven
years until petitioners were able to start their presentation of their evidence on March 11, 1998.49

The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases. However, it must
be emphasized that speed alone is not the chief objective of a trial. It is the careful and deliberate
consideration for the administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the
requirements of procedural due process, and an adherence to this Court’s standing admonition that
the disposition of cases should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts and of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby. These are more important than a race to end the trial.50 Indeed, court litigations are
primarily for the search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are
given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.51

Ironically, the precipitate action of the RTC prolonged the litigation and unnecessarily delayed the
case, in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Instead of unclogging
dockets, it has actually increased the workload of the justice system as a whole. Such action does
not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.

Issue: EFFECTS OF PET ADMISSIONS of the due execution of the real estate mortgage during the
pre-trial conference

As to the effect of petitioners’ admission of the due execution of the real estate mortgage during the
pre-trial conference, it must be noted that in Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 53 this
Court ruled that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document simply means
that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it
was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
 However, it does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration.

Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting evidence regarding their claim of want of
consideration.

It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration and alleged fraudulent scheme
perpetuated by third-party defendants, being evidentiary, should be threshed out in a proper
trial. To deny petitioners their right to present evidence constitutes a denial of due process,
since there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.

Ordinarily, when there is sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it to resolve the fundamental
issues, the Court will dispense with the regular procedure of remanding the case to the lower court,
in order to avoid further delays in the resolution of the case.54 However, a remand in this case, while
time-consuming, is necessary, because the proceedings had in the RTC are grossly inadequate to
settle factual issues. Petitioners were unduly deprived of the full opportunity to present evidence on
the merits of their defense and third-party complaint.

Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the other issues raised by petitioners. Suffice
it to say that such matters are best decided by the RTC only after full reception of petitioners’
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 23, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals and the Decision dated July 31, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7384, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
the said Regional Trial Court for reception of petitioners’ evidence and further proceedings.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. 165987             March 31, 2006

JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, vs. JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and

THE COURT OF APPEALS, 

FACTS:

the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for
Partition before the (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two
children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of
the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses. respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for
Intervention,4 alleging as follows:

1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for partition
between plaintiffs and defendants;
 2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the
children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to
herein special proceedings for partition;

3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of her late
husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.

WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case and to submit attached
Answer in Intervention.5

Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention,6 claiming that she was the surviving
spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and
Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the appointment
of a special administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of
the marriage contract7 which indicated that she and Jose were married on February 1, 1956.

Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented the
marriage contract as well as the Reply-in- Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased, where
Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the
herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9 However, Josefina did not appear in court.

Teresita testified before the RTC.10 She narrated that she and the deceased were married in civil
rites at Tagum City, Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and that they were subsequently married
in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966. Among those listed as secondary
sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty. Margarito Halasan, her brother, and Valentino
Halasan, her father.11 While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband
had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live together as husband
and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s)
marriage with Jose because there had been no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few
months after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and
Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained unknown.

Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina annulled
because he believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more than
seven years. This opinion was shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita also declared that
she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been married three times, was
now happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United States.

Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order12 denying the motion and dismissed her complaint, ruling
that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that the intervenor
failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover, no witness was
presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an original copy of the
document or any public officer who had custody thereof. According to the court, the
determinative factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the second marriage
with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been previously married. Thus,
the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof required to allow the
intervention. the RTC ruled that while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract,
the lack of its identification and the accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial
manifestation or formalities required by law could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the
legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to them as his
children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the oppositor did not
present evidence to dispute the same.

On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor through counsel
sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly
supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children,
Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late
Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the latter in
accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or intestate
proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance, they are legally
entitled, along with the other heirs, as the case maybe (sic).13

Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita
admitted in her Reply in Intervention that (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous marriage to her.
Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous marriage. 16 Since the
existence of the first marriage was proven in accordance with the basic rules of evidence,
pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second marriage was void from
the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil Code
provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present" (thus, the
deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity of the second
marriage were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of the second
marriage, an absurd situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by
two legitimate spouses.

The trial court denied the motion in its Order.

Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring that
she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage valid and
declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also stressed that Articles 80 and
83 of the New Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that any subsequent marriage is null and
void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that she had been absent for seven
consecutive years before the second marriage.

In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the legal wife
must show proof thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the following to
prove the fact of the previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s
public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedding; the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children during such union, and other subsequent documents mentioning
such union. Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission of the first marriage in her Reply in
Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay, without
probative value, as she heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to
Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own personal knowledge. They also
pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose after
their alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first time in 1988 during the filing of the
case for partition of the latter’s share in his parents’ estate. They further pointed out that Josefina
does not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of Josefina,
paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family Code, is applicable. Moreover,
her inaction all this time brought to question her claim that she had not been heard of for more than
seven years.

the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both
verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof.
Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that Josefa was married to
the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos,18 the appellate court ruled that an admission made
in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission, and is conclusive as to
such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who made the admission
should be ignored whether objection is interposed by the other party or not. The CA concluded that
the trial court thus gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of Josefina’s Complaint-in-
Intervention. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the appellate
court.

Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the
admission of private respondent’s intervention. They insist that in setting aside the Orders of the trial
court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA completely disregarded the hearsay
rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an
admission does not require proof, such admission may be contradicted by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresita’s statement in the Reply-in-Intervention admitting
knowledge of the alleged first marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.

Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission which does not
require proof.

Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage to
private respondent in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified during the hearing, for
the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be considered
hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and substantiate her
Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a purported
marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.

ISSUE: wnot TERESITA’S ADMISSIONS OF the alleged first marriage, is without probative
value for being hearsay.

ruling: NO

The petition is dismissed.

The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the
existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:

1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor,
with that of the herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956;20

Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband
had been previously married to another. To the Court’s mind, this admission constitutes a
"deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of judicial
proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. A party who judicially admits a
fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The
allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader.
A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757
is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit respondent
Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper proceedings with
dispatch.

8. G.R. No. 190321               April 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SAMMY UMIPANG y ABDUL

Facts

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling drugs along
Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the [Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs – Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was
dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2] Gasid was
assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a ₱ 500.00 marked money. The operation was
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the length of the street
while the other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. The confidential informant
saw the man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then
approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said "Sam, pa-iskor kami." Sam replied
"Magkano ang iiskorin nyo?" The confidential informant said "Five hundred pesos." Sam took out
three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price tags–500, 300, and
100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked ₱ 500.00 to Sam who received the
same.

Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as the pre-arranged signal
that the sale had been consummated. Sensing danger, Sam attempted to flee but PO2 Gasid
immediately grabbed and arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team. PO1
Ragos handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline
substance were recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials "SAU" [which
stood for Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant].
Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where he was booked, investigated and identified as
accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the
crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug.

On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and his brother Nash Rudin
Umipang. According to them:
In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping, accused-appellant and his family were
awakened by loud knocking on the door. The persons outside shouted "Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo
ang pinto kung hindi gigibain namin ito." Accused-appellant obliged and opened the door. Five (5)
policemen barged into his house and pointed a gun at him. Against his will and amid the screams of
his wife, accused-appellant was brought to a waiting vehicle and brought to the police headquarters.
At the Taguig Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him ₱ 100,000.00 for his release. He
denied the charges and that the alleged evidence were all "planted" by the police. 3

RTC Ruling

Pasig City RTC found accused-appellant guilty of violating Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals) and Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of
R.A. 9165. The RTC gave more weight to the testimonies of the arresting officers on how they
conducted the buy-bust operation than to accused-appellant’s claim of frame-up by the police.

the CA affirmed in toto the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the RTC. According to the appellate court,
the elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs
were present and established. Thus, it no longer disturbed the RTC’s assessment of the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. Furthermore, the CA found that there was no showing of improper motive
on the part of the police officers. With the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties, it ruled against the denials of accused-appellant, and his defense of frame-up.

We have consistently declared that a review of the factual findings of the lower courts is not a
function that is normally undertaken in appeals before this Court. However, after a careful scrutiny of
the CA Decision, we find it proper to reevaluate the factual issues surrounding the present case,
especially since it is not clear from the Decision whether the proper implementation of the strict
procedural safeguards laid down in R.A. 9165 was established.

Issue

Whether or not the the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses were sufficient to convict
accused-appellant of the alleged sale and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which
are violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. 9165.

Discussion

Accused-appellant argues that since there were two versions presented during trial – one, that of the
4 

prosecution; and the other, that of the accused – the latter version must be adopted, because the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties should not take precedence
over the presumption of innocence of the accused. He also contends that a surveillance of just
30 minutes was insufficient to establish that Umipang was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs.
Lastly, accused-appellant claims that the fact of possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was
not clearly established, and that the evidence allegedly confiscated from him was merely
planted. Alluding to the testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points out that the former did not see him
5 

holding the drugs, and that the sachet was shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of the RTC
Joint Decision in all respects, as it was decided in accord with law and evidence. The OSG
6 

argues that the necessary elements to convict a person under Sections 5 and 11 were proven
7 

beyond reasonable doubt. It then contends that, absent independent proof and substantiated
evidence to the contrary, accused-appellant’s bare-faced denial should be deemed merely as a self-
serving statement that does not hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no evidence
of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against accused-appellant,
the testimony must be given full faith and credence.

Substantive law requires strict observance of the procedural safeguards outlined in R.A. 9165

At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation conducted by
the SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our pronouncement in People v. Garcia:

A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to
be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in
secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the
framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool
for extortion. In People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that "by the very nature of anti-narcotics
operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the
ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility
of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." Accordingly,
specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down in the law (R.A.
No. 9165) for the police to strictly follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these
procedures have been followed in proving the elements of the defined offense.Section 21 of R.A.
9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards that are applicable in cases of buy-bust
9 

operations:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under
oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after
the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does
not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination
report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to
be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be
 issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-
four (24) hours;

(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct
an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including
the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall
within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same,
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the
guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be
borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the
Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a
representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of
the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the
PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the
representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally

observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission
of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after
due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before
the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall
appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former;

Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86 of R.A. 9165, which
requires the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine National Police (PNP), and Bureau of
Customs (BOC) to maintain close coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related
operations:

Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – x x x.

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all
other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the
investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a
violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or
any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the
NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug
related matters. (Emphasis supplied.)

Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive procedural safeguards crafted
in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who
conducted the operations. Although we have ruled in the past that mere procedural lapses in the
conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the prosecution’s cause, so long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved, courts must still
10 

thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from
those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the
law. Consequently, Section 21(a) of the IRR provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined
under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those procedural aspects
that may be relaxed under justifiable grounds, viz:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous

Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — x x x:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
(Emphasis supplied.)

We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the
procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds" after which, "the
prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been
preserved." To repeat, noncompliance with the required procedure will not necessarily result in the
11 

acquittal of the accused if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. 12

Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of
law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter
13 

of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural

technicality. The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address
potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life
imprisonment. In People v. Coreche, we explained thus:
14 

The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with evidence found legislative
expression in Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on the inventory of seized dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of
inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs the
duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof". (Emphasis supplied.)

Consequently, in a line of cases, we have lain emphasis on the importance of complying with the
15 

prescribed procedure. Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be
construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. Otherwise, "the
16 

procedure set out in the law will be mere lip service."

17

Material irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operations

The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which raises doubts on the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items from accused-appellant.

First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items. According to his
testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-
appellant in order to mark the confiscated sachets. The marking was done immediately after
Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal
that his prior knowledge of the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the latter’s full
name, was not clearly established. Thus, doubt arises as to when the plastic sachets were actually
marked, as shown by PO2 Gasid’s testimony:

The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized items are suspect. From their
testimonies during the trial, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos both admitted that they only knew
their target by the name "Sam." They both testified that, after accused-appellant was
handcuffed, frisked, and read his rights, they immediately brought him to the police precinct.
They then said that it was a certain PO1 Saez who investigated him.

Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge of the complete
name of accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which enabled the former to mark the
seized items with the latter’s complete initials. This suspicious, material inconsistency in the
marking of the items raises questions as to how PO2 Gasid came to know about the initials of
Umipang prior to the latter’s statements at the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on
the issues of where the marking really took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who asked
accused-appellant about the latter’s personal circumstances, including his true identity, and that the
questioning happened when accused-appellant was already at the police station. We thus reiterate:

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband[s] are immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The
marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar
or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the
end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting", or contamination of evidence.

Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the
authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the
corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v.
Casimiro, we held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the
accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. These
rulings are refinements of our holdings in People v. Mapa and People v. Dismuke that doubts on the
authenticity of the drug specimen occasioned by the prosecution’s failure to prove that the evidence
submitted for chemical analysis is the same as the one seized from the accused suffice to warrant
acquittal on reasonable doubt.

It is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place of arrest
does not by itself impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated
items inadmissible in evidence. We have already clarified that the marking upon "immediate"
29 

confiscation of the prohibited items contemplates even that which was done at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. We will analyze this possible seed of doubt that has
30 
been planted by the unexplained marking of the shabu with the complete initials of Umipang,
together with the other alleged irregularities.

Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek the third-party
representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the law, the inventory and
photographing of seized items must be conducted in the presence of a representative from the
media, from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public official.

Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the marking
of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.
However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the
barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they
contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried
to get in touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason
for failing to do so – especially considering that it had sufficient time from the moment it received
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest.

Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police
officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable – without so much as an explanation on whether
serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances – is to be
regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to
establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so.
33  34

Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the
seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed out by the defense during trial, the 35 

Certificate of Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the arresting
officer who prepared the certificate – thus making the certificate defective. Also, the prosecution
36 

neither submitted any photograph of the seized items nor offered any reason for failing to do so. We
reiterate that these requirements are specifically outlined in and required to be implemented by
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. 37

Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an
accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted. This is especially true when the lapses
38 

in procedure were "recognized and explained in terms of [] justifiable grounds." There must also be
39 

a showing "that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some
justifiable consideration/reason." However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural
40 

safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the
identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. This uncertainty cannot be
41 

remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a
gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an
irregularity in the performance of official duties. As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed
42 

to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal
liability of the accused.
43 
1âwphi1

For the arresting officers’ failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude from the
totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers deliberately
disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious
doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-
up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt."44

As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities "to exert greater efforts in
combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for
the greater benefit of our society." The need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing the
45 

evidence of the prosecution – especially when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust
operation – "redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties and at
the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors." 46

WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24 July 2007 RTC Joint
Decision is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is hereby ACQUITTED of the
charges in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on the ground of reasonable
doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from custody, unless he is detained for some other lawful
cause.

9. G.R. No. 190749               April 25, 2012

VALENTIN ZAFRA y DECHOSA and EROLL MARCELINO y REYES, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

The Facts

The prosecution’s lone witness, (SPO4 Mendoza), Chief of the Investigation and Drug Enforcement
Unit of the Philippine National Police of Balagtas, Bulacan, testified that on 12 January 2003, at
around 4:30 in the afternoon, he conducted surveillance in front of a sari-sari store at the corner of
Miraflor Subdivision and P. Castro Street in Balagtas, Bulacan, due to reported drug trafficking in the
area. SPO4 Mendoza found there the group of Zafra, Marcelino, and a certain Marlon Daluz (Daluz)
standing and facing each other. In that position, he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, while
7 

Daluz was holding an aluminum foil and a disposable lighter. Seeing this illegal activity, SPO4
8 

Mendoza single-handedly apprehended them. He grabbed the shabu from the hands of Zafra and
Marcelino, and confiscated the drug paraphernalia from Daluz. Then, he ordered the three to lie
down; he frisked them. Boarding a tricycle, he brought them to the Balagtas Police Station, where he
9 

personally marked the confiscated two (2) sachets of shabu, one with VSD, the initials of Valentin
Zafra y Dechosa and the other with EMR, the initials of Eroll Marcelino y Reyes. 10

On the following day, SPO4 Mendoza brought the accused and the items to the crime laboratory for
urine sampling and laboratory examination, respectively. The test of the items resulted to positive
 

presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

The RTC, Bulacan, in a decision convicted Zafra and Marcelino for the crime of possession of
shabu:

Daluz, on the other hand, who was charged of possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of
Section 12 of RA No. 9165 pleaded guilty to the charge and was released after serving his sentence
of eight (8) months. 14

Zafra and Marcelino appealed; but the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision:

Hence, this appeal on the following grounds:

first, the arrest was unlawful;

second, the prohibited drugs are inadmissible in evidence;

third, Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not complied with; and,

finally, the prosecution failed to prove petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to ACQUIT petitioners Zafra and Marcelino on the following grounds:

First, the prosecution’s lone witness, SPO4 Mendoza, testified that, from a distance, he saw Zafra
16 

and Marcelino holding shabu by their bare hands, respectively, while Daluz was holding an
aluminum foil and a disposable lighter. Seeing this illegal activity, he single-handedly apprehended
17 

them. He grabbed the shabu from the hands of Zafra and Marcelino, and confiscated the drug
18 

paraphernalia from Daluz.

On cross examination, SPO4 Mendoza testified that it was Zafra and not Daluz, who was holding
the aluminum foil (contrary to his earlier testimony that Zafra was holding shabu); that Daluz20 

(whom he claimed during the direct examination to be holding the aluminum foil) and Marcelino were
holding handkerchiefs and on top of them were shabu; When the defense confronted SPO4
21 

Mendoza about the inconsistency, he told the court that his version during his direct
testimony was the correct one. 22

While, it is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of the witness and
the testimony is entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon appeal, such rule does
23 

not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of weight or
substance. In the instant case, these circumstances are present, that, when properly appreciated,
24 

would warrant the acquittal of petitioners.

Certainly, SPO4 Mendoza’s credibility has to be thoroughly looked into, being the only witness in this
case. While in his affidavit, SPO4 Mendoza claimed that he saw the sachet of shabu (0.30 gram)
because Zafra was in the act of handing it to Marcelino.

his testimony during the direct examination reveals another version, that is, from a distance,
he saw Zafra and Marcelino holding shabu, respectively, hence, he approached them from behind
and confiscated the shabu from both of them and the paraphernalia from Daluz. How he saw a 0.30
gram of shabu from a distance in a busy street, baffles this Court. Asked, however, on cross
examination, who among the three were holding the shabu and drug paraphernalia, SPO4 Mendoza
failed to be consistent with his earlier testimony and pointed to Daluz as the one holding shabu with
a handkerchief in his hand and Zafra as the one in possession of drug paraphernalia. These
inconsistencies are not minor ones, and, certainly, not among those which strengthens the credibility
of a witness. Possession of drug paraphernalia vis-à-vis shabu, are two different offenses under RA
No. 9165. That Zafra was holding drug paraphernalia and not shabu is material to this case, to the
accusation against him, and to his defense.

Second, a reading of the RTC decision on this matter reveals that the conviction was arrived at
upon reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of Mendoza’s official
duty.25
It is noteworthy, however, that presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt
26 

beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this
burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all
doubts as to his culpability.

Third, SPO4 Mendoza was the lone arresting officer, who brought the petitioners to the police
station, who himself marked the confiscated pieces of evidence sans witnesses, photographs,
28 

media, and in the absence of the petitioners. His colleagues were nowhere. And, worse, he was the
29 

same person who took custody of the same pieces of evidence, then, brought them on his own to
the crime laboratory for testing. No inventory was ever done; no inventory was presented in
30  31 

court.

The solo performance by SPO4 Mendoza of all the acts necessary for the prosecution of the
offense is unexplained and puts the proof of corpus delicti, which is the illegal object itself in
serious doubt. No definite answer can be established regarding the question as to who possessed
what at the time of the alleged apprehension. More significantly, we are left in doubt whether not the
two sachets of shabu allegedly seized from the petitioners were the very same objects offered in
court as the corpus delicti.

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty. The dangerous drug itself
32 

constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be
33 

established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not
34 

suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More
35 

than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is
the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs
36 

this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed. 37

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 reads:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

Section 21(a) Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9165 reads:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
38 

the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
39 

describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 40

The records readily raise significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly
seized from Zafra and Marcelino. SPO4 Mendoza’s claim that the two sachets of shabu presented in
court were the same ones confiscated from the petitioners, cannot be taken at its face value, solely
on the presumption of regularity of one’s performance of duty. SPO4 Mendoza blatantly broke all the
rules established by law to safeguard the identity of a corpus delicti. There was even no mention
about the details of the laboratory examination of the allegedly seized drugs. To allow this to happen
is to abandon everything that has been said about the necessity of proving an unbroken chain of
custody. SPO4 Mendoza cannot alone satisfy the requirements in RA No. 9165 which is anchored
on, expressly, the participation of several personalities and the execution of specified documents.

And, while jurisprudence has refined the enumerated duties of an apprehending officer in a drug
case and has thus described the equivalent requirements for a proper chain of custody of the corpus
delicti, still, the case at bar cannot pass the constitutional requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

We reiterate, that this Court will never waver in ensuring that the prescribed procedures in the
handling of the seized drugs should be observed. In People v. Salonga, we acquitted the accused
41 

for the failure of the police to inventory and photograph the confiscated items. We also reversed a
conviction in People v. Gutierrez, for the failure of the buy-bust team to inventory and photograph
42 

the seized items without justifiable grounds. People v. Cantalejo also resulted in an acquittal
43 

because no inventory or photograph was ever made by the police.

The present petition is the sum total of all the violations committed in the cases cited above.

, we reiterate that non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements does not
necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid; the seizure may still
be held valid, provided that (a) there is a justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are shown to have been properly
preserved. These conditions, however, were not met in the present case as the prosecution did not
47 

even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of SPO4 Mendoza to follow the prescribed
procedures in the handling of the seized items.  As we held in People v. De Guzman, the failure to
1âwphi1
48 

follow the procedure mandated under RA No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
must be adequately explained. The justifiable ground for the non-compliance must be proven as a
fact. The Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving
the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of
49 

the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. In dubio
50 
pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
51 

inevitably becomes a matter of right.

52

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 31713. Petitioners Valentin Zafra y Dechosa
and Eroll Marcelino y Reyes are hereby ACQUITTED for the failure of the prosecution to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless
they are confined for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.