Licomcen Case

12/12/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 531
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 705

LICOMCEN, Incorporated vs. Foundation Specialists, Inc.
*
G.R. No. 167022. August 31, 2007.
LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs.

FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC., respondent.
*
G.R. No. 169678. August 31, 2007.
FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC., petitioner, vs.

LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR); Arbitration;

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC);
Construction Industry Arbitration Law (E.O. No. 1008);
Jurisdictions; Words and Phrases; The power and authority of a
court to hear, try, and decide a case is defined as jurisdiction.—
The power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case
is defined as jurisdiction. Elementary is the distinction between
jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the
person. The former is conferred by the Constitution or by law,
while the latter is acquired by virtue of the party’s voluntary
submission to the authority of the court through the exercise of its
coercive process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Construction Industry

Arbitration Commission (CIAC) has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with
construction contracts entered into by parties that have agreed to
submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.—Section 1, Article
III of the Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration
provides that recourse to the CIAC may be availed of whenever a
contract contains a clause for the submission of a future
controversy to arbitration, thus: SEC-
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001765554f3ebcc36793c003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/28
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
706
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
TION 1. Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction.—An arbitration clause

in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a
construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an
existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration
institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission. When
a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future
controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to
enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may
invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC. Clearly then, the CIAC has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or
connected with construction contracts entered into by parties that
have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The active involvement of a

party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of, or at
least an acquiescence to, the court’s jurisdiction.—The issue of
jurisdiction was rendered moot by LICOMCEN’s active
participation in the proceedings before the CIAC. It is true that
LICOMCEN initially assailed the jurisdiction of the CIAC. But
when the CIAC asserted its jurisdiction in its February 20, 2003
Order, LICOMCEN did not seek relief from the CIAC ruling.
Instead, LICOMCEN took part in the discussion on the merits of
the case, even going to the extent of seeking affirmative relief.
The active involvement of a party in the proceedings is
tantamount to an invocation of, or at least an acquiescence to, the
court’s jurisdiction. Such participation indicates a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from
later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction. The Court will
not countenance the effort of any party to subvert or defeat the
objective of voluntary arbitration for its own private motives.
After submitting itself to arbitration proceedings and actively
participating therein, LICOMCEN is estopped from assailing the

jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter rendered an
adverse decision.
Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; “And” in

statutory construction implies conjunction, joinder or union.—
LICOMCEN faults the CIAC and the CA for ruling that the
contract had been terminated, insisting that it was merely
indefinitely suspended. To bolster its position, LICOMCEN cited
GC-41 of the GCC which reads: GC-41 LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED’S RIGHT TO SUSPEND WORK OR
TERMINATE THE CONTRACT x x x x 2. For Convenience of
LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED If any time before
707
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 707
completion of work under the Contract it shall be found by the

LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED that reasons beyond the control
of the parties render it impossible or against the interest of
LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED to complete the work, the
LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED at any time, by written notice to
the Contractor, may discontinue the work and terminate the
Contract in whole or in part. Upon issuance of such notice of
termination, the Contractor shall discontinue the work in such
manner, sequence and at such time as the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct, continuing and doing
after said notice only such work and only until such time or times
as the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct. x x x
(Emphasis supplied) Unfortunately for LICOMCEN, this
provision does not support but enervates its theory of indefinite
suspension. The cited provision may be invoked only in cases of
termination of contract, as clearly inferred from the phrase
“discontinue the work and terminate the contract.” And in
statutory construction implies conjunction, joinder or union. Thus,
by invoking GC-41, LICOMCEN, in effect, admitted that the
contract had already been terminated.
Laches; It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes

laches—the essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,

thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had either abandoned or declined to assert it; Unless reasons of
inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the
prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not to be considered
delay that would bar relief.—Neither can LICOMCEN find refuge
in the principle of laches to steer clear of liability. It is not just the
lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of
laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise
to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either
abandoned or declined to assert it. Indeed, FSI filed its petition
for arbitration only on October 8, 2002, or after the lapse of more
than four years since the project was “indefinitely suspended.”
But we agree with the CIAC and the CA that such delay can
hardly be considered unreasonable to give rise to the conclusion
that FSI already abandoned its claim. On the contrary, the delay
was due to the fact that FSI exerted efforts to have the claim
settled extrajudicially which LICOMCEN rebuffed. Besides,
except for LICOM-
708
CEN’s allegation that the filing of the suit is already barred by

laches, no proof was offered to show that the filing of the suit was
iniquitous or unfair to LICOMCEN. We reiterate that, unless
reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the
prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not to be
considered delay that would bar relief. In the instant case, FSI
filed its claim well within the ten-year prescriptive period
provided for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Therefore, laches
cannot be invoked to bar FSI from instituting this suit.
Evidence; Just because a piece of evidence is not objected to

does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in
dispute—the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with
its probative value.—We must emphasize the distinction between
admissibility of evidence and its probative value. Just because a
piece of evidence is not objected to does not ipso facto mean that it
conclusively proves the fact in dispute. The admissibility of

evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers
to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
Obligations and Contracts; It is not for the Court to change

the stipulations in the contract when they are not illegal.—FSI’s
claim for unrealized profit has to be rejected too. GC-41
specifically provided that: x x x The Contractor shall have no
claim for anticipated profits on the work thus terminated, nor any
other claim, except for work actually performed at the time of
complete discontinuance, including any variations authorized by
the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/ Engineer to be done under
the section dealing with variation, after the date of said order,
and for any claims for variations accruing up to the date of said
notice of termination. (Emphasis supplied) The provision was
agreed upon by the parties freely, and significantly, FSI did not
question this. It is not for the Court to change the stipulations in
the contract when they are not illegal. Article 1306 of the Civil
Code provides that the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Besides, no convincing
proof was of-
709
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 709
fered to prove the claim. In light of the foregoing, the CA,

therefore, correctly denied the claim for unrealized profit.
Motions for Reconsideration; The filing of a motion for

reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does
not impose on the Court the obligation to deal individually and
specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the
same way that the Court does in its judgment or final order as
regards the issues raised and submitted for decision.—In sum, we
find no reason to disturb the decision of the CA. It cannot be

faulted for denying FSI’s motion for reconsideration through a
mere Minute Resolution, for as we held in Ortigas and Company
Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 254 SCRA 234 (1996): The filing
of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules
of Court, does not impose on the Court the obligation to deal
individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon
therefor, in much the same way that the Court does in its
judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and
submitted for decision. This would be a useless formality or ritual
invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already
set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the
arguments advanced by the movant; and it would be a needless
act, too, with respect to issues raised for the first time, these
being, x x x deemed waived because not asserted at the first
opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and
summarily with the motion for reconsideration, and merely state
a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e.,
the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments
already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court
in its judgment, or the basic issues have already been passed
upon, or the motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent
reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment
or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too
unsubstantial to require consideration, etc.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for
Licomcen, Inc.
Nelson A. Clemente for Foundation Specialists, Inc.
710

NACHURA, J.:
For review in these

1
consolidated petitions is the November
23, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP. No.
2
78218, as well as the Resolutions
3
dated February 4,
2005 and September 13, 2005, denying the motions for its
reconsideration.
Liberty Commercial Center, Inc. (LICOMCEN) is a

corporation engaged in the business of operating shopping
malls. In March 1997, the City Government of Legaspi
leased its lot in the Central District of Legaspi to
LICOMCEN. The Lease Contract was based on the Build-
Operate-Transfer Scheme under which LICOMCEN will
finance, develop and construct the LCC City Mall
(CITIMALL). LICOMCEN engaged E.S. De Castro and
Associates (ESCA) as its engineering consultant for the
project.
On September 1, 1997, LICOMCEN and Foundation
Specialist, Inc. (FSI) signed a Construction
4
Agreement for
the bored pile foundation of CITIMALL. Forming part of
the agreement were the Bid5 Documents and the General
Conditions of Contract (GCC) prepared by ESCA. A salient
provision of the GCC is the authority granted the
engineering consultant to suspend the work, wholly or
partly. LICOMCEN was also given the right to suspend the
work or terminate the contract. Among other caveats, GC-
05 provided that questions arising out or in connection with
the contract or its breach should be litigated in the courts
of Legaspi, except where otherwise stated, or when such
question is submitted for settlement through arbitration.
GC-61 also provided that
_______________
1 Penned by Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, with Associate Justices

Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, concurring; CA
Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1695-1713.
2 Id., at pp. 1817-1820.
3 Id., at p. 2011.
4 Exhibit “A,” CIAC Records, Folder II, pp. 419-429.
5 Exhibits “B-14” to “B-50,” Id., at pp. 444-480.
711
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 711

disputes arising out of the execution of the work should

first be submitted to LICOMCEN for resolution, whose
decision shall be final and binding, if not contested within
thirty (30) days from receipt. Otherwise, the dispute shall
be submitted to the Construction Industry Arbitration

Commission (CIAC) for arbitration.
Upon receipt of the notice to proceed, FSI commenced
work and undertook to complete it within ninety (90) days,
all in accordance with the approved drawing, plans, and
specifications.
In the course of the construction, LICOMCEN revised
the design for the CITIMALL involving changes in the
bored piles and substantial reduction in number and length
of the piles. ESCA, thus,
6
informed FSI of the major revision
on December 16, 1997 and ordered the non-delivery of the
steel bars, pending approval of the new design. FSI,
however, responded that the steel bars had already been
loaded and shipped out of Manila. ESCA then suggested
the delivery of 50% of the steel bars to the jobsite and the
return of the other7 50% to Manila, where storage and
security were better.
On January 15, 1998, LICOMCEN sent another letter to
FSI ordering all the construction activities suspended,
because Albay Accredited Constructions Association
(AACA) had contested the award of the Contract of Lease
to LICOMCEN and filed criminal complaints with the
Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act against LICOMCEN and the
City Government of Legaspi. Thus, pending a clear
resolution of the case, LICOMCEN decided to suspend all
construction activities.
8
It also requested FSI not to unload
the steel bars.
_______________
6 TSN, March 10, 2003, pp. 33-34, CIAC Records, Folder III, pp. 1058-
1059.
7 Letter dated January 6, 1998, Exhibit “2,” CIAC Records, Folder II, p.
660.
8 Letter dated January 15, 1998, Exhibit “3,” Id., at p. 662.
712

On January 17, 1998, the steel bars for the CITIMALL

arrived at the Legaspi port, and despite LICOMCEN’s
previous request, these were unloaded and delivered to the
9
9
jobsite and some to Tuanzon compound, FSI’s batching
site. Then, on January 19, 1998, LICOMCEN reiterated its
decision to suspend construction, and ordered
demobilization
10
of the materials and equipment for the
project. Finally, on February 17, 1998, LICOMCEN
indefinitely suspended
11
the project, due to the pending cases
in the Ombudsman.
FSI demanded payment for its work accomplishments,
material costs, and standby off equipment,12
as well as other
expenses amounting to P22,667,026.97, but LICOMCEN
took no heed.
On October 12, 1998, the Ombudsman dismissed the
cases filed against the City Government and 13
LICOMCEN.
The dismissal was affirmed by this 14
Court and attained
finality on September 20, 2000. This notwithstanding,
LICOMCEN did not lift the suspension of the construction
that it previously ordered. It then hired Designtech
Consultants and Management System (Designtech) as its
new project consultant, which, in turn, invited contractors,
including FSI,
15
to bid for the bored piling works for
CITIMALL.
FSI reiterated its demand for payment from
LICOMCEN, but the latter failed and refused to pay,
prompting FSI to file a petition for arbitration with the
CIAC, docketed as CIAC Case No. 37-2002.
_______________
9 TSN, March 10, 2003, pp. 40-43, CIAC Records, Folder III, pp. 1065-
1068.
10 Letter dated January 19, 1998, Exhibit “4,” CIAC Records, Folder II,
p. 663.
11Letter dated February 17, 1998, Exhibit “6,” Id., at p. 669.
12 Letters dated February 3, 1998 and March 3, 1998, Exhibits “J” and
“K,” Id., at pp. 526, 531-532.
13 Exhibit “14,” Id., at pp. 764-765.
14 Exhibit “15,” Id., at p. 766.
15 Exhibit “I-1,” Id., at p. 523.
713
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 713

LICOMCEN denied the claim of FSI, arguing that it lacks

factual and legal basis. It also assailed the jurisdiction of
the CIAC to take cognizance of the suit, claiming that
jurisdiction over the controversy was vested in the regular
courts, and that arbitration under the GC-61 of the GCC
may only be resorted to if the dispute concerns the
execution of works, not if it concerns breach of contract.
During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to
submit the controversy to the Arbitral
16
Tribunal and signed
the Terms of Reference (TOR). But on February 4, 2003,
LICOMCEN, through a collaborating counsel,17
filed an Ex
Abundati Ad Cautela Omnibus Motion. It reiterated the
claim that the arbitration clause in the contract does not
cover claims for payment of unrealized profits and
damages, and FSI did not comply with the condition
precedent for the filing of the suit, thus, the CIAC cannot
take cognizance of the suit. LICOMCEN further averred
that FSI has no cause of action against it because the claim
for material costs has no factual basis and because the
contract is clear that FSI cannot claim damages beyond the
actual work accomplishments, but only reasonable
expenses for the suspension or termination of the contract.
LICOMCEN also alleged that the expenses incurred by
FSI, if there be any, cannot be considered reasonable,
because there was no showing that the materials were
ordered and actually delivered to the job site. Finally, it
prayed for the suspension of the proceedings, pending the
resolution of its omnibus motion. 18
On February 20, 2003, the CIAC issued an Order
denying LICOMCEN’s omnibus motion on the ground that
it runs counter to the stipulations in the TOR. Trial,
thereafter, ensued. FSI and LICOMCEN presented
witnesses in support of their respective claims.
_______________
16 CIAC Records, Folder I, pp. 369-375.

17 Id., at pp. 379-397.
18 CIAC Records, Folder II, pp. 697-698.
714

19
19
After due proceedings, the CIAC rendered a Decision in
favor of FSI, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of Claimant FOUNDATION SPECIALIST,
INC. and against Respondent LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED,
ordering the latter to pay to the former the following amounts:
1. P14,643,638. 51 representing material costs at site;

2. P2,957,989.94 representing payment for equipment and
labor standby costs;
3. P5,120,000.00 representing unrealized profit; and
4. P1,264,404.12 representing the unpaid balance of FSI’s
billing.
FURTHER, the said Respondent is ordered to solely and

exclusively bear the entire cost of arbitration proceedings in the
total amount of P474,407.95 as indicated in the TOR, and to
reimburse the herein Claimant of any amount thereof which it
had advanced and paid pursuant to TOR.
All the above-awarded amounts shall bear interest of 6% per
annum from the date of the formal demand on February 3, 1998
(Par. 10, Admitted Facts, TOR) until the date this Decision/Award
becomes final and executory and 12% per annum from the date
this Decision/Award 20becomes final and executory until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.”
LICOMCEN elevated the CIAC Decision to the CA. It

faulted the CIAC for taking cognizance of the case, arguing
that it has no jurisdiction over the suit. It also assailed the
award and the ruling that the contract had been
terminated, allegedly for lack of factual and legal basis.
On November 23, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, modifying the CIAC Decision, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Decision

is hereby MODIFIED to the extent that paragraph 1 of the
_______________
19 CIAC Records, Folder IV, pp. 1448-1462.

20 Id., at p. 1462.
715
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 715
dispositive portion is amended and accordingly, petitioner is

ordered to pay only the amount of P5,694,939.865 representing
the material costs at site; and paragraphs 2 and 3 on equipment
and labor standby costs and unrealized profit of the same
dispositive portion are deleted. The rest is AFFIRMED in all
respects. No costs. 21
SO ORDERED.”
Both LICOMCEN and FSI filed motions for partial

reconsideration, but these were denied
22
by the CA in its
Resolutions
23
dated February 4, 2005 and September 13,
2005.
LICOMCEN and FSI reacted with the instant petitions.
Considering that the cases involve the same parties, issues
and assailed decision, this Court ordered the consolidation
of G.R. No. 167022 and G.R. No. 169678 in its Resolution
dated November 20, 2006.
LICOMCEN raised the following issues:
1.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROJECT WAS MERELY

SUSPENDED AND NOT TERMINATED.
2.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIBUNAL HAD JURISDICTION

OVER THE DISPUTE.
3.
WHETHER OR NOT FSI IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM ANY

AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
4.
WHETHER
24
OR NOT LICOMCEN IS THE PARTY AT
FAULT.
FSI, on the other hand, interposes the following:
_______________
21 CA Rollo, Vol. IV, p. 1713.

22 Id., at pp. 1817-1820.
23 Id., at p. 2011.
24 Memorandum, Rollo (G.R. No. 167022),Vol. II, pp. 1914-1915.
716

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

AWARDING TO PETITIONER THE FULL
AMOUNT OF MATERIAL COSTS AT THE SITE.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR EQUIPMENT AND
LABOR STANDBY COSTS.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR UNREALIZED
PROFIT.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RENDERING A MERE MINUTE RESOLUTION
IN RESOLVING PETITIONER’S25
MOTION FOR
PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION.
First, we resolve the issue of the CIAC’s jurisdiction.

LICOMCEN insists that the CIAC had no jurisdiction
over the suit. Citing GC-05 and GC-61 of the GCC, it posits
that jurisdiction over the dispute rests with the regular
courts of Legaspi City.
The argument is misplaced.
The power and authority of a court to hear, try, and
decide a case is defined as jurisdiction. Elementary is the
distinction between jurisdiction over the subject matter
and jurisdiction over the person. The former is conferred by
the Constitution or by law, while the latter is acquired by
virtue of the party’s voluntary submission to the authority26
of the court through the exercise of its coercive process.
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008, or the
Construction Industry Arbitration Law, provides:
“SECTION 4. Jurisdiction.—The CIAC shall have original and

exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected
with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in
the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the
completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach
thereof.
_______________
25 Memorandum, Id., at p. 2130.

26 Arnado v. Buban, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, May 31, 2004, 430 SCRA 382, 386.
717
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 717

These disputes may involve government or private contracts. For

the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must
agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.
The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to
violation of specifications for materials and workmanship;
violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or
application of contractual provisions; amount of damages and
penalties; commencement time and delays; maintenance and
defects; payment default of employer or contractor and changes in
contract cost.
Excluded from the coverage of this law are disputes arising
from employer-employee relationships which shall continue to be
covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines.” (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollarily, Section 1, Article III of the Rules of Procedure

Governing Construction Arbitration provides that recourse
to the CIAC may be availed of whenever a contract
contains a clause for the submission of a future controversy
to arbitration, thus:
“SECTION 1. Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction.—An arbitration

clause in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of
a construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit
an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration
institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission. When
a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future
controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to
enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may
invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC.”
Clearly then, the CIAC has original and exclusive

jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with
construction contracts entered into by parties that have27
agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.
The GCC signed by LICOMCEN and FSI had the

following arbitral clause:
_______________
27 Philrock, Inc. v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 412

Phil 236, 245; 359 SCRA 632, 640 (2001).
718

“GC-61 DISPUTES AND ARBITRATION
Should any dispute of any kind arise between the LICOMCEN,

INCORPORATED and the Contractor or the Engineer and the
Contractor in connection with, or arising out of the execution of
the Works, such dispute shall first be referred to and settled by
the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED who shall within a period of
thirty (30) days after being formally requested by either party to
resolve the dispute, issue a written decision to the Engineer and
Contractor.
Such decision shall be final and binding upon the parties and
the Contractor shall proceed with the execution of the Works with
due diligence notwithstanding any Contractor’s objection to the
decision of the Engineer. If within a period of thirty (30) days
from receipt of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED’s decision on
the dispute, either party does not officially give notice to contest
such decision through arbitration, the said decision shall remain
final and binding. However, should any party within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED’s decision
contest said decision, the dispute shall be submitted for
arbitration under the Construction Industry Arbitration Law,
Executive Order 1008. The arbitrators appointed under said rules
and regulations shall have full power to open up, revise and
review any decision, opinion, direction, certificate or valuation of
the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED. Neither party shall be
limited to the evidence or arguments put before the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED for the purpose of obtaining his said decision.
No decision given by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED shall
disqualify him from being called as a witness and giving evidence
in the arbitration. It is understood that the obligations of the
LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, the Engineer and the Contractor
shall not be altered by reason of the

28
arbitration being conducted
during the progress of the Works.”
LICOMCEN theorizes that this arbitration clause cannot

vest jurisdiction in the CIAC, because it covers only
disputes arising out of or in connection with the execution
of works, whether permanent or temporary. It argues that
since the claim of FSI was not connected to or did not arise
out of the execution of the works as contemplated in GC-61,
but is based
_______________
28Exhibit “B-50,” CIAC Records, Folder II, p. 480.
719
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 719

29
on alleged breach of contract, under GC-05 of the GCC,
the dispute can only be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts. Furthermore, FSI failed to comply with the
condition precedent for arbitration. Thus, according to
LICOMCEN, the CIAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over
the case.
Contrary to what LICOMCEN wants to portray, the
CIAC validly acquired jurisdiction over the dispute. Firstly,
LICOMCEN submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
30
CIAC
when its president Antonio S. Tan signed the TOR during
the preliminary conference. The TOR states:
V. MODE OF ARBITRATION
The parties agree that their differences be settled by an Arbitral

Tribunal who were appointed in accordance with the provision of
Article V, Section 2 of the CIAC Rules of Procedure Governing
Construction Arbitration, as follows:
SALVADOR C. CEGUERA
Chairman
FELISBERTO G.L. REYES

Member
SALVADOR P. CASTRO, JR.

Member
The case shall be decided in accordance with the Contract of

the parties and the Construction Industry Arbitration Law
(Executive Order No. 1008) and on the basis of evidence
submitted, applicable laws,
31
and industry practices where
applicable under the law.”
_______________
29 GC-05. JURISDICTION
Any question between the contracting parties that may arise out of or
in connection with the Contract or breach thereof shall be litigated in the
courts of Legaspi, except where otherwise specifically stated or except
when such question is submitted for settlement thru arbitration as
provides herein.
30 CIAC Records, Folder I, pp. 369-375.
31 Id., at p. 372.
720

Secondly, we agree with the CA that the suit arose from

the execution of works defined in the contract. As it aptly
ratiocinated:
“[T]he dispute between [FSI] and [LICOMCEN] arose out of or in

connection with the execution of works. [LICOMCEN] has gone
quite far in interpreting “disputes arising out of or in connection
with the execution of work” as separate and distinct from
“disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract” citing
the various provisions of the Construction Agreement and Bid
Documents to preclude CIAC from taking cognizance of the case.
To the mind of this Court, such differentiation is immaterial.
Article 1374 of the Civil Code on the interpretation of contracts
ordains that “the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.” Essentially,
while we agree that [FSI’s] money claims against [LICOMCEN]
arose out of or in connection with the contract, the same
necessarily arose from the work it accomplished or sought to
accomplish pursuant thereto. Thus, said monetary claims can be
categorized as a dispute
32
arising out of or in connection with the
execution of work.”
Thirdly, FSI complied with the condition precedent

provided in GC-61. Record shows that FSI referred the
claim to ESCA on February33 3, 1998, and then to
LICOMCEN on 34March 3, 1998, but it was disallowed on
March 24, 1998. Then, on April 15, 1998, FSI rejected the
evaluation of the billings made by ESCA and LICOMCEN
and further35informed the latter of its intention to turn over
the project. FSI exerted efforts to have the claim settled
amicably, but no settlement was arrived at. Hence, on
March 3614, 2001, FSI through counsel made a final demand
to pay. LICOMCEN, however, adamantly refused to pay,
prompting FSI to file suit
_______________
32 CA Rollo, Vol. IV, p. 1702.

33 Supra note 12.
34 Exhibit “L,” CIAC Records, Folder II, p. 543.
35 Exhibit “L-2,” Id., at p. 545.
36 Exhibit “M,” Id., at p. 546.
721
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 721

with the CIAC. Clearly, FSI substantially complied with

the condition precedent laid down in GC-61. Finally, the
arbitral clause in the agreement, considering that the
requisites for its application are present, is a commitment
by the parties to submit to arbitration the disputes covered
therein. Because that clause 37
is binding, they are expected
to abide by it in good faith.
Just as meaningful, the issue of jurisdiction was
rendered moot by LICOMCEN’s active participation in the
proceedings before the CIAC. It is true that LICOMCEN
initially assailed the jurisdiction of the CIAC. But when the
CIAC 38asserted its jurisdiction in its February 20, 2003
Order, LICOMCEN did not seek relief from the CIAC
ruling. Instead, LICOMCEN took part in the discussion on
the merits of the case, even going to the extent of seeking
affirmative relief. The active involvement of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of, or at least

an acquiescence to, the court’s jurisdiction. Such
participation indicates a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case, and will bar said party
39
from later on
impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction. The Court will
not countenance the effort of any party to subvert or defeat
the objective
40
of voluntary arbitration for its own private
motives. After submitting itself to arbitration proceedings
and actively participating therein, LICOMCEN is estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because
the latter rendered an adverse decision.
Having resolved the issue of jurisdiction, we proceed to
the merits of the case.
_______________
37 Reyes v. Balde II, G.R. No. 168384, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 186,
194.
38 CIAC Records, Folder II, pp. 697-698.
39Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 411
Phil. 959, 977-978; 359 SCRA 409, 425 (2001).
40 Philrock v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, supra
note 27, at p. 246; p. 642.
722

LICOMCEN faults the CIAC and the CA for ruling that the
contract had been terminated, insisting that it was merely
indefinitely suspended. To bolster its position, LICOMCEN
cited GC-41 of the GCC which reads:
GC-41 LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED’S RIGHT TO SUSPEND

WORK OR TERMINATE THE CONTRACT
xxxx
2. For Convenience of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED
If any time before completion of work under the Contract it shall

be found by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED that reasons
beyond the control of the parties render it impossible or against
the interest of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED to complete the
work, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED at any time, by written
notice to the Contractor, may discontinue the work and terminate

the Contract in whole or in part. Upon issuance of such notice of
termination, the Contractor shall discontinue the work in such
manner, sequence and at such time as the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct, continuing and doing
after said notice only such work and only until such time or times
as41the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct. x x
x” (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately for LICOMCEN, this provision does not

support but enervates its theory of indefinite suspension.
The cited provision may be invoked only in cases of
termination of contract, as clearly inferred from the phrase
“discontinue the work and terminate the contract.” And in
statutory
42
construction implies conjunction, joinder or
union. Thus, by invoking GC-41, LICOMCEN, in effect,
admitted that the contract had already been terminated.
The termination of the contract was made obvious and
unmistakable when LICOMCEN’s new project consultant
rebidded the contract for the bored piling works for the
CITI-
_______________
41 Exhibit “B-40,” CIAC Records, Folder II, p. 470.

42 Solanda Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 194, 206; 305
SCRA 645, 655 (1999).
723
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 723

43
MALL. The claim that the rebidding was conducted for
purposes
44
of getting cost estimates for a possible new
design taxes our credulity. It impresses us as nothing
more than a lame attempt of LICOMCEN to avoid liability
under the contract. As the CIAC had taken pains to
demonstrate:
“Suspension of work is ordinarily understood to mean a

temporary work stoppage or a cessation of work for the time
being. It may be assumed that, at least initially, LCC had a valid
reason to suspend the Works on December 16, 1997 pursuant to
GC-38 above-quoted. The evidence show, however, that it has not
ordered a resumption of work up to the present despite the lapse

of more than four years, and despite the dismissal of the case filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman which it gave as reason for the
suspension in the first place. As such, LCC’s suspension of the
Works had already lost its essential characteristic of being merely
temporary or only for the time being. To still consider it a
“suspension” at this point is to do violence to reason and logic.
Perhaps because of this LCC came up with the assertion that
what we have is an “indefinite suspension.” There is no such term
in the Construction Agreement or the Contract Documents. In
fact, it is unknown in the construction industry. Construction
work may either be suspended or terminated, but never
indefinitely suspended. Since it is not sanctioned by practice and
not mentioned in the herein Construction Agreement and the
Contract Documents, “indefinite suspension” is irregular and
invalid. Due to the apparent incongruity of an “indefinite
suspension,” LCC changed the term to “continued suspension” in
its Memorandum. Unfortunately for it, the factual situation
remains unchanged.
45
The Works stay suspended for an indefinite
period of time.”
Accordingly, the CA did not err in affirming the CIAC

ruling that the contract had already been terminated.
Neither can LICOMCEN find refuge in the principle of
laches to steer clear of liability. It is not just the lapse of
time or
_______________
43 Exhibit “I-1,” CIAC Records, Folder II, p. 523.

44 TSN, April 11, 2003, p. 10, CIAC Records, Folder III, p. 1369.
45 CIAC Records, Folder IV, p. 1455.
724

delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the

failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, through due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a
presumption that the party entitled46
to assert it had either
abandoned or declined to assert it.
Indeed, FSI filed its petition for arbitration only on

October 8, 2002, or after the lapse of more than four years
since the project was “indefinitely suspended.” But we
agree with the CIAC and the CA that such delay can
hardly be considered unreasonable to give rise to the
conclusion that FSI already abandoned its claim. On the
contrary, the delay was due to the fact that FSI exerted
efforts to have the claim settled extrajudicially which
LICOMCEN rebuffed. Besides, except for LICOMCEN’s
allegation that the filing of the suit is already barred by
laches, no proof was offered to show that the filing of the
suit was iniquitous or unfair to LICOMCEN. We reiterate
that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are
adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is
sanctioned by law 47
and is not to be considered delay that
would bar relief. In the instant case, FSI filed its claim
well within the ten-year prescriptive
48
period provided for in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Therefore, laches cannot be
invoked to bar FSI from instituting this suit.
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public
policy which require, for the peace of society, discouraging
stale claims. It is principally a question of the inequity or
unfair-
_______________
46 Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, G.R. No.

169973, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 761, 769.
47 Agra v. Philippine National Bank, 368 Phil. 829, 844; 309 SCRA 509,
521 (1999).
48 Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years
from the time the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
725
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 725

ness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or

asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes
laches; each case is to be determined according to its

particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it
is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be worked49
to defeat
justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.
We now come to the monetary awards granted to FSI.
LICOMCEN avers that the award lacked factual and legal
basis. FSI, on the other hand, posits otherwise, and cries
foul on the modification made by the CA. It asserts that the
CA erred in disregarding the pieces of evidence that it
submitted in support of the claim despite the lack of
objection and opposition from LICOMCEN. It insists
entitlement to the full amount of material costs at site, for
equipment and labor standard costs, as well as unrealized
profits.
In this connection, we must emphasize the distinction
between admissibility of evidence and its probative value.
Just because a piece of evidence is not objected to does not
ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in
dispute. The admissibility of evidence should not be
confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to
the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation 50
within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
We have carefully gone over the records and are
satisfied that the findings of the CA are well supported by
evidence. As
_______________
49 Placewell International Services Corporation v. Camote, supra note

46, at p. 769.
50 Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa, 456 Phil. 161, 172; 408 SCRA 692,
700 (2003).
726

mentioned above, the contract between LICOMCEN and

FSI had already been terminated and, in such case, the
GCC expressly provides that:
GC-42 PAYMENT FOR TERMINATED CONTRACT
If the Contract is terminated as aforesaid, the Contractor will be

paid for all items of work executed, and satisfactorily completed
and accepted by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED up to the
date of termination, at the rates and prices provided for in the
contract and in addition:
1. The cost of partially accomplished items of additional or

extra work agreed upon by the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED and the Contractor.
2. The cost of materials or goods reasonably ordered for the
Permanent or Temporary Works which have been
delivered to the Contractor but not yet used and which
delivery has been certified by the Engineer.
3. The reasonable cost of demobilization
For any payment due the Contractor under the above

conditions, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, however, shall
deduct any outstanding balance due from the Contractor for
advances in respect to mobilization and materials, and any other
sum the 51 LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED is entitled to be
credited.”
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the liability of

LICOMCEN for the cost of materials on site is only
P5,694,939.85. The said award represents the materials
reasonably ordered for the project and which were
delivered to the job site. FSI cannot demand full payment
52
of the steel bars under Purchase Order No. 6035. As
shown by the records, the steel bars53
were loaded at M/V
Alberto only on January 5412, 1998 and reached Legaspi
City on January 16, 1998. But as
_______________
51 Exhibits “B-40” to “B-41,” CIAC Records, Folder II, pp. 470-471.

52 Exhibit “Q-2,” CIAC Records, Folder II, p. 571.
53 Exhibit “Q-3,” Id., at p. 572.
54 Exhibit “Q-4,” Id., at p. 573.
727
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 727

early as December 16, 1997, LICOMCEN already informed

FSI of the major revision of the design and ordered the
nondelivery to the jobsite of the 50% of the steel bars.
Inexplicably, FSI continued the delivery. Worse, it
unloaded all the steel bars and delivered them to the
jobsite and
55
some to the Tuanzon batching plant on January
17, 1998, despite LICOMCEN’s order not to do so. FSI
cannot now claim payment of the cost of all these
materials.
LICOMCEN, however, cannot deny liability for 50% of
the steel bars because, as mentioned, it ordered their
delivery to the jobsite. The steel bars had in fact been
delivered
56
to the jobsite and inventoried by Cesar Cortez of
ESCA, contrary to LICOMCEN’s claim. The payment of
these materials is, therefore, in order, pursuant to GC-41:
“The Contractor shall receive compensation for reasonable

expenses incurred in good faith for the performance of the
Contract and for reasonable expenses57
associated with the
termination of the Contract. x x x.”
We also uphold the denial of FSI’s claim for equipment and

labor standard costs, as no convincing evidence 58
was
presented to prove
59
it. The list of rented equipment and the
list of workers offered by FSI and which were admitted by
CIAC, are far from being clear and convincing proof that
FSI actually incurred the expenses stated therein.
As aptly said by the CA, FSI should have presented
convincing pieces of documentary evidence, such as the
lease contract or the receipts of payment issued by the
owners of the rented equipment, to establish the claim. As
to its claimed labor expenses, the list of employees does not
categorically
_______________
55Supra note 8.
56 Exhibit “R,” CIAC Records, Folder II, p. 738.
57 Exhibits “B-14” to “B-50.”
58 Exhibits “K-8” to “K-9,” CIAC Records, Folder II, pp. 539-540.
59 Exhibits “K-10” to “K-11,” Id., at pp. 541-542.
728

prove that these listed employees were actually employed

at the construction site during the suspension. Hence, even
assuming that LICOMCEN failed to submit evidence to
rebut these lists, they do not ipso facto translate into duly
proven facts. FSI still had the burden of proving its cause
of action, because 60it is the one asserting entitlement to an
affirmative relief. On this score, FSI failed. The CA,
therefore, committed no reversible error in denying the
claim.
FSI’s claim for unrealized profit has to be rejected too.
GC41 specifically provided that:
“x x x The Contractor shall have no claim for anticipated profits

on the work thus terminated, nor any other claim, except for work
actually performed at the time of complete discontinuance,
including any variations authorized by the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED/ Engineer to be done under the section dealing
with variation, after the date of said order, and for any claims for
61
variations accruing up to the date of said notice of termination.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The provision was agreed upon by the parties freely, and

significantly, FSI did not question this. It is not for the
Court to change the stipulations in the contract when they
are not illegal. Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that
the contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to62 law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. Besides, no
convincing proof was offered to prove the claim. In light of
the foregoing, the CA, therefore, correctly denied the claim
for unrealized profit.
Similarly, we agree with the CIAC and the CA that
LICOMCEN should bear the cost of arbitration as it
adamantly
_______________
60 Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa, supra note 50, at p. 172, p. 700.

61 Exhibit “B-40,” CIAC Records, Folder II, p. 470.
62 Security Bank & Trust Company v. RTC Makati, 331 Phil. 787, 793-
794; 263 SCRA 483, 489 (1996).
729
VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 729

refused to pay FSI’s just and valid claim, prompting the

latter to institute a petition for arbitration.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the decision of the
CA. It cannot be faulted for denying FSI’s motion for
reconsideration through a mere Minute Resolution, for as
we held63in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v.
Velasco:
“The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52

of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the Court the obligation
to deal individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon
therefor, in much the same way that the Court does in its
judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and
submitted for decision. This would be a useless formality or ritual
invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already
set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the
arguments advanced by the movant; and it would be a needless
act, too, with respect to issues raised for the first time, these
being, x x x deemed waived because not asserted at the first
opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and
summarily with the motion for reconsideration, and merely state
a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e.,
the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments
already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court
in its judgment, or the basic issues have already been passed
upon, or the motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent
reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment
or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too
unsubstantial to require consideration, etc.”
WHEREFORE, the herein petitions for review are

DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,

Chico-Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.
_______________
63 Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 324 Phil. 483,

491-492; 254 SCRA 234, 242 (1996).
730

Chieng vs. Santos
Petitions denied, assailed judgment and resolution

affirmed.
Notes.—Executive Order No. 1008 which vests

jurisdiction to the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) over construction disputes is a special
law—hence, it takes precedence over Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, a general
law which vests jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Courts
over civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Reyes vs. Balde II, 498
SCRA 186 [2006])
As an arbitration body, the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) can only resolve issues
brought before it by the parties through the Terms of
Reference (TOR) which functions similarly as a pre-trial
brief. (Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation vs.
Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation,
511 SCRA 335 [2006])
——o0o——
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12/12/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 531

VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 705

LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs.

FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC., petitioner, vs.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR); Arbitration;

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Construction Industry

706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LICOMCEN, Incorporated vs. Foundation Specialists, Inc.

TION 1. Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction.—An arbitration clause

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The active involvement of a

participating therein, LICOMCEN is estopped from assailing the

Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; “And” in

VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 707

LICOMCEN, Incorporated vs. Foundation Specialists, Inc.

completion of work under the Contract it shall be found by the

Laches; It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes

through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,

708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LICOMCEN, Incorporated vs. Foundation Specialists, Inc.

CEN’s allegation that the filing of the suit is already barred by

Evidence; Just because a piece of evidence is not objected to

conclusively proves the fact in dispute. The admissibility of

Obligations and Contracts; It is not for the Court to change

VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 709

LICOMCEN, Incorporated vs. Foundation Specialists, Inc.

fered to prove the claim. In light of the foregoing, the CA,

Motions for Reconsideration; The filing of a motion for

find no reason to disturb the decision of the CA. It cannot be

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and

710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

For review in these

Liberty Commercial Center, Inc. (LICOMCEN) is a

1 Penned by Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, with Associate Justices

VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 711

disputes arising out of the execution of the work should

be submitted to the Construction Industry Arbitration

712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On January 17, 1998, the steel bars for the CITIMALL

VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 713

LICOMCEN denied the claim of FSI, arguing that it lacks

16 CIAC Records, Folder I, pp. 369-375.

714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

1. P14,643,638. 51 representing material costs at site;

FURTHER, the said Respondent is ordered to solely and

LICOMCEN elevated the CIAC Decision to the CA. It

“WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Decision

19 CIAC Records, Folder IV, pp. 1448-1462.

VOL. 531, AUGUST 31, 2007 715

LICOMCEN, Incorporated vs. Foundation Specialists, Inc.

dispositive portion is amended and accordingly, petitioner is

Both LICOMCEN and FSI filed motions for partial

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROJECT WAS MERELY

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIBUNAL HAD JURISDICTION

WHETHER OR NOT FSI IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM ANY

FSI, on the other hand, interposes the following:

21 CA Rollo, Vol. IV, p. 1713.

24 Memorandum, Rollo (G.R. No. 167022),Vol. II, pp. 1914-1915.

716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

First, we resolve the issue of the CIAC’s jurisdiction.

“SECTION 4. Jurisdiction.—The CIAC shall have original and

25 Memorandum, Id., at p. 2130.