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A REFORMULATION OF THE ABC MODEL

IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOTHERAPIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESSMENT AND
TREATMENT

Clarke Institute of Psychiatry

ABSTRACT. An adaption of Woodworth’s earlier SOR model of human behavior, Ellis’

ABC model has become the prototype of human disturbance in the cognitive tradition,
followed by Beck, Lazarus, Meichenbaum, and others. It has become, over the years, the focus
of much cm’ticism and has gone through many revisions as a result. This article reviews some
of the important re~~~~o~s,surnrn~r~~es th.e c~.tic~~, and offers a reforrn~~~tio~l of the model
that is more consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature from cognitive psychother-
apy, cognitive psychology, social cognition, psycholinguistics, and emotion theory. Specify-
tally, it presents a conceptualization of schemata as tacit cognitive-affective-motoric structures
that account for emotional experience in the face of external stimuli. Fi,nally, the article
suggests some impli&utions of this refo~u~ti~n for the assessment and treatment of human
d~tu,rb~nce in co~itive p~&hother~~, i~~~u.ding the use of set-scenarios for tup~ing
schematic structures and emotionally evocative procedures for schematic restructuring.

According to a constructivistic view of science (e.g., Leahey, 1987; Maturana &

Varela, 1987), scientists typically develop models of reality from a theory, which
are highly simplified and idealized partial simulations of reality. The models
purport to explain only some phenomena, and only some aspects of these. A
scientific theory is not about the real world as we experience it, but about abstract
idealized models that do not and can not account for the infinite number of

I would like to acknowledge Jeremy Safran, Zindel Segal, and Albert Ellis for their
invaluable feedback and support in the preparation of this manuscript.
Requests for reprints should be sent to J. C. Muran, Psychotherapy Research Project,
Department of Psychiatry, Beth Israel Medical Center, Nathan D. Perlman Place, 2
Bernstein Pav., Room 2B30, New York, NY 10003.

399
variables that. exist in reality. The real world, unlike the model, is far too complex
to be explained thoroughly by a theory. It is important to realize how limited a
scientific model truly is and what is its true purpose. To borrow an expression
from General Semantics (Korzybski, 1933), a model is merely “a map of the
territory” and should not be confused with the territory itself. Nevertheless, it can
be a useful guide. Models give science enormous power, freeing the scientist from
the impossible task of describing all of reality with its infinite complexity and
enabling him/her to make powerful and wide-ranging explanations of observed
phenomena. In light of this, the purpose of this article is to examine the scientific
status of one such model with respect to recent theoretical and empirical contri-
butions.

THE ABC MODEL

Ellis’ (1962) ABC model of human disturbance, in which A represents activating

events, R belief systems, and C emotional and behavioral consequences, is an
adaption of Woodworth’s (1929) earlier SOR model of human behavior. The ABC
model has subsequently become the prototype of human disturbance in the
cognitive tradition (e.g., Beck, 1976; Lazarus, 1976; Maultsby, 1984; Meichen-
baum, 1977; Wessler & Hankin-Wessler, 1986). According to Ellis’ (1962, 1973)
formulation, humans have an innate ability to disturb themselves by creating
irrational beliefs, which are absolutistic and self-defeating evaluations. He origi-
nally identified 11 specific irrational beliefs, emphasizing the content of irrational
thinking. In his more recent formulations (e.g., Ellis, 1979), he has focused more
on the general style of irrational thinking, identifying dogmatic demands as a
central feature of human disturbance. ElIis’ emphasis on demandingness reflects
his psychoanalytic origins, particularly the primitive demands of Freud’s (1949) Id
at conflict with reality, the moralistic dictates of Freud’s superego, and Horney’s
(1950) tyranny of the shoulds. He posits that humans can make absolute demands
on self, other people, and the world, from which they tend to draw a number of
irrational conclusions, deemed as derivatives of demandingness; these include
awfulizing, i-can’t-stand-it-itis, and self-damnation (Ellis & Dryden, 1987). Accord-
ingly, disturbed humans usually hold at least one belief (sometimes two or three)
couched as a demand that is identified as a core irrational belief, to which other
irrational beliefs are peripherally related (Ellis, personal communication). Core
irrational beliefs seem to fall into two categories of psychological disturbance: ego
disturbance and discomfort disturbance (Ellis 8c Dryden, 1987). Ego disturbance
involves such contingencies as “I must succeed at all tasks important to me or be
approved of by significant others in order to be worthwhile.” Discomfort distur-
bance involves such contingencies as “I must be comfortable or comfortable life
conditions must exist in order to be happy,” which reflects what Ellis (1979) has
called low-frustration tolerance. While many irrational beliefs are considered to
operate out of awareness and to be accessibie through effort and attention, core
irrational beliefs are considered to be especially nonconscious and difficult to
access (Bernard, 1981; Ellis, 1962, 1984a).
Another prominent formulation of the ABC model is that of Beck (Beck, 1976;
Beck & Emery, 198.5; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck & Shaw, 1977; Beck
& Weishaar, 1989), which describes human disturbance as related to a number of
cognitive distortions that are somewhat akin to what Adler (1963) originally
 A Reformulation of the ABC Model 401

s-- > P--> I--> E-- > c

FIGURE 1. The Wessler and Wessler (1980) model. S = stimulus, P =
perception, I = inference, E = evaluation, and C = consequence.

identified as basic mistakes. These include arbitrary inference, selective abstrac-

tion, overgeneralization, magni~cation/minimization, personalization, and dichot-
omous thinking. Cognitive distortions are systematic errors in logic or misinterpre-
tations about an event. They often emerge automatically, operating out of
awareness, without any apparent antecedent reflection. These so-called automatic
thoughts are generated by dysfunctional attitudes or underlying assumptions,
which are absolute and inflexible, making one vulnerable to psychological distur-
bance. These attitudes generally concern how one conceptualizes oneself and the
world. They are rules learned from one’s own experiences or from signi~cant
others, which are tacit and have become “structuralized” as permanent formations
of one’s cognitive organization. They are, therefore, considered cognitive struc-
tures or schemata that direct an individual’s perceptions, inferences, and evalua-
tions of one’s experiences and regulate one’s behavior. Accordingly, these schemata
can be called core beliefs that concern such issues as acceptance, competence, and
control, and can be stated in the form of if-then contingencies, such as “If I
succeed at all tasks important to me, then I am worthwhile” (competence), which is
similar in breadth to Ellis’ core irrational beliefs (DeRubeis & Beck, 1988). To
complete his formulation of the relationship among cognition, emotion, and
behavior, Beck (Beck & Emery, 1985) postulated a feedback loop from behavioral
and emotive schemata to the cognitive schemata, with primacy assigned to the
cognitive schemata; the loop leads to modi~cation in the controlling cognitive
schemata.
Over the years, the ABC model has gone through many revisions by a number
of cognitive theorists (e.g., DeSilvestri, 1989; Dryden, 1984; Grieger, 1986;
Maultsby, 1984; Wessler, 1984), including Ellis himself (1985a), who noted that the
model was “oversimpli~ed and [did] omit salient information about human
disturbance and its treatment“ (p. 3 13). One of the more interesting revisions that
attempted to elaborate on cognitive processes in general, rather than irrational
specific thinking, was presented by Wessler and Wessler (1980). They expanded
the ABC model by accounting for the interface between external stimuli (S) and
perception (P), and by distinguishing between inferences (I), which involve
thoughts about the world and evaluations (E), which involve thoughts about how
good or bad the perceived world is, and lead to emotional and behavioral
consequences (C) (see Figure 1). In other words, inferences refer to interpretations
or attributions regarding one’s perceptions, and evaluations refer to appraisals of
one’s inferences.
Wessler and Wessler conceptualized perceptual and inferential processes as
corresponding to the A in the ABC model and reserved B exclusively for
evaluations. Accordingly, inferences relate to Beck’s (Beck 8c Weishaar, 1989)
cognitive distortions, and evaluations relate to all of Ellis’ (Ellis & Dryden, 1987)
irrational beliefs. Specifically, absolute demands are described as evaluative prem-
ises that are generalized cognitions or personal rules of living from which specific
conclusions (i.e., the derivative irrational beliefs) are drawn, applying to specific
events (Wessler, 1982, 1984).
402 J. C. Muon

S --> P --> I --> E --> C

& ‘p p 1‘
CONSTRUCTUAL --> PERSONAL PARADIGM
AE3ILlTIES

FIGURE 2. The DiGiuseppe (1986) model. S = stimulus, P = perception, I

= inference, E = evaluation, and C = consequence.

DiGiuseppe recently (1986) amended the Wessler and Wessler model by hypoth-
esizing a cognitive structure that organizes the cognitive processes in their model.
He proposed a construct underlying perceptual, inferential, and evaluative pro-
cesses called personal paradigms and described them as personal theories or
underlying assumptions that people construct to explain and maneuver their way
in the world (see Figure 2). He envisioned perceptual processes as A in the ABC
model and inferential and evaluative processes, as well as paradigms, as B.
Personal paradigms represent core belief systems that are not always apparent to
the individual; instead, they are nonconscious, which is similar to conceptualiza-
tions of core cognitive structures proposed by other theorists (Beck & Emery,
1985; Guidano SCLiotti, 1983). What DiGiuseppe did, in effect, was separate more
definitively the evaluative construct as depicted by Wessler and Wessler (1980),
delineating between evaluative premises and evaluative conclusions as separate
constructs. In other words, he described dysfunctional paradigms as represented
by absolute demands and dysfunctional evaluative processes as solely represented
by the derivative irrational beliefs of awfulizing, I-can%-stand-it-itis, and self-
damnation. Personal paradigms are conceptualized as comparable to schemata as
depicted by Beck (Beck, 1976; Beck 8c Emery, 1985; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery,
1979; Beck & Shaw, 1977; Beck SC Weishaar, 1989).
While DiGiuseppe’s (1986) model offers an interesting integration of Ellis and
Beck’s original formulations, it is not without its problems. First, Wessler (1988)
disagrees with DiGiuseppe’s position that demands as represented by “should” and
“need” statements are not evaluations. Instead, he argues that such statements are
indeed evaluations in that they implicitly express ideas about what is good or bad
for a person. Interestingly, Ellis (e.g., Ellis SC Dryden, 1987) himself continues to
consider demands as evaluative. Second, although Ellis and DiGiuseppe agree in
conceptualizing demandingness as core to human disturbance, Beck and col-
leagues (e.g., Beck 2%~ Emery, 1985, Weissman& Beck, 1978; DeRubeis & Beck,
1988) take a less definite stance on what is core. They do not exclusively emphasize
demandingness when describing dysfunctional attitudes, but rather describe atti-
tudes that involve many elements of Beck’s cognitive distortions and Ellis’ ir-
rational beliefs, with demands inclusive. Third, although Beck and DiGiu-
seppe agree in their use of cognitive structures to explain human disturbance,
their conceptualization of schemata is not especially rigorous, thus contributing to
the often cited conceptual confusion regarding the definition of the construct
(e.g., Alba SC Hasher, 1983). Specifically, they apparently seem to simply equate a
dysfunctional schema with a core dysfunctional attitude or belief. As a number of
cognitive theorists (Safran, 1990; Segal, 1988; Williams, Watts, Macleod, & Mathews,
1988) suggest, it is not made consistently clear how such core attitudes or beliefs
represent schemata as traditionally defined in cognitive psychology: that is,
 A Reformulation of the ABC Model 403

stored bodies of knowledge that constitute abstract prototypical representations of

environmental regularities, which are based on past experiences (e.g., Bartlett,
1932; Neisser, 1976; Williams et al., 1988). This conceptual confusion is further
confounded by schema-focused research based on the use of self-report invento-
ries (e.g., Weissman & Beck, 1978), according to which an individual is supposed
to endorse attitudes and beliefs that are posited to be particularly difficult to
access.

RECENT CRITICISMS OF THE ABC MODEL

For the sake of convenience and clarity, critics of the ABC model can be divided
into two camps. One includes those who follow the associationist or behavioral
tradition and argue for clear, conceptually discrete definitions of the constructs of
the ABC model, which would allow for reliable and valid measures of these
constructs (e.g., Burgess, 1986; Kendall 8c Korgeski, 1979; Smith, 1989). This
camp adopts the componential thinking or elementalism common in scientific
research: that is, the strategy of reducing and conceptualizing a phenomenon in
terms of discriminable elements, which contribute to causing the phenomenon. It
more accurately interprets the ABC model as its behavioral predecessor, the SOR
model, where A equals an external Stimulus or reality, B equals Organismic
variables (i.e., all cognitive processes), and C equals an emotional or behavioral
Response. Much of the current research in RET and Cognitive Therapy seems to
conform to the philosophy of science espoused by this camp with the development
of discrete measures of its constructs, specifically of the B (e.g., DiGiuseppe, Leaf,
Exner, SCRobin, 1988; Hollon & Kendall, 1980; Kassinove, 1986; Lefebvre, 1981;
Weissman & Beck, 1978). By comparison, less attention has been given to the C in
the cognitive tradition, particularly of late. This may be more indicative of a lack of
general agreement regarding a definition of B, which stifles the development of a
definitive measure, rather than a neglect of C. After all, both Beck (Beck, Ward,
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and Spielberger (Spielberger, Gorsuch, &
Lushene, 1970), for example, have developed rather definitive measures of C
based upon a widely endorsed, multidimensional definition of emotion.
The other camp includes those who follow a phenomenological tradition and
argue that thought, feeling, and action are structurally and functionally insepara-
ble (e.g., Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Mahoney, 1988; Safran & Greenberg, 1988).
Accordingly, lines of distinction between constructs of the ABC model are blurred.
In terms of the A-B connection, reality is considered to be an individual,
constructive process, not separate from perceptual and higher-order cognitive
processes. As for the B-C connection, the two constructs are wholistically inte-
grated as one. Thus, this camp adopts a wholistic, rather than elemental, approach
to phenomena. Except for a recent attempt by Ellis (1989), traditional adherents to
the ABC model have not adequately addressed some of the concerns and criticisms
of the phenomenological camp (see Mahoney, 1988, for an elaboration of this
dichotomy). They seem much more absorbed by the associationist stance, particu-
larly in terms of gathering empirical support for the constructs of the ABC model.

RECENT RESEARCH AND CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

The bone of contention between the behavioral and phenomenological camps,

predominantly, though not exclusively, concerns the relationship between the B
and the C in the ABC model. Much of the support for the behavioral position
404 J. C. Mwan

seems to come from correlational research that demonstrates a significant relation-

ship between measures of irrational beliefs, cognitive distortions, automatic
thoughts, or dysfunctional attitudes and measures of negative emotion (see Parks
& Hollon, 1988; Smith, 1989, for reviews). However, as Smith and Alfred (1986)
pointed out, many of the correlations yielded from such research are spuriously
high, suggesting that measures of cognition and emotion are indistinguishable
(actually two measures of a single construct). At closer inspection, measures such
as the Jones (1968) Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT; Jones, 1968) and the Dysfunc-
tional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman 8c Beck, 1978) include references of affect
in their items (e.g., IBT: “I worry about how much people approve of and accept
me,” and DAS: “If you don’t have anyone to lean on, you are bound to be sad”),
which would logically overlap with items in measures of negative emotions.
Further, measures of automatic thinking, such as Holland and Kendall’s (1980)
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ), include items that not only make
reference to affect but are also identical to those in the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI; Beck et al., 1961) (e.g., “I am disappointed in myself’), which would, in part,
explain the resulting significantly high correlations between the two measures. In
response to all of this, a number of measures of irrational thinking have been
recently developed to establish discriminant validity by eliminating references to
affect, characteristic of previous measures (e.g., DiGiuseppe et al., 1988; Kas-
sinove, 1986; Malouff & Schutte, 1986). The resulting correlations of these
measures with measures of negative emotion were significant, but no longer
spuriously high, suggesting discriminant validity (DiGiuseppe et al., 1989; Muran,
Kassinove, Ross, & Muran, 1989; Warren & Zgourides, 1989).
These results, however, are still misleading because many of the prominent
measures of negative emotion that were used, including the BDI and the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, SC Lushene, lQ70), consist
of items with cognitive references (e.g., BDI: “I believe that I look ugly,” and
STAI: “I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them”).
These references probably contribute to the elevations in the correlations. This
point is not to suggest that measures of negative emotion should eliminate all
references to cognition. Rather, it is meant to highlight an integral part of theories
of emotion, which have important implications for theories of cognition and the
ABC model. A number of notable theorists have conceptualized emotion as
multidimensional. For example, Arnold (1960), Barlow (1988), and Lang (1985)
have each endorsed a tripartite response system in emotion, consisting of behav-
iora~motoric, physiological/somatic, and cogniti~,e/subjective components. Scherer
(1984) has painted an even more elaborate picture of emotion, including cognitive,
motivational, physiological, behavioral, and subjective feeling aspects.
These examples explain why many theorists (e.g., Barlow, Hayes, & Nelson,
1986; Plutchik, 1980) have argued for a multidimensional approach to the
development of self-report measures of emotion and why many of the more valid
and widely accepted self-report measures are multidimensional (e.g., BDI and
STAI). For example, the BDI is comprised of items that tap behavioral (“I cry ali
the time now”), affective (“I feel sad”), motivational (“I have not lost interest in
other people”),,vegetative (“I have no appetite at all anymore”), and cognitive (“I
am a complete failure as a person”) aspects of depression. Further, these examples
make one wonder why many in cognitive psychotherapy continue to take such a
simplistic, unidimensior~al approach to cogmtlon in general and to hypotheticaIly
 A Reformulation of the ABC Model 405

sophisticated cognitive structures such as schemata or core belief systems in

particular. After all, in emotion theory and cognitive psychology, both Leventhal
(1984) and Lang (1985) have integrated emotion in the cognitive system, suggest-
ing representations of emotion at the schematic level, and Oatley and Johnson-
Laird (1987) have proposed that emotions are central to the organization of
cognitive processing. Further, in social cognition, Abelson (1988) has demon-
strated that “emotional commitment” is one of three latent factors that underlie
deeply rooted attitudes and beliefs. Finally, even in cognitive psychotherapy,
Safran and Segal (1990) have recently conceptualized schemata as cognitive-
affective structures, and Jaremko (1986) has similarly proposed cognitive-affective
structures to explain human disturbance.

A REFORMULATION OF THE ABC MODEL

What can be concluded from the recent correlational research and conceptualiza-
tions regarding cognition and emotion is that, perhaps, the B-C connection in the
ABC model is not so discrete. Perhaps schemata when used to account for
emotional events are not exclusively cognitive structures, as presented previously
by Beck (Beck & Emery, 1985) and DiGiuseppe (1986). Rather, what is proposed
as a reformulation of the ABC model is a model that posits that such cognitive
processes as perception, inference, and evaluation are not only highly integrated
among themselves but also highly integrated with what has been identified as
Consequences in the ABC model; i.e., emotional and behavioral responses. This is
consistent with Ellis’ (1962, 1984a, 1984b, 1985b) original proposition that B and C
in his ABC model significantly overlap and are, in some respects, the same.
Further, the structure that integrates all of these processes is the schema construct,
which is conceptualized here as a tacit cognitive-affective-motoric structure. Such a
conceptualization of schemata seems rather consistent with a number of current
conceptualizations of emotion as a form of tacit meaning that provides humans
with information about their action dispositions to situations (Guidano, 1987;
Lang, 1985; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Mahoney, 1988; Greenberg SC Safran,
1989), as well as consistent with motoric theories of the mind that advocate an
integral link between cognition and action (Neisser, 1976; Weimer, 1977).
According to the proposed model, the schema construct is conceptualized only
to explain the processing of emotional events and should not be confused with
schemata for other events. Schemata for emotional events are formulated here as
procedural schemata. Procedural schemata or scripts (Abelson, 1981), as they are
otherwise known (see Pace, 1988, or Hastie, 1981, for an elaboration of the other
types of schemata), are traditionally defined as cognitive structures that consist of
procedural knowledge about particular events, which the mind extracts in the
course of exposure to particular instances of the events. The knowledge consti-
tutes an abstract prototypical representation, which interacts with the processing
of external information and exerts an organizational influence on that informa-
tion (Williams et al., 1988). Examples of the type of knowledge represented
schematically that have been addressed in the clinical literature include represen-
tations about the self identified as self-schemata (Markus, 1977) and representa-
tions of self-other relationships identified as interpersonal schemata (Safran,
1990). Accordingly, self-schemata are “cognitive generalizations about the self,
derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-
406 J. C. Murnn

related information contained in an individual social experience” (Markus, 1977,

p. 63). Markus (1983) has recently expanded this definition to include the idea of
“possible selves”; that is, what the individual might become, would like to become,
and is afraid of becoming. Safran’s (1990) interpersonal schemata are defined as
cognitive-affective generalizations “that [are] abstracted on the basis of interactions
with attachment figures and that [permit] the individual to predict interactions in
a way that increases the probability of maintaining relatedness with these figures”
(p. 93).
Implicit to the knowledge contained in procedural schemata are rules for
activating sequences of action. These rules are typically cast as if-then contingen-
cies (Abelson, 1981; Glass SC Holyoak, 1986), which make the initiation of an
operation contingent on the presence of some input (i.e., if the appropriate input
is detected, then a certain operation is performed). Thus, a rule such as one that
establishes an absolute contingency between self-worth and achievement (i.e., “If I
succeed at all things important to me, then I am worthwhile”) can be viewed as an
implicit rule for maintaining self-worth that is abstracted on the basis of past
experiences. Such a contingency would direct one’s attention toward and organize
one’s memories around achievement-oriented information. It would also direct an
individual to actively and anxiously move either toward or away from competitive
situations in order to fulfill the contractual contingency outlined in the rule. As
Kuiper and Olinger (1986) suggest, it is only when the contractual conditions for
self-worth are not met that psychological disturbance develops, which accounts for
how life’s events impinge on Beck’s (Beck & Weishaar, 1989) notion of cognitive
vulnerability, and is consistent with Ellis’ (Ellis & Dryden, 1987) contention that
absolute beliefs do not absolutely lead to disturbance.
Ellis (1979) would probably couch the contingency exemplified above in terms
of demandingness (i.e., “I must succeed at all tasks important to me in order to be
worthwhile”). Demandingness manifested in such a contingency, however, differs
from the demands that are the result of distorted evaluative processing, which are
generated rather automatically by individuals in such statements as “I shouldn’t
have!” or “I need it!” This difference can be understood in terms of the Hollon
and Kriss (1984) typology, according to which such demand statements are
considered products of distorted processing, the resultant expressed thoughts. In
other words, cognitive distortions and irrational beliefs that are products of
inferential and evaluative processing can be simply described as automatic
thoughts. They operate out of awareness, at an automatic level, and can be
articulated consciously through attention. In contrast, absolute rules or contingen-
cies, with demandingness inclusive, operate out of awareness, but at an implicit
level; they are implied in the schematic structure. Consequently, as Abelson (198 1)
suggests, these rules are not easily articulated consciously by an individual.
Therefore, they probably cannot be readily accessed through self-report invento-
ries of attitudes and beliefs. Instead, they can be accessed through a process of
inference following a thorough exploration of the knowledge contained within the
schematic structure. Hollon and Bemis (1981) have also invoked the linguistic
distinction of surface and deep structures (Chomsky, 1957) to account for this
difference. Surface structures represent what is said (overt statement) or thought
(covert self-statement) by the individual, while deep structures represent the
meaning that underlies the statement. Therefore, it is not so essential in what
linguistic terms a dysfunctional schematic contingency is couched as long as the
absolutistic meaning is represented.
 A Reformulation of the ABC Model 407

In the conceptualization presented here for emotional events, the rules are
implicit to schemata, which are defined as cognitive-affective-motoric structures in
that the knowledge represented within them includes cognitive, affective, and
motoric components. This is in contrast to previous conceptualizations (e.g.,
Taylor & Cracker, 1981; Turk & Salovey, 1985; Turk & Speers, 1983) that
proposed schemata as containing two interacting components: a cognitive and an
affective one. This conceptualization is very similar to Leventhal’s (Leventhal,
1984; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987) emotional schemata, which are representations
in memory of specific perceptions, expressive motor (instrumental and autonomic)
reactions, and subjective feelings tied to situationally specific stimuli. According to
Leventhal, when any of these components is activated, the potential for activating
the entire schematic structure is increased, resulting in the emotional experience.
Both Bower (1981) and Lang (1985) have proposed similar conceptualizations of
emotion. Further, Leventhal suggests that emotional schemata direct an individu-
al’s perception, and bathe that perception with information about one’s own
subjective feelings and motor reactions. Similarly, in the current conceptualization,
perceptual, inferential, and evaluative processes are all very much colored by the
affective and motoric components represented in the memories comprising a
schema. In other words, they are laden with affect, which parallels the concept of
hot cognitions (Abelson, 1963), and with motoric expression, which parallels
perceptual-motor theories of the mind (e.g., Neisser, 1976).
A conceptual model is presented in Figure 3, where the impact of the affective
and motoric components is represented as projections or axes of a schema that
interface with these processes. This model further represents a cognitive projec-
tion extending from the schema to perception, which is meant to suggest that the
meaning represented in the schema is inherent to all these processes. This
conceptualization originates from Neisser’s (1976) integration of ecological and
information-processing approaches to cognitive psychology. Specifically, Neisser
adopted the ecological perspective of perception (Gibson, 1979), according to
which no distinction is made between perception and cognition; and meaning is
considered inherent in the act of perception. He integrated this perspective with
the information-processing concept of the schema, suggesting that the meaning
inherent in perception is derived from the schema which, in turn, actively directs
the perceptual process. The model in Figure 3 also represents perceptual,
inferential, and evaluative processes as separated from each other by dotted lines
in order to suggest that they are continuous and fluid and to avoid the discrete
divisions in the associationist tradition of the previous models (e.g., DiGiuseppe,
1986; Wessler & Wessler, 1980). In other words, perceptual, inferential, and
evaluative processes are intrinsically integrated, and never experienced in isola-
tion, which is consistent with correlational research based on self-report measures
that demonstrate a significant relationship between distorted inferences and
evaluations (Muran, 1990). In fact, the delineation of these processes serves more
as a clinical heuristic than as a realistic representation of human functioning. It
represents important elements of the ABC model of human disturbance as
conceptualized by both Beck (1976) and Ellis (1979).
To demonstrate dysfunctional schematic processing of an emotional event
according to the reformulated model, an example of an absolute rule is one that
concerns the theme of self-worth contingent on affiliation, which is frequently
evidenced with socially anxious clients: “I must act appropriately to gain the
acceptance that I need in order to be worthwhile.” Safran (1990) would probably
 STIMULUS
SITUATION

FIGURE 3. A schema for emotional events.

view this as an implicit rule for maintaining relatedness that has been developed
on the basis of maladaptive learning experiences with attachment figures. Ellis
(1989) would qualify this view by adding that humans bring their own innate
abilities to create such absolute rules to their learning experiences. This rule would
direct one’s perceptual processing toward affiliative information and make one
extremely self-conscious and hypervigilant of other people’s reaction to him or
her. In the face of a yawn by another during a conversation, it would activate such
possibly distorted inferential products as “He doesn’t like me!” (i.e., arbitrary
inference). It would also activate such distorted evaluative products as “This is
terrible!” (i.e., awfulizing). In addition, it might activate such a thought as “I’m a
social outcast!” which is an integrated example of both a distorted inference (i.e.,
overgeneralization) and a distorted evaluation (i.e., self-damnation). All these
products would be bathed in the subjective feeling of anxiety or panic and the
motoric expression of inhibition or paralysis. As Ellis (1962) originally wrote,
cognitive, affective, and motoric processes are never experienced in isolation,
rather, “They are integrally interrelated and never can be seen wholly apart from
each other” (p. 39). He later elaborates “Thinking . . . importantly includes feeling
and behaving . . . [and] emoting significantly includes thinking and behaving”
(1985a, p. 320). Both Mahoney (1977) and Schwartz (1982) have also made a
similar case for such an integrative conceptualization, although neither of these
 A Reformulation of the ABC Model 409

authors has made use of the schema construct to account for such integration.
Subsequently, if one was to take a componential or elemental approach to
explaining emotional experience, what can be clearly delineated can be reduced to
two elements: an external stimulus and an experiential response, where an
experiential response would be cognitive, affective, and motoric.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT

This reformulation of the ABC model better captures some very important
concepts that even Ellis (1962) originally recognized in part, and others have
begun to recognize. However, it is still a gross representation of emotional
experience and should be considered as just a model, a road map rather than a
relief map of the territory that is emotional experience. For example, it fails to
represent that there are schemata of different orders of abstractness and general-
ity, which are embedded within one another and function in a hierarchical
fashion (Neisser, 1976). Nevertheless, this model strikes a balance between the
conceptual simplicity of the ABC model and the conceptual complexity of the
interface among cognitive, affective, and motoric processes in reality: not too
simple as to misrepresent and not too complex as to depreciate the heuristic value
for the practitioner and the researcher, which is the great attraction of Ellis’
original model. Therefore, it suggests some very important implications for
practice and research in cognitive psychotherapy in particular, and perhaps for
psychotherapy in general.
First, it has implications for the accessing and restructuring of core cognitive
processes and structures in the psychotherapeutic process. Safran and Greenberg
(1982, 1986), for example, have discussed the importance of accessing hot
cognitions in therapy, since the more important cognitive processes may be
accessible only in the affective state in which the problem is usually experienced by
the client. This is consistent with Bower (198 1) and Teasdale’s (1983) findings that
the accessibility of cognitions is mood-dependent. Therefore, this reformulated
model would support Safran and Greenberg’s (1986) recommendation to work
with clients in an emotionally vivid, real, and immediate fashion, and to use a
variety of procedures ranging from role-plays to in vitro and in vivo exercises to
reach such an end. It is important to be aware, however, that there are harmful
possibilities to being emotionally evocative with clients. As Ellis (personal commu-
nication) cautions, clients can easily become extremely self-condemning and
self-destructive in a heightened emotional state, so therapists should manage the
processes accordingly and actively prevent unruly self-punishment.
With this in mind, one approach consistent with the Safran and Greenberg
recommendation is to encourage clients to “walk through” specific and concrete
examples of problematic situations and their reactions to them (Safran & Segal,
1990). A related approach described by Rice (1984) is called systematic evocative
unfolding and involves the therapist systematically moving back and forth between
aspects of a problematic situation particularly salient for the client and the client’s
experiential reaction to these aspects. Another approach that is consistent with the
Safran and Greenberg recommendation, and that can be used in conjunction with
Rice’s (1984) approach, is a procedure described by Safran, Vallis, Segal, and Shaw
(1986) called vertical exploration. This involves helping a client articulate an entire
constellation of automatic thoughts with specific attention to the degree of
410 J. C. A4wan

centrality for the client, and that accesses an entire chain of higher-level processes
embedded in the client’s distress. Moore (1983) and Dryden (1989) have described
a similar procedure called chaining that attempts to deepen the client’s emotional
understanding. Chaining involves prompting through specific queries that enables
the client to fully attend to inferential and evaluative processes in order to access
deeply rooted belief systems. Such procedures can also be used in the service of
restructuring dysfunctional core processes and structures in an emotionally imme-
diate way.
Ellis (e.g., Ellis & Dryden, 1987) has described a number of emotionally
evocative approaches to cognitive restructuring and behavioral change, including
rational-emotive imagery, rational role reversal, shame-attacking, and risk-taking
exercises. Others in cognitive psychotherapy and different orientations also de-
scribe techniques that can be evocative and effective in cognitive-affective-motoric
restructuring, such as focusing (Gendlin, 1981), imagery (Shorr, 1974), enact-
ments (Adler, 1963; Kelly, 1955), evocative responding (Rice, 1974), and Gestalt
two-chair dialogues (Greenberg & Safran, 1987). The ultimate goal, as implied by
the reformulated model and as maintained by a number of theorists (Ellis, 1962,
1979, 1984b; Goldfried, 1980; Meichenbaum & Jaremko, 1983; Safran SC Green-
berg, 1986; Schwartz, 1982), is to integrate cognitive, affective, and motoric
processes in order to effect a therapeutic change. In other words, maximum
therapeutic effectiveness should be obtained by incorporating all these processes
in therapeutic interventions. After all, the question as to which process is primary
has yet to be answered definitively. Perhaps, as Bandura (1978) and Led-
widge (1978) argue, changing behavior may be the best way to alter cognition and
affect. Moreover, schematic restructuring may only come about by incorporating
as many of the schematic components as possible in the intervention.
Second, the reformulated model has implications for the assessment of core
cognitive processes and structures. In one respect, as previously indicated, it casts
a large shadow of doubt on whether discriminant validity is an appropriate goal in
assessing the relationship between cognition and emotion, considering the cogni-
tive-affective-motoric structure of the model. In another respect, as many have
maintained (Nisbett & Wilson, 1979; Williams et al., 1988), if core cognitive
processes and structures are hypothesized to be nonconscious, then it seems very
unlikely that clients could identify them from an inventory of attitudes and beliefs,
especially if, as Beck (Beck SC Shaw, 1977) suggests, schemata may be “dormant.”
Nevertheless, in the clinical literature (e.g., Merluzzi & Boltwood, 1989; Oliver &
Baumgart, 1985), it seems that such self-report inventories as the DAS have
become the standard for the assessment of schemata, despite some compelling
presentations to consider alternatives. For example, Segal (1988) has reviewed
research regarding various cognitive assessment procedures and has recom-
mended methods adopted from cognitive psychology used to assess more general
knowledge structures, such as semantic networks. Furthermore, Landau and
Goldfried (1981) have developed a hypothetical typology of schemata and pre-
sented a number of examples of relevant assessment strategies that stand apart
from the traditional use of self-report inventories.
One possible assessment procedure, which is akin to the use of personal
narratives or case formulations to represent core problematic processes (e.g.,
Alexander, 1988; Persons, 1989; Safran, Segal, Hill, & Whiffen, 1990; Sampson &
Weiss, 1986), involves the use of extended passages or scenarios to represent
 A Reformulation of the ABC Model 411

schematic content. These scenarios would be tailored to a particular client’s

idiosyncratic issues and used as an idiographic repeated measures outcome
measurement, in the tradition of Shapiro’s Personal Questionnaire (PQ; Phillips,
1986). Each would entail an elaborate, though generic, description of a highly
distressful event for the client that would be constructed collaboratively from a
structured interview with the client, which would attempt to represent the
products of perceptual, inferential, and evaluative processing and schematic rules
according to the model presented in this article. This would be embedded in a
scenario depicting a frequently occurring emotional event for the client, including
the client’s typical affective and motoric response patterns; in other words, the
scenario would tie a stimulus situation to a response represented in cognitive,
affective, and motoric terms, incorporating the client’s own language as much as
possible. Thus, the content of these personal or “self’ scenarios would create a
context highly relevant to a particular client that would more likely act as an
effective prime for that client. Context has been singled out as particularly
significant in the accessing of cognitive processes and structures in the cognitive
sciences (Neisser, 1976; Nisbett & Wilson, 1979) and in the semantic analysis of
language (Breal, 1964; Ziff, 1940). Procedural steps, of course, would need to be
specified for constructing and establishing the psychometric properties of a self
scenario for a client [see Luborsky (1984); Curtis, Silberschatz, Weiss, Sampson, &
Rosenberg (1988); for related examples, and Cone (1988) for important psycho-
metric considerations in the development of adequate idiographic measures]. The
following is an example of one self-scenario from a client whose presenting
problems were anxiety and interpersonal difficulties (quotations are incorporated
in the example to highlight the client’s own language):

When I am with people important to me, I feel “tense and guarded” and act rather
“formally” and carefully with them. I am extremely concerned about what they think
of me and about acting “appropriately.” I believe it is absolutely essential to not “screw
up,” or else it will prove what a complete “screw-up” I am and will always be.

As the example illustrates, self-scenarios are highly self-referent and, subse-

quently, consistent with the delineation of self-referent cognitions as central, which
was theoretically proposed by Guidano and Liotti (1983). The superiority for
self-referenced material in recall is a well-established finding (e.g., Lord, 1980;
Klein 8c Kilstrom, 1986; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977), suggesting that any such
material acts as a highly salient retrieval cue and should be an essential element of
any self-report measure, particularly those that attempt to access unconscious
processes and structures. Self-scenarios differ most prominently from previously
proposed uses of vignettes in the assessment of distorted cognitions, such as the
Cognitive Bias Questionnaire (CBQ; Hammen & Krantz, 1976), the Cognitive
Errors Questionnaire (CEQ; Lefebvre, 1981), and the Cognitive Response Test
(CRT; Watkins & Rush, 1983), in that the vignettes are not nomothetic. They are
contextually relevant for a client, therefore, much more likely to tap relevant core
processes. The CBQ, CEQ, and CRT are highly susceptible to being artificial and
alien to a particular client and, therefore, less likely to prime the client’s attention
toward tacit material. While the value of an idiographic approach has been
debated extensively (e.g., Allport, 1937, 1962; Barlow & Hersen, 1984; Beck,
1953; Chassan, 1967; Harris, 1980; Lamiell, 1982; Lewin, 1935; Marceil, 1977;
Pervin, 1984), it seems logical that when it comes to the assessment of a
412

TABLE 1. Proposed Dimensions for Self-Scenarios

How often has such a scenario occurred recently?

How concerned have you been recently about this
happening?
How easily can you imagine such a scenario?
How easily can you imagine alternatives to this scenario?
How confident are you in your ability to act on these
alternatives?
How well does this scenario describe you?
How well does this scenario describe your relationships
14th others in your life?
How far back in your life can you recall such a scenario
occurring?

sophisticated construct such as a schema, a highly sensitive assessment method

should be used. As Cone (1988) argues, nomothetic instruments are useful for
describing differences among individuals but, by their very nature, are too general
and remote from the individual case. As a result, they would be too insensitive to
schematic processing and changes within au individual.
Self-scenarios would also differ from most self-report inventories of cognition in
that they would not be scaled on a single dimension, such as frequency or degree
of belief. There seems to be neither theoretical nor empirical rationale for the use
of unidimensional scaling of core processes, and there is some indication that
measures tapping core processes should be multidil~lensio~lal (Abelson, 1988).
Only the ATQ, which assesses both frequency of thought and degree of belief, and
the Distressing Thoughts Questionnaire (DTQ; Clark & Hemsley, 1985), which
assesses cognition on such dimensions as frequency, sadness, worry, removal and
disapproval, have ventured beyond the conventional unidimensional approach to
self-reporting cognitions. Therefore, it is proposed that the client’s experience of
each passage be assessed along several dimensions. which have been implicated as
relevant to cognitive processes and structures, such as the following possibilities:
frequency (Hollon & Kendall, 1980), preoccupation (Abelson, 1988), accessibility
(Bransford, Sherwood, Vye, & Kieser, 1986; Higgins 8c Bargh, 1987; Simon 8c
Newell, 1970), accessibility of alternatives (Bransford et al., 1986; Platt 8r Spivack,
1972: Simon 8c Newell, 1970), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982), self-view (Markus,
1977), interpersollal-views (Safran, 1990), and chronicity (Safran & Segal, 19901.
Table I lists examples of items that represent such dimensions. In contrast, clients
would not be required to choose from a selection of tacit attitudes and beliefs, but
rather to attend to one or two scenarios elicited from an assessment interview and
to rate them along these eight dimensions.
In short, self-scenarios seem to offer several advantages. First, in terms of
assessment, the co~istrLlction of self-scenarios that represent many significant
processes involved in the schematic processing and the scaling of such scenarios on
several relevant dimensions may be sensitive and sophisticated enough to ade-
quately capture schematic content. In other words, identifying specific cognitive
distortions and irrational beliefs of a particular client, along with concomitant
affective and motoric patterns, and presenting them all in the appropriate context
may be an effective prime for clients to attend to schematic material. Second, in
 A Reformcclatior~ of‘ the ABC Model 413

terms of treatment, this approach would foster the conceptualization of core

problematic issues for a particular client and subsequently foster the development
of idiographic treatment strategies, which not only seem natural but also effica-
cious to the treatment process. It would also yield data regarding some very
significant dimensions. Therefore, it should be of great heuristic value to the
therapist dealing with the individual case.

SUMMARY

This article attempts to elucidate some subtle aspects of emotional experience that
Ellis’ ABC model misrepresents by proposing a reformulation of the ABC model.
Interestingly, Ellis (1962, 1985b) has qualified his model and addressed some of
these subtleties at one time or another throughout the years. However, the ABC
model seems to have grown apart from these quali~cations for some reason and
has promulgated constructs that are not only hypothetical but also, evidently,
anti-empirical. Therefore, this article proposes a more phenomenological ap-
proach to emotional experience, such that: (a) processes that produce cognitive
distortions and irrational beliefs as automatic thoughts are conceptualized in an
integrative manner within a schematic structure, and (b) schemata are conceptu-
alized as tacit cognitive-affective-motoric structures. The implications of these
conceptualizations are the increased use of emotionally evocative interventions for
schematic restructuring and the development of measures that account for the
tacit and cognitive-affective-motoric aspects of schematic processing.

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Received May 2, 1990

Accepted July 10, 1990