Review of General Psychology © 2011 American Psychological Association

2011, Vol. 15, No. 2, 85–98 1089-2680/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0023483

Toward a Unified Model of Human Motivation

David L. Forbes
Forbes Consulting Group, LLC, Lexington, Massachusetts

Motivational theory has taken many forms throughout history, reflecting the scientific paradigms and
current concerns of the day. The result is a diverse array of theoretical constructs and core motive
concepts, with no systematic integration of this work. This paper proposes a unified model that places
motivational concepts from past work within a comprehensive descriptive structure, akin to the periodic
table of elements in chemistry. Starting from the precept that all human motivation is a search for change,
the model identifies two key taxonomic questions: “Change where?” and “What type of change?” The
result is a 3 ⫻ 3 matrix with rows that represent answers to the “Change where?” question (within the
self, within the material world, within the social world), and columns that represent answers to the “What
type of change?” question (change in potential/expectations for life, change in process/experience of
living, and change in outcomes/evaluation of life activities). The matrix generates nine motivational
domains— each reflecting the properties of its respective rows and columns. The model accounts for
virtually all of the motives proposed by the major motivational theorists of the last century. By
introducing a potentially precise common language in the taxonomy of motives, it is hoped that the model
can provide a foundation for the systematic study of individual development, for the analysis of
personality and cultural differences, and for investigating situational dynamics in human behavior.

Keywords: motivation, development, affect, emotion, values

For the first time, I saw a medley of haphazard facts fall into line and
order. All the jumbles . . . seemed to fit into the scheme before my
eyes—as though one were standing beside a jungle and it suddenly
transformed itself into a Dutch garden.
- The periodic table as described by C.P. Snow in The Search (1959,
p. 27)
The idea of motivation has obvious interest for students of
human behavior, being, as it were, a major domain of explanations
for why we do the things we do the way that we do them. As
generally defined, motivation is “a desire operating on the will and
causing it to act” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2010, p. 810). In
more psychological terms “motivations provide the motor for
behavior” (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 5). As the primary driver of
behavior, the concept of motivation in psychological theory has a
long and venerable history, including the most well known of all
psychological theories, such as Freudian psychodynamics,
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, McClelland’s need for achievement,
and Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory. These models, and
many others, represent fundamental building blocks in our efforts
to understand why we do what we do. These theories represent the
best efforts of some of the most gifted minds in history. Why then
would we need another model of motivation?
I thank my colleague Dr. Jeremy Pincus, whose assistance and collab-
oration have been vital to the completion of this article. I thank as well all
of my staff at The Forbes Consulting Group who have spent tireless hours
assisting on this project.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David L.
Forbes, Forbes Consulting Group, LLC, 24 Hartwell Avenue, Lexington,
MA 02421. E-mail: dforbes@forbesconsulting.com
Limitations of Motivation Theories
Motivation as a concept has played many different roles as
analytic paradigms in psychology have risen and fallen over the
decades, resulting in a bewildering array of theoretical constructs
and systems. The utility of these theories has been limited due to
three primary shortcomings: (a) failure to separate basic reflexes
and biologically based motivations from high-order social and
cognitive motivations; (b) a tendency for theory to be embedded
within a dominant theoretical paradigm or narrow area of interest;
and; (c) a tendency to deal with motivations as discrete forces,
without examining the similarities and linkages between them.
Overemphasis on Biological Homeostasis, Reflex,
Physics, and Behavior
Past theories of motivation have often sought to account for the
entire range of motivations, from physiological reflexes and in-
stincts, to biological drives, to cognitive needs, up to and including
social motives. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, for example, begins
with physiological needs such as the need for food and water.
Prime theory (Buck, 1985) provides another example of a model
that seeks to span the distance from biological reflexes to social
motivations. Buck actually goes beneath the level of biology, at
least metaphorically, to characterize the relationship between mo-
tivation and emotion at the level of physics, defining motivation as
potential energy (e.g., voltage, a tightly wound piano wire, or a
boulder on top of a hill) and emotion as the read out of its release.
There are also those theorists whose efforts to unify analyses of
motivational theory at the biological level with analyses at the
social-cognitive level took a fundamentally reductionist position—
that is, that behavior can be explained without the need for psy-
chological constructs. These theorists include Robert Sessions
Woodworth and, later, Clark Hull, W.B. Cannon (the father of

85
86 FORBES
homeostasis), and the behaviorist Edward Lee Thorndike, who
shared a desire to include hard scientific evidence of homeostasis
and reflex as cornerstones of discussions of motivation.
The difficulty in attempting to draw straight connections from
biology to psychology is as old as Descartes’ mind/body dualism.
In motivational theories, this problem emerges especially when
theorists consider processes of biological homeostasis and reflex to
be motivational in the same way that others consider aspirations
for self-actualization to be motivational. Although it can be well
argued that both homeostatic and personal growth motivations can
direct behavior, any attempt to unify or organize a description of
human motivation must struggle with what are ultimately different
levels of analysis. At the biological level of analysis, we find
concepts of forces that are innate, vary little among individuals,
and are continuously active throughout life. At the sociocognitive
level of analysis, we find concepts of forces that emerge in indi-
vidual fashion over development, become a basis for individual
differences, and operate contingently from life situation to life
situation. It’s no small wonder that theories attempting to span
these levels of analysis might encounter difficulty in proceeding
systematically.
To avoid such category errors, the model advanced in this paper
seeks to organize motivational theory solely at the level of analysis
where concepts such as emotion, aspiration, and thought are rel-
evant. Understanding that these qualities have only metaphorical
standing from the perspective of the harder sciences of biology or
physics, we accept motivation as an existentially real construct,
and propose that it is both necessary and powerful for predicting
and explaining behavior and experience. We acknowledge in this
that biological processes may constitute the ultimate foundation of
why we are as we are, and do what we do. However, we propose
that the biologically evolved capacities of humans to conceive of
and plan in their worlds, to learn from and teach one another, have
created emergent psychological phenomena (including our concept
of motives) that are worthy of study in their own right. Moreover,
we suggest that these emergent motivations, like emergent entities
in many systems of analysis, cannot be meaningfully reduced to
the (biological) substrate from which they emerge, but must be
studied and understood in their own right.
Narrowness of Scope
Many theories of motivation arose as byproducts of work with
a wholly different focus. Sigmund Freud was interested in psychi-
atric disorders, and studied the interplay of motivational forces that
contributed to psychological dysfunction; Abraham Maslow was
interested in highly accomplished individuals, and developed the
hierarchy of needs to describe the developmental path to self-
actualization.
Within social psychology in the late 1940s through 1960s, a
variety of theories were proposed to explain the complexities of
social relations, all of which touched upon the topic of motivation.
Among the most influential formulations were the following:
• Balance theory (Heider, 1946) proposes that social relations
are either balanced or imbalanced, and that a state of imbal-
ance creates a psychological disturbance that motivates either
behavioral or attitudinal change.
• Field theory (Lewin, 1951) asserts that unmet psychological
and physiological needs result in increasing tension, causing
previously neutral stimuli to accumulate valences, similar to a
magnetic attraction (which can be weak, moderate, or strong,
depending on the intensity of the need state). Vectors or
forces represent the strength of the attraction toward or re-
pulsion from certain social situations or behaviors.
• Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) holds that humans
are universally motivated to validate their opinions and abil-
ities relative to those held by others.
• Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) posits that humans have a
need to see themselves as free, and are motivated to react
against perceived limitations of their freedom.
David McClelland, focusing on motivation in social interaction,
further developed a series of individual motivational traits origi-
nally proposed by Murray (1938):
• The need for affiliation (McClelland,1951); that is, the need to
fit in;
• The need for power (McClelland, 1961); that is, the need to
exert control over others; and
• The need for achievement (Atkinson, 1964); that is, the need
to make a significant accomplishment and/or receive praise.
A variety of theorists have focused on a single concept of
motivation in their work. The need for cognition was proposed as
the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive tasks
(Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955). Robert White (1959) cited Jean
Piaget’s study of the patterns of play of young children and
concluded that humans need effective interactions with the envi-
ronment once their basic physiological and social needs have been
met. Albert Bandura’s social learning theory (1977b) included a
similar type of motivation as a stable individual trait known as
self-efficacy. A more recent contribution in the same vein of single
motivations is Mihalyi Csikszentmihályi’s flow theory (1990).
Despite the significant contributions of these theories, each
addresses motivation only within a limited context defined by the
larger project and focus of the theorist. This limitation of scope is
not problematic within the purview of any of these individual
theories; it merely renders them inadequate as a starting point for
systematic analysis of the totality of motives. Because our efforts
are explicitly aimed at this objective, the scope of our project is
broadened to embrace a comprehensive taxonomy of motives.
Lists of Discrete Motives Rather Than Systems
Several past theorists have also proposed taxonomies of moti-
vation that take the form of lists, without any explicit theoretical
framework for organizing the items of these lists. William Mc-
Dougall’s theory of motivation (1908/2001), for example, pro-
poses that most human behavior is based, at its root, on a list of
nine inherited instincts, with no accounting for how these are
identified or why they are proposed as exhaustive. Earlier, William
James (1890/1950) proposed a list of 16 instincts, again without a
principle for this enumeration. Henry Murray proposed a list of 27
needs in his Explorations in Personality (1938); Abraham Maslow
(1943) suggested five categories of human needs; Gordon Allport
(Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960) proposed a different set of five
motives; and Reiss (2004) recently proposed 16 universal basic
desires.
In summary, the past century of work on motivation has left us
with a broad array of individual motivational concepts, but without
a structural model for organizing and integrating them. Attempts to
 UNIFIED MODEL OF HUMAN MOTIVATION
comprehensively catalogue the full range of human motivations by
simple enumeration inevitably leave open the question, “Is the list
complete?” A structured model of human motives, however,
would provide a foundation for a systematic study, whether such a
study pursues an agenda of understanding individual development,
analyzing personality and cultural differences, or investigating
situational dynamics in human behavior. To develop such a model
we must, like Mendeleev did for the periodic table of elements,
begin with a proposal of properties of qualities that can be used to
describe all of the entities under analysis.
The Unified Model: Conceptual Framework
in Overview
Almost everyone is familiar with the periodic table of the
elements, which displays all of the chemical elements according to
similarities between them. Dmitri Mendeleev developed the table
in 1869, based in large part on observations about the appearance
and behavior of elements. Later science, with hard data on atomic
structure, solidified and essentially validated Mendeleev’s efforts.
This data revealed that elements in the same column share a
similar structure of electrons orbiting their nucleus, and elements
in the same row share a pattern of increased nuclear size relative
to those above them in the same column.
The main value of the periodic table is its ability to predict the
properties of an element based on its location within the table, the
opportunity to recognize similarities and differences among ele-
ments, and, in early days of chemistry, the ability to predict the
existence of undiscovered elements whose atomic structure was
suggested by the table structure. So, too, will our “periodic table of
motivation” hopefully promote a study of motives based on sim-
ilarities and differences among motive types and offer a basis for
consensus about the total number and nature of motivational
concepts.
Our attempt to create a structured model for human motivation
begins with the observation that all motivation is directed by
aspiration—a desire to achieve some sort of positive change in the
circumstances of the motivated individual. This leads to two key
questions: “Where is change sought?” and “What type of change is
sought?”
In our model, answers to the first question form the structure of
the columns, which pertain to the focus of aspiration. Three areas
of aspirational focus are identified: intrapsychic (change in one’s
sense of self), instrumental (change in one’s relationship with the
material world), and interpersonal (change in one’s social rela-
tionships). Three answers to the second question form the structure
of rows in the model, which are termed levels of aspiration. We
define these as change in potential/expectation (I want to be or
become a certain way), change in process/experience (I want to do
things, experience life, in a certain way), and change in outcomes/
evaluation (I want to have certain types of results, attain certain
outcomes). We discuss these organizing concepts of the model in
depth in the following sections.
As we review the concepts on which our model is built, it will
become evident that we have often chosen to broaden the meaning
of motivational concepts from past work to make them optimally
inclusive of the diversity in that work, and in order to construct a
model that is at once unifying as well as reasonably parsimonious.
We shall make note of all cases where we broaden past concepts
87
in service of our model, and we will strive to explain our reason-
ing.
The Matrix Columns: Intrapsychic, Instrumental, and
Interpersonal Spheres of Aspiration
“Be glad of life because it gives you a chance to love, and to work and
to play and to look up at the stars.”
- Henry Van Dyke, Footpaths to Peace (as cited in Bulletin by the U.S.
Department of Education, 1913, p. 6)
We propose a logical deconstruction of the question, “Where is
change sought?” as follows: We first distinguish the pursuit of
change that is directed inward from that which is directed outward.
Within outward-directed change, we then distinguish change that
is focused on the material world from that which is directed at the
social world. The result is a logically exhaustive threefold answer
to the “Change where?” question.
The first sphere of aspiration pertains to the ways one can feel
about oneself. It includes how one feels fundamentally about one’s
identity as a person; how one shapes this identity through the
development of personal values, tastes, and styles; and how one
actualizes oneself through the development of personal traits and
talents into measurable skills and abilities. We term this sphere of
aspiration the intrapsychic.
To grasp the full purview of motivational forces in the intra-
psychic sphere, it is important to understand that the “self” at the
center of these motivations can be as focused as a particular role
(e.g., “I, the school teacher”) or as broad as a community in which
an individual participates (e.g., “my neighborhood”).
The second sphere of aspiration pertains to the ways one can
feel about one’s relationship to the world of objects. How one feels
about one’s ability to act in the world, how these actions feel as
they are experienced, and what types of outcomes ultimately result
from material actions—all fall within this sphere of aspiration. We
term this sphere of aspiration the instrumental.
The motives we propose for the instrumental category can
operate in both the worlds of work and play. When the potential
social aspects of these activities (treated later) are excluded, both
these types of activity share the psychological dynamic of an
individual interacting with the objects of the material world—with
motivation focused on the nature and outcomes of this instrumen-
tal activity.
The final sphere of aspiration pertains to the ways one can feel
about one’s relationships with others. This sphere of aspiration
pertains to desires for positive change in how one feels about
connections to others, how interactions with others feel, and how
one is ultimately regarded by others in the social world. We term
this sphere of aspiration the interpersonal.
Our distinctions among the self, the material world, and the
social world are most congruent with the work of Deci and Ryan
(1991, 1995) who propose three main categories of needs that
motivate individuals toward taking action. The authors consider
these three needs to be innate and universal (Ryan & Deci, 2002):
1. The need for autonomy (or self-determination) refers to
the need to actively participate in determining one’s own
behavior. It includes the need to experience one’s actions
88 FORBES
as the result of autonomous choice without external in-
terference.
2. The need for competence refers to the need to experience
oneself as capable and competent in controlling the en-
vironment and being able to reliably predict outcomes.
3. The need for relatedness refers to the need to care for
and be related to others. It includes the need to experi-
ence authentic relatedness from others and to experience
satisfaction in participation and involvement with the
social world (Deci & Ryan, 1991, 1995).
The distinctions between the material and social worlds can also
be found in the work of Freud, who identified them in his maxim,
“Love and work. . . work and love, that’s all there is . . . love and
work are the cornerstones of our humanness” (Wordsworth, 1998,
p. 132). In his theory of cognitive development, Piaget added the
importance of play, leading Elkind (2006) to state that “Play, love,
and work are the three innate drives that power human thought and
action throughout the entire life cycle” (para. 6). Our model locates
both work and play in the instrumental sphere of aspiration, and
love within the interpersonal sphere.
While work, play, and love are indeed important categories for
action in the external world, there still remains the task of consid-
ering the world of self-reflection, including such concepts as
self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 1991); identity (Erikson, 1959;
Fromm, 1941); self-actualization (Maslow, 1943); and self-
concordance (Sheldon, 1995), which relate to the need for self-
esteem, the need to forge an identity, and the need to fulfill one’s
potential. The addition of the intrapsychic sphere of aspiration to
the model reflects these important motivational concepts.
The Matrix Rows: Aspiration for Positive Change at
the Levels of Being (Expectations), Doing (Experience),
and Having (Outcomes)
“You’ve got to be before you can do and do before you can have.”
-Hilary Hinton “Zig” Ziglar, American author, salesperson, and
motivational speaker (http://quotationsbook.com/quote/853/
#axzz1E2ZX5cqk)
The organizing rows of the system describe three forms of
fulfillment that motivated behavior can pursue. Again, we propose
a logical deconstruction of answers to the question “What type of
change?” that allows us to arrive at the concepts for the model, this
time based on the time frame in which change is experienced.
Temporally speaking, we can distinguish change in three catego-
ries. The first is the pursuit of change via establishing and enhanc-
ing one’s potential and resources for action in life in the future.
Aspiration at this level is oriented to securing the future by
developing and expanding areas of self confidence, extending
one’s sense of capability, or increasing one’s range of options for
interpersonal interaction—all ways of generating forward-looking
positive potential and expectations for how one can be in the
world. The search for fulfillment at the level of potential/
experience can be found in all three of our aspirational spheres:
being as a person (intrapsychic), being as an agent (instrumental),
and being in relation to others (interpersonal).
The second row of our model pertains to pursuit of change in
the present tense—in the real-time experience of one’s actions
in the world. Aspiration at this level is oriented to process/
experience, creating the best possible experiences in the mo-
ment: making work activities more productive, more interest-
ing, more compelling; making activities at play more exciting,
more absorbing. As with each of our levels, aspiration at the
level of process/experience is manifest in all three aspirational
spheres, including action as self (intrapsychic), action in the
material world (instrumental), and action as interaction in the
social world (interpersonal).
The third row in the model involves fulfillment from activity
that has already taken place and is focused on the outcomes of that
activity. Aspiration at this level is oriented to outcomes/
evaluations. This form of fulfillment is attained when an individual
regards the results of activity, makes an evaluation of these out-
comes against some sort of (internal or external) standard, and
judges the results to be satisfactory. In our three spheres of
aspiration, this level of fulfillment involves satisfaction with skills/
self-actualization (intrapsychic), satisfaction with material out-
comes of activity (instrumental), and the satisfaction of earning
respect and admiration from others (interpersonal).
In his book, To Have or To Be?, Erich Fromm (1976) discusses
the ways in which a person is oriented to life, and the different
ways the person acts or reacts to stimuli and situations. In his
discussion, he distinguishes between modes of existence that per-
tain to being, building one’s internal resources and potential (e.g.,
self-esteem, feelings of competence or permission, social accept-
ability) and those that pertain to having, the acquisition of out-
comes (e.g., dominance, achievement, or social status).
Rand (1993) expands on Fromm with the addition of a doing
mode, which refers to the actual process of acting or doing. He
argues that this refinement is necessary to address the processes
that translate the potential represented by being into the outcomes
represented by having. Rand’s contribution is consistent with a
range of motives that speak to the need to engage in activity for its
own sake; for example, Piaget’s (1936) curiosity stage of cognitive
development, Erikson’s (1959) play age, White’s (1959) effec-
tance motivation, and Csikszentmihályi’s (1990) flow theory all
speak to the existence of motivation that seeks fulfillment at the
level of doing.
In light of this past work, and in order to create a motivational
terminology that provides maximum consistency with this work,
we term the levels of aspiration in our model as being, doing, and
having.
Crossing Rows and Columns: A Unified Model of
Motivation
Using the organizing principles of the rows and columns in our
model as described above, we develop a 3 ⫻ 3 matrix (see Table
1) that systematically organizes nine primary human motivations.
We have adopted names for each motive that capture the funda-
mental character of the intersection of each row and column and
serve to unify familiar concepts in diverse past work on motiva-
tion.
 UNIFIED MODEL OF HUMAN MOTIVATION
Table 1
Framework of Human Motivations as a Function of Focus of Aspiration Crossed by Level of
Aspiration
Intrapsychic
(Self)
Level of Aspiration
Enhanced Expectations (Being) Security
Enhanced Experiences (Doing) Identity
Enhanced Outcomes (Having) Mastery
The Nine Individual Motivational Domains
The Intrapsychic Triad
Security: To be safe, confident, and free from worry. At
the level of building new potential and creating positive expecta-
tions, we find the most fundamental of intrapsychic motivations—
striving for security, which corresponds to the need for safety,
protection, confidence, and personal peace. When a person is
motivated by security needs, they seek validation, reassurance,
reinforcement, and/or freedom from worry.
Maslow’s discussion of safety needs, the second tier in his need
hierarchy (i.e., Maslow, 1943, 1955, 1967), elaborates on the
concept of security motivation. In Maslow’s model, once physio-
logical (e.g., homeostasis required for health: air, food, drink,
exercise, rest/sleep, pain avoidance, warmth, excretion) needs are
met, safety needs become dominant (e.g., shelter, security, protec-
tion, law and order, comfort, peace, money).
Security theory (Blatz, 1940; Bowlby, 1969) holds that children
need to develop a secure dependence on caregivers before striking
out into the unknown. The theory’s core concept, that people need
a secure foundation from which they can gradually venture out and
develop new skills and connections, is consistent with our hierar-
chical structure.
Terror management theory as proposed by Becker (1971, 1973)
and elaborated on more recently by Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszc-
zynski (1991) holds that instincts for self-preservation (the most
physical manifestation of our security concept) are innate in hu-
mans and other animals.
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; Molden, Lee, & Hig-
gins, 2008) addresses prevention concerns that arise in connection
with the experience of loss or threat that are accompanied by
feelings of anxiety, in contrast with a sense of security, which is
accompanied by feelings of calmness.
Self-enhancement theory (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and self-
affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) posit that individuals are moti-
vated to restore their threatened sense of self-worth by creating
self-enhancing positive illusions or affirming other sources of
self-worth.
Other individual motives that align with our concept of security
include protection (Max-Neef, 1991); hope/trust (Erikson, 1959);
tranquility (Reiss, 2004); order (Murray, 1938; Reiss, 2004); harm
avoidance, blame avoidance, defendance (Murray, 1938); secre-
tiveness and shyness (James, 1890/1950); and modesty (McDou-
gall, 1908/2001).
89
Focus of Aspiration
Instrumental Interpersonal
(Material World) (Social World)
Empowerment Belonging
Engagement Nurturance
Achievement Esteem
Identity: To do things that reflect my personal taste, style,
and values. Next in the triad of motives in the intrapsychic
sphere is identity. Atop a platform of basic confidence and secu-
rity, the identity domain of motivation involves striving to act as
one’s self and express one’s individuality. In this domain lie
motivations for expressing personal tastes, values, and styles that
define who one is as a particular individual. Note that we propose
that the motive of identity applies equally to individuals in search
of truly unique features, tastes, qualities, or values, as well as those
who seek to define themselves by identifying with a subgroup of
others.
Like our security motive, identity as a primary motivation is also
well established in the literature. It is a central focus of reactance
theory (Brehm, 1966), Erikson’s stages of psychosocial develop-
ment, and the identified motives concept within self-determination
theory.
Reactance theory posits that humans possess a natural motiva-
tion to act in a self-directed and free manner, and that when they
perceive attempts to limit their freedom, a state of psychological
reactance is aroused. This state is the motivational force directed
at reestablishing their personal freedom to act as they choose.
Reactance theory’s emphasis on the self as the director of one’s
own behavior, freely asserting one’s independent identity, aligns
with our matrix concept of identity.
Erikson’s (1979) focus on identity merits special mention. As
part of his theoretical eight stages of psychosocial development,
Erikson distinguished between ego identity (the psychological
continuity of the “self”), personal identity (personal styles and
idiosyncrasies that differentiate people), and social or cultural
identity (the social roles adopted by an individual). Erikson’s
theory suggests that those most likely to resolve a midlife identity
crisis are those who have most successfully resolved the earlier
identity crisis that occurs in adolescence. Erikson’s concept of
personal identity is well aligned with our matrix notion of identity.
In their discussion of self-determination theory, Deci and Ryan
(1991) posit a concept of identified motivation wherein people are
motivated to express self-endorsed values or beliefs. Our concept
of an identity motive is consistent with this idea.
Higher degrees of self-concordance (Sheldon, 2002), the degree
to which a person’s life goals align with their personality traits and
needs, is associated with a variety of positive psychological out-
comes (Sheldon, 1995; Sheldon & Elliot, 2000). The notion of a
motivation to align personal behavioral goals and personality traits
also fits within the identity concept in the matrix.
90 FORBES
Beyond the above-mentioned theories, we propose that our
definition of identity additionally subsumes the following motives:
independence (Reiss, 2004); autonomy, exhibition (to attract at-
tention), contrariance (motivation to be unique) (Murray, 1938);
self-assertion (McDougall, 1908/2001); and individuation (Jung,
1921).
Mastery: To have full actualization of my personal talents
and strengths. The final member of the intrapsychic triad is
mastery. Standing atop the platform of experiencing and express-
ing one’s identity is the striving for distinctive outcomes of the
self. This striving, toward realizing the fullness of one’s distinctive
potential as a person, includes aspirations for excellence, expertise,
perfection, control, organization, and understanding.
The mastery motive has also been included in several major
systems of motivational theory, particularly in the fields of positive
and humanistic psychology, for whose adherents it is consistently
viewed as a primary motivation. Mastery is a major focus of
Maslow’s need hierarchy (1943); mastery goal hypothesis (Ames,
1992); possible selves theory (Markus & Ruvolo, 1989); locus of
control (Rotter, 1966); and desirability of control (Burger & Coo-
per, 1979).
The highest possible need within Maslow’s (1943) theory is
self-actualization, or reaching one’s full potential as marked by
creativity, spontaneity, morality, purpose, and meaning. This mo-
tivation occurs when one has satisfied all prior needs and one
realizes one’s fullest potential and exercises one’s talents fully.
With regard to our intrapsychic sphere of motivation, the notion of
striving to reach one’s full potential is well aligned with the
mastery concept.
The mastery goal hypothesis (Ames, 1992; Maehr & Midgley,
1991) draws a distinction between performance goals and mastery
goals, positing that mastery goals are ultimately more adaptive and
should be promoted in work and school settings. Again, the con-
cept of mastery goals in this work corresponds precisely to the
domain of mastery as we define it within our matrix. The distinc-
tion of mastery goals from performance goals can similarly be
used to differentiate mastery from achievement (the analogous
having motive in the instrumental sphere, described below).
The concepts of possible selves (Markus & Ruvolo, 1989) and
personalized goals and life dreams (King, 2008) address the mo-
tivational forces that stem from consciously important life goals.
Motivation toward the fulfillment of one’s life goals or becom-
ing one’s best possible self is well aligned with our concept of
mastery.
In their work on personality, Burger and Cooper (1979) advance
the concept of a trait they term desirability of control. People who
score higher on their desirability of control scale tend to set loftier
aspirations and work harder on challenging tasks than those scor-
ing lower. In our terminology, these individuals have more moti-
vation concentrated within the mastery domain.
In related work, Rotter’s (1966) locus of control theory postu-
lates that individuals differ in terms of how they perceive their
lives as being influenced primarily by their personal will and
desires (internal locus) or primarily by external circumstances and
events (external locus). Without suggesting a complete congruence
with Rotter’s work, which largely undertakes to examine percep-
tion and cognition, it appears that a strong internal locus of control
likely bears testament to a concentration of motivation in the
mastery domain.
We also propose that mastery subsumes the following listed
motives: understanding (Max-Neef, 1991; Murray, 1938); wis-
dom/ego integrity (Erikson, 1959); acceptance (Reiss, 2004); and
need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).
Note on the intrapsychic sphere. Because the sphere of
intrapsychic motivation is focused upon feelings one wants to have
about oneself, usage of the term self bears further elaboration. In
our system, intrapsychic motivation could include motivations
focused on one’s sense of family, community, neighborhood—
when these social entities form part of an individual’s sense of self.
In contrast, explicitly social motivations—to interact with one’s
family, community, or neighborhood—would not fall into the
intrapsychic sphere.
The Instrumental Triad
The middle column contains the instrumental sphere of motives
that deals with aspirations regarding interactions with the material
world that is outside of the self. Again, there are three distinct
motives within the sphere.
Empowerment: To be equal to the task, capable, and free to
act. We subsume motivation aimed at creating positive expec-
tations and building potential in the instrumental sphere under the
concept of empowerment. Empowerment pertains to a host of
strivings for feelings of permission, capability, and entitlement that
allow one to feel free to take a chosen or desired course of action.
While not as common a focus for motivation theorists, empow-
erment plays a prominent role in several influential theories of
personality and developmental psychology: Erikson’s stages of
psychosocial development (1959), McClelland’s need for power
(1961), Bowlby’s exploration system theory (1969), and Bandu-
ra’s self-efficacy theory (1977a).
Self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977a, 1986, 1997) posits that
motivation to act intentionally is moderated by beliefs about one’s
ability to act competently. Although Bandura’s concept of self-
efficacy is discussed more in terms of a state as opposed to a trait,
we suggest that the aspiration to achieve this state lies in empow-
erment motivation. Self-efficacy refers to self-perceptions that one
is able to perform adequately in a specific task situation. Despite its
contextual dependency, the concept that people act when they
believe they can make a difference is well aligned with the matrix
concept of empowerment.
Erikson’s will/autonomy stage of psychosocial development
(1959) addresses the crisis in early childhood associated with
doing things for one’s self, as opposed to being dependent on
others. The implied drive for self-sufficiency is consistent with our
proposed empowerment motive.
According to Bowlby’s theory, there is a naturally occurring
relationship between attachment and exploration (Ainsworth &
Bell, 1970; Ainsworth, Bell, & Stayton, 1971; Bowlby, 1969/
1999). Very young children rely on a parent as a secure base for
exploration of the environment and as a safe haven for protection
(Ainsworth, 1967; Schaffer & Emerson, 1964). When the parent
supports a child’s need for both protection and independent ex-
ploration, the child develops a positive, competent self-image; if
these needs are not supported, the child develops a negative,
incompetent self-image. The posited innate drive to explore from
a secure base also fits the matrix concept of empowerment.
 UNIFIED MODEL OF HUMAN MOTIVATION
Elaborating on Murray’s (1938) list, McClelland (1961) and his
student, Winter (1973), discuss the need for power (nPow) in two
forms: a need for personal power, involving directing others and being
in charge, and a need for institutional or social power, that is, the
desire to organize others on behalf of the interests of a social group or
organization. Our empowerment motive expands McClelland’s no-
tion to include the issue of instrumental power—a general sense of
efficacy or feeling that one has the power to act and take action.
We propose that empowerment additionally subsumes the fol-
lowing motives: curiosity (McDougall, 1908/2001; James, 1890/
1950; Reiss, 2004); egoism/power (Allport, 1954; Allport, Vernon,
Lindzey, 1960); and freedom (Max-Neef, 1991).
Engagement: To do all the activities of my life in a way that
feels great— exciting, productive, absorbing. The next level
in the instrumental triad is engagement motivation. This domain
entails striving to optimize the experience of actions in process, to
make the experience of living as inherently rewarding as possi-
ble—absorbing, exciting, productive, or just plain fun. Not sur-
prisingly, engagement in any particular action context rests atop
fulfillment in the empowerment domain, without which the move
to action is at best a hesitant one.
Work pertinent to the concept of engagement comes primarily
from a variety of efforts that describe single motivations as expla-
nations for cognitive activities that are inherently rewarding and
experientially engaging. Need for cognition was proposed as the
tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive tasks (Cohen et
al., 1955). White (1959), reviewing the body of psychoanalytic
instinct and drive theory, noted the absence of a construct to
adequately explain human behavior that is devoted to exploring the
environment and seeking stimulation. Citing Piaget’s (1924, 1936)
work on children’s play, White concluded that humans have a need
for effective interactions with the environment and proposed ef-
fectance motivation as an inherent part of our neurological sys-
tem’s design and function. Asch (1952), expanding the concept of
motivation beyond self-interest, offered the concept of interested
engagement with one’s environment as a primary motivation.
A more recent contribution pertinent to our concept of engage-
ment is Csikszentmihályi’s (1990) flow theory. He specifies nine
conditions that characterize and promote the experience of flow:
clear and attainable goals, a high degree of concentration on a
limited field of attention, a loss of feeling self-conscious (the
merging of action and awareness), a distorted sense of time, direct
and immediate feedback, activities that are neither too easy nor too
difficult, a sense of control over situations or activities, activities
that are intrinsically rewarding, and becoming absorbed in activi-
ties. Flow theory’s portrait of experiential motivation aligns well
with the matrix concept of engagement.
The concept of regulatory fit (Higgins, 2008) also bears simi-
larity to both flow theory and the present concept of engagement.
Higgins suggests that a state of regulatory fit occurs “when the
manner of their engagement in an activity sustains (vs. disrupts)
their current regulatory orientation” (p. 357), which facilitates their
motivation to continue the activity and makes the activity “feel
right.” Our concept of engagement also subsumes the following
motives: hedonism/pleasure (Allport, 1954; Allport, Vernon,
Lindzey, 1960); play (James, 1890/1950; Murray, 1938); purpose/
initiative (Erikson, 1959); constructiveness/construction (James,
1890/1950; Murray, 1938); sentience (Murray, 1938); and partic-
ipation/leisure (Max-Neef, 1991).
91
Achievement: To have good results from my life’s activities,
and outcomes of which I can feel proud. The final member of
the instrumental triad is achievement, which pertains to aspirations
for positive outcomes from one’s actions: outcomes capable of
passing external standards of evaluation. The domain of achieve-
ment forms a capstone of motivation aimed at the world of ac-
tion—standing atop empowerment and engagement in any partic-
ular area of activity, it refers to striving for completion, success,
triumph over adversity, and pride in a job well done.
Drawing on Murray’s (1938) list of motives, McClelland inves-
tigated three motives in his work (1961): needs for achievement,
affiliation, and power. The need for achievement was the first and
most prolonged focus of his work. McClelland (and later Atkinson,
1964) identified achievement as a drive to create, to problem solve,
and to accomplish tasks.
Bridging personality and motivation theory, McClelland noted
that people with a high need for achievement (nAch in his formu-
lation) are primarily focused on the achievement per se, rather than
upon the rewards or compensation they might receive as a result of
an achievement. Those with a high nAch demonstrate a consistent
concern about meeting obligations and accomplishing tasks.
Interestingly, McClelland noted that individuals high on his
measures of nAch are more focused on internal motivation rather
than external rewards. For example, those high in nAch are more
likely to value intelligence and personal achievement over recog-
nition and praise. From the perspective of our proposed model, we
might suggest in retrospect that, although McClelland has made a
seminal contribution to the theoretical understanding of achieve-
ment, his measures of nAch might actually benefit from our
distinctions among mastery (personal achievement), esteem (rec-
ognition and praise), and achievement per se (the outcome itself).
As cited above in our discussion of mastery, the work of
achievement goal theorists (Ames, 1992; Dweck & Leggett, 1988;
Nicholls, 1984) makes a distinction that has equal pertinence to our
concept of achievement. Again, in examining their distinction
between performance goals and mastery goals, we find our concept
of achievement is aligned with the concept of performance goals.
We propose also that our domain of achievement subsumes the
following other concepts of motivation: industry (Erikson, 1959);
creation (Max-Neef, 1991); saving (Reiss, 2004); acquisitiveness-
acquisition (James, 1890/1950; McDougall, 1908/2001; Murray,
1938); and greed (McDougall, 1908/2001).
Note on the instrumental sphere. It is important to note that
the sphere of instrumental motivation contains two very distinctive
subgroups, play and work, brought together here by the rubric of
our model, but discussed separately by Freud (1933) and Elkind
(2006). The specific texture of motivations in the instrumental
sphere would typically differ depending on whether the nature of
the action is focused on work or play. In the domain of empow-
erment, work-focused motivation would be more likely to focus on
aspirations for empowerment via capability (i.e., “I can do this
task”), whereas in a play-focused situation, motivation would more
likely be focused on aspiration for empowerment via entitlement
(i.e., “I have permission to play”). Similarly, words that might
describe an experience of engagement in the world of work (i.e.,
productive, efficient, concentrating) differ from words typically
used to describe full engagement in playful activity (i.e., thrilling,
funny, beautiful). Finally, the nature of achievement, typically
understood from a work-focused perspective, also takes on a
92 FORBES
different tone when play is at hand, where outcomes might take the
form of reward or adventure.
The Interpersonal Triad
The third and final column contains the interpersonal sphere of
motives—pertaining to aspirations regarding one’s social relation-
ships with others. As with the intrapsychic and instrumental
spheres, three levels of aspiration exist for interpersonal motiva-
tions.
Belonging: To be connected with relationships to other peo-
ple in my world. The first motive in the interpersonal sphere is
the aspiration for a sense of belonging, a desire to simply feel
connected to others and to feel acceptance, affiliation, community,
kinship, partnership, and friendship. Again, this motive is founda-
tional in the interpersonal sphere in that all other interpersonal
fulfillment rests upon the fact of having others who are willing to
interact.
The importance of belonging motivation is emphasized by the-
orists in the tradition of symbolic interactionism, who suggest that
our very realities as individuals are socially constructed (Blumer,
1969; Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934); that is, that mind and self are
products of communication between organisms. Developmentally,
Mead (1934) proposed that only through social communication
can an individual create the potential for thought, which requires
the use of language to create the content of mind. Further, theorists
in this tradition posit that people come to see themselves as they
believe others view them, that our subjective self is defined by
what we see reflected in others’ behavior toward us. This concept
is known as the reflected self, which is constructed over time
through reflected self-appraisals (Blumer, 1969; Cooley, 1902;
James, 1890/1950; Mead, 1934). The reflected self is then further
influenced by generalized others, our abstract notion of what
society thinks, or would think, of us (Mead, 1934). All this real and
imagined social influence then causes us to develop a variety of
personas to present ourselves in ways that match specific require-
ments in different social contexts (Goffman, 1959).
The instinctual roots of the drive to connect with others reveals
itself extremely early in life through mother/infant bonding behav-
iors that are apparent in the first hours of infancy (Trevathan,
1981). These are analogous to the imprinting behaviors noted in
other animal species (Lorenz, 1935).
McClelland (1951), again building on the work of Murray
(1938), described the need for affiliation (nAff) as a need for
harmonious relationships with others, and a need for approval from
those others. The need for affiliation has a long history of research
showing that those with a high nAff often have a larger social
circle. They spend more time interacting with others, such as
talking on the phone and writing letters, and they are more likely
to be members of social groups or clubs. Those with high nAff are
also more likely to get lonely than those low in nAff, so their need
for affiliation may be related to their sense of self and their desire
for external stimulation.
Belonging needs in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow,
1943, 1967) clearly fits within our concept of belonging. In
Maslow’s model, once safety needs are met, belonging needs (e.g.,
acceptance, affection, affiliation, membership, connection, partner-
ship, intimacy, love, family, friendship, caring) dominate a per-
son’s behavior.
The social dynamic motivational theories of the 1950s also fit
within the belonging concept. Both balance theory (Heider,
1958) and social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) posit the
existence of a drive to compare one’s attitudes or abilities
against those of others. Balance theory adds the stipulation that
there is a need for psychological balance, which is achieved
when attitudes are consistent with others whom one likes and
inconsistent with disliked others. To the extent that these drives
act in service of social belonging, they fit within the belonging
motive of the matrix.
We propose that belonging subsumes the following additional
listed motives: social contact (Reiss, 2004); sociability (James,
1890/1950); sympathy (affiliation), suggestion (socially shared
cognition), and imitation (conforming behavior; Allport, 1954;
Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960).
Nurturance: To do things with others that make us feel
good—loving, liking, caring, and cooperating. Atop the plat-
form of interpersonal belonging lies the domain of nurturance.
Nurturance motivation pertains to varied aspirations to experience
social interactions that involve feelings of empathy, love, affec-
tion, caretaking, kindness, support, consideration, understanding,
cooperation, and collaboration. Readers who are familiar with
work on nurturance should note that we broaden the meaning of
the term considerably in our analytic rubric so that it encompasses
the entirety of positive emotional experiences from social interac-
tion.
Bowlby and Ainsworth’s attachment theory represents the most
comprehensive theoretical system devoted to nurturance (Ain-
sworth, 1967, 1969; Bowlby, 1969/1999, 1979). Attachment the-
ory posits an innate drive in infants to attach to a caregiver, and
this universal motive matches the matrix concept of nurturance. In
Bowlby and Ainsworth’s system, attachment refers to affectional
bonds between individuals, which are built on a developmental
foundation of early childhood experiences with a principal attach-
ment figure, usually a parent. These experiences are associated
with the development of internal working models of the self as
positive (secure) or negative (insecure) and corresponding attach-
ment styles (i.e., secure, avoidant, ambivalent/resistant, disorga-
nized). Abused and neglected children are dramatically more likely
to exhibit insecure attachment styles, are more likely to develop
psychopathologies (Pearce & Pezzot-Pearce, 2007), and are less
likely to develop secure attachments as adults (Rutter, 2002;
Thompson, 2008). The four attachment styles have also been used
to describe adult attachments by Hazan and Shaver and colleagues
(Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Crowell, Fraley, & Shaver,
2008; Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Hazan & Shaver, 1990, 1994).
McAdams’ intimacy motivation (McAdams, Jackson, & Kirsh-
nit, 1994) is defined as the persistent desire for experiences of
merging one’s self with others. McAdams and colleagues have
demonstrated that people with a high need for intimacy are more
likely than those with less need for intimacy to engage in a variety
of behaviors including laughter, reciprocal dialogue, self-
disclosure, and spontaneous interaction (McAdams & Constantian,
1983; McAdams et al., 1984; McAdams & Powers, 1981). The
drive to actively seek intimacy aligns well with the nurturance
motive in the matrix.
We propose that nurturance additionally subsumes the following
listed motives: affection (Max-Neef, 1991); family and romance
(Reiss, 2004); love/intimacy (Erikson, 1959); succorance (to seek
 UNIFIED MODEL OF HUMAN MOTIVATION
protection), nurturance (to protect the helpless), and similance (to
empathize; Murray, 1938); parental love and sympathy (James,
1890/1950); and parenting (McDougall, 1908/2001).
Esteem: To have a standing in my social network that begets
respect and admiration. The final motive in the interpersonal
sphere involves a striving for social outcomes of one’s social
interactions. In particular it concerns the outcomes that involve
positive evaluation by others in one’s social world—positive
standing in the eyes of one’s social group(s). We have termed
this domain esteem. As with aspirations for positive outcomes
in other spheres of motivation, esteem arguably occupies a
position atop the lower levels of aspiration in the interpersonal
sphere. This is because esteem concerns only come into play
once one has developed the social potential that comes from
connections with others (belonging), and has had experiences of
positive social interaction with those others (nurturance). The
domain of esteem motivation encompasses aspirations for so-
cial outcomes that include respect, integrity, responsibility,
leadership, and moral authority.
The subfield of prosocial motivation theory is particularly
relevant to the matrix concept of esteem motivation, since we
have proposed that this motive stems from a desire to do right
by others, eliciting their positive regard. A range of theories
have been proposed to explain the motive to help others in need,
including self-benefit (egoistic prosocial motivation; Batson et
al., 1988), emotionally based motives to help others (empathy-
altruism hypothesis; Batson et al., 1989; Batson, Duncan, Ack-
erman, Buckley, Birch, 1981; Cialdini et al., 1987), motivation
to benefit a valued group (collectivist motivation; Dawes, van
de Kragt, & Orbell, 1988, 1990), and motivation to uphold a
universal principal such as concern for the welfare of others
(principalist motivation; Kant, 1788).
We propose that esteem motivation additionally subsumes the
following listed motives: esteem (Maslow, 1943); status, honor,
and idealism (Reiss, 2004); counteraction (to defend honor), rec-
ognition (to gain social status), deference (to serve), exposition (to
share information; Murray, 1938); and care/generativity (Erikson,
1959).
Alignment of Past Motivational Concepts Within the
Proposed Matrix
When the sum of motive concepts proposed in past work is
taken, we find 106 basic motivations have been proposed in past
work. As Table 2 shows, all but a few special cases fit one of the
nine cell definitions.
The motivational concepts in past work that fall outside of
our matrix almost all share one of two characteristics that
prevent their inclusion. We explained at the start of this paper
our reasoning in excluding biological or physiological drives
from our purview. Seven past motive concepts are excluded on
this basis: physiological (Maslow, 1943); hunting (James, 1890/
1950); mating (McDougall, 1908/2001); sex (Murray, 1938);
subsistence (Max-Neef, 1991); eating (Reiss, 2004); and clean-
liness (James, 1890/1950; McDougall, 1908/2001). Another
group of the remaining motive concepts are ones we would call
negative motivations—in the sense of negative reinforcement.
That is, they are motivations that seek the fulfillment of remov-
ing an aversive condition. When these motives are viewed in
93
terms of the state which results when the aversive condition is
removed, each of these concepts falls within our taxonomic
system. In this category we find fear (James, 1890/1950) to be
a negative case of security; rejection (Murray, 1938) and rivalry
(James, 1890/1950) to be negative cases of belonging; pugnac-
ity (James, 1890/1950; McDougall, 1908,2001) and vengeance
(Reiss, 2004) to be negative cases of nurturance; and jealousy
(James, 1890/1950; McDougall, 1908/2001) and abasement
(Murray, 1938) to be negative cases of esteem.
Finally, the motive concept of aggression (Dollard, Doob,
Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1939; Murray, 1938) is excluded from
our taxonomic efforts on the grounds that aggression is not appro-
priately viewed as a motive per se. In our view, aggression is better
conceived as a mode of expressive behavior, rather than a motive
for behavior. Within our motivational system, we can observe a
many-to-one relationship between motivation and aggression—
aggression in defense of one’s child (motivated by nurturance);
aggression on behalf of one’s country (motivated by belonging or
esteem); or aggression in the face of personal threat (motivated by
security).
Our matrix appears to meet its proposed goal of bringing to-
gether virtually all the individual motivations proposed by the
major motivational theorists into a single structured model.
Discussion
The Potential Impact of a Unified Theory
We began this essay by noting the reasons that past motivational
theorists have not developed a unified theory. In the course of
proposing one, we should also touch upon the value that such a
construct might bring to the science of psychology, both in areas
of pure research, as well as across the diverse array of human
endeavor in which applied psychology strives to add value.
We suggest that a unified theory can offer value to the efforts of
both academic and applied psychologists, for at least five reasons:
1. A unified theory can provide a comprehensive accounting
of the full range of motivations and, accordingly, serve to
delineate what this area of theory pertains to as opposed
to what it does not. A comprehensive theory should also
make it possible to develop methods for answering open-
ended “why” questions (e.g., in diagnostic or personality
testing) with confidence that the full range of alternative
answers have been considered.
2. A unified theory can provide a common language for
psychologists who work in the area of motivation, and
promote comparing and contrasting of efforts that cur-
rently might be deemed incommensurate by virtue of
idiosyncratic nomenclature.
3. This common language and the conceptual set to which it
refers may also promote a level of precision in language,
whether one is working to understand the nuances within
a particular domain or working across domains to explore
broader contrasts among the ideas of motivation (note our
example of nAch above).
94
Table 2
The Place of Past Motivational Concepts and Theories Within the Matrix
Intrapsychic (Self)
Security
• Safety Needs (Maslow, 1943, 1955, 1967)
• ⌻error Management Theory (Becker, 1971, 1973)
• Security Theory (Blatz, 1940; Bowlby, 1969)
• Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997)
• Self-Enhancement Theory (Taylor & Brown,
1988)
• Self-Affirmation Theory (Steele, 1988)
• Protection (Max-Neef, 1991)
• Hope/Trust (Erikson, 1959)
• Tranquility and Order (Reiss, 2004)
• Harm Avoidance, Inavoidance, Blame Avoidance,
Defendance, Order (Murray, 1938)
• Secretiveness and Shyness (James, 1890/1950)
• Modesty (McDougall, 1908/2001)
Intrapsychic (Self)
Identity
• Reactance Theory (Brehm, 1966)
• Oedipus Complex (Freud, 1930)
• Electra Complex (Jung, 1930/1971)
• Individuation (Jung, 1921)
• Identity vs. Role Confusion (Erikson, 1959)
• Identity vs. Conformity (Fromm, 1941)
• Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1991)
• Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957)
• Self Concordance (Sheldon, 1995, 2002; Sheldon
& Elliot, 2000)
Intrapsychic (Self)
Mastery
• Mastery Goal Hypothesis (Ames, 1992; Maehr
and Midgley, 1991; Dweck and Leggett, 1988;
Nicholls, 1984)
• Self-Actualization (Maslow, 1943, 1967)
• Internal Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966)
• Desirability of Control (Burger & Cooper, 1979)
• Possible Selves (Markus & Ruvolo, 1989)
• Personalized Goals and Life Dreams (King, 2008)
• Understanding (Max-Neef, 1991)
• Wisdom/Ego Integrity (Erikson, 1959)
• Acceptance (Reiss, 2004)
• Understanding (Murray, 1938)
• Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)
FORBES
Enhanced Expectations (Being)
Instrumental (Material World)
Empowerment
• Need for Power (Murray, 1938;
McClelland, 1961; Winter, 1973)
• Self-Efficacy (Bandura, 1977a, 1986,
1997)
• Will/Autonomy Stage of Psychosocial
Development (Erikson, 1959)
• Exploration Needs (Bowlby, 1969)
• Curiosity (McDougall, 1908/2001; James,
1890/1950; Reiss, 2004)
• Egoism/Power (Allport, 1954; Allport,
Vernon, Lindzey, 1960)
• Freedom (Max-Neef, 1991)
Enhanced Experiences (Doing)
Instrumental (Material World)
Engagement
• Optimal Experience (Flow) Theory
(Csı́kszentmihályi, 1990)
• Effectance Theory (White, 1959)
• Interested Engagement (Asch, 1952)
• Self-Efficacy Theory (Bandura, 1997)
• Exploration System (Bowlby, 1969)
• Need for Cognition (Cohen, Stotland, &
Wolfe, 1955)
• Regulatory fit (Higgins, 2008)
• Hedonism/Pleasure (Allport, Vernon, &
Lindzey, 1960)
• Play (James, 1890/1950; Murray, 1938)
• Purpose/Initiative (Erikson, 1959)
• Constructiveness/Construction (James,
1890/1950; Murray, 1938)
• Sentience (Murray, 1938)
• Participation/Leisure (Max-Neef, 1991)
Enhanced Outcomes (Having)
Instrumental (Material World)
Achievement
• Need for Achievement (McClelland,
1961; Murray, 1938; Atkinson, 1964)
• Achievement Goal Theory (Dwek &
Leggett, 1988)
• Competence/Industry (Erikson, 1959)
• Creation (Max-Neef, 1991)
• Saving (Reiss, 2004)
• Acquisitiveness/Acquisition (James, 1890,
1950; McDougall, 1908/2001; Murray,
1938)
• Greed (McDougall, 1908/2001)
Interpersonal (Social World)
Belonging
• Belonging (Maslow, 1943)
• Symbolic Interactionism (Cooley, 1902;
James, 1890/1950; Mead, 1934; Blumer,
1969; Goffman, 1959).
• Balance Theory (Heider, 1958)
• Social Comparison Theory (Festinger,
1954)
• Social Contact (Reiss, 2004)
• Affiliation (Murray, 1938; McClelland,
1951)
• Sociability (James, 1890/1950)
• Love/Intimacy (Erikson, 1959)
• Sympathy (affiliation), Suggestion and
Imitation (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey,
1960)
Interpersonal (Social World)
Nurturance
• Attachment Theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1979;
Ainsworth, 1967, 1969; Hazan & Shaver,
1990, 1994)
• Intimacy motivation (McAdams, Jackson,
& Kirshnit, 1984)
• Affection (Max-Neef, 1991)
• Family and Romance (Reiss, 2004)
• Love/Intimacy (Erikson, 1959)
• Succorance, Nurturance, and Similance
(Murray, 1938)
• Parental Love and Sympathy (James,
1890/1950)
• Parenting (McDougall, 1908/2001)
Interpersonal (Social World)
Esteem
• Egoistic Prosocial Motivation (Batson,
Dyck, et al. 1988)
• Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis (Batson,
Duncan, et al., 1987; Batson, Batson, et
al., 1989; Cialdini et al., 1987)
• Collectivist Motivation (Dawes, van de
Kragt, & Orbell, 1988, 1990)
• Principalist Motivation (Kant, 1788)
• Esteem (Maslow, 1943)
• Status, Honor, and Idealism (Reiss, 2004)
• Counteraction, Recognition, Deference,
Exposition (Murray, 1938)
• Care/Generativity (Erikson, 1959)
 UNIFIED MODEL OF HUMAN MOTIVATION
4. The use of a common and precise taxonomy of lan-
guage by students of motivation can also increase the
potential for more reliable results in studies of the
topic. Without fundamental agreement on the concepts
under study and the precise purview of those concepts,
assessments that measure motivation will be largely
incommensurate.
5. The structure of the model is also very suggestive with
respect to studies aimed at understanding development in
the area of motivation. As discussed below, developmen-
tal change in both ontogenetic and microgenetic frame-
works appears as if it may follow the structure of the
model.
Development Through the Lens of the Model
A perspective on ontogenesis. We should begin by noting that
we conceived the overall structure of the matrix, in part, to provoke
thinking about motivation from a developmental perspective. Thus, as
one moves from left to right along the columns of the matrix, fulfilling
each of the three spheres of motivation requires an increasing level of
what Piaget (1937) termed cognitive decentering. In the intrapsychic
sphere, motivations that can be fulfilled by changes in how one feels
about one’s self represent, at least in principle, a closed system, where
fulfillment is independent of any need for changes in the world
outside the individual. Thus, the intrapsychic triad is, in principle, the
least decentered of our motivational spheres.
By contrast, motivations focused on the instrumental sphere
require that an individual exert influence on external reality to
achieve fulfillment. Developmental psychologists tell us that the
ability to distinguish ourselves from the world around us is a
critical first accomplishment in intellectual life (Piaget, 1937).
Some of the most basic ideas about how the world works (e.g.,
object permanence, cause and effect) rest upon our ability to
distinguish between what is part of us and what is part of the world
around us. Effective action in the world of objects requires that the
individual transcend a purely egocentric view of the world and
become capable of what Piaget terms concrete operations of
thought.
Motivation focused in the interpersonal sphere requires still
further decentering. The ability to attain fulfillment now becomes
dependent upon the actions of agents that lie outside the self, and
the individual must gain the capacity to understand and influence
those agents; that is, to take the role of the other (Piaget &
Inhelder, 1967).
A perspective on microgenesis. When considered in terms of
the rows from top to bottom, the model also provides an interesting
perspective on individual change that takes place in short time
frames. The ability to discover invariant sequences of development
that are not a manifestation of universal organismic qualities was
first put forth by Vygotsky (1978) in his work on cognitive
processes. Since then, the concept of microgenesis has been ex-
panded to pertain to “the development of an individual organism
caused by acquisitional processes (of learning, imitation, etc.) and
in time periods that vary from decades to moments” (Tharp, 1994a,
p. 88).
From this perspective, one can see that the structure of the
model describes microgenetic development from the top row to
95
the bottom row in each of our spheres of aspiration. Consider,
for example, the case of a new mother: we might observe that
her primary motivations upon bringing her child home focus on
not having bad things happen, that is, on keeping the child safe
and caring for all of its needs adequately. The new mother is
seeking security, as regards her new self-as-mother. Once this
base of security is established, a mother may come to recognize
certain types of parenting that are best suited to her circum-
stances and personality and her aspirations will turn toward
building and expressing a distinctive personal identity as a
mother. Mothers with great experience, particularly grandmoth-
ers, may ultimately arrive at the stage where aspirations are
focused on really knowing what there is to know about the task
of mothering, to become masters of this domain of feminine
endeavor.
Similarly, in the instrumental world, we might observe the
process of building a stone wall by a weekend do-it-yourselfer.
At the first stage, aspiration focuses on whether this is a task at
which the builder can reasonably expect to succeed (empower-
ment). Next, he or she will strive to make the process of
building this wall both as pleasant and as efficient as possible
(engagement). Finally, with the wall built, the do-it-yourselfer
can regard the outcome and hopefully feel accomplished
(achievement).
In the interpersonal sphere, we can imagine a family moving
into a new neighborhood. Each member of the family will first
set about the task of meeting and developing social connections
to people in the neighborhood (belonging). As time unfolds, the
family will have a range of social interaction with these new
acquaintances and they will build real relationships through
expression of caring, cooperation, and so forth (nurturance).
Finally, Mom may decide to run for the city council, if she feels
that the community will support her (esteem).
Conclusion
We must conclude by expressing our gratitude for all of the
important ideas developed by past efforts in the theoretical work-
space of motivation. We hope this essay can provide a foundation
for furthering those efforts, by proposing a structured vision that
encourages collaboration and precision in this domain. Questions
about human motivation will likely always be with us, whether at
the front of academic research, or in the field of practical appli-
cation. A unified taxonomy and language for describing the object
of all these diverse efforts and interests should serve to build
synergy among the professionals who are moved to ask “How
come?”
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Received December 21, 2010
Revision received February 12, 2011
Accepted March 8, 2011 䡲

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