Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181182               April 10, 2013

BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL (deceased) substituted by Reynaldo P. Villareal, Jr.-spouse, Shekinah Marie Villareal-
Azugue-daughter, Reynaldo A. Villareal ill-son, Shahani A. Villareal-daughter, and Billy Ray A. Villareal-son,
Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law." 1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 seeks a review of the Court of Appeals' (CA) April 25, 2007 Resolution 3in CA-
G.R. SP No. UDK 5711 which dismissed outright petitioner's Petition. Also assailed is the December 21, 2007
Resolution4 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly organized and existing domestic corporation engaged
in the selling of ready-to- wear (RTW) merchandise. Respondent Elvira A. Villareal (Villareal), on the other hand, is one
of Boardwalk’s distributors of RTW merchandise.

On October 20, 2005, Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint 5 for replevin against Villareal covering a 1995 Toyota
Tamaraw FX, for the latter’s alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained from the former. The case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 160116, was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila and was assigned to Branch 27 thereof.

Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

On May 30, 2005, the MeTC rendered its Decision6 favoring Boardwalk, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
adjudging that the former has the right to the possession of the subject motor vehicle and for the latter to pay the costs of
the suit.

SO ORDERED.7

Villareal moved for reconsideration,8 but failed.9

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

She thus appealed10 to the Manila RTC, which court11 issued a Decision12 reversing the MeTC Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is granted. The assailed judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside. Defendant
Villareal has the right of possession to and the value of subject vehicle described in the complaint. Hence, plaintiff is
directed to deliver the subject vehicle to defendant or its value in case delivery cannot be made. The complaint and
counterclaim are both dismissed.

SO ORDERED.13

Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration,14 but the same was denied by the RTC in a December 14, 2006 Order, 15
which Boardwalk received on January 19, 2007.16 On February 5, 2007,17 Boardwalk through counsel filed with the
Manila RTC a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, 18 praying that it be granted 30 days, or until
March 7, 2007, to file its Petition for Review. It paid the docket and other legal fees therefor at the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Manila RTC.19 On even date, Boardwalk also filed a Notice of Appeal 20 with the RTC which the said court
denied for being a wrong mode of appeal.21

On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk filed through mail22 its Petition for Review23 with the CA.1âwphi1

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On April 25, 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.

SO ORDERED.24

In dismissing the Petition for Review, the CA held that Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for Extension and paying the
docket fees therefor with the RTC. It should have done so with the CA as required by Section 125 of Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. It held that as a result of Boardwalk’s erroneous filing and payment of docket fees, it was as if no Motion for
Extension was filed, and the subsequent March 7, 2007 filing of its Petition with the appellate court was thus late and
beyond the reglementary 15-day period provided for under Rule 42.

The CA added that Boardwalk’s prayer for a 30-day extension in its Motion for Extension was irregular, because the
maximum period that may be granted is only 15 days pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42. A further extension of 15 days
should only be granted for the most compelling reason which is not obtaining in the present case. Moreover, it held that
Boardwalk’s Petition for Review failed to include a board resolution or secretary’s certificate showing that its claimed
representative, Ma. Victoria M. Lo (Lo), was authorized to sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings,
which thus rendered defective the Verification and Certification against forum-shopping. Finally, the CA faulted
Boardwalk for its failure to attach to its Petition copies of the Complaint, Answer, position papers, memoranda and other
relevant pleadings, as required in Sections 2 and 326 of Rule 42, thus meriting the outright dismissal of its Petition for
Review.

Boardwalk filed a Motion for Reconsideration27 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,28 invoking a liberal
construction of the Rules in its favor. It further informed the CA that it had paid the docket fees with the CA Cashier, and
submitted the required secretary’s certificate and additional pleadings in support of its Petition.

In the second assailed December 21, 2007 Resolution subsequently issued, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration
and its supplement. It held that despite curative action, the fact remains that Boardwalk’s Petition was filed beyond the
reglementary 15-day period. Even if technicality were to be set aside and Boardwalk were to be allowed an extension of
15 days from the filing of the Motion for Extension on February 5, 2007, or until February 20, 2007, within which to file
its Petition, its actual filing on March 7, 2007 would still be tardy.

Issues

Boardwalk thus filed the instant Petition, raising the following issues for resolution:

PETITIONER IS INVOKING THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES TO EFFECT SUBSTANTIAL

JUSTICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 1, SECTION 6 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
SPECIFICALLY, THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS X X X ORDERING THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW X X X DUE TO PROCEDURAL LAPSES, IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES CLEARLY RAISED THEREAT, ARE CONTRARY TO EXISTING RULES, LAW,
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.29

Petitioner's Arguments

In its Petition and Reply,30 Boardwalk invokes the principle that litigations should be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities; that litigants should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their causes,
free from the constraints of technicalities. It claims that it should not be faulted for the error committed by its counsel’s
clerk in wrongly filing the Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees with the RTC Clerk of Court. It prays that the
Court review the merits of its case.

As for the defective Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping, Boardwalk contends that these are formal, not
jurisdictional, requisites which could as well be treated with leniency. Its subsequent submission of the proper secretary’s
certificate should thus have cured the defect. It adds that the same treatment should be accorded its subsequent payment of
the docket fees with the CA Cashier and submission of the required annexes and pleadings in support of its Petition. It
prays the Court to consider these as substantial compliance with the Rules.

Respondent’s Arguments

In her Comment,31 respondent simply echoes the CA ruling. She insists that Boardwalk’s reasons for erroneously filing
the Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees in the RTC are flimsy and should not be considered.

Respondent adds that Boardwalk’s Petition raised factual issues relative to the merits of the case, which may not be the
subject of review at this stage.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Petitioner’s case is not unique, and there is no compelling reason to accord it the privilege it now seeks.

"The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law." 32 This being so,

x x x an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the
Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to
facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules
need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of
appellants. x x x33

In this case, petitioner must comply with the following requirements laid down in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.

A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x.
Upon proper motion x x x, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.

Sec. 2. Form and contents.

The petition shall be x x x accompanied by x x x copies x x x of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.

In addition, the Rules also require that the Petition must be verified or accompanied by an affidavit by which the affiant
attests under oath that he "has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records."34

And finally, Section 3 of Rule 42 provides that non-compliance "with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, x x x and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."

Records show that petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing rules.

The Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and Certification against forum shopping. Copies of the relevant
pleadings and other material portions of the record must likewise be attached to the Petition.

The Rules require that the Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and Certification against forum shopping. If the
petitioner is a juridical entity, as in this case, it must be shown that the person signing in behalf of the corporation is duly
authorized to represent said corporation. In this case, no special power of attorney or board resolution was attached to the
Petition showing that Lo was authorized to sign the Petition or represent Boardwalk in the proceedings. In addition,
petitioner failed to attach to the Petition copies of the relevant pleadings and other material portions of the record.

Petitioner tried to cure these lapses by subsequently submitting a board resolution showing Lo’s authority to sign and act
on behalf of Boardwalk, as well as copies of the relevant pleadings. Now, it prays that the Court consider these as
substantial compliance with the Rules.

Concededly, this Court in several cases exercised leniency and relaxed the Rules. However, in this case, petitioner
committed multiple violations of the Rules which should sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency. As will be
shown below, petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the reglementary period and paying the
docket and other lawful fees before the proper court. These requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional.

Petitioner erroneously paid the docket fees and other lawful fees with the RTC.

Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court specifically states that payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees should be
made to the clerk of the CA. A plain reading of the Rules leaves no room for interpretation; it is categorical and explicit. It
was thus grave error on the part of the petitioner to have misinterpreted the same and consequently mistakenly remitted its
payment to the RTC clerk. Petitioner’s subsequent payment to the clerk of the CA of the docket fees and other lawful fees
did not cure the defect. The payment to the CA was late; it was done long after the reglementary period to file an appeal
had lapsed. It must be stressed that the payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees must be done within 15 days from
receipt of notice of decision sought to be reviewed or denial of the motion for reconsideration. In this case, petitioner
remitted the payment to the CA clerk long after the lapse of the reglementary period.

The CA may grant an extension of 15 days only. The grant of another 15-days extension, or a total of 30-days extension is
allowed only for the most compelling reason.

Petitioner sought an extension of 30 days within which to file its Petition for Review with the CA. This is not allowed.
Section 1 of Rule 42 allows an extension of only 15 days. "No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason x x x."35 Petitioner never cited any compelling reason.
Thus, even on the assumption that the CA granted Boardwalk a 15-day reprieve from February 3, 2007, or the expiration
of its original reglementary period,36 it still failed to file its Petition for Review on or before the February 19, 2007 37 due
date. Records show that the Petition was actually filed only on March 7, 2007, or way beyond the allowable February 19,
2007 deadline. The appellate court thus correctly ruled that this may not simply be brushed aside.

Petitioner’s appeal is not deemed perfected.

More significantly, Section 8 of Rule 42 provides that the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner "upon the timely
filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful fees." Undisputably,
petitioner’s appeal was not perfected because of its failure to timely file the Petition and to pay the docket and other
lawful fees before the proper court which is the CA. Consequently, the CA properly dismissed outright the Petition
because it never acquired jurisdiction over the same. As a result, the RTC’s Decision had long become final and
executory.

To stress, the right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it must comply with the statute or rules. The
requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the same renders
the judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, so also does the prevailing party have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of a decision in his favor.

True it is that in a number of instances, the Court has relaxed the governing periods of appeal in order to serve substantial
justice. But this we have done only in exceptional cases. Sadly, the instant case is definitely not one of them. 38

At this point, it must be emphasized that since petitioner’s right of appeal is a mere statutory privilege, it was bound to a
strict observance of the periods of appeal, which requirements are not merely mandatory, but jurisdictional.

Nor may the negligence of Boardwalk’s former counsel be invoked to excuse it from the adverse effects of the appellate
court’s pronouncement. His negligence or mistake proceeded from carelessness and ignorance of the basic rules of
procedure. This does not constitute excusable negligence that would extricate and excuse Boardwalk from compliance
with the Rules.

Boardwalk's request for the Court to review its case on the merits should be denied as well. The import of the Court's
foregoing pronouncements necessarily renders the R TC judgment final and unassailable; it became final and executory
after the period to appeal expired without Boardwalk perfecting an appeal. As such, the Court may no longer review it.

In light of the above conclusions, the Court finds no need to further discuss the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' April 25, 2007 and December 21, 2007 Resolutions in
CA-G.R. SP No. UDK 5711 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO<br />Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 February 15, 2017

G.R. No. 196084

NUEVA ECIJA II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., AREA I, Mr. REYNALDO VILLANUEVA, President,
Board of Directors, and Mrs. EULALIA CASTRO, General Manager, Petitioners
vs.
ELMER B. MAPAGU, Respondent

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the September 2, 20102 and March 3, 20113 Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 114690. The CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari filed by Nueva
Ecija II Electric Cooperative, Inc., Area I (NEEC), Reynaldo Villanueva (Villanueva) and Eulalia Castro (Castro)
(collectively, petitioners) on the ground that their Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping was unsigned.

Respondent Elmer B. Mapagu (Mapagu) was employed with NEEC as a data processor since May 1983.4 NEEC is an
electric cooperative which supplies electricity to households in Nueva Ecija, including Aliaga, where Mapagu resides.5
Upon the request of the NEEC Board of Directors, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) conducted a special
audit on the power bills and accounts receivables of the consumers, as well as related internal control and procedure, of
NEEC.6 The audit revealed unaccounted consumption or readings which have accumulated due to under-reading and
under-billing in prior years or months. Mapagu's electric consumption was found to be under-read and under-billed by
12,845 kilowatt hours (kWhrs) and 1,918 kWhrs for the months of April 2004 and March to May 2005, respectively. This
under-reading/under-billing amounted to a total of P87,666.17.7 As a result, petitioners sent a Notice of Charges dated
June 13, 2006 against Mapagu, charging him with grave violations of Sections 7.2.18 & 7.2.19 of the NEEC Code of
Ethics and Discipline (NEEC Code),8 to wit:

"Section 7.2.18 - Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her supervisor or by the
management."

"Section 7.2.19 - All other acts of dishonesty which cause or tend to cause prejudice to the REC."9

Mapagu was informed that the penalty for the charges is dismissal for the first offense and was directed to submit an
answer within 72 hours from receipt of the Notice of Charges.10 In his answer, Mapagu denied under oath that his electric
meter was under-read and under-billed by 1,918 k Whrs. He asserted that he has no meter reading from November 2002 to
April 2005. He also argued that he availed of the amnesty offered and given by the NEEC Officer in Charge General
Manager Jun Capulong in connection with employees' meter problems. Since the charges have been condoned, pardoned
and disregarded, Mapagu maintains that he cannot be charged with unaccounted consumption.11

NEEC created an Investigation and Appeals Committee (IAC) to investigate Mapagu and the other workers implicated in
the special audit. The IAC scheduled four conferences where data encoders and meter readers were invited as resource
persons.12

On September 5, 2006, the IAC issued its findings and recommendations. It held that while the charges of under-reading
and under-billing were not established, Mapagu failed to observe the highest degree of honesty as an employee. He did
not take action to correct his kWhr consumption despite knowledge that he has no reading from 2002 to 2005. To the IAC,
this was proof that Mapagu consented to the anomaly for his own benefit.13 On account of his failure to protect the
interest of NEEC, the IAC found him guilty of the charges against him, with the additional finding that he also violated
Section 7.2.3 of the NEEC Code for concealing defective work resulting in the prejudice or loss of NEEC.
Nevertheless, and for humanitarian reasons, the IAC recommended that Mapagu only be suspended for two years, on the
condition that he execute a waiver in favor of NEEC management against the filing of any legal action regarding his
suspension. He was also ordered to pay his unbilled consumption worth ₱87,666.17.14

On January 2, 2007, however, Mapagu received a Notice of Dismissal from service. Hence, he filed a Complaint for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of allowances against petitioners. He later amended the Complaint to include a prayer
for moral, exemplary and actual damages and attorney's fees, dropping his claim for allowances.15 NEEC countered that
Mapagu was dismissed due to valid and legal causes. His gross dishonesty, fraud and willful misconduct were unveiled by
the special audit conducted by the NEA.16 NEEC contended that the amnesty claimed by Mapagu cannot work in his
favor because it only provided for a special payment arrangement, where he was allowed to pay his under-billed
obligation on installment for two years.17

In his November 30, 2007Decision,18 Labor Arbiter (LA) Leandro M. Jose ruled in favor of petitioners. Stating that
NEEC discharged its burden of proving that Mapagu was lawfully dismissed, LA Jose dismissed Mapagu's Complaint for
lack of merit.19

Mapagu appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed and set aside20 the ruling of the
LA. The NLRC held that under the circumstances and facts of the case, the penalty of dismissal is unwarranted.
According to the NLRC, while the law does not condone wrongdoing by an employee, it urges a moderation of the
sanction that may be applied to him where a penalty less punitive would suffice.21 The NLRC compared the penalty
imposed upon Mapagu with the sanctions received by his co-employees who admitted that they altered or tampered their
meter reading slips. It found that despite the IAC recommendation of dismissal from the service, the other employees
were merely suspended and even given separation pay by the petitioners.22 The NLRC observed:

Further, if respondents-appellees [herein petitioners] were able to condone, through Board Resolution No. 09-11-05, those
with tampered meters, under read meters, stop/slow meters and illegal connection through payment of the unaccounted
consumption, the dismissal of the complain[ant]-appellant all the more is shown to be tainted with bad faith. The
condonation of some employees who have committed acts punishable with the (sic) dismissal and the dismissal of
employees who have committed acts punishable with dismissal shows the bias of appellees.23

The NLRC concluded that Mapagu is entitled to the twin relief of reinstatement and backwages. Considering, however,
that the trust reposed on Mapagu can no longer be restored, and reinstatement is no longer feasible, the NLRC ordered the
payment of separation pay reckoned from the time of Mapagu's employment up to the finality of the Decision. The
dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted. The 30 November 2007 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter is reversed and set aside and a new one entered directing Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative II to pay Elmer
Mapagu separation pay in an amount equivalent to one (1) month pay reckoned from his employment up to the finality of
this Decision and backwages reckoned from the time he was dismissed up to the finality of this Decision. However, from
his backwages, the amount pertaining to his two years suspension must be deducted.

The claims for moral and exemplary damages are dismissed for want of merit.

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis in the original.)

Petitioners sought reconsideration but this was denied by the NLRC. Mapagu, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Clarification
and Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The NLRC denied the latter motion but clarified that the separation pay referred
to in the decretal pmiion of its Decision refers to one (1) month pay for every year of service reckoned from the time of
Mapagu's employment up to the finality of its Decision.25 Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

In its September 2, 2010 Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition outright. It found that petitioners failed to sign the
attached Verification and Ce1iification against Forum Shopping and held that a defective verification and certification is
equivalent to non-compliance with the Rules. It also constitutes valid cause for dismissal of the petition under the last
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. Further, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules which requires the pleader to submit a
certification of non-forum shopping executed by the plaintiff or principal party, is mandatory. Subsequent compliance
cannot excuse a party from failing to comply in the first place.26

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. The CA noted that petitioners still failed to attach a
signed verification and certification of non-forum shopping.27 Petitioners seek recourse with us via a petition for review
under Rule 45.

Petitioners fault the CA for dismissing the case on the ground that not all of the petitioners signed the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping. They explained that only Castro, the General Manager of NEEC, signed the
verification and certification because she was authorized and empowered by the NEEC Board of Directors through
Resolution No. 02-18-0728 dated February 22, 2007, to sign on behalf of NEEC. Likewise, Villanueva, the President of
NEEC, executed a Special Power of Attorney29 (SPA) dated February 20, 2007, giving Castro the power to represent him
in this case and to sign all the documents for and on his behalf.30 More importantly, petitioners contend that Villanueva
and Castro have only one defense--that they were both sued as officers of NEEC. Thus, sharing a common interest, the
execution by one of them of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.31

Mapagu filed his Comment,32 claiming that the petition is filed out of time. He asserts that petitioners themselves
disclosed that they received the Resolution of the CA denying their Motion for Reconsideration on March 17, 2011;
hence, they only had until April 2, 2011 to file a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was filed on May 5, 2011,
well beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the questioned Resolutions of the CA have become final and executory.33
With respect to the alleged SPA in favor of Castro, Mapagu allege that NEEC only authorized Castro to represent
Villanueva in the case before the NLRC and not before the CA. Also, the Board Resolution of the NEEC refers only to
pending cases as of February 22, 2007. Since the original action for certiorari before the CA was filed only on July 23,
2010, Castro could not have validly signed the verification and certification on behalf of NEEC on the basis of the
February 22, 2007 SPA.34

On the merits of the case, Mapagu attacks the LA's Decision for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion because the
latter did not explain how petitioners were able to prove the validity of his dismissal from the service. He alleges that the
LA merely declared petitioners as "victors without explanation."35 He explains that petitioners' charges against him relate
to his status as a customer and not as an employee of NEEC.36 He maintains that as a computer operator or data
processor, he merely encoded the bills of industrial consumers. This did not include residential consumers or those of
NEEC employees.37 Mapagu attributes bias against petitioners who he claimed treated him harshly compared to his co-
employees who admitted their wrongdoings and committed far worse offenses.38

On April 4, 2012, petitioners filed their Reply39 and insist that they have 60 days from March 17, 2011 (or until May 1 7,
2011) to file the petition for review on certiorari. Since the petition was filed on May 6, 2011, they maintain that the same
was in fact, filed 11 days ahead of the deadline for submission.40

On December 13, 2011, Mapagu filed an Urgent Manifestation41 disclosing that since he had already been paid the full
monetary award granted him by the NLRC, petitioners are now released from any and all obligations to him arising from
the NLRC's judgment.

The issues raised are:

1. Whether the petition for review on certiorari was, filed before the CA within the reglementary period; and

2. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for non-compliance with the Rules.

II

We deny the petition.

The facts and material dates are undisputed. Petitioners received the September 2, 2010 Resolution of the CA on
September 14, 2010. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration and received the Resolution denying the same on March
17, 2011. Thereafter, they filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari with Payment of
Docket Fees.42 They sought an extension of 20 days from April 1, 2011 or until April 21, 2011 within which to file the
appeal.

On May 6, 2011, they filed this petition. They allege that they have 60 days to file the appeal and in fact, they claim that
they are filing it 11 days ahead of the reglementary deadline. Petitioners insist that following Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 and Bello v. National Labor Relations Commission,44 petitions for review on certiorari can be filed within 60
days from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners are gravely mistaken. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. One who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly
comply with the requirement of the rules. Failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.45 The case before us
calls for the application of the requirements of appeal under Rule 45, to wit:

Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.

Sec. 2. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court
may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Petitioners failed to comply with the foregoing provisions. They confuse petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
with petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. It is the latter which is required to be filed within a period of not later than 60
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. If a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed, the 60-day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the motion. Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 read:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

xxx

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution.1âwphi1 In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.x
x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners' reliance on Republic and Bello are misplaced. In both cases, we are confronted with the issue of whether the
petitions for certiorari before the CA were filed out of time. No other issue was raised in Republic and Bello. Further, it
does not escape our attention that petitioners initially filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
where they recognized that they only have until April 1, 2011 (or 15 days from receipt of the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration) to file the petition. Clearly, petitioners were fully aware of the correct period for filing an appeal under
Rule 45. Yet, in their actual petition, they maintain that they have 60 days to file the appeal. We cannot countenance
petitioners' obvious legal maneuvering.
A party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on certiorari must do so within 15 days from notice of the judgment,
final order or resolution sought to be appealed. Here, petitioners received the Resolution of the CA denying their Motion
for Reconsideration on March 17, 2011. Under the Rules, they have until April 1, 2011 to file the petition. However; they
filed the same only on May 6, 2011. This was 50 days beyond the 15-day period provided under Section 2, Rule 45 and 30
days beyond the extension asked for. Even if petitioners were given the maximum period of extension of 30 days, their
petition before us still cannot stand. The Rules allow only for a maximum period of 45 days within which an aggrieved
party may file a petition for review on certiorari. By belatedly filing their petition with the CA, petitioners have clearly
lost their right to appeal.46

There are instances when we have relaxed the rules governing the periods of appeal to serve substantial justice.47 In
Azores v. Securities and Exchange Commission,48 we held:

The failure of a party to perfect his appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to
be appealed final, with the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. For it is more
important that a case be settled than that it be settled right. It is only in exceptional cases when we have allowed a
relaxation of the rules governing the periods of appeals. As stated in Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., typical
of these cases are the following:

In Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of four days in the filing of a notice of appeal because the
questioned decision of the trial court was served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was already
dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, we allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days
to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its
name and had since then been devoted for educational purposes. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 177
SCRA 38, 41, we accepted a tardy appeal considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore beenjudicially
settled, with finality, in another case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered
twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.49 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted. Italics in the original.)

None of the foregoing justifications are, however, present here. Petitioners remain adamant that they properly observed
the Rules when clearly they failed to do so. They did not even attempt to allude to any exceptional circumstance that
would move us to use our equity jurisdiction to allow a liberal application of the Rules. Hence, we are constrained to
declare that for petitioners' failure to file an appeal by certiorari within the reglementary period, the assailed Resolutions
of the CA had already become final and executory.

In the case of Gonzales v. Pe,50 we held that:

While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality.
It raises a jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is
declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal
within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.51

All told, considering that we have lost jurisdiction to review the case in view of the finality of the CA Decision, we see no
further reason to delve into the other issues raised by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 2, 2010 and March 3, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 114690 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 November 21, 2016

G.R. No. 197191

OASIS PARK HOTEL, Petitioner

vs.
LESLEE G. NAVALUNA, AMIE M. TUBELLEJA, JOAN REODIQUE, JOCELYN ORENCIADA, ELLAINE B.
VILLAGOMEZ, OLIVIA E. AMASOLA and JONA MAE COSTELO, Respondents

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Oasis Park Hotel assails the
Resolutions dated January 26, 20111 and June 6, 20112 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117663 which,
respectively, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court due to procedural
infirmities and denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. The appellate court effectively affirmed the Decision3
dated August 31, 2010 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 11-003089-09 which (a)
reversed the Decision4 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 11-15936-08, 11-16353-08, and 01-01669-09,
finding the dismissal of respondents Leslee G. Navaluna, Amie M. Tubelleja, Joan Reodique, Jocelyn Orenciada, Jona
Mae Costelo, Olivia E. Amasola, and Ellaine B. Villagomez valid; (b) declared that respondents were illegally dismissed;
and (c) ordered petitioner to immediately reinstate respondents to their former positions, pay respondents full backwages,
wage differentials, and proportionate 13th month pay.

Respondents were variously employed by petitioner as food attendant, cashier, or front desk clerk since 2003 to 2004.

Respondents, believing that they were not being accorded the labor standard benefits for regular employees, filed on
August 28, 2008 a complaint for violation of labor standard laws against petitioner and/or the spouses Jean and William
Victor (also called Bill) Percy, President and Vice President, respectively, of petitioner, before the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE), docketed as NCROO-MF0-0809-IS-004. Respondents, though, continued reporting for work,
confident that they were merely exercising their constitutional rights.

On September 17, 2008, petitioner issued a similarly worded Notice to Explain and Preventive Suspension5 to each
respondent. The Notice required respondents to submit within five days from notice their written explanation on why they
should not be subject to disciplinary action or their services terminated for the following alleged offenses:

a. Serious Misconduct and Willful Breach of the trust reposed upon you by management, specifically when you, together
with [names of the other co-respondents], conspired among yourselves to sabotage the operations of the hotel by
committing the following acts:

1 By being moody and miserable in dealing with the hotel's customers;

2 By intentional "slowdown" in the performance of your duties;

b. Serious Misconduct, specifically by breeding contempt and fostering discontent among your co-workers through rumor
mongering, discourtesy and crude attitude towards management.

The Notice also summoned respondents, assisted by their counsel, if they so desired, to attend the
investigation/conference as regards their administrative cases on September 24, 2008 at the office of petitioner's counsel.
Respondents' failure to submit their written explanation within the prescribed period or to attend the scheduled hearing
would be deemed as a waiver of the same. The Notice further placed respondents on preventive suspension effective
immediately and during the course of the investigation as their continued presence at the hotel "will pose a meaningful
disruption in the productive operations."
Respondents individually submitted their written explanations to refute the charges against them,6 but did not attend the
administrative hearing. On October 16, 2008, petitioner issued to each respondent a written Notice of Termination,7 ll
identically stating that:

Based on your written explanation and your refusal and failure to attend the administrative hearing, you failed to present
reasonable justification and sufficient evidence to counter the charges against you.

After a thorough and careful deliberation of the evidence presented and investigation, management hereby finds that there
exists substantial evidence establishing that you had committed all the said offenses charged against you. The offenses
that you had committed constitute serious misconduct, willful disobedience of lawful orders of management and willful
breach of the trust reposed on you by management, which are just causes of termination of employment according to
Article 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Considering the gravity of the offenses that you had committed, your failure to dutifully perform your functions, and your
previous offenses against the company, your employment is hereby terminated effective immediately from the date of this
Notice.

Consequently, respondents filed before the NLRC three separate complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages
and labor standard benefits, damages, and attorney's fees, against petitioner and the spouses Percy, docketed as NLRC
NCR Case Nos. 11-15936-08, 11-16353-08, and 01-01669-09.

In their Position Papers, respondents averred that the acts imputed against them by petitioner were not substantiated and
did not constitute serious misconduct. Hence, there was no valid ground for their termination. Respondents asserted that
they were dismissed as retaliation for their prior complaint against petitioner and the spouses Percy filed before the
DOLE, i.e., NCROO-MFO-0809-IS-004. After receiving notice of NCROO-MFO-0809-IS-004, the spouses Percy
verbally and emotionally maltreated respondents even more. Bill, in particular, became more vicious when he was drunk,
throwing ice cubes and empty bottles, and uttering offensive remarks at respondents, such as "fuck you," "take off your
pants," "do you want to have sex with a fat old guy," "you're fucking stupid," or "fucking idiot." During those moments,
respondents would just reply to Bill "I love you, sir," to avoid further trouble. Subsequently, respondents were strictly
prohibited from entering the main restaurant and transferred to the newly reopened sports bar, which was located at what
used to be a stock area. Jean reportedly commented about respondents' transfer that, "mabuti yan, para lamukin sila."

Petitioner and the spouses Percy maintained that respondents were terminated for intentionally slowing down the
performance of their duties; being rude, moody, and miserable towards the patrons of the hotel; and breeding contempt
and fostering discontent among other employees, which amount to serious misconduct and wilful breach of trust
punishable by termination. Petitioner and the spouses Percy also argued that they had fully complied with labor standard
laws, and that respondents were dismissed only after compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

On September 10, 2009, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision favoring petitioner and the spouses Percy. According to
the Labor Arbiter:

[Respondents'] acts, established by substantial evidence, notably, by the verified Position Paper and its Annexes, coupled
with Affidavits of witnesses (Annexes A, B, and C of [petitioner and the spouses Percy's] Sur-Rejoinder) submitted by the
[petitioner and the spouses Percy], constitute serious misconduct that justified the [petitioner] hotel into validly dismissing
them from employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Maintaining them in its employ would further ruin the
reputation of the hotel and ultimately destroy its business altogether.

As the [petitioner and the spouses Percy's] Position Paper validly argues: It is respectfully submitted that the acts of
[respondents] fall within the purview of what is serious misconduct which is a just cause for termination under the Labor
Code. [Respondents] were food attendants for [petitioner] Oasis Park Hotel ("Hotel" for brevity). As food attendants,
their primary responsibility is to attend to the customers of the [petitioner] Hotel. As food attendants, they were supposed
to show the [petitioner] hotel's customers that they were very much happy and willing to accommodate them. They were
supposed to answer the legitimate needs of the [petitioner] hotel's customers. When they have shown their lack of
interests in serving the [petitioner} hotel's customers, when they were intentionally slow in answering the orders of the
said customers, when they worked very sluggish in the performance of their primary duties, these acts constitute
dereliction of duty and, thus, qualify as a misconduct. Such acts of misconduct are of grave and aggravated character
considering that to serve with gusto and eagerness the [petitioner] hotel's customers are their primary duty and the fact
that these acts were done intentionally completely make it serious misconduct.

Indeed, with a mental make-up and disposition that would drive away our country's tourists, the [respondents] do not
deserve a place in the hotel industry.8

The Labor Arbiter, while denying respondents' claims for overtime pay, night shift differential pay, premium pay for
holiday and rest day work, and damages, granted respondents' claims for proportionate 13th month pay for October 2008
and wage differentials due to underpayment of wages.

The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made dismissing as wanting in merit the charge of illegal dismissal but ordering the
[petitioner] hotel to pay each [respondent] a proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2008.

The [petitioner] hotel is also ordered to pay each [respondent] wage differentials arising from underpayment of wages but
subject to the usual three years prescriptive period on money claims.

Other claims are dismissed for lack of merit9.

Respondents filed an appeal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC LAC No. 11-003089-09. In its Decision dated August
31, 2010, the NLRC found:

At the outset, it bears stressing the well-entrenched rule in dismissal cases that the onus of proving that the employee was
not dismissed or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal, rests on the employer and failure to discharge the same
would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. Thus, the employer must not only rely on the weakness
of the employees' evidence but must stand on the merits of their own defense. A party alleging a critical fact must support
his allegation with substantial evidence for any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend
due process. (Dina Abad et al., vs. Roselle Cinema Silverscreen Corp. and Vermy Trinidad, G.R. No. 141371, March 24,
2006)

In the case at bar, We find that [petitioner and the spouses Percy] failed to hurdle the aforesaid duties. By relying alone on
the affidavits attached to Sur-Rejoinder, [petitioner and the spouses Percy], in effect, put the cart before the horse when
they dismissed the [respondents] on account of the alleged offenses. In other words, [petitioner and the spouses Percy]
failed to present substantial evidence to support their accusations against [respondents] at the time they were dismissed
from employment. As correctly pointed out by the [respondents], the belated execution of the questioned affidavits a year
after the alleged infractions only tend to show that their dismissals were not supported by any evidence, much less
substantial evidence, since the likelihood being that they were non-existing evidence at the time of the alleged
investigation conducted by [petitioner]. This likelihood was further bolstered by the fact that [petitioner and the spouses
Percy] considered the belated submission of the said affidavits of witnesses in their Sur-Rejoinder as newly discovered
evidence, an implied admission that they were non-existing evidence at the very time [petitioner and the spouses Percy]
supposedly deliberated on the dismissal of the [respondents].

The same is true anent the Position Paper filed by [petitioner and the spouses Percy]. Contrary to the Labor Arbiter's
finding, such can never partake of an evidence nor carries evidentiary weight, unless substantiated with the quantum of
evidence required in this proceedings. For it is an elementary rule that mere allegations are not evidence.

Moreover, We note the' proximity of the complaint filed by [respondents] against the [petitioner] for violation of labor
laws, in one hand, and the date [petitioner and the spouses Percy] subsequently effected their dismissals, on the other. The
lapse of the short period of time between the two inextricably related incidents further lends strong credence upon the
[respondents'] stance that their dismissal was in retaliation to their filing of said complaint.

The foregoing disquisitions are in accord with the settled rule in termination cases enunciated in Acebedo Optical vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 150171, July 17, 2007, thus:
"From the preceding discussion, the dearth of reliable evidence on record constitutes serious doubt as to the factual basis
of the charge of violation of company policy filed against private respondent. This doubt shall be resolved in her favor in
line with the policy under the Labor Code to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in favor of labor. The
consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the
dismissal was for a justifiable cause. Having failed to satisfy this burden of proof, we find that petitioners dismissed
private respondent without just cause. Consequently, the termination of her employment wasillegal. "x x x.10

The NLRC decreed in the end:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the appealed decision of the Labor Arbiter is SET ASIDE in so far
as it upheld as valid the termination of [respondents]. A new one is issued finding all [respondents] to have been illegally
dismissed from employment. Accordingly, [petitioner] Oasis Park Hotel owned by Perth, Incorporated is hereby ordered
to immediately reinstate [respondents] to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and pay them full
backwages computed from date of their dismissal up to their actual reinstatement. The monetary award as of the date of
this Decision is appended as Annex "A".

The grant of wage differentials and proportionate 13th month pay is AFFIRMED.11

The NLRC, in a Resolution12 dated November 30, 2010, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner and the
spouses Percy.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 117663.

The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated January 26, 2011 dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 117663 due
to the following procedural infirmities:

1) Incomplete verified statement of material dates as to the date of receipt of the assailed Decision dated August 31, 2010
of public respondent NLRC and the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration thereof in violation of Section 3, Rule
46 of the Revised Rules of Court;

2) Defective Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Service dated January 17, 2011 in that
the same were not accompanied by duly accomplished jurat indicating the respective affiants' competent evidence of
identity pursuant to A.M. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008, which amended Section 12(a), Rule II of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, for failure to attach photocopies of their valid identification cards showing their photographs thereon;

3) The petition was not accompanied by other material supporting documents which were filed before the Labor Arbiter
such as certified true copies of the respective complaints for illegal dismissal filed by private respondents in violation of
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court;

4) The Affidavit of Fact dated September 8, 2008, marked as Annex "2" of petitioners' Position Paper filed before the
Labor Arbiter, which in turn is marked as Annex "F" of the instant petition, is not a clear and legible copy thereof;

5) There was no proof of service of the petition upon private respondents in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to Section[s] 2 and 13, Rule 13 of the same Rules; and

6) The petition's caption is defective for failure to implead the complete names of all private respondents pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court.13

Consequently, the Court of Appeals resolved:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. This case is considered CLOSED and
TERMINATED.14
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to which respondents filed a Comment. In its Resolution dated June 6,
2011, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. On procedural matters, the appellate
court adjudged:

After going over the grounds raised in the said Motion for Reconsideration, vis-vis the Comment filed by private
respondents, We find that petitioner still failed to substantially rectify all the infirmities cited in the Resolution dated
January 26, 2011.

First, petitioner failed to sufficiently comply with the requirement of a verified petition which shall indicate the material
dates to show the timeliness of its filing in accordance with Section 3, Rule 46, in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration that its failure to state the date of receipt of the assailed NLRC
Decision dated August 31, 2010 is not a fatal defect, it bears to stress the well-settled rule that there are three (3) material
dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, i.e. (1) the date when notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution was received; (2) the date when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and (3) the date
when notice of the denial thereof was received.

Second, We find no sufficient justification for petitioner's failure to attach the other pertinent and relevant portions of the
records of the case such as the respective complaints for illegal dismissal filed by private respondents before the Labor
Arbiter. Also, the attached affidavit of fact which is a material part of the records of the case was not clear and legible.
These documents are relevant and pertinent for proper appreciation of the antecedent facts and the complete disposition of
the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

Third, petitioner's reason of inadvertence does not constitute justifiable circumstance that could excuse non-compliance
with the rule requiring that all the names of the parties be indicated in the petition pursuant to Section 1, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court.

Verily, Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the failure of petitioner to comply with any of the
requirements set forth therein shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The rules of procedure are tools
designed to promote efficiency and orderliness, as well as, to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence
thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial
justice, which is not present in the case at bar.15

The Court of Appeals also did not find merit in the substantive grounds argued by petitioner:

After considering the records, We find that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that private
respondents committed serious misconduct and willful disobedience warranting their dismissal from employment.

To prove the charges of serious misconduct and willful disobedience, petitioner relied on the affidavits of its alleged
witnesses executed a year after the alleged infractions were committed by private respondents. Petitioner also labeled
these as newly-discovered evidence when the same were presented before the Labor Arbiter. However, a perusal of the
aforesaid affidavits readily reveals that these are clearly self-serving and mere afterthought. They could not be given
evidentiary weight considering that they were executed a year after the alleged infraction were committed by private
respondents and sans any explanation as to their unavailability at the time of the supposed investigation conducted by
petitioner prior to private respondents' termination. Hence, We agree with the NLRC in holding that the belated execution
of the questioned affidavits which were considered by petitioner as newly-discovered evidence clearly shows that the
dismissal of private respondents were not supported by substantial evidence.

Any allegation constituting serious misconduct or willful disobedience that warrants the dismissal of an employee must be
proven by facts and substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Thus, when there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment,
the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.

In fine, for a writ of certiorari to issue, it is a condition sine qua non that there be grave abuse of discretion or such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or is equated to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the discretion
was exercised arbitrarily, or despotically, or whimsically. We find neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in rendering the assailed Decision dated August 31, 2010.16

Hence, petitioner comes before the Court via the instant Petition which raises the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN SUSTAINING THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED,
DEPARTING FROM APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND FACTS WHICH WERE NOT
DISPUTED AND IF TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE COURT'S RESOLUTION.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ON ALLEGED PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES.17

The Court determines that the issues for its resolution are (1) substantive, whether or not respondents were illegally
dismissed; and (2) procedural, whether or not the Petition for Certiorari of petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 117663 was
dismissible for its procedural infirmities.

The Court addresses the procedural issue first and rules that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error for
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari of petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 117663 for failing to state the material dates as
required by Rule 46, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It is settled that the mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC is by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court filed before the Court of Appeals. This special original action is limited to the resolution of
jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.18

To recall, the Court of Appeals identified in its Resolution dated January 26, 2011 six procedural infirmities as grounds
for the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 117663. Out of the six procedural infirmities, though,
five are without basis or are not fatal to the Petition, viz.:

(a) The Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Service attached to the Petition were
accompanied by a duly Accomplished jurat indicating the respective affiants' competent evidence of identity, particularly,
their Social Security System Card and Voter's ID, respectively.19 The Court already pointed out in Heirs of Amada
Zaulda v. Isaac Zaulda,20that dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition for lack of competent evidence on the
affiant's identity on the attached verification and certification against forum shopping was without clear basis. The 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice does not require the attachment of a photocopy of the identification card in the document. Even
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof, is silent on it.

(b) When service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the
mailing and the registry receipt,21 both of which are present in this case. The notarized Affidavit of Service attached to
the Petition stated that a copy of said Petition was served by registered mail upon Atty. Nicolas B. Medenilla, respondents'
counsel, and indicated as well the corresponding registry receipt number and date and place the mail was posted. The
registry receipt was attached to the Affidavit of Service. Service upon Atty. Medenilla is sufficient as the Court had
previously declared that if a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments shall be made
upon said counsel, unless service upon the party is specifically ordered by the court.22

(c) The failure of petitioner to implead the complete names of all private respondents in the caption of the Petition did not
warrant the dismissal of said Petition, especially when all the names and circumstances of the parties were stated in the
body of the Petition, under "PARTIES." As the Court held in Genato v. Viola:23 "It is not the caption of the pleading but
the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a
formal requirement under Section [1], Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to
pierce the form and go into the substance. The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the
title of a complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such
complainant/s was/were made party to such action."

(d) The failure of petitioner to attach to the Petition respondents' complaints before the NLRC, as well as a clear and
legible copy of the Affidavit of Fact dated September 8, 2008, likewise did not justify the dismissal of said Petition. In
Gutierrez v. Valiente,24 the Court described what constitutes relevant or pertinent documents under Rule 65, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court:

With regard to the failure to attach material portions of the record in support of the petition, Section 1 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court requires that petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the records as are referred
to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto; and failure of compliance shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.

xxxx

These documents, however, are not at all relevant to the petition for certiorari. Since the issue of whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion pertained only to the Orders dated May 15, 2000, June 23, 2003, June 9, 2004 and
September 9, 2004, copies of said Orders would have sufficed as basis for the CA to resolve the issue. It was in these
Orders that the RTC supposedly made questionable rulings. Thus, the attachment of these Orders to the petition was
already sufficient even without the other pleadings and portions of the case record. Moreover, Spouses Gutierrez corrected
the purported deficiency by submitting the required documents in their Motion for Reconsideration.

In Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, the Court clarified that not all pleadings and parts of case records are required
to be attached to the petition; only those pleadings, parts of case records and documents which are material and pertinent,
in that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion, are required to be
attached to a petition for certiorari, and omission to attach such documents may be rectified by the subsequent submission
of the documents required. (Citations omitted.)

Based on the foregoing, copies of the NLRC Decision dated August 31, 2010 and Resolution dated November 30, 2010
attached to the Petition would have sufficed.1âwphi1 Even if respondents' complaints before the NLRC and the Affidavit
of Fact dated September 8, 2008 were arguably "relevant and pertinent for proper appreciation of the antecedent facts and
the complete disposition of the case x x x," then the Court of Appeals could have simply required their subsequent
submission.

Nonetheless, the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 117663 did fail to comply with one requirement which cannot
be excused, i.e., the statement of material dates, specifically, the date petitioner received a copy of the NLRC Decision
dated August 31, 2010.

Petitioner insists that the date they received the NLRC Decision dated August 31, 2010 is immaterial, as the 60-day period
for filing its Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 117663 is reckoned from the date it received the NLRC Resolution
dated November 30, 2010 denying its Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

Apropos herein is the following disquisition of the Court on the matter in Blue Eagle Management, Inc. v. Naval25:

On the matter of procedure, the Court of Appeals should have, at the outset, dismissed respondent's Petition for Certiorari
in CA-G.R. SP No. 106037 for failure to state material dates.

A petition for certiorari must be filed within the prescribed periods under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended:
Section 4. When and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

For the purpose of determining whether or not a petition for certiorari was timely filed, Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, requires the petition itself to state the material dates:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - x xx

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment
or final circler or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed
and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

xxxx

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. x x x.

The Court, in Vinuya v. Romulo, expounded on the importance of stating the material dates in a petition for certiorari:

As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment, final order or
resolution, or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not.
To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or
resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition; otherwise, the petition
for certiorari must be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates determine the
timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge Development
Corporation:

There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration
was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suffice in a
matter involving strict observance with the Rules. x xx.

The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals:

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of
determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from
receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to
determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since
the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen
(15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the
proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the
Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. x x x.

xxxx

Absent the date when respondent received the NLRC Decision dated May 31, 2007, there is no way to determine whether
respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the same was timely filed. A late motion for reconsideration would
render the decision or resolution subject thereof already final and executory. x x x

It is true that in a number of cases, the Court relaxed the application of procedural rules in the interest of substantial
justice.1âwphi1 Nevertheless, the Court is also guided accordingly in this case by its declarations in Sebastian v. Morales:
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle
to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the
convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the
effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are
contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it
would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.

Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except
only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the rules.x x x. (Citations omitted.)

Based on the rules and jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 117663 for failure to state material dates.

The Court, furthermore, finds no persuasive reason to relax or liberally apply the rules of procedure in the instant Petition
for the sake of substantive justice, as the finding of the NLRC, sustained by the Court of Appeals, that respondents were
illegally dismissed by petitioner is supported by the evidence or record.

Article 277 of the Labor Code guarantees the right of an employee to security of tenure, thus –

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code,
the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with
the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. xxx.

It is clear from the above provision that the dismissal of respondents may be sustained only if shown to have been made
for a just and authorized cause and with due process; and that the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause rests upon the employer.

Time and again, the Court has ruled that in illegal dismissal cases, the onus of proving that the employee was not
dismissed or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal, rests on the employer, and failure to discharge the same
would mean that the dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal. The petitioner must not only rely on the weakness of
the respondents' evidence, but must stand on the merits of its own defense. A party alleging a critical fact must support his
allegation with substantial evidence, for any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation and unreliable documentary
evidence cannot stand, as it will offend due process.26

Petitioner was unable to submit substantial evidence that respondents actually committed serious misconduct and wilful
breach of trust to justify the respondents' dismissal from employment. Initially, there were only the self-serving and
unsubstantiated allegations of petitioner and the spouses Percy. Subsequently, petitioner and the spouses Percy attached to
the Sur-Rejoinder they submitted to the Labor Arbiter on August 18, 2009 "newly discovered evidence," i.e., the affidavits
of other hotel employees to establish respondents' guilt. The Court agrees with the observation of the NLRC that such
affidavits, belatedly executed by the hotel employees almost a year after respondents' dismissal on October 16, 2008,
deserve little weight and credence for these were non-existent at the time petitioner conducted its alleged investigation of
the charges against respondents and could not have been the basis for respondents' dismissal. Moreover, the Court cannot
turn a blind eye to the very short period between respondents' filing of their complaint before the DOLE on August 28,
2008 and the issuance by petitioner to respondents of the Notices to Explain and Preventive Suspension on September 17,
2008 and Notices of Termination on October 16, 2008, giving rise to the reasonable belief that petitioner administratively
charged and dismissed respondents as retaliation for respondents' filing of their complaint before the DOLE.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the herein assailed Resolutions dated January 26, 2011 and June 6, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117663, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED.