CASE 1

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. DBM

Facts

The amount of ₱215,270,000.00 was appropriated for the petitioner’s Central Office by the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all
sources of funds are considered, amount to ₱285,660,790.44.1 It complains, however, that the
total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only
₱279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of ₱5,807,392.30.

To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its "no report,
no release" policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the
necessary supporting documents. Petitioner contends that the application of the "no report, no
release" policy upon independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the
principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Respondent claims that the delay in releasing the balance of petitioner’s budget was not on
account of any failure on petitioner’s part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a
shortfall in revenues which would be proper under the basis of a resolution issued by the
Supreme Court.4

Issue: WON CSC’s fiscal autonomy was violated?

Ruling:

That the "no report, no release" policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with
fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices
possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which
provides:

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

Theconstruction of "automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a

constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to
mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

As to respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall
in revenues, the same does not lie. Even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that
does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of
the Constitution.

If respondent’s theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and
regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month 12
that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering
insignificant altogether, such mandate.

Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that
petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue
shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy
on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to
naught the distinction established by the Constitution.

The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given
priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly
vested when there is a revenue shortfall.

This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a guiding
principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy that:

4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and
regularly released subject to availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)

This phrase "subject to availability of funds" does not, however, contradict the present ruling that
the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released,
a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a
situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total
appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy . In such event, it would be
practically impossible to fully release the Judiciary’s appropriations or any of the entities also
vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such other entities to
an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that situation that a relaxation of the
constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.

Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion of the
total national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will the total revenue collections
fall short of the requirements of such agencies.

Finally, petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than that of the
previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected.

For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional
Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the amount
for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.

The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of
appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing
the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for
the previous year.

CASE 2

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (CHREA)

vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

FACTS:
The CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission on the strength of
Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998 which
provided a Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy.
It stated that the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices,
to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal services itemization
including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective
offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are affected by such
reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any unexpended balance of, or
savings in the appropriations of their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation standardization laws.
The DBM secretary denied the request for it was not favorably considered as it
effectively involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services. The CSC-National
Capital Region Office recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBM's disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with
appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request
hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy.
2. WON can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an upgrading and
reclassification of personnel positions without the prior approval of the Department of
Budget and Management?

RESOLUTION:
1. NO, the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR
is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act
or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum –
what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations,
other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by
law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require
from time to time.
In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is understood that it is only the Judiciary,
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and
the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.
In Bengzon v. Drillon, the SC explained: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit,
the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee
of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their
needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
The special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522 did not specifically mention CHR as
among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement
organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the Special Provision
Applicable to the Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the General Appropriations Act of 1998
specifically mentions that such special provision applies to the judiciary and had
categorically authorized the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and implement
the organizational structure of the Judiciary.

2. No, The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the
Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof, as defined
above, encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.
This power to "administer" is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by
the Court of Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of
others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or
conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.15
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading,
reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding
that such scheme lacks legal justification.
The imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any
reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of
the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to
wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall
assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget,
preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of
accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and
efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation
 and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review
and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.

CASE 3

Gaminde v. Commission on Audit

FACTS:

The President of the Philippines appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde as ad

interim Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission on June 11, 1993. Gaminde
assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. The Commission on
Appointments and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on
September 07, 1993. Her appointment paper stated that her term expires on
February 02, 1999.

However, on February 24, 1998, Gaminde sought clarification from the Office of
the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter, opined that Gaminde’s term of office would
expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.

Relying on said advisory opinion, Gaminde remained in office after February 02,
1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the
Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.

On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an

opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as
stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent."

Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe

issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments pertaining to Gaminde and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02,
1999.
 Gaminde appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. The
Commission on Audit then issued Decision No. 99-090 dismissing Gaminde’s appeal.
The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the
issue of Gaminde’s term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her
appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the
implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.

Gaminde moved for reconsideration, which was then denied by the Commission
on Audit in Decision No. 99-129.

1st ISSUE: When did the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde expire? Did it
expire on February 2, 1999 or on February 2, 2000?

RESOLUTION:

The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as

appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she
served as de-facto officer in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of office of the
Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987
Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2):

“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President

withthe consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for
seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

In the case of Republic vs. Imperial, it was held that "the operation of the
rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the
terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that
any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term
should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term."
 Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date,
irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the
appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years
should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of
the terms.

Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate
starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification,
the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee
must be counted against the latter.

**There’s a computation here, nakalagay sa case but then I don’t know if it’s
important. See the case na lang… yung rotational scheme na diniscuss ni Atty. Libiran
is discussed in this case.

NOTE: What is the distinction between “term” and “tenure”?

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and
"tenure." "The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent.
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right,
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office.
The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the
term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent."

In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of
office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3
year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX
(C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly
prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven, five and three
years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of
the term of office as this is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution
upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).

2nd ISSUE: Did the COA err in disallowing in audit the salary and other
emoluments of Gaminde and her co-terminus staff? Are they still entitled to
receive their salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered?

RESOLUTION:

Yes, the COA erred in disallowing in audit the salary and other emoluments of
Gaminde and her co-terminus staff. They should be entitled to receive their salary and
other emoluments for actual service rendered because Gaminde acted as a de facto
officer in good faith from February 02, 1999 to February 02, 2000.

CASE 6

Facts
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar)
were the OffierrfnrCharge/Presfdent and the Vfie Presfdent for
Admfnfstratfon, respeitfvely, of the Polyteihnfi Unfversfty of the Phflfppfnes
(PUP) fn 2005.

On September 27, 2005, petftfoner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP

Chfef Legal Counsel, fled an admfnfstratfve iase agafnst Guevarra and
Cezar for gross dfshonesty, grave mfsionduit, falsffiatfon of offifal
doiuments, ionduit prejudfifal to the best fnterest of the servfie, befng
notorfously undesfrable, and for vfolatfng Seitfon 4 of Republfi Ait (R.A.)
No. 6713. Cueva iharged Guevarra wfth falsffiatfon of a publfi doiument,
speiffially the Applfiatfon for Bond of Aiiountable Offifals and Employees
of the Republfi of the Phflfppfnes, fn whfih the latter denfed the exfstenie of
hfs pendfng irfmfnal and admfnfstratfve iases, despfte the fait that
Guevarra and Cezar have 17 iases pendfng before th Sandfganbayan.

On Marih 24, 2006, the Cfvfl Servfie Commfssfon (CSC) formally iharged
Guevarra wfth Dfshonesty and Cezar wfth Conduit Prejudfifal to the Best
Interest of the Servfie. Subsequently, the respondents fled thefr Motfon for
Reionsfderatfon and Motfon to Deilare Absenie of Prfma Faife Case. Thfs
was denfed and Guevarra was subsequently plaied under preventfve
suspensfon for nfnety (90) days.

Guevarra and Cezar fled a petftfon for certiorari and prohfbftfon before the
CA essentfally questfonfng the jurfsdfitfon of the CSC. On Deiember 29,
2006, the CA rendered fts Deifsfon grantfng the petftfon and nullffyfng and
settfng asfde the questfoned resolutfons of the CSC for havfng been
rendered wfthout jurfsdfitfon iftfng EO 292 (Admfnfstratfve Code of 1987)
whfih states that heads of agenifes and fnstrumentalftfes "shall have
jurfsdfitfon to fnvestfgate and deifde matters fnvolvfng dfsifplfnary aitfon
agafnst offiers and employees under thefr jurfsdfitfon" thereby bestowfng
upon the Board of Regents the jurfsdfitfon to fnvestfgate and deifde matters
fnvolvfng dfsifplfnary aitfon agafnst respondents Guevarra and Cezar.

Issue - Ruling:
CSC has jurisdiction over cases
filed directly with it, regardless of
who initiated the complaint

The CSC, as the ientral personnel ageniy of the government, has the power
to appofnt and dfsifplfne fts offifals and employees and to hear and deifde
admfnfstratfve iases fnstftuted by or brought before ft dfreitly or on
appeal.17 Seitfon 2(1), Artfile IX(B) of the 1987 Constftutfon defnes the
siope of the ifvfl servfie:

The ifvfl servfie embraies all branihes, subdfvfsfons, fnstrumentalftfes, and

agenifes of the Government, fniludfng governmentrowned or iontrolled
iorporatfons wfth orfgfnal iharters.

By vfrtue of Presfdentfal Deiree (P.D.) No. 1341,18 PUP beiame a ihartered

state unfversfty, thereby makfng ft a governmentrowned or iontrolled
iorporatfon wfth an orfgfnal iharter whose employees are part of the Cfvfl
Servfie and are subjeit to the provfsfons of E.O. No. 292.19

The iontroversy, however, stems from the fnterpretatfon of the dfsifplfnary

jurfsdfitfon of the CSC as speiffed fn Seitfon 47, Chapter 7, Subtftle A,
Tftle I, Book V of E.O. No. 292:

SECTION 47. Dfsifplfnary Jurfsdfitfon.— (1) The Commfssfon shall deifde

upon appeal all admfnfstratfve dfsifplfnary iases fnvolvfng the fmposftfon of
a penalty of suspensfon for more than thfrty days, or fne fn an amount
exieedfng thfrty days’ salary, demotfon fn rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dfsmfssal from offie. A iomplafnt may be fled dfreitly wfth the
Commfssfon by a prfvate iftfzen agafnst a government offifal or employee
fn whfih iase ft may hear and deifde the iase or ft may deputfze any
department or ageniy or offifal or group of offifals to ionduit the
fnvestfgatfon. The results of the fnvestfgatfon shall be submftted to the
Commfssfon wfth reiommendatfon as to the penalty to be fmposed or other
aitfon to be taken.
(2) The Seiretarfes and heads of agenifes and fnstrumentalftfes, provfnies,
iftfes and munfifpalftfes shall have jurfsdfitfon to fnvestfgate and deifde
matters fnvolvfng dfsifplfnary aitfon agafnst offiers and employees under
thefr jurfsdfitfon. Thefr deifsfons shall be fnal fn iase the penalty fmposed
fs suspensfon for not more than thfrty days or fne fn an amount not
exieedfng thfrty days’ salary. In iase the deifsfon rendered by a bureau or
offie head fs appealable to the Commfssfon, the same may be fnftfally
appealed to the department and fnally to the Commfssfon and pendfng
appeal, the same shall be exeiutory exiept when the penalty fs removal, fn
whfih iase the same shall be exeiutory only after ionfrmatfon by the
Seiretary ionierned. [Emphases and undersiorfng supplfed]

A lfteral fnterpretatfon of E.O. 292 would mean that only prfvate iftfzens
ian fle a iomplafnt dfreitly wfth the CSC. For admfnfstratfve iases
fnstftuted by government employees agafnst thefr fellow publfi servants,
the CSC would only have appellate jurfsdfitfon over those. Suih a plafn
readfng of the subjeit provfsfon of E.O. 202 would efeitfvely dfvest CSC of
fts orfgfnal jurfsdfitfon, albeft shared, provfded by law. Moreover, ft fs
ilearly unreasonable as ft would be tantamount to dfsenfranihfsfng
government employees by removfng from them an alternatfve iourse of
aitfon agafnst errfng publfi offifals.

There fs no iogent reason to dfferentfate between a iomplafnt fled by a

prfvate iftfzen and one fled by a member of the ifvfl servfie, espeifally fn
lfght of Seitfon 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtftle A, Tftle I, Book V of the same
E.O. No. 292 whfih ionfers upon the CSC the power to "hear and deifde
admfnfstratfve iases fnstftuted by or brought before ft dfreitly or on appeal"
wfthout any qualffiatfon.

In the iase of Camacho v. Gloria,23 the Court stated that "under E.O. No.
292, a iomplafnt agafnst a state unfversfty offifal may be fled wfth efther
the unfversfty’s Board of Regents or dfreitly wfth the Cfvfl Servfie
Commfssfon."24 It fs fmportant to note that the Court dfd not fnterpret the
Admfnfstratfve Code as lfmftfng suih authorfty to exilude iomplafnts fled
dfreitly wfth ft by a member of the ifvfl servfie.

It iannot be overemphasfzed that the fdentfty of the iomplafnant fs

fmmaterfal to the aiqufsftfon of jurfsdfitfon over an admfnfstratfve iase by
the CSC. The law fs qufte ilear that the CSC may hear and deifde
admfnfstratfve dfsifplfnary iases brought dfreitly before ft or ft may
deputfze any department or ageniy to ionduit an fnvestfgatfon.)
CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Board of Regents over
administrative cases

The Unfform Rules on Admfnfstratfve Cases fn the Cfvfl Servfie28 (the

Unfform Rules) explfiftly allows the CSC to hear and deifde admfnfstratfve
iases dfreitly brought before ft:

Seitfon 4. Jurfsdfitfon of the Cfvfl Servfie Commfssfon. – The Cfvfl Servfie

Commfssfon shall hear and deifde admfnfstratfve iases fnstftuted by, or
brought before ft, dfreitly or on appeal, fniludfng iontested appofntments,
and shall revfew deifsfons and aitfons of fts offies and of the agenifes
attaihed to ft.

Exiept as otherwfse provfded by the Constftutfon or by law, the Cfvfl

Servfie Commfssfon shall have the fnal authorfty to pass upon the removal,
separatfon and suspensfon of all offiers and employees fn the ifvfl servfie
and upon all matters relatfng to the ionduit, dfsifplfne and effifeniy of
suih offiers and employees. [Emphases and undersiorfng supplfed]

The CA ionstrued the phrase "the Cfvfl Servfie Commfssfon shall have the
fnal authorfty to pass upon the removal, separatfon and suspensfon of all
offiers and employees fn the ifvfl servfie" to mean that the CSC iould only
step fn after the relevant dfsifplfnary authorfty, fn thfs iase the Board of
Regents of PUP, had fnvestfgated and deifded on the iharges agafnst the
respondents. Regrettably, the CA fafled to take fnto ionsfderatfon the
suiieedfng seitfon of the same rules whfih undenfably granted orfgfnal
ioniurrent jurfsdfitfon to the CSC and belfed fts suggestfon that the CSC
iould only take iognfzanie of iases on appeal:

Seitfon 7. Jurfsdfitfon of Heads of Agenifes. – Heads of Departments,

agenifes, provfnies, iftfes, munfifpalftfes and other fnstrumentalftfes shall
have orfgfnal ioniurrent jurfsdfitfon, wfth the Commfssfon, over thefr
respeitfve offiers and employees.29 [Emphasfs supplfed]

Followfng the earlfer dfsqufsftfon, ft ian be safd that the Unfform Rules does
not iontradfit the Admfnfstratfve Code. Rather, the former sfmply provfdes
a reasonable fnterpretatfon of the latter. Suih aitfon fs perfeitly wfthfn the
authorfty of the CSC, pursuant to Seitfon 12(2), Chapter 3, Subtftle A, Tftle
I, Book V of E.O. No. 292, whfih gfves ft the power to "presirfbe, amend
and enforie rules and regulatfons for iarryfng fnto efeit the provfsfons of
the Cfvfl Servfie Law and other pertfnent laws."

Another vfew has been propounded that the orfgfnal jurfsdfitfon of the CSC
has been further lfmfted by Seitfon 5 of the Unfform Rules, suih that the
CSC ian only take iognfzanie of iomplafnts fled dfreitly wfth ft whfih: (1)
are brought agafnst personnel of the CSC ientral offie, (2) are agafnst
thfrd level offifals who are not presfdentfal appofntees, (3) are agafnst
offifals and employees, but are not aited upon by the agenifes themselves,
or (4) otherwfse requfre dfreit or fmmedfate aitfon fn the fnterest of justfie:

Seitfon 5. Jurfsdfitfon of the Cfvfl Servfie Commfssfon Proper. – The Cfvfl

Servfie Commfssfon Proper shall have jurfsdfitfon over the followfng iases:

A. Dfsifplfnary

1. Deifsfons of the Cfvfl Servfie Regfonal Offies brought before

ft on petftfon for revfew;

2. Deifsfons of heads of departments, agenifes, provfnies,

iftfes, munfifpalftfes and other fnstrumentalftfes, fmposfng
penaltfes exieedfng thfrty days suspensfon or fne fn an amount
exieedfng thfrty days salary brought before ft on appeal;

3. Complafnts brought agafnst Cfvfl Servfie Commfssfon Proper

personnel;

4. Complafnts agafnst thfrd level offifals who are not

presfdentfal appofntees;

5. Complafnts agafnst Cfvfl Servfie offifals and employees

whfih are not aited upon by the agenifes and suih other
iomplafnts requfrfng dfreit or fmmedfate aitfon, fn the fnterest
of justfie;

6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearfng on iases befng

heard by Cfvfl Servfie Regfonal Offies;

7. Appeals from the Order of Preventfve Suspensfon; and

8. Suih other aitfons or requests fnvolvfng fssues arfsfng out of

or fn ionneitfon wfth the foregofng enumeratfons.

It fs the Court’s posftfon that the Unfform Rules dfd not supplant the law
whfih provfded the CSC wfth orfgfnal jurfsdfitfon. Whfle the Unfform Rules
may have so provfded, the Court fnvftes attentfon to the iases of Cfvfl
Servfie Commfssfon v. Alfonso31 and Cfvfl Servfie Commfssfon v. Sojor,32 to
be further dfsiussed fn the iourse of thfs deifsfon, both of whfih buttressed
the pronouniement that the Board of Regents shares fts authorfty to
dfsifplfne errfng sihool offifals and employees wfth the CSC. It ian be
presumed that, at the tfme of thefr promulgatfon, the members of thfs
Court, fn Alfonso and Sojor, were fully aware of all the exfstfng laws and
applfiable rules and regulatfons pertafnfng to the jurfsdfitfon of the CSC,
fniludfng the Unfform Rules. In fait, Sojor speiffially ifted the Unfform
Rules fn support of fts rulfng allowfng the CSC to take iognfzanie of an
admfnfstratfve iase fled dfreitly wfth ft agafnst the presfdent of a state
unfversfty. As the Court, fn the two iases, dfd not ionsfder Seitfon 5 of the
Unfform Rules as a lfmftatfon to the orfgfnal ioniurrent jurfsdfitfon of the
CSC, ft ian be stated that Seitfon 5 fs merely fmplementary. It fs merely
dfreitory and not restrfitfve of the CSC’s powers. The CSC ftself fs of thfs
vfew as ft has vfgorously asserted fts jurfsdfitfon over thfs iase through thfs
petftfon.

Based on all of the foregofng, the fnesiapable ionilusfon fs that the CSC
may take iognfzanie of an admfnfstratfve iase fled dfreitly wfth ft agafnst
an offifal or employee of a ihartered state iollege or unfversfty. Thfs fs
regardless of whether the iomplafnant fs a prfvate iftfzen or a member of
the ifvfl servfie and suih orfgfnal jurfsdfitfon fs shared wfth the Board of
Regents of the sihool.

R.A. No. 8292 is not in confict

with E.O. No. 292.

In addftfon, the respondents argue that R.A. No. 8292, whfih granted to the
board of regents or board of trustees dfsifplfnary authorfty over sihool
employees and offifals of ihartered state iolleges and unfversftfes, should
prevafl over the provfsfons of E.O. No. 292.39 They anihor thefr assertfon
that the Board of Regents has exilusfve jurfsdfitfon over admfnfstratfve
iases on Seitfon 4 of R.A. No. 8292,40 to wft:

Seitfon 4. Powers and dutfes of Governfng Boards. – The governfng board

shall have the followfng speiffi powers and dutfes fn addftfon to fts general
powers of admfnfstratfon and the exerifse of all the powers granted to the
board of dfreitors of a iorporatfon under Seitfon 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
68 otherwfse known as the Corporatfon Code of the Phflfppfnes;

xxxx

(h) to fx and adjust salarfes of faiulty members and admfnfstratfve offifals

and employees subjeit to the provfsfons of the revfsed iompensatfon and
ilassffiatfon system and other pertfnent budget and iompensatfon laws
governfng hours of servfie, and suih other dutfes and iondftfons as ft may
deem proper; to grant them, at fts dfsiretfon, leaves of absenie under suih
regulatfons as ft may promulgate, any provfsfons of exfstfng law to the
iontrary notwfthstandfng; and to remove them for iause fn aiiordanie wfth
the requfrements of due proiess of law. [Emphasfs supplfed]
The respondents are mfstaken.

Basfi fs the prfnifple fn statutory ionstruitfon that fnterpretfng and

harmonfzfng laws fs the best method of fnterpretatfon fn order to form a
unfform, iomplete, ioherent, and fntellfgfble system of jurfsprudenie, fn
aiiordanie wfth the legal maxfm fnterpretare et ioniordare leges legfbus
est optfmus fnterpretandf modus.41 Sfmply beiause a later statute relates to
a sfmflar subjeit matter as that of an earlfer statute does not result fn an
fmplfed repeal of the latter.42

A perusal of the abovequoted provfsfon ilearly reveals that the same does
not fndfiate any fntentfon to remove employees and offifals of state
unfversftfes and iolleges from the ambft of the CSC. What ft merely states fs
that the governfng board of a sihool has the authorfty to dfsifplfne and
remove faiulty members and admfnfstratfve offifals and employees for
iause. It nefther supersedes nor ionffits wfth E.O. No. 292 whfih allows
the CSC to hear and deifde admfnfstratfve iases fled.

Note

All members of the ifvfl servfie are under the jurfsdfitfon of the CSC, unless
otherwfse provfded by law. Befng a nonriareer ifvfl servant does not remove
respondent from the ambft of the CSC.

Career or nonriareer, a ifvfl servfie offifal or employee fs wfthfn the

jurfsdfitfon of the CSC.

CASE 7

Del Castillo vs CSC

FACTS:

On August 1, 1990, petttnen, an empltyee tf the Pntfessitnal Regulattn Ctmmissitn (PRC), was
placed unden pneventve suspensitn by the PRC ftn "gnave misctnduct" and "ctnduct pnejudicial tt the
best intenest tf the senvice." Afen due investgattn, petttnen was ftund guilty tf gnave misctnduct
and was dismissed fntm the senvice with ftnfeitune tf all benefts.

Petttnen appealed the PRC'ss decisitn tt the Meenit Systems Pnttecttn otand (MeSPo) which extnenated
him tf said change.

On appeal by the PRC, htweven, the Civil Senvice Ctmmissitn (CSC) ftund petttnen guilty tf gnave
misctnduct, and imptsed uptn him the penalty tf dismissal. Petttnen'ss mtttn ftn nectnsidenattn was
denied.

SC nevensed the decisitn tf CSC.

ISSUE:

Whethen petttnen wht is extnenated in the administnatve case fled against him, and tndened
neinstates, enttled tt backwages?

RESOLUTION:

YES.

When an tfcial tn empltyee was illegally dismissed and his neinstatement has laten been tndened, ftn
all legal punptses he is ctnsidened as ntt having lef his tfce. Theneftne, he is enttled tt all the nights
and pnivileges that accnue tt him by vintue tf the tfce he held (Tañada v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 [1965]).

oack salanies may be tndened paid tt said tfcen tn empltyee (City Meaytn tf Zambtanga v. Ctunt tf
Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).

CASE 8

Case 8: PNo vs GARCIA GR 141246

FACTS:

Pnivate nesptndent Ricandt V. Gancia, Jn. senved as a check pntcesstn and cash nepnesentatve at the
ouendia onanch tf the Philippine Nattnal oank, the petttnen in this case. Gancia was laten changed by
PNo with Gntss Neglect tf Duty because tf the funds that wene ltst tn August 5, 1994. The amtunt was
PHP 7Me.

On July 21, 1995, thntugh the PNo-Administnatve Adjudicattn Ofce (PNo-AAO), a decisitn was
nendened fnding Gancia guilty as changed st he was penalized with ftnced nesignattn with benefts
withtut pnejudice tt his mtnetany liability anising fntm the case. Gancia mtved ftn a nectnsidenattn but
the same was denied by PNo-AAO. The nesptndent then appealed tt the Ctunt tf Appeals.

The CA then issued its nestluttn nttng that Gancia is extnenated tf the changes due tt the evidence tn
nectnd failed tt establish neglect tf duty. The CA alst asked PNo tt auttmatcally neinstate Gancia tt his
ptsittn with back salanies. PNo mtved ftn nectnsidenattn but it was denied. The CA ntted that the
tnly panty wht can appeal in an administnatve case is the aggnieved panty.

Ntte: Initally, PNo was a public bank untl it was pnivatzed.

ISSUE:

“Whethen tn ntt the Ctunt tf Appeals is ctnnect in st htlding that petttnen canntt anymtne elevate tn
appeal the nestluttn tf the Civil Senvice Ctmmissitn nevensing petttnenes fnding tf guilt ftn gntss
neglect tf duty tn Resptndent Gancia.”

RULING:

The night tt appeal is ntt a natunal night tn a pant tf due pntcess, but a mene statuttny pnivilege that may
be exencised tnly in the mannen pnescnibed by law. Unden Pnesidental Decnee (PD) 807, the CSC has
junisdicttn tven appeals tf administnatve disciplinany cases, in which the penalty imptsed is suspensitn
ftn mtne than thinty days; a fne exceeding thinty dayse salany; a demtttn in nank tn salany; tn tnansfen,
nemtval, tn dismissal fntm tfce. The CA stated that this pntvisitn must be nead in ctngnuence with
Secttn 39 tf the same law. The laten pntvisitn neads thus:

"Sec. 39. Appeals. — (a) Appeals, whene alltwable, shall be made by the panty advensely afected by the
decisitn within ffeen days fntm neceipt tf the decisitn unless a petttn ftn nectnsidenattn is
seastnably fled, which petttn shall be decided within ffeen days."

Citng Meendez v. Civil Senvice Ctmmissitn, the CA ctnstnued the phnase "panty advensely afected" in the
abtve-qutted pntvisitn tt nefen stlely tt the public tfcen tn empltyee wht was administnatvely
disciplined. Hence, an appeal may be availed tf tnly in a case whene the nesptndent is ftund guilty.

Htweven, this intenpnetattn has been tventunned in Civil Senvice Ctmmissitn v. Dactycty. Speaking
thntugh Justce oennandt P. Pandt, the Ctunt said that "we ntw expnessly abandtn and tvennule extant
junispnudence that the phnase ‘panty advensely afected by the decisitne nefens tt the gtvennment
empltyee against whtm the administnatve case is fled ftn the punptse tf disciplinany acttn which may
take the ftnm tf suspensitn, demtttn in nank tn salany, tnansfen, nemtval tn dismissal fntm tfcec”

It is a well-entnenched nule that if a statute is clean, plain and fnee fntm ambiguity, it must be given its
litenal meaning and applied withtut atempted intenpnetattn. Venily, the wtnds empltyed by the
legislatune in a statute ctnnectly expness its intent tn will and pneclude ctunts fntm ctnstnuing it
difenently. The legislatune is pnesumed tt have kntwn the meanings tf the wtnds, tt have used thtse
wtnds advisedly, and tt have expnessed its intent by the use tf such wtnds as ane ftund in the statute.
Whene the language tf a statute is plain and unambigutus and ctnveys a clean and defnite meaning,
thene is nt tccasitn ftn nestntng tt the nules tf statuttny ctnstnucttn, and this Ctunt has nt night tt
lttk ftn tn imptse antthen meaning.

Indeed, the batles against ctnnupttn, malfeasance and misfeasance will be senitusly undenmined if we
ban appeals tf extnenattn. Afen all, administnatve cases dt ntt pantake tf the natune tf cniminal
acttns, in which acquitals ane fnal and unappealable based tn the ctnsttuttnal pntscnipttn tf
dtuble jetpandy.

Funthenmtne, tun new Ctnsttuttn expnessly expanded the nange and sctpe tf judicial neview. Thus, tt
pnevent appeals tf administnatve decisitns except thtse initated by empltyees will efectvely and
penventedly entde this ctnsttuttnal gnant.

Finally, the Ctunt in Dactycty nuled that the CSC had acted well within its nights in appealing the CAes
extnenattn tf the nesptndent public tfcial thenein, because it has been mandated by the Ctnsttuttn
tt pnesenve and safeguand the integnity tf tun civil senvice system. In the same light, henein Petttnen
PNo has the standing tt appeal tt the CA the extnenattn tf Resptndent Gancia. Afen all, it is the
aggnieved panty which has ctmplained tf his acts tf dishtnesty. oesides, this Ctunt has ntt ltst sight tf
the fact that PNo was alneady pnivatzed tn Meay 27, 1996. Shtuld nesptndent be fnally extnenated
indeed, it might then be incumbent uptn petttnen tt take him back intt its ftld. It shtuld theneftne be
alltwed tt appeal a decisitn that in its view hampens its night tt select htnest and tnustwtnthy
empltyees, st that it can pnttect and pnesenve its name as a pnemien banking insttuttn in tun ctuntny.
 CASE 10

CASE 11

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

vs.
DR. AGNES OUIDA P. YU

Facts: Thene wene 2 Pntvincial Health Ofcens in oasilan, Dn. Ftntunata Castllt (Dn. Castllt) and Dn.
Agnes Ouida P. Yu. A devtluttn 1 pntgnam was implemented punsuant tt the Ltcal Gtvennment Ctde
and Dn. Castllt was supptsed tt be devtlved tt the pntvince tf oasilan. Gtvenntn Genny Salapuddin
nefused tt accept Dn. Castllt and favtned Dn. Yu. Gtvenntn Salapuddin nequested that Dn. Castllt be
detailed instead at the DOH, which was ctnfnmed by then Secnetany tf Health Juan Me. Flavien Dn. Yu
was assigned by oasilan Gtvenntn Genny Salapuddin (Salapuddin) tt the ptst tf Pntvincial Health Ofcen
II (PHO II) afen the devtluttn pntgnam, punsuant tt the Ltcal Gtvennment Ctde, which devtlved the
htspital ptsittns pnevitusly unden the ctntntl tf the nattnal tfces tt the pntvince.

Republic Act Nt. 8543 was subsequently passed intt law and the htspital ptsittns pnevitusly
devtlved tt the ltcal gtvennment unit tf oasilan wene ne-nattnalized and nevented tt the DOH. The
oasilan Pntvincial Health Htspital was laten nenamed the oasilan Genenal Htspital, and the ptsittn tf
PHO II was then ne-classifed tt Chief tf Htspital II.

While Dn. Yu was amtng the penstnnel nevented tt the DOH with the ne-nattnalizattn tf the
oasilan Genenal Htspital, she was made tt netain hen tniginal item tf PHO II instead tf being given the
ne-classifed ptsittn tf Chief tf Htspital II. DOH Secnetany Meanuel Me. Daynit (Secnetany Daynit)
apptinted Dn. Dtmingt Remus A. Daynit (Dn. Daynit) tt the ptsittn tf Chief tf Htspital II.

Dn. Yu fled a pnttest statng that:

“c the ptsittn tf Chief tf Htspital II tt which Dn. Daynit has been apptinted is a mene
ctnvensitn fntm the item tf Pntvincial Health Ofcen II pnevitusly tccupied by the henein pnttestant.”

The CSC tniginally gnanted the petttn but nevensed itself uptn mtttn ftn nectnsidenattn
declaning that the ptsittn tf PHO II was neven devtlved tt the Pntvincial Gtvennment tf oasilan but
was netained by the DOH; that the PHO II ptsittn held by Dn. Yu was a newly-cneated ptsittn; and that,
theneftne, she did ntt have a vested night tt the Chief tf Htspital II ptsittn that was cneated by vintue
tf R.A Nt. 8543.

Yu then elevated hen case tt the CA tn petttn ftn neview naising the stle issue tf whethen the
item tf PHO II she pnevitusly tccupied was a devtlved ptsittn tn a ltcally cneated tne.

The CA nuled in favtn tf Yu statng that the PHO II was a devtlved ptsittn based tn a leten
dated Meay 19, 1994, sent by Mes. Vivian L. Ytung, Ofcen-in-Change tf the Depantment tf Health, Ltcal
Gtvennment Assistance & Metnittning Senvice inftnming ftnmen Gtvenntn Salapuddin that the PHO II
ptsittn was devtlved tt the ltcal gtvennment.

1 The tnansfen tn delegattn tf ptwen tt a ltwen level, especially by centnal gtvennment tt ltcal tn negitnal
administnattn.
 The CA alst tttk intt ctnsidenattn a leten fntm Dinecttn Meacybel Alfant-Sashi tf the Civil
Senvice Ctmmissitn Regitnal Ofce IX inftnming Yu that:

“At the tutset, it is appanent that the ptsittn ytu pnesently tccupy is tne which shtuld be
included in the list tf nenattnalized ptsittns nttwithstanding the fact that the said ptsittn cannies a
ptsittn item numben difenent fntm that cannied by the pnevitus htlden thenetf. Hence, the contention
of the DOH Regional Ofce that your position is not the same as that of the previous holder simply
because they bear diferent position item numbers deserves very scant consideration. The ptsittn
item numbens ane immatenial in case tf nenattnalizattn as such a system is menely adtpted ftn
punptses tf pntpen and systematc ctding tf all ptsittns in the gtvennment, pantculanly in the
budgetng pntcess. Thus, the ptsittn ytu ane pnesently htlding shtuld be ctnsidened as tne beltnging
tt the nattnal gtvennment pnitn tt its devtluttn, negandless tf the ptsittn item numben atached tt
the ptsittn tf the pnevitus htlden thenetf.”

Issue: Did the Ctunt tf Appeals enn in htlding that the PHO II ptsittn pnevitusly tccupied by nesptndent
Yu is a devtlved ptsittn?

Ruling: Nt, the Ctunt tf Appeals was ctnnect.

As defned, ―devtluttn is the act by which the nattnal gtvennment ctnfens ptwen and
authtnity uptn the vanitus ltcal gtvennment units tt penftnm specifc functtns and nesptnsibilites.
Specifcally, Secttn 17(i) tf the same Ctde pnescnibes the mannen tf devtluttn, as ftlltws:

(i) The devtluttn ctntemplated in this Ctde shall include the tnansfen tt ltcal gtvennment units
tf the nectnds, equipment, and tthen assets and penstnnel tf nattnal agencies and tfces
ctnnesptnding tt the devtlved ptwens, functtns and nesptnsibilites.

Personnel of said national agencies or ofces shall be absorbed by the local government units
to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively
viable as detenmined by the said tvensight ctmmitee: Provided, further, That negitnal dinecttns wht ane
caneen executve senvice tfcens and tthen tfcens tf similan nank in the said negitnal tfces wht canntt
be abstnbed by the ltcal gtvennment unit shall be netained by the nattnal gtvennment, withtut any
diminuttn tf nank, salany tn tenune.

Thene is nt deanth tf evidence shtwing that the item ptsittn tf PHO II was, in fact, devtlved tt
the Pntvincial Gtvennment tf oasilan. Gtvenntn Salapuddin himself centfed that said ptsittn was
included in the 1992 OSCAS (Onganizattn, Stafng and Ctmpensattn Acttn) neceived fntm the
Depantment tf oudget and Meanagement (DoMe) with its ctnnesptnding budget appntpniattn. He funthen
declaned that duning the ftnmal tunn tven pntgnam in 1993 atended by Dn. Meilagnts Fennandez,
nepnesentng the DOH Regitnal Ofce, the item ptsittn tf PHO II was amtng the ptsittns tunned tven
tt the Pntvincial Gtvennment tf oasilan. Thus, the angument tf CSC that tnly 53 plantlla ptsittns, ntt
54, wene devtlved tt the ltcal gtvennment tf oasilan dtes ntt htld waten. It canntt be disputed that Dn.
Castllt'ss PHO II ptsittn was devtlved.

As tt why Yu was PHO II and ntt Castllt, the Supneme Ctunt nuled that:

Neithen did Dn. Castllt fnd need tt naise a htwl when, at the behest tf Gtvenntn Salapuddin
wht was detenmined tt neplace hen, DOH tfcials categtnized hen as a devtluttn ntn-viable empltyee,
altng with 216 tthens nattnwide, by the mene fact that she was ntt accepted by the LGU tf oasilan and
ntt because tf an actual ntn-viability. Hence, in 1994, when Gtvenntn Salapuddin ftnmally manifested
his intenttn tt sttp the dnawing tf Dn. Castllt'ss salany fntm the LGU in antcipattn tf his apptintment
tf Dn. Yu tt the PHO II ptsittn, Dn. Castllt ceased tt be a detailed empltyee at the DOH Regitnal Ofce
but was ne-abstnbed by the DOH as a devtluttn ntn-viable empltyee and, ctnsequently, paid salanies
and benefts fntm the Meiscellanetus Penstnnel oenefts Fund that had been set aside unden the Ofce
tf the Secnetany tf Health pnecisely ftn such empltyees.

Mes. Vivian L. Ytung, OIC tf the DOH Ltcal Gtvennment Assistance and Metnittning Senvice,
assuned Gtvenntn Salapuddin that, while Dn. Castllt was ―netained by the DOH, hen item ptsittn
nemained with the LGU tf oasilan. Metnetven, Dn. Meilagnts L. Fennandez, Dinecttn IV tf the DOH Regitnal
Field Ofce Nt. IX in Zambtanga City, clanifed that Dn. Castllt ―neven cannied with hen the item ptsittn
and the funds appntpniated ftn salany and tthen benefts accnuing tt the ptsittn tf Pntvincial Health
Ofcen II.” Hence, the apptintment tf Dn. Yu tt the ptsittn PHO II.

We nule, theneftne, unden the atendant cincumstances tf the case, that with Dn. Castllt'ss ne-
abstnpttn by the DOH which appeans tt bean the ftnmen'ss appntval, hen devtlved ptsittn with the LGU
tf oasilan was lef vacant. In hen Meay 19, 1994 leten tt Gtvenntn Salapuddin, Mes. Vivian L. Ytung
inftnmed the ltcal chief executve that he had the ―tpttn tt netain the item vacated tn tt ctllapse the
same ftn fnancial neastns.”

Thus, we hold that Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II in 1994 and,
consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classifed designation – Chief of Hospital II. As such, Dr.
Yu should have been automatically re-appointed by Secretary Dayrit in acctndance with the Guidelines
ftn the Re-Nattnalizattn tf Penstnnel, Assets and Appntpniattns tf oasilan Pntvincial Htspital.

Item III. Pninciples and Ptlicies Gtvenning the Tnansfen tf oasilan Pntvincial Htspital

A) xxx

3) The DOH shall assune that the ne-nattnalized penstnnel tf the htspital shall:

3.i) Ntt be invtluntanily sepanated, tenminated tn laid tf;

3.ii) Ctntnue tt enjty secunity tf tenune;

3.iii) Be automatically re-appointed by the Secretary immediately upon their transfer;

3.iv) Retain thein pay tn benefts withtut diminuttn.

Ctnsidening, htweven, that Dn. Yu had alneady netned tn August 24, 2004, we uphtld the
ftlltwing fndings tf the appellate ctunt, tt wit:

xxx ln as much as a ne-apptintment is nt ltngen feasible due tt hen netnement, petttnen shtuld
at least nectven hen salanies ftn the senvices she had nendened. Htweven, petttnen admited
that she neceived hen salany as PHO II ctnvented tt Chief tf Htspital ftn the penitd August tt
Ntvemben 2001. Theneftne, she shtuld neceive hen salany and benefts as Chief tf Htspital fntm
Decemben 2001 up tt hen netnement in August 24, 2004.
 CASE 20

FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI,

AND MAUREEN A. BIEN
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONERS
Facts: Delos Santos, Bacaltos, Antoni and Bien, officials of the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center (VSMMC or hospital), are being held solidarily liable for the amount of P3,386,697.10.
The amount was the disallowance (A disallowance is a disapproval by the CoA, in whole or in
part, of a disbursement by a government agency.) of several disbursements from the PDAF of
Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of Cebu City.
Cuenco had made a MoA with the previous VSMMC hospital chief appropriating to the
hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to
cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health
Program (TNT Program).
The CoA found that there were forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for
the availment of medicines under the TNT Program.
Delos Santos explained that during the initial stage of the implementation of the MOA
(i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the hospital screened, interviewed, and determined the qualifications of
the patients-beneficiaries through the hospital’s social worker. However, sometime in 2002,
Cuenco put up the TNT Office in VSMMC, which was run by his own staff who took all pro
forma referral slips bearing the names of the social worker and the Medical Center Chief, as well
as the logbook. From then on, the hospital had no more participation in the said program and was
relegated to a mere “bag keeper.” Since the benefactor of the funds chose Dell Pharmacy as the
sole supplier, anti-rabies medicines were purchased from the said pharmacy and, by practice, no
public bidding was anymore required
Examination by the SAT (Special Audit Team, which was constituted to conduct a
special audit investigation with respect to the findings of the previous team.) of the records and
interviews with the personnel involved showed that the purported patients-beneficiaries of the
TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed except for
the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified as evidenced.
The SAT Team Supervisor, Boado disallowed the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the
payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents, and
holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable. Petitioners’
respective participations were detailed as follows:
(a) for Delos Santos, in her capacity as Medical Center Chief, for signing and approving
the disbursement vouchers and checks;
 (b) for petitioner Dr. Josefa A. Bacaltos, in her capacity as Chief Administrative Officer,
for certifying in Box A that the expenses were lawful, necessary and incurred in her
direct supervision;
(c) for Antoni, in her capacity as Chief of the Pharmacy Unit, for approving the
supporting documents when the imputed delivery of the medicines had already been
consummated;
(d) for petitioner Maureen A. Bien, in her capacity as Hospital Accountant, for certifying
in Box B of the disbursement voucher that the supporting documents for the payment to
Dell Pharmacy were complete and proper.
Delos Santos et al. argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement
of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their
respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that
their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.
Issue:
1. Did the CoA commit grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for
the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10?
2. May Delos Santos et al. invoke good faith in the performance of their duties as a defense?
Ruling:
1. No, the CoA did not.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The
exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the
check and balance system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on
the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in
the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not
only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave
abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not
based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism. In this case, the Court finds
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will be
discussed below.
 The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been
deeply involved in the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA
and, as such, has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of Cuenco’s PDAF. Further, under the
MOA executed between VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as “willing to
cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program.”
More importantly, it undertook to ascertain that “[a]ll payments and releases under [the] program
x x x shall be made in accordance with existing government accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.” It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds
shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or
damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the
law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records.
However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476
were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing auditing
laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines.
The TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency, i.e.,
the Department of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the medicines purchased
from Dell Pharmacy did not go through the required public bidding in violation of the applicable
procurement laws and rules. Similarly, specific provisions of the MOA itself setting standards for
the implementation of the same program were not observed. For instance, only seven of the 133
prescriptions served and paid were within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that an indigent
patient can avail of from Cuenco’s PDAF. Also, several indigent patients availed of the benefits
more than once, again in violation of the provisions of the MOA. By allowing the TNT Office
and the staff of Cuenco to take over the entire process of availing of the benefits of the TNT
Program without proper monitoring and observance of internal control safeguards, the
hospital and its accountable officers reneged on their undertaking under the MOA to
“cooperate/coordinate and monitor” the implementation of the said health program. They
likewise violated paragraph 5 of NBC 476 which requires a “regular monitoring activity” of all
programs and projects funded by the PDAF, as well as Sections 123 and 124 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the “Government Auditing Code of the Philippines”
(Auditing Code), which mandates the installation, implementation, and monitoring of a “sound
system of internal control” to safeguard assets and check the accuracy and reliability of the
accounting data.

2. No, they may not.

Delos Santos et al. invoke good faith in the performance of their duties, and jurisprudence holds
that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an
explicit rule that was violated.
In Reyna v. CoA (Reyna), the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein,
notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule
in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending Operations. In similar regard, the Court,
in Casal v. CoA (Casal), sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum who
again, notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive
award granted to its officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and
29.
Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their
respective violations of the applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners
herein have equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing
auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners’
neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and
eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines
supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by
the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto.
Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would
have been exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims
and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability
for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco
always reminded them that it was his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure
at the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification
of the indigent-beneficiaries, be justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked and
undermanned section of the hospital.”
In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos’ argument that the practices of the
TNT Office were already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no
reason to change the same remains highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that Antoni
disclosed to her the irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and
forged prescriptions. Hence, having known this significant information, she and Antoni
should have probed into the matter further, and, likewise, have taken more stringent
measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself with giving oral
instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed
prescriptions pads, which Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for new doctors. But,
just the same, the falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in
December 2004, that Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities.
By then, too much damage had already been done.