Sol

SimriE, [07.03.
20 15:22]
A portative electromagnet is one designed to just hold material in place; an example is a lifting magnet.
A tractive electromagnet applies a force and moves something.[8]
Electromagnets are very widely used in electric and electromechanical devices, including:
Motors and generators
Transformers
Relays
Electric bells and buzzers
Loudspeakers and headphones
Actuators such as valves
Magnetic recording and data storage equipment: tape recorders, VCRs, hard disks
MRI machines
Scientific equipment such as mass spectrometers
Particle accelerators
Magnetic locks
Magnetic separation equipment, used for separating magnetic from nonmagnetic material, for
example separating ferrous metal from other material in scrap.
Industrial lifting magnets
magnetic levitation, used in a maglev train or trains
Induction heating for cooking, manufacturing, and
hyperthermia therapy
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:22]
[ Photo ]
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:26]
What is an Economic System?

An economic system is a means by which societies or governments organize and distribute available
resources, services, and goods across a geographic region or country. Economic systems regulate factors
of production, including capital, labor, physical resources, and entrepreneurs. An economic system
encompasses many institutions, agencies, and other entities.
Economic System
Types of Economic Systems
There are many economies around the world. Each has its own distinguishing characteristics, although
they all share some basic features. Each economy functions based on a unique set of conditions and
assumptions. Economic systems can be categorized into four main types: traditional economies,
command economies, mixed economies, and market economies.
1. Traditional economic system
The traditional economic system is based on goods, services, and work, all of which follow certain
established trends. It relies a lot on people, and there is very little division of labor or specialization. In
essence, the traditional economy is very basic and the most ancient of the four types.
Some parts of the world still function with a traditional economic system. It is commonly found in rural
settings in second- and third-world nations, where economic activities are predominantly farming or
other traditional income-generating activities.
There are usually very few resources to share in communities with traditional economic systems. Either
few resources occur naturally in the region or access to them is restricted in some way. Thus, the
traditional system, unlike the other three, lacks the potential to generate a surplus. Nevertheless,
precisely because of its primitive nature, the traditional economic system is highly sustainable. In
addition, due to its small output, there is very little wastage compared to the other three systems.
2. Command economic system
In a command system, there is a dominant, centralized authority – usually the government – that
controls a significant portion of the economic structure. Also known as a planned system, the command
economic system is common in communist societies since production decisions are the preserve of the
government.
If an economy enjoys access to many resources, chances are that it may lean towards a command
economic structure. In such a case, the government comes in and exercises control over the resources.
Ideally, centralized control covers valuable resources such as gold or oil. The people regulate other less
important sectors of the economy, such as agriculture.
In theory, the command system works very well as long as the central authority exercises control with
the general population’s best interests in mind. However, that rarely seems to be the case. Command
economies are rigid compared to other systems. They react slowly to change because power is
centralized. That makes them vulnerable to economic crises or emergencies, as they cannot quickly
adjust to changed conditions.
3. Market economic system
Market economic systems are based on the concept of free markets. In other words, there is very little
government interference. The government exercises little control over resources, and it does not
interfere with important segments of the economy. Instead, regulation comes from the people and the
relationship between supply and demand.
The market economic system is mostly theoretical. That is to say, a pure market system doesn’t really
exist. Why? Well, all economic systems are subject to some kind of interference from a central
authority. For instance, most governments enact laws that regulate fair trade and monopolies.
From a theoretical point of view, a market economy facilitates substantial growth. Arguably, growth is
highest under a market economic system.
A market economy’s greatest downside is that it allows private entities to amass a lot of economic
power, particularly those who own resources of great value. The distribution of resources is not
equitable because those who succeed economically control most of them.
4. Mixed system
Mixed systems combine the characteristics of the market and command economic systems. For this
reason, mixed systems are also known as dual systems. Sometimes the term is used to describe a
market system under strict regulatory control.
Many countries in the West follow a mixed system. Most industries are private, while the rest,
comprised primarily of public services, are under the control of the government.
Mixed systems are the norm globally. Supposedly, a mixed system combines the best features of market
and command systems. However, practically speaking, mixed economies face the challenge of finding
the right balance between free markets and government control. Governments tend to exert much
more control than is necessary.
Final Word
Economic systems are grouped into traditional, command, market, and mixed systems. Traditional
systems focus on the basics of goods, services, and work, and they are influenced by traditions and
beliefs. A centralized authority influences command systems, while a market system is under the control
of forces of demand and supply. Lastly, mixed economies are a combination of command and market
systems.
An economic system, or economic order,[1] is a system of production, resource allocation and

distribution of goods and services within a society or a given geographic area. It includes the
combination of the various institutions, agencies, entities, decision-making processes and patterns of
consumption that comprise the economic structure of a given community. As such, an economic system
is a type of social system. The mode of production is a related concept.[2] All economic systems have
three basic questions to ask: what to produce, how to produce and in what quantities and who receives
the output of production.
The study of economic systems includes how these various agencies and institutions are linked to one
another, how information flows between them and the social relations within the system (including
property rights and the structure of management). The analysis of economic systems traditionally
focused on the dichotomies and comparisons between market economies and planned economies and
on the distinctions between capitalism and socialism.[3] Subsequently, the categorization of economic
systems expanded to include other topics and models that do not conform to the traditional dichotomy.
Today the dominant form of economic organization at the world level is based on market-oriented
mixed economies.[4]
Economic systems is the category in the Journal of Economic Literature classification codes that includes
the study of such systems. One field that cuts across them is comparative economic systems, which
include the following subcategories of different systems:
Planning, coordination and reform.
Productive enterprises; factor and product markets; prices; population.
Public economics; financial economics.
National income, product and expenditure; money; inflation.
International trade, finance, investment and aid.
Consumer economics; welfare and poverty.
Performance and prospects.
Natural resources; energy; environment; regional studies.
Political economy; legal institutions; property rights.[5]
Economic systems is the category in the Journal of Economic Literature classification codes that includes
the study of such systems. One field that cuts across them is comparative economic systems, which
include the following subcategories of different systems:
Planning, coordination and reform.
Productive enterprises; factor and product markets; prices; population.
Public economics; financial economics.
National income, product and expenditure; money; inflation.
International trade, finance, investment and aid.

Consumer economics; welfare and poverty.
Performance and prospects.
Natural resources; energy; environment; regional studies.
Political economy; legal institutions; property rights.[5]
Components
There are multiple components to an economic system. Decision-making structures of an economy

determine the use of economic inputs (the factors of production), distribution of output, the level of
centralization in decision-making and who makes these decisions. Decisions might be carried out by
industrial councils, by a government agency, or by private owners. An economic system is a system of
production, resource allocation, exchange and distribution of goods and services in a society or a given
geographic area. In one view, every economic system represents an attempt to solve three fundamental
and interdependent problems:
What goods and services shall be produced and in what quantities?
How shall goods and services be produced? That is, by whom and with what resources and
technologies?
For whom shall goods and services be produced? That is, who is to enjoy the benefits of the goods
and services and how is the total product to be distributed among individuals and groups in the society?
[6]
Every economy is thus a system that allocates resources for exchange, production, distribution and
consumption. The system is stabilized through a combination of threat and trust, which are the outcome
of institutional arrangements.[7] An economic system possesses the following institutions:
Methods of control over the factors or means of production: this may include ownership of, or
property rights to, the means of production and therefore may give rise to claims to the proceeds from
production. The means of production may be owned privately, by the state, by those who use them, or
be held in common.
A decision-making system: this determines who is eligible to make decisions over economic activities.
Economic agents with decision-making powers can enter into binding contracts with one another.
A coordination mechanism: this determines how information is obtained and used in decision-making.
The two dominant forms of coordination are planning and markets; planning can be either decentralized
or centralized, and the two coordination mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and often co-exist.[8]
An incentive system: this induces and motivates economic agents to engage in productive activities. It
can be based on either material reward (compensation or self-interest) or moral suasion (for instance,
social prestige or through a democratic decision-making process that binds those involved). The
incentive system may encourage specialization and the division of labor.
Organizational form: there are two basic forms of organization: actors and regulators. Economic
actors include households, work gangs and production teams, firms, joint-ventures and cartels.
Economically regulative organizations are represented by the state and market authorities; the latter
may be private or public entities.
A distribution system: this allocates the proceeds from productive activity, which is distributed as
income among the economic organizations, individuals and groups within society, such as property
owners, workers and non-workers, or the state (from taxes).
A public choice mechanism for law-making, establishing rules, norms and standards and levying taxes.
Usually, this is the responsibility of the state, but other means of collective decision-making are possible,
such as chambers of commerce or workers’ councils.[9]
Typology
Common typology for economic systems categorized by resource ownership and resource allocation
mechanism
Marxist–Leninist socialist states (red) and former socialist states (orange) of the world
There are several basic questions that must be answered in order for an economy to run satisfactorily.
The scarcity problem, for example, requires answers to basic questions, such as what to produce, how to
produce it and who gets what is produced. An economic system is a way of answering these basic
questions and different economic systems answer them differently. Many different objectives may be
seen as desirable for an economy, like efficiency, growth, liberty and equality.[10]
Economic systems are commonly segmented by their property rights regime for the means of
production and by their dominant resource allocation mechanism. Economies that combine private
ownership with market allocation are called "market capitalism" and economies that combine private
ownership with economic planning are labelled "command capitalism" or dirigisme. Likewise, systems
that mix public or cooperative ownership of the means of production with economic planning are called
"socialist planned economies" and systems that combine public or cooperative ownership with markets
are called "market socialism".[11] Some perspectives build upon this basic nomenclature to take other
variables into account, such as class processes within an economy. This leads some economists to
categorize, for example, the Soviet Union's economy as state capitalism based on the analysis that the
working class was exploited by the party leadership. Instead of looking at nominal ownership, this
perspective takes into account the organizational form within economic enterprises.[12]
In a capitalist economic system, production is carried out for private profit and decisions regarding
investment and allocation of factor inputs are determined by business owners in factor markets. The
means of production are primarily owned by private enterprises and decisions regarding production and
investment are determined by private owners in capital markets. Capitalist systems range from laissez-
faire, with minimal government regulation and state enterprise, to regulated and social market systems,
with the aims of ameliorating market failures (see economic intervention) or supplementing the private
marketplace with social policies to promote equal opportunities (see welfare state), respectively.
In socialist economic systems (socialism), production for use is carried out; decisions regarding the use
of the means of production are adjusted to satisfy economic demand; and investment is determined
through economic planning procedures. There is a wide range of proposed planning procedures and
ownership structures for socialist systems, with the common feature among them being the social
ownership of the means of production. This might take the form of public ownership by all of the
society, or ownership cooperatively by their employees. A socialist economic system that features social
ownership, but that it is based on the process of capital accumulation and utilization of capital markets
for the allocation of capital goods between socially owned enterprises falls under the subcategory of
market socialism.
By resource allocation mechanism
The basic and general "modern" economic systems segmented by the criterium of resource allocation
mechanism are:
Market economy ("hands off" systems, such as laissez-faire capitalism)
Mixed economy (a hybrid that blends some aspects of both market and planned economies)
Planned economy ("hands on" systems, such as state socialism, also known as "command economy"
when referring to the Soviet model)
Main types
Capitalism
Capitalism generally features the private ownership of the means of production (capital) and a market
economy for coordination. Corporate capitalism refers to a capitalist marketplace characterized by the
dominance of hierarchical, bureaucratic corporations.
Mercantilism was the dominant model in Western Europe from the 16th to 18th century. This
encouraged imperialism and colonialism until economic and political changes resulted in global
decolonization. Modern capitalism has favored free trade to take advantages of increased efficiency due
to national comparative advantage and economies of scale in a larger, more universal market. Some
critics[who?] have applied the term neo-colonialism to the power imbalance between multi-national
corporations operating in a free market vs. seemingly impoverished people in developing countries.
Mixed economy
There is no precise definition of a "mixed economy". Theoretically, it may refer to an economic system
that combines one of three characteristics: public and private ownership of industry, market-based
allocation with economic planning, or free markets with state interventionism.
In practice, "mixed economy" generally refers to market economies with substantial state
interventionism and/or sizable public sector alongside a dominant private sector. Actually, mixed
economies gravitate more heavily to one end of the spectrum. Notable economic models and theories
that have been described as a "mixed economy" include the following:
Georgism – socialized rents on land
Mixed economy
American School
Dirigisme
Indicative planning, also known as a planned market economy
Japanese system
Nordic model
Progressive utilization theory
Social corporatism
Social market economy, also known as Soziale Marktwirtschaft
Socialist market economy
State capitalism
Socialist economy
Socialist economic systems (all of which feature social ownership of the means of production) can be
subdivided by their coordinating mechanism (planning and markets) into planned socialist and market
socialist systems. Additionally, socialism can be divided based on their property structures between
those that are based on public ownership, worker or consumer cooperatives and common ownership
(i.e. non-ownership). Communism is a hypothetical stage of socialist development articulated by Karl
Marx as "second stage socialism" in Critique of the Gotha Program, whereby the economic output is
distributed based on need and not simply on the basis of labor contribution.
The original conception of socialism involved the substitution of money as a unit of calculation and
monetary prices as a whole with calculation in kind (or a valuation based on natural units), with business
and financial decisions replaced by engineering and technical criteria for managing the economy.
Fundamentally, this meant that socialism would operate under different economic dynamics than those
of capitalism and the price system.[13] Later models of socialism developed by neoclassical economists
(most notably Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner) were based on the use of notional prices derived from a
trial-and-error approach to achieve market clearing prices on the part of a planning agency. These
models of socialism were called "market socialism" because they included a role for markets, money and
prices.
The primary emphasis of socialist planned economies is to coordinate production to produce economic
output to directly satisfy economic demand as opposed to the indirect mechanism of the profit system
where satisfying needs is subordinate to the pursuit of profit; and to advance the productive forces of
the economy in a more efficient manner while being immune to the perceived systemic inefficiencies
(cyclical processes) and crisis of overproduction so that production would be subject to the needs of
society as opposed to being ordered around capital accumulation.[14][15]
In a pure socialist planned economy that involves different processes of resource allocation, production
and means of quantifying value, the use of money would be replaced with a different measure of value
and accounting tool that would embody more accurate information about an object or resource. In
practice, the economic system of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc operated as a command
economy, featuring a combination of state-owned enterprises and central planning using the material
balances method. The extent to which these economic systems achieved socialism or represented a
viable alternative to capitalism is subject to debate.[16]
In orthodox Marxism, the mode of production is tantamount to the subject of this article, determining
with a superstructure of relations the entirety of a given culture or stage of human development.
Evolutionary economics
See also: Evolutionary economics

Karl Marx's theory of economic development was based on the premise of evolving economic systems.
Specifically, in his view over the course of history superior economic systems would replace inferior
ones. "Inferior" systems were beset by "internal contradictions" and "inefficiencies" that make them
"impossible" to survive over the long term. In Marx's scheme, feudalism was replaced by capitalism,
which would eventually be superseded by socialism.[17] Joseph Schumpeter had an evolutionary
conception of economic development, but unlike Marx he de-emphasized the role of class struggle in
contributing to qualitative change in the economic mode of production. In subsequent world history,
communist states run according to Marxist–Leninist ideologies have either collapsed or gradually
reformed their centrally planned economies toward market-based economies, for example with
perestroika and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Chinese economic reform and Đổi Mới in Vietnam.
Mainstream evolutionary economics continues to study economic change in modern times. There has
also been renewed interest in understanding economic systems as evolutionary systems in the emerging
field of complexity economics.
Context in society
An economic system can be considered a part of the social system and hierarchically equal to the law
system, political system, cultural and so on. There is often a strong correlation between certain
ideologies, political systems and certain economic systems (for example, consider the meanings of the
term "communism"). Many economic systems overlap each other in various areas (for example, the
term "mixed economy" can be argued to include elements from various systems). There are also various
mutually exclusive hierarchical categorizations.
What is economics? Economics is can say as branch of social science that read the production
distribution and consumption of goods and service. Definition of economics and associated terms such
as scarcity, choice , house hold, goods, consumption, production, and ceteris paribus.
When we talk about Economics system, economics system it is are way to studies the method and
institution by which societies determine the ownership, direction, and allocation of economics
resources. They are three types of economics system is socialist system, capitalist system, mixed
economics.
The three economics system.
Socialist system
Can tell as centrally planned or command economies. This system are fully controlled by government its
mean the choices about resources are made by and left to the government. This system i
Capitalist system
its mean free market economics, this economics system is like freedom economics because the
decisions take by the people who in the particular country.
Mixed economy
this economy system based on the free enterprise principle, there is some form of direct intervention
and control by the government
The question is asking about the mixed economy attempts to combine the advantages of free enterprise
system and the central command system
Definition of mixed economy
Mixed Economy can be defined as a form of organization where the elements of both capitalist economy
and socialist economy are found.
Simply in such type of economy there is the presence of private economic freedom with centralized
planning with a common goal of avoiding the problems associated with both capitalism as well as
socialism.
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In this system the liberty in the economic activities are influenced by the Government’s regulation and
licensing policies. Example like if are new business is coming to the market they must have the license by
the government for the particular business to operate in the country. So by this, the government can
became a big power in the country.
What is mixed economy?
A “mixed” economy system is a mix combination between socialism and capitalism. a market economy
where there is some government intervention although the degree of intervention is important in
ascertaining the effectiveness of the price mechanism.
The mixed economy refers to such an economic system wherein two the sector exist and function for
achieving national objectives. The two sectors are the public sector and private sector. Both these
sectors exist and function for achieving national objectives. Both these sectors make the economic
system of the country. In fact the mixed economy is the glad combination of private enterprise with
government enterprise on the one side there is freedom of enterprise, private ownership and profit
earning. On the other side there is government guidance and control so as to stop evil economic,
pressures. An order to remove the impact of the capitalistic economy, mixed economy has been
introduced. It prevails in most of the countries of the world.
ADVANTAGE
Mixed economy is help in increasing national production in the country. Both public and private sectors
work hard to bring about more production. The problems created by free enterprise and too much
public control are solved through mixed economy. It provides freedom of enterprise ownership and
profit earning as well as social welfare and political freedom. And all the national recourses are utilized
under mixed economy.
DISADVANTAGES
Mixed economy is half way house. It is not helpful in access optimal use of national resources. The
mixed economy suffers from the disadvantages of both the capitalism and the socialism. Mixed
economy seldom achieved progress. It suffers from continues back wardness. Under mixed economy use
without thought of different types occurs in the economy.
What is price mechanism?
The price device is a system of determination of prices and resource allocation. It operates in a free
market situation where forces of petition and supply mechanism prices. Both producers and consumers
base their specific production and consumption plans on the prevailing market price. When consumers
pay a price for a commodity, they motivate the producer of that commodity and hence more of the
same is produced and vice versa. The price paid becomes a vote for more production.
Prices are determined by shortages and surpluses. Because a shortage of a product causes the price to
rise, whereas a surplus causes the price to fall. The price will determine how much of a product a
producer decides to supply. If the product price is high then profit is greater and more will be supplied
due to producer profit motive. If consumers decide that they want more of a good (or if producers
decide to cut back supply), then demand will exceed supply. The resulting shortage causes the price to
rise.
The result is that consumers will be discouraged to buy as much where as producers will be encouraged
to supply more. The price of a good will continue to rise until the shortage has been eliminated. The
opposite is true if consumers decide that they want less of a good causing the price to fall until the
surplus is eliminated. As this process is continued we can see that there is only one price at which there
is neither upward nor downward pressure on price. This is termed the equilibrium price and occurs
when demand equals supply.
How government interfere
The intervention of the Government can take a number of forms.
Fixing prices above or below the free market equilibrium
Taxing the production or sale of carious goods
Subsidizing the production or sale of various goods
Price control is a clear example where government intervention disrupts the price mechanism. Prices
can be effected in a many of ways. A government subsidy will artificially reduce the price of a good and
boost demand, an example being certain foodstuffs. Conversely, a government tax or tariff in a good in
this way will increase its price to the consumer and decrease demand. This illustrates how government
can use the efficiency of the price mechanism to change supply and demand. The reason for their
interaction can be based on economic, social or political factors. For instance, tobacco products are
taxed very heavily thus artificially raising the price of the product. This reduces demand for cigarettes
despite their inelastic nature, thereby benefiting the general health of the population whilst raising
substantial revenues for other social programmers.
How does shortage happen?
The reduction in the supply of the item is then termed a shortage. A shortage occurs when a producer
cannot or will not produce an item for the current price and alsoa situation in wich quantity demanded
is greter then supplied. Consumers are unable to buy allthey want at the going price. Price is below
equilibrium and tends to rise to achive balace in the market. A good example of this is what happens
during a gas shortage. During the 1970’s, the gas shortage experienced in the US was due to the fact
that the oil companies were raising the price of gas and consumers were forced to cut back on the
amount that they used due to the high cost.
Government stepped in, established an excess profits tax on the oil companies, and fixed the price of
gasoline. The oil companies had plenty of gas in their storage facilities but were unwilling to sell more
than a certain amount at the price dictated by the government. Because of this, the market had less gas
to distribute to consumers at the government defined price. The results of this were lines to buy gas and
rationing.
How does surplus happen?
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:37]
Its time when are quantity supplied is more than quantity demanded. Price above equilibrium price.
People who produce are unable to sell all they want at the going price and price tends to fall to achieve
balance in the market. Surplus can say also has a particular thing is not to demand but the supplier
supply more and so it’s became access
The Plan Behind a Mixed Economy
The basic plan of the mixed economy is that:
The means of production are mainly under private ownership;
Markets remain the dominant form of economic coordination; and

Profit-seeking enterprises and the accumulation of capital would remain the fundamental driving
force behind economic activity. However, the government would wield considerable indirect influence
over the economy through fiscal and monetary policies designed to counteract economic downturns
and capitalism’s tendency toward financial crises and unemployment, along with playing a role in
interventions that promote social welfare. Subsequently, some mixed economies have expanded in
scope to include a role for indicative economic planning and/or large public enterprise sectors.
The relative strength or weakness of each component in the national economy can vary greatly between
countries. Economies ranging from the United States to Cuba have been termed mixed economies. The
term is also used to describe the economies of countries which are referred to as welfare states, such as
Norway and Sweden.
What do Governments Provide?
Governments in mixed economies often provide:
Environmental protection,
Maintenance of employment standards,
A standardized welfare system,
Maintenance of competition.
Who Supports the Ideal of Mixed Economies?
As an economic ideal, mixed economies are supported by people of various political persuasions,
typically center-left and center-right, such as social democrats or Christian democrats. Supporters view
mixed economies as a compromise between state socialism and laissez-faire capitalism that is superior
in net effect to either of those.
Keynesian economics advocates a mixed economy — predominantly private sector, but with a
significant role of government and public sector. It also served as the economic model during the later
part of the Great Depression, World War II, and the post-war economic expansion (1945–1973), though
it lost some influence following the tax surcharge in 1968 and the stagflation of the 1970s. The advent of
the global financial crisis in 2008 has caused a resurgence in Keynesian thought.
The Benefits of Mixed Economies

A mixed economy allows private participation in production while ensuring that society is protected
from the full swings of the market.
Learning Objectives
Outline the characteristics of a mixed economy that help to maintain a stable economy
Key Takeaways
Key Points
Mixed economies allow many more freedoms than command economies, such as the freedom to
possess the means of production; to participate in managerial decisions; to buy, sell, fire, and hire as
needed; and for employees to organize and protest peacefully.
Mixed economies have a high level of state participation and spending, leading to tax-funded libraries,
schools, hospitals, roads, utilities, legal assistance, welfare, and social security.
Various restrictions on business are made for the greater good, such as environmental regulation,
labor regulation, antitrust and intellectual property laws.
The ideal combination of these freedoms and restrictions is meant to ensure the maximum standard
of living for the population as a whole.
Key Terms
monopoly: An exclusive control over the trade or production of a commodity or service through
exclusive possession.
protectionism: A policy of protecting the domestic producers of a product by imposing tariffs, quotas
or other barriers on imports.
Social Security: A system whereby the state either through general or specific taxation provides
various benefits to help ensure the wellbeing of its citizens.
Overview: The Advantages of a Mixed Economy
A mixed economy permits private participation in production, which in return allows healthy
competition that can result in profit. It also contributes to public ownership in manufacturing, which can
address social welfare needs.
image
Marketplace: Private investment, freedom to buy, sell, and profit, combined with economic planning by
the state, including significant regulations (e.g., wage or price controls), taxes, tariffs, and state-directed
investment.
The advantage of this type of market is that it allows competition between producers with regulations in
place to protect society as a whole. With the government being present in the economy it brings a sense
of security to sellers and buyers. This security helps maintain a stable economy.
Overall, businesses, as well as consumers, in mixed economies have freedoms that are important to
both. And while government is actively involved and provides support, its control is limited, which is
good for structure.
The Details: The Advantages of a Mixed Economy
In a mixed economy, private businesses can decide how to run their businesses (e.g. what to produce,
at what price, who to employ, etc.).
Consumers also have a choice in what they want to buy.
In this system, there is also less income inequality.
Monopolies, market structures that are the only producer of a certain product, are allowed under
government watch so they do not make it impossible for entrepreneurs in the same industry to succeed.
More specifically:
The elements of a mixed economy have been demonstrated to include a variety of freedoms:
to possess means of production (farms, factories, stores, etc.)
to participate in managerial decisions (cooperative and participatory economics)
to travel (needed to transport all the items in commerce, to make deals in person, for workers and
owners to go to where needed)
to buy (items for personal use, for resale; buy whole enterprises to make the organization that creates
wealth a form of wealth itself)
to sell (same as buy)
to hire (to create organizations that create wealth)

to fire (to maintain organizations that create wealth)
to organize (private enterprise for profit, labor unions, workers’ and professional associations, non-
profit groups, religions, etc.)
to communicate (free speech, newspapers, books, advertisements, make deals, create business
partners, create markets)
to protest peacefully (marches, petitions, sue the government, make laws friendly to profit making
and workers alike, remove pointless inefficiencies to maximize wealth creation).
They provide tax-funded, subsidized, or state-owned factors of production, infrastructure, and services:
libraries and other information services
roads and other transportation services
schools and other education services
hospitals and other health services
banks and other financial services
telephone, mail, and other communication services
electricity and other energy services (e.g. oil, gas)
water systems for drinking, agriculture, and waste disposal
subsidies to agriculture and other businesses
government-granted monopoly to otherwise private businesses
legal assistance
government-funded or state-run research and development agencies
Such governments also provide some autonomy over personal finances, but include involuntary
spending and investments, such as transfer payments and other cash benefits, including:
welfare for the poor
social security for the aged and infirm
government subsidies to business
mandatory insurance (e.g. automobile)

They also impose regulation laws and restrictions that help society as a whole, such as:
environmental regulation (e.g. toxins in land, water, air)
labor regulation, including minimum wage laws
consumer regulation (e.g. product safety)
antitrust laws
intellectual property laws
incorporation laws
protectionism
import and export controls, such as tariffs and quotas
taxes and fees written or enforced with manipulation of the economy in mind
The Disadvantages of Mixed Economies
The disadvantages of mixed economies can be understood through examining criticisms of social
democracy.
Learning Objectives
Examine the criticisms of social democracy as a vessel to understanding the disadvantages of mixed
economies.
Key Takeaways
Key Points
One disadvantage of mixed economies is that they tend to lean more toward government control and
less toward individual freedoms.
While most modern forms of government are consistent with some form of mixed economy, the
mixed economy is most commonly associated with social democratic parties or nations run by social
democratic governments.
Some critics of contemporary social democracy argue that when social democracy abandoned
Marxism it also abandoned socialism and has become, in effect, a liberal capitalist movement.
Marxian socialists argue that because social democratic programs retain the capitalist mode of
production they also retain the fundamental issues of capitalism, including cyclical fluctuations,
exploitation and alienation.
The democratic socialist critique of social democracy states that capitalism could never be sufficiently
“humanized” and any attempt to suppress the economic contradictions of capitalism would only cause
them to emerge elsewhere.
Market socialists criticize social democracy for maintaining a property-owning capitalist class, which
has an active interest in reversing social democratic policies and a disproportionate amount of power
over society to influence governmental policy as a class.
Key Terms
regulation: A law or administrative rule, issued by an organization, used to guide or prescribe the
conduct of members of that organization.
social democracy: a moderate political philosophy or ideology that aims to achieve socialistic goals
within capitalist society such as by means of a strong welfare state and regulation of private industry
mixed economy: Mixed economy is an economic system in which both the state and private sector
direct the economy, reflecting characteristics of both market economies and planned economies.
One disadvantage of mixed economies is that they tend to lean more toward government control and
less toward individual freedoms. Sometimes, government regulation requirements may cost a company
so much that it puts it out of business. In addition, unsuccessful regulations may paralyze features of
production. This, in return, can cause the economic balance to shift.
Another negative is that the government decides the amount of tax on products, which leads to people
complaining about high taxes and their unwillingness to pay them. Moreover, lack of price control
management can cause shortages in goods and can result in a recession.
Disadvantages of Social Democratic Policy In a Mixed Economy
While most modern forms of government are consistent with some form of mixed economy, given the
broad range of economic systems that can be described by the term, the mixed economy is most
commonly associated with social democratic parties or nations run by social democratic governments. In
contemporary terms, “social democracy” usually refers to a social corporatist arrangement and a
welfare state in developed capitalist economies.
Critics of contemporary social democracy argue that when social democracy abandoned Marxism it also
abandoned socialism and has become, in effect, a liberal capitalist movement. They argue that this has
made social democrats similar to center-left, but pro-capitalist groups, such as the U.S. Democratic
Party.
image
The Democratic Party Logo: The Democratic party in the United States is seen by some critics of
contemporary social democracy (and mixed economies) as a watered-down, pro-capitalist movement.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:38]
Marxian socialists argue that because social democratic programs retain the capitalist mode of
production they also retain the fundamental issues of capitalism, including cyclical fluctuations,
exploitation and alienation. Social democratic programs intended to ameliorate capitalism, such as
unemployment benefits or taxation on profits and the wealthy, create contradictions of their own
through limiting the efficiency of the capitalist system by reducing incentives for capitalists to invest in
production.
Others contrast social democracy with democratic socialism by defining the former as an attempt to
strengthen the welfare state and the latter as an alternative socialist economic system to capitalism. The
democratic socialist critique of social democracy states that capitalism could never be sufficiently
“humanized” and any attempt to suppress the economic contradictions of capitalism would only cause
them to emerge elsewhere. For example, attempts to reduce unemployment too much would result in
inflation, and too much job security would erode labor discipline. In contrast to social democracy,
democratic socialists advocate a post-capitalist economic system based either on market socialism
combined with workers self-management, or on some form of participatory-economic planning.
Social democracy can also be contrasted with market socialism. While a common goal of both systems is
to achieve greater social and economic equality, market socialism does so by changes in enterprise
ownership and management, whereas social democracy attempts to do so by government-imposed
taxes and subsidies on privately owned enterprises. Market socialists criticize social democracy for
maintaining a property-owning capitalist class, which has an active interest in reversing social
democratic policies and a disproportionate amount of power over society to influence governmental
policy as a class.
CHARACTERISTICS, ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
1. ECONOMICS: ECONOMIC SYSTEMS BY DINEO NKAWANE.

2. LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Definition of the economy. Definition of economic system. Types of
economic systems. The types of economic systems addressing the three questions in the economy.
Characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of the types of economic systems.
3. What is economics? ECONOMICS is the social science that analyzes the production, distribution
and consumption of goods & services. {by Shoresinha, A. (2011) } Economics is the study of how
individuals and societies make decisions about ways to use scarce resources to fulfil wants and needs.
{Michael. N (2012) } ECOMOMICS is the study of choices that we make everyday.
4. What is economy? continue Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a
relationship between given ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.(Robbins, L) WHAT IS
ECONOMIC SYSTEM? Economic System is the system of production, distribution and consumption.
5. What is economic system? cont. An economic system is a mechanism (also defined as system or
social institution) which deals with the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services
in a particular society. An economic system is the way in which country try to solve the questions of
what should be produced, with what and by whom. (Chaplin, C. Serfontein, B. Van zyl, C. (2012) solution
for all ECONOMICS. Published by: Macmillan South Africa.
6. BASIC CONOMIC CHOICES: • WHAT goods and services should be produced? • HOW should the
goods and services be produced? • WHO receive and consume these goods and services? (Yucub13
published on Feb. 10 2012. published in: Technology, Economy and Finance available on slide share)
7. BASIC ECONOMIC CHOICES TYPES OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM. WHAT TO PRODUCE? HOW TO

PRODUCE? FOR WHOM TO PRODUCE? Traditional economic system  Determined by tradition. 
Economic roles often passed from generation to generation.  Determined by custom.  Usually
centered around traditional family and social units such as tribe. Command economic system 
Determined by government officials.  Determined by government officials.  Determined by
government officials. Market economic system  Determined by  Determined by  Determined by
8. Types of economic systems: 1. Traditional economic system  people are expected to do what
their parents did.
9. Traditional economic system continue People are rich or poor based on their social level. It is
based on culture and tradition. Activities in traditional economy: farming gathering/ hunting herding
10. 2. Market economic system
11. Market economy continue: Market is a place where buyers and sellers meet to exchange goods
and services with medium of exchange(money). Market economy system is an economy where private
individuals take their own decisions with less government intervention.
12. 3. Command economic system In a command economy the resources are owned and controlled
by government. The government decides what and how goods are produced, distributed and shared.
Personal economic freedom is limited much like communism
13. 4. Mixed economic system Mixed economy combine the elements of command and market
economies. There are various degree where government involvement exist. Traditional economy will
develop into this kind of economy.
14. CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM. Are found in rural, non developed
countries. Technology is not used in traditional economies. Economic activities are usually centered
towards the family or ethnic unit. Men and women are given different economic roles and tasks.
15. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM. ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES  Clearly answers three economic questions.  They resist change.  Little
disagreement on economic goals.  Lower standard of living.  Higher occupancy and better
engagement of people within the community.  Prevent people to do what they want.  sense of pride.
 Lack of progress lead to lower standard of living.  Self sufficiency.
16. CHARACTERISTICS OF MARKET ECONOMY Resources are owned by individuals. Economic

decisions are made by individuals competing to make profit. There is individual freedom Economic
decisions are determined by the demand and supply
17. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MARKET ECONOMY. ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 

Freedom of choice.  Poverty still exist.  Control of the economy.  Because of profit motive there is
always self interest.  Monopoly power can be monitored and controlled.  Excessive government
spending may results in inefficiency.
18. CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMAND ECONOMY. Government makes the decision. Change can
occur easily. There is little individual freedom. There is no competition.
19. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF COMMAND ECONOMY. ADVANTAGES. DISADVANTAGES 

Equal distribution of income.  Shortage of consumer goods and services.  There is no wastage caused
by competition.  Lack of consumer choice because of lack of competition by producers.  The state
provides all social services.  Low economic growth.
20. CHARACTERISTICS OF MIXED ECONOMIC SYSTEM. Democracy and freedom exist. Competition
exist between businesses. Government intervene and passes laws to improve the running of the
economy. There is public and private ownership of businesses.
21. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MIXED ECONOMIC SYSTEM. ADVANTAGES.

DISADVANTAGES.  Freedom of choice.  Poverty still exist.  There is control of the economy. 
Because of profit motive there is always self interest.  Improved social welfare.  Excessive government
spending may results in inefficiency.
2. describe about the traditional court system in Ethiopia in different society
1. Introduction
1.1 Country Profile

Ethiopia is located in East Africa in the sub-region known as the Horn of Africa. It covers an area of about
1.2 millions square kilometers. It is bordered by Sudan on the west, Kenya on the south, Somalia and
Djibouti on the east, and Eritrea on the north. It has a population of some 80 million inhabitants, about
85 per cent of whom earn their living from agriculture. [[1]] Agriculture is the backbone of the national
economy. The country has a GDP per capita of about USD 318. [[2]] Life expectancy at birth is 53 years
for males and 56 years for females. [[3]] Ethiopia’s capital city, Addis Ababa, is the sit of numerous
international and regional organizations including the African Union and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa.
1.2 Overview of Modern Political History
Ethiopia is one of the ancient countries in the world. Present day Ethiopia was created by highland rulers
through twin processes of political and economic conquest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Emperor Menelik II (r. 1889-1913) embarked on a campaign of expanding his rule from the
central highland regions to the South, West and East of the country and established the current map of
Ethiopia, a country housing more than eighty different ethnic groups. [[4]] Emperor Menlik II also led the
Ethiopian forces that defeated the Italian colonial army at the battle of Adwa in March 1896, in Tigray,
North Ethiopia. After the demise of the power of Emperor Menlik II and his eventual death, Ras Tafari
Mekonnen won the power struggle and was crowned Emperor Haile Selassie in November 1930.
Although Emperor Haile Selassie is credited for the modernisation of the bureaucracy and for
establishing a relatively longer period of political stability, his reign was controversial, inter alia, because
of his exile during the second Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1936-1941 and the oppressive control of the
political and economic life of the citizenry. [[5]] In 1961 the royal bodyguard attempted a coup d’état
which was taken as a sign of the popular dissatisfaction with the pace of development and liberalization
at the time. The lack of proper and adequate reform led to a growing movement against Haile Selassie’s
regime mostly led by the radical and left wing intelligentsia. The popular movement caused the break
down of Haile Selassie’s regime in 1974. The lack of organized political groups to lead the country
enabled a group of low ranking military officers called the Derg [[6]] to assume power in September
1974. The Derg era was characterized by massive human rights violations and internal conflicts. In 1991
the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) launched a successful military assault
through central and western provinces, while in the east, Eritrean forces closed in on the cities of Assab
and Asmara. [[7]] In May 1991, the Head of State, Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam, fled to Zimbabwe.
EPRDF forces took control of Addis Ababa at the end of May 1991. In July 1991 a national conference
established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. The conference also endorsed a Transitional
Charter that worked as an interim constitution. In December 1994 the newly elected federal parliament
ratified the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
2. Overview of the Ethiopian Legal System
2.1 Law-Making Institutions
(A) Federal Institutions
(1) The Federal Legislature
The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution) establishes a two-
house parliament for the federal government: the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of
Federation. [[8]] Although the FDRE Constitution establishes a two-house parliament, the Ethiopian
Parliament is not bicameral in the strict sense of the term. The highest legislative authority is vested in
the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), which is comparable to the first or lower chamber of a
legislature, normally serving the interests of the people in the federation as a whole. The members of
the HPR are elected by a plurality of the votes cast in general elections every five years. [[9]] The HPR
has 550 members, and at least 20 seats are reserved for minority nationalities and peoples in order to
ensure their representation. However, the FDRE Constitution does not define these groups, save that it
declares that particulars shall be determined by law. [[10]]
The Ethiopian system is essentially parliamentarian, where the political party or parties with the greatest
number of seats in the HPR shall form and lead the executive and approve the appointment of members
for the executive Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. [[11]] The HPR shall also nominate the
candidate for the president, who will be accepted by a two-thirds majority of both chambers of the
legislature. [[12]] The President has no real powers, but should, similar to other constitutional
presidents and monarchs, formally sign all new laws coming from the HPR. [[13]] The Prime Minister has
extensive powers, akin to those of presidents in presidential systems. [[14]]
Members of the HPR are popularly elected for a five-year term in a “first-past-the-post” electoral
system. The most important function of the HPR is to enact laws on matters assigned to federal
jurisdiction and ratify national policy standards. [[15]] The HPR also exercises other important functions
including the appointment of federal judges, the ratification of international agreements and the
investigation of the conduct of members of the executive.
The House of the Federation (HOF) is the second or upper chamber in the federal government of
Ethiopia. In conventional federal systems, the second chamber serves as the representative institution
for the regional units. In the Ethiopian system, the HOF has essentially the same function, but in the
FDRE Constitution, this is formulated in a slightly different way: it is not composed of representatives
from the federal units, but “of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples”. [[16]]
Each officially recognized ethno-national group should have in principle one representative in the HOF.
Additionally, the population number of each nation or nationality is taken into consideration by giving
one representative extra for each million of its population. [[17]] Members of the HOF are elected by the
State Councils in each regional state. [[18]] The HOF is given the most important power of the
interpretation of the FDRE Constitution.[[19]] The HOF is also empowered to decide upon issues related
to the rights of states to self-determination including secession, find solutions to disputes between
states, and determine the division of joint federal and state revenues and the federal subsidies to the
states. [[20]]
(2) The Federal Executive
(i) The Prime Minister
The power of government is granted to the majority party in the House of Peoples’ Representatives
(HPR), and the highest executive powers of the federal government are vested in the Prime Minister and
Council of Ministers, who are accountable to the HPR. [[21]] The Prime Minister is elected from among
members of the HPR and is not subject to a term limit. The Prime Minister has the following powers and
functions: [[22]]
· The Prime Minister is the Chief Executive, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the
Commander-in-Chief of the national armed forces.
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· The Prime Minister shall submit for approval to the House of Peoples’ Representatives nominees for
ministerial posts from among members of the two Houses or from among persons who are not
members of either House and possess the required qualifications.
· He shall follow up and ensure the implementation of laws, policies, directives and other decisions
adopted by the House of Peoples' Representatives.
· He leads the Council of Ministers, coordinates its activities and acts as its representative.
· He exercises overall supervision over the implementation of policies, regulations, directives and
decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers.
· He exercises overall supervision over the implementation of the country’s foreign policy.
· He selects and submits for approval to the House of Peoples’ Representatives nominations for posts
of Commissioners, the President and Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court and the Auditor
General.
· He supervises the conduct and efficiency of the Federal administration and takes such corrective
measures as are necessary.
· He appoints high civilian officials of the Federal Government other than those referred to in sub-
Articles 2 and 3 of this Article.
· In accordance with law enacted or decision adopted by the House of Peoples’ Representatives, he
recommends to the President nominees for the award of medals, prizes and gifts.
· He shall submit to the House of Peoples’ Representatives periodic reports on work accomplished by
the Executive as well as on its plans and proposals.
· He shall discharge all responsibilities entrusted to him by this Constitution and other laws.
· He shall obey and enforce the Constitution.
(ii) The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers along with the Prime Minister is vested with the highest executive authority.
The Council of Ministers comprises the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers and other
members as may be determined by law. The Council of Ministers has the following powers and
functions: [[23]]
· The Council of Ministers ensures the implementation of laws and decisions adopted by the House of
Peoples’ Representatives.
· It shall decide on the organizational structure of ministries and other organs of government
responsible to it; it shall coordinate their activities and provide leadership.
· It shall draw up the annual Federal budget and, when approved by the House of Peoples’
Representatives, it shall implement it.
· It shall ensure the proper execution of financial and monetary policies of the country; it shall
administer the National Bank, decide on the printing of money and minting of coins, borrow money from
domestic and external sources, and regulate foreign exchange matters.
· It shall protect patents and copyrights.

· It shall formulate and implement economic, social and development policies and strategies.
· It shall provide uniform standards of measurement and calendar.
· It shall formulate the country’s foreign policy and exercise overall supervision over its
implementation.
· It shall ensure the observance of law and order.
· It has the power to declare a state of emergency; in doing so, it shall submit, within the time limit
prescribed by the Constitution, the proclamation declaring a state of emergency for approval by the
House of Peoples’ Representatives.
· It shall submit draft laws to the House of Peoples’ Representatives on any matter falling within its
competence, including draft laws on a declaration of war.
· It shall carry out other responsibilities that may be entrusted to it by the House of Peoples’
Representatives and the Prime Minister.
· It shall enact regulations pursuant to powers vested in it by the House of Peoples’ Representatives.
(B) State Institutions
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The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia consists of the Federal Government and nine member
States (also referred to as regions or regional States) and two federal cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.
The nine member States of the federation are the State of Tigray, the State of Afar, the State of Amhara,
the State of Oromia, the State of Somalia, the State of Benshangul/Gumuz, the State of the Southern
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, the State of Gambela, and the State of Harari People. [[24]] The FDRE
Constitution provides that the nine member States of the federation shall have legislative, executive and
judicial powers over matters falling under State jurisdiction. [[25]] Within their legislative mandate, the
member States of the federation have the power to enact and execute state constitutions. [[26]] All
member States of the federation have enacted their respective constitutions. The State constitutions
provide the details of the legislative, executive and judicial branch of State administration.
(1) The State Legislature
The FDRE Constitution empowers member states of the federation to establish a legislative organ called
the State Council. [[27]] The State Council is composed of representatives accountable to the people of
the State. The State Council represents the highest level of state authority, and has the power of
legislation on all matters falling under state jurisdiction. [[28]] The State Council is also given the power
to draft, adopt and amend the state constitution. [[29]] State Constitutions provide the number of the
members of the State Councils in each state and the modalities of their election. Most States have only a
single parliamentary Council that both enacts laws and decides State constitutional issues. In at least
two States, however, second legislative houses have been established to decide State constitutional
issues, similar to the role of the Federal House of Federation. [[30]] Where they exist at State level,
these separate constitutional decision-making parliamentary bodies are known as the House of
Nationalities.
(2) The State Executive
The State administration constitutes the highest organ of executive power. [[31]] The State
administration has a Chief Administrator, or Regional Administrator as its chief executive officer. The
Chief Administrator is elected among members of the State Council by a political party or coalition of
political parties that constitutes a majority in the State Council. The Chief Administrator establishes the
State executive council and nominates its members. The members of the State executive council (the
Chief Administrator, Deputy Administrator and the heads of the various regional bureaus) need to be
confirmed by the State Council. State executive councils have the power to implement laws and policies
enacted by the State Council and the federal legislature. The State executive structure is replicated in
lower State administration levels such as Zones and Weredas (districts).
2.2 The Judiciary
2.2.1 Federal Courts
(A) Structure and Jurisdiction
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Ethiopia has a dual judicial system with two parallel court structures [[32]]: the federal courts and the
state courts with their own independent structures and administrations. Judicial powers, both at Federal
and State levels, are vested in the courts. The FDRE Constitution states that supreme federal judicial
authority is vested in the Federal Supreme Court and empowers the HPR to decide by a two-third-
majority vote to establish subordinate federal courts, as it deems necessary, nationwide or in some
parts of the country. [[33]] There is a Federal Supreme Court that sits in Addis Ababa with national
jurisdiction and until recently, the Federal High Court and First Instance Courts were confined to the
federal cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. In recent years, Federal High Courts have been established
in five States. [[34]] Federal courts at any level may hold circuit hearings at any place within the State or
“area designated for its jurisdiction” if deemed “necessary for the efficient rendering of justice.” [[35]]
Each court has a civil, criminal, and labor division with a presiding judge and two other judges in each
division.
The Federal Supreme Court includes a cassation division with the power to review and overturn
decisions issued by lower federal courts and State Supreme Courts containing fundamental errors of
law. Besides, judicial decisions of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court on the
interpretation of laws are binding on Federal as well as State courts. [[36]]
The Federal Courts Proclamation allocates subject-matter jurisdiction to federal courts on the basis of
three principles: laws, parties and places. It stipulates that federal courts shall have jurisdiction over,
first, “cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws and international treaties,’ second, over parties
specified in federal laws.” [[37]] Article 3(3) of the Federal Courts Proclamation states that federal courts
shall have judicial power in places specified in the FDRE Constitution or in federal laws. Article 5 of the
same Proclamation stipulates that federal courts shall have civil jurisdiction over “cases to which a
federal government organ is a party; suits between persons permanently residing in different regions;
cases regarding the liability of officials or employees of the federal government in connection with their
official responsibilities or duties; cases to which a foreign national is a party; suits involving matters of
nationality; suits relating to business organizations registered or formed under the jurisdiction of federal
government organs; suits regarding negotiable instruments; suits relating to patent, literary and artistic-
ownership rights; and suits regarding insurance policy and application for habeas corpus’.
Article 4 of the Federal Courts Proclamation bestows upon federal courts criminal jurisdiction over:
offences against the national state; offences against foreign states; offences against the law of nations;
offences against the fiscal and economic interests of the federal government; offences regarding
counterfeit currency; offences regarding forgery of instruments of the federal government; offences
regarding the security and freedom of communication services operating within more than one region
or at international level; offences against the safety of aviation; offences of which foreigners are victims
or defendants; offences regarding illicit trafficking of dangerous drugs; offences falling under the
jurisdiction of courts of different regions or under the jurisdiction of both the federal and regional courts
as well as concurrent offences and offences committed by officials and employees of the federal
government in connection with their official responsibilities or duties. [[38]]
NOTE: Important cases are selected and compiled by the Federal Supreme Court. These compilations are
in Amharic ( the national working language) and are sold by the Federal Supreme Court. Otherwise
copies of cases can be acquired from the registrar of the court where they are finally settled.
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(B) Accountability and Administration
The FDRE Constitution provides that the President and Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court
shall be appointed by the House of Peoples’ Representatives upon the recommendation of the Prime
Minister; other federal judges are appointed by the HPR from a list of candidates selected by the Federal
Judicial Administration Commission.[[39]]
The FDRE Constitution prohibits the removal of judges before retirement age except for violation of
disciplinary rules, gross incompetence or inefficiency, or illness that prevents the judge from carrying out
his responsibilities. [[40]] Such determinations are made by the Federal Judicial Administration
Commission, which likewise decide issues of appointment, promotions, disciplinary complaints, and
other conditions of employment.
The Federal Judicial Administration Commission is a nine-member body comprising of six Federal judges
and three members of the House of Representatives. [[41]] The Commission is composed of the
following members: [[42]]
The President of the Federal Supreme Court, Chairman;
The Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court;
Three members of the House of Peoples' Representatives;
The most senior judge of the Federal Supreme Court;
The President of the Federal High Court;
The most senior judge of the Federal High Court ;
The President of the Federal First Instance Court.
The Federal Judicial Administration Commission has the following powers and duties: [[43]]
To select those who qualify for judgeship in accordance with Article 8 of this Proclamation from
among candidates nominated by members of the Commission;
To forward its opinion on the list of Regional Supreme and High Court candidate- Judges, submitted to
it by a Regional Judicial Administration Commission pursuant to
Article 81 (4) of the Constitution;
To issue the Disciplinary and Code of Conduct Rules for federal judges; ,
To decide on the transfer, salary, allowance, promotion, medical benefits and placement of federal
judges;
To examine and decide in accordance with Article79 (4) of the Constitution, matters presented to it
pursuant to article 9 herein. It may suspend a judge until the decision is approved by the House of
Peoples' Representatives, subject to details to be determined in the Disciplinary and Code of Conduct
Rules.
The day-to-day operations of the Federal Courts in Ethiopia are supervised and managed by court
presidents, who therefore act both as judges and administrators with responsibilities and obligations
towards the President of the Supreme Court.
2.2.2 State Courts
(A) Structure and Jurisdiction
The FDRE Constitution provides for the establishment of three levels of State courts: the State Supreme
Court (which also incorporates a cassation bench to review fundamental errors of state law), High
Courts, and First-Instance Courts. [[44]] State Supreme Courts sit in the capital cities of the respective
States and have final judicial authority over matters of State law and jurisdiction. State High Courts sit in
the zonal regions of States while State First Instance Courts sit at the lowest administrative levels of
States.
The FDRE Constitution delegates to State Supreme Courts and State High Courts the jurisdictions of the
Federal High Court and Federal First Instance Courts respectively.[[45]] In order to guarantee the right of
appeal of the parties to a case, decisions rendered by a State High Court exercising the jurisdiction of the
Federal First Instance Court are appealable to the State Supreme Court while decisions rendered by a
State Supreme Court on federal matters are appealable to the Federal Supreme Court. [[46]]
(B) Accountability and Administration

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The State systems of judicial administration and accountability mirror the federal process. The State
governments have also established Judicial Administration Commissions with a view to safeguarding the
independence and accountability of State Courts. With respect to appointment, the President and Vice-
President of the State Supreme Court are recommended by the President (Chief Executive Office) of the
States and appointed by the State Council; all other State judges are appointed by the State Council
based upon recommendations made by the State Judicial Administration Commission. Similar gurantees
of tenure of judges exist in State Judicial Administration Commissions.
2.2.3 Municipal Courts
The Addis Ababa City Charter creates two levels of City Courts exercising municipal jurisdiction: First
Instance and Appellate Courts. [[47]] There is no Supreme Court in the municipal system, although a
cassation bench is included within the Appellate Court. Cassation review of the Appellate Court
decisions can be brought before the Federal Supreme Court, which also decides jurisdictional conflicts
between the city and federal courts. [[48]] The Addis Ababa City Courts have civil, criminal and petty
offence jurisdiction. [[49]] The State of Oromia has also established similar Municipal Courts in cities
with more than 10, 000 people.
2.2.4 Social Courts
The Addis Ababa City Charter established Kebele [ [50]] Social Courts (more than 200 Kebeles exist in
Addis Ababa) to hear property and monetary claims up to 5,000 birr. [[51]] Social Court decisions can be
appealed to the First-Instance City Courts.[[52]] If there is a fundamental error of law in the decisions of
the First-Instance City Courts on appeal from Social Courts, it can be a ground to lodge cassation before
the Appellate Court of the City. [[53]] Some States have also established Social Courts that handle small
claims and minor disputes. [[54]]
2.2.5 Religious Courts
The FDRE Constitution provides the framework for the independent validity of non-state or unofficial
laws such as customary and religious laws in some fields of social activity. Article 34 (5) of the FDRE
provides that: “This Constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and
family laws in accordance with religious and customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the
dispute. Particulars shall be determined by law.” Article 78(5) of the FDRE Constitution also stipulates
that: “Pursuant to sub-Article (5) of Article 34 the House of Peoples’ Representatives and State Councils
can establish or give official recognition to religious and customary courts that had state recognition and
functioned prior to the adoption of the Constitution shall be organized on the basis of recognition
accorded to them by this Constitution.” As can be gleaned from the above-cited constitutional
provisions, formal legal pluralism under Ethiopia’s new constitutional order is confined to certain
matters: only personal status and family law.
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To date, Sharia Courts that apply Islamic law are the only religious courts that have been officially
established both at the federal and state levels. Sharia Courts apply only Islamic law and have their own
appellate system. They are required, however to follow the procedural rules of ordinary courts and
receive their budgets from the state. Parties must voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of these courts,
or the dispute should be redirected to the regular courts. Proclamation 188/1999 [[55]] spells out the
circumstances under which Islamic law can be applied by Sharia courts at the federal level. The Sharia
Courts at the federal level have been reconstituted in to a three-level judicial structure, distinct from the
regular federal judicial structure. These are: (1) Federal First-Instance Court of Sharia, (2) Federal High
Court of Sharia, and (3) Federal Supreme Court of Sharia. Like the federal state judicial organs, all the
federal Sharia courts have been made accountable to the Federal Judicial Administration Commission.
All of the State Councils have also given official recognition to Sharia Courts within their respective
jurisdictions.
Article 4(1) of Proclamation No. 188/1999 stipulates that Federal Courts of Sharia have common
jurisdiction over the following matters:
any question regarding marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of minors and family
relationships; provided that the marriage to which the question relates was concluded or the parties
have consented to be adjudicated in accordance with Islamic law;
· any question regarding Wakf, gift/Hiba/, succession of wills, provided that the endower or donor is
a Muslim or the deceased was a Muslim at the time of his death;
any question regarding payment of costs incurred in any suit relating to the aforementioned matters.
Sub-Article (2) of the same reiterates the principle of parties’ consent as the basis for the adjudicatory
jurisdiction of Sharia courts. Sharia courts can assume jurisdiction “only where... the parties have
expressly consented to be adjudicated under Islamic law.” Tacit consent has also been provided for in
addition to express consent. Pursuant to Article 5(2) of Proclamation No. 188/1999, failure to appear
before the Sharia court amounts to consent to the court’s jurisdiction on condition that the defaulting
party has been duly served with summons. Thus, the suit will be heard ex parte. Article 5(3) of the same
provides that in the absence of clear consent of the parties for the case to be adjudicated by the court of
Sharia before which the case is brought, such court shall transfer the case to the regular federal court
having jurisdiction. Moreover, once a choice of forum has been made by the plaintiff and the defendant
has consented to the jurisdiction of such a forum, under no circumstance can either party have their
case transferred to a regular court. [[56]]
2.2.6 Customary Courts
Customary courts are not established by law, despite their constitutional recognition. They are only
recognized, not created, by law. The authority of these courts stems from tradition and local customs.
These courts have evolved from traditional elder councils, which do not have legal authority, but carry
moral force and still operate widely as primary decision-makers in rural areas throughout Ethiopia. To
name but a few of the customary courts: the Shemagelle in Amhara, the Bayito and Abo Gereb in Tigray,
and the Luba Basa in Oromia. In addition, the choice whether to take a dispute to regular courts or to
one of those non-official forums is entirely left to the parties.
3. Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms as they are applied here refer to the mechanisms of
resolving differences through processes other than formal litigation in courts. This section outlines the
mechanisms found in formal laws and institutions rather than customary/ traditional methods.
3.1 The 1960 Ethiopian Civil Code (Civil Code)
(A) Conciliation
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The Civil Code Title XX, Chapter 1, Section 2, Article 3318 (1) defines conciliation as a process ‘where
parties may entrust a third party with the mission of bringing them together and, if possible, negotiating
a settlement between them’. The definition shows that conciliation is a voluntary process of mediation
based on negotiation between two or more parties for the amicable settlement of their dispute.
Moreover, Articles 3319 and 3320 of the Civil Code provide the duties of the parties to the negotiation
and the conciliator. Article 3319 of the Civil Code states that: (1) The parties shall provide the conciliator
with all the information necessary for the performance of his duties; (2) They shall refrain from any act
that would make the conciliator’s task more difficult or impossible.
In a similar parlance, Article 3320 of the Civil Code provides the duties of the conciliator as follows: (1)
Before expressing his findings, the conciliator shall give the parties an opportunity of fully stating their
views; (2) He shall draw up the terms of a compromise or, if none can be reached, a memorandum of
non-conciliation; and (3) He shall communicate these documents to the parties.
The Civil Code further provides that the conciliator shall carry out his/her duties within the period of
time fixed by the parties. Where the parties did not fix any time limit, the law provides that the
conciliator shall finish his work within six months from the date of her/his appointment. The law further
declares that the parties are not allowed to bring their case to the court before the expiry of the fixed
period of time unless the conciliator draws up a memorandum of non-conciliation. This means in effect
the parties can not take their case to a court before a negative or positive outcome of the process of
conciliation to which they have submitted themselves voluntarily (see Article 3321 (1) and (3) of the Civil
Code). As indicated in Article 3320 (2), the conciliation process can end up in drawing a non-conciliation
memorandum (a negative outcome) or it may end up in drawing a compromise (a positive outcome).
Where the outcome is a compromise, the meaning and legal consequences of a compromise are
provided under Title XX, Chapter 1, and Section 1 of the Civil Code. The following section (B) analyses
the relevant provisions on compromise.
(B) Compromise
As indicated above, conciliation may result in compromise. The Civil Code defines ‘compromise’ as a
mechanism where parties to a dispute ‘terminate an existing dispute’ or prevent future dispute ‘through
mutual concessions’ (Article 3307). In terms of format, the Civil Code provides that a compromise should
be made in a form of contracts. That means a compromise document drawn up as a result of the
conciliation process described in the section above should be made in writing and the parties to such
compromise will be bound by the terms only when they declare their acceptance in writing. Article 276
of the Ethiopian Civil Procedure Code provides the content of a compromise agreement. Once a
compromise is properly drawn and accepted by the parties, the Civil Code declares that ‘ [a]s between
the parties, the compromise shall have the force of res judicata without appeal’(see Article 3312(1)).
This means the agreement of the parties that resulted from the conciliation process is taken as final and
binding. The strong position of the Civil Code can also be inferred from its declaration that a
compromise can be invalidated only when there is a fundamental mistake (where for instance the
agreement of one of the parties was based on a false document) or when there was a court judgment
on the same issue that was subject of the compromise and when such judgment was unknown to at
least one of the parties. The compromise is considered void ab initio, where it relates to a contractual
agreement the object of which is contrary to the law or public morality (see Article 3316).
(C) Arbitration
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The Civil Code recognizes the procedure of arbitration to resolve cases out of the formal courts of law.
The provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 3325—3345) provide the details on arbitration.
3.2 The Labour Proclamation No.377/2003 and the Labour Conciliation Office
(A) The Labour Proclamation No.377/2003

The Labour Proclamation No.377/2003 is a law enacted by the federal government that recognizes and
protects the rights of employees and employers and governs their relationship. [[57]] The Labour
Proclamation provides for the possibility of conciliation between parties in a labour dispute. Article
136(3) of the Labour Proclamation defines labour dispute as ‘any controversy arising between a worker
and an employer or trade union and employers in respect of the application of law, collective
agreement, work rules, employment contract or customary rules and also any disagreement arising
during collective bargaining or in connection with collective agreement’.
Article 136(1) of the Labour Proclamation defines conciliation as ‘the activity conducted by a private
person or persons appointed by the Ministry [[58]] at the joint request of the parties for the purpose of
bringing the parties together and seeking to arrange between them voluntary settlement of a labour
dispute which their own efforts alone do not produce.’
The above definition shows that conciliation is a mediation process between parties with the objective
of finding amicable settlement of their labour dispute. The Labour Proclamation does not provide any
mandatory procedure that should be followed by a conciliator in finding amicable settlement to labour
disputes. In this regard, Article 142(2) of the Labour Proclamation generally provides that the ‘conciliator
shall endeavor to bring about a settlement by all reasonable means as may seem appropriate to that
end.’ The conciliator is expected to find amicable settlement to a labour dispute within 30 days. If it is
not possible to find amicable settlement, the conciliator shall write a report on the dispute and provide
the reasons why amicable settlement of the dispute was not possible. Once a report of non-conciliation
is drawn by the conciliator, any of the parties can take the case to the Labour Relations Board or the
Labour court for judicial settlement.
(B) The Labour Conciliation Office
As indicated above, the Labour Conciliation Office is established pursuant to the Labour Proclamation
No.377/2003 and attempts to find amicable settlement of labour disputes based on the voluntary
submission of the parties to its mediation efforts. It is also pointed out that the Labour Proclamation
No.377/2003 does not provide a procedure to be followed during the mediation process. Nonetheless, a
visit to the Labour Conciliation Office at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs reveals that the Office
follows the following written internal procedure in the mediation process: [[59]]
As a first step, one of the parties to a labour dispute should apply to the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs and request the Ministry to mediate the dispute.
The Labour Conciliation Office at the Ministry will then send a letter to the other party asking if it
agrees to the mediation process.
If the parties agree to the mediation process, a conciliator assigned for the case by the Ministry will
have a preliminary discussion with them.
The conciliator will collect all information and evidence connected with the case.
The conciliator will then examine the written applications and responses of the parties and require
oral explanation of issues, which are not clear on the written submission the parties.
The conciliator will attempt to build consensus between the parties taking the following points into
consideration:
Allowing the parties to propose solutions to their problems;
Tackling issues in the order of their importance;
Understanding the expectations of the parties out of the mediation process.
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Help the parties to develop a framework of agreement on the amicable settlement of the dispute.
Write down all points of agreement;
Advise on the implementation of the agreement;
Advise on how to avoid similar dispute in the future.
Where there is no agreement /no amicable settlement/, the conciliator shall write and send a report
to all concerned parties. The report shall contain:
The issues of the dispute;

The demands of the parties;
The efforts made by the conciliator to bring about amicable settlement of the dispute;
The weak and strong points of the parties in the mediation process.
According to the information gathered from the Labour Conciliation Office at the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs a little, more than half of the labour disputes that went through the mediation process are
settled amicably.
3.3 The Institution of the Ombudsman Establishment Proclamation No.211/2000
Article 22(1) of the Ombudsman Proclamation provides that ‘[a] complaint may be lodged by a person
claiming to have suffered from maladministration or, by his spouse, family member, and his
representative or by a third party.’ After a complaint is filed, the institution of the Ombudsman may
launch its investigation and examine evidence presented in support of the complaint. Once investigation
is done, the Ombudsman Proclamation provides amicable settlement as the first line of remedy. Thus,
Article 26(1) of the Ombudsman Proclamation declares that the institution shall make all the effort it can
summon to settle a complaint brought before it amicably.
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman Proclamation does not provide a procedure on the amicable settlement
of administrative disputes. In practice, investigators of the Ombudsman office have informally
conducted mediation processes to resolve some of the cases that came to their attention.
3.4 The Ethiopian Human Rights Establishment Proclamation 210/2000
In similar parlance with the Ombudsman proclamation, Article 26(1) of the Ethiopian Human Rights
Establishment Proclamation provides that the Human Rights Commission shall make all the effort it can
summon to settle a complaint brought before it amicably. Again, there is no procedure provided for the
amicable settlement of disputes. In practice, investigators of the Commission have informally conducted
mediation processes to resolve some of the cases that came to their attention.
3.5 The Ethiopian Arbitration and Conciliation Center and the Draft Mediation Law
(A) The Ethiopian Arbitration and Conciliation Center
The Ethiopian Arbitration and Conciliation Center (the Center) is an independent (non-governmental),
non-profit organization established by a group of lawyers in March 2004. The objectives of the Center
include the provision of Alternative Dispute Resolution services for the settlement of disputes in; inter
alia, business, labor and family relations. The Center has also the objective of working on research and
training as well as the introduction of new laws on Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms in
Ethiopia.
In line with the above objectives, the Ethiopian Arbitration and Conciliation Center has undertaken
numerous mediation efforts in cases involving family and labour rights. The Center carries out the most
organized mediation process compared to the other organizations mentioned in this report. As
explained in the section below, the Center has developed a draft mediation law. The Center uses the
provisions of the draft mediation law as the main instrument for its mediation efforts. In addition to the
draft mediation law, the Center follows the following steps in the mediation process:
· The Center undertakes mediation as a result of requests from two major sources. One source is
when a court of law refers a case to the Center. This is called court-annexed mediation. According to the
Executive Directress of the Center, about 10 court-annexed mediation efforts are being undertaken by
the Center currently.
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· The other request for mediation service comes directly from individuals. In such cases, the Center
calls on the other party and explains the applicant’s request for mediation. Where both parties agree to
the mediation effort, they sign a form expressing their agreement in some detail before they begin the
mediation process.
· In all kinds of mediation by the Center, the participants are at the end given a form that asks them
to evaluate the process.
· The Center conducts mediation processes at both its headquarters in Addis and its branch offices in
six states (Hawassa, Dire Dawa, Mekelle, Bahir Dar, Adama and Arba Minch) across the country.
(B) The Draft Mediation Law
The draft mediation law entitled ‘Draft Provisions on Mediation’ was initially prepared by the Ethiopian
Arbitration and Conciliation Center. It is believed that the draft law is under consideration by the
relevant committees in the House of Peoples’ Representatives.
The draft mediation law contains 29 articles. The draft mediation law can roughly be divided in to four
parts. The first part contains Articles 1-10 that define mediation, and explain the source of authority to
mediate as well as the respective roles and duties of the mediator and the parties to the mediation
process. Article 1(1) of the draft mediation law defines mediation as ‘a process by which a third party
neutral, whether one or more, acts as a facilitator to assist in resolving a dispute between two or more
parties’. Interestingly, Article 1(2) differentiates between a mediator and a conciliator. According to the
provision, a conciliator is more than a mediator as she/he can draw up and propose terms of agreement.
Nonetheless, Article 1(4) provides that ‘unless the context provides otherwise the term ‘mediator’ shall
be deemed to include the term ‘conciliator’ in the draft mediation law. Article 2(1) explains that the
source of authority in mediation is either agreement between parties to the mediation process or a
court of law. In relation to the capacity to act as a mediator, Article 4 (1) provides that ‘any physical
person having the capacity to contract may act as a mediator’. Article 6 (1) and (2) explain the role of the
mediator in the following terms:
The Role of the mediator shall be to facilitate communication between the parties, assist them in
focusing on real issues of the dispute and generate options for settlement.
He shall proceed building trust, educating each participant about the dispute from the other party’s
perspective and generate and evaluate possible solutions.
Article 8 of the draft mediation law declares that the mediator shall be impartial and independence and
provides that a ‘mediator shall have to disclose any current, past, or possible future relationship with
any one of the parties to the mediation before the process commences.’ Similarly, Article 10 establishes
the confidentiality of the mediation process while Article 19(2) declares that:
Unless disclosure is required by law, or for the enforcement of a settlement agreement, a mediator or
any staff of an institute in cases of institutional mediation, any representative of a party, an expert or a
professional may not disclose any information that came to his knowledge due to the process of
mediation.
In relation to the duties of the parties to the mediation process, Article 7 provides that the parties ‘shall
cooperate with the mediator’ and ‘owe the duty to attend the proceedings, respond to questions ,
submit evidences and clarifications whenever required to do so.’
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The second part of the draft mediation law contains Articles 11-20 that focus on defining and explaining
the actual process of mediation. Thus, Article 11 explains what the parties need to provide before the
mediation process begins. Article 12 provides that attendance is mandatory while Article 13 declares the
private nature of the mediation process. Article 17 provides that the mediator shall conclude his/her
duties within the period fixed by the parties or in the absence of such agreement within 90 days of
accepting her/his appointment.
The third part of the draft mediation law contains Articles 20-25 that provide the options at the end of
the mediation process. Thus, Article 22 (1) declares that a ‘mediation process, where possible, shall end
in a settlement agreement between the parties’ while Article 24 (1) provides that when ‘a mediation
process does not end in a settlement agreement, the mediator shall draw up a memorandum of non-
settlement’. The fourth part of the draft mediation law contains miscellaneous provisions (Articles 26-
29). It is worth noting that Article 28 provides a very important standard when it declares that a
‘mediator may not act as an arbitrator or a legal counsel or an advocate in any subsequent adversarial
process between the same parties and the same issues in the mediated dispute.
4. Law Enforcement Agencies
4.1 Federal Institutions
(A) The Ministry of Justice

The Federal Ministry of Justice is part of the executive branch of the Federal Government. The Federal
Ministry of Justice has the primary authority of prosecution of cases falling under the jurisdiction of
federal courts. Article 23 of Proclamation 471/2005 enumerates the powers and duties of the Ministry
of Justice. The Federal Ministry of Justice:
· Is chief advisor to the Federal Government on matters of law;
· Represents the Federal Government in criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts;
· Orders the conduct of investigation where it believes that a crime the adjudication of which falls
under the jurisdiction of the federal courts has been committed; orders the discontinuance of an
investigation or instructs further investigation on good cause; withdraw criminal charges in accordance
with the law;
· Studies the causes of and the methods of crime prevention; devise ways and means of crime
prevention; coordinate the relevant government organs in crime prevention;
· Ensure that witnesses to a criminal case are accorded protection, as necessary;
· Assists victims of crimes or violations of human rights in civil proceedings to claim damages where
such victims are unable to institute such claims in federal courts and to follow up the proceeding on
their own;
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Institutes or cause the institution of suits or intervene at any stage of the proceedings of such suits
before federal and regional state courts, any judicial body or arbitration tribunal where the rights and
interests of the public and of the Federal Government so require;
Registers religious organizations, nonprofit making foreign organizations and, unless specific power is
given to other government organs, non-governmental organizations and associations operating in the
cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa or in more than one Regional State;
Follows up, as necessary, the handling of civil sots and claims to which the federal government organs
are parties; cause reports-to be submitted to it on same, and ensure that competent staff is assigned for
the purpose;
Assists in the preparation of draft laws when, so requested by federal and regional state organs;
Issues, supervises and revokes licenses advocates for practicing before federal courts;
Provides legal education through the use of various methods with a view to raising public legal
consciousness in relation to the protection of human rights; cooperate with the appropriate bodies
regarding legal education and training;
Undertakes legal reform studies and carry out the codification and consolidation of federal laws;
collect regional State laws and consolidate.
Article 10 of the Council of Ministers Regulation 44/98 deals with the accountability of the Federal
Prosecutors and stipulate that prosecutors shall be accountable to the Minister of Justice and also to
their immediate or any superior. As the ultimate superior of all prosecutors, the Minister of Justice may
thus initiate a specific criminal investigation or stop another. The Minister also has the authority to
reverse a decision of a prosecutor or to dismiss a pending case.
(B) The Federal Police Commission
The Federal Police Commission is established by the Federal Police Commission Proclamation
No.313/213. The Commission is accountable to the Ministry of Federal Affairs. [[60]] Article 6 of
Proclamation No.313/213 provides that the Federal Police have, inter alia, the following powers and
functions:
· Prevent and investigate crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of Federal Courts;
· Prevent any activities in violation of the Constitution that may endanger the Constitutional order;
· Prevent violence against public peace, hooliganism, terrorism, trafficking in and transferring of
drugs;
· Prevent crimes against the interests and institutions of the Federal Government;
· Without prejudice to Sub-Article (2) of this Article, maintain law and order in any region in
accordance with the order of the Federal Government when there is a deteriorating security situation
beyond the control of the concerned region and a request for intervention is made by the region: or
when disputes arise between two or more regions and the situation becomes dangerous for the Federal
security;
· Safeguard the security of borders, airports, railway lines and terminals, mining areas, and other vital
institutions of the Federal Government;
· Give security protection to higher officials of the Federal Government and dignitaries of foreign
countries;
· Execute orders and decisions of courts;
· Execute orders issued by the Federal Public Prosecutor in regard to investigation of crimes;
· Issue a certificate of no criminal record.
(C) The Federal Prisons Commission
The Federal Prisons Commission is established by Proclamation No.365/2003 as an institution

accountable to the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The objectives of the Commission is to admit and ward
prisoners, and provide them with reformative and rehabilitative service in order to enable them make
attitudinal and behavioral changes, and become law abiding, peaceful and productive citizens. The
Federal Prisons Commission has powers and functions akin to most prison facilities.
4.2 State Institutions
(A) The State Justice Bureaus
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The State Justice Bureaus mirror the Federal Ministry of Justice in their structure and mandate. The
State Justice Bureaus are part of the executive branch of the State government. They have similar
powers and functions with that of the Federal Ministry of Justice. The Head of a State Justice Bureau has
similar powers with the Federal Minister of Justice.
(B) The State Police and Prison Commissions
States are allowed to establish their own Police and Prison Commissions. [[61]] The Police and Prison
Commissions of the States are accountable to the State Justice Bureaus. Even though the State Police
and Prison Commissions are functionally independent, they are obliged to cooperate with their federal
counterparts in order to maintain improved conditions of prisons across the nation.[[62]]
5. Sources of Ethiopian Law
5.1 Federal Laws
(A) The FDRE Constitution

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution) was adopted in
Addis Ababa by the Constitutional Assembly on the 8th of December 1994, and came into force on the
21st of August 1995. The FDRE Constitution is the supreme law of the land and, as such, all laws of the
country derive their legal validity from the Constitution. The FDRE Constitution contains 106 provisions
29 of which are dedicated to the recognition of the fundamental political, economic, social, and cultural
rights of citizens.
NOTE: All laws in Ethiopia (including the codes) are published by the state owned Berhanena Selam
printing press. The laws are sold at stores owned by the press in Addis Ababa and in other parts of the
country.
(B) International Treaties
Article 9(4) of the FDRE Constitution provides that “all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia are
an integral part of the law of the land.” Moreover, Article 13(2) of the FDRE Constitution provides that
the fundamental rights and freedoms recognized under Chapter 3 of Constitution shall be interpreted in
a manner conforming to International Covenants on Human Rights and international instruments
adopted by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has ratified numerous international and regional treaties. For instance,
Ethiopia has ratified the [Banjul] African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights ,[[63]] the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, [[64]] the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, [[65]] the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
[[66]] the Convention on the Rights of the Child,[[67]] the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, [[68]] the 1982 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ,[[69]] and the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.[[70]]
(C) Codified Laws and Statutes

During the period between 1957 and 1965, six comprehensive legal codes were enacted in Ethiopia. A
new Penal Code was introduced in 1957, which largely drew upon its counterpart in Switzerland. In the
1960's, in rapid succession, a large body of law was introduced into Ethiopia, in the form of five codes. .
First, the Civil, Commercial and Maritime Codes in 1960, followed by the Criminal Procedure Code in
1961, and finally, the Civil Procedure Code in 1965. All of the six codes were promulgated in the form of
proclamations as extraordinary issues in the Negarit Gazetta, the official legal gazette in place for the
publication of Ethiopian laws since 1942. In addition, a Revised Family Code, which has been in force
only within the federal jurisdiction and a Criminal Code, which has been in force throughout the
federation, have been promulgated in the form of proclamations in 2000 and 2005 respectively.
(D) Decrees, Regulations and Directives
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The Council of Ministers of the Federal Government can issue regulations. In practice a federal ministries
issue directives. The mandate to issue regulations and directives of the Council of Ministers and
Ministries respectively emanates from the House of Peoples’ Representatives as expressed in primary
legislations. Moreover, the Council of Ministers of the Federal Government is also empowered ‘to
decree a state of emergency should an external invasion, a break down of law and order which
endangers the constitutional order and which cannot be controlled by the regular law enforcement
agencies and personnel, a natural disaster, or an epidemic occur.’[[71]]
(E) Precedent
A precedent is a judicial decision, normally recorded in a law report, used as an authority for reaching
the same decision in subsequent cases by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare
decisis had been absent from the Ethiopian legal system until it was introduced very recently by virtue
Proclamation 454/2005. Pursuant to Article 2(1) of this Proclamation, judicial decision by the Cassation
Division of the Federal Supreme Court on interpretation of a law is binding on Federal and State Courts
at all levels.
5.2 State Laws

(A) State Constitutions
Article 52 (2) (b) of the FDRE Constitution provides that States can promulgate their own constitution. In
practice, all States of the federation have promulgated State Constitutions. The State Constitutions
declare their supremacy with in each State.
(B) State Proclamations
The above provision of the FDRE Constitution also allows States to issue proclamations on matters falling
under their jurisdiction. For instance, the States of Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and the Southern Nations,
Nationalities and People have enacted their own Family Codes.
(C) State Decrees, Regulations and Directives
State Executive Councils are empowered to decree a Statewide state of emergency should a natural
disaster or an epidemic occur.[[72]] State regulations and directives are issued by State Executive
Councils and State Bureaus by virtue of the power delegated to them by State Councils, the State
legislature.
5.3 Hierarchy
The FDRE Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It has primacy over all Federal as well as State
laws. Article 9(1) of the FDRE Constitution proclaims that any law, customary practice or a decision of an
organ of state or public official, which contravenes the Constitution, shall be no effect. At the federal
level, international agreements and proclamations have the same status as they are issued by the
Federal legislature. These are followed by Decrees, Regulations and Directives respectively. When
Decrees are adopted by the House of Representatives, it becomes a proclamation. The same order
applies to State laws.
5.4 Publications
The Federal and State laws described above are issued through the official publications indicated below.
The first row indicates the source of the laws while the second row indicates the name of the official
publication.
Federal Laws……….Federal Negarit Gazeta
Addis Ababa City…………..Addis Negarit Gazeta
Dire Dawa City…………..Dire Negarit Gazeta
The State of Oromia………….…Megeleta Oromia
The State of Tigray………………Negarit Gazeta Beherawe Mengiste Tigray
The State of Amhara …………..Zikre Hig
The State of Benshangul/Gumuz………….Lisane Hig
The State of Harari People ………………….Harari Negarit Gazeta’
The State of Afar………………………….Dinkara

The State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People……Debub Negarit Gazeta
6. National Human Rights Institutions
6.1 The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
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Article 55 of the FDRE Constitution requires the Federal government to establish a Human Rights
Commission and an Office of the Ombudsman. Proclamation 210/2000 was enacted to provide for the
establishment of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. Article 5 of Proclamation 210/2000 provides
that the objective of the Commission is “to educate the public be aware of human rights, see to it that
human rights are protected, respected and fully enforced as well as to have the necessary measure
taken where they are found to have been violated.” According to Article 6 of Proclamation No.210/200,
the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission has the following powers and duties:
· ensure that the human rights and freedoms provided for under the Constitution of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia are respected by all citizens, organs of state, political organizations and
other associations as well as by their respective officials;
· ensure that laws, regulations and directives as well as government decisions and orders do not
contravene the human rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution;
· educate the public, using the mass media and other means, with a view to enhancing its tradition of
respect for, and demand for enforcement of, rights upon acquiring sufficient awareness regarding
human rights;
· undertake investigation, jupon complaint or its own initiation, in respect of human rights violations;
· make recommendations for the revision of existing laws, enactment of new laws and formulation of
policies.
· provide consultancy services on matters of human rights;
· forward its opinion on human rights reports to be submitted to international organs;
· translate into local vernaculars, international human rights instruments adopted by Ethiopia and
disperse same;
· participate in international human rights meeting, conferences or symposia;
· own property, enter into contracts, sue and be sued in its own name;
· perform such other activities as may be necessary to attain its objective.
6.2 The Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman
The establishment of the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman is set out in Article 55(15) of the FDRE
Constitution. In line with this provision of the Constitution, the House of Peoples’ Representatives
enacted Proclamation 211/2000 that established the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman (EIO). The
EIO is designed to prevent and remedy arbitrary or unjust administrative actions of the executive vis-à-
vis its citizens, and to provide an easily accessible means to the public to assure that basic rights are not
violated by the executive without an avenue for complaint investigation and redress. According to
Article 5 of Proclamation 211/2000, the objective of the EIO is “to see to bringing about good
governance that is of high quality, efficient and transparent, and are based on the rule of law, by way of
ensuring that citizens' rights and benefits provided for by law are respected by organs of the executive.”
Article 6 of Proclamation 211/2000 stipulates that the EIO shall have the powers and duties to:
· supervise that administrative directives issued, and decisions given, by executive organs and the
practices thereof do not contravene the constitutional rights of citizens and the law as well;
· receive and investigate complaints in respect of maladministration;
· conduct supervision, with a view to ensuring that the executive carries out its functions in
accordance with the law and to preventing maladministration;
· seek remedies in case where it believes that maladministration has occurred;
· undertake studies and research on ways and means of curbing maladministration;
· make recommendations for the revision of existing laws, practices or directives and for the
enactment of new laws and formulation of policies, with a view to bringing about better governance;
· perform such other functions as are related to its objective.
7. Legal Education
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Currently the following state and private universities offer legal education at the indicated levels:
· School of Law, Addis Ababa University (LL.B. and LL.M. programs);
· Law Faculty, Mekele University (LL.B. program);
· Law Faculty, Bahir Dar University (LL.B. program);
· Law Faculty, Jimma University (LL.B. program);

· Law Department, Debub University (LL.B. and Diploma programs);
· Law Faculty, Saint Mary’s University College (LL.B. and Diploma programs);
· School of Law and International Studies, Unity University College (LL.B. program).
8. Legal Periodicals
Currently the following legal periodicals are published by universities and other institutions:
· The School of Law of Addis Ababa University publishes the following journals: 1) Journal of
Ethiopian Law; 2) Ethiopian Human Rights Law Series; 3) Ethiopian Business Law Series; 4) Ethiopian
Constitutional Law Series; and 5) Addis Ababa University Student Law Review.
· The Law Faculty of Jimma University publishes Jimma University Journal of Law.
· The Justice and Legal System Research Institute publishes the Ethiopian Journal of Legal Education.
· The Law Faculty, Saint Mary’s University College publishes Mizan Law Review.
· The Ethiopian Bar Association publishes the Ethiopian Bar Review.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:47]
Traditional CriMinal Procedure in Ethiopia
"'Nom odern legislation which does not have its roots in the customs of those whom it governs can have
a strong founda- tion." Haile Sellassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia
INMRODUCTION
In the decade 1955-1965 the Ethiopian government completely revolutionized its legal system by
promulgating comprehensive legal codes and a new constitution.1 These laws have a predominantly
Western flavor, and seem to bear little relation to the traditional patterns of life which still prevail in the
Empire-one of the least "developed" areas of Africa. This state of affairs has led some to
STANLEY Z. FIsHER is Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Assistant Professor, Haile
Sellassie I University Law Faculty, 1964-68. The author wishes to thank the SAILER program and its
parent organization, the International Legal Center of New York, for making possible the research for
this article. He also gratefully acknowledges the invaluable contribu- tions of Ato Seifu Felleke and Ato
Nebiyeleul Kifle, Ethiopian lawyers with whom this research was begun as a joint project, too long ago to
hold them responsible for its final shape and contents. Legal historian Thomas Green gave helpful
criticism of the article and provided useful references to Anglo-American legal sources. The citation is
from Fetha Nagast (Eng. transl. by Abba Paulos Tzadua; ed. by P. Strauss, 1968), Preface, p. v. [Cited
hereafter as Fetha Nagast]. 1. The codification history is reported in Vanderlinden, "Civil Law and
Common Law Influences on the Developing Law of Ethiopia," Buffalo L. Rev., vol. 16, p. 250. Literature
on the codification includes David, "Civil Code for Ethiopia," Tulane L. Rev., vol. 37, (1963), p. 187; David,
"Les sources du Code civil ethiopien," Rev. intVl de droit compare (1952), p. 497; Singer, "Modernization
of Law in Ethiopia: A Study in Process and Personal Values," Harv. Intl L.J., vol. 11 (1970), p. 73; J.
Graven, "Vers un nouveau droit penal ethiopien," Rev. int'l de criminologie et police technique (1954), p.
250; and other sources cited in Vanderlinden, "Outline of a Bibliography on Ethiopian Law," Journal of
Ethiopian Law (hereafter J. Eth. L.) vol. 3 (1966), pp. 256, 273 ff. passim, supplemented in J. Eth. L., vol. 4
(1967), p. 433. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1961 is discussed in P. Graven, "La nouvelle procedure
penale ethiopienne," Rev. penale suisse (1963), p. 70; P. Graven "Joinder of Criminal and Civil
Proceedings," J. Eth. L., vol. 1 (1964), p. 135; P. Graven, "Prosecuting Criminal Offences Punishable only
upon Private Complaint," J. Eth. L., vol. 2 (1965), p. 121; Current Issue, "Criminal Ap- peals," J. Eth. L., vol.
1 (1964), p. 349; Current Issue, "Conditional Release," J. Eth. L., vol. 2 (1965), p. 539; Fisher, "Some
Aspects of Ethiopian Arrest Law: The Eclectic Approach to Codification." J. Eth. L., vol. 3 (1966), p. 463;
Fisher, "Involuntary Confessions and Article 35, Criminal Procedure Code," J. Eth. L., vol. 3 (1966), p. 330,
and S. Fisher, Ethiopian Criminal Procedure (1969). The last-named work is hereafter cited as Fisher
(1969).
709
www.abyssinialaw.com
710 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 19
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:47]
characterize the new codes as "fantasy law," which may serve to put a modern "face" on the country
but, at least for some time to come, will not have any serious impact on the conduct of its affairs.2
Ethiopia's policy in regard to customary law does seem to have been remarkably negative. The codifiers
apparently made no attempt to review existing written sources on the customary legal systems in
operation throughout the Empire, much less to initiate or encourage systematic studies to supplement
the scanty information available. Post-hoc justifications of this policy have been published by some of
the code drafters as well as by scholars. They range from denial that customary law really existed in
Ethiopia, to negative comments on its changeability, lack of uniformity, incompleteness, obscurity, and
low status. These commentators also point out that some customs have been incorporated into the new
laws, or otherwise permitted to operate within the new legal framework, that uniformity of laws is
necessary and desirable for a country as heterogeneous as Ethiopia, and, finally, that the abandonment
of custom is not a serious worry because for a long time to come the codes will not be applied in large
parts of the Empire.3 These circumstances raise two important questions: first, what was "the
customary law" of Ethiopia which the codes changed, and, second, how have the new codes changed it,
both "on paper" and in practice? In this article we shall attempt to answer only the first of these
questions, with regard to the law of criminal procedure. Drawing mainly upon scattered secondary
sources,4 we shall attempt to construct a model of Ethiopian
2. Schiller, "The Changes and Adjustments Which Should be Brought to the Present Legal Systems of the
Countries of Africa to Permit them to Re- spond more Effectively to the New Requirements of the
Development of the Countries," in A. Tunc (ed), Les aspects juridiques du developpment econo- mique
(1966). See also Allott, "The Unification of Laws in Africa," Am. J. Comp. L., vol. 16 (1968), pp. 51, 52, 59,
describing the phenomenon as "phantom law." 3. Cf. David, "Sources of the Ethiopian Civil Code," J. Eth.
L., vol. 4 (1967), pp. 341-44; Sedler, "The Development of Legal Systems: The Ethiopian Experience," Ia.
L. Rev., vol. 53 (1967), p. 562, 567-68; Krzeczunowicz, "Code and Custom in Ethiopia," J. Eth. L., vol. 2
(1965), p. 425. 4. The present writer has primarily relied on the following sources in attempting to
reconstruct "traditional" Ethiopian criminal procedure: a. Secondary materials in English, Italian, French,
and Amharic in the Ethiopian collections at the Institute for Ethiopian Studies and the Law Faculty
Archives at Addis Ababa, the British Museum in Lon- don, the libraries of the Harvard and Boston
Universities, and the Library of Congress. Italian and Amharic materials required the use of translators.
Most of the materials were "travellers reports," which are difficult to use because their authors
frequently did not distinguish between what they personally observed and what they heard (or read)
about. Because of the possible pyramid effects of rumor- mongering, it is just possible that a "widely
reported" phenomenon was actually observed, or mis-observed, only once. In an effort to keep the
record clear, we have tried to cite differing or duplicate secondary accounts in detail.
1971] FISHER: TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 711
customary criminal procedure. This model will hopefully provide some basis for future research
assessing the Ethiopian Criminal Pro- cedure Code of 19615 in the light of this background.
THE CUSTOMARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Scope of Study
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procedure." In the past, a condition of legal dualism obtained for most subjects of the Empire. The
Imperial courts, whose structure we shall attempt to describe below, were the official judicial organs of
the nation. They supposedly administered as law the sacred legal text, the Fetha Nagast,7 and any
relevant Imperial orders. But particular ethnic groups in the Empire had their own dispute settlement
organs and procedures, which presumably paralleled the hierarchical structure of the Imperial system,
and these organs applied their own customary law.8 This picture, if it is an accurate reconstruction, is
further complicated by the fact that even among the highland Chris- tians the Fetha Nagast was not
widely applied; it remained an esoteric document hardly known or used outside of the highest Imperial
court -the Emperor's chilot.9 What law, then, did the Imperial courts actually apply? Although most of
the Imperial judges appear to have been (and, indeed, remain) Amharas, and they may have tended to
apply the law known to them, it is very likely that Imperial courts in non-Amhara areas, with the aid of
assessors, did at least attempt to apply the local customary law. If, at least in Amhara areas, the Imperial
courts generally applied Amhara customary law10-including the procedural law-then our inquiry into
customary Ethiopian criminal procedure need make no distinction between Imperial law courts on the
one hand, and "customary" law courts on the other. While it is true that many aspects of the criminal
procedure occurred outside of the courts-in "informal" adjudication or settlement, etc.-such activity
should be seen as part of, and subordinate to, the formal court mechanisms, rather than parallel to
them. Therefore, when we speak of "customary Ethiopian criminal procedure" we are referring to the
actual procedure followed among the Christian Amhara, whether before "duly constituted" Imperial
officials or other accepted bodies. However, our identification as "customary" law of all proceedings in
the Amhara areas, whether under Imperial sanction or otherwise,
7. The Fetha Nagast, "The Law of the Kings," is a text of religious and secular rules written in Egypt in the
thirteenth century as a guide for Coptic Christians living there. It was introduced into Ethiopia in the
15th or 16th Century. The religious content of the Fetha Nagast derives from the Old and New
Testaments, and its secular content from Roman-Byzantine law sources. See Foreword, Fetha Nagast,
pp. xv ff. 8. See Singer, "A Traditional Legal Institution in a Modern Setting: The Atbia Dagnia of
Ethiopia," U.C.L.A. L. Rev., vol. 18, no. 2 (Dec., 1970), p. 308. 9. W. Plowden, Travels in Abyssinia (1868),
pp. 93-94; A. Pollera, L'Abis- sinia di ieri (1940), p. 99 [cited hereafter as Pollera]; A. Raffray, Abyssinie
(1876), p. 162 [cited hereafter as Raffray]. But see, contra, Foreword, Fetha Nagast, pp. xxi ff. 10. One
might argue that Amhara law was not a "customary" legal system because its basic document, the
Fetha Nagast, was written. However, we apply the terms "customary" and "traditional" interchangeably
in this article to refer to the pre-1935 legal system.
1971] FISHE: TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 713
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:49]
cannot continue into the modern era of extensive legislation inspired by nonindigenous models. We
have therefore established 1935-the year of the Italian occupation-as a general cut-off date to the cus-
tomary era. Within that era, our chief focus will be on the latest periods (for which we have the most
information), starting with the reign of Menelik II (1889-1913). A last issue as to scope relates to the
meaning of "customary criminal procedure"-by what criteria do we regard certain procedures as
"criminal" and others as "civil"? In the great bulk of offenses considered "criminal" under
contemporary Western (and Ethio- pian) law-offenses against private property and aginst persons (in-
cluding homicide)-the injured party himself initiated and prosecuted the action. Indeed, as will appear
below, he also executed the penal sentence. Not only was the method of criminal prosecution "civil" in
character, but such offenses were usually "compoundable" in the sense that the injured party could
accept restitution and thereby save the offender, even after conviction, from penal sanctions. Certain
offenses such as blasphemy, perjury, banditry or treason were not subject to this "quasi-civil"
procedure, but were prosecuted and punished by state officials. However, in this article we will not
focus on the procedure followed in such cases of "true crimes." Since our ultimate interest is the way in
which modern Ethiopian law has changed the traditional practice, we will be concerned here with the
customary procedure used to deal with disputes now governed by the 1961 Criminal Procedure Code-
i.e., crimes under contemporary law. Since many of these offenses were treated as "civil" matters under
customary law, it results that the ordinary customary "civil procedure" is often as relevant as the
criminal.
B. The Imperial Administrative and Judicial Structure As was the case in most African traditional
societies, separation of judicial from administrative power was until very recently not a feature of
Ethiopian governmental organization. In order to understand the context of customary criminal
procedure it is therefore necessary to know something of the Empire's administrative structure during
the period under consideration. The following account, like our description of the customary procedure
itself, is reconstructed from secondary sources which are often unsystematic, fragmentary and
conflicting. Therefore, the picture we present can be only approxi- mate. At the base of the official
Imperial structure we find the parish headman, or chief, called the chika shum ("appointed over the
soil")."
11. S. Messing, Highland-Plateau Amhara of Ethiopia (unpublished doc- toral thesis, Univ. of Pa., 1957),
p. 79 [hereafter cited as Messing]. In some parts of the Empire, apparently, the chika-shum was a
subordi-
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:49]
31. Aymiro Negussie, supra n. 28, p. 23, traces the origin of affersata to 1781, during the reign of
Emperor Adyam Seged Iyasu, when it was insti- tuted as an aid to his police force, the Leba Aden ("Thief
Hunters"). I am indebted for this information to Ato Seifu Felleke. Compare also Fetha Nagast, p. 296,
quoting the Bible, Deut. 21: "When you find a murdered man in a deserted place or a field and no one
knows who killed him, then your judges and elders shall go out and measure [the distance] between the
place where the murdered man was and the city. [They shall see] which city is nearest to the murdered
man, and then the elders of that city shall take an oath and say: 'Not ours the hand that shed this blood;
our eyes never saw who killed him.'" And you, [O judges,] make inquiries about this blood and judge the
matter with righteousness." 32. Sandford, n. 13, p. 83; Affersata Proclamation, 1933, Preamble, quoted
in Mahtama Selassie Wolde Meskel, n. 21, p. 95; Knutsson, supra n. 30, p. 122; Pollera, n. 9, p. 131;
Walker, n. 20, p. 153. But Messing, n. 11, pp. 326-27, says it is usually used only in homicide cases. 33.
Compare R.P. Azais and R. Chambard, Cinq annees de recherches archeologiques en Ethiopie (1931), p.
69: inhabitants of the village all brought to the affersata in chains. 34. But some writers state that only
grown men were required to attend, Messing, n. 11, pp. 326-27; Walker, n. 20, pp. 153-54 (only in
murder case will women and children attend-but a woman or slave always remained behind in each
household to bring food to those inside the enclosure); Pollera, n. 9, p. 131; Sandford, n. 13, p. 84, Sahle
Sellassie, The Afersata (1968) p. 21. 35. But cf. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 244: seven day maximum limit. 36.
Walker, n. 20, p. 153; Pollera, n. 9, p. 132. 37. Walker, n. 20, p. 156; Pollera, n. 9, p. 134 (also fine to
governor); Sahle Sellassie, n. 34, p. 89; H. Ludolph, A New History of Ethiopia (1682), p. 239 ("If the
Homicide escapes unknown, the Inhabitants of the place and all the Neighborhood are obliged to pay a
Fine; by which means many Mur- thers are either prevented or discovered.") But Messing suggests that
there would be no communal liability if they could prove that the offender was a passing stranger, and
that they were blameless in failing to prevent the crime. Messing, n. 11, p. 326. Compare the
"hundred's" collective responsibility under old English law, Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common
Law (5th ed., 1956), p. 89. 38. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 244: "Tant que dure l'affersata, on n'a pas le droit
de mener le boeuf au paturage, le veau a la vache, l'enfant a la nourrice;" Perham, n.16, p. 149. One can
hardly accept this description literally.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:49]
This personage, whose eligibility for the post is hereditary and tied to land ownership,12 is appointed by
the governor-general of the province (tekle guezat). The parish headman acts as the lowest judge
(dagnca) in the court hierarchy.14 Conciliatory or arbitral dispute settlement involving the elders
(shemagalye), large land holders (balabath) or others takes place at a still lower level, but outside of the
formal governmental structure, and will be discussed later. Some writers seem to distinguish between
the parish headman's administrative office and that of the judge (dagna) 15, but it appears that only in
urban areas, where specialization of function was warranted by the increased volume of judicial
business, were the two offices held by different persons.'6 The administrative level between the village
and the province is the district (woreda) , administered by the district governor (woreda-gaj). Although
there is some inconsistency and confusion in the terminology used by different writers in describing this
functionary, it seems that the following terms also refer to him: woreda-shum (district chief), mislene
(lieutenant), and malkagnia (officer, deputy) .11 The district governor was appointed by the provincial
gover- nor, and reportedly sat to hear appeals in cases decided by the parish headman.19 From the
district governor's court, appeals went to the provincial governor, who sat in court with an uncertain
number of judges.20 Redress lay from the provincial governor's court to that of the Emperor, but not to
him personally. An official known as the
nate to the parish headman, known there as the "Bal a Gult"; see Singer, op cit. supra n.8, pp. 316-17. In
this article we follow Messing's description of the chika-shum's role. 12. D. Levine, Wax and Gold (1965)
pp. 57-58. 13. Messing, supra n.11, p. 79. Compare C. Sandford, Ethiopia Under Haile Sellassie (1946) at
p. 81, stating that the district governor appoints the local judge. 14. Castro, "Criminali, giudici e tribunali
etiopici," Bollettino della Soci- eta Geografica Italiana, Serie IV, vol. 12, no. 4 (1911) p. 434 [hereafter
cited as Castro (1911)]. T. Lefebvre, Voyage en Abyssinie (1845), vol. 1, p. xxxv; P. de Lauribar, Douze ans
en Abyssinie (1898), p. 91. 15. Messing, supra n.11, pp. 318-19, describes the dagna as a regular, "year
round" judge, appointed by the governor of the sub-province. See note 25, infra. 16. M. Perham, The
Government of Ethiopia (1948), p. 144 [hereafter cited as Perham]. 17. But see note 25, infra. 18.
Sandford, n. 13, p. 81 and Perham, n. 16, p. 144 use malkagnia; Mess- ing, n. 11, pp. 80, 281, 284 and N.
Marein, The Ethiopian Federation and Laws (1954), p. 53 use mislene but the former implies that the
mislene is not the district governor, but "ranks equal" to and "expects aid" from him (p. 80). 19. Perham,
supra n. 16, p. 144; Castro supra n. 14, p. 434. 20. The Amharic word for judge is wonber (lit. "chair").
According to C.H. Walker, The Abyssinian at Home (1933), pp. 145-46 [hereafter cited as Walker], the
provincial governor has two judges, appointed by himself: one of the left (gera) and one of the right
(kagn), "of whom the Right Wamber is the greater." The judges may sit alone, or in court together with
the gover-
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:49]
Afe Negus ("Mouth of the King") heard the great bulk of the Em- peror's judicial business. To relieve the
excessive burden of cases coming to the Afe Negus, and thereby to speed up the appeal process, in 1908
Emperor Menelik established a special tribunal to Addis Ababa composed of twelve "princely judges"
(wonder-rases), two to deal with cases from each of the six parts of the Empire. From this court,
apparently, cases could still go to the Afe Negus,22 and from him, in last resort, to the Emperor's
court.23 Two additional points should be noted. First, it is probable that each level of "appeal court"
mentioned above also had original jurisdiction, although the rules, if any, restricting the initiation of
cases at any given level are not known to the present writer.24 Also, although only the major levels of
administration/adjudication have been presented, it may be that other levels existed.25 Surely, in
addition, there
nor and jurors. He states that appeal seems to have been allowed from the left to the right judge, and
from the latter to the governor's court. J.B. Coul- beaux, Histoire politique et religieuse de l'Abyssinie
(1929), vol. 2, p. 302, has the governor sitting with three judges of the right and three of the left;
Messing, n.11, p. 319-20, with two on each side, and Sandford, n.13, p. 81, one. Perham, n.16, pp. 144-
45, suggests that the litigant dissatisfied with the district governor's decision had the option to appeal
either to the provincial governor's judges (whom she has sitting with four assessors) or to the governor
himelf. 21. Guebre Sellassie, Chronique du regne de Menelik II (1932), vol. 2, p. 531; Mahtama Selassie
Wolde Meskel, Zikire Neger (1950), p. 70 [hereafter cited as Mahtama Selassie Wolde Meskel]. Walker,
n.20, p. 151, speaks of the Afe Negus being assisted by "twenty-four Wambars, who divide among
themselves the affairs of Ethiopia." This sounds suspiciously like the twelve- judge tribunal created by
Menelik. 22. Guebre Sellassie, op. cit. supra n. 21, vol. 2, p. 531, n. 3; Perham, n. 16, p. 145; L. Castro,
Nella Terra dei Negus (1915), vol. 2, p. 130. The exact relationship between the Afe Negus' jurisdiction
and that of the twelve "princely judges," on the one hand, and the Emperor's court, on the other, is not
clear. As to his role as "Minister of Justice" see note 25, infra. 23. Castro, supra n. 14, p. 434. 24. It is
reported that the twelve "princely judges" in Addis Ababa had original jurisdiction over cases submitted
by litigants from the respective provinces under their charge, should those away from home wish to be
judged by someone from their own province. Castro, supra n. 22, vol. 2, p. 129. As another example,
capital cases were in the sole jurisdiction of the Emperor, although preliminary hearings might be held at
various levels below his court. 25. For example, we have omitted mention of two levels of
administration and judicial competence which function currently in Ethiopia but which are not
mentioned by any of the historical sources: the sub-district (mektl woreda) and the sub-province
(awraja). Thus, there may have been four official levels below the provincial one: village (parish), sub-
district, district, and sub-province. Messing, n.11, who wrote in the nineteen fifties, does describe both
additional levels: pp. 80, 284-85; and see note 15, supra. Mahtama Selassie Wolde Meskel, pp. 73, 75
also speaks of an appeal from the twelve "princely judges" in Addis Ababa to the "Minister of Justice,"
but this probably is meant to refer to the Afe Negus, who apparently held that portfolio from the time
that Emperor Menelik created the Ministries (1908) until the Restoration (1941). See Selamu Bekele and
J. Vanderlinden, "In- troducing the Ethiopian Law Archives: Some Documents on the First Ethio-
were specialized judicial bodies such as church28 and market27 courts which functioned to some extent
outside of the normal hierarchy.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:49]
The affersata procedure utilized a small group of elders who administered the interrogation of
everyone present, and a system of anonymous denunciation under which the informers were referred
to only as "birds."39 Walker describes the procedure thus: The crowd of those shut in will select seven
or eight or nine "mirtocc," or chosen ones, who will sit apart with the clerk. First each of the chosen will
take the oath, for a small hole will have been dug and fire lighted within. Then preparing water each will
swear, saying, "What I saw and heard I will not hide," saying, "The guilty man is my brother. Even if he is
my father I will tell." So quenching the fire with the water he adds, "If I spoke a lie, may God likewise
extinguish me!" and sweeping the ground with the stalk of maize and its cob he swears, "May God thus
sweep away our seed if I lie." Also there may be closed eggs, a closed gourd, and a sickle, on which each
will swear, saying, "If I conceal what I have seen and heard, may He close me as this gourd and cut my
stomach thus!" So all present will take the oath. Also there will be two or three "birds" who swear that
they will tell what they hear to none but the clerk. Or perhaps the chosen ones will pass from group to
group questioning each person and will find someone who saw or heard. Then they will return to the
clerk and say, "We have heard the mouth of the bird tell that so-and-so was the thief." It may be fifteen
days before the thief is found and, when the birds have spoken, the priest will come bearing the Cross
and Picture of Mary and will sit beside the chosen ones. Then one by one they will all pass and strike the
Cross and Picture and swear, "May He perforate me as the Cross! May he obliterate me as the Gospel! I
saw not!" But the "bird" will swear, "Having seen I spoke not with lies," having related all in secret to the
chosen ones.40
Apparently all persons present at the affersata gave testimony under oath to the elders,41 who were
sworn not to reveal their identity. When all the evidence had been collected, Pollera reports, the elders
classified the results and, aided by a scribe, reduced them to writing in this way: Eye-witnesses to the
deed were called merfee ("needles"); those who witnessed relevant facts and circumstances were
called emni ("stones"); and those claiming to have heard the name of
39. An Ethiopian observer has suggested that the "birds" expression origi- nates in an indigenous saying
"that even in a very lonely forest there is either a devil or a bird to see you." Nebiyelul Kifle, Issuance of
Arrest Warrants in Ethiopian Law (1965, unpublished, Addis Ababa, H.S.I.U. Law Faculty Archives) p. 17.
40. Walker, n. 20, p. 154. See also Sahle Sellassie, n. 34, pp. 21 ff. 41. Messing, n. 11, p. 326; Nebiyeleul
Kifle, n. 39, p. 17; Pollera, n. 9, p. 132.
the guilty party by hearsay were called uf ("birds"). The document prepared by the elders reportedly ran
something like this: The committee, composed of (names of members), having carried out the Afarsata
for discovery of the authors of the crime ...., having assembled on such and such a day, in such and such
a place, declares that this evidence has been collected: Such and such . . . needles: they have said to
have seen such a person(s) carry out the crime. Such and such . . . stones: they have declared that, for
the facts and circumstances observed a little before or a little after the crime, they consider the guilty
are such and such.
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C. The Procedure Having described the traditional institutional framework of Ethi- opian Imperial law,
we can now consider the criminal procedure itself. We shall divide our discussion roughly according to
the stages of the process: criminal investigation where the offender is unknown, sanctuary, pre-trial
procedure, informal settlement of disputes, trial procedure, appeal and execution of sentence.
1. Where the Offender is Unknown: Criminal Investigation a. Police Investigation. Apparently some sort
of indigenous "police force" has existed in Ethiopia for a long time.28 The netch lebash ("thief-catchers
in white") are non-uniformed rural police irregulars whose service obligation is tied to feudal land
tenure.29 Unfortunately, the present writer knows nothing more about their organization or functions.
b. Affersata (communal inquiry). A very significant traditional institution is the affersata, or
government-sponsored communal inquiry into crime. A Gallinya word, "affersata" may be related to the
verb affersa ("to fan"), which is applied to the process by which bits of husk are separated from kernels
of corn. The institution is also known as auchachin in Shoa and Wollo provinces, and as iwus in Gojjam
province;30 it has apparently functioned in Ethiopia for a
pian Cabinet," J. Eth. L., vol. 4 (1967), p. 413; Bereket Ab Habte Sellassie, "Constitutional Development in
Ethiopia," J. Afr. L., vol. 10 (1966), p. 80. It must be noted, though, that appeal to the Minister of Justice
entailed no conflict with his duties as Afe Negus, or "Chief Justice," because in those days the task of
the Ministry did not, as now, include the prosecution of offenders (there was then no system of public
prosecution), but solely supervision of the judiciary. 26. Perham, supra n. 16, p. 150. 27. The market
master, or nagadras, supervised, and perhaps sat on cases along with, this special judge; P. Merab,
Impressions d'Ethiopie (1929), vol. 3, p. 230 [hereinafter cited as Merab]; Perham, p. 150; Walker, pp.
150-51. 28. The history of police in Ethiopia is reportedly given in Aymiro Negus- sie, Yeselam zeb (1963).
29. Bulcha Demeksa, The Law and Practice of Bail in Ethiopia (1965, unpublished, Addis Ababa, H.S.I.U.
Law Faculty Archives), p. 3; Messing, supra n. 11, p. 80. 30. Grazmatch Taddesse Tebike, "Affersata,"
Addis Zemen, Tekemt 26, 1959 E.C., with English translation in Law Faculty Archives, H.S.I.U., Addis
Ababa. But some writers state that these are different institutional forms. See Poletti, II Codice penale
abissino (1938), pt. III, pp. 249-256 (ehuss is a privately initiated communal inquiry; affersata, used in
more serious cases, is called by government); Sandford, n. 13, pp. 83-84 (affersata meetings called first,
and if fail to turn up criminal, more "drastic" session, auchachin, is convoked). K.E. Knutsson, Authority
and Change (1967), p. 122, n. 10 offers another Gallinya term for affersata, izgota.
long time.31 An affersata to discover a criminal's identity was called by a local official such as the district
governor, either upon request of the injured party, or, in cases of serious public disturbance, on
government initiative.32 The technique used was to summon33 all inhabitants34 of the neighborhood
where the crime was committed, and to sequester them until they named the criminal.35 Failure to
attend the affersata was sanctioned by an "absence fine,"36 and the assembly's failure to name the
criminal resulted in communal liability to repair the damage caused by the offense.37 The wish to avoid
this liability, together with the serious hardship caused by sequestration of the whole community (it was
reportedly decreed: "not a cow be milked nor a baby suckled" until the investigation was over) ,38
provided ample incentive to name the offender if that was possible.
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The term "customary Ethiopian criminal procedure" requires clar- ification on several points. First, which
of the myriad customary societies do we investigate? ". . . Ethiopia is a country which embraces a
complex variety of ethnic elements representing a veritable mosaic of races, tribes, and linguistic
groups."6 Joined together in the Em- pire with the dominant highland Christian groups are large Muslim
and pagan groups of the most diverse socio-economic organization. Some of these groups have been
hardly studied, and we know very little about them. Most generalizations about "the customary law of
Ethiopia" would therefore be absurd if taken literally. In this work we have chosen to focus upon the law
of the dominant Christian groups: the Amhara, who inhabit the central plateau region, and the Tigrai,
of highland Eritrea. Although there appear to be differences between the procedures used by these two
tribes (and, doubtless, also, among sub-groups within them), the broad outlines of their procedure seem
sufficiently similar to treat them as the same for our purposes. Although some features of procedure
among the third major group in Ethiopia, the heavily Muslim and pagan Galla of Southern and Western
Ethiopia, also resemble those of the Chris- tian groups, we shall for the most part exclude them;
likewise, Islamic law, which is of considerable importance in Ethiopia, is not considered. But some of our
conclusions will doubtless apply to these groups, as well as to the many others found in Ethiopia.
Focusing as we do upon the Amhara tribe, we manage to mini- mize another serious definitional
problem, which however needs to be kept in mind. That concerns the meaning of "customary criminal
b. Interviews sporadically conducted by two Ethiopian students in Addis Ababa and Harrar between
1964-1968. In 1965-1966 both students participated in a radio program in Addis Ababa on customary
procedure, and one wrote a series of Amharic-language newspaper articles, published in the summer
of 1966, on the subject. On both occa- sions public appeals for criticisms of our tentative
reconstructions, and for more information, were unfortunately in vain. c. Personal observations,
newspaper stories, and anecdotal accounts gathered in Ethiopia between 1964-1968. d. (No
substantial observations or interviews in the "field" were done). 5. Promulgated by "The Criminal
Procedure Code Proclamation, 1961," Negarit Gazeta, Extraordinary Issue No. 1 of 1961. 6. E. Ullendorf,
The Ethiopians (1960), p. 33. See also H. Lewis, Peoples of the Horn of Africa (1955); E. Cerulli, Peoples of
Southwest Ethiopia and its Borderland (1956).
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Such and such . . . birds: they have claimed to have heard from a third party that the guilty would be
such and such. 42 Pollera's classification is thus more precise than that of other writers, in that he
breaks down into three groups the informants which others seem to describe simply as "birds." He also
states that one accused at an affersata could appeal to the governor only against the testimony of
"birds," not against that of "needles" and "stones."43 However, it is not clear when an accusation at
affersata was treated as sufficient evidence of guilt to support the application of sanctions;44
sometimes, of course, the accused confessed on the spot. The institution of affersata was not very
popular either with the people or with the central government authorities, but local poten- tates
apparently found it useful. An important effect of convening an affersata was to oppress the poor
inhabitants of the neighborhood where it was held, for it was they who had to provide the visiting
officials and soldiers with food and drink for as long as it lasted;45 the desire to be rid of the invading
parasites, and to get back to untended farms and households, might conceivably have led to false
accusations and even to false confessions. Then, too, some criminals and others reportedly took
advantage of the anonymity of the "birds" to accuse innocent persons, perhaps personal enemies, who
could never
42. Pollera, n. 9, p. 133. 43. Ibid. 44. Knutsson, n. 30, p. 122, implies that proof, in addition to bare
accusation, was required to be presented at the affersata. Sandford, n. 13, p. 83, states that those
accused in affersata would be sent by the district governor (malkagnia) for trial before the local judge.
According to Nebiyeleul Kifle, n. 39, pp. 17-18, if the suspect failed to confess the people of the
neighborhood were canvassed or re-convened, and asked to agree to reveal the names of the "birds" as
witnesses to be used in court proceedings. But other writers give the impression that accusation, at least
by some minimum number of "birds," was enough. 45. Poletti, n. 30, p. 256. But see Walker, n. 20, pp.
153-54: "the judge will receive his dinner by turn from those who asked for the holding of the inqu.iry. . .
."

learn the identity of their accusers.46 In an attempt to curb some of these abuses Emperor Haile
Sellassie issued a proclamation in 1933 to regulate affersata:47
AFFERSATA PROCLAMATION, 1933
Whereas before, whenever cattle were lost, [or] money stolen, people were forced to leave their crops
or occupation and gather for Affersata; Whereas now we have come to realize that the harm done by
such an act is greater than the wealth lost or stolen, and whereas many used this system in falsehood,
and whereas innocent people have been said to have done an act by informers who change their
names48 only to harm their enemies, for the future we make the following law. FIRST Those persons
who come for Affersata shall not be forced to stay until all others come but should be examined under
oath and be allowed to leave. SECOND There shall be Affersata only once a month on Saturdays and
Sundays and not on working days. TEMD WVhen Affersata is held twice a month, the judge should go
every three hours to control the places of meeting and he should not force people from far away places
to come and spend the night outside their homes. When a person has been examined and sworn, he
shall be asked to send his family after he returns and he shall not be asked to come with all his family at
once, leaving the house, cattle or work unattended.
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S To avoid procrastination and possible delay to the [victim of the crime] and the judge, family members
should be sworn and examined between 3 o'clock and 9 o'clock on Saturday. Heads of families should
gather on Sundays from 1 o'clock to 3 o'clock and should stay until 8 o'clock and be let free. If, during
the two days, a household member or a head of family is absent, let him pay "alad" ($0.50). If this
happens during the next month, let the judge inquire whether the person is absent because of things
beyond his control, and if he is not, the judge can make him pay two or three times the above sum
according to the fault of the absentee. SEVKTH This absentee's fine shall be collected by a person
appointed by the governor, and out of every ten, let two be paid to the court as fees, one to the judge,
and seven to the complainant. The Affersata judge may not accept anything from the poor in the name
of "sup- per".49
46. Pollera, n. 9, p. 134; Mahtama Selassie Wolde Meskel, n. 21, p. 96. 47. Reproduced in Mahtama
Sellassie Wolde Meskel n. 21, p. 95. The English translation is from Aberra Jembere, The Right to a
Speedy Trial in Ethiopia (1965, unpublished, Addis Ababa, H.S.I.U. Law Faculty Archives), Appendix II. 48.
Referring, apparently, to those who testify as "birds." 49. See text accompanying note 45, above.
TZ:mi Governor, you are paid because you are a judge,50 and therefore you should not be careless
with your job and let thieves flourish. You should take a complaint and follow it up and destroy the cul-
prit, otherwise the responsibility will be yours.
This reform legislation apparently had only limited success, and some of the problems it was designed to
solve still exist today. c. Lebashai ("Thief-Seeker"). A much-reported traditional method of criminal
investigation involves the lebashai, or thief- seeker, who discovers the wrongdoer's identity and the
location of any fruits of the crime by drugging a young boy who "sniffs out" the culprit.5h1 According to
Walker,52 the victim of a theft would go to the "chief" thief-seeker who would send a suitable53 boy
back with the victim to the scene of the crime, where the parish headman (chika shum) would set up at
the door of the [victim's] house a tent in which the boy may be guarded that night lest he eat and
drink.54 At dawn the servant of the chief of the leba shai will come with witnesses and will make the
boy sit and taking medicine from a bag, will mix it with milk and give the boy to drink. Then, filling a pipe
with tobacco, he lays on the top another medicine and placing an ember on it he gives it to the boy to
smoke. . . .55 Having smoked a little, the boy collapses like a drunken man and lies extended. Then the
Chiqa Shum three times passes round the boy's head a short yellow wand and strikes him thrice,
intoning the word "Diras!" ("arrive!"). So the boy, rising with fixed eyes, reels here and there like a
drunken man, at another time flying like a winged bird, while all follow behind. The Chiqa Shum keeps
hold of a sash tied round the boy's waist and, when they come to water, he (or the witnesses or servant)
will carry the
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50. Recall that district and provincial governors also acted as judges; there was no separation of powers.
See text accompanying notes 17-20, above. 51. This practice is said to exist elsewhere in the world.
Messing, n. 11, p. 325, says it has been traced by some to ancient Greek parallels, and by others to Arab
bedouin practices. G. MacCreagh, The Last of Free Africa (2d ed., 1935), p. 184, without further specifics
declares its similarity to the West African "obeah." 52- Walker, n. 20, pp. 157-58, 161. Other detailed
descriptions are found in Castro, "Ipnotizzati ed ipnotizzatori cercatori di ladri," Archivio di Psichiatria
Neuropatologia, Antropologia criminale e Medicina legale, vol. xxxix (1908), pp. 606-07; Mrab, n.27, vol.
3, p. 254ff.; W.C. Harris, The Highlands of Ethiopia (1843), p. 115. 53. The boy was supposed to be young
(ten to fifteen years old), and only just entering puberty, to ensure his virginity. Castro, n.52, p. 608;
Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 254; MacCreagh, n.51, p. 184; Walker, n.20, p. 159. He was usually the son of a
slave or poor man. Ibid. 54. According to Castro, n. 52, p. 606, the boy is "prepared" on the evening
before the main event: he is washed, his fingernails cleaned, etc. 55. According to Castro a water pipe is
used, ibid.
boy across, lest he touch it and suffer contamination. If they see animals on the road, the boy may run
towards them, but the Chiqa Shum will seize him in his arms till they pass. If they meet a man, the man
will at once squat in the road, for the boy will slap and cuff him. So the boy follows the thief and, if he
comes to the hut where the thief lived, will enter and make as if he were carrying out the stolen goods.
Or he may get up onto the bed or mud dais and stretch himself where the thief slept. Or the thief may
have pushed the money into a hole or under a stone, and sometimes the boy will go and pull it out,
blowing hard with his breath. If there is a gathering of men and the thief is among them, the boy will go
round the circle, as they all sit in fear, and knock with his knee each as he passes. When he comes to the
thief, he will whisper softly to him as a robber to his accomplice and circle round him thrice and butt him
with his knee, and puffing and blowing will at length fall upon his neck and seize him. So men know the
thief and take him. Then the servant of the chief of the thief seeker [sic] lifts up the prostrate boy and
carries him outside and covers him up and gives him bread and beer to make him vomit and be cured. . .
A wrongdoer may know that water defeats the boy, and so he will wash himself. Or he will run to the
edge of a precipice and pretend to jump down, or will climb a tree and with a rope pretend to hang
himself. This the thief finder will do also, and must be restrained. Once a murderer cast the body into
river and the boy led men to it, acting as though he were dragging a corpse, and would have fallen in if
he had not been held. Then he led them back to Addis Ababa from house to house, till the murderer was
found.56
The thief-seeker institution has been reported to function among the highland Christians in both
Ethiopia and Eritrea, and among the Galla.57 Walker states that there is a "head" thief-seeker in Addis
Ababa who "licenses" all thief-seekers of the Empire annually,58 and it is probably this personage who
in Walker's above-quoted account is referred to as the "chief" who sends a "servant" with the boy, to
perform under the parish headman's direction. Most reports instead attribute the direction of the entire
ceremony, "sniffing out," etc., to a thief-seeker who accompanies the boy to the scene.
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56. MacCreagh, n. 51, p. 186, reports another device to escape detection: if a piece of iron or steel bent
in a half-moonshape is carried by the criminal, the thief-seeker's "trail" will be bent and will return to
the starting point. 57. F. Ostini, Trattato di diritto Consuetudinario dell'Eritrea (1956), p. 44 [hereafter
cited as Ostini]; Castro, n. 52, passim; Perham, n.16; p. 150. But see Pollera, n.9, p. 127: Eritreans never
adopted thief-seeker practice. And P.M. de Salviac, Les Galla (1901), p. 165 describes it is an Amhara
practice. 58. Walker, n. 20, pp. 158-59; Messing, n. 11, pp. 322-24.
The secrets of the thief-seeker's art are passed down from father to son-the chief secret reportedly
being the drug's composition.59 Observers state that judging by the odor the drug is probably hashish,
perhaps mixed with other substances such as opium or stramonium.60 Perhaps the thief-seeker also
practices hypnotism on his young subject,61 through which he influences him to accuse whichever
person seems the most likely suspect in light of the thief-seeker's own prior (and presumably discreet)
investigations.62 A popular story relates that Emperor Menelik opposed the thief- seeker practice and in
order to demonstrate its inefficacy had a palace notable pretend that his ring was stolen. In fact the
Emperor hid the ring in his own garments. A thief-seeker was consulted, and the child he drugged
immediately pointed to the ring's hiding place. Thereafter, it is said, Menelik did not oppose this means
of investigation.63 There are even some reports of government patronage of the practice.64
Undoubtedly the thief-seeker was often extremely effective, if only because most people feared his
powers.65 Mere threats to summon his aid would no doubt often bring about the return of stolen
goods, etc. But the thief-seeker was also a controversial institution, subject to great abuse. Frequently, it
seems, no corroborating evidence was required beyond the boy's "sniffing out" of the accused, which
sufficed as a basis for application of sanctions.66 Since the thief-seeker's fee was collected out of the
guilty party's payment, in restitution and compensation, to the injured party, the incentive for false
accusation was increased.67 There are numerous reports of such abuses, extending even to accusations
that the thief-seeker acted in cahoots with thieves, corruptly agreeing to provide "protection" by seeing
that innocent parties were always "tagged" by the boy.68 Not
59. Ibid; Harris, n. 52, p. 115; Castro, n. 52, p. 607; Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 255; de Salviac, n. 57, p. 165.
60. Pollera, cited in Ostini, n. 57, p. 44; Castro, n. 52, pp. 606-07. 61. Azais and Chambard, n. 33, p. 70;
Castro, n. 52, p. 608. 62. Castro, n.52, p. 608; M6rab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 262; Pollera, n.9, p. 128. 63. Ostini,
n. 57, p. 44; Pollera, n. 9, p. 129; de Salviac, n. 57, p. 166. Harris, n. 52, p. 115 attributes the experiment
to an earlier monarch. 64. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 255, describes a government "department" em- ploying
numbers of thief-seeker "trainers" and their apprentices. See also Pollera, n.9, pp. 128, 130. 65. H.
Rebeaud, Au Service du Negus (2d ed., 1935), pp. 154-58, reports that most people were terrified of the
thief-seeker. 66. Harris, n. 52, px. 115; Castro, n. 52, pp. 608-09; MacCreagh, n. 51, p. 186. A. Gleichen,
With the Mission to Menelik (1898), p. 241, carries another version to apparent extremes: the boy is
drugged to sleep and told to dream, and "whatever person he dreams of is fixed on as the criminal; no
further proof is needed." 67. Harris, n. 52, p. 115; Messing, n. 11, pp. 324-25. 68. Castro, n. 52 (1908),
pp. 608-09; Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 263; "Thief- Detector" (no author, no date), Brihanina Selam, in
H.S.I.U. Law Faculty Archives. Walker, n. 20, pp. 158-59, reports that some thief-seekers will make
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surprisingly, therefore, there has been some government regulation of the practice such as maximum
fee amounts,69 and sanctions against accusation of innocent parties.70 d. Other supernatural means of
investigation. The victim of a crime committed by unknown persons might resort to supernatural means
of investigation other than the thief-seeker. An Amhara might go to the tankwa ("sorcerer"), a
practitioner of "black magic" who can divine the offender's identity by throwing bones,71 and whose
supernatural powers enable him to "summon the devil to liquidate the enemy of a client."72 The use of
diviners for such purposes, a practice well known to African custom,73 is also reported among the
Gurage of Ethiopia.74 Another procedure used in cases where the victim is unable to learn the
offender's identity is to go to a Coptic church and, "having purchased incense and given a gift,
pronounce a solemn curse, 'sabate masdafat,'" on the offender.75
2. Sanctuary
In his classic work The Nature of African Customary Law, Dr. T.O. Elias writes of traditional monarchical
societies in Africa that the offender may usually escape surnmary justice by beating a hasty retreat into
any nearby sanctuary, such as a sacred grove or King's palace, chief's or councillor's residence, pending
the hearing of the case against him. . . . The whole thing is a device against free or frequent indulgence
in vendetta by the populace. Of course, it is otherwise if the criminal were caught by the injured
a "deal" with thieves to give the boy ineffective drugs, or advise the thieves on methods to evade
detection, e.g., by walking in water, washing themselves immediately after the crime, etc. 69. Messing,
n. 11, pp. 324-25 reports that Menelik fixed a maximum fee of E$6. 70. Walker, n.20, p. 161, refers to
sanctions of damages and fine. Merab, n. 27, vol. 3, p. 260, n. 1 reports that in 1925 Emperor Haile
Sellassie I, as Regent, forbade the use of thief-seekers under threat of severe penalty; see also
MacCreagh, n. 51, p. 186. But the Ethiopian royal chroniclers do not, to our knowledge, mention any
such legislation. A different sort of safeguard against abuse of the institution may have been the
requirement that before the thief-seeker's aid was summoned, the complainant solemnly swear as to
injury by the alleged crime. Walker, n. 20, p. 160. 71. Messing, n. 11, p. 325. 72. Levine, n. 12, p. 70. 73.
T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (1956), p. 221. 74. Shack, "Guilt and Innocence: Problem
and Method in the Gurage Judicial System," in M. Gluckman (ed.), Ideas and Procedures in African
Customary Law (1969) pp. 153, 160. 75. Messing, n. 11, p. 325.
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party and/or his sympathisers before reaching the security of a sanctuary.76 The institution of sanctuary
at certain77 Coptic churches was also recognized by the people and government authorities in Ethiopia.
Messing states that the procedure was for an accused to enter a churchyard and sound the bell, thus
announcing to his pursuers (whether they be government police or the victim's kinsmen) that he had
placed himself under the protection of the church.78 The available reports confirm that the function of
sanctuary in Ethiopia was as Dr. Elias has suggested-to forestall blood revenge by the injured party for
long enough to set reconciliation procedures in motion.79 It seems that the church authorities took an
active part in promoting this reconcilation.80 Thus, the Fetha Nagast, quoting the Bible in part,8' says of
homicide: "If the striking was accidental, without any enmity, or if out of malice one threw a stone or
some other thing which brings about one's death, unaware that he would die . . . without any feeling of
enmity or evil, judgment shall take place between the slayer and he who claims the blood; due
consideration shall be given to the case, and the slayer must be rescued from the power of the avenger
of the blood and sent to a place [of refuge] and make his home there." In case he had no intention to kill
him, but God provided the occasion for the death of the other by his hand, he may take refuge in the
place of God; but if the avenger of the blood finds him outside [the place of refuge] and kills him, he will
incur no guilt.... In case the slayer is proud and lets himself be seen by the kinsmen of the man he killed,
boast- ing of himself against them, and they kill him, they shall not be held guilty; there shall be no
punishment for his killers for he should not be seen until the end of their mourning.82 The right of
sanctuary was not available in all cases; particularly those crimes which were so heinous as not to permit
of blood-money compromise, such as homicidal recidivism83 and treason,84 were not
76. Elias, n. 73, pp. 215-16. 77. Poletti, n. 30, p. 267, says only five out of the one thousand churches in
Gojjam province could give sanctuary. See also "Consul Plowden's Description of Abyssinia, 1852-5" in
J.C. Hotten (ed.), Abyssinia and Its People (1868) p. 118 [hereafter cited as Plowden in Hotten]. 78.
Messing, n. 11, pp. 389-90. 79. Poletti, n. 30, p. 267. Compare church asylum in Anglo-Saxon law, which
functioned similarly except that the Crown also had a pecuniary interest in reconciliation. C.H. Riggs,
Criminal Asylum in Anglo-Saxon Law (1963), pp. 20-21, 34. 80. Ibid. 81. Numbers, chap. 35, v. 22. 82.
Fetha Nagast, p. 294. 83. Id., p. 291, text accompanying n. 15. 84. See the eighteenth century case of
Surahe Krestos recounted in the
subject to sanctuary, and anyone invading the church to remove such an offender from his claimed
asylum was protected.85 To violate legitimate sanctuary, on the other hand, was a serious crime: One
who by his power and with violence takes a person seeking refuge in a holy church out of that church
shall be beaten and his hair shall be shaved. He shall be sent into exile and remain there forever....86
3. Proceedings Where the Offender is Known
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In cases where the complainant knew the alleged offender's identity, his first task was to secure the
latter's submission to some dispute-settlement machinery. In appropriate cases informal tech- niques
for reconciling the parties first would be tried; if unsuccessful, the procedure could progress on more
formal levels. a. The issuance of "process," pre-trial detention and conditional release through personal
sureties. It appears that under Amhara customary law any person had the power to "arrest" a suspected
law- breaker by ordering the latter to submit to custody in the name of the Emperor or some other royal
personage.87 If the suspect ignored the injunction to stop he could be apprehended by force,88 a
situation which presumably raised a community social obligation to assist. The person against whom this
oral injunction89 was issued was further
Foreward to Fetha Nagast, p. xv. This case also discusses fully the question whether intentional killers
are eligible to take sanctuary. 85. Fetha Nagast, p. 291. 86. Id., p. 294. See also id., p. 306: "One who
transgresses against a person who took refuge in a church, pulling him out of it violently, shall be
flogged twelve times. . . ." For comparable Anglo-Saxon legal rules see Laws of Alfred cap. 2-1 in F.L.
Attenborough, The Laws of the Earliest Eng- lish Kings (1922). 87. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 235; C. Conti-
Rossini, Principi di Diritto Con- suetudinario dell'Eritrea (1916), p. 500 [hereafter cited as Conti-Rossini].
The general formula runs, Be .amlak, or "By the divinity of ." Variations include, Behig amlak, ("By the
divinity of the law"), Be Menelik amlak ("By the divinity of [Emperor] Menelik"), Be Haile Sellassie amlak,
etc. These expressions are commonly heard today in Ethiopia. Messing, n.11, p. 315 reports the use of
Haile Sellassie Yemut ("Let Haile Sel- lassie die . . .") in this context but this appears to be a confusion
with the testimonial or promissory oath formula ("Let Haile Sellassie die [if I lie] .... ," discussed at text
accompanying notes 164-65, infra. 88. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, pp. 214, 235. But see, contra, Walker, n.20,
pp. 168-69: if the accused refuses to stop, the accuser "may not lay hands on him" but can only follow
after him, appealing to passers-by to judge his case. 89. This power of private individuals to issue oral
injunctions in the nature of "service of process" has been reported in Eritrean customary law as well,
but in a more extreme form. There the oral injunction, known as ghezzi, could apparently be used as a
sort of temporary restraining order binding the accused to refrain from various kinds of actions which
the accuser considered prejudicial to him, until the dispute could be placed before a judicial authority.
Thus, Pollera reports the use of ghezzi to enjoin an adversary from working disputed agricultural lands,
and even from speaking.
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obliged to accompany his accuser before whatever formal or informal body90 the accuser wished to
submit the dispute to. Following the accused's initial physical submission to the legal process, there
seem to have been two major types of restraint employed to assure his continued attendance at the
proceedings: ambulatory custody (koragna)91 and conditional release to sureties.92 A third technique,
fixed-location detention in "public facilities" such as the parish headman's living compound, seems to
have occurred only exceptionally. Ambulatory custody refers to the practice of physically linking the
accused and his accuser by knotting together one corner of each of their cotton togas (shammas); the
pair thus joined were under an obligation not to break the knot unless ordered to by a judge. In a
variation of the practice, the accused's right wrist was chained to the accuser's left.93 They had to live
together thus until either the case was resolved or the accused produced acceptable sureties for his
conditional release. But the accuser had the right to substitute for himself any of his dependent family
or retainers to serve as a "walking prison."94 It should be stressed that this "prison" often depended
for its power of constraint on the accused's acceptance of community expectations that he submit
peaceably, rather than on the use of force. Thus, even young boys, whose time and energies were
relatively ex- pendable, were used as "jailors." Apparently, ambulatory custody
The latter injunction (justified apparently as needed to stop the restrained party from intimidating or
suborning witnesses) led to his appearing before the authorities to request by humming that the
injunction be lifted! Pol- lera, n. 9, pp. 108, 109. See also Nadel, "Land Tenure on the Eritrean Plateau,"
16 Africa 1, 99 at 193 (1946); Conti-Rossini, n. 87, p. 523. (The 1945 local Eritrean legislation, Laws of
Adghena Tegheleba: Customary Law of Akele- Guzai (1946) which codified local customary law, punishes
with fine any litigant who uses a ghezzi to restrain his adversary from speaking. Chap. 23, art. 202).
Pollera, n. 9, p. 108 points out that the ghezzi, though obviously subject to great abuse, usefully
functioned to "freeze" the status quo pending submission of a dispute to recognized authorities which,
owing to vast distances and poor communications, were not quickly accessible to the parties. Failure to
abide by the ghezzi, and abuse of the power to issue same, were sanctioned by fines. Ibid.; Conti-Rossini,
n. 87, pp. 500, 523. In Amhara customary law the injunctive power does not appear to have been given
thus to private parties, but Messing, n. 11, pp. 317-18, reports that even the lowest courts issued similar
"cease and desist" orders (fetem) pending the litigation. 90. But see d'Abbadie, "La procedure en
Ethiopie," Nouvelle Revue His- torique de Droit Frangais et etranger, 12th yr. (1888) p. 462, 463
[hereafter cited as d'Abbadie], stating the accused always has the right to select the judge he will appear
before. 91. Koragna was also used in post-conviction stages of the process. See text accompanying note
201, infra. 92. Suretyship is discussed in connection with trial at text accompanying notes 116-20, infra.
93. Plowden, n. 9, p. 95; Walker, n. 20, p. 169. 94. Castro, n. 4, p. 429. Some report the accuser's hiring
of a substitute "jailor", and even renting the chains! Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 207; Plowden in Hotten, n.77,
p. 183.

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could be imposed by the accuser himself or, at his demand, by any passer-by, or by a judge. The knotted
togas or the wrist chains indicated to the passing public that the pair were obliged to maintain their
mutual bondage peaceably.95 Thus, over a century ago Plowden reported that when a passer-by is
stopped by disputants and asked to deal with their case, "He must . . . place the accused in bonds, which
is done by tying his cloth to that of the accuser, and escort or send them to the nearest magistrate, who,
should the accused demand it, must in like manner forward him to his immediate master or chief, where
the case is first heard. . " .1)96 And another nineteenth century traveler reports: "When one has a
complaint against another, he ties the bottom of his shamma to the other's and he cannot untie it
without declaring himself guilty. He is led this way before the judge. If the suspect is a criminal
suspected of wanting to escape, he is bound by a chain which is fastened to his wrist at one end, and at
the other to the wrist of [the plaintiff's] trusted servant."97 Most observers agree that the accuser was
responsible for the accused's welfare while in ambulatory custody, including providing for his food and
shelter.98 Although subject to abuse,99 this feature may have operated as a deterrent to unfounded
accusations, or the arbitrary rejection of persons nominated as sureties.100 The institution of
ambulatory custody should be viewed in light of the fact that, as was true of African societies generally,
prisons were virtually unknown in Ethiopia before the modern era. The outstanding exception was the
use of remote natural fortresses (ambas) to keep "politically dangerous" persons in preventive
detention. Members of the royal family who were potential rivals for the throne were particularly
subject to this form of treatment. How- ever, imprisonment was not generally known in the ordinary
criminal process, either as a temporary pre-trial measure or as a penal sanction.101 And, it appears,
even the use of ambulatory custody was
95. Merab, n.27 vol. 3, p. 214. 96. Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 186. 97. Lefebvre, n. 14, vol. 1, p. xl. 98.
Messing, n. 11, p. 328; Walker, n. 20, p. 170. Walker reports, p. 169, that the accuser had even to
provide sureties to guarantee safe and fair treatment of the accused. But see Lefebvre, n. 14, vol. 1, p.
xl: accused must feed the accuser's retainer with whom he has been placed in ambulatory custody. 99.
Walker, n. 20, p. 170, refers to the possibility that the accuser will under-feed the accused to force him
to capitulate. 100. Messing, n. 11, p. 328. 101. Pollera, n. 9, p. 101; Messing, n. 11, p. 308; Alvares wrote
in the 16th century: "The . . . valley reaches to the (very high) mountain where they put (all) the sons of
the Prester John. . . . They say that this mountain is
1971] FISHER: TRADITIONAL CRIMINALP ROCEDURE 729
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looked upon as exceptional once the proceedings had been initiated before a court; conditional release
on personal guarantee seems to have been regarded as the normal situation for accused persons.102 b.
Informal settlement of disputes. "Than the pleader at law, the reconciler, than the washer the drier [is
better]" is an Amhara proverb attesting to the universal preference for "out of court settlement" of
disputes.'03 Conciliation definitely appears to have been a part of Ethiopian criminal procedure, but the
sources do not, in general, reveal any group certain from whom the conciliators were drawn. There are
some reports indicating that elders (shemagalye) were preferred,104 and one which points to the
involvement of the parish headman,105 but some observers remark that any passerby could and might
be pressed into service as a judge, "in the name of Menelik" or some other royal personage.108 The
complainant would simply request the stranger to be his judge, and the person so approached had to
convene a tribunal on the spot to hear the case: "Litigation at its lowest stages was a voluntary and
spontaneous form of arbitration. Parties in civil and even minor criminal disputes would call upon a
passer-by to decide the issue between them under a tree. These informal roadside courts might last for
hours, to the deep interest of the spectators. . . . Judges thus conscripted were expected to accept their
duties . . . as a civic obligation. They were generally offered a small fee for their services."107 It may be
that ordinary passersby did function in this way as judges for strangers, perhaps of different tribes, who
fell into disputes while on the road or in a country market, without ready access either to tribal
authorities recognized by both parties or to Imperial court officials.108 On the other hand, it is
suggested by some writers that the "passerby judge" did not actually hear the case, but had only
cold and big . . . that it is by no means possible to get out of it, . . . and that in this valley . . . they place
those who are nearest to the King, that is to say, those who are still of his own blood . . . and no one
approaches them, nor do they go near others. . . ." F. Alvares, The Prester John of the Indies (Hakluyt
Society ed. by C.F. Beckingham and G.W.B. Huntingford, 1961), pp. 237-38, 243-44. 102. Conditional
release is discussed below at text accompanying notes 116-20, infra. 103. Walker, n. 20, p. 135. 104.
Ostini, n. 57, p. 17; Messing, n. 11, pp. 316-17; Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 187. 105. Ostini, n. 57, p. 17.
106. "Be Menelik Amlak Dagnegne," meaning "For the divine sake of Menelik, judge me" is one formula,
reportedly still in use today. 107. Perham, n. 16, pp. 144-45. See also C.F. Rey, Unconquered Abyssinia
(1923) p. 114; E. Combes and. M. Tamisier, Voyage en Abyssinie (1839) vol. 3, p. 357; Plowden in Hotten,
n. 77, p. 186. De Salviac, n. 57, p. 207 states this practice is not followed by the Galla peoples. 108. See
Pollera, n. 9, p. 111.
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the task of ensuring, as discussed above,109 that the defendant accom- panied the complainant to the
nearest (official) judge, i.e., that he acted to issue (or bolster) compulsory process: "If a creditor meets
his debtor on the road, he may follow him, crying, 'By the Bed! By the State! Go not!' But he may not lay
hands on him . . . If he meets a passer-by, he will cry, 'Lo! This man, whom I adjured by the Bed, would
not stop. Take heed, for thou wilt be my witness!' And, when he finds a fit person, he will say, 'Come!
Judge me!' or he may appeal to several passers-by. So that person must return with them to a big
judge and hand them over....110 It is also not clear whether or in what circumstances the decisions of
these "impromptu" tribunals were binding. Walker, stressing the conciliatory aspect, quotes the Amhara
proverb, "If it burns me, with my spoon; if it burns me not, with my hand," meaning "if you decide fairly,
I'll accept the decision; if not, I'll go to a (real) judge".'" But others describe a true arbitral procedure,
where the parties make solemn oath that they will accept the "decision of the elders."11"2 The likely
explanation for this apparent conflict is that the writers in question were describing different
institutions. Both types of settlement procedure may have existed-conciliations and arbitrations. But it
should be noted that even those describing conciliatory procedures cite the strong pressure of public
opinion on the litigants to accept the decision." 3 c. Trial court proceedings. Court proceedings in
traditional Ethiopia resemble in many respects those which have been reported throughout indigenous
Africa. Those are characterized by relative informality, free debate by the parties, their pleaders, and
bystanders, major reliance on testimonial proof by human witnesses, some supernatural modes of
proof, and "consensus" judgments strongly influenced by lay observer/participants.'14 In addition, the
traditional procedure in Christian Ethiopia appears to have certain prominent features not commonly
found in other parts of Africa: these are the extensive use of personal sureties, the institution of wagers,
and the apparently elaborate regulation of witness evidence.115
109. See the discussion at text accompanying notes 94-96 supra. 110. Walker, n.20, pp. 168-69. See also
Merab, n.27, vol. 3, pp. 212-13; Plowden in Hotten, n.77, p. 186. 111. Walker, n. 20, p. 134. See also
Perham, n. 16, p. 144; Combes and Tamisier, n. 107, vol. 3, p. 357. 112. Both Ostini, n. 57, p. 18 and
Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 187, state that no appeal lies from the arbitral decision of the elders. 113.
Plowden, n. 9, p. 106; Perham, n. 16, p. 144. 114. See Elias, n. 73, chap. 12, passim. 115. These
differences may in part be due to the Semitic and Roman- Byzantine influences on Ethiopian culture. See
n. 7, supra.
(i) Preliminary proceedings: the requirement of personal sure-
ties
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"After the injunction to appear before the judge, the first act to institute any case is the establishment of
one or more guarantors according to the importance of the case. The guarantor, called 'wahs,' is a
personage that one meets in Abyssinia in any contract or controversy, who in the judicial procedure
answers for the disciplinary conduct of the parties before the judge, for their appearance in court, and
for the execution of the civil sentence."'116 As the above-quoted account by an Italian administrator
implies, both parties to the litigation had to present sureties,'17 who were responsible to insure
various obligations of the parties-not just their continued appearance. Also, although this passage
specifies the surety's secondary liability vis-a-vis the "civil sentence," there are indications that a form of
suretyship existed in criminal cases'18 whereby the surety was liable to criminal penalties if the accused
absconded.119 Sureties were drawn from the accused's circle of kin and friends, and absconding was
reportedly rare.120 The surety practice was ubiquitous in Ethiopia in a multitude of contexts
unconnected with litigation. We have already mentioned how it functioned in the pre-trial stage, and
below we shall be noting its use at other stages of the proceedings-particularly con- cerning wager
obligations, and execution of the sentence. (ii) Composition and functioning of the tribunal. The Ibo
proverb, "A case forbids no one,"'121 also describes the Ethiopian tradition of public trial, where the
two parties confronted one another before the judge and in the presence of an active lay audience: "It
is traditional . . . that procedures of any kind have to take place in a public place, accessible to all. Each
region, with such an intention, possesses a place where in the shade of an old tree, the leader
administers justice."1122 The adversariness of the procedure is illustrated in the Fetha Nagast, which
states:
116. Pollera, n. 9, p. 114; Masucci, 11 garante nelle consuetudini etiopiche (1914), p. 106. See also
Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, pp. 121, 183. The different types of suretyship contracts have been described
in Poletti, n. 30, p. 260. 117. See also Plowden, n. 9, p. 96; d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 463; Laws, n. 89, ch. 23,
Art. 192A. For similarities in early Anglo-Saxon law see E. de Haas, Antiquities of Bail (1940) p. 4. 118.
See p. 713, supra, for our definition of "criminal" cases. 119. Castro, n. 14, p. 434; Plowden in Hotten, n.
77, p. 184; Poletti, n. 30, p. 260 (describing leesserat Was). 120. Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 184. 121.
Elias, n. 73, p. 239. 122. Pollera, n. 9, p. 113. See also d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 469.
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146. Conti-Rossini, n. 87, p. 526; Pollera, n. 9, p. 118; Walker, n. 20, p. 137. Bets of limbs or one's life
were, as in the case of honey or livestock, generally payable at "fixed" dollar amounts which, we may
speculate, were quite high relative to the resources of most litigants. 147. Messing, n. 11, pp. 318-19,
329. It is not clear whether a defendant, if he refused to wager, would automatically lose the case. (The
sanction of non-access to the courts would obviously only be effective against the complainant.)
Lefebvre, n. 14, vol. I, pp. xxxix-xli, states that he would. Conti- Rossini, n. 87, p. 524 states the only
sanction on either party's refusal to wager was the risk of losing credibility and the judge's favour. 148.
Walker, n. 20, p. 142, states that a poor litigant had the right to keep the stakes relatively low. Other
writers suggest that the poor were remedy- less, but one claims the wager system favored the poor
because it was to the judge's advantage to decide the case on the merits against the party who was
most able to pay the amount waged. Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 185. 149. Walker, n. 20, pp. 181-82.
150. Pollera, n. 9, p. 118; Guebre Sellassie, n. 21, vol. 2, p. 529, n. 2; Messing, n. 11, p. 283. Judges also
received gifts from the litigants. The line between acceptable gift-giving to judges and the payment of
bribes (goubo), which were disapproved but apparently common, is unclear. See Coulbeaux, n. 20, vol.
2, p. 300; Merab, n.27, vol. 3, pp. 246 ff.; Rey, n. 107, p. 130. Sal- aries for judges were apparently
established for the first time in 1931 or thereabouts. See Brihanina Salem, Hedar 2, 1924 E.C., p. 367,
"Good Prog- ress: Judge Fees for Hearing Witnesses and Judges' Salaries" (Addis Abada, H.S.I.U. Law
Faculty Archives). Compare Sec. 143, Penal Code of 1930 (judges allocated share of cer.tain fines); Laws,
n. 89, Art. 210 (establishes fees for judges, plus wager proceeds). 151. Mahtama Selassie Wolde Meskel,
n. 21, p. 896. A slightly different version is given in Guebre Sellassie, n. 21, vol. 2, pp. 428-29. 152.
Mahtama Selassie Wolde Meska1, n. 21, p. 103. Messing, n. 11, p. 329,
The extension of wagers to issues other than the main subject of the litigation had the effect not only of
mounting the stakes considerably, but of delaying and possibly distorting resolution of the principal
question. Thus, the parties might wager as to who would win a wager previously made, on whether or
not a certain witness would be believed, on whether a cited rule of law was actually contained in the
Fetha Nagast, etc. Again, the judge's pecuniary interest in the "piling up" of wagers conflicted with his
duty to keep the proceedings focused on the original dispute. This problem was no doubt intensified if,
as some have reported, not only the parties to the case but also the collected bystanders could
participate in the wagering.'53 (iv) Modes of Proof. After the parties had designated guarantors, made
their initial statements, and entered into wagers, the witness evidence would be heard. The sources
seem in accord that only the accuser could call witnesses,154 which the accused had power to reject for
cause. Thus, it is reported that the accused could insist on the disqualification of the accuser's servants
and other dependents, and his relatives by blood or marriage within four de- grees of relationship.155
He could also reject any witness who was involved in litigation against him, or otherwise known to be his
"enemy," and young children.156 To solve the problem of transporting witnesses from remote places to
the place of trial, it was quite common to take evidence "on commission."'157 The judge appointed an
agent, known as a calati,158 who was empowered to travel to the homes of the accused's witnesses,
and there record their testimony.159 The accuser and the accused accom- panied him on his journeys,
which could be very long and arduous.160 (If the accused had no guarantor, he would be in ambulatory
custody
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states that the Imperial restrictions on the wager stakes resulted in more surreptitious bribing of judges.
153. Messing, n. 11, p. 330; H. Norden, Africa's Last Empire (1930) p. 27. 154. Plowden in Hotten, n.77,
p. 184; Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 234. 155. Conti-Rossini, n. 87, p. 503; Walker, n. 20, pp. 140-41; Messing,
n. 11, p. 316. See also the similar rules in Fetha Nagast, p. 265-66. 156. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 234;
Ostini, n.57, p. 25. 157. Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 184; Walker, n. 20, p. 168. 158. Eritrean sources use
the term memaskari. 159. Some sources state that the calati syste of introducing witness testimony
was exclusive, and that witnesses were never produced to testify in court, d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 467;
Pollera, n. 9, p. 120; Maj. Abebe Guangoul, Summary Contempt Power of Ethiopian Courts (1966,
unpublished, Addis Ababa, H.S.I.U. Law Faculty Archives), p. 6. Others state, more convincingly, that the
calati was used only when a witness lived far from the court and could not conveniently be produced.
See, e.g., Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 234. Many trial observers report seeing witnesses testify. 160. Plowden,
n. 9, p. 105; Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 184. One source suggested that the calati institution served to
"bring the parties together during the peregrinations and thus to furnish the occasion for a peaceful
agreement." Pollera, n. 9, p. 122.
during this entire time). Since, to avoid subornation, the accused generally refused to name his
witnesses prior to the time of their testimony, only the location would be known. If when the travelers
reached the witness, the accused objected to him for cause, the calati could decide to take the
testimony subject to later objection before the court.16' At the journey's conclusion, the trial would
resume and the calati would report the testimony to the judge in a public hearing. The subject of
witness testimony under traditional Ethiopian law is quite bound up with the matter of oaths. Several
different types of oath can be distinguished. First, there were "testimentary oaths," employed by
witnesses and the parties themselves'62 to validate their evidence. There were also decisive oaths of
two sorts, resorted to in the absence of testimonial evidence: suppletory oaths, administered by the
judge to a party to fill a specific gap in the evidence, and decisory oaths, administered by one party (or
by religious authorities) to the other party when there was no acceptable witness evidence to prove
the main issue of litigation.'03 Testamentary oaths, which were taken by all who bore witness,'64 seem
to have been in the form very commonly used in everyday parlance even today in Ethiopia: on the life
of the Emperor or other hallowed personnage. Thus, "Haile Selassie yemut" ("let Haile Sel- lassie die [if I
lie] "), or even "menghesti yemut" ("let the government perish") 16-5 As for decisive oaths, the Fetha
Nagast says: "Know that it is the accuser who must produce witnesses to prove something, and the ac-
cused who must take the oath."'66 The need for suppletory and decisory oaths was increased by the
accused's power to reject the testimony of various classes of persons, and by a possible requirement,
at least in certain types of cases, that the accusation be supported by a minimum number of acceptable
witnesses.'67 Where the accuser was
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161. Pollera, n. 9, p. 120; Conti-Rossini, n. 87, p. 503; Laws, n. 89, chap. 23, art. 200. 162. The status of
an accused's testimony is dealt with in Fetha Nagast, p. 266. 163. Ostini, n. 57, pp. 26-27. Ostini's
classification of decisive oaths seems clearly influenced by the Roman and modern civil law
classification: see Silving, n. 142, pp. 16 ff. Decisory oaths in African customary law generally are
discussed in Elias, n. 73, pp. 228, 230-31. Another form of oath, the fetzmi, is reported for Eritrea. This
oath was sworn by both parties, in the "Let X die" form, at the start of proceedings to affirm their
intention to abide by the decision of the court. Pollera, n. 9, p. 125; Conti-Rossini, n. 87, p. 522; Ostini, n.
57, p. 17. 164. Pollera, n. 9, p. 122; Dufton, n. 144, p. 65; Ostini, n. 57, p. 24; Walker, n. 20, pp. 139-40.
But see d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 467. 165. Poletti, n. 30, p. 264; Merab, n. 27, vol. 3, pp. 234-35; M. Griaule,
Abyssinian Journey (1935) p. 131. 166. Fetha Nagast, p. 258; see also id. at pp. 255-56, 259. 167. Conti-
Rossini, n. 87, p. 503; Pollera, n. 9, p. 120; Fetha Nagast, p. 265. There are also reported tendencies on
the part of Ethiopian judges to decide
unable to produce a sufficient quantity of acceptable witnesses'88 he might challenge the accused to
take a decisive oath. If the accused took the decisory oath, he won the case; if he refused, he lost. Oath-
taking was an extremely solemn ceremony which often took place at the local church, before the judge
or his representative, parish priests, monks, and onlookers.169 Various forms of the church oath have
been reported. One form required the swearer to take hold of the church door and close it, saying, "If I
lie, may [St. George, St. Mary, etc.] close my mouth as I close this door. "170 Or, the swearer would lie
outside the church on a spread used for the dead. The priest would recite a sermon, then give the
swearer a lighted candle which the latter would blow out, saying, "If that which I have affirmed is false . .
. may my life go out in sin as the flame of this candle goes out."171 Or, the priest would hand him a cup
of water which he poured on the ground saying "may my family be lost up to the seventh level, may its
blood be absorbed by the earth as this water dis- appears."'172 Or, the swearer might light a little straw,
and extinguish the flame with water, saying his family "may be burnt, and their memory blotted out
from the face of the earth for seven genera- tions" if he lies.'73 The supernaturally enforced
consequences of these oaths were considered so terrible that, apparently, every effort was made to
reconcile the parties at the church to avoid the accused's taking of the oath.'74 A last mode of proof that
should be mentioned in addition to witness testimony and oaths is the ordeal. Although the ordeal is
reportedly much used in African customary law,'75 there are few reports of it in the literature on
Ethiopia. One observer describes an ordeal requiring theft suspects to eat a large piece of bread, which
the guilty ones were unable to swallow because their mouths were too dry.176 Another describes
forcing a suspected "witch" to drink a truth-in- ducing beverage.L77
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according to the number, rather than credibility, of witnesses. See Coul- beaux, n. 20, vol. 2, p. 302;
Fetha Nagast, p. 269. 168. M&rab, n. 27, vol. 3, pp. 241-42; Walker, n. 20, p. 140. But see J.S.S.
Rowlands, "Notes on Native Law and Custom in Kenya," J. Afr. L., vol. 6 (1962) p. 192, 207, contra. This
procedure is reported also for the Gurage tribe: W. Shack, The Gurage (1966), pp. 158-59. 169. Merab,
n.27, vol. 3, pp. 241-43; Walker, n.20, p. 140. 170. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, pp. 241-42. 171. Pollera, n. 9, p.
124. 172. Ibid. 173. M. Parkyns, Life in Abyssinia (1853) vol. 2, pp. 257-58. 174. Walker, n.20, p. 135;
Merab, n.27, vol. 3, pp. 241-42. For a form of Galla oath, see Merab, p. 243. 175. Elias, n. 73, pp. 228 ff.
176. H. de Monfried, Vers les terres hostiles de l'Ethiopie (1933) pp. 213-14. Compare Plucknett, n. 37, p.
114, reporting a similar ordeal in Anglo-Saxon law. 177. Ostini, n. 57, pp. 43-44.
(v) Judgment From the little information available on the judgment stage of proceedings, it appears that
after the evidence was heard the judge would invite the "jurors" 178 or elders present to give their
opinions on the case, and he would only make his decision after hearing their opinions. Thus, Walker
reports of the procedure in the provincial governor's court:179 After the jurors have listened . . . the
Chamberlain will cause them to testify-one from the right, one from the left, each in his turn swearing,
"May he judge against it, my soul! May the sword judge against me!" "If I show favour, may He show fa-
vour against me!" Let that party conquer!" Each juror-be- ginning from the left-having adjusted his
shamma will step to the front and make the oath . ... Lastly the Right Wambar ["judge"] will rise up and
all with him save the Governor, and he will make the Wambar's oath and all will sit again when he sits.
And after him the Left Wambar. A similar procedure, of opinions by the elders before the judge spoke, is
described for the Emperor's court.180 d. Appeal. Ludolph's seventeenth century history of Ethiopia
states: It is lawful to appeal from Inferior Sentences either to the King or the Court-Tribunals: but that is
seldom done; by reason of the Poverty of the People, and the tediousness of Travel- ling: and partly
out of the Little hopes they have of redress. For the Governors and Judges of Provinces are offended
with appeals, as seeming to them an accusation of Injustice; and therefore the wrong'd Parties fearing
their displeasure, rather choose to lose their right, than the favour of the Judges.'81 To the contrary,
more recent observers note a very strong tradition of taking appeals,'81 on minor interlocutory issues as
well as major ones, through multiple court levels and up to the Emperor's own court.'82 The Emperor
himself has always been popularly regarded as the ultimate source of justice, to whom litigants could
appeal in the last resort. But Ludolph's statement reveals certain characteristics of the traditional
appeals system which are noteworthy. Because of the lack of separation of powers between
administration and ju-
178. See the text accompanying notes 121-127, supra. 179. Walker, n. 20, pp. 138-39. See also
d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 468. 180. Mahtama Selassie Wolde Meskel, n. 21, pp. 106-08. 181. Ludolph, n. 37, p.
238. See also Almeida, "History of High Ethiopia, 1628-46," in G.W.B. Huntingford and C. Beckingham
(ed.), Some Records of Ethiopia, 1593-1646 (1954) p. 73, accord. 182. D'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 467; Nebiyelul
Kifle, n. 39, pp. 14-16, as quoted in Fisher (1969), n.1, pp. 421-22; Perham, n. 16, p. 143.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:54]
diciary,183a n appeal was often, in fact or effect, a claim that one's "lord" had done him an injustice.
This "personal" aspect is illustrated by the fact that the judge below was himself a party to the appeal,
and had to appear either in person or by representative.184 If the appeal court determined that the
judge had acted arbitrarily or unjustly, he could be disciplined.'85 Also, it seems that the system of
wager applied to appeals, in that the appellant might bet the judge that his decision would be
reversed.186 For these reasons judges would understandably be hostile to appeals. The procedure by
which one could appeal from the decision of a district governor's court, for example, to the provincial
governor's was to bring the case to the latter's attention by means of a petition. Apparently this was
done by a combination of personal "connections" and gifts to the appropriate court officials.187 For the
poor man who lacked the necessary means or contacts to penetrate the bureaucracy it was customary
to use more drastic methods of drawing attention to his complaint: If a man is oppressed by the
Wambar he may place a load of stone or wood upon his head and wait by the road side or at the gate till
the governor passes. Then he will lift up his burden and cry out "Abeit Abeit!"188 The "right" to direct
appeal to orne'sr uler by crying "abeit" has been widely noted by foreign observers, and was used to
complain of alleged administrative as well as judicial injustice. Even in contemporary Ethiopia, one sees
subjects approach the Emperor's entourage, petition in hand, and try to throw themselves in the path
of His automobile. In many cases the security guards will simply brush such peti- tioners aside, but a
successful attempt would result in His Majesty's instructions to a subordinate to accept the petition and
deal with it. If the petition appeared worthy of investigation, an order might be issued to the court
below to send up the case file for review.189 Or, the judge might simply be summoned to appear with
the file, the parties, and perhaps the witnesses, for a hearing of the appeal.
183. Refer to ouir description of the administrative/judicial structure on appeal at text accompanying
notes 12-25, supra. 184. Walker, pp. 146-47; Merab, vol. 3, p. 238 ("The judge who sat at first instance is
called to give his account of the proceedings and to give the reasons which motivated his sentence.");
Pollera, p. 121; d'Abbadie, p. 467. 185. Merab, vol. 3, p. 238; Walker, pp. 146-47. 186. Pollera, p. 121.
187. Id., p. 102. 188. Walker, p. 147. See also Merab, n. 27, vol. 3, p. 238; Messing, n.11, p. 307; Pollera,
n.9 p. 102. 189. Article 8 of His Majesty's preamble to the Penal Code of 1930 states: "The Minister of
Justice may call for the record of any case before the tribunals to assure himself of the correctness
legality and propriety of all proceedings and to transmit the same to us with such observations as he
thinks fit." Recall that the Minister was for some time the Afe Negus as well.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:54]
Whether or not every appeal consisted of a full trial de novo is not clear.'90 e. "Execution of Sentence:"
The Injured Party's Role. A central characteristic of Ethiopian customary criminal procedure was the
absence of any official prosecuting agency. In the great bulk of offences considered "criminal" by
modern laws the injured party initiated and prosecuted the action. It was often his task, also, to execute
the sentence: "In case of murder, for instance, unless the victim has some relative, who, acting as
accuser, seizes the homicide himself, proves the crime, and is ready to slay him with his own hand, the
culprit will be untouched-justice furnishing neither accuser nor execu- tioner."'9' In some offences, such
as blasphemy, perjury, banditry or treason, the (theocratic) state itself was the chief victim, and took
action through its own agents (parish headman, local governor, etc.) So also, theft at the market place
might be summarily punished192 by action of the market master. But most offences-and the sources
refer mainly to homicide cases-were regarded as primarily a matter between the victim (or his kin) and
the convict. A convicted murderer was handed over for punishment to the victim's family, who could
inflict on him any kind of gruesome death they chose.193 Over the years the central government made
certain efforts to assert its interest in such cases. First, the law saved to the Emperor personally the sole
right to decide capital cases,'94 and forbade blood revenge without mediation of the official court
process.193
190. The question is particularly important in capital cases, since traditionally only His Majesty
personally, sitting in his chilot (court), could impose that penalty. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 211; Plowden in
Hotten, n.77, p. 121; Rey, n. 107, p. 130. 191. Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 188. See also de Salviac, n. 57,
pp. 201-02; Pollera, n.9, p. 99; Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 213. 192. Non-capital punishments included
banishment, flogging, fines, and mutilation. Descriptions of these and other gory punishments alleged to
have been used are found in Wylde, n.130, p. 310; Plowden in Hotten, n.77, pp. 189-90; Merab, n.27,
vol. 3, pp. 188 ff.; J. Bruce, Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile, 1768-1773 (1790) vol. 3, pp. 286-
87; Castro, n. 14, p. 438. 193. Ludolph, n. 37, p. 239; Plowden, n. 9, p. 98; Almeida, n. 181, pp. 75-76;
Ostini, n. 57, p. 32; H.A. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy (1965), p. 60. But other sources state that the
execution had to be in the same manner as the original homicide: Castro, n.14, p. 436; Wylde, n. 130,
p. 308; Harmsworth, n. 129, p. 273-74; M6rab, n. 27, vol. 3, p. 217-218. Thus the famous story attributed
to various emperors: when the victim's kin in a case of accidental homicide refused to accept blood
money, and unreasonably demanded the convict's life, the emperor insisted they kill him in precisely the
way he had killed the deceased: by falling upon him from a tree branch high above the ground. The kin
group chose the blood money instead. Merab, vol. 3, p. 218; Gleichen, n. 66, p. 240; Parkyns, n. 173, vol.
2, p. 238. 194. See note 190, supra. 195. See Fetha Nagast, p. 295.

SimriE, [07.03.20 15:54]
Second, the government periodically tried to control the manner and means of execution by the kin
group, by requiring that executions take place at special government supervised locations. For exam-
ple,'96 in 1925 the then-Regent Haile Sellassie established an execution device in a village near the
capital, where the murdered man's kin were restricted to pulling a lever which caused a rifle to fire at
the condemned man's heart from a fixed position.197 However, the penalty in personal injury or
homicide cases did not necessarily result in "legalized vengeance" by the victim or his kin: it could be
converted at the latter's option into a "blood money" payment of reconciliation. There were money
equivalents, established by custom or statute in various parts of the Empire, for all kinds of injuries,
including death.'98 But if in a capital case the victim's family, through spite or pride,199 refused to
accept compensation, they might proceed to execute the offender. Interestingly enough, it was the
function of the elders, church officials, and judge (including in capital cases, the Emperor Himself), to
plead with the "winners" of the case to be merciful and accept a reconciliatory settlement from the
loser.200 But the injured party could and often would reject even the Emperor's plea for mercy. If the
victorious victim agreed to accept compensation in lieu of other penalty, the accused would produce a
guarantor of payment, or else might be placed in ambulatory custody for the duration of whatever
travels he required to raise the necessary money from his relatives.201 If that source failed, he might
take to begging in the streets.202
CONCLUSION
The above description demonstrates that there was a functioning indigenous system of criminal
procedure before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. The system was marked by a number of
striking characteristics. Some, like ordeal, oath-taking, and the role of elders are common to many
African customary systems: others, like guaran-
196. Plowden in Hotten, n. 77, p. 235, reports that the Emperor Theodore, newly acceded to the throne,
"has abolished the barbarous practice of de- livering over murderers to the relatives of the deceased,
handing over offenders, in public, to his own executioners to be shot or decapitated." 197. Merab,
n.27, vol. 3, p. 220, n.1. 198. Id., p. 190; Messing, n.11, p. 307; Ostini, n.57, pp. 32-33. 199. Messing, n.
11, p. 307, states that a weaker kin group will likely accept blood money but a stronger will not, thereby
perpetuating a blood feud. 200. Fetha Nagast, p. 294; Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 236; Mahtama Selassie
Wolde Meskel, n.21, p. 107; Kassa Beyene, "Blood Money" Problems in Ethio- pian Traditional and
Modern Law (1967, unpublished, Addis Ababa, H.S.I.U. Law Faculty Archives), p. 8. See also n. 193,
supra. 201. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, pp. 190, 236; Messing, n.11, p. 316. 202. Castro, n.14, p. 436; de Salviac,
n.57, p. 208; Merab,vol. 3, p. 236.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:54]

tors and wager, may be more uniquely Ethiopian. The traditional system of criminal procedure was very
deeply rooted in Ethiopia's religious culture and highly stratified society, and depended for its
effectiveness upon a social context of close-knit rural community. At least some of the traditional legal
institutions would not be well- suited to the changed conditions, such as increased mobility and ur-
banization, which have developed in the Empire during the last thirty- five years. In the comprehensive
revamping of the national law which took place in Ethiopia between 1955 and 1965, the question of
which institutions to retain as compatible with desired change, and which to discourage or forbid, must
have been formidable. As it developed, the new law presents a contrast so marked as to be revolu-
tionary. The Revised Constitution of 1955 contains a "bill of rights" closely resembling, in significant
parts, the American Constitution. The Anglo-American framework thus superimposed upon the law of
criminal procedure includes provisions203 on "due process," "equal protection," right to counsel,
arrest, detention, search and seizure, etc., which would be familiar to an American lawyer, but which
bear no obvious relationship to traditional law or values. The Criminal Pro- cedure Code, enacted in
1961,204 completed the drive to "modernity." Unlike the new Civil Code, which expressly makes a
sweeping repeal of customary law,205 the Criminal Procedure Code contains no repeals provision.
Article 1 (2) states that: "the provisions of this Code shall apply to all matters coming within the
jurisdiction of the courts, the prosecution and police authorities." This impliedly repeals inconsistent
statutory and customary rules, but does not settle the status of practices which are not inconsistent with
any provision of the Code, e.g., the inviolability of sanctuary. But if the Criminal Procedure Code does
not specifically repeal customary law, neither does it commonly incorporate customary practices, either
directly or by reference.206 On the contrary, the procedure of the
203. See Arts. 37, 43 and 52, Rev. Const. 204. Op. cit. supra n. 5 [hereinafter cited as Crim. Proc. C.]. 205.
See Krzeczunowicz, "A New Legislative Approach to Custom: the 'Repeals' Provision of the Ethiopian Civil
Code of 1960," J. Eth. Studies, vol. 1 (1963), p. 57; Krzeczunowicz, "Code and Custom in Ethiopia," J. Eth.
L., vol. 2 (1965), p. 425. The Penal Code of 1957, which superseded the Penal Code of 1930, is also silent
about the effect of customary law, but repeal was certainly intended. Article 3 ("Other Penal
Legislation") states: "Nothing in this Code shall affect Police regulations and special laws of a penal
nature: Provided that the general principles embodied in this Code are applicable to those regulations
and laws except as otherwise expressly provided therein." For com- mentary on the Penal Code see
Lowenstein, "The Penal System of Ethiopia," J. Eth. L., vol. 2 (1965), p. 383, and sources cited in Fisher,
"Some Aspects ," op. cit. supra n. 1, in footnote 4. 206. The Civil Code does so to a significant extent. See
sources cited in n. 205, supra.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:54]
strongly Anglo-American Code is considerably different from, and often highly inconsistent with,
traditional forms. Thus, the provisions on "criminal investigation" make little concession to the Ethio-
pian context. Investigation is conducted by police officers, who are accountable to the public
prosecutor.207 The Code does not mention such traditional institutions as affersata or thief-seeker. The
rules on arrest are standard Western fare,208 and do not mention the customs of "ambulatory custody"
or sanctuary. As in the West, suspects may be detained before trial in police jails and in prisons.209 The
law of bail, drawn from Commonwealth law, departs from customary law in denying the possibility of
pre-trial liberty to defendants charged with capital offenses.210 In contrast to customary procedure,
most cases are brought by a public prosecutor, rather than the injured party, and payment of "blood
money" will not generally insulate the accused from criminal liability. The Code's procedure at trial does
not provide for the practice of wager. Furthermore, the Code not only fails to recognize the defendant's
customary oath-taking at trial, but, in the European fashion, apparently does not permit the defendant
to give sworn testimony-he may make only an unsworn statement.211 The Code does not provide for
commission (calati) evidence,212 and there is no disqualification of witnesses on account of their
relationship to the injured party or the defendant. Laymen, whose participation formed a vital part of
the traditional criminal process, have no role in the trial of all but the most minor offenses under the
Code213-professional judges are the sole triers of fact. Criminal ap-
207. Arts. 22-39, Crim. Proc. C. 208. Id., Arts. 49-51; Art. 51, Rev. Const.; Fisher, "Some Aspects . . n. 1,
passim. 209. Arts. 59-60, Crim. Proc. C. With the break-down of the system of personal guarantee in
urban centers Ethiopia has acquired a problem well known to "developed" countries-the prolonged pre-
trial detention of suspects. In 1965 over one-third of Ethiopia's prison population was awaiting trial.
Detention periods of a year or more are not rare; see Fisher, n. 1, (1969), pp. 161-62, 299-304.
Ethiopians also experience "preventive detention" for political purposes, a quite traditional practice in
the Empire. See text accompanying n. 101, supra. A wartime preventive detention statute was enacted
in 1942, but was presumably repealed by the war's end and the enactment of the Code. In contrast to
the post-independence law of many other developing countries, Ethiopia's new Constitution and laws
contained no preventive detention authority, yet until 1969 the practice existed illegally. In 1969 the
first modern preventive detention act, to remain in force six months, was promulgated in response to
student disturbances. See Public Safety and Welfare Order, 1969, Order No. 56, Neg. Gaz,, yr. 28, no. 13.
The legislation has since been renewed for a second six month period. Public Safety and Welfare
(Amendment) Order, 1969, Order No. 60, Neg. Gaz., yr. 29, no. 7. 210. Art. 63, Crim. Proc. C. 211. Id.,
Art. 142(3). See the discussion in Fisher, n. 1, (1969), p. 316. 212. Compare Arts. 122 ff., Eth. Civ. Proc. C.,
establishing the practice for civil cases. But the law of evidence, which may soon be enacted in code
form, may fill this gap. 213. See Singer, n. 8, passim.
peals are no longer unlimited in number-the Code limits the parties to two appeals,21 although the right
of ultimate resort to the Emperor's court is preserved.215 On the other hand, traditional practices have
not been entirely rejected in the new law; some accommodations have been made. In future research
we hope to explore the extent of those compromises, an enterprise which the limitations of space here
prevent. In this article we hope to have laid some basis for such inquiries.
214
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strained by comparison to Western courtroom etiquette, the Ethiopian proceedings operated in a
context of strict decorum which allotted to each party a particular place before the tribunal, and which
forbade speaking out of turn and other disruptive conduct on pain of contempt sanctions. Thus, Walker
reports that the complainant always had the right to be on the judge's right side: "I, being the accuser,
will take the right like the Saints, whose work is to the right towards God. And do thou take the left like
Satan, whose work is left-handed and deceitful."'138 In some tribes, it is reported that pleading ritual
required the plaintiff when addressing the tribunal to hold the sole of one foot up against a tree while
the defendant had to squat with one leg extended and the other bent under him. The report states
that this arrangement was designed to assure brevity of speech.'39 There was also a definite
progression of speeches by the various participants. First the complaining party would address the court
recounting the injury done him by the defendant. Then the judge would ask the defendant whether the
accusation was true, whereupon the latter was free to tell his story. It was forbidden to interrupt one
who had the floor. According to the Fetha Nagast, If one insults the other or says shameful words, the
judge shall cut him short; if he does this again, the judge shall reproach him, and if he persists in this, the
judge shall excommunicate him.'40 Such was the advantage of having bishops on the bench! Witnesses
would only be called after both sides had spoken, to clarify disputed issues.14' But first wagers, to which
we now turn, would be made. (iii) Wager. If the defendant admitted his accuser's allega- tions, the court
would directly consider the sentence. If, however, the defendant denied his liability, the production of
witness evidence was normally preceded by the making of wagers between the parties. The wager
institution is not unique to Ethiopian law: it has been reported elsewhere in Africa,'42 Europe, and
other places.'43 Wagers serve several functions: providing revenue (out of the loser's bet) to the judicial
organ, "weeding out" some of the more flagrantly unmeri-
138. Walker, n. 20, p. 179. 139. De Salviac, n. 57, p. 201. 140. Fetha Nagast, p. 258. See also Walker, n.
20, pp. 179-80; Laws, n. 89, chap. 23, Arts. 200-203. 141. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 232. 142. Elias, n. 73, pp.
232-33 mentions the tradition of oath and betting in combination among the Ibo of Nigeria. The
connection in early Roman law between the oath and wager is remarked by H. Silving, Essays on
Criminal Procedure (1964) p. 17. 143. Silving, loc. cit.; Conti-Rossini, n. 87, p. 524 adverts to the
relationship
torious claims, and heightening the dramatic qualities of public litigation. As will appear from our
discussion below, they are also subject to severe abuse. Two types of wager ritual have been reported
in traditional Ethi- opian tribunals. The most commonly reported method involved symbolic knotting of
the cotton toga, referred to in the following ex- cerpt as futa: The acceptance of the wager has its
characteristic rite. The pro- poser, holding on to the edge of his own "futa", makes a knot rapidly, puts it
on the palm of his left hand, pronouncing the bet, and with his right hand repeatedly taps the knot. If
the adversary accepts, he unties the knot and makes a new one that unites his "futa" with his
adversary's "futa"; he taps this with his right hand, declaring his acceptance. Naturally, he may propose
modi- fications, additions or clarifications, so that before arriving at the definitive formula there is a
repetition of different proposals, a tying and untying of knots . . . up to the point where, having reached
an agreement, the wager is accepted.144
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:54]
Another method involved the making of certain body motions to indicate the amount of the wager one
wished to make. Before a money economy existed in the country, wagers were made in kind. Litigants
would commonly bet honey or livestock. Wager by sign- language consisted, for example, of licking
one's palm to indicate a bet of honey, extending arms and waving of hands in imitation of a gallop to
indicate a bet of a horse, and raising the hands to the ears and moving them up and down to indicate a
bet of a mule.145 With the passage of time, and the introduction of government regulation by statute,
commodities acquired fixed money equivalents in certain regions, so that a bet of "honey" was
understood to mean so many dollars, a bet of a "horse" such and such larger sum, etc. But the tradition
continued, apparently, of expressing wagers in terms of the original commodities, and in the ways
described. The custom of wager gave rise to two kinds of problems: the escalation of wager stakes far
beyond the means of the parties, and extension of wagering to issues which were of remote relevance
to the principal issue of the case. Thus, the wager system permitted the
between the wager institutions of Ethiopia, India, ancient Greece, ancient Rome, and Aryan law. 144.
Pollera, n. 9, p. 119. See also H. Dufton, Journey Through Abyssinia (2d ed., 1867) pp. 65-66, and
d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 467. The latter reports a procedure of knotting the judge's toga, not the adversary's.
He also mentions an alternate method of indicating a bet-closing the extended, open hand of the
judge; the adversary signifies his acceptance of the bet by re- opening the judge's hand. Conti-Rossini, n.
87, p. 524 reports the same. 145. Messing, n. 11, p. 519. But see Walker, n. 20, p. 182, implying that only
a mute would wager by use of this sign language.
parties to top each other's bets in a spiral which might even end in the wagering of one's hand, eye, or
very life.'46; If a complainant refused to wager on his cause, he apparently could not proceed with the
case.147 While it is not clear what remedy a poor litigant had against escalation of the stakes beyond his
means,148 it was not unusual in the heat of contest for a litigant, moved by pride and a wish to im-
press upon the judge the worth of his cause, to participate in the bet- topping.149 Since the judges
received their income in large part from a share of the loser's bet,150 they were reportedly less than
vigilant in helping to keep the stakes at a reasonable level. This abuse was apparently so serious and so
widespread as to provoke an Imperial proclamation by the Emperor Menelik in 1908: I proclaim that
henceforth no bets should be contracted in which the losing party in the litigation shall receive a certain
number of whippings. From now on honey should be used as a possible payment. At the most let the
parties promise a horse or a mule. The judge should not permit an amount greater than this to be
staked. If a party loses on a mule, he may pay twenty dollars; on a horse, ten dollars; on honey, four
dollars. 51 In 1932 Emperor Haile Sellassie found it necessary to issue a further proclamation,
establishing reduced dollar equivalents for bets of a "mule," "horse," etc.152
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:54]
"He [the judge] shall not receive the litigants individually, in the absence of their adversaries, nor must
he see them individually after they are separated." 123 A judge who gave a decision on the basis of ex
parte argument was liable, under the Fetha Nagast, to the sentence he passed.'24 All observers appear
to agree that the proceedings were much influenced by the lay audience, who were free to interject
their own questions, comments, and even wagers on the outcome of the suit.125 Some report, in
addition, the practice of establishing jurors in certain cases to aid in deciding the case. Thus, Walker
describes the provincial governor's court: " . [I]f the matter is important, the judge may call on all those
who are listening to become jurors, provided that they are of prudent age, since all men love a suit and
many will be there saying, "I will listen to the procedure and accustom myself to the Law." . . . Thus
there may be a crowd of jurors. The adversaries may deny the judgment of the witnesses, but the
jurors will bear witness to the . . . contradiction and agreement made by each party in the pleading. . . .
A man may choose his own jurors, for there is a saying, "A juror and a horse according to one's love!"
But the adversary may refuse to accept them till the judge tires and cries, "Thou has refuSed them all!
Whence can others be brought! Prefer So- and-so and So-and-so!" and will constrain him. ...126 Other
writers describe the selection of a few jurors to aid the judge rather than the above described system of
converting the assemblage at large into a "jury").127 In Ethiopia, as in African customary procedure
generally,128 the principle of court representation of a party by another was well established. Thus, in
1935 the English observer Harmsworth wrote: Two men in white chammas were dancing and stamping
and making frenzied gesticulations. Before them, in solemn array, sat a dozen or more elders who
listened intently and made occa- sional notes. ... Not once . . did either the plaintiff . . . or the
accused . . . utter a single word. But their silence was more
123. Fetha Nagast, p. 253. See also Ethiopian Penal Code of 1930, para. 223. 124. Fetha Nagast, p. 258.
125. See, e.g., Messing, n. 11, p. 330. 126. Walker, n. 20, pp. 138-39. 127. See d'Abbadie, n.90, p. 463;
Merab, n. 27, vol. 3, p. 232. According to the Fetha Nagast "experienced persons" [in law] were to sit
with the judge to be consulted on "difficult questions," Fetha Nagast, pp. 257-58. See also de Salviac, n.
57, pp. 201-02, reporting the existence of a system among the Galla whereby two juries were
empaneled to deliberate simultaneously in each case. 128. Elias, n. 73, p. 240.
SimriE, [07.03.20 15:54]
than made up for by the volubility of the counsels for the de- fense and the prosecution, who vied with
each other in theatrical wavings of the arms and stamping movements of their feet. At the end of their
impassioned orations . .. each would gather his chamma around him and throw the ends over his
shoulder, as proud as a Roman....129 But it has also been observed many times that the average
Ethiopian litigant prided himself on his considerable ability in self-advocacy, and often preferred to
defend himself rather than engage a spokes- man.130 Advocates included both "amateur" family
members and "professionals" hired for a fee. The latter did not enjoy a high status and, we can
speculate, were not very numerous.131 Foreigners were frequently struck by the dynamic and skillful
advocacy which they observed in customary Ethiopian tribunals. As indicated in the above description by
Harmsworth, energetic physical gesticulations were commonly employed;132 most of these probably
served symbolic functions. The use of a large stick-similar to the kind which men in some parts of Africa
carry wherever they go- is often mentioned,133a s is symbolic manipulation of the toga.134 For
instance, Messing describes the device of a defendant's throwing his toga off his shoulders in the middle
of his argument, as a way of showing his readiness to receive the flogging which the court could order.
This serves to prove his sincerity and express confidence that the court will not judge him guilty.135 The
"language of the toga," wherein status or mood is communicated symbolically by the way one wears
one's toga-raised or lowered, covering the mouth or exposing it, etc.-is a general feature of Ethiopian
culture; its appearance in judicial proceedings is simply one instance of its general social function.136
Proverbs, which also function prominently in traditional Ethiopian culture, play a marked role as well in
judicial advocacy.137 Despite the acceptance of advocacy styles which seem unre-
129. G. Harmsworth, Abyssinian Adventure (1935) p. 183. 130. Merab, n.27, vol. 3, pp. 240-41; Perham,
n.16, p. 144; Messing, n.11, p. 327; A. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (1901) p. 310; Raffray, n.9, p. 163. 131.
Walker, n.20, pp. 174-78; Shack, n. 74, p. 153; Merab, n.27, vol. 3, p. 240-41. 132. See H. d'Orleans, Une
Visite d L'Empereur Menelick (1898) pp. 131-32: Merab, n.27, vol. 3, pp. 228-29. Compare P. Gulliver,
Social Control in an African Society (1963) p. 224 reporting similar phenomena among a different African
people. 133. Walker, n. 20, pp. 179-80; Fetha Nagast, Foreword, p. xx, n. 33. De Salviac, n. 57, p. 201 and
d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 465 report the use of small whip- like rods by court speakers among the Galla. 134.
Messing, n. 11, pp. 238-39 and 519; d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 463. 135. Messing, n. 11, p. 329. 136. See
Levine, n. 12, p. 254. 137. Messing, n. 11, pp. 330-31; d'Abbadie, n. 90, p. 466 ("Every pleading is
sprinkled with rhymed and well-known proverbs").

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SimriE, [07.03.

Motors and generators

Electric bells and buzzers

Loudspeakers and headphones

Actuators such as valves

Scientific equipment such as mass spectrometers

Industrial lifting magnets

magnetic levitation, used in a maglev train or trains

Induction heating for cooking, manufacturing, and

SimriE, [07.03.20 15:22]

SimriE, [07.03.20 15:26]

What is an Economic System?

Types of Economic Systems

1. Traditional economic system

3. Market economic system

An economic system, or economic order,[1] is a system of production, resource allocation and

Planning, coordination and reform.

Productive enterprises; factor and product markets; prices; population.

Public economics; financial economics.

National income, product and expenditure; money; inflation.

International trade, finance, investment and aid.

Consumer economics; welfare and poverty.

Performance and prospects.

Natural resources; energy; environment; regional studies.

Political economy; legal institutions; property rights.[5]

Planning, coordination and reform.

Productive enterprises; factor and product markets; prices; population.

Public economics; financial economics.

National income, product and expenditure; money; inflation.

International trade, finance, investment and aid.

Performance and prospects.

Natural resources; energy; environment; regional studies.

Political economy; legal institutions; property rights.[5]

There are multiple components to an economic system. Decision-making structures of an economy

What goods and services shall be produced and in what quantities?

By resource allocation mechanism

Market economy ("hands off" systems, such as laissez-faire capitalism)

Georgism – socialized rents on land

Indicative planning, also known as a planned market economy

Progressive utilization theory

Social market economy, also known as Soziale Marktwirtschaft

Socialist market economy

See also: Evolutionary economics

The three economics system.

Definition of mixed economy

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What is mixed economy?

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What is price mechanism?

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How government interfere

The intervention of the Government can take a number of forms.

Fixing prices above or below the free market equilibrium

Taxing the production or sale of carious goods

Subsidizing the production or sale of various goods

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How does surplus happen?

SimriE, [07.03.20 15:37]

The Plan Behind a Mixed Economy

The basic plan of the mixed economy is that:

The means of production are mainly under private ownership;

Markets remain the dominant form of economic coordination; and

What do Governments Provide?