Dependent Origination Emptiness Nagarju PDF

Shi Huifeng: “Dependent Origination = Emptiness”—Nāgārjuna’s Innovation?
“Dependent Origination = Emptiness”

—Nāgārjuna’s Innovation?
An Examination of the Early and
Mainstream Sectarian Textual Sources
Shì Hùifēng
Abstract
It is claimed that one of the innovative contributions of Nāgārjuna
in his Madhyamaka thought was establishing the equivalence of
emptiness (P: suññatā, Skt: śūnyatā; kōng 空, kōngxìng 空性) and
dependent origination (P: paṭiccasamuppāda, Skt: pratītyasamutpāda;
Ch: yīnyüán 因緣, yüánqĭ 緣起). This study examines early and
mainstream Buddhist textual sources to discover what relationship
between emptiness and dependent origination was established before
Nāgārjuna.
In Part 1, we broadly outline the near paradigmatic modern Buddhist

studies discourse on the teachings of emptiness. We then focus on the
role of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka within this discourse. Lastly, this
study rounds off with a literature review of studies on emptiness and
dependent origination before Nāgārjuna.
Part 2 covers the early teachings found in the Pāli Nikāyas and
(Chinese translations of) the Āgamas. It finds that the term emptiness
was sometimes used independently to refer to the process of dependent
arising as saṃsāric dissatisfaction and cause, and also as dependent
cessation into nirvāṇa. Emptiness as the “profound” also described
these two complementary processes as a whole.
Part 3 continues with the broad range of mainstream sectarian sūtra

and śāstra literature. Here, the previous relationships are made more
firm and explicit. There is greater association with the two doctrines as
rejection of extreme views based on a “self”. The two are also brought
within the Abhidharma methodology of analysis into conventional
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or ultimate truths, and classification as conditioned or unconditioned

phenomena.
Part 4 concludes, that while already nascent in the early literature, the
relation or equation of emptiness with dependent origination, along
with related terms, was quite well developed in pre-Nāgārjunian
sectarian literature, and is strongest in the Sarvāstivādin literature.
We recommend that aspects of the academic discourse on emptiness
should be rectified as a result of these findings.
Keywords: emptiness, dependent origination, Nāgārjuna,

Madhyamaka, early Buddhism, sectarian Buddhism
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1. Emptiness, Dependent Origination & Nāgārjuna

Modern Buddhist studies has an already established academic
discourse and narrative with regard to the teaching of the “empty”
or “emptiness” (P: suñña, suññatā, Skt: śūnya, śūnyatā; Ch: kōng 空 /
kōngxìng 空性). Although this general position on emptiness is seldom
stated as a “discourse” or “narrative”, and is moreover not a position
held universally by all scholars, it is nonetheless fairly common, a
default position as it were. The fact of the lack of need to express it
as an academic discourse or narrative is perhaps further indication of
its paradigmatic status. Its lines of development and argument often
begin from middle to late Mahāyāna, and then work backwards through
history showing how each stage differed from the previous. This is
because it tends to (quite erroneously) argue that “emptiness” is largely
a Mahāyāna doctrine. This form of teleological approach, whereby
earlier forms are only investigated in as much as they are relevant for
later forms, obviously leads to numerous distortions.
Here, however, we shall use the more natural diachronic presentation

in a natural forward historical sequence, noting some of the modern
scholars who support the respective elements of the discourse:
1. It is stated that early Buddhism as found in the Nikāyas and Āgamas
also did not consider the doctrine of emptiness as particularly
important.
1.1. Time period is from the Buddha to the schism of the Saṅgha,
approximately 5th to 3rd century bce.
1.2. More often than not, the sutta (and to a much lesser extent the
vinaya) canon of the Pāli Theravādin tradition alone is used to
represent the doctrines of “early” Buddhism.
1.3. What little early Buddhism so defined does say regards
emptiness, is by and large merely a synonym for not self.
2. Slightly later, mainstream sectarian Buddhism, as typified by the
Abhidharma, referred to with the polemic term “Hīnayāna”, also
did not consider the teaching of emptiness as particularly important.
2.1. The alleged time period is from the schism of the Saṅgha to
the dominance of the Mahāyāna, approximately 3rd century
bce to 2nd century ce.
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2.2. It is shown that the Abhidharma dharmavāda system considers

phenomena as a plurality of really existent entities. Although
rejecting a “self” (ātman) in the person (pudgala), known as
“pudgalanairātmya” or “pudgalaśūnyatā”, they considered the
dharmas to in fact exist.
2.3. The Northern Abhidharmakośa and Southern Visuddhimagga
are perhaps the most commonly referred to texts of this period,
despite their providence of c. 5th cty, quite some centuries after
the advent of the Mahāyāna.
3. In contradistinction to the above two historical stages, the notion
of emptiness is an extremely important doctrine in Mahāyāna
Buddhism, especially the Prajñāpāramitā.
3.1. Spans from the turn of the millennia 0 ce on, for several
centuries.
3.2. As opposed to the “Hīnayāna” view espoused above, it is
claimed that the Mahāyāna notion of emptiness encompasses
both the “emptiness of the person” (pudgalaśūnyatā, pudgala
nairātmya) and also the “emptiness of the phenomenal”
(dharmaśūnyatā, dharmanairātmya).
3.3. This is considered at least a direct refutation against the
Abhidharma systems, if not mainstream sectarian Buddhism
as a whole.
3.4. Standard explanations of the Prajñāpāramitā Sutras are
often based on much later Indian commentaries which have
been preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan, particularly the
Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka of Haribhadra.
4. The definitive Mahāyānic meaning of emptiness is usually sourced
from the Madhyamaka texts of Nāgārjuna and his doctrinal heirs.
4.1. From the time of Nāgārjuna, 2nd to 3rd century ce.
4.2. Sometimes Nāgārjuna is given the status of a founder or
inspiration for the Mahāyāna as a whole, or at least its principal
systematizer.
4.3. In particular, Nāgārjuna’s seminal text, the Mūlamadhyāmaka
kārikā, is taken as definitive, if not exclusively.
4.4. Often his expression of emptiness is considered “revolutionary”
when compared to the “realist” or “substantialist” positions of
Abhidhamma Buddhism, or more specifically, the teachings of
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the Pudgalavādins and the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda.

This was the “emptiness doctrine” (śūnyatāvāda) against the
“own-nature doctrine” (svabhāvavāda). Some consider the
“early” teachings to also be his target.
4.5. Later commentaries on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,
especially those preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan, such as
Candrakīrti, are used to explain Nāgārjuna’s key śāstra in turn.
5. It is commonly said that Nāgārjuna received the inspiration for his
formulation on emptiness from the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras.
5.1. The relationship between these sūtras and śāstras is sometimes
explained as Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka emptiness being a
systematic philosophical expression of the Prajñāpāramitā
Sūtras religious teaching of emptiness.
It was mainly a number of earlier studies, by the likes of Murti (1955),

Stcherbatsky (1968) and Conze (1962), who first established this
modern “discourse of emptiness” through detailed scholastic studies
focusing on the source materials available at the time. Recently,
Westerhoff has provided a survey of “The Philosophical Study of
Nāgārjuna in the West”, laying out three phases: “First is the Kantian
phase, then the analytic phase, and finally a post-Wittgensteinian one”
(Westerhoff 2009: 9ff). It is noteworthy that Stcherbatsky and Murti,
for instance, fall within the Kantian phase, and that Conze has strong
Hegelian credentials. The above “discourse” is an outline of some of the
key points, as exemplified in major writings by a number of Buddhist
studies scholars, far too many to list individually here.
For now, we would like to point out that as a whole, the discourse of
emptiness so established is a very useful general outline which may
serve as is when laying out the broad picture of the development of
Indian Buddhist thought. However, it is not without some problems.
Over the last few decades, several scholars have shown more nuanced
approaches and proposed amendments to various parts of the discourse,
which are worth noting.
1.1. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as Emptiness and Dependent Origination

We shall not here attempt to discuss the discourse on emptiness
in its entirety, which would be a huge project encompassing much
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of Buddhism in India and beyond. However, we would like to draw

attention to certain aspects of it, which while being commonly accepted
as paradigmatic, are still nonetheless somewhat problematic. Of the five
main elements of the discourse outlined above, we would like to reflect
on the general position of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka. In the last few
years a number of excellent studies in this area have been published,
such as those by Westerhoff (2009), Seyfort Ruegg (2010) and
Siderits & Katsura (2013). However, focusing mainly on Nāgārjuna’s
philosophy, rather than as historical development of Buddhist thought,
the Madhyamaka role within the broader “discourse” is only briefly
touched upon. But despite the progress in finding more appropriate
ways to read and understand Nāgārjuna, in particular his Mūla
madhyamakakārikā, certain approaches have remained unchanged.
Candrakīrti, for example, remains the default commentator of choice,
and the use of Tibetan sources far exceeds that of the Chinese sources
(see “Discourse” point 4.5). More importantly for our essay here, is the
continued great emphasis placed upon Kārikā verse 24:18:
yāḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe|
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā||
That dependent origination, we declare it is emptiness; It is
designation on a basis, it is indeed the middle way.
With emptiness already the accepted core of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka

thought, this verse now directly associates emptiness with “dependent
origination” (P: paṭiccasamuppāda, Skt: pratītyasamutpāda; Ch:
yīnyüán 因緣, yüánqĭ 緣起). A large number of scholars indicate
that this verse was not only crucial for a number of classic Buddhist
traditions, but also themselves continue to consider it as central to the
text itself. For example, Garfield states that “It is generally, and in my
view correctly, acknowledged that chapter 24, the examination of the
Four Noble Truths, is the central chapter of the text and the climax of
the argument” (Garfield 2002: 26). Similar claims have been made
by Kalupahana (1986: 28f, 31-7), Garfield (1994; 2002: 69-85),
Westerhoff (2009: 91-127), and Siderits & Katsura (2013: 13ff),
among others. The four noble truths are themselves a locus classicus of
the principle of dependent arising. The import of this fundamental law
of arising in dependence is further strengthened with reference to the
very opening verses of the Kārikās, which state:
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anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam|

anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam||
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam|
deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhas taṃvande vadatāṃ varam||
I prostrate to the fully awakened one, the best of speakers,
who has taught dependent origination, the appeasement of
conceptual proliferation, the auspicious, which is not cessation,
not production, not annihilation, not eternalism, not singularity,
not plurality, not coming, not going.
As such, the two aspects, namely emptiness and dependent origination,
as well as the relationship or even equivalence between them, have
long been considered by most scholars to be of central concern for
Nāgārjuna and the Madhyamaka as a whole. Again, we see this attitude
in a large number of studies, such as those of Kalupahana (1986: 28f,
31-7); Garfield (1994; 2002: 69-85); Westerhoff (2009: 91-127); and
Siderits & Katsura (2013: 13ff).
The discourse on emptiness has largely given the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras

as the source of Nāgārjuna’s teachings on emptiness, though much less
so for dependent arising (see “Discourse” point 5). This naturally fitted
with his status as one of the founders of the Mahāyāna and a number
of its philosophical systems, not just the Madhyamaka. In fitting with
the classical “Mahāyāna vs Hīnayāna” polemic, it was not only thought
that his teachings on emptiness (and dependent origination) were not
derived from the so-called “Hīnayāna” sources, but must be in active
opposition to them (see “Discourse” point 4.4).
This notion has been challenged in the last decades, with several
scholars first questioning the Mahāyāna status of either Nāgārjuna
himself, or of the Kārikās. The citation of the Nikāya and Āgama
teaching to Katyāyana in Nāgārjuna’s Kārikās 15:7ff is well known (eg.
Kalupahana 1991: 232ff; Siderits & Katsura 2013: 159ff). Several
decades ago, Warder heralded a change in English language studies
when he challenged this fundamental assumption, asking “Is Nāgārjuna
a Mahāyānist?” (Warder 1973). Later, he stated the accepted tradition,
yet pointed out the fact of the Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikā as referencing
only Tripiṭaka materials (Warder 1998: 138). Others have since
followed or countered this thesis. However, over half a century ago
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in China, Yìnshùn had already considered that Nāgārjuna’s seminal

work was written based on the Āgamas, not Mahāyāna sūtras. In the
introduction to his book An Investigation into Emptiness (Kōng zhī
tànjìu 空之探究), Yìnshùn reflected on statements that he had made
decades before Warder and others (1985: i; cf. Yìnshùn 1949: 18, 24):
In the last few years, when I was reading the Prajñāpāramitā
Sūtras for writing my book The Origins and Development of
Early Mahāyāna Buddhism [1980], I thought of my views in
Modern Discussion on the Madhyamaka over thirty years before
[1949]: “The *Madhyamaka Śāstra is a treatise to elucidate the
Āgamas”; and “the *Madhyamaka Śāstra takes the perspective of
the Mahāyāna scholars … and selectively develops the profound
meaning of dependent origination in the Āgamas, and firmly
establishes the right view of (Mahāyāna) Buddha Dharma on
the key-stone of dependent origination, the middle way.”
This pithy summary again highlights scholars’ perceived relationship
between emptiness and dependent origination in Nāgārjuna’s thought,
in particular verse 24:18. Since such recent revisions, some efforts
have been made to seek sources for Nāgārjuna’s thought from earlier
sources. However, as our outline of the discourse shows, these have
sometimes been fraught with source bias issues, in both the early
Buddhism and mainstream sectarian Buddhism periods.
Most studies and conclusions regarding “early” Buddhism rely solely

on the Pāli canon of the Theravāda, and seldom investigate the Āgamas.
The Pāli Theravāda here referred to is that of the Śrī Lankan Mahāvihāra,
located some distance from the “central lands” of Gaṅgetic North India.
Seldom are the Āgamas of other schools used, such as those Chinese
translations of Āgamas from the Sarvāstivāda, the Dharmagupta and
Mahāsaṃghika. Yìnshùn (1985) and Choong (1999) are exceptions
here, though Lamotte (2001) also makes mention of Āgama sources.
Given the relative dominance of the latter schools in mainstream Indian
Buddhism, their texts and doctrines are more relevant to the greater
picture of mainstream Indic Buddhist, whereas the Theravāda was
geographically more removed. Yet even using these Nikāyas or Āgamas
outright is problematic, for they belong to a given Buddhist mainstream
school. The issue of using these to identify “early Buddhism”, if not the
teachings of the “historical Buddha” himself, or even a representation
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of those teachings and tenets held before the various schools split apart,
is a very complex and difficult matter.
As for such problems in early Buddhism, likewise too for the

mainstream period Abhidharma and commentarial literature. Often
it is the 5th cty Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa and Vasubandhu’s
5th cty Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya which are cited as representing
the non-Mahāyāna traditions. But neither the Northern or Southern
Abhidharma traditions began as the alleged fully fledged “reified” or
“substantialist” positions that may be found in these two works. The
substantialist theories which are the supposed target of the Mahāyāna
according to the discourse on emptiness only reached this state perhaps
even after the early Mahāyāna and Prajñāpāramitā around the turn of
the millennium was established. How can one anachronistically argue
that the earlier Prajñāpāramitā and / or Madhyamaka is a refutation
or reaction against later Abhidharma substantialism, when the sources
cited have such an historical relationship? Another important point is
that such Abhidharma theories, in either early or later form, do not
represent the entirety of pre- and non-Mahāyāna Buddhist thought.
The Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda were originally closely related as
Sthavīra schools, and likewise too, the Pudgalavādins. The plethora of
schools at this time period show a huge range of positions on a wide
range of subjects. This includes Mahāsāṃghika influenced works such
as the *Satyasiddhi Śāstra, and other non-Mahāyāna content from the
Mahāprajñāpāramitā Upadeśa (see Yìnshùn 1985: 132f; 92ff).
By studying the precedents to Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka thought

with these problems unresolved, it is little wonder that claims of
revolutionary thought and innovation are made with respect to his
teachings on emptiness and dependent arising. But as we have shown,
for examining these ideas in both early and mainstream Buddhism,
the Pāli canon alone will simply not suffice, even if their Abhidhamma
and commentarial texts are included, nor will the Abhidharmakośa as
sole representative of the Northern traditions. A deeper understanding
of the teaching of emptiness across a broad range of mainstream
schools is required. For this, the large number of Chinese sources need
be utilized to their full extent. Moreover, closer care to the historical
sequence and relationships of texts and doctrines is essential. Only then
will we be in a position to ascertain the significance of Nāgārjuna’s
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Madhyamaka teachings on emptiness and dependent origination as a

stage of Buddhist doctrinal development within their own historical
context.
1.2. Literature Review

Despite the aforementioned problems of source biases and anachronisms,
even sole use of the Pāli canon is already sufficient to show that “empty”
and “emptiness” were not first coined by the Mahāyāna, or Nāgārjuna.
One of the earliest demonstrations of this can be seen in Karunaratne,
who as per the academic discourse equated early Buddhist emptiness
with absence of self or what pertains to self (1956, 1988: 169). While
written in 1956, which would have made it a perfect foil for Murti as
much as against Stcherbatsky’s earlier writings, this was unfortunately
only published in 1988. As such, it has been largely overlooked.
For early Buddhism, also working exclusively from the Pāli sources
for emptiness in “early Buddhism”, we also have shorter essays such
as Gómez’s “Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli Canon” (1976), and Vélez
de Cea’s “Emptiness in the Pāli Suttas and the Question of Nāgārjuna’s
Orthodoxy” (2005), both of which show scholars’ great interest in
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka. They largely take emptiness as a philosophy,
rather than as a matter of meditation, which is the main feature of
emptiness in the early texts (see Choong 1999: 43-84; Yìnshùn 1985:
1-78). Though these attempts to trace earlier sources and contexts for
Nāgārjuna are commendable, by relying only on the Pāli canon and
neglecting other schools contemporary with it, the results are limited.
In the end, though Vélez de Cea very clearly sees the problems of
modern scholarship in this area, he really only shows that Nāgārjuna
would probably not disagree with some basic tenets of the Nikāyas
and Āgamas. This would be greatly assisted by broadening the source
material from which comparisons are made.
One of the few more comprehensive studies in English directly related

to emptiness in early Buddhism is The Notion of Emptiness in Early
Buddhism, by Choong (1999). Although the title explicitly states “early
Buddhism” as the scope, he curiously states in his aims that he “shall
argue that the teaching of emptiness is not a creation of early Mahāyāna,
but that it has clear antecedents in early Buddhism”, and his very last
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words on the matter are: “… ‘emptiness’ is genuinely a teaching of

the Buddha himself, and not simply a creation of the Mahāyāna” (pg.
2, 88). It has rather the tone of a Mahāyāna apologetic in the face of
modern Buddhist studies’ text-historical criticisms.
Another, different kind of apologetic, is found in Dhammajothi’s

The Concept of Emptiness in Pāli Literature (2008), which seeks to
“examine the relation between the concept of suñña in early Buddhism
and emptiness in Madhyamaka” (pg. iii). He appears to wish to deflect
the criticisms of Nāgārjuna and others away from the Theravāda, and
towards other mainstream groups (pg. iii, 163). However, again, due
to being “specially focused on the Pāli Tipiṭaka, and the Visuddhi
magga” (pg. iii; pp. 100-120), this quite disorganized study can only be
seen as representing the Theravāda, and neither “early Buddhism” or
the entirety of mainstream Buddhism. Thus, while the author wishes
to deflect Madhyamaka criticisms against the Theravādin tradition,
those same criticisms remained unexamined as to their true target and
precedents, and the “Hīnayāna” bogeyman remains hidden.
It is to be admitted, lamentably, that there are even fewer systematic and

dedicated studies into the doctrine of emptiness within the mainstream
Buddhist period. This in turn reflects the general status of studies in
this period, wherein there has been little research into specific doctrinal
issues. However, let us examine these few relevant studies in order.
Given the supposed “Mahāyāna vs Hīnayāna” polemical claims on

emptiness within the discourse, it is not at all surprising that there
are even fewer studies on this topic centered on mainstream sectarian
material (source biases aside). In one of the many sub-essays within
his epic five volume translation of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Upadeśa
(Dàzhìdù lùn 大智度論), Lamotte breaks the mainstream Buddhist
schools into three types: 1. The “personalists”, such as the Pudgala
vādin Vātsīputrīyas and Saṃmittīyas; 2. The “realists”, namely the
Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas; and 3. The “nominalists”,
for instance, the Mahāsāṃghika Prajñaptivādins, and possibly non-
Abhidharma Sthavira groups. Concerning their respective positions
on emptiness, Lamotte establishes two basic positions, which reflect
an earlier statement in the Upadeśa on the meaning of prajñā: “The
teaching of emptiness is the emptiness of beings (pudgalaśūnyatā) and
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the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā)” (Lamotte 2001: 836f,

1650f). Due to the focus of this work, there is barely any discussion on
these texts themselves. In his first two volumes of translation (1944 &
1949), Lamotte considered what he at the time called the “Śāstra” to
be a work of Nāgārjuna. Though he changed his position on this in the
third volume (1970), now considering it an “Upadeśa” and authored
by anonymous Indic Madhyamaka convert scholar, he still thought it a
Madhyamaka work doctrinally faithful to that of Nāgārjuna.
Working directly with the philosophy rather than the text of the Upadeśa,
Ramanan’s (1966) Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy: As Presented in the Mahā-
Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra, also considered Nāgārjuna the author of this
work, following Lamotte’s first two volumes. Regarding emptiness
in mainstream schools, he outlined three groups, albeit different from
those of Lamotte (Ramanan 1966: 53ff): 1. The pluralist line—the
Sarvāstivāda. He states that: “The Vibhāṣā admits dharmātmā while it
denies pudgalātmā”, and: “The Sarvāstivādins admit śūnyatā. For them
this means that among the basic elements of existence there is no ātman,
no eternal substantial entity called “I”. They interpret the Middle Way
so as to make it agree with their doctrine of elements”. 2. The line in
between—Vātsīputrīyas, Sāṃmitīyas, Sautrāntikas (Saṃkrantivādins)
and Mahīśāsakas. (Note: all Sthavira groups.) 3. The absolutist line—
the Mahāsāṃghikas: “The credit of having kept alive the emphasis on
the ultimacy of the unconditioned reality by drawing attention to the
non-substantiality of the basic elements of existence (dharmaśūnyatā)
belongs to the Mahāsāṃghikas”; “[t]hese were the teachings of …
śūnyatā of the composite as well as the incomposite, the absence of
self-being in things and the peace of Nirvāṇa”. We would like to the
point out, however, that this last point was also accepted by most of the
Sthaviras too (Yìnshùn 1985: 104, 113), though the Pudgalavādins may
be an exception (Bareau 2005: 116 #38).
This brings us finally to Yìnshùn’s work An Investigation into Emptiness

(Kōng zhī Tànjìu 空之探究) (1985), and excellent study unfortunately
almost unknown outside of the sphere of Buddhist studies in Chinese
language.1 It covers the doctrine of emptiness as it developed through
four stages. 1. Early Buddhism of the Āgamas and Nikāyas; 2. The
Abhidharma or Nikāya period; 3. The early Mahāyāna period of the
Prajñāpāramitā literature; and 4. The Madhyamaka philosophy of
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Nāgārjuna, including the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Upadeśa, which is

traditionally attributed to him. As such, it is one of the most complete
modern studies on the theme of emptiness. Structurally, it does
follow the broad historical categories of the discourse, but avoids the
anachronistic use of material, and draws on numerous lines of textual
tradition. For early Buddhism, Yìnshùn uses both classic Chinese
translations and modern Chinese translations of the Pāli canon, and for
the mainstream period, has mastery over the entire range of sectarian
literature well preserved in Chinese, in addition to modern translations
of Pāli Abhidhamma and paracanonical material.
As can be seen, previous studies into the broader question of pre-

Mahāyāna teachings on emptiness are few and often apologetic in
nature. Very little has been at all on the more specific question of how
emptiness relates to dependent origination. As such, the notion within
the academic discourse on emptiness, which itself works backwards
from the accepted idea that Nāgārjuna’s teachings were rather innovative
in the light of the early and mainstream “Hīnayāna” positions, remains
unexamined and unchallenged. The next two sections of this essay
will thus examine the pre-Nāgārjunian literature on emptiness and
dependent origination in two general historical periods, namely “early
Buddhism” (Section §2) and “mainstream Buddhism” (Section §3).
The distinction between these periods is as much for convenience as
representing a clear cut historical division, and itself partly follows
the modern academic discourse attitude toward phases of Buddhist
doctrinal qua historical development.
2. Emptiness & Dependent Origination in Early Buddhism

We will first examine the canonical texts of early Buddhism to understand
the relationship between empty / emptiness and dependent origination.
By “early” we do not mean to imply “original”, the philological holy
grail of establishing the “original words of the historical Buddha” now
being somewhat out of vogue. We do believe that by cross comparison
of parallel texts from a number of early Buddhism schools will reveal
in their commonalities those basic teachings that existed before the
division into such schools occurred. Taking the first basic schism of
the Buddhist community into the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghika to have
occurred during the time of Aśoka, ie. circa 268-232 bce, with later
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splits continuing subsequently, we can give an approximate date for

“early Buddhism” from the time of the Buddha himself up to the 3rd or
perhaps even the 2nd century bce. This is almost universally regarded
as well before the start of the Mahāyāna, and many centuries before the
time of Nāgārjuna himself.
The extant texts of the earliest sūtra discourses are the five Nikāyas of
the Pāli canon, and also the Chinese translations of the four Āgamas.
The five Pāli Nikāyas are: 1. The Samyutta Nikāya (SN); 2. The Majjhima
Nikāya (MN); 3. The Dīgha Nikāya (DN); 4. The Anguttara Nikāya
(AN); and 5. The Khuddhaka Nikāya (KN), which itself contains a range
of material, wherein the Dhammapada and Suttanipāta are considered
the oldest strata. This tradition is what is now commonly known as
the Theravāda. The Chinese Āgama translations are:2 1. The Saṃyukta
Āgama (SĀ, T99), translated 435-443 ce (two fascicles are missing).
There is also the Alternative Translation Saṃyukta Āgama (AltSĀ,
T100), possibly from the Kāśyapīya school. 2. The Madhyama Āgama
(MĀ, T26), translated 397-398 ce. These Āgamas are considered to
belong to the Sarvāstivāda traditions. 3. The Dīrgha Āgama (DĀ, T1),
translated 413 ce, of Dharmagupta origins. 4. The Ekottara Āgama (EĀ,
T125), translated 397 ce and later revised. This is from a late sect of
the Mahāsāṅghika and already contains some Mahāyānic philosophy. 3
It must thus be used cautiously in any context of “early” Buddhism.
Before we examine the texts, a note on the topic of dependent arising,

the Buddhist law of causality, is in order, for it is a theme which strongly
underlies much of early Buddhist texts. In fact, there is much evidence
to suggest that the entirety of the Buddha’s teachings can be subsumed
under this general principle.4 From the SN in particular, we find terms
such as “stability of Dhamma” (dhammaṭṭhitatā), “certainty (or law)
of Dhamma” (dhammaniyāmatā), “specific conditionality” (idap
paccayatā) and “Dhammic nature” (dhammatā) to describe dependent
origination, with the SĀ providing an even greater number of such
synonyms.5 Therefore, here we shall only focus on this doctrine as far
as it is directly related to emptiness and related doctrines.
2.1. “Profound, Connected with Emptiness”
14
One of the more pithy and explicit connections between emptiness and
dependent origination, is that found in SN 20:7 Aṇī or SĀ 1258. In
it, the Buddha states that his disciples should study “those discourses
taught by the Tathāgata that are profound, profound in meaning,
transmundane, connected with emptiness”, rather than those texts
which are “mere poetry composed by poets, beautiful in words and
phrases, created by outsiders”.6
The term “profound” or “deep” (gambhīra) was originally imbued with

a simple prosaic sense, such as the “deep ocean”. Here, and elsewhere
in the Pāli texts, it is used to describe the Dhamma realized by the
Buddha, as expressed in SN 6:1 and MN 26 and 27:7
Profound, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful and sublime,
not within the sphere of reasoning, subtle, to be experienced
by the wise. … For such a generation this state is hard to see,
that is, specific conditionality, dependent origination. And this
state too is hard to see, that is, the stilling of formations, the
relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving,
dispassion, cessation, nibbāna.
This is a complement to the statement that seeing dependent origination
is seeing the Dharma itself. The Āgama equivalent of these Pāli texts
either do not have this passage, or show only an abbreviated form.8
However, this two-fold meaning of “profound” as both the law of
conditionality and also pacified liberation does appear in SĀ 293, which
states that “these two dharmas are known as the conditioned (saṃskṛta)
and the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta)”.9 The sense of the law of dependent
arising as profound is further emphasized in DN 15 Mahānidāna Sutta,
and corresponding MĀ 97 and DĀ 13, where Ānanda on contemplating
dependent co-arising states that it “is wonderful and marvelous, … how
this dependent origination is profound and appears profound. Yet, to
myself, I see it as clear as clear can be,” and was thus berated by the
Buddha for under-estimating the profundity of this Dhamma.10
One way to understand this dual aspect of the “profound”, is to consider

it in terms of dependent origination and also dependent cessation,
the former as the arising which is saṃsāra or dissatisfaction—the
conditioned, the latter as its cessation or nibbāna—the unconditioned.
These correspond to the two complementary aspects of the standard
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formula in Udāna 1:1-3: “When this is, that is; When this arises, that
arises”; and “When this is not, that is not; When this ceases, that
ceases.”11
2.2 Emptiness of Self in Dependent Cosmogenesis

Why does SN 20:7 Aṇī and SĀ 1258 thus make such an emphatic
statement on what seems to imply the identity of dependent arising
and emptiness? A clear candidate to answer this derives from some
recent research by Jurewicz into the idea of the Buddha’s twelve-fold
dependent origination as a response to Vedic cosmogenetic theories of
the Ṛg Veda (X 129), and other pre-Buddhist Brāhmaṇic literature, such
as the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Aitareya, Taittirīya and
Chāndogya Upaniśads (see Jurewicz 2000: 171).
The Vedic cosmogonies all revolve around what we may call the
transformations of the ātman, whereas for the Buddhist twist to this
theory, Jurewicz considers that “the Buddha chose those cosmogonic
descriptions which met two conditions: first, they explicitly express
the cosmogony as transformations of the ātman; second, they preserve
their cognitive meaning, even if they are taken out of the Vedic content”
(Jurewicz 2000: 80). Likewise says Schulman (2008: 297): “Rather
than relating to all that exists, dependent origination related originally
only to processes of mental conditioning. It was an analysis of the self,
not of reality, embedded in the Upaniśadic search for the ātman.”
For the Vedic tradition, “nidāna” referred to the connection between the
world at large and the microcosm represented in the sacrificial fire, and
this connection was the ātman. But for the Buddha’s “nidāna”, “there
is no ātman … The negation of the ontological nidāna constitutes the
Buddha’s mahānidāna” (Jurewicz 2000: 100). The various twelve links
are broken down by Jurewicz into small consecutive groups, each of
which is closer to some or other passage in the various Brāhmaṇic texts
listed above. Despite this, the ātman idea is seen throughout them all,
whereas other phenonema such as the puruṣa, fire and so forth, have
more or less importance at different stages of the dependent arising
process. Jurewicz envisages the Buddha using the terminology of the
Vedic cosmogony, only to conclude: “That’s right, this is how the whole
process develops. However, the only problem is that no one undergoes
16
a transformation here!” This is “to deny the ātman as the metaphysical

basis of all cosmogonic transformations as well as its final forms”
(Jurewicz 2000: 101). Rather than the creative power of the soul, it was
an absurd and pointless cycle of death and rebirth.
As Gombrich rightly concludes, Jurewicz’s interpretation through the

light of ancient pre-Buddhist theories, which were no doubt known
to both the Buddha and much of his more learned audiences, shows
its function of “adding substance and detail to the Buddha’s ‘no soul’
doctrine” (Gombrich 2003: 14; also 2009: 133ff). Thus, references
to either not self or emptiness in the many expositions on dependent
origination, would have simply been unnecessary for the Buddha at
that time. It would have been implicitly understood that he thus taught
saṃsāric arising without a soul. The process of dependent arising is
empty.
2.3. Causality and the Middle Way

We find other examples of how the Buddha expressly rejects an
actor agent in favour of the doctrine of dependent origination in,
for example, SN 12:12 or SĀ 372. Here, when asked about agency,
as “Who consumes the nutrient of cognition? … makes contact? …
feels? … craves?”, the Buddha declares that the question is invalid.
Rather than “who?”, the question should be “For what is the nutriment
cognition [a condition]? … etc.”12
In the teaching given by Ānanda to Channa (SN 22:90 Channa, SĀ

262 *Chanda 闡陀), which brought about the latter’s breakthrough into
the Dhamma, is for all purposes a verbatim repetition of that famous
discourse given by the Buddha himself to Kaccānagotta (SN 12:15)—
avoiding the two extreme views of existence and non-existence, and
pursuing the middle way which is the dependent origination and
cessation of dissatisfaction.13 The connection in SĀ 262 between
emptiness and absence of (extreme) views is oblique, apart from
emptiness as mere “absence” itself, and is via the doctrine of dependent
origination. The implication being that the views of either existence
or non-existence, of body and soul as identical or different, etc. are
incompatible with the Buddha’s unique teaching of conditionality.
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The rejection of arising from any one or other of the four categories
of self, other, both or neither (non-causality), all types of extremes to
be avoided, is a recurring theme throughout SN 12 Nidānasamyutta.14
Rejection of arising from “self” can be seen as further expressions
of emptiness as not self (or what pertains to self), as the usual “self-
view” predominant in non-Buddhist Indian religious-philosophical
systems was one of “existence”. For example, in “saccid-ānanda”, and
the uncaused cause. Rejection of arising from “other” is in effect just
“another self”. With these two rejected, naturally arising from “both” is
also out of the question. Yet the Buddha’s strong emphasis on causality
also meant that an outright rejection of all causality, things being
uncaused, was also totally out of the question.
2.4. Nirvāṇa as “Empty Pacification”

Where the cosmogenetic causality of the preceding sections represents
the world and its coming into being—dissatisfaction (duḥkha), the
goal is the cessation of this world—the liberated release entailing
extinguishing the fire of afflictions (P: nibbāna, Skt: nirvāṇa).
A well known passage in SN and SĀ states that “the destruction of

desire, … aversion, … delusion—this friend is called nibbāna”,
“… the unconditioned” (asaṅkhata) or “… the fruition of a worthy
one” (arahantaphala).15 The second definition here, that of the
“unconditioned”, elsewhere has another similar statement again in SĀ
262, which gives a list of definitive terms as follows:16
… the empty pacification (*śūnyaśamatha) of all conditionings,
their non-apprehension (*anupalabhyate), the destruction of
craving, the fading away of desire—nirvāṇa.
Given that the equivalent sutta in SN has merely “the pacification
(samatha) of all formations …”,17 one may question both the Chinese
translators here and their use of the term “空寂”, and also our English
translation as “empty pacification”. Should not the Chinese phrase
really just be “pacification” or “appeasement” (*śamatha)? We think
not. As Yìnshùn astutely notes, the Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra on citing
this text verifies that in fact the Sarvāstivādin SĀ did indeed use the
term “empty pacification” (śūnya*śamatha) here. It explains this very
sūtra passage as “The term ‘empty’ means the forsaking of all the
18
defilements” (see Yìnshùn 1985: 118).18 Thus while there is the implied
sense of “absence” of afflictions and their resultant dissatisfaction
in unconditioned release, the SĀ, at least, explicitly refers to this as
“empty” (śūnya).
2.5. The Emptiness Samādhi as Absence of Causes

Here, a term in early Buddhism which later became almost synonymous
for the path to liberation as a whole, is that of “mental release” (P: ceta
vimutti) or “mental meditation” (Skt: *cetosamādhi; 心三昧). There is
also a connection here between emptiness and causation.
The Pāli Nikāya term “mental release”, which appears in the Āgamas
as “mental meditation”, is the common name given to a set of four
practices analyzed by several of the Buddha’s great disciples in several
texts.19 Also, at times the Pāli also does use cetosamādhi, rather than
just cetovimutti, but only for the signless, and not for the other three
immeasurables.20 For example, in MN 43, when the question is asked as
to “What is the signless mental release?” (°-vimutti), the actual answer
is given in terms of the “signless mental concentration” (°-samādhi).21
The Āgamas, on the other hand, do not seem to use the equivalent ceto-
vimukti (*心解脫) for the four immeasurables, though this term itself is
used in other contexts.
According to SN and SĀ, the four are: 1. Immeasurable (appamāṇa-°,

apramāṇa-°; 無量) mental release / meditation; 2. Nothingness
(ākiñcañña-°, ākiṃcanya-°; 無所有) mental release / meditation;
3. Emptiness (suññatā-°, śūnyatā-°; 空) mental release / meditation;
and 4. Signless mental release / meditation (animitta-°; 無相).22 In
response to a question, they are all explained in two senses, firstly as
“different in meaning and also different in phrasing”, and secondly as
“one in meaning and different only in phrasing”. There are some slight
differences between answers in the Pāli and Āgama readings, but we
wish to draw attention to the second set of answers, where they are
alike in meaning and differ only in expression.
As for the four being synonyms, “one in meaning and different only in
phrasing”, it is explained that: 1. Desire, aversion and ignorance are
“makers of measurement (or limit)” (pamāṇakaraṇa), their absence
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(suñña) is the “immeasurable (or unlimited) release”; 2. These same

three defilements are causes for “something” (kiñcanaṃ), a synonym
for saṃsāric becoming, the absence (suñña) of “something-ness” is
hence the “nothingness release; 3. The emptiness mental release is
not explained here, but is a generic term for all three (see below); 4.
The three defilements are also “makers of signs” (nimittakaraṇa), their
absence (suñña) is the “signless” release.
The unifying theme through #1, #2 and #4, is actually #3, the “emptiness
mental release”. While its unifying function is not explained explicitly,
it is obviously referred when the other three are described in terms
of being empty (suñña) of defilements. That is to say, of the other
three, their ultimate culmination is the “immovable mental release” (P:
akuppa; Skt: akopya) in SN, or “non-conflict” (*araṇa; 無諍) in SĀ.23
This is the absence (suññatā) of the three root defilements which act
as makers of measure-limits and signs, and are the basis for becoming.
These three terms—limit (pamāṇa), somethingness (kiñcana) and sign
(nimitta)—all refer to defilements and their causes, and “emptiness”,
here given as “nothingness”, is their forsaking.
2.6. The Three Dharma Seals and Characteristics

At the end of the early period, when sectarian doctrines already start
to make their appearance in the Nikāyas and Āgamas, we shall turn to
material that quickly developed into standard criteria for the authentic
Dharma, namely the Dharma seals (mudra) and characteristics
(lakkhaṇa). In many ways, the colloquial use of the term “seal” (mudrā)
is similar to both “nimitta” and “lakkhaṇa” in the objective sense, the
special mark or sign, often of an important official, a classic example
being the “royal seal” (rājāmuddā) (see PTSD 570).
There are several early texts which provided the implicit principles
behind the later systematized and explicit formation of the three
Dharma seals. We shall deal with the Sarvāstivādin SĀ, as it is the
only one to use the term in an early text—SĀ 80, the *Āryadharma
mudrājñānadarśaṇa-viśuddhi Sūtra.24 This is perhaps the only early
sūtra which discusses the “dharma seals” (dharmamudrā) in direct
relation to the three samādhis, headed by the śūnyatāsamādhi. Indeed,
the Pāli tradition uses the term “three characteristics” (tilakkahaṇa)
20
for a slightly different set of statements with similar overall intention,

albeit without the direct association to emptiness. SĀ 80 also deals
with the three samādhis of emptiness, nothingness and the signless. It
explains that the emptiness samādhi is required before proceeding to
nothingness and the signless, and that each of the three has a specific
contemplation:
One, in the emptiness samādhi they contemplate that each of the

aggregates “is impermanent and subject to cessation” and “not solid
or stable, but subject to change”, they then “become detached from
desire”. This is actually more of a contemplation of impermanence
than not self, which is the more common gloss for emptiness.
Two, in the signless samādhi they forsake the signs of the six sensory
objects, form, sound, etc.. This is exactly the same as the earliest idea of
“non-attention to all signs”, as found in the exegetical sūtra MĀ 211.25
This conforms to the position of SĀ 80 here, as it does not reify the
signless into an object to which one can direct attention, unlike parallel
text MN 43 Mahāvedalla.26
Three, in the nothingness samādhi they forsake the signs of the three
root defilements of desire, aversion and delusion. Again, the early
explanation of the defilements as “somethings”, causes for existence in
saṃsāra. Thus, up to this point in SĀ 80, the signless and nothingness
basically match SN 41:7 and SĀ 567, which were the precursors to the
exegeses in MN 43 and MĀ 211.
However, and more pertinent for our discussion of emptiness and

dependent arising here, after these three contemplations,27
one investigates … that [notions of] “I” and “mine” arise from
either what is seen, or heard, or smelt, or tasted, or touched,
or cognized. … Moreover, they investigate in this manner: By
whatever cause or whatever condition that cognition arises, those
causes and those conditions are all impermanent. Moreover,
when those causes and those conditions of that [cognition]
are all impermanent, how could the cognition itself which has
arisen from them be permanent? Whatever is “impermanent” is
conditioned (*saṃskṛta), a formation (*abhisaṃskāra), arisen
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from conditions (pratītyasaṃutpanna); is subject to decay

(*vayadharma), subject to cessation (*kṣayadharma); subject to
fading away (*virāgadharma), subject to cessation (*nirodha
jñāṇadharma). This is known as the purity of gnosis and vision
of the āryan dharma seals.
So, what exactly here does the phrase “dharma seals” in SĀ 80 refer
to? Here, “dharma” is used in the sense of being “subject to” some or
other principle, as per SN 12:34,28 for which Bodhi has: “… subject to
destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation” (Bodhi 2000: 573).
Parts of the Chinese Āgama, when read alone, are slightly ambiguous.29
These principles mainly refer to cessation, but this is in turn one aspect
of causal conditionality.
Thus, SĀ 80 is using a fairly standard set of terms used to describe

conditioned phenomena, almost implying the realized goal as the natural
state of conditioned phenomena. The list is headed by phenomena
being dependently originated, showing the underlying principle behind
the arising and ceasing of dharmas, their conditionality. The remaining
four basically synonymous terms indicate the impermanence of
conditioned phenomena. These are contemplations used to eradicate
the view of a self or what pertains to self. Thus, the purity of gnosis and
vision of the āryan dharma seals is largely about eliminating internal
and external defilements, including self view and self conceit, through
various forms of contemplation.
2.7. Summary
Between the aforementioned Nikāya and Āgama explanations,
emptiness and dependent origination were related as a key part of the
Dharma from its inception. The previous six sections can perhaps be
divided into three broad groups.
In the first category, sections §2.1 and §2.6, emptiness relates to both
the process of dependent arising and also cessation. We have seen
that the notion of “profound” or “deep” (gambhīra) as referring to
both dependent origination and also dependent cessation—nibbānic
release—was present though not overly strong in the very early canon.
However, the Sthavira traditions considered it important enough at quite
an early date, texts and statements which appear to be specific to both
22
the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools. Our examination of the three

dharma seals is from the later stages of the early tradition. The texts
still explicitly connect this to dependent origination, that phenomena
are subject to arise and cessation. As “seals” of conditioned dharmas,
there is a gradually movement toward universality.
The second group, in sections §2.2 and §2.3, we see how the Sarvāstivāda
in particular used the term “emptiness” to refer to dependent arising
in a broad sense. While this mainly focuses on its forward saṃsāric
process, there is still a connection with the reversal into nirvāṇa. Recent
studies by Jurewicz provide a key connection between the implied
sense of lack of self, ie. emptiness, within the Buddha’s standard twelve
limb form of dependent origination, and other expressions thereof, as a
parody of Brahmanic cosmogenesis. Included within this broader sense
of causality, was the middle way of the absence of extreme views, which
were considered counter to the position of the Dharma as dependent
origination itself.
Lastly, a third group consisting of sections §2.4 and §2.5 makes

stronger the relationship between dependent arising and emptiness
as nirvāna. Again, it is the Sarvāstivādin tradition that makes the
explicit connection of release as “empty pacification”. But both this
school and the Theravāda use the emptiness meditation or mind release
(respectively) as a catch all term for the practices that bring about the
total elimination of afflictions as causal factors.
3. Emptiness & Dependent Originationin Mainstream Buddhism

We can now move from the early period, to that of the subsequent
mainstream sectarian period. From the last section (§2.6) in particular,
it is important to recall that this historical distinction is a simple heuristic
rather than a hard delineated fact.
As we underscored in our criticisms of the modern academic “discourse

of emptiness” in the introduction, there are several methodological
problems with regards to the mainstream period, in particular source
biases and anachronist explanations of doctrinal relations and development.
Regarding source biases, there is the heavy usage of later Abhidharma
literature, particularly that of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
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and Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, as representative of this period as

a whole. This reflects a more general bias towards viewing only the
extant Pāli and Sanskrit literature as of value in the study of Indian
Buddhism. With respect to historical anachronisms, the Mahāyāna position
is typified by the doctrine of emptiness from the Prajñāpāramitā and
systematized by Nāgārjuna, and the aforementioned Abhidharma texts
represent the mainstream period. However, the former texts both hail
from the 5th century, whereas the latter are from the 1st to 3rd centuries—
how can the latter be a critical response to the former?
Therefore, in this section, we must pay close attention to textual sources

that are deemed to date from before Nāgārjuna’s time (2nd—3rd cty ce),
and even then, be aware of their relative historic relationships. The
previous section on early Buddhism spanned up to the 3rd, or at the
latest, the 2nd century bce, as noted at the start of the previous section.
Our material here begins with the latter end of this period, when the
Nikāyas and Āgamas were still being compiled by each of the schools.
Therefore, though we shall naturally cite śāstra sources which are
more obviously affiliated with a given school, we shall first cite several
sūtras. These are texts which appear in the Āgamas of some schools, but
are not necessarily found in or approved by other schools, thus lying
outside of our basic criteria for textual sources of “early Buddhism”.
In particular, this includes several sūtras for which we have Chinese
translations in the Sarvāstivādin SĀ and the later Mahāyāna influenced
Mahāsāṃghika EĀ (both discussed previously in §2), in addition to the
Śālistamba Sūtra.
For the mainstream sectarian period, it is admittedly more natural

to refer to the Abhidhamma or Abhidharma literature. The various
schools disagreed as to whether or not it was recited at the first
convocation. The Mahāsāṃghika and two Vibhajyavāda schools, the
Mahīśāsaka and Theravāda, did not mention its recitation there in their
respective Vinayas, but only spoke of it as the third Piṭaka in their later
commentarial traditions. The Sarvāstivāda, Haimavata, Dharmagupta
and Mūlasarvāstivāda did include it, but differed in their details. In
the commentarial literature, both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda
stated that the Abhidhamma / Abhidharma was in fact the “word of
the Buddha” (see Yìnshùn 1968: 9-11). However, the Theravāda meant
24
this in the literal sense, whereas the Sarvāstivāda had a more figurative
explanation.
The core Abhidharma literature thus became even while the Nikāyas
and Āgamas were being compiled and finalized, up to the 2nd century
bce. This is still a century or two before the early Mahāyāna, giving
it sufficient time to be propagated broadly across the Indian sub-
continent. Of the two Abhidharma schools, the Pāli Theravāda has
seven core texts: 1. Dhammasaṅgaṇī; 2. Vibhaṅga; 3. Dhātukathā; 4.
Puggalapaññatti; 5. Yamaka; 6. Paṭṭhāna; and 7. Kathāvatthu. 30 The
other Abhidharma school, the Sarvāstivāda, also had seven Abhidharma
Śāstras, albeit different to the above: 1. Dharmaskandhapāda Śāstra
(T1537 法蘊足論); 2. Saṃgītiparyāya Śāstra (T1536 集異門足論); 3.
Prajñapti Śāstra (T1538 施設論); 4. Vijñānakāya Śāstra (T1539 識身
足論); 5. Jñānaprasthāna Śāstra (T1543 八犍度論) and (T1544 發智
論); 6. Prakaraṇapāda Śāstra (T1541 眾事分) and (T1542 品類足論);
and 7. Dhātukayapāda Śāstra (T1540 界身足論). 31 Additionally, there
is the Śāriputra Abhidharma Śāstra (T1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論). This is
also a Vibhajyavādin work, exhibiting clear structural parallels with
the Vibhaṅga and Dharmaskandhapāda Śāstra, and also the Dhamma
saṅgaṇī and Prakaraṇapāda, from the other two Abhidharma traditions.
It is believed that the Śāriputra Abhidharma Śāstra was probably shared
with the early Vātsīputrīyas, Dharmaguptas, and other more central
Indian Sthavira Vibhajyavādin schools. 32
What we now have of the Theravāda commentarial tradition by

Buddhaghosa in the Aṭṭhakathās is a summary of earlier material. We
still have the Northern Sarvāstivādin commentarial Vibhāṣa literature
in Chinese translation, most notably the Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa
Śāstra (T1545 大毘婆沙論), with variants Abhidharma Vibhāṣa
Śāstra (T1546 毘婆沙論) and Vibhāṣa Śāstra (T1547 鞞婆沙論).
This Vaibhāṣika standard was likely compiled by a large number of
Abhidharma scholars over the course of centuries, in order to establish
orthodoxy within their own ranks, as well as counter the views of other
schools, and reached its basic final form in the mid 2nd cty ce (see
Yìnshùn 1968: 209-220; Dhammajoti 2007: 65).
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As such, the Mahāvibhāṣa is the last pre-Nāgārjunian material that we

shall examine here. Citing material later than Nāgārjuna would endanger
our goal here by potentially falling into anachronistic arguments as
discussed earlier in the discourse on emptiness above. However, this time
period coincides with the formative period of the incipient Mahāyāna
movement, and we can feel the currents of mainstream school notions
of the bodhisattva—here referring to Śākyamuni—influencing the new
movement, even while these mainstream Ābhidharmika commentaries
did not seem to be aware of the Mahāyāna as a distinct school in its own
right. We shall see how mainstream notions of the bodhisattva, and
how they involve both emptiness and dependent origination, may have
developed in these texts in Section §3.4, below.
3.1. Ultimate Emptiness—“Neither Coming Nor Going”

The first sectarian sūtra under consideration is the Paramārthaśūnyatā
Sūtra, extant as SĀ 335 and EĀ 37:7. 33 If we only compared with the
Pāli to find no equivalent of this sūtra, we may be tempted to classify
it as a text of mainstream school origins. However, the fact that the
Sthavira Sarvāstivādin version is nearly word for word identical with
the Mahāsāṃghika EĀ version—with the exception of some juxta
posing of paragraphs which is negligible in terms of content—suggests
that the text could also possibly be considered “early”. It is possible
that the Theravāda tradition may have lost their own version of this text
at some point in time. The Paramārthaśūnyatā Sūtra (SĀ 335) states:34
… when the eye arises, it does not come from any location;
when [the eye] ceases, it does not go to any location. In this
way, the eye is unreal, yet arises; and on having arisen, it ends
and ceases. There is action (karma) and result (vipāka), and yet
no actor agent (kāraka). On the cessation of these skandhas,
another set of aggregates continues elsewhere (anyatra). There
are merely dharmas classified as conventional, ie. the ear, nose,
tongue, physical body and mind, are also declared as such.
Here, the parallel text EĀ 37:7 also adds “These six sense faculties
are also not created by a ‘person’ (*puriṣa, *pudgala).”35 This further
emphasizes the absence of an agent. According to Karunadasa, such
statements on neither coming nor going are also found in the later
Theravādin commentarial literature: “There is no store (sannidhi) from
26
which they come and there is no receptacle (sannicaya) to which they

go”;36 and “If they appear it is not that they come from somewhere (na
kuto ci āgacchanti); if they disappear it is not that they go anywhere
(na kuhiñci gacchanti)” (Karunadasa 2010: 30-31). 37 This is the same
basic gloss the commentaries also give to SN 35:246 Vīṇā (= SĀ 1169),
which uses a simile of how the music of a lute is dependent on a number
of parts and factors. 38
The phrase in translation “除俗數法” (“dharmas classified as

‘conventional’”) poses some problems for interpretation. We must
examine the various versions of this sūtra and also parallels of the
passage in other texts. The phrase appears in the Bimbisāra Sūtra, which
is in turn cited in the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya. 39 Subsequently, in the
Kośa and Bhāṣya.40 we conclude that the original term was “*dharma
saṅkheta”, which we translate as “dharmas classified as conventional”.
This is akin to phenomena being “nominal” here, though semantically
at least, it differs from the Abhidharma usage of “prajñapti” as
“designation”, and the implications of it be vis-à-vis “paramārtha”, the
“ultimate sense”.
The SĀ version of the sūtra then continues, stating:41

Dharmas classified as ‘conventional’, that is to say—‘When this
exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises … the arising of
this sheer great mass of dissatisfaction.’ … Moreover—‘When
this does not exist, that does not exist; when this ceases, that
ceases … the cessation of this sheer great mass of dissatisfaction.’
O monks! this is named the Dharma Discourse on Ultimate
Emptiness (Paramārthaśūnyatādharma Sūtra).
It is thus clear that “dharmas classified as conventional” refers to the
dharmas which comprise the limbs of dependent arising itself. This
is not only in the forward order of arising, but also the reversal into
cessation. The cessation of dissatisfaction is nirvāna, the unconditioned.
Is it any particular one of these aspects which is “ultimate emptiness”?
It is difficult to say, but the overall sense appears that it is the totality
of this situation, the Dharma law of dependent arising and cessation
of conventional or nominal dharmas as phenomena, all of which takes
place without recourse to an agent or actor, that is “ultimate emptiness”.
It could be possible to then read this through the “two truths” system
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so popular in the mainstream sectarian period, utilized by both the

Abhidharma systems as well as the Madhyamaka. In that way, the
“ultimate” could be juxtaposed against the “designated” (prajñapti),
giving the underlying principle of dependent origination as the former,
whereas the phenomena are the latter.
3.2. Great Emptiness—“Neither Identity Nor Plurality”

The second sectarian sūtra is another Sarvāstivādin text, SĀ 297
Mahāśūnyatā Dharmaparyāya.42 Without a Pāli equivalent, Yìnshùn
(1971: 651) locates it in the Nidānasaṃyukta, which is supported by
the content and surrounding sūtras. It has a similar teaching format
to SĀ 262, above. As we would thus expect, it explicitly uses the
standard twelve link formula of dependent arising. However, it also
ties dependent origination in with emptiness:43
What is the Dharma Discourse on Great Emptiness? It is this—
‘When this exists, that exists; when this arises, that arises.’ Which
is—‘Formations are conditioned by ignorance; cognitions are
conditioned by formations; and so forth, up to; the amassing of
this sheer mass of dissatisfaction.’ …
Then follows a refutation of several positions which appear in the ten
or fourteen unanswered questions (avyākṛta), all of which are forms
of “self-view” (ātmadṛṣṭi), such as “life (jīva) and body are different”
or “identical”. A very similar statement occurs in SN 12:35,44 lending
further support to placing SĀ 297 in the Nidānasaṃyukta. The sūtra
stresses dependent origination as the “middle path” between these
extremes of view based around the idea of a self (as jīva).45 The
connection between these questions and the rest of the text is most
likely that such questions are basically predicated on the notion of a
“self”, though often under the guise of the term “tathāgata” (Karuna
dasa 2005). As we have already seen from Jurewicz’s studies above,
this is obviously one of the key points that the Buddha’s formulation of
dependent origination seeks to reject.
The reverse process, the destruction of the dependent cessation process

in reverse sequence (pratilomika), is given as the sūtra ends with:46
With the fading away (*viraktā) of ignorance (avidyā),
knowledge (vidyā) arises; on the cessation of ignorance, there
28
is the cessation of conditionings; up to; the cessation of the

sheer, great mass of dissatisfaction. This is named the Dharma
Discourse on Great Emptiness.
Together, these show that existence is dependent arising in forward
order (anuloma) from self view and desire, and also dependent cessation
through the reverse order (pratiloma) of this process. In the text it is
not altogether clear whether the term “emptiness” applies to both, or
merely one of, these two processes. However, we have shown earlier
how “empty” was used as a description of conditioned phenomena,
along with impermanence, dissatisfactoriness and not self, and also, that
the absence of the defilements is given as the transmundane meaning
of “emptiness” elsewhere. Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the
terms “empty” and “emptiness” refer to both processes.
3.3. Seeing Dependent Origination as Dharma, as Buddha

A third sectarian sūtra of note is the Śālistamba Sūtra. This is often
claimed to be a Mahāyāna sūtra. While the titles of the earliest recensions
in Chinese are simply “Śālistamba”, the later Sanskrit recension title
is prefixed with “Madhyamaka-°”. However, as Reat clearly shows,
content and structure “much of which is found scattered through the
Pāli suttas”, all suggest “as the date of the Śālistamba Sūtra as a whole,
200 bce plus or minus 100 years” (Reat 1993: 4-5).47 It thus actually
pre-dates the already self-identifying form of the Mahāyāna, but was
later widely cited by Mahāyāna scholars, and formed an important
basis for their presentation of dependent origination. Note that unlike
the previous two sectarian sūtras, however, it is not associated with
the SĀ or the Sarvāstivāda in general. The sūtra famously states that:
“Whoever sees dependent origination sees the Dharma. Who sees the
Dharma, sees the Buddha.”48 This is most likely a combination of two
statements concerning “seeing the dharma” found in the Āgamas.49
The text has a four-fold structure, considering “cause” (hetu) and

“condition” (pratyaya) in relation to internal and external phenomena.
The predominant simile is that of the growing of a seed, hence the
name “śāli-stamba” which means “rice-stalk”, which also hints at a
distinction between seed as cause, and other factors as conditions.
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The difference between cause and condition is somewhat akin to that

between the causal nature of “own nature” (sabhāva) and “other nature”
(parabhāva) in the Theravādin Peṭakopadesa and Nettippakaraṇa (see
Warder in Ñāṇamoli 1982b: xvii). It is a distinction also found in the
Sarvāstivāda.
According to the earliest version of the sūtra,50

living beings do not go from this life to another life … but there
is action (karma) and result, causally conditioned retribution
without any loss.
There are other paraphrases of statements found in the early sūtras.
There are passages in the earlier recensions with a variety of terms
as direct adjectives for dependent arising, which include “not
conditioned, not abiding, unconditioned, not an object of mind,
pacified, cessation, signless”.51 In the later Sanskrit, this is expanded
to include “impermanence, dissatisfaction, emptiness, absence of
self”.52 The terms of this common pericope are often very closely
associated with emptiness, in fact, emptiness is often the first term on
the list, indicating its predominance over the others.53 This means that
the correct contemplation of dependent origination ensures that the
practitioner will not arise various deluded views about their existence
in the past or future. They will remove all the heterodox views which
are based on theories of a soul (ātmavāda), living being (sattva-°), life
principle (jīva-°), person (pudgala-°), and so forth.54 The implied sense
is that of the emptiness of the Self.
The sūtra finally concludes with statements that one who “correctly
enters into receptivity of the Dharma of dependent origination” will in
fact become a fully awakened buddha.55 As this statement is found in
most recensions of the text, it is at present difficult to assess whether
this statement is a later addition or original. Similar to statements in the
Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra indicate that dependent arising was the object of
contemplation for the bodhisattva(s), a point which we shall examine in
further detail below, via the comments of the Vaibhāṣika Master Parśva.
30
3.4. Abhidharma Śāstra and Mahāvibhāṣa Exegesis

In addition to the obvious connection that the Sarvāstivādin sūtras
place upon considering dependent origination as emptiness, their
Abhidharma also makes this connection. We shall examine this from
the ancient Dharmaskandhapāda Śāstra, and the later orthodox stan-
dard, the Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra.
The Dharmaskandhapāda is perhaps the earliest of the Northern

Abhidharma literature, hailing from around 300 bce, contemporary
with the Pāli Vibhaṅga. The text cites a sūtra which discusses both the
Dharma law of dependent origination (緣起[法]) as well as dependently
originated dharmas as phenomena (緣起已生法).56 The sūtra cited,
*Pratītyasamutpādadharma (因緣法), appears to be our previously
encountered SĀ 296, a parallel of the Pāli SN 12:20 Paccayo. Dealing
with “causality” (nidāna), it suggests a text from the oldest strata of SĀ
and SN, the Nidānasaṃyuktā. This same sūtra is also cited by perhaps
the oldest of all the Abhidharma literature, the Śāriputra Abhidharma,
but without elaboration.57
After elucidating both the Dharma principle of the causal relationships

between the phenomenological dharma events, and the actual dharmas
themselves, it is stated that for one who knows and sees this as it really
is, it is impossible that they will fall into various forms of thought such
as “Did I exist in the past?”, “Will I exist in the future”, and so forth.
Both the SĀ sūtra itself and also the Dharmaskandhapāda usage of it,
(but neither the Pāli sutta itself nor the Śāriputra Abhidharma Śāstra
citation,) then expressly state that this is because for one who knows
and sees, they have totally removed all these various conceptualizations
which are “connected with the view of a self, … a living being” and so
forth.58 This is thus akin to the points of view rejected in the Mahā
śūnyatā Dharmaparyāya and the Śālistamba Sūtra (above).
Together, this is a very strong indicator that vision of dependent

arising, and thus not self, was the considered the factor which made
one an āryan. This is supported by earlier material such as SĀ 347 and
SN 12:70 Susīma, which explains that one first realizes gnosis of the
“stability of Dharma” (dharmasthitatā), and then gnosis of nirvāṇa.
But despite this seemingly important statement, the Dharmaskandha
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pāda commentary resigns itself to merely mechanically explaining

the twelve links, and remains silent as these various ātman based
views. Of approximately the same historical period, the Theravādin
Paṭisambhidāmagga also explains this gnosis of stability of Dhamma
(dhammaṭṭhitatā) as knowledge of the various dependently related
conditions.59
The same sūtra cited by Dharmaskandhapāda also provides us with a

number of terms for dependent origination which indicate its position
as a kind of natural and immutable law. The SĀ version adds several
terms over and above the Pāli, including “suchness of Dharma” (法如;
*dharmatathatā), “Dharmic nature” (法爾; *dharmatā), “factuality”
(審諦; *bhūtatā), and others.60 Elsewhere in the Dharmaskandha
pāda, a strikingly similar description which indicates a kind of eternal
principle, hinting at an unconditioned nature, is also given for the āryan
truths.61 A shortened list featuring only *dharmasthititā and *dharmatā
appears in the Mahāvibhāṣa. Here the authors wish to refute the
Vibhajyavādin view that dependent origination is an unconditioned
(asaṃskṛta) dharma, by stating that unlike the unconditioned cessation,
etc., dependent origination is still within the sphere of the past, present
and future, and thus conditioned, despite it being a fixed and eternal
principles.62 All this quite possibly has its roots in the Dharmaskandha
pāda passages cited above.
As shown in the Dharmaskandhapāda, although both the Dharma of

dependent arising itself and dependently originated dharmas are “of
one substance”, they are still “different objects”.63 The Vaibhāṣika
master Vasumitra, in presenting the statement “Whosoever sees …
dependent origination sees the Dharma”, where dependent origination
is explicitly given in the twelve causal links (nidāna) format, claims that
“some [masters] state” that “realization through the emptiness entrance
to release” is a case of “seeing dharmas but not seeing … dependent
origination”; whereas “realization through the intentionless entrance
to release” is “seeing both dharmas and dependent origination”.64
This would mean that the emptiness release described by Vasumitra
refers to the various dharmas themselves, but not their mutual causal
relationships.
32
Moving ahead several centuries we arrive at the critical Northern

Abhidharma commentarial tome, the Mahāvibhāṣa. Completed in the
middle of the 2nd century ce, it certainly precedes Nāgārjuna (2nd—3rd
century ce), and would doubtlessly have been a major doctrinal force
across much of mainland Indian Buddhism during his lifetime. In the
Mahāvibhāṣa, the Susīma Sūtra was again cited for discussion, but now
the above position of the Dharmaskandhapāda became just one of
many explanations, to be finally supplanted by an explanation more in
tune with the developing Vaibhāṣika system.65
In the Mahāvibhāṣa, Parśva analyses various personality types, and

states that the bodhisattvas who are “followers by desire” (*tṛṣṇānusārin)
who “take the result as the entrance”, and also the “followers by
views” (*dṛṣṭyanusārin) who “take the cause as the entrance”, both
“contemplate the Dharma of dependent origination”, and “based on the
emptiness samādhi, they enter into certitude of perfection”.66 This is
further shown by a verse which states:67
The fully awakened ones (saṃbuddha) of the three periods of
time, break the poison of sorrow, they all emphasize the true
Dharma (*saddharma), always abiding in the nature of Dharma
(*dharmatā).
While this appears to be specifically just for those on the bodhisattva
path to eventual full awakening, elsewhere other statements seem to
imply that āryans as a whole all “realize *dharmatā”.68 But despite
this, the connection between realization of this dependent arising
and the āryan stages appears to have become gradually weaker over
time. Perhaps it was more the case that this sort of release through the
emptiness samādhi which contemplates dependent origination as per
*dharmatā as their object, was a special case for the bodhisattva.
Statements in the Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra which explicitly connect the

emptiness samādhi to dependent arising are few,69 when compared with
the extremely common format of this practice being contemplation on
the not self and emptiness aspects of the four truths. In the opening
passages of the Mahāvibhāṣa, the connection between knowledge of
not self (emptiness is not mentioned) and dependent origination is
made explicit, as perception of the former gives rise to the latter.70
Rather than a vision of dependent origination, insight into those fixed
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laws that indicated how specific dharmas arise and cease due to specific
conditions as being the first stage of āryan status, there was a shift
towards vision of just the dharmas themselves.
Both Parśva’s position vis-à-vis the bodhisattva(s), which is no doubt

based on the notion that it was just such a contemplation that led to
Śākyamuni’s own awakening universally extended to all bodhisattva
candidates, and also Vasumitra’s older source for dependent arising,
hint at the antiquity of these two scholars who have a tendency towards
the earlier works over the later commentarial śāstras. Both would have
been approximately 100 years before Nāgārjuna’s own time (circa 2nd—
3rd centuries ce), around the period of the newly forming Mahāyāna.
3.5. Un/conditioned Status of Dependent Origination

At this point, we would like to leave aside the citation of individual
texts, and turn to a broader issue. Up to this point, we have seen that
the Abhidharma methodology of classification of dharma(s) as either
conditioned (saṃskṛta) or unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharma gradually
became more significant as time progressed. While this “dharmavāda”
approach should be more narrowly confined to dharmas (plural) as
phenomena, it appears that the use of dharma (singular) as a law or
principle, was unable to escape such analysis. It thus came to be that the
question of whether or not the very principle of dependent origination
(pratītyasamutpādadharmaḥ) was conditioned or unconditioned,
and not just those things that were dependently originated (pratītya
samutpannadharmāni), came about. As we have already seen in
the Nikāyas and Āgamas themselves, there were a number of terms
commonly taken as synonyms for dependent arising, such as “stability
of Dharma” (dharmasthititā) and “suchness” (tathatā). These were also
drawn into the range of this debate, though as we shall see below, they
were not necessarily seen as exact equivalents.
Drawing from the excellent study of Bareau on the “jungle of views”

that makes up sectarian Buddhism, we may tabulate the attribution of
conditioned or unconditioned status to these three notions—dependent
origination, the stability of Dharma, and suchness—as advocated by
various schools (from Bareau 2005: 287):71
34
Conditioned (saṃskṛta) Unconditioned (asaṃskṛta)

Stability Stability
Dependent Dependent
of Suchness of Suchness
Origination Origination
Dharma Dharma
Vātsīputriya ✓ (#38)
Theravāda ✓ (#55) ✓ (#21) ✓ (#186)
Sarvāstivāda ✓ (#6, #28) ✓ (#6) ✓ (#6)

Śāriputra
✓ (#10) ✓ (#10) ✓ (#10)
Abhidharma
Mahāsāṃghika ✓ (#43) ✓ (#43) ✓ (#43)
Mahīśāsaka ✓ (#19) ✓ (#19) ✓ (#19)

✓
Uttarāpathaka ✓ (#32*)
(#32*)
Dharmagupta ✓ (#13)
Pūrvaśaila ✓ (#9)
Vibhajyavāda ✓ (#8)
On one side, there were the schools which tended towards considering
dependent origination, etc., as conditioned: These are notably the earlier
Sthavira schools with Ābhidharmika tendencies, such as the Theravāda,
Vātsīputriya and Sarvāstivāda. We would probably expect to see the
Śāriputra Abhidharma Śāstra among this group, but out of the three
they only considered suchness as conditioned. For the conditioned
status of the stability of Dharma and suchness, there was also support
from the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas, and a qualified affirmation
from the Uttarāpathakas.
On the other side, there were also those who inclined to an interpretation
of these as unconditioned: The Mahāsāṃghikas and Śāriputra
Abhidharma Śāstra had a shared list of nine unconditioned, including:
“8. The self-nature of the members of conditioned production (*pratītya
samutpādāṇgasvabhāva)”; and “9. The self-nature of the factors of the
Path (*mārgāṇgasvabhā).”72 However, according to Bareau’s sources
at least, both the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Śāriputra Abhidharma
Śāstra otherwise considered that suchness itself is conditioned. Were
there different forms of suchness, such that some were conditioned
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and others not? The Mahīśāsaka also had nine unconditioned, on

a slightly different list, although also including: “8. The suchness
of the Path (mārgatathatā)”; and “9. The suchness of dependent
origination (pratītyasamutpādatathatā).”73 The Dharmaguptakas upheld
unconditioned status regards dependent origination alone, but there is
no mention of their position vis-à-vis stability of Dharma or suchness.74
The Pūrvaśailas agreed, simply on the basis of a sūtra, which was most
probably their equivalent of SN 12:20 / SĀ 296.75 They also considered
that the four āryan truths themselves were unconditioned, for basically
the same reasons.76 The otherwise unelucidated agreement of so-called
Vibhajyavādins,77 makes them appear to be any group other than the
three early Sthavira Abhidharma schools.
In addition to the above points, we also find some other related doctrinal
positions of the Sthavira traditions. The Katthāvatthu states a position
of the Theravādins against the Andhakas, namely that the former
consider that emptiness (along with the signless and intentionless)
“is not included in the aggregate of the mental formations”.78 On the
grounds that whatever is a formation (saṃskāra) is also conditioned
(saṃskṛta), this would seem to mean that the Andhakas considered
even emptiness itself to be conditioned.
The category of the unconditioned has always been a standard of

Ābhidharmika analysis based on the early sūtras. However, the very
notion of anything being “unconditioned” has always been problematic
for Buddhists who were loathe to run up against their core doctrine of
not self or non-self, ie. emptiness. Here we have seen how it related to
dependent arising, and its synonyms. But it obviously also extended to
the notion of emptiness, as some form of equivalence had already been
established. This difficulty can be seen, for example, in Nāgārjuna’s
understanding of “the emptiness of emptiness”, the argument that to
turn emptiness itself into a reified—unconditioned, not dependent—
phenomena, is to make perhaps the greatest mistake of all. Much of
the discourse on “the emptiness of emptiness” has been an ontological
one, which has often failed to look to its earlier precedents. It appears to
have its roots in seeing as empty the very insight contemplation which
perceives the emptiness of phenomena. This is quite a different matter
altogether, but unfortunately beyond our scope here.
36
3.6. Summary
The first two subjects for discussion of emptiness and dependent
origination in mainstream sectarian Buddhism involved citing two
Saṃyuktāgama sūtras, the Paramārthaśūnyatā (Section §3.1) and
Mahāśūnyatā (Section §3.2) sūtras. Both of these two sūtras not only
directly related emptiness — described as “ultimate” or “great” emp-
tiness — to dependent origination, in the simple format “When this
exists, that exists”, etc., or in the later standardized twelve limb format.
Furthermore, the two texts raise the not ions of “neither coming nor
going” and “neither identity nor plurality”, respectively, to describe de-
pendent arising. These two statements would appear to be sources for
four of the famous “eight negations” that make up the opening verses
of Nāgārjuna’s Kārikās. This fact has been noted by Yìnshùn in his
Investigations, Chp. 4.2, where he also provides early (and sectarian)
sources for the other two sets of negations, “neither arising nor ceas-
ing” and “neither eternalism nor nihilism” (Yìnshùn 1985: 210f). We
have omitted detailed discussion of these sources here, as while highly
implying a relation to emptiness, they do not mention it explicitly.79
Yìnshùn concludes that “We have no doubts that teaching dependent
origination based on the eight negations has its source in the Samyukta
Āgama sūtras” (1985: 210f). Most of these texts have Pāli equivalents,
though EĀ parallels are available. As such, they are seldom if ever
raised in the usual discourse on emptiness which relies excessively on
Pāli material. While sūtras, they still most likely represent notions from
the early sectarian period, rather than any so-called primitive or early
Buddhism.
The Śālistamba Sūtra provides further early sectarian material from

other than Sarvāstivādin sources (in Section §3.3). We know that this
text was later fully adopted by the Madhyamaka and other Mahāyāna
scholars. Similar to “Ultimate Emptiness” and “Great Emptiness”,
much attention is given to describing dependent origination in terms
that avoid the extremes that result from views of a Self, or other
synonymous entity. The system of causality distinguishing primary
cause from supportive conditions began to develop, whereas earlier
these terms were for all purposes simply synonymous. This development
also suggests just how early the systems that appear as Nāgārjuna’s
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model for analysis in Chp. 1 of the Kārikās may be. This system may
thus not necessarily be restricted to the Vaibhāṣikas.
By the actual Abhidharma śāstras themselves, and the later fully

developed Vaibhāṣika system, we see the continued reference and
citation to the Āgamas, albeit interpreting them through the Abhidharma
method (Section §3.4). In particular, the analysis into real existent
dharmas and designations (prajñapti), and their being conditioned
or unconditioned (Section §3.5). This basic method posed problems,
however, when interpreting both the principle (dharma—singular) or
dependent origination and those phenomena (dharmas—plural) which
were dependently originated. Various schools were split along lines
where the Ābhidharmikas generally considered both conditioned, but
others, most notably the Mahāsāṃghikas and those they influenced,
considering the principle itself as unconditioned.
4. “Emptiness = Dependent Origination”

— Nāgārjuna’s Innovation?
In Section §1, we began our examination from the broad context of
the academic discourse on emptiness. This fairly standard and often
paradigmatic scholastic narrative of the teaching of emptiness usually
starts from Nāgārjuna’s Mahāyāna Madhyamaka which it extols as a
novel and creative if not revolutionary teaching, only then moving
back through mainstream sectarian “Hīnayāna” schools, and finally
to early Buddhism. But the earlier historical stages are often only
there to explain the Madhyamaka, giving the approach something
of a teleological flavor. But besides this difficulty, source biases and
anachronistic arguments are also highly problematic. The source biases
are mainly the heavy if not sole use of Pāli and Sanskrit material,
ignoring translations of important Indic texts preserved only in Chinese
translation. The anachronistic arguments are that lines of doctrinal
development often use post-Nāgārjunian classic Theravādin and
Sarvāstivādin cum Sautrāntika commentarial literature to represent the
targets of the Madhyamaka critique. That Madhyamaka critique is, in a
word, emptiness (śūnyatā). Or, in a verse, that emptiness is dependent
origination, designation on a basis, and the middle way (as per Mūla
madhyamakakārikās, v. 24:18), and also the opening verses of praise of
the Kārikās, upon which the academic discourse places such a heavy
38
weight. While the discourse of emptiness is a very broad topic, we

have chosen to focus upon this latter particular aspect of it. That is,
we have asked: is Nāgārjuna’s direct relationship of equivalence or
near equivalence between emptiness and dependent origination, an
innovation on his part?
In the light of the source biases and anachronistic arguments mentioned

above, we have chosen a relatively simple approach here. The stronger
that equivalences or relationships between emptiness and dependent
origination can be shown in the literature prior to Nāgārjuna (circa 2nd
to 3rd century ce), the weaker the argument that this is an innovation
on his part, is clear. Thus we have examined the material utilizing two
heuristically functional historical periods of “early” Buddhism (up
to circa 3rd century bce), and “mainstream sectarian” Buddhism (3rd
century bce to mid 2nd century ce), respectively. Now, to what degree
has a pre-Nāgārjunian relationship between these two doctrines been
shown?
In short, a direct and explicit connection between emptiness and

dependent origination has been present in Buddhist literature from
the early period. While this may not be particularly strong in the Pāli
texts, it can be seen more clearly in the Chinese translations of the
Āgamas, in particular the Sarvāstivādin Saṃyuktāgama and (probably)
Mahāsāṃghika Ekottarāgama. The connection also continues into the
sectarian period, as can be seen from examination of translations of
the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma śāstras and commentarial literature.
Such use of early and mid-period Indian Buddhist literature outside of
the usual Pāli and Sanskrit recensions should be standard practice for
Buddhist studies. We can no longer justify the source biases that often
occur when such alternate material is ignored.
The relationship between the notions of emptiness and dependent

arising found in the early texts that we have examined here works on
a number of levels: 1. As demonstrated in Sections §2.1 and §2.6, the
first is where emptiness refers to a lack of a “Self” or “what pertains to
Self”, the usual gloss of the discourse for early teachings on emptiness.
The process of the arising and coming into being of phenomena,
saṃsāric becoming, is one which takes place with recourse to such
a Self entity. This finding is quite to be expected, a core thread
39
JCBSSL VOL. XI
that winds from most likely the Buddha himself through the texts
and commentaries, to Nāgārjuna, and beyond. 2. But in addition
to this is the sense wherein emptiness refers to the state of nirvāṇa
itself, the absence of affliction, as shown in Sections §2.3 and §2.3.
The complementary aspect is not dependent arising, but, if we may
coin a neologism, dependent cessation. 3. A position tending toward
universalization of the aforementioned two levels begins to emerge,
as per Sections §2.4 and §2.5. Both the principle dependent arising
and the state of appeasement, two otherwise radically different sense of
“emptiness”, are “profound”. Thus this becomes almost a catch phrase
for the totality of the Buddha’s teachings, a notion which develops into
the idea of “dharma seals” or “dhamma characteristics” during the end
phase of the early texts and the start of the mainstream schools. That
“all phenomena are empty”, be they conditioned or unconditioned,
saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, is a hall mark of not just the phenomena (dharmas)
themselves, but the principle (Dharma) that connects them, and the
teaching (Dharma) that elucidates both aspects.
The mainstream period continues this trend, where Abhidharma

methodology such as analysis into conditioned and unconditioned,
conventional and ultimate truths, and so forth, further clarifies the ever
more significant role of “emptiness”. 1. First, in the Saṃyuktāgama
texts on “Ultimate Emptiness” (Paramārthaśūnyatā) and “Great
Emptiness” (Mahāśūnyatā), there is the equation wherein emptiness is
explicitly described in terms of both aspects of dependent origination
and cessation (in Sections §3.1 and §3.2). The Sarvāstivādins, at
least, elevated emptiness to have a similar status as impermanence,
dissatisfaction and absence of Self. By making it one of the sixteen
fundamental aspects (ākāra), a characteristic shared by all phenomena
(samānyalakṣaṇa), this was further strengthened. 2. Outside this school,
the Śalistamba Sūtra (see Section §3.3), which was later to be adopted
by the Madhyamaka Mahāyāna, further pushed dependent origination
to the fore by identifying it as a universal truth. This occurred both
abstractly, as the “Dharma”, and anthropomorphically as the “Buddha”.
3. While the Abhidharma had its own methodology, it was still bound
to a greater or lesser degree, to conform to the early texts. When faced
with early sūtra (and probably vinaya) that described the Bodhisattva
Gautama’s awakening in terms of insight into dependent origination,
the notion that this was a particular practice for cultivation for those
40
on the bodhisattva path (as opposed to śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas),

became more formalized (Section §3.4). An incipient Mahāyāna
tradition, drawing much from the institutionally large and philosophical
powerful traditions such as the Sarvāstivāda, would no doubt be
influenced by such doctrinal lineages. The influence need not be one of
mere acceptance and continuation thereof, and could just as likely be
one of dialectical opposition and transformation.
As can now be clearly seen, the connection between emptiness and

dependent origination is not an innovation or creation of Nāgārjuna. In
the still narrower sense of the relationship being an equation of the two,
namely that emptiness is just dependent origination itself, this has also
been well established before Nāgārjuna’s time. In addition, there are
numerous other doctrinal positions that associate the two one way or
another. But while we have shown in the introduction of this essay how
influential the notion of Nāgārjuna’s equation between emptiness and
dependent origination is on academic narrative, we have not detailed
what Nāgārjuna actually meant by this. But this has been amply
discussed elsewhere, so we need not cover old ground here. What we
have aimed to do is provide earlier material, letting the texts speaks for
themselves, as they say. Although this textual analysis demonstrates
that relating and connecting emptiness and dependent origination is not
an innovation of Nāgārjuna, no doubt new doctrinal interpretations of
these core ideas have been made by him. The next task would then be to
compare the material presented here with that of Nāgārjuna to further
understand what his specific developments were exactly.
41
JCBSSL VOL. XI
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Notes
1 Full disclosure: The author here is presently working on a full English translation
of this work, to be titled An Investigation into Emptiness, to be published by
Noble Path Publishing, USA.
2 Refer also Yìnshùn (1971: 89-102).
3 See Yìnshùn (1971: 755); though Mizuno (2003: 561fff) is less sure about its
sectarian affiliation.
4 The usual generic formula is given as that in Ud 1:1-3: “Iti imasmiṃ sati
idaṃ hoti, imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati, imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa
nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati”; Ireland (1997: 13ff); also SN ii 28, 65, 70, 78f, 95f,
v 388; Bodhi (2000: 552, 575, 579, 585f, 596f); and MN 38 i 262f, ii 32, iii 63;
Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 355f, 655, 927); AN v 184. Bodhi (2000: 517) states:
“Dependent origination is one of the central teachings of early Buddhism, so
vital to the teaching as a whole that the Buddha is quoted elsewhere as saying,
‘One who sees dependent origination see the Dhamma, and one who sees the
Dhamma sees dependent origination’ (MN i 190-191)”; “Vuttaṃ kho panetaṃ
bhagavatā—‘yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati; yo dhammaṃ
passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passatī’ ti.” See Kalupahana (1975), Causality:
The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, for an in depth examination of this teaching
in early Buddhism.
5 Such as those seen in SN 12:20, ii 25: “Katamo ca, bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppādo?
… Uppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ, ṭhitāva sā dhātu
dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idappaccayatā…”; and SN 6:2, i 140 for
“dhammatā” as the content realized by all the Buddhas, which they in turn
reverence; Bodhi (2000: 550f, 235). In equivalent SĀ 296 《雜阿含經》卷
12：「云何為因緣法。謂此有故彼有。謂緣無明行。緣行識。…若佛出世。
若未出世。此法常住。法住法界。…此等諸法。法住．法空．法如．法爾。
法不離如。法不異如。審諦真實．不顛倒。如是隨順緣起。是名緣生法。…
」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 84, b14-26), we see the addition of the generalized
formula at the start (cf. Ud 1:1-3).
6 SN 20:7 Āṇi ii 267: “… ye te suttantā tathāgatabhāsitā gambhīrā gambhiratthā
lokuttarā suññatāpaṭisaṃyuttā …”; Bodhi (2000: 709). Also SN 55:53
Dhammadinna v 407; Bodhi (2000: 1833f). Parallel in SĀ 1258 《雜阿含經》
卷47：「如來所說修多羅甚深明照空相應隨順緣起法」(CBETA, T02, no. 99,
p. 345, b13-14), and also SĀ 293 《雜阿含經》卷12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 83,
c4-6); which has no Pāli equivalent.
7 SN 6:1 i 136: “Adhigato kho myāyaṃ dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho
santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo, ālayarāmā kho panāyaṃ
pajā ālayaratā ālayasammuditā ālayarāmāya kho pana pajāya ālayaratāya
ālayasammuditāya duddasaṃ idaṃ ṭhānaṃ yadidaṃ idappaccayatā paṭicca
samuppādo. Idampi kho ṭhānaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhi
paṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbāṇaṃ.”; Bodhi (2000: 231). A
largely identical Pāli passage in MN 26 i 167 and MN 72 i 487; see Ñāṇamoli &
Bodhi (1995: 260, 593)
8 SN 6:1, paralleled by EĀ 19:1 《增壹阿含經》卷10〈19 勸請品〉 (CBETA,
46
T02, no. 125, p. 593, a25-27), where dependent origination is not mentioned,
however. MN 26 and parallel MĀ 204 which lacks this passage altogether. MN
72 and parallel SĀ 962 which merely has 《雜阿含經》卷34：「是則不然。甚
深廣大。無量無數永滅。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 246, a10): “… it cannot be
fathomed, it is most deep, vast, immeasurable, incalculable, eternal cessation”,
refering to the extinction of the fire—nirvāṇa.”
9 SĀ 293 《雜阿含經》卷12：「此甚深處。所謂緣起。倍復甚深難見。所
謂一切取離．愛盡．無欲．寂滅．涅槃。如此二法。謂有為．無為。」
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 83, c13-15) No equivalent in SN, though possibly
around SN 12 given the relation of other adjacent sūtra / sutta. Similar to both
SN 6:1, above, and also the opening of DN 15 Mahānidāna Sutta, ii 55.
10 DN 15 ii 55: “… “acchariyaṃ bhante, abbhutaṃ bhante, yāvagambhīro
cāyaṃ bhante, paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīravabhāso ca. Atha ca pana me
uttānakuttānako viya khāyatī”ti. Mā hevaṃ ānanda avaca, mā hevaṃ ānanda
avaca, gambhīro cāyaṃ ānanda paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca.”; see
Walshe (1987: 223); Bodhi (1984: 45). Same as MĀ 97 Mahānidāna Sūtra 《
中阿含經》卷24〈4 因品〉：「… 此緣起甚奇。極甚深。明亦甚深。然我觀
見至淺至淺。世尊告曰。阿難。汝莫作是念。此緣起至淺至淺。所以者何。
此緣起極甚深。明亦甚深。」(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 578, b13-17). Also DĀ
13 (大緣方便經) *Mahānidānaupāya Sūtra and DN 15 Mahānidāna Sutta, are
largely similar. Note that for Ānanda’s comments, Pāli has “clear as clear can
be”, whereas MĀ has “shallow as shallow can be”, ie. opposite of “profound”.
11 Udāna 1:1-3 1f: “imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imassūppādā idaṃ uppajjati, imasmiṃ
asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.”; English in Ireland (1997:
13f). See also SĀ sūtras 296-302 《雜阿含經》卷12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p.
84, b12 – p. 86, b23); etc.
12 SN 12:12 ii 13f; Bodhi (2000: 541f). SĀ 372 《雜阿含經》卷15 (CBETA,
T02, no. 99, p. 102, a12-b17).
13 SĀ 262 《雜阿含經》卷10 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 66, c25-p. 67, a8). SN 12:15
Kaccānagotta Sutta; SN ii 17; Bodhi (2000: 544). Or SĀ 301 《雜阿含經》卷
12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 85, c17-p. 86, a3).
14 On causality, see suttas SN 12:15, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26 and 67; and for other extreme
views, SN 12:46, 47 and 48.
15 For “nibbāna” in SN 38:1f iv 251f: “Yo kho āvuso rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo
mohakkhayo idaṃ vuccati nibbānanti”; Bodhi (2000: 1294f). Parallel in SĀ 490
《雜阿含經》卷18：「涅槃者。貪欲永盡。瞋恚永盡。愚癡永盡。一切諸
煩惱永盡。是名涅槃。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 126, b3-4). As a definition
of the “unconditioned” (asaṅkhata) in SN 43 Asaṅkhata Saṃyutta iv 359ff:
“Katamañca bhikkhave asaṅkhataṃ: yo bhikkhave rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo
mohakkhayo, idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave asaṅkhataṃ”; Bodhi (2000: 1372ff).
Parallel in SĀ 890 《雜阿含經》卷31：「云何無為法。謂貪欲永盡。瞋恚．
愚癡永盡。一切煩惱永盡。是無為法。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 224, b1-3).
Also as a definition for the fruition of an arhat in SĀ 1129 《雜阿含經》卷41：
「何等為阿羅漢果。若彼貪欲永盡。瞋恚永盡。愚癡永盡。一切煩惱永盡。
是名阿羅漢果。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 299, a5-7); the sūtra other paralleled
by SN 55:55-58 v 410-411; Bodhi (2000: 1836-7), but the Pāli lacks this phrase.
47
JCBSSL VOL. XI
16 SĀ 262 《雜阿含經》卷10：「一切諸行空寂．不可得．愛盡．離欲．涅
槃。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 66, b17-18; c10-11) Unlike the SN version, the
SĀ states that this occurred “not long after the [Buddha’s] parinirvāṇa”. Pāli is
SN 22:90 Channa iii 133 (see below).
17 SN 22:90 Channa iii 133: “Atha ca pana me sabbasaṃkhāra samathe sabbūpadhi
paṭinissagge taṇhakkhaye virāge nirodhe nibbāne cittaṃ na pakkhandati
nappasīdati na santiṭṭhati nādhimuccati paritassanā upādānaṃ uppajjati,
paccudāvattati mānasaṃ, atha kho carahi me attāti, na kho panevaṃ dhammaṃ
passato hoti “ko nu kho me tathā dhammaṃ deseyya yathāhaṃ dhammaṃ
passeyya”nti.” Refer Bodhi (2000: 946).
18 Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra 《瑜伽師地論》卷83：「所言空者。謂離一切煩惱
等故。無所得者。謂離一切所有相故。言愛盡者。謂不希求未來事故。
言離欲者。謂無現在受用憙樂故。所言滅者。謂餘煩惱斷故。言涅槃者。
謂無餘依故。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, p. 766, a22-26): “The term ‘empty’
means forsaking all the defilements. The term ‘non-obtainment’ means being
separated from the signs of any existence. The term ‘destruction of craving’
means not seeking anything in the future. The term ‘forsaking of desire’ means
not delighting in present experiences. The term ‘cessation’ means abandoning
remaining defilements. The term ‘nirvāṇa’ means no remaining substratum.”
19 SN 41:7 Godatta; SN iv 295f; Bodhi (2000: 1325f), which has the Citta and
Godatta; parallel is SĀ sūtra 567 (T02, no. 99, p. 149, c6 – p. 150, a15), which
has instead Citra and Nāgadatta. Also MN 43 Mahāvedalla Sutta, MN i 292;
Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 387f); with Mahākoṭṭhita and Sāriputta; parallel is
AN 6:175 Koṭṭhita; and MĀ 211; paralleled by SĀ 251. The SN and both SĀ
versions are the shortest, while the MN and MĀ versions have become more
extensive exegeses.
20 SN 40:9 Animitta; PTS SN iv 268; Bodhi (2000: 1308). Here, it is also given as
“non-attention to all signs”. The only other Pāli uses of “cetosamādhi”seems not
directly related to any of the four immeasurables, such as DN Brahmajāla i 13ff;
DN Mahāpadāna ii 100; DN Pāthika iii 30; AN ii 54, iii 51; etc.
21 MN 43 Mahāvedalla; PTS MN i 298; = Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 395).
22 SN 41:7 Godatta; SN iv 295f; Bodhi (2000: 1325f). Parallel in SĀ 567 《雜阿
含經》卷21：「有無量心三昧．無相心三昧．無所有心三昧．空心三昧。」
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 149, c13-14).
23 Possibly, as Yìnshùn states, simply shorthand for “non-conflict meditation
(*araṇasamādhi; 無諍三昧)” (Yìnshùn 1985: 22).
24 SĀ 80 *Āryadharmamudrājñānadarśaṇaviśuddhi Sūtra (聖法印知見清淨經) 《
雜阿含經》卷3 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 20, a25-b27).
25 MĀ 211 《中阿含經》卷58：「有二因二緣住無想定。云何為二。一者不念
一切想。二者念無想界。是謂二因二緣住無想定。」(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p.
792, b18-20).
26 MN 43 Mahāvedalla Sutta, MN i 296-297: “Tayo kho āvuso paccayā animittāya
cetovimuttiyā ṭhitiyā: sabbanimittānañca amanasikāro, animittāya ca dhātuyā
manasikāro pubbeva abhisaṅkhāro ...”; English in Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995:
393): “… there are two conditions for the persistence of the signless deliverance
of mind: non-attention to all signs, attention to the signless element, and the
48
prior determination [of its duration].”

27 SĀ 80 《雜阿含經》卷3：「… 復有正思惟三昧。觀察…我．我所。從若
見．若聞．若嗅．若甞．若觸．若識而生。復作是觀察。若因．若緣而生識
者。彼識因．緣。為常．為無常。復作是思惟。若因．若緣而生識者。彼
因．彼緣皆悉無常。復次。彼因．彼緣皆悉無常。彼所生識云何有常。無常
者。是有為行。從緣起。是患法．滅法．離欲法．斷知法。是名聖法印．知
見清淨。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 20, a29-b25).
28 SN 12:20, ii 26; SN 12:34, ii 60; SN 22:21, iii 24; SN 36:8, iv 214f; MN i
500: ≈ “… aniccā saṅkhatā paṭiccasamuppannā khayadhammā vayadhammā
virāgadhammā nirodhadhammā” (slight variants); Bodhi (2000: 551, 573,
871, 1268f); Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 605f): “…impermanent, conditioned,
dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away and ceasing”
(with slight variants).
29 However, it appears that the Chinese reads “*virāgadharma” or “*virakta-°”
as literally “forsake desire dharma” (離欲法), which seems out of place in that
it suggests that all formations (*abhisaṃskāra) have thus “forsaken desire”.
Also, “forsake knowledge dharma” (斷知法; *nirodhajñānadharma) does not
match the Pāli “subject to cessation” (nirodhadhamma). It is hard to ascertain
whether this reading is part of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, or translator error.
A similar translation appears in the Śāriputra Abhidharma Śāstra 《舍利弗阿
毘曇論》卷11 (CBETA, T28, no. 1548, p. 606, a2-12; and ibid. p. 654, c9-10):
= “… teaching on pacification, cessation, the dharma of forsaking desire, the
true path towards nirvāṇa.” However, another sense of “dharma” as “teaching”
appears in the Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷161：「復次
有瑜伽師。雖厭欲界苦求離欲樂。而於離欲法懈怠不修故。」(CBETA, T27,
no. 1545, p. 816, c3-5): = “Moreover, although some practitioners of meditation
(*yogācārin) have revulsion towards the dissatisfaction of the desire realm
and seek the [meditative] bliss of forsaking sensual craving, however, they are
negligent and do not cultivate the ‘dharma of forsaking desire’.” There may be
some conflation of various senses of “dharma” here, eg. teaching, principle or
law, phenomenon, etc.
30 These are listed in accepted order of compilation (from Gethin 1998: 205).
31 These are listed in accepted order of compilation, for a full list see Yìnshùn
(1968: 121-171), and using Dhammajoti’s system of abbreviations (2007: x-xii,
98ff).
32 See Yìnshùn (1968: 20f, 69ff, 127f); Willemen, Dessein & Cox (1998: 164);
Bareau (2005: 289f); and Mizuno (2003: 389-416) for details of the Śāriputra
Abhidharma Śāstra in this role.
33 SĀ 335 《雜阿含經》卷13 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c12-26); and EĀ 27:7
《增壹阿含經》卷30：〈37 六重品〉 (CBETA, T02, no. 125, p. 713, c12-p.
714, b12). Similar passages are also given in: EĀ 38:9 《增壹阿含經》卷32
(CBETA, T02, no. 125, p. 724, b12-18); and EĀ 51:8 《增壹阿含經》卷49〈51
非常品〉 (CBETA, T02, no. 125, p. 819, c5-25), (which otherwise parallel to
MN 143 Anāthapiṇḍikovāda, but the Pāli lacks the passage here).
34 SĀ 335 《雜阿含經》卷13：「眼生時無有來處。滅時無有去處。如是眼不
實而生。生已盡滅。有業報而無作者。此陰滅已。異陰相續。除俗數法。
49
JCBSSL VOL. XI
耳．鼻．舌．身．意亦如是說。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c16-25). No

Pāli equivalent.
35 EĀ 37:7 《增壹阿含經》卷30：〈37 六重品〉「彼云何名為第一最空之
法。若眼起時則起。亦不見來處。滅時則滅。亦不見滅處。除假號法．因緣
法。…此六入亦無人造作。亦名色．六入法。六入亦無人造作。」(CBETA,
T02, no. 125, p. 713, c12-p. 714, b12).
36 From Vibhaṅgaaṭṭhakathā 68; also compare PṭsA 371.
37 From Visuddhimagga 410; also Abhidhammatthavikāsinī 417.
38 Cf. SN 35 Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta SN 35:246 Vīṇā (CBETA and Akanuma have
35:205 which is incorrect); = Bodhi (2000: 1253f); SN iv 195f. SĀ 1169 《雜
阿含經》卷43 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 312, c6-16).
39 For the Sanskrit Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya Saṃghabhedavastu, (Gnoli A 407b,
SBV I 158): “… nānyatra dharmasaṅketāt; tatrāyaṃ dharmasaṅketo yadutāsmin
satīdaṃ bhavati; …”. For the Chinese version of the Bimbisāra Sūtra: 《頻婆
娑羅王經》卷1 (CBETA, T01, no. 41, p. 826, b5-10); which has “由有法想”
and “由彼法想” for “dharmasaṅkhetād”, lit. “from those dharma perceptions”.
Also MĀ 《中阿含經》卷11〈6 王相應品〉：「…皆由因緣合會生苦…」
(CBETA, T01, no. 26, p. 498, b9-14), which gives a stronger sense of dependency.
40 Abhidharmakośa verse 3:17-18, and Bhāṣya: “asti karmāsti vipākaḥ, kārakas
tu nopalabhyate ya imāṃś ca skandhān nikṣipati anyāṃś ca skandhān prati
sandadhāty anyatra dharmasaṃketāt| tatrāyaṃ dharmasaṃketo yadutāsmin
satīdaṃ bhavatīti vistareṇa pratītyasamutpādaḥ|” An English translation can
be found in de la Vallèe Poussin, trs. Pruden (1991: Vol II, 399); though the
meaning seems lost in translation.
41 SĀ 335 《雜阿含經》卷13：「「除俗數法。俗數法者。謂此有故彼有。此
起故彼起。如無明緣行。行緣識。廣說乃至純大苦聚集起。又復。此無故彼
無。此滅故彼滅。無明滅故行滅。行滅故識滅。如是廣說。乃至純大苦聚
滅。比丘。是名第一義空法經。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 92, c16-25). No
Pāli equivalent.
42 This text is strictly speaking a “paryāya, and not to be confused with MN 121 /
MĀ 190 Mahāśūnyatā Sūtra.
43 SĀ 297 《雜阿含經》卷12：「云何為大空法經。所謂此有故彼有。此起故
彼起。謂緣無明行。緣行識。乃至純大苦聚集。..」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p.
84, c14 – p. 85, a1-9) For a Sanskrit re-construction of this text, see Trīpāṭhi in
Choong (1999: 91f).
44 SN 12:35 Avijjāpaccayā, ii 60f; see Bodhi (2000: 60f).
45 SĀ 297 《雜阿含經》卷12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 84, c14–p. 85, a1-9).
46 SĀ 297 《雜阿含經》卷12：「…若比丘無明離欲而生明。彼無明滅則行
滅。乃至純大苦聚滅。是名大空法經。」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 84, c14 – p.
85, a1-9).
47 Although Reat’s study is excellent, it is unfortunate that apart from the Sanskrit
and Tibetan sources for the sūtra and comparisons with the Pāli, more attention
was not given to the Chinese sources and extant Āgama literature.
48 See Reat (1993: 28); Vaidya (1961: 100): “yo bhikṣavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ
paśyati, sa dharmaṃ paśyati | yo dharmaṃ paśyati, sa buddhaṃ paśyati iti”;
Chinese Śālistamba Sūtra 《佛說稻芉經》卷1：「見十二因緣。即是見[23]
50
法。即是見佛。」(CBETA, T16, no. 709, p. 816, c24-25) [23]法＋（見法）【

元】【明】; and other Chinese translations.
49 The two statements are found in MN 28 i 190-1 and SN 22:87 iii 120 respectively.
50 Śālistamba Sūtra 《佛說稻芉經》卷1：「如是舍利弗。眾生不從此世至於後
世。不從後世復至於[9]此。然有業果因緣報應。不可損減。…」(CBETA,
T16, no. 709, p. 818, b20-26) [9]此＋（世）【宋】【元】【明】. Compare
with Sanskrit in Reat (1993: 64 v36); and Vaidya (1961: 105): “tatra na kaścid
dharmo ‘smāllokāt paralokaṃ saṃkrāmati| asti ca karmaphalaprativijñaptiḥ,
hetupratyayānāmavaikalyāt|”.
51 Śālistamba Sūtra 《佛說稻芉經》卷1：「…無生無作。非有為無住無為。非
心境界寂滅無相。…」(CBETA, T16, no. 709, p. 817, a11-17).
52 Reat (1993: 32, 70); and Vaidya (1961: 100-1, 106): “…asataḥ tucchataḥ
riktataḥ asārataḥ rogataḥ gaṇḍataḥ śalyataḥ aghataḥ anityataḥ duḥkhataḥ
śūnyataḥ anātmataḥ samanupaśyati.”
53 See SĀ 259 《雜阿含經》卷10 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 65, b14-15); SN
22 Khandhasaṃyutta has “aniccato dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato
ābādhato parato palokato suññato anattato ...”. Other references include SĀ 104
(= SN 22:85 Yamaka); SĀ 259 (= SN 22:122 Sīla); SĀ 265 (= SN 22:95 Pheṇa);
SĀ 291 (= SN 12:66 Sammasa); SĀ 864, 867, 869, 870; SĀ 1175 (= SN 35:204
Kiṃsukā); etc.
54 Śālistamba Sūtra 《佛說稻芉經》卷1：「…諸見我見眾生見命見丈夫見吉
不吉見。…」(CBETA, T16, no. 709, p. 818, c6-13); see Reat (1993: 70-2);
Śālistamba Sūtra (Vaidya 1961: 106): “… ātmavādapratisaṃyuktāni sattvavāda
pratisaṃyuktāni jīvavādapratisaṃyuktāni pudgalavādapratisaṃyuktāni kautuka
maṅgalavāda- pratisaṃyuktāni …||”. This passage is from the end of SN 12:20
or SĀ 296,
55 Śālistamba Sūtra 《佛說稻芉經》卷1 (CBETA, T16, no. 709, p. 818, c13-
16). See Reat (1993: 72-73); Vaidya (1961: 106): “yo bhadanta śāriputra
evaṃvidhadharmakṣāntisamanvitaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ samyagavagacchati,
tasya tathāgato ‘rhan samyaksaṃbuddho … samyak saṃbodhiṃ vyākaroti—
samyak saṃbuddho buddho bhaviṣyasīti |”.
56 Dharmaskandhapāda 《阿毘達磨法蘊足論》卷11〈21 緣起品〉：(CBETA,
T26, no. 1537, p. 505, a9-b13).
57 Śāriputra Abhidharma Śāstra 《舍利弗阿毘曇論》卷12〈非問分〉：(CBETA,
T28, no. 1548, p. 606, b17-25).
58 Dharmaskandhapāda 《阿毘達磨法蘊足論》卷11〈21 緣起品〉：「彼如是
知，如是見故。所有世間，各別見趣。謂：我論相應、有情論相應、命者論
相應、吉凶論相應；瑩飾防護，執為己有，有苦有礙，有災有熱。彼於爾
時，得斷遍知。如斷樹根及多羅頂，無復勢力，後永不生。」(CBETA, T26,
no. 1537, p. 505, b6-10). The parallel passage in SĀ 296 《雜阿含經》卷12
(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 84, c3-7).
59 Pṭs i 50-52; English in Ñāṇamoli (1982b: 50-52).
60 SĀ 296 《雜阿含經》卷12：「云何為因緣法。謂此有故彼有。謂緣無明
行。緣行識。…若佛出世。若未出世。此法常住。法住法界。…此等諸法。
法住(*dharmasthititā)．法空(à 法定 *dharmaniyāma; see Yìnshùn 1944: 18)．
法如(*dharmatathatā)．法爾(*dharmatā)．法不離如(*dharmaviparītatathatā)
51
JCBSSL VOL. XI
．法不異如(*dharmāviparītathatā)．審諦(*bhūtatā)．真實(*satyatā / *tattva)
．不顛倒(*aviparyayatā)。如是隨順緣起。是名緣生法。…」(CBETA, T02,
no. 99, p. 84, b14-26). The passage in Dharmaskandhapāda 《阿毘達磨法蘊足
論》卷11〈21 緣起品〉：「苾芻當知。生緣老死。若佛出世。若不出世。
如是緣起法住(*dharmasthititā)法界(*dharmadhātu)。一切如來。自然通達。
等覺宣說。施設建立。分別開示。令其顯了。謂生緣老死。如是乃至。無明
緣行。應知亦爾。此中所有法性(*dharmatā)．法定(*dharmaniyāma)．法理
(*dharmanaya / °-yukti)．法趣(*dharmagati)．是真(*tattva)．是實(*bhūtatā)
．是諦(*satyatā)．是如(*tathatā)．非妄(*avitathatā)．非虛(*amṛṣatā)．非倒
(*aviparītatā)．非異(*aviparyayatā)．是名緣起。」(CBETA, T26, no. 1537, p.
505, a16-22).
61 Dharmaskandhapāda 《阿毘達磨法蘊足論》卷6〈10 聖諦品〉：(CBETA,
T26, no. 1537, p. 480, c23-29; p. 481, a19-25; p. 481, b25-c2; p. 482, a14-20);
four paralleled statements, one for each of the four āryan truths.
62 Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷23 (CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p.
116, b28-c22).
63 Dharmaskandhapāda 《阿毘達磨法蘊足論》卷11〈21 緣起品〉：「此中緣
起、緣已生法，其體雖一，而義有異。謂：…或有緣已生法非緣起者。謂：
無明、行、識、名色、六處、觸、受、愛、取、有、生、老死。」(CBETA,
T26, no. 1537, p. 505, b14-19). Assuming, of course, that Vasumitra adheres
to the Dharmaskandhapāda. This portion at the beginning of the chapter is
unfortunately not within the recently discovered and edited Sanskrit fragments
of the Dharmaskandhapāda.
64 *Vasumitra Bodhisattva Saṃgraha Śāstra 《尊婆須蜜菩薩所集論》卷2：「…
以世間智觀。不等越次取證。頗觀法不觀十二緣起耶。空解脫門等越次取
證。頗觀法及十二緣起。以是緣觀。無願解脫門等越次取證。頗不觀法不觀
十二緣。除上爾取事則其義也。…」(CBETA, T28, no. 1549, p. 735, a27-b14);
and ibid. 卷2：「問起亦是十二緣起。或作是說。若十二緣起。是十二緣起
法耶。或十二緣起法。彼非十二緣起諸起空寂法。或作是說。諸法生時。是
十二緣起諸法。已生十二緣起法。」(CBETA, T28, no. 1549, p. 736, a25-28).
65 Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷110： (CBETA, T27, no.
1545, p. 572, b16-c27).
66 Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷24：(CBETA, T27, no. 1545,
p. 123, c1-p. 124, a8); and also at VbŚ 《阿毘曇毘婆沙論》卷13〈3 人品〉
：(CBETA, T28, no. 1546, p. 97, b9-13).
67 Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷183：「三世三佛陀，能破諸
愁毒，彼皆重正法，恒住於法性。」(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 917, b9-10).
68 Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷126：「…證法性故。」
(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 658, b17-21).
69 Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷33：「無怖者。謂善通達
緣起法故。善修習空解脫門故。不畏惡趣及生死苦。」(CBETA, T27, no.
1545, p. 173, a28-29): = “‘Fearless’ is from having skillfully penetrated into
the Dharma of dependent origination, from having skillfully cultivated the
emptiness entrance to release, they no longer fear evil destinites and the pains of
birth and death.” Also in variant Vibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘曇毘婆沙論》卷18〈4
愛敬品〉：(CBETA, T28, no. 1546, p. 131, b8-12).
52
70 Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷2：(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p.

7, a24-b2).
71 See Bareau (2005: 287) for the basic theses of each school on these three
issues. The thesis numbers (#) are those given in Bareau’s lists, and are found
respectively on pages: Theravāda #21, #55, #186 (pp. 222, 226, 242); Vātsīputrīya
#38 (pg. 116); Sarvāstivāda #6 (pg. 137); Śāriputra Abhidharma #10 (pg. 199);
Mahāsāṃghika #43 (pg. 56); Mahīśāsaka #19 (pg. 188); Dharmagupta #13 (pg.
197); Pūrvaśaila #9 (p. 94); Uttarāpathaka #32 (pg. 258)—note that they are split
on both sides; and the Vibhajyavāda #8 (pg. 175).
72 Bareau (2005: 56 n130): “Vasumitra, thesis 40. Vinītadeva, thesis 25”; and
ibid. (2005: 199 n1066): “Taishō 1548, 633ab.” Given that the source below
for the Mahīśāsaka is from the Pāli where the sources here are all from the
Chinese, Bareau’s rendering here of “*°-svabhāva” from “性” should probably
be “°-tathatā” (as below), or at least “°-tā”.
73 Bareau (2005: 188 n995): “Vasumitra, thesis 17; Vinītadeva, thesis 8.
Kathāvatthu, II, 11; VI, 2 and 6.”
74 Bareau (2005: 197 n1052): “Taishō 1545, p. 198a.”
75 Bareau (2005: 94 n374): “Kathāvatthu, VI, 2.”
76 Bareau (2005: 94 n375): “Kathāvatthu, VI, 3.”
77 Bareau (2005: 175 n917): “Taishō 1545, p. 116c. Cf. L. V. P.: Kośa, III p. 77. See
thesis 9 of the Pūrvaśailas.”
78 Katthāvatthu 19:2 578: “Suññatā saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannāti? Āmantā.
… Suññatā na vattabbā—‘‘saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannā’’ ti? Na hevaṃ
vattabbe…”; etc.. See Bareau (2005: 242).
79 “Neither arising nor ceasing”: See SĀ 293 《雜阿含經》卷12 (CBETA, T02,
no. 99, p. 83, c13-17); no equivalent in SN, though possibly around SN 12
given the relation of other adjacent sūtras. It is similar to both SN 6:1, and also
the opening of DN 15 Mahānidāna Sutta, DN ii 55. “Neither eternalism nor
nihilism”: See SĀ 300 《雜阿含經》卷12 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 85, c11-13);
= SN 12:46 Aññatara (Another); refer Bodhi (2000: 583); SN ii 76.
53
JCBSSL VOL. XI
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Shi Huifeng: “Dependent Origination = Emptiness”—Nāgārjuna’s Innovation?

“Dependent Origination = Emptiness”

In Part 1, we broadly outline the near paradigmatic modern Buddhist

Part 3 continues with the broad range of mainstream sectarian sūtra

or ultimate truths, and classification as conditioned or unconditioned

Keywords: emptiness, dependent origination, Nāgārjuna,

1. Emptiness, Dependent Origination & Nāgārjuna

Here, however, we shall use the more natural diachronic presentation

2.2. It is shown that the Abhidharma dharmavāda system considers

the Pudgalavādins and the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivāda.

It was mainly a number of earlier studies, by the likes of Murti (1955),

1.1. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as Emptiness and Dependent Origination

of Buddhism in India and beyond. However, we would like to draw

With emptiness already the accepted core of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam| ­

The discourse on emptiness has largely given the Prajñā­pāramitā Sūtras

in China, Yìnshùn had already considered that Nāgārjuna’s seminal

Most studies and conclusions regarding “early” Buddhism rely solely

As for such problems in early Buddhism, likewise too for the

By studying the precedents to Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka thought

Madhyamaka teachings on emptiness and dependent origination as a

1.2. Literature Review

One of the few more comprehensive studies in English directly related

words on the matter are: “… ‘emptiness’ is genuinely a teaching of

Another, different kind of apologetic, is found in Dhammajothi’s

It is to be admitted, lamentably, that there are even fewer systematic and

Given the supposed “Mahāyāna vs Hīnayāna” polemical claims on

the emptiness of dharmas (dharma­śūnyatā)” (Lamotte 2001: 836f,

This brings us finally to Yìnshùn’s work An Investigation into Emptiness

Nāgārjuna, including the Mahā­prajñā­pāramitā Upadeśa, which is

As can be seen, previous studies into the broader question of pre-

2. Emptiness & Dependent Origination in Early Buddhism

splits continuing subsequently, we can give an approximate date for

Before we examine the texts, a note on the topic of dependent arising,

The term “profound” or “deep” (gambhīra) was originally imbued with

One way to understand this dual aspect of the “profound”, is to consider

2.2 Emptiness of Self in Dependent Cosmogenesis

a transformation here!” This is “to deny the ātman as the metaphysical

As Gombrich rightly concludes, Jurewicz’s interpretation through the

2.3. Causality and the Middle Way

In the teaching given by Ānanda to Channa (SN 22:90 Channa, SĀ

2.4. Nirvāṇa as “Empty Pacification”

A well known passage in SN and SĀ states that “the destruction of

2.5. The Emptiness Samādhi as Absence of Causes

According to SN and SĀ, the four are: 1. Immeasurable (appamāṇa-°,

(suñña) is the “immeasurable (or unlimited) release”; 2. These same

2.6. The Three Dharma Seals and Characteristics

for a slightly different set of statements with similar overall intention,

One, in the emptiness samādhi they contemplate that each of the

However, and more pertinent for our discussion of emptiness and

from conditions (pratītya­saṃutpanna); is subject to decay

Thus, SĀ 80 is using a fairly standard set of terms used to describe

the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools. Our examination of the three

Lastly, a third group consisting of sections §2.4 and §2.5 makes

3. Emptiness & Dependent Originationin Mainstream Buddhism

As we underscored in our criticisms of the modern academic “discourse

and Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhi­magga, as repre­sentative of this period as

Therefore, in this section, we must pay close attention to textual sources

For the mainstream sectarian period, it is admittedly more natural

What we now have of the Theravāda commentarial tradition by

As such, the Mahāvibhāṣa is the last pre-Nāgārjunian material that we

3.1. Ultimate Emptiness—“Neither Coming Nor Going”

which they come and there is no receptacle (sannicaya) to which they

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam|

The discourse on emptiness has largely given the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras

the emptiness of dharmas (dharmaśūnyatā)” (Lamotte 2001: 836f,

Nāgārjuna, including the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Upadeśa, which is

from conditions (pratītyasaṃutpanna); is subject to decay

and Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, as representative of this period as

The Dharmaskandhapāda is perhaps the earliest of the Northern

The same sūtra cited by Dharmaskandhapāda also provides us with a

As shown in the Dharmaskandhapāda, although both the Dharma of

on the bodhisattva path (as opposed to śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas),