What Makes A Mad̠hab A Mad̠hab: Zaydī Debates On The Structure of Legal Authority

Arabica 59 (2012) 332-371 brill.
nl/arab
What Makes a Mad̠hab a Mad̠hab:

Zaydī debates on the structure of legal authority
Bernard Haykel and Aron Zysow

Princeton University
Abstract
Over the centuries Zaydīs have been called upon to respond to a series of challenges from within
and without to the internal cohesion of their tradition. Noting that Zaydīs did not commonly
follow the legal opinions of their eponym Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 112/740), Sunnī critics challenged
them to justify their adoption of the label Zaydī. The classical response was provided by the
Yemeni imam al-Manṣūr ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥ amza (d. 614/1217), who explained affiliation to Zayd
in theological and political terms. Within Zaydism itself, however, disagreement among leading
imams on questions of law occasioned dissent among their followers. To counter this threat to
unity within their ranks, Zaydī jurists widely adopted the theory that all qualified legal experts
(muǧtahids), including the Zaydī imams, were equally correct. More technical were the questions
that came to surround the character of the legal school (mad̠hab) that became dominant among
Yemeni Zaydīs. These concerned both the source of the legal opinions that made up the doctrine
of the school and the related question of the school’s structure of authority. These historical and
theoretical questions acquired a particular urgency from the 11th/17th century and were popu-
larized with the circulation of Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s (d. 1173/1760) short poem, ʿUqūd al-taškīk,
which directly challenged Yemeni Zaydīs to clarify their legal identity. Equally challenged was
the structure of authority of all the Sunnī mad̠habs, and therefore issues raised here pertain to
Islamic law more generally. This poem evoked a variety of responses in prose and verse, including
a short treatise by the poem’s author, al-Tafkīk li-ʿUqūd al-taškīk. While several respondents
sought to affirm the viability of the legal school, others, notably Ibn al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī
(d. 1182/1769) and Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Šawkānī (d. 1250/1834), argued that it could not be
saved. Their objections to traditional legal authority (taqlīd ) within Zaydism were widely dis-
seminated by 19th- and 20th-century Muslim reformers interested in undermining the Sunnī
schools of law and continue to enjoy great currency.
Keywords
Zaydism, Šīʿism, Legal Authority, School of Law, mad̠hab, iǧtihād, taqlīd, mud̠ākirūn, muḥ aṣsị lūn,
taḫrīǧ, taṣwīb
Résumé
Au cours des siècles, les Zaydites ont été amenés à répondre à une série de remises en cause – du
dedans comme du dehors – dirigées contre la cohésion interne de leur tradition. Remarquant
que les Zaydites ne suivent généralement pas les opinions légales de leur ancêtre éponyme Zayd
b. ʿAlī (m. 112/740), les critiques sunnites ont mis ceux-là au défi de justifier leur adoption du
label « zaydite ». La réponse classique fut avancée par l’imam yéménite al-Manṣūr ʿAbd Allāh b.
Ḥ amza (m. 614/1217), lequel expliqua l’affiliation zaydite en termes théologiques et politiques.
Au sein même du zaydisme, toutefois, des divergences opposant les principaux imams sur des
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/157005812X629284
B. Haykel, A. Zysow / Arabica 59 (2012) 332-371 333
questions légales causèrent des dissensions parmi leurs adeptes. Afin de contrer cette menace à
l’unité dans leurs rangs, les jurists zaydites adoptèrent largement la théorie selon laquelle tous les
experts légalement qualifiés (muǧtahids) – ce qui incluait les imams zaydites – étaient égaux dans
leurs avis. Plus techniques s’avérèrent les questions entourant le caractère de l’école juridique
(mad̠hab) devenue dominante chez les Zaydites yéménites. Elles touchaient tant la source des
opinions légales qui avaient façonné la doctrine de l’école que la question liée de la structure de
l’autorité de l’école. Ces questions, d’ordre historique et théorique, acquirent une acuité particu-
lière à partir du xie/xviie siècle pour être popularisées grâce à la circulation du court poème
d’Isḥāq b. Yūsuf (m. 1173/1760), ʿUqūd al-taškīk, lequel appelait les Zaydites yéménites à clari-
fier leur identité « légale ». Mais c’est également la structure d’autorité de l’ensemble des mad̠habs
sunnites qui se trouva interrogée, si bien que certains points soulevés ici relèvent de la loi
islamique de manière plus générale. Ce poème évoquait une palette de réponses, en prose et en
vers, incluant un court traité de l’auteur du poème, al-Tafkīk li-ʿUqūd al-taškīk. Alors que nom-
bre de défendeurs s’efforcèrent d’affirmer la viabilité de l’école juridique, d’autres, notamment
Ibn al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī (m. 1182/1769) et Muḥammad b. ʿAlī l-Šawkānī (d. 1250/1834),
considérèrent qu’elle ne pouvait être sauvée. Leurs objections à l’autorité légale traditionnelle
(taqlīd ), dans le cadre du zaydisme, furent largement reprises par les réformateurs musulmans
des xixe et xxe siècles qui ambitionnaient de miner les mad̠habs sunnites et continuent, encore
aujourd’hui, à jouir d’un réel crédit.
Mots clés
zaydisme, chiisme, autorité légale, école juridique, mad̠hab, iǧtihād, taqlīd, mud̠ākirūn,
muḥ aṣsị lūn, taḫrīǧ, taṣwīb
If you were to collect the opinions of the school’s eponym in any of these voluminous
treatises of law, you would not even have enough for a single volume.
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Aḥmad al-Šaʿrānī (d. 973/1565)1
The term school (mad̠hab) has a technical sense . . . such that the eponym himself
sometimes has an opinion that goes against what is termed his school.
Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUt ̠aymīn (d. 1421/2001)2
[. . .] each school does not merely comprise the work of a single Imam, but rather
represents a large collectivity of scholars whose research in Sacred Law and its ancillary
disciplines has been characterized by considerable division of labor and specialization
over a very long period of time.
Nuh Ha Mim Keller3
1
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Aḥmad al-Šaʿrānī, Iršād al-ṭālibīn, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya,
1428/2007, p. 183. Al-Šaʿrānī was a major Egyptian Sufi and legal scholar.
2
Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUt ̠aymīn, Šarḥ al-Mumtiʿ ʿalā zād al-mustaqniʿ, Riyadh, Muʾassasat
Āsām, 1994, I, p. 15. Al-ʿUt ̠aymīn was a major Wahhābī Ḥ anbalī scholar from Saudi
Arabia.
3
In the introduction on p. vii of Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri’s Reliance of the Traveller, Evan-
ston, Sunna Books, 1994. Keller is an American-born and traditionally-trained Muslim scholar
who resides in Jordan.
334 B. Haykel, A. Zysow / Arabica 59 (2012) 332-371
Introduction
In the year 1134/1722 the following anonymous verses began to circulate

among Zaydī scholars in Yemen:
O leaders of our sayyids and lamps that illumine the dark recesses of the obscure
Tell us: Do we have a mad̠hab to be followed in speech or in deed?
Or have we been left unattended to graze without a shepherd whom we can fol-
low in the straight path?4
These verses and the various responses they evoked illustrate the elusive char-
acter of the Zaydī tradition, which is constituted by a distinctive blend of
theological, legal and political elements. In this article we will explore the
most important challenges brought against the internal coherence of Zaydism,
both from within and without, as well as a representative range of responses to
these. These challenges include a far-reaching critique of the structure of legal
authority within Zaydism that has obvious implications for Islamic law in
general. A particularly consequential objection posed to the Yemeni Zaydīs
was the 6th/12th century question of the nature of their affiliation to their
eponym Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 122/740) in that the Zaydīs, by and large, did not
follow the reported legal opinions of Zayd, as was the model familiar from the
leading Sunni legal traditions (mad̠āhib). A second pressing question for the
Zaydīs, given the centrality of the imamate, was how to justify legal disagree-
ment among the imams. A third objection of critical importance to Yemeni
Zaydīs was a need for a precise characterization of the dominant legal tradition
that had developed in Yemen, and that was often said to be the school of Yaḥyā
b. al-Ḥ usayn, imam al-Hādī (d. 298/911), the founder of the Zaydī imamate
in Yemen. Lastly, Yemeni critics of traditional legal authority throughout Islam
turned the full force of their general attack on taqlīd against this dominant
school. This last and most severe challenge generated a flurry of disparate
responses, which only illustrate the complexity of the nature of traditional
legal authority in Zaydism and the other schools of law.
The Zaydīs take their name from the learned Zayd b. ʿAlī, a great-grandson
of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and a great-great-grandson of the Prophet Muḥammad.
Zayd’s imamate was of very short duration, a matter of days, as his uprising
against the Umayyads in Kufa was quickly crushed, and Zayd died a martyr.
On questions of law, by far the most significant repository of his learning is
the work known as the Maǧmūʿ of Zayd b. ʿAlī: actually a double work, a legal
compendium and a ḥ adīt̠ compendium. It has been claimed by Zaydīs and
4
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Šawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ, Beirut, Dār al-maʿrifa, n.d., I, p. 135.
some Western scholars to be the earliest work of Islamic law.5 Only a very small
and obscure minority among those who claim to be followers of Zayd came
to adhere to his positions on questions of Islamic law. According to Zaydism
each imam must be qualified as a muǧtahid, and therefore it is not surpris-
ing that the Zaydī tradition has spawned several legal schools, each of them
tracing its origins to an individual imam.6 Of these imams, those with the
most significant historical following were the Medinese Ḥ asanid al-Qāsim b.
Ibrāhīm (d. 246/860), his grandson al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥ usayn (d. 298/911),
and the Caspian imam al-Nāṣir al-Ḥ asan b. ʿAlī l-Uṭrūš (d. 304/917). An
interesting development was that of imams who elaborated on the teachings
of these imams while also putting forth their own body of law.7
Because the great majority of Zaydīs did not follow Zayd on legal matters,
Sunni critics of Zaydism, assuming that Zaydism was principally a legal school,
were led to question on what basis Zaydīs appealed to the authority of Zayd
when they did not adhere to his legal teachings. The classic response to this
question is found in the large and discursive work of the imam al-Manṣūr
ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥ amza (d. 614/1217) entitled Kitāb al-Šāfī. In this work, the
imam argues with a Šāfiʿī Ašʿarite interlocutor, ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. Abī l-Qabāʾil,8
who among various other points raised this question. Al-Manṣūr’s response
has continued to be cited with approval by Zaydīs until our day. His answer
identifies certain theological teachings, such as the justice and unity of God as
well as the imamate of ʿAlī and his family, as the essential constituents of Zaydī
identity. While the true source of these teachings is ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, the label
Zaydī is appropriate because of Zayd’s dramatic uprising against tyranny. Any
Šīʿīte who approves of Zayd’s conduct and follows in his footsteps is a Zaydī.9
In Kitāb al-Šāfī, al-Manṣūr also explicitly addresses the matter of the Zaydīs
not following Zayd in law. It would seem, he says, that his interlocutor, the
Šāfiʿī faqīh, has seen the compendium on law of Zayd b. ʿAlī (containing
mostly ritual law) and noted that not all the Zaydī jurists agree with the views
expressed by Zayd therein. The faqīh has incorrectly assumed that adherence
to the imam’s legal doctrine is fundamental to the label Zaydī. In fact it is not.
5
Cf. GAS, I, p. 552-6.
6
The development of such schools depends on recognizing the validity of following a
deceased muǧtahid, on which see Ibn Miftāḥ, Šarḥ al-Azhār, Cairo, al-Tamaddun, 1332/1914,
I, p. 14-5.
7
Al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr, Hidāyat al-rāġibīn ilā mad̠hab al-ʿitra l-ṭāhirīn, Saada, Markaz
ahl al-bayt li-l-dirāsāt al-islāmiyya, 1423/2002, p. 275.
8
For further information on Ibn Abī l-Qabāʾil see [al-Ḥ ibšī] al-Ḥ abšī’s Muʾallafāt ḥ ukkām
al-Yaman, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1979, p. 44.
9
ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥ amza, Kitāb al-Šāfī, Sanaa, Maktabat al-Yaman al-kubrā, 1406/1986,
II, p. 130-1.
It is theology, rather than law, that is fundamental. And in theology the doc-
trines of the Zaydīs go back to ʿAlī and are undisputed among them. In any
case, al-Manṣūr continues, even a Šāfiʿī or a Ḥ anafī would be hard pressed to
defend his affiliation if he had to show absolute correspondence between the
legal views of the eponym and those of their followers, a point that will prove
significant in later stages of the controversy.10
Imam al-Manṣūr’s reply is, as we have suggested, the classic explanation of
affiliation to Zaydism. What makes one a Zaydī are one’s theological and
political positions, with perhaps different emphases on one or the other. Or to
put the matter negatively, “the Zaydīs differ from the Šāfiʿīs and Ḥ anafīs in
this: that the latter are affiliated to Abū Ḥ anīfa and al-Šāfiʿī by following them
in furūʿ.”11 This is a quotation from Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā l-Murtaḍā, the imam
al-Mahdī (d. 840/1436), author of the standard work of Zaydī law in Yemen,
Kitāb al-Azhār.
Despite the insistence of Zaydīs that their movement was not founded on
legal doctrine, competition between the followers of the various legal tradi-
tions that emerged among them threatened at times to undermine the politi-
cal aims of Zaydism. A well-known example is friction in the Caspian region
in the 4th/10th century between the followers of al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm and his
grandson al-Hādī on the one hand and those of al-Nāṣir al-Uṭrūš on the other.
Matters reached the deplorable point that each faction accused the other of
grave error (ḍāll ) if not outright unbelief.12 Several solutions were offered to
resolve these frictions. One was to claim that in fact the imams were in agree-
ment despite their apparent differences.13 But the solution that proved to be
the most durable and influential was to accept the differences between the
leading Zaydī jurists as real and to argue for their equal authority. This doc-
trine, that of the infallibility of the muǧtahid (taṣwīb), enjoyed great currency
among many Basran Muʿtazilīs, and along with other features of Muʿtazilī
10
ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥ amza, Kitāb al-Šāfī, III, p. 228.
11
Al-Mahdī Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Murtaḍā, al-Munya wa-l-amal fī šarḥ al-Milal wa-l-niḥ al,
Beirut, Dār al-nadā, 1410/1990, p. 96. For a typical contemporary explanation of Zaydism
along the same lines, see the answers of Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥ ūt ̠ī (d. 1431/2010) to questions posed
by Muḥammad ʿIzzān, p. 5-6. Here al-Ḥ ūt ̠ī stresses that affiliation to Zaydism is not based on
taqlīd as one would find in legal questions (hād̠ihi l-nisba laysat nisbat taqlīd ), but rather on
theological and political convictions. We are grateful to Muḥammad ʿIzzān for providing us with
a copy of this text.
12
Cf. Wilferd Madelung (ed.), Aḫbār aʾimmat al-zaydiyya, Beirut, Franz Steiner, 1987,
p. 114-5.
13
Cf. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, Sanaa, al-Maktaba l-yamaniyya,
1985, p. 130-1.
doctrine, came to be widely accepted by both Caspian and subsequently

Yemeni Zaydīs.14
Not only did the doctrine of infallibilism15 prove practically useful in unify-
ing the ranks of the believers, it also became for many centuries a constitutive
element in Zaydī self-understanding. In fact we find this doctrine invoked on
numerous occasions in response to the persistent question: Who are the
Zaydīs? And the related question: On what basis do they claim to follow Zayd
when they do not adhere to his teachings in law? A rather full answer to these
questions can be found in a short treatise of the imam al-Muʾayyad bi-Llāh
Yaḥyā b. Ḥ amza (d. 749/1349). According to this imam, the Zaydīs are
unquestionably so-called because of their affiliation to the imam Zayd b. ʿAlī
since the label of Zaydī was unknown before his day. It appropriately applies
to one who shares Zayd’s theological doctrine, including his views on the
imamate. Whoever acknowledges these elements of belief is a Zaydī. Strictly
speaking one’s legal affiliation is irrelevant to the applicability of the label
Zaydī because the legal opinions of all qualified muǧtahids are correct. There
is thus no obstacle to imams subsequent to Zayd exercising full legal authority
in their own name. Although the infallibility of the muǧtahids is not raised to
the level of theology by this imam, and thus it is not essential to the definition
of Zaydism, it is nonetheless listed by him as one of the distinctive points of
agreement among the Zaydīs of his day.16
Zaydīs came to identify themselves essentially as a theological movement
with distinct political goals in light of the doctrine of the imamate. The doc-
trine of infallibilism that came to be widely held among them enabled them
to dismiss criticisms about their failure to follow their eponym Zayd in law as
misplaced, and, in general, to relegate the legal dimension of their tradition to
a secondary place. While the definition of Zaydism in terms of theology has
remained constant until our day, the following centuries brought intense scru-
tiny to the questions of legal authority within the school which remained to
14
Al-Muʾayyad Yaḥyā b. Ḥ amza (d. 749/1349) claimed that taṣwīb was the view of the Zaydī
imams and that there was a consensus going back to the Companions of the Prophet on the
matter (cf. Yaḥyā b. Ḥ amza, al-Intiṣār ʿalā ʿulamāʾ al-amṣār, Sanaa, IZbACF, 1422/2002, I,
p. 162-6). See also al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr who explicitly identifies infallibilism as the
position of the imams al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm, al-Hādī and al-Nāṣir (al-Hādī l-Wāzīr, Hidāyat
al-rāġibīn, p. 356). The importation of taṣwīb to Yemen occurred in the 6th/12th century.
15
A fuller discussion of the topic of infallibilism of the muǧtahids may be found in the
unpublished dissertation by Aron Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: The Typology of Islamic Legal
Theory, PhD dissertation, Harvard University 1984, p. 463-83. The infallibilism at issue extends
only to the products of iǧtihād and is not to be confused with the full-blown infallibility con-
veyed by the term ʿiṣma.
16
Al-Muʾayyad Yaḥyā b. Ḥ amza, al-Risāla l-Wāziʿa, Sanaa, Maktabat Dār al-turāt ̠, 1990,
p. 50-6.
be adequately dealt with. These questions were forced upon Zaydīs by both
internal and external critics of the entire phenomenon of legal schools. In this
sense the issues that the Zaydīs were called upon to address have significance
to adherents of the other legal schools but unquestionably acquired a particu-
lar urgency for the Zaydīs.
A striking peculiarity of the legal tradition that came to dominate among
the Zaydīs of Yemen is that its precise locus of authority remained elusive to
its own adherents. On the one hand, we have the popular view held by virtu-
ally all laymen and even some scholars that the basis of the tradition was the
legal doctrine of imam al-Hādī himself, thus the common appellation Hādawī
for this legal tradition. On this view, the development of their school of law
would closely parallel that familiar among Sunnis. On the other hand, there
were those who offered a far more complex account of the bases of the school,
namely that it was the product of a collective effort to identify legal principles
shared by a select group of imams—including al-Hādī—which were then
applied to selecting the soundest legal opinions within the teachings of the
Prophet’s family. In other words, the mad̠hab is not founded on the opinions
of a single imam but on the underlying principles of a collectivity of imams.
These opposed understandings of the character of the mad̠hab seem to have
co-existed for centuries.
A representative of the first position, that the mad̠hab is founded on the
opinions of imam al-Hādī, is al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr (d. 822/1419). This
author addressed the allegation that imam al-Hādī had concocted his legal
system from scratch to achieve renown. While wrestling with the precise loca-
tion of the authority of imam al-Hādī within the larger Zaydī tradition, he
clearly accepts without question the identification of the mad̠hab predomi-
nant in Yemen as that of imam al-Hādī.17 A development of his answer is
found in the work of the poet and scholar ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Mut ̣ahhar al-Ḥ amzī
(d. after 910/1504)18 who saw fit to point out that the significance of the
term “the school” (al-mad̠hab) in common use was “unclear” to many. They
used the term without understanding what was meant by it. Al-Ḥ amzī goes
on to say
17
Al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr, Nihāyat al-tanwīh fī izhāq al-tamwīh, Saada, Markaz ahl
al-bayt li-l-dirāsāt al-islāmiyya, 1421/2000, p. 224-77 (p. 276: wa-qad iḫtāra aʾimmatunā
l-mutaʾaḫḫirūn mad̠hab al-Hādī ʿalayhi l-salām wa-qarrarūhu wa-ʿtamadūhu wa-had̠d̠abūhu
wa-šayyadūhu wa-ʿalayhi maḍā ʿulamāʾ al-Yaman wa-fursān al-farāʾiḍ wa-l-sunan). Also see
al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr, Hidāyat al-rāġibīn, p. 261. The challenge for Ibn al-Wazīr was to
specify the position of imam l-Hādī vis-à-vis his predecessors in the imamate and his authority
relative to subsequent living imams.
18
Aḥmad b. Ṣāliḥ b. Abī l-Riǧāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr wa-maǧmaʿ al-buḥ ūr, Saada, Markaz ahl
al-bayt li-l-dirāsāt al-islāmiyya, 1425/2004, III, p. 136-44.
often it is falsely conceived that what is meant by it is the mad̠hab of al-Hādī, but
this is not so. For we find it said in legal texts popular today that al-Hādī holds
this opinion, but the mad̠hab is something else. And we also find it said in the
books that this is the opinion of scholars of the mad̠hab in opposition to al-Hādī.
This shows that what is meant by the mad̠hab is not [the teachings] of al-Hādī
himself but the opinions held by al-Muʾayyad bi-Llāh [Aḥmad b. al-Ḥ usayn], his
brother al-Nāṭiq Abū Ṭālib [Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥ usayn] and Qāḍī Zayd [b. Muḥammad
al-Kalārī] on the basis of al-Hādī’s teachings.19
In this way, al-Ḥ amzī could readily dispel the confusion as to how the mad̠hab
could conflict with the expressed opinion of imam al-Hādī.
The chief problem with this relatively straightforward account is the citation
of the opinions of numerous other Zaydī imams, notably some of the predeces-
sors of al-Hādī, in the legal corpus of the mad̠hab. The complex composite
character of the legal school was in fact already regarded as adumbrated in the
preface to Kitāb al-Taḥ rīr of the Caspian imam al-Nāṭiq Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥ usayn
(d. 424/1032), who makes reference there to the legal teachings of al-Hādī’s
grandfather, al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 246/860).20 This composite account spe-
cifically addresses the problem of the frequent reference to the opinions of
numerous imams, and even to Sunni jurists, within the standard legal works of
the school. It is noteworthy that the most popular Zaydī legal text, the Šarḥ
al-Azhār of Ibn Miftāḥ, cites a welter of authorities and thereby manifests a
striking surface complexity that obviously confounded many of its students.
An account of the composite nature of the mad̠hab had already developed
by the time of the famous imam al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad (d. 1029/1620).
Al-Qāsim’s brief exposition came in response to a question specifically address-
ing the nature of the contents of the Kitāb al-Azhār itself.
Question: Are these contents the mad̠hab of a specific imam, such as al-Hādī or
Zayd b. ʿAlī or some other imam? And is the imām al-Mahdī [Ibn al-Murtaḍā,
author of al-Azhār] simply reporting the law according to the mad̠hab of that
specific imam, as would appear to be the case? If the answer to this is yes, then
why does al-Mahdī pronounce as weak the opinion of al-Hādī in some places and
say that the mad̠hab is some other view? And why then are the doctrines of
al-Azhār sometimes considered weak on the basis of an objection from the author
of al-Fatḥ or an opinion endorsed by the imam Šaraf al-Dīn? Please be so kind to
clarify these questions.
19
From al-Ḥ amzī’s Rayāḥ īn al-anfās as quoted in ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Ḥ usayn Dulāma’s Šud̠ūr
al-d̠ahab fī taḥ qīq al-mad̠hab, p. 4. We would like to thank Muḥammad ʿIzzān for kindly provid-
ing a typescript of this work. Cf. Ḥ usayn Aḥmad al-Sayāġī, Uṣūl al-mad̠hab al-zaydī l-yamanī
wa-qawāʿiduhu, Sanaa, Maktabat Ġ amḍān, 1404/1984, p. 27-8.
20
Cf. Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥ usayn al-Hārūnī, Kitāb al-Taḥ rīr, Sanaa, Maktabat Badr, 1418/1997,
p. 43.
Answer: The mad̠hab, the opinions of which are contained in the al-Azhār,
consists of principles set forth and adopted by the muḥ aṣsị lūn as the mad̠hab on
the basis of what they understood to be the legal opinions of al-Qāsim, his son
Muḥammad, al-Hādī and his two sons, Muḥammad and Aḥmad, in their fatwas
and compilations on all the chapters of fiqh. And they determined the mad̠hab to
be all those questions of substantive law in each chapter which were subsumed
under those principles. As far as the opinions of earlier imams like Zayd b. ʿAlī
and [Ǧ aʿfar] al-Ṣādiq and their like and others, the muḥ aṣsị lūn adopted as the
mad̠hab those which correspond with the principles.
In explanation of the second part of the question as to why the opinion of the
jurist to whom the mad̠hab is attributed is sometimes regarded as weak, the answer
is that the mad̠hab consists of those principles and the legal opinions that corres-
pond to them, as has just been stated. And so pronouncing an opinion weak
simply stems from its conflicting with those principles.21
The question that al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad addressed was a persistent

one, and when it came before his son, the imam al-Mutawakkil Ismāʿīl
(d. 1087/1676), the imam directed the scholar Yaḥyā b. Ibrāhīm al-Ǧ aḥḥāf
(d. 1102/1691) to answer. Al-Ǧ aḥḥāf ’s long response, which appears to incor-
porate that of al-Qāsim, is significantly more detailed and provides a frame-
work for understanding the authority structure of the mad̠hab. According to
his response the school’s teachings rest on the legal principles of five Zaydī
imams, a family cluster centered on imam al-Hādī, his grandfather, uncle and
two sons. Taking the underlying principles of these five imams—the so-called
ahl al-nuṣūṣ—as their starting point, the muḥ aṣsị lūn scholars brought coher-
ence to their disparate legal opinions in the exercise of what is termed naẓar.22
On matters for which they could find no explicit opinion of these imams,
they looked to earlier imams, such as Zayd b. ʿAlī and Ǧ aʿfar al-Ṣādiq among
others, and included these in the mad̠hab insofar as they were consistent
with the mad̠hab’s underlying principles. Where no answer could be found in
the legal corpus of recognized imams, the muḥ aṣsị lūn applied the principles
of the school to the primary sources of Islamic law—the Qurʾān, Sunna and
21
Ibn Miftāḥ, Šarḥ al-Azhār, I, p. 45. The imam Šaraf al-Dīn is al-Mutawakkil Yaḥyā (d.
965/1558), the grandson of the author of the al-Azhār, a text that he re-worked in his own
al-At̠mār. The al-Fatḥ al-ġaffār of the jurist Yaḥyā b. Muḥammad al-Miqrāʾī (d. 990/1582) is a
commentary on the al-At̠mār.
22
The collections of the principles (qawāʿid ) of the mad̠hab appear in list form in several
sources: that of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Šarafī in Ibn Miftāḥ, Šarḥ al-Azhār, I, p. 46-8; an
annotated version of this list of 117 principles appears in Muḥammad Aḥmad Muḥammad
al-Kibsī’s al-Furūq al-wāḍiḥ a l-bahiyya bayna l-firaq al-imāmiyya wa-bayna l-firqa l-zaydiyya,
Sanaa, Maṭābiʿ Šarikat al-adwiya, 1413/1992, p. 68-98. Here other lists are briefly mentioned. A
list of 89 numbered principles, taken from Ḥ asan b. ʿAbd Allāh Dulāma discussed below, can be
found in al-Sayāġī, Uṣūl al-mad̠hab al-zaydī l-yamanī wa-qawāʿiduhu, p. 29-35.
consensus—to elaborate answers. The period of the muḥ aṣsị lūn, headed by the
two Caspian imams, al-Muʾayyad bi-Llāh Aḥmad b. al-Ḥ usayn (d. 411/1020)
and his brother al-Nāṭiq Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥ usayn (d. 424/1032),
extended to the time of the Yemeni Zaydī imam al-Manṣūr ʿAbd Allāh b.
Ḥ amza (d. 614/1217). From his day on, the period of the muḥ aṣsị lūn gave
way to that of the mud̠ākirūn. Their activity—also labeled naẓar—consisted
largely of harmonizing the work of the muḥ aṣsị lūn. In short, the structure of
the mad̠hab is tripartite, a foundation consisting of the ahl al-nuṣūṣ, whose
work was clarified and elaborated by the muḥ aṣsị lūn, in turn subject to the
harmonizing efforts of the mud̠ākirūn.23
Ǧ aḥḥāf is at pains to provide the elements of a justification of this rather
complex structure. The activity of the muḥ aṣsị lūn, according to Ǧ aḥḥāf, con-
sisted of (i) recognition of the five imams who constituted the ahl al-nuṣūṣ;
(ii) harmonizing the opinions of these imams; (iii) in the event none of these
opinions provided an answer to a problem, locating an adequate solution in
the opinions of other imams; (iv) and where no answer could be found in this
larger corpus, arriving at an answer through a direct engagement with the
primary sources of revelation.
In all these activities, the muḥ aṣsị lūn benefitted from the implicit approval
of the imams of the ahl al-nuṣūṣ. In the mutual recognition that each imam
granted his predecessors, Ǧ aḥḥāf found the basis for an underlying unity of
legal method. The deeper principles identified by the muḥ aṣsị lūn thus provide
a more authoritative version of the mad̠hab than the legal opinions of any sin-
gle imam and entitle the muḥ aṣsị lūn to treat the solutions that they have put
forth as virtually endorsed by every imam. Essentially then, the muḥ aṣsị lūn,
taking as their starting point a disparate body of legal opinion, identified the
shared principles underlying that body of law which they then applied to the
effort of producing a coherent and adequate corpus of Zaydī law, the mad̠hab.
This mad̠hab consisted of the original corpus of legal opinions after a pro-
cess involving the elimination of those opinions that were not consistent with
the shared principles. It was also enhanced by the adoption of legal opinions
from a larger corpus as needed, and, when required, fresh opinions were
incorporated from an examination of primary sources in light of the mad̠hab’s
principles.
On this account the implicit endorsement by all the imams of the ahl
al-nuṣūṣ of the principles of the mad̠hab justified the attribution of any opin-
ion adopted to each and every imam, whether or not he explicitly held it. As
23
Quoted in Dulāma’s Šud̠ūr al-d̠ahab fī taḥ qīq al-mad̠hab, p. 4-6. A parallel quotation of
the Ǧ aḥḥāf response from Šud̠ūr al-d̠ahab is reproduced in the introduction to the 1424/2003
edition of Ibn Miftāḥ’s Šarḥ al-Azhār, Saada, Maktabat al-turāt ̠ al-islāmī, I, p. 11-3.
Ǧ aḥḥāf explains, even when a given imam has not expressed an opinion on a
matter “the fact that the opinion adopted is subsumed under the principles of
the mad̠hab means that it is as if each imam explicitly holds it (lammā nṭabaqat
ʿalayhā tilka l-uṣūl ṣāra kull wāḥ id minhum ka-l-nāṣṣ ʿalayhā).” The authority of
the principles is such that even when they are used to eliminate as weak the
express opinion of one of the imams, that process enjoys the implicit approval
of the imam in question. This remarkable effort to justify the authority of the
dominant mad̠hab in Yemeni Zaydism can be seen as an ultimate stage in the
long-held aspiration of Zaydīs for a legal unity that would transcend the con-
flicting opinions of the individual imams. The unity achieved was that of an
abstract body of legal principles that did not rest on the authority of any par-
ticular imam. In fact, the legal doctrine of the individual imams was sub-
merged in a conglomerate unity which enjoyed the implicit approval of the
ahl al-nuṣūṣ, and by extension of the Zaydī tradition as a whole. The principles
are invested with such authority that where none of the opinions of the imams
can be subsumed under them, the muḥ aṣsị lūn have no alternative but to reject
these and look elsewhere.24
By all accounts what appears to be the fullest exposition of the growth of
this corporate version of the mad̠hab comes from ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Qāsim
al-Šahārī’s (d. 1190/1776) Bulūġ al-arab wa-kunūz al-d̠ahab fī maʿrifat
al-mad̠hab, a book-length study of the question. While relying, by his own
admission, on what he terms the brief account of Ǧ aḥḥāf, Šahārī attempts to
provide an historical explanation of why the mad̠hab emerged when it did.
According to him the immediate background for the work of the muḥ aṣsị lūn
was the enmity that had arisen between the feuding camps of the followers of
al-Qāsim/al-Hādī and al-Nāṣir, mentioned above. This conflict was unprece-
dented in earlier Zaydism and reflected ignorance by the uneducated Zaydī
masses of the respect that the imams accorded each other. The elaboration of
a unified mad̠hab was in part intended to provide the ordinary Zaydī with a
doctrine that would bridge the unfortunate divisions that had emerged within
the community and forge a single legal tradition that would reflect the unity
of Zaydism at the theological plane. According to Šahārī, the selection of the
family of the imams who constituted the ahl al-nuṣūṣ took as its starting point
those imams who already enjoyed a substantial following at that time. But
Šahārī also suggests, while admitting that he cannot offer a definitive account
of the origins of the mad̠hab, that its development would in any case have
been required by the need to address constantly arising questions. The legal
doctrine of no single imam would have been sufficient to respond to such
24
Ibn Miftāḥ’s Šarḥ al-Azhār, I, p. 11-3.
contingencies, even had full reports of their teachings been accessible, which
was often not the case. The collective school moreover facilitated the practice
of some Zaydīs of following the jurists of the Prophet’s family as a group,
rather than any single imam (mutamassik bi-ǧamīʿ ṣafwat al-ʿitra).25
The rich and complex exposition of Šahārī’s work must be placed in its
historical setting. His book not only attempts to explain the structure of
authority in the mad̠hab, as did the earlier accounts which we have examined,
but also has a clear polemical purpose. Beginning in the 9th/15th century,
there emerged in Yemen scholars from within Zaydism who in the first instance
called for a revision of school doctrine in light of what they considered to be
the vastly more reliable Ḥ adīt̠ found in the well-known Sunni collections. The
first and perhaps most brilliant of the Yemeni Zaydīs to call for this is
Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr (d. 840/1436), the brother of the aforemen-
tioned al-Hādī l-Wazīr.26 Muḥammad Ibn al-Wazīr’s program was adopted and
popularized by a series of now famous Yemeni scholars, including Muḥammad
b. Ismāʿīl al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 1182/1769) and Muḥammad b. ʿAlī l-Šawkānī
(d. 1250/1834), who increasingly came to call for a renunciation of taqlīd and
the consequent rejection of all existing schools of law. Prominent in Šahārī’s
book is his clear interest in establishing the grandeur of the traditional Zaydī
mad̠hab and the extraordinary contribution of generations of Yemeni scholars
to its elaboration.27 He thus devotes large sections of his work to listing the
many scholarly families, true to traditional Zaydism, who participated in
this endeavor. He is then able to contrast the meticulously scrutinized doc-
trine of the traditional school with the less credible claims made for the author-
ity of Sunni ḥ adīt̠. Because even the most careful scrutiny of Ḥ adīt̠ could not
arrive at more than probable opinion (ẓann) of authenticity, Šahārī was able to
25
Šahārī’s account of the role of al-Nāṣir al-Uṭrūš is much fuller than earlier accounts as
would be demanded by his historical focus. For him the problem of the status of al-Nāṣir is par-
ticularly acute because his explanation of which imams were selected as the ahl al-nuṣūṣ claims
that these were the imams with a following at the time. He thus needs to justify the exclusion of
the popular imam al-Naṣir from this list. Cf. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Šahārī, Bulūġ al-arab wa-kunūz
al-d̠ahab fī maʿrifat al-mad̠hab, Sanaa, IZbACF, 1423/2002, p. 343-4. In some manuscripts this
work has the title al-Maqṣad al-aqrab ilā maʿrifat al-mad̠hab.
26
His leading book on the topic is the multi-volume polemic entitled al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-
qawāṣim fī l-d̠abb ʿan sunnat Abī l-Qāsim, a work he himself abridged in al-Rawḍ al-bāsim. Both
have been edited and published.
27
For a modern exponent of the same view see al-Kibsī’s al-Furūq al-wāḍiḥ a l-bahiyya. On
p. 60-1 of this work, Kibsī says: “the elaboration of the mad̠hab in Yemen for 800 years permits
one to compare the scrutiny that the jurists applied to every single question of Zaydī law to that
of a builder who in constructing an edifice does not lay down a single stone without minutely
examining, polishing and weighing it. The result is that Zaydī law is now a towering and com-
plete structure, the integrity of which cannot be shaken by the raging winds of skepticism. It is
the foundation of the comprehensive and enduring constitution of blessed Yemen.”
counter with the plausible claim that the intellectual effort that had been for
centuries expended in the elaboration of the mad̠hab had produced a degree of
probability that could trump that of its critics.
Jettisoning the Mad̠hab: the Two-Pronged Attack of al-Qāsim

b. Muḥammad
Despite this impressive and remarkable account of the structure of authority

in the mad̠hab, it proved unable entirely to withstand continuing two-pronged
attacks in Yemen on the infallibilism of the muǧtahids and on taqlīd itself.
Some idea of the theoretical confusion which still surrounded adherence to
Zaydī law can be gathered from a query posed to the imam al-Qāsim b.
Muḥammad and which is worth quoting in extenso:
What is the status of an utter layman who acquired some learning on ritual and
civil law and then thought that [adherence to this] was what God commanded
him to do and that it constituted the only version of the Zaydī mad̠hab and was
completely undisputed among them? Subsequently he became aware of their disa-
greement and the conditions that governed taqlīd and the status of the muǧtahid
and the follower and for being bound to the doctrine of a muǧtahid (iltizām) and
other such matters. For a while he acted in accordance with the views in the Kitāb
al-Azhār but without intending to be bound by them. Later, he took upon him-
self adherence to the mad̠hab of the Ahl al-Bayt collectively (ǧumlatan) in the belief
that this was a safer course (aḥ waṭ) and preferable in that he could choose among
the opinions of the imams and act according to the opinion that he chose when
there was a dispute. Moreover in so doing, he thought that he was free to move
from the opinion that he had acted upon to another that judged differently.
However, he afterwards came to learn that once he had acted according to the
opinion of any one of them it became binding upon him. So he then reverted to
what he had been doing originally before he learned that there was any disagree-
ment and continued along this course in uncertainty and confusion as to what he
was up to, sometimes saying: “I adopted the mad̠hab of a particular imam”, and
at other times saying: “I am bound by my initial adherence”. Throughout all of
this he believed that every muǧtahid was correct because of the arguments offered
by the proponents of infallibilism. However, when he became familiar with the
arguments of those against infallibilism, he was upset and confused as to what to
do. Despite all this, he was not averse to adhering to the mad̠hab of al-Hādī, or
some other of the leading imams if this was available to him, because al-Hādī is
the fountain of knowledge and sound judgment from whose ocean of knowledge
one draws and the respected imams are all agreed that he was a man of vast lear-
ning and that those who came after him did not reach his level.28
28
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, Maǧmūʿ kutub wa-rasāʾil, Sanaa, IZbACF, 1424/2003, I, p. 268-9.
Most immediately striking about this question is the degree to which well-
known disputes in Islamic legal theory seem to have engaged an ordinary
Zaydī believer in this period.29 Underlying the options that lay before this
believer is the dispute that had emerged between those Zaydīs who endorsed
the infallibilism of the muǧtahids (muṣawwiba), specifically the leading Zaydī
imams, and those who favored the view that only one legal opinion based on
iǧtihād could be correct (muḫaṭtị ʾa). The former position, which in our case
was the initial understanding of this confused Zaydī, was, as we have seen, that
which came to be dominant first among the Caspian and then among the
Yemeni Zaydīs. Instrumental in reviving the latter position, which he claimed
to be that of the majority of Zaydī imams, was imam al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad,
to whom the question above is addressed.30 For al-Qāsim this position on the
results of iǧtihād, namely that there was only one correct answer, was an inte-
gral element in what he understood to be a revival of authentic Zaydism before
the inroads of Basran Muʿtazilism in the 6th/12th century.31
Once this confused Zaydī came to know of disagreement among the Zaydī
imams, as a committed infallibilist he was torn between following the doctrine
of the Kitāb al-Azhār and following the Ahl al-Bayt as a collectivity. Infalli-
bilism clearly is necessary for the viability of the second option, which involves
following the consensus of the imams where they agree, but freely choosing
from any one of their opinions where they disagree. But even the former
option, that of following the Kitāb al-Azhār, would seem to be based on an
underlying application of infallibilism in the process of determining this cor-
porate doctrine known as the school and identified with the teachings of the
Kitāb al-Azhār.32 Interestingly a third option that apparently did not attract
the confused Zaydī at this stage in his travails was to follow consistently the
opinions of a single imam. It was only after he became familiar with the argu-
ments against infallibilism and in favor of fallibilism that he inclined to adopt
this third option. Perhaps not surprisingly he was particularly attracted to the
idea of following imam al-Hādī who enjoyed the greatest reputation for
29
Our discussion does not address the rules for adherence (iltizām) raised in the question. On
these see Ibn Miftāḥ, Šarḥ al-Azhār, I, p. 18-23.
30
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, Kitāb al-Asās li-ʿaqāʾid al-akyās, Saada, Maktabat al-turāt ̠
al-islāmī, 1415/1994, p. 141. Al-Qāsim’s attribution of fallibilism to the Zaydī imams is obvi-
ously correct for the leading early imams, including al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥ usayn.
31
Cf. Wilferd Madelung, Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen,
Berlin, de Gruyter, 1965, p. 220.
32
The principle of the infallibility of the muǧtahids appears as the eighth principle on the list
in al-Sayāġī, Uṣūl al-mad̠hab al-zaydī l-yamanī wa-qawāʿiduhu, p. 30. Significantly, it does not
appear on the list of qawāʿid provided by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Šarafī, a disciple of the strict
fallibilist the imam al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad. Cf. Ibn Miftāḥ, Šarḥ al-Azhār, I, p. 46-8.
learning in the Zaydī-Yemeni tradition. Because there is only one correct

answer on the theory of fallibilism, in following al-Hādī the believer could be
confident that he had chosen the course that was calculated to lead him to the
correct answer most often on account of this imam’s superior learning.33
Behind al-Qāsim’s response to the question above is his firm commitment
to fallibilism and his rejection of the taqlīd of any Zaydī imam when there is
disagreement of opinion (iḫtilāf ).34 His rejection of infallibilism would imme-
diately rule out the first and second options that confronted the confused
Zaydī, that is to follow the opinion of the Kitāb al-Azhār or to choose freely
among the conflicting opinions of the imams. The third option, to follow the
views of a single imam, in this case al-Hādī, is rejected by al-Qāsim on the
basis of his general attack on taqlīd, which like infallibilism would inevitably
lead to a fragmentation of Muslims in religion, something prohibited by the
Qurʾān. In addition to finding taqlīd objectionable, al-Qāsim singles out for
special criticism the confusion introduced into Zaydī law by the characteristic
mad̠hab practice of taḫrīǧ (elaboration of a muǧtahid ’s doctrine on the basis of
his underlying principles). Taḫrīǧ, a practice we have already encountered in
the work of the muḥ aṣsị lūn, is the lynchpin of the account of how the mad̠hab
came to be what is found in a standard work like the Kitāb al-Azhār. In his
response al-Qāsim readily locates important points of legal doctrine in which
the mad̠hab flatly rejects the express opinion of their foundational imams. He
thus puts this familiar practice of the school in a particularly unfavorable
light.35 Al-Qāsim quotes with apparent approval the view of his predecessor,
the imam al-Nāṣir al-Ḥ asan b. ʿAlī (d. 1024/1615), at the time a prisoner of
the Ottomans in Turkey, that the practice of taḫrīǧ was a reprehensible innova-
tion taken over into Zaydism from the four Sunni mad̠habs. Al-Nāṣir in fact
alleged that taḫrīǧ appeared among the followers of the four Sunni eponyms
who found their express legal doctrines insufficient and did not regard them-
selves as free to look outside their schools for solutions.36
Instead of following al-Hādī, or any other imam, al-Qāsim, appealing to
the authority of al-Hādī himself, calls for a direct examination of competing
opinions in light of the Qurʾān and Sunna (al-ʿarḍ ʿalā kitāb Allāh wa-sunnat
rasūlihi maʿa l-iḫtilāf ).37 Where the believer lacks the learning to undertake
33
For a typical discussion on the obligation to follow the most learned muǧtahid, see Ibn
Miftāḥ, Šarḥ al-Azhār, I, p. 15.
34
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, Maǧmūʿ, I, p. 261.
35
Cf. al-Ḥ usayn b. al-Qāsim, Kitāb Hidāyat al-ʿuqūl, n.p., al-Maktaba l-islāmiyya, 1401/1981,
II, p. 680 (marginal gloss).
36
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, al-Iršād ilā sabīl al-rašād, Sanaa, Dār al-ḥikma l-yamaniyya,
1417/1996, p. 119-20.
37
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, Maǧmūʿ, p. 270.
this examination, al-Qāsim directs him to practice precaution (al-ʿamal bi-l-

aḥ waṭ).38 Al-Qāsim’s positive recommendations to the confused Zaydī draw
upon his short and programmatic work Kitāb al-Iršād ilā sabīl al-rašād, to
which he refers in his response.39
In this interesting work al-Qāsim directly addresses the problem of dis-
agreement (iḫtilāf ) within Islam and within Zaydism. Iḫtilāf is not as some
argue the desired state of affairs. Iḫtilāf outside of Zaydism is not hard to
explain since it stems from an unwarranted rejection of the guiding role of the
Prophet’s Family. Iḫtilāf within the teachings of the Prophetic family is a prob-
lem, for, now that infallibilism has been rejected, it is clear that only one view
is correct. Al-Qāsim suggests possible explanations of legal diversity within
Zaydism: simple human error and inadvertence and sadly the influx of exter-
nal influences. He also sets forth guidelines to deal with such iḫtilāf. The final
authorities must always be the Qurʾān and Sunna. There is no place for adher-
ing to the teachings of any single imam of the ʿitra except ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. But
since the non-muǧtahid cannot in many cases decide issues by direct reference
to the Qurʾān and Sunna, guidance is called for. Briefly put al-Qāsim focuses
on the consensus of the Prophetic Family as the guide in disputed cases. Their
consensus can be relied upon in a rigoristic fashion (iḥ tiyāṭ) in the various
disputed issues that arise. He understands his rigorism to be simply the conse-
quence of his position that only one of the competing opinions can be correct
(wa-ǧamīʿ hād̠ā muqtaḍā mad̠hab man yaqūlu inna l-ḥ aqq maʿa wāḥ id wa-inna
muḫālifahu muḫtị ʾ).40 One set of examples will convey the thrust of his
approach. These are points of the law of prayer on which the opponents of the
Zaydīs frequently accused them of not following Zayd b. ʿAlī: the raising of
the hands, the putting of hand over hand, the saying of āmīn after the Fātiḥ a,
and petitions uttered in non-Qurʾānic wording. Al-Qāsim, applying his prin-
ciples, holds that since the Prophetic Family is divided over the validity of such
practices, but are in agreement that their omission will not invalidate prayer,
they should not be performed.41
A close reading of the writings of al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad will show that
his thought allows no place for anything like a traditional school of Islamic
law, including that of the Yemeni Zaydīs. In its place, he puts the collectivity
of the imams of the Ahl al-Bayt, but following their agreed-upon teaching is
not strictly speaking to be labeled taqlīd, nor is adopting a precautionary
course in cases of disagreement. Although al-Qāsim’s program for Zaydī law
38
Cf. al-Ḥ usayn b. al-Qāsim, Kitāb Hidāyat al-ʿuqūl, II, p. 682 (marginal gloss).
39
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, Maǧmūʿ, p. 271.
40
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, al-Iršād, p. 105.
41
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, al-Iršād, p. 95-6.
seems not to have been widely followed, in his rejection of taqlīd and his call
for constant recourse to the Qurʾān and Sunna in disputed cases he can be
regarded as an unwitting predecessor of those critics of the mad̠hab who,
unlike him, abandoned the guidance he still found in the Prophet’s family.42
Instead, these critics looked for this guidance in the Sunni Ḥ adīt̠ collections.43
The Lineage of the Mad̠hab Affirmed
Qāsim b. Muḥammad sharply distinguishes between the mad̠hab on the one

hand and the law of the Prophet’s family on the other. There is no basis at all
for identifying one with the other. In the generation immediately following we
find a modest effort to reassert such an identification in the poem entitled
al-Ṭ irāz al-mud̠hab fī isnād al-mad̠hab of the qāḍī Ibrāhīm b. Yaḥyā l-Saḥūlī
(d. 1060/1650), which was intended to supply a chain of transmission (sanad )
for the law of the mad̠hab, which he understood to be that of imam al-Hādī.44
In producing a chain in which al-Hādī is only one link going back to the
Prophet through his family, al-Saḥūlī was demonstrating that the mad̠hab was
the authoritative culmination of true Šīʿism. It is clearly not coincidental that
al-Saḥūlī had the reputation for being one of the leading teachers and com-
mentators of the principal work of the mad̠hab, Kitāb al-Azhār.45
Al-Saḥūlī’s versified chain was subjected to a critique by al-Ḥ asan al-Ǧ alāl
(d. 1084/1673), one the leading opponents of taqlīd at the time.46 Al-Ǧ alāl’s
42
Cf. Ṣāliḥ b. al-Mahdī l-Maqbalī, al-ʿAlam al-šāmiḫ, Damascus, Maktabat Dār al-bayān,
n.d., p. 487. Here al-Maqbalī cites al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad’s Iršād as endorsing fallibilism in
iǧtihād along the same lines that he himself adopted.
43
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad’s standards for the acceptance of Ḥ adīt̠ are significantly stricter
than those of the Sunni Ḥ adīt̠ scholars. Cf. al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, Mirqāt al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm
al-uṣūl, Sanaa, Dār al-turāt ̠ al-yamanī, 1412/1992, p. 20-3.
44
Cf. the sanad for Ḥ anafī law going back to God through the Prophet and the Angel
Gabriel that Ibn ʿĀbidīn (d. 1252/1836) provided in his preface to his Radd al-muḥ tār ʿalā l-durr
al-muḫtār, Damascus, Dār al-t ̠aqāfa wa-l-turāt ̠, 1421/2000, I, p. 9. And on p. 67 of the same
work Muḥammad b. ʿAlī l-Ḥ askafī (d. 1088/1677), the author of the underlying text al-Durr,
refers to his sanad for the science of law.
45
Ibn Abī l-Riǧāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr wa-maǧmaʿ al-buḥ ūr, I, p. 221-33. Cf. Muḥammad
al-Ḥ aǧrī, Masāǧid Ṣanʿāʾ, Sanaa, Maktabat al-Yaman al-kubrā, 1398/1977-82, p. 56-8.
46
Al-Ḥ aǧri, Masāǧid Ṣanʿāʾ, p. 56-8. Ibrāhīm al-Saḥūlī’s grandson, Yaḥyā b. Ṣāliḥ al-Saḥūlī,
defended his ancestor’s work against the critique of al-Ǧ alāl in a short work entitled al-Tat̠bīt
wa-l-ǧawāz ʿan mazāliq al-iʿtirāḍ ʿalā l-Ṭ irāz. The chain for Zaydī law was already provided
by the imam Yaḥyā Šaraf al-Dīn (d. 965/1558) who says: “We have an amazing chain in law
and a stretched out solid tether going back to the seal of the messengers” (lanā sanad fī l-fiqh
ʿaǧīb wa-sabab mumtadd ṣalīb yattaṣilu bi-ḫātam al-mursalīn). For this chain see Maǧd al-Dīn b.
attack on this chain rests on his observations that: (i) the chain that was pro-
vided by al-Saḥūlī could not plausibly be claimed to support the traditions
reported by al-Hādī since it was to be found only once in all his writings;
(ii) on the view that this chain was meant to support for Zaydī legal doctrine,
in fact the traditions and opinions in al-Hādī’s works represent no more than
one tenth of the mad̠hab. So it was impossible for such a chain to bolster the
mad̠hab as it had been elaborated. Al-Ǧ alāl even went so far as to dismiss as
pointless the suggestion offered by his own father that the chain should be
interpreted in a spiritual and non-literal fashion (isnād maʿnawī). Significantly,
in his critique al-Ǧ alāl makes appeal to the authority of al-Qāsim b.
Muḥammad, whom he labels the greatest authority of the age, for the demand
that constant recourse be made to living muǧtahids who will always be present
until the end of time.
The thrust of the critique of the mad̠hab that came from its sharpest critics
was that, however understood, it could not plausibly be explained as the legal
doctrine of any single or collectivity of imams. Even apart from the unaccept-
ability for these critics of the most straightforward instance of taqlīd, in which
a layman directly follows the opinion of a muǧtahid, the complex develop-
ment of the doctrine of the mad̠hab made it obviously vulnerable to a further
problem. As explained by al-Ǧ alāl, the derived ruling (ḥ ukm) is not the opin-
ion of the one from whom it was derived nor of the person who did the deriv-
ing on the basis of the muǧtahid’s opinion, and thus this ruling is the opinion
of no one. As such, how can it provide guidance on ritual and civil law. For
al-Ǧ alāl, this is a quagmire into which all the jurists have fallen except those
who adhere to the texts of revelation.47 The derived opinion is by definition
not the express opinion of the muǧtahid, neither can it be the opinion of the
scholar deriving it (muḫarriǧ) because it is not put forward as such. Therefore,
it appears to float detached from any obvious human authority.48 Al-Ǧ alāl and
the other Yemeni critics of the Zaydī mad̠hab were thus consciously exposing
the bankruptcy not only of that mad̠hab but of all the historical schools of
Islamic law.
Muḥammad al-Muʾayyadī, Lawāmiʿ al-anwār, Saada, Maktabat al-turāt ̠ al-islāmī, 1414/1993,

II, p. 128-9.
47
Masāǧid Ṣanʿāʾ, p. 57.
48
Al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad was already familiar with this argument. Cf. al-Qāsim b.
Muḥammad, al-Iršād, p. 118.
The Mad̠hab Questioned in Verse and Prose
A focal point for the arguments brought against the traditional mad̠hab by its
critics and for attempts to salvage this school was provided by a short 18th-
century poem of Isḥāq b. Yūsuf (d. 1173/1760), a grandson of the imam al-
Mutawakkil Ismāʿīl, entitled ʿUqūd al-taškīk.49 It would seem that the poem
was circulated initially anonymously before the identity of its young author
became widely known. According to the modern Yemeni historian, Ismāʿīl
al-Akwaʿ (d. 1429/2008), the poem was penned as a result of a series of heated
discussions initiated by Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī, who was
himself among those who responded to it.50 The numerous responses both in
verse and prose constitute a rich body of theory engaged with the jurispruden-
tial issues that had come to surround the concept of the school. The complete
poem, the first three verses of which were quoted in the introduction, is as
follows:
O leaders of our sayyids, and lamps that illumine the dark recesses of the obscure
Tell us: Do we have a mad̠hab to be followed in speech or in deed?
Or have we been left unattended to graze without a shepherd whom we can follow
in the straight path?
For if we say: [the mad̠hab] is that of Yaḥyā [l-Hādī], it is said: No! The right here
belongs to Zayd b. ʿAlī.
And if we say: [the mad̠hab] is that of Zayd, they judge that the opinion of Yaḥyā
is the definite authority (al-naṣṣ al-ǧalī)
And if we say: [it is the mad̠hab] of both, for they are the best of all nations
Or [it is the mad̠hab] of other Fatimids, those entrusted with the revelation after
the Prophet
They label the mad̠hab to be an opinion outside the views of the Family. So inves-
tigate and question [the following:]
If it was a muǧtahid who made the determination, then this would amount to
taqlīd of him as much as of those who came before
If the determination is that of a non-muǧtahid, then the path of defensive argu-
ment has been blocked
49
Cf. Muḥammad Zabāra, Našr al-ʿarf, Sanaa, Markaz al-dirāsāt wa-l-buḥūt ̠ al-yamanī, n.d.,
I, p. 324-41. These verses with some variants, including several responses to it, can also be found
in Ismāʿīl al-Akwaʿ, al-Zaydiyya našʾatuhā wa-muʿtaqadātuhā, Beirut, n.p., 2000, p. 59-78. The
respondents include al-Ḥ asan b. Isḥāq, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAlī l-Wazīr, Ibn al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī and
Ṣalāḥ b. al-Ḥ usayn al-Aḫfaš.
50
Ismāʿīl al-Akwaʿ, Hiǧar al-ʿilm wa-maʿāqiluhu fī l-Yaman, Beirut, Dār al-fikr al-muʿāṣir,
1995, IV, p. 1850-3.
And furthermore the one who questions or debates or seeks to remove a mote that
will not go away
They impugn his belief and make his honor a target of their pointed arrows51
These verses raised several embarrassing issues for the Zaydīs of the period.
The first is the identity of the ultimate authorities of the mad̠hab, which is
itself seen as problematic. Interestingly, the possibility is considered that Zayd
b. ʿAlī is in fact the eponym of the legal tradition or serves jointly in that role
with al-Hādī.52 Another possibility proffered is that the mad̠hab is rooted in
the opinions of a collectivity of ʿAlids. A second question is how to construe
the activity of those who are determining the current answer of the school on
points of law. The question was troublesome, because if these were not them-
selves muǧtahids, how could one justify taking them as objects of taqlīd? The
final verses make clear how sensitive these questions were inasmuch as they
can be construed as an attempt to undermine the mad̠hab, and al-Šawkānī, a
later respondent to the poem, in fact takes them to have been written with this
purpose in mind. In what follows we will examine a series of responses to these
verses. At the broadest level these responses fall into two categories: (i) those
who sought in one form or another to preserve the Zaydī mad̠hab in its entirety
or in some reformulated version; (ii) those who concluded that the anti-
mad̠hab arguments were so compelling as to make it impossible to preserve the
integrity of the Zaydī mad̠hab in any form. Most of the answers, it should be
noted, appear to assume that the mad̠hab is an elaboration of the teachings of
51
Cf. al-Šawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ, I, p. 135-6. A number of responses to this poem are men-
tioned in Zabāra’s Našr al-ʿarf, I, p. 334 and al-Šawkānī speaks of a large number being penned
and which were collected by many people. The popularity of the works appears to have led to the
production of many copies, some of which contain variants.
52
There was at this time a small group of scholars who did consider themselves followers of
the fiqh of Zayd b. ʿAlī. Among them was Ṣāliḥ b. al-Ḥ usayn al-Aḫfaš (d. 1143/1731) who was
in the circle of Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī, from which the verses emerged. Both
al-Ṣanʿānī and al-Aḫfaš penned responses to Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s poem. Al-Aḫfaš, earlier in his career,
had considered a real Zaydī to be one who followed Zayd b. ʿAlī in both theology and law. He
and like-minded Zaydīs, not surprisingly, held the Maǧmūʿ of Zayd in great esteem, placing it
alongside the Qurʾān as their authority. Cf. Zabāra, Našr al-ʿarf, I, p. 793-4. His response to
the verses of Aḥmad b. Isḥāq reflects his increasing engagement with the study of Sunni Ḥ adīt̠
under the influence of al-Ṣanʿānī (cf. Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥ ūt ̠ī, Nafaḥ āt al-ʿanbar, Beirut,
Muʾassasat al-taʾrīḫ, 1429/2008, II, p. 140). A century earlier, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Ḥ ābis al-Ṣaʿdī
(d. 1061/1651), a protégé of imam al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad, elevated Zayd to the position of
the overall eponym of the Zaydī legal school by minimizing the extent to which his opinions
were not followed by later Zaydīs. Ibn Ḥ ābis, however, recognized Zaydī sub-schools such as the
Hādawiyya. Cf. Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Ḥ ābis, Muqaddimat Kitāb al-Maqṣad al-ḥ asan, Sanaa, IZbACF,
1423/2002, p. 49, 69-70, see also material from al-Maqṣad al-ḥ asan reproduced in the preface
of E. Griffini to his edition of the Maǧmūʿ of Zayd b. ʿAlī (Corpus Iuris di Zaid Ibn ʿAlī, Milan,
Ulrico Hoepli, 1919, p. cxxi-cxxxviii).
the single imam, al-Hādī, and do not delve into the other possibilities raised
by the poem.
Preserving the Mad̠hab: the argument from infallibilism
The poem’s author, Isḥāq b. Yūsuf, took it upon himself to pen a commentary
in prose on the ʿUqūd al-taškīk entitled al-Tafkīk li-ʿUqūd al-taškīk.53 The
response is all the more interesting in that it comes from someone who openly
states that for a time he was tempted to adopt the rejectionism of the anti-
mad̠habists, whose arguments he restates briefly in the introduction of his
commentary. But having determined that some element of taqlīd is inevitable
and crucial in the practice of Islamic law, he sees fit to offer a theoretical justi-
fication for continued adherence to the mad̠hab as it has come to exist. The
focal point of the Tafkīk is to provide justification in terms of Islamic legal
theory for the practice of adherence to a legal tradition that cannot plausibly
be identified with the teachings of any single muǧtahid. As thus formulated,
the problem far from being unique to the Zaydīs, in fact arises with respect to
all the major schools of Islamic law. The theoretical justification for taqlīd here
addressed to the mad̠hab of al-Hādī presents a parallel problem for each of the
other mad̠habs. It is clear throughout the treatise that the author is concerned
to provide a solution that would address this problem in its universal form. In
fact, he notes that a Šāfiʿī judge from D̠ ū Ǧ ibla, Ṭāhā b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Sāda
(d. 1141/1729), was compelled to admit upon reading his poem that the
problem posed in the verses with respect to the Šīʿite school had its exact par-
allel in the Šāfiʿī school and was of a general nature.54
The solution that Isḥāq b. Yūsuf proffers acknowledges that taqlīd cannot
take as its object the opinion of anyone other than a muǧtahid. This means
that to the extent that non-muǧtahids are responsible for the elaboration of a
legal school, such as that of the Zaydīs, their opinions cannot be accepted by
others on the basis of taqlīd. To preserve the mad̠hab institution, Isḥāq b.
Yūsuf appeals to the doctrine of the infallibility of all muǧtahids. His radical
argument is that the opinions of the non-muǧtahid elaborators will in almost
every instance coincide with that of an actual muǧtahid, if not among the
53
Isḥāq b. Yūsuf, al-Tafkīk li-ʿUqūd al-taškīk, ms. Sanaa, Ġ arbiyya Library, ʿilm kalām
no. 33. See the appended edition of this text. The edition is based on three manuscripts and does
not purport to represent a critical edition of this very popular work of which many manuscripts
survive.
54
It appears that provoked by the poem, al-Sāda had penned an answer to the questions it
raised. Cf. Zabāra, Našr al-ʿarf, I, p. 807.
Zaydīs, then somewhere and at some time in the community of Muslims

worldwide and throughout history. It is the authority of that muǧtahid which
validates adherence to the opinion in question without regard to whether he
presents it as his own opinion or develops it from the teaching of another
muǧtahid. Against a central anti-infallibilism argument that a multiplicity of
equally valid opinions fragments the community of Muslims, he argues that
since infallibilism respects all muǧtahid opinions it does not threaten the unity
of the community. Rather it is the strong fallibilist position that undermines
the cohesion of the community, for it is the fallibilists who denigrate opposing
opinions and who shatter Muslim unity.
This optimistic understanding of the facts provides an answer to the ques-
tions posed in the poem, but at the cost of attenuating the historical integrity
of the mad̠habs, which it aims to preserve. The author sees Islamic law as con-
stituted of individual opinions of an indefinite and possibly anonymous body
of muǧtahids, and his answer depends essentially on their collective activity to
justify the individual schools. The attribution of any of these schools to a sin-
gle muǧtahid is thus openly acknowledged to be a fiction and the solution
offered for their preservation depends on activities that potentially transcend
the boundaries of any given mad̠hab. This ecumenical and global solution to
what the author clearly, and correctly, perceived to be a problem for the exist-
ing mad̠habs is consistent with the spirit of Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s larger program.55
Based on a radical version of infallibilism, this atomistic understanding of
Islamic law also has potential implications for legal practice among the Yemeni
Zaydīs. While professing preference for the teachings of the Prophet’s family,
the author argues that among the leading muǧtahids of the Ahl al-Bayt the
Zaydīs are free to follow anyone of their choosing and that there is no basis for
privileging the teachings of al-Hādī except the fanatical sentiment (ṭaʿaṣsụ b) of
his followers. Via his understanding of the existing mad̠hab, his theory revives
the notion of following the Ahl al-Bayt collectively (taqlīd ǧumlat ahl al-bayt).
To this extent his treatise goes beyond preservation of the status quo and opens
the door to significant reform.
Šud̠ūr al-d̠ahab: an addendum to Isḥāq b. Yūsuf
Another response to the poem is presented by its author, ʿAbd Allāh b.

al-Ḥ usayn Dulāma (d. 1179/1765), as a supplement to his teacher Isḥāq b.
55
Cf. Isḥāq b. Yūsuf, al-Waǧh al-ḥ asan al-mud̠hib li-l-ḥ azan li-man ṭalaba l-sunna wa-mašā
ʿalā l-sanan, Sanaa, Maktabat Dār al-turāt ̠, 1990. This work attempts to reconcile the tensions
between the two camps of radical Traditionists (ahl al-Ḥ adīt̠) and the staunch mad̠hab adherents
in his day.
Yūsuf ’s commentary, which he praises as the most significant effort to answer

the poem’s queries.56 This work entitled Šud̠ūr al-d̠ahab fī taḥ qīq al-mad̠hab
addresses more fully historical and technical questions than Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s
conceptual treatment of the issue. Dulāma is more concerned than his teacher
with establishing that every opinion in the school’s teachings has a pedigree
that can be traced to a specific muǧtahid in the extensive commentaries on the
tradition. Furthermore, a third of his response is devoted to providing an
extensive list of the principles underlying the school’s opinions to which he
made additions. As one would expect from a work that presents itself as an
addendum, this treatise’s contents include a miscellany of discrete topics.
A Simple Solution for a Complex Problem
Another response, in this case itself in verse, is that of al-Ḥ asan b. Isḥāq b.
al-Mahdī (d. 1160/1747), which the author compares in its clarity to water
and in its solidity to a mountain. In fact, the work does not provide the theo-
retically elegant solution of Isḥāq b. Yūsuf in that it attempts to preserve the
traditional authority structure of the mad̠hab alongside the possibility of free
choice from among the muǧtahids of the Prophet’s family. While admitting
that iǧtihād is preferable to taqlīd where possible, the author adopts without
criticism the traditional view that the mad̠hab can override imam al-Hādī’s
express opinion on the basis of his underlying principles (al-kullī min taʾṣīlihi).
In defending traditional taḫrīǧ, he rejects the difficulty raised in Isḥāq b.
Yūsuf ’s poem that where the opinion is that of a muḫarriǧ who is a muǧtahid,
following it amounts to taqlīd of that muḫarriǧ and not the eponym. The
problem then would be that the unity of the school would be undermined.
The correct view, he says, is that taqlīd in this case applies to both the muḫarriǧ
and the eponyms ( fa-id̠ā qalladtahu qalladtahum). Against the view of Isḥāq
b. Yūsuf ’s poem, al-Ḥ asan b. Isḥāq defends the position that the taḫrīǧ of a
reliable non-muǧtahid scholar is simply a form of reporting the view of the
eponym (naql ) that does not require iǧtihād. Finally, in those rare cases where
the derivation of law comes from neither a muǧtahid nor a reliable transmitter
the taḫrīǧ has as much authority as that of a camel herder.57
56
The Šud̠ūr al-d̠ahab is likely to be identical with Īḍāḥ al-Tafkīk li-ʿUqūd al-taškīk attributed
to the same author. Cf. Zabāra, Našr al-ʿarf, II, p. 90-2.
57
Cf. Zabara, Našr al-ʿarf, I, p. 334-6. The author of this response, following the language
of the original question, uses the term taqrīr for taḫrīǧ throughout. Two further responses by
al-Ḥ asan b. Isḥāq can be found in the material collected by Ismāʿīl al-Akwaʿ in his book al-Zaydiyya
(p. 67-9, 76-8). In these the author strikes a more strident tone in criticizing al-Ṣanʿānī’s anti-
mad̠hab position as leaving the non-muǧtahid without practical guidance when he could sim-
ply follow the Kitāb al-Azhār. In the latter of these further responses, he emphasizes that the
The High Price of Preserving the Mad̠hab
A further response to the problem to the nature of the mad̠hab is that of

Ismāʿīl b. Aḥmad al-Kibsī (d. 1233/1817) author of the Kitāb al-Asrār
al-marḍiyya l-kāšifa ʿan ḥ aqīqat mad̠hab al-zaydiyya.58 His contribution to the
question of how one could validly adhere to the opinions of those who had
elaborated the teachings of the mad̠hab was to explain the activities of these
elaborators in such a way as to render the question of taḫrīǧ irrelevant. Al-Kibsī,
who refers to the various failed attempts by earlier scholars to address satisfac-
torily the questions posed by the verses of Isḥāq b. Yūsuf, claims to have arrived
at his solution by a searching examination of the literature of Zaydī law. This
he contrasts with the somewhat facile and over-theoretical approaches of some
of his predecessors. As an exception he does acknowledge the inspiration that
he derived for his own work from his near contemporary, discussed above, ʿAlī
b. ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Qāsim al-Šahārī (d. 1190/1776) whose intense study of the
Zaydī mad̠hab he admiringly notes and whose account of a collective mad̠hab
model he completely adopts in distinction to the other respondents.59 The
result of the scrutiny of the mad̠hab by al-Kibsī led him to claim that the activ-
ity of those who had elaborated the mad̠hab after the time of the foundational
imams of the Ahl al-Bayt, that is the muḥ aṣsị lūn and the mud̠ākirūn men-
tioned above, was essentially uncreative. No element of their activity upon
close scrutiny involved what could be considered iǧtihād.60 In the case of the
muḥ aṣsị lūn, their activity was largely organizational in nature in that they col-
lected, compared and sifted through the opinions of the foundational imams
and articulated in coherent fashion the principles upon which their opinions
rested. The mud̠ākirūn, by contrast, did no more than simply draw out the
logical consequences (al-lawāzim al-ʿaqliyya) of the material that the muḥ aṣsị lūn
had organized. An example favored by al-Kibsī to illustrate the work of the
problems raised in the ʿUqūd al-taškīk apply to all the schools of law: “Ask the Ḥ anafī and the
Ḥ anbalī and note the law of the Šāfiʿīs how often a later scholar disagrees with an earlier one; and
how often [Šams al-Dīn] al-Ramlī supports an opinion which [ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad]
al-Rāfiʿī had not maintained” (p. 78).
58
Ismāʿīl b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Kibsī, Kitāb al-Asrār al-marḍiyya l-kāšifa ʿan ḥ aqīqat
mad̠hab al-zaydiyya, Sanaa, Maktabat Markaz Badr, 1417/1997.
59
Al-Kibsi, Kitāb al-Asrār al-marḍiyya, p. 27, 48-51.
60
This does not exclude the possibility that some of these figures might have attained the rank
of muǧtahid. It is just that in their capacity as elaborators of the mad̠hab they were not called
upon to exercise iǧtihād. For a list of mud̠ākirūn said to have attained the rank of muǧtahid, see
Ibn Miftāḥ, Šarḥ al-Azhār, I, p. 42.
muḥ aṣsị lūn is their application to various facts of the principle that what is
required to perform an obligation is itself obligatory.61
In sum, according to al-Kibsī, the activity of both the muḥ aṣsị lūn and the
mud̠ākirūn can be considered to consist of mere transmission (muǧarrad
al-riwāya), reliance upon which does not in any way involve taqlīd.62 His
response does no more than superficially preserve the Zaydī mad̠hab together
with its claim to represent the valid teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt. His uncon-
vincingly simple explanation of the character of the activity of the muḥ aṣsị lūn
and mud̠ākirūn fails to do justice to the actual role they played. This blithe
ahistorical response was of course compelled by the contemporary theoretical
attacks on taḫrīǧ. Moreover, his solution to the problem of taqlīd acts as a
solvent to dissolve the organic unity of the school that his predecessors had
argued for. The organic unity of the school for them lay precisely in an abstract
body of underlying principles, but the theoretical attack to which al-Kibsī
responded elicited an answer not in terms of taqlīd of abstract principles but
of disparate human muǧtahids. Islamic legal theory never provided for taqlīd
of abstract principles but always of muǧtahids.
Elimination of the Mad̠hab
Ibn al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī, already noted as a central figure surrounding the con-
troversy raised by the poem, is among the prominent critics of the mad̠hab in
Islamic legal history. Al-Ṣanʿānī’s responses in verse to the questions raised in
Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s poem were completely negative, dismissing any effort at reha-
bilitating the mad̠hab as a lost cause.63 He refers to two other replies, one of
which sought to reassert the identity of Zaydism as a theological school. To
this al-Ṣanʿānī noted that the issues the poem raised were entirely jurispruden-
tial and therefore any appeal to theology was irrelevant to a discussion about
legal authority anchored in the practice of taqlīd.64 A point in the original
61
An example of the application of this principle is the obligation of the believer who is at
a distance from the water and required to perform his ablutions to traverse that distance. Cf.
al-Kibsī, Kitāb al-Asrār al-marḍiyya, p. 44-5.
62
Al-Kibsī, Kitāb al-Asrār al-marḍiyya, p. 52.
63
Nonetheless, al-Ṣanʿānī was willing to acknowledge the impressive intellectual effort
that had been expended in the process of the elaboration of the teachings of al-Hādī, but
was quite critical of the more recent stage in the development of the mad̠hab. Here he finds
the inadequate learning of the jurists had led them to sustain weak opinions (cf. al-Akwaʿ, al-
Zaydiyya, p. 70-1)
64
Theology, as is well known, was understood to be a discipline where iǧtihād in the technical
sense was considered to be inapplicable since in theology certainty was required, whereas iǧtihād,
by definition, was confined to questions admitting of only probable answers.
verses that al-Ṣanʿānī treats with particular vehemence is what he considers to

be the absurd suggestion that there is no distinction to be made between the
mad̠habs of Zayd b. ʿAlī and al-Hādī. If this unity were understood in the
sense that they agreed on the most general categories, then, he notes, this
should lead to all the major schools collapsing into an undifferentiated unity,
an absurd conclusion.
Make all the opinions one, and stop speaking about Ḥ anafīs and Ḥ anbalīs
( fa-ǧʿalū l-aqwāla qawlan wāḥ idan // la taqūlū ḥ anafiyyun ḥ anbalī)65
Any attempt to claim an overall identity on the level of specific legal doctrine
between Zayd and al-Hādī was of course impossible. And in fact the failure of
the Yemeni Zaydīs to follow Zayd in law was repeatedly raised by al-Ṣanʿānī in
his polemical writings. An instance of such polemical use can be found in his
arguments for the practice of raising the hands at the beginning of prayer
(raf ʿ al-yadayn ʿinda takbīrat al-iḥ rām). This practice, which was rejected
by the mad̠hab, was in fact supported by Zayd b. ʿAlī. On this and similar
issues, al-Sanʿānī scores the polemical point that as followers of Zayd b.
ʿAlī, whom he terms the “imam of the mad̠hab”, it is incumbent upon Zaydīs
to adhere to his opinions. If they fail to do so, he asks, then what claim do they
have to be Zaydīs?66
In doing so, al-Ṣanʿānī revived the old problem of the appropriateness of
the label Zaydī for a legal tradition that did not follow the opinions of their
eponym.67 Al-Ṣanʿānī made constant reference to the Maǧmūʿ of Zayd b. ʿAlī,
a text that had been relatively ignored by the Zaydīs in Yemen as mentioned
above. The controversy over taqlīd in fact led to a revival of a certain interest
in this text. Among the defenders of its authority was the ardent Šīʿite Yaḥyā
65
Al-Akwaʿ, Hiǧar al-ʿilm, IV, p. 1853. Al-Ṣanʿānī’s original response in verse is largely aimed
at the poem of his teacher, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAlī l-Wazīr (d. 1144/1732); cf. al-Akwaʿ, al-Zaydiyya,
p. 63-4.
66
Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Amīr, Masāʾil ʿilmiyya, Sanaa, Maktabat al-iršād, n.d., p. 18-23.
Cf. al-Šawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ, II, p. 134. In his first response al-Ṣanʿānī notes that those who
follow the opinions of Zayd b. ʿAlī in their worship were apt to be labeled Šāfiʿīs and Ḥ anbalīs
and to be subject to ostracism (cf. al-Akwaʿ, al-Zaydiyya, p. 64-5). In one Zaydī response to
al-Ṣanʿānī’s claim that one had to follow Zayd in law to be a Zaydī, it is dismissed as a cheap
debater’s trick (muġālaṭa) that could only fool the most ignorant Zaydīs. Al-Ṣanʿānī is accused of
reviving a criticism that had already been definitively addressed centuries earlier by imam ʿAbd
Allāh b. Ḥ amza in his Kitāb al-Šāfī among others. Cf. Aḥmad b. Ṣalāḥ al-Kawkabānī’s al-Budūr
al-muḍiyya l-hādiya ilā mad̠hab al-ʿitra l-nabawiyya, Yemeni ms. from private library, p. 14-5.
67
In this he seems to have already had a predecessor in his father, see verse cited in Masāʾil
ʿilmiyya, p. 16.
b. al-Ḥ usayn68 (d. 1090/1679) whom al-Šawkānī accuses of having expur-

gated with the collaboration of his students the text to remove all reference to
those points of divergence with the mad̠hab in ritual matters that were consti-
tutive of Yemeni-Zaydī practice (e.g., raf ʿ al-yadayn, ḍamm, taʾmīn, etc.).69
Al-Šawkānī’s Attack
The final text to be examined in this study is that of the well-known jurist
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī l-Šawkānī (d. 1250/1834) entitled al-Taškīk ʿalā l-Tafkīk
li-ʿUqūd al-taškīk. This is a refutation in prose of the theoretical principles
underlying Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s reply to his own verses. Al-Šawkānī elsewhere in
his writings suggests that Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s verses were intended to cast doubt
on the validity of the mad̠hab, but that when his identity as the author of the
poem became known he succumbed to pressure and penned a response which
was inconsistent with his true leanings.70 Elaborating on this point, al-Šawkānī
quotes in his al-Taškīk Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s earlier verses against taqlīd that
al-Šawkānī much admired.71
Al-Šawkānī’s refutation is limited to the first few pages of Isḥāq b. Yūsuf ’s
al-Tafkīk. He says that with the demolition of the foundations of the response,
what is built on it will fall of itself, and in any case an adequate reply to the
rest of the treatise would require a book-length study. It is enough, he says, to
note that the structure of the Zaydī mad̠hab is known and does not require
the forced justification that Isḥāq b. Yūsuf provides. Al-Šawkānī’s refutation
thus focuses entirely on the underlying disputes on the validity of taqlīd
and the infallibility of the muǧtahids, both of which he vigorously attacks.
Against them he deploys not only textual arguments but historical claims. For
example, against infallibilism as a doctrine common to Zaydīs he cites the
well-known fact that it was originally introduced among the Caspian Zaydīs
by the imam Ibn l-Dāʿī (d. 360/970-1).72 To refute the allegation made by
Isḥāq b. Yūsuf that the contemporary opponents of taqlīd cannot in the final
analysis come up with anything other than another mad̠hab like the ones
already in existence, al-Šawkānī responds that whereas the mad̠hab of al-Šāfiʿī,
68
Not to be confused with the famous historian by the same name who also engaged himself
with the study of the Maǧmūʿ of Zayd.
69
Al-Šawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ, II, p. 329-30.
70
Ibid., I, p. 136.
71
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī l-Šawkānī, al-Taškīk ʿalā l-Tafkīk, in Kitāb al-Fatḥ al-rabbānī min fatāwā
l-imām al-Šawkānī, Sanaa, Maktabat al-ǧīl al-ǧadīd, 1423/2002, V, p. 2140-1.
72
Al-Šawkānī, al-Taškīk, p. 2158.
for example, includes considerable elements of mere personal opinion (raʾy)

what he subscribes to would be a legal doctrine based squarely on revealed
texts in all cases.73 In fact, al-Šawkānī’s response merely takes advantage of the
controversy over the verses to refute familiar arguments for taqlīd and infalli-
bilism.74 His refutation thus stands alongside his better-known writings attack-
ing the legitimacy of the mad̠habs, which in Yemen have been remarkably
successful at weakening the traditional Zaydī school of law.75
Conclusion
In Yemen in the 12th/18th century the controversy provoked by the short

poem of Isḥāq b. Yūsuf brought to the fore fundamental questions concerning
the validity of the structure of authority in the traditional Yemeni-Zaydī
mad̠hab. As was not lost upon the disputants, these questions, mutatis mutan-
dis, were common to all the historic Sunni schools of Islamic law. A long his-
tory of attacks on Zaydism and its distinct identity gave a particular urgency
to these theoretical questions when once again it appeared that Zaydism as a
legal school was fighting for its very survival. One cannot but be struck by the
bewildering range of Zaydī responses and their failure to present a single front
against their many critics. It was only 150 years subsequently that the Sunni
schools of law came to be confronted by any intellectual threat that was
remotely comparable. It is not coincidental that in this latter attack the anti-
mad̠hab literature from Yemen was deployed with vigor and that the elements
specific to Zaydism were insignificant to the general thrust of the arguments.
In India, for example, Ṣiddīq Ḥ asan Ḫ ān and his circle were devoted followers
of al-Šawkānī and other Yemenis, and in Egypt Rašīd Riḍā was instrumental
in the broader dissemination of the Yemeni anti-mad̠hab works. In this article,
we have tried to evoke the intellectual environment in Zaydī Yemen in which
this broader attack on the schools of law enjoyed its heyday.
73
Al-Šawkānī, al-Taškīk, p. 2132.
74
The work al-Iqlīd li-adillat al-iǧtihād wa-l-taqlīd (Istanbul, Maṭbaʿat al-ǧawāʾib, 1296/1879)
by ʿAlī b. Ḥ asan b. Ṣiddīq Ḥ asan Ḫ ān is taken, as the author says, from the Taškīk of al-Šawkānī,
p. 2. The mistaken attribution of the work to Ṣiddīq Ḥ asan Ḫ ān in the Istanbul edition is cor-
rected in the edition of Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Saʿīd Maʿšāšā (Beirut, Dār Ibn Ḥ azm, 1421/2000,
p. 8-10), who inexplicably provides the work with a new title.
75
Cf. Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2003.
‫‪360‬‬ ‫‪B. Haykel, A. Zysow / Arabica 59 (2012) 332-371‬‬
‫‪Appendix‬‬
‫]ﺹ ‪ [1‬ﺍﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﻚ ﻟﻌﻘﻮﺩ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ‬

‫ﺗﺄﻟﻴﻒ ﻣﻮﻻﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻣﺔ ﺿﻴﺎﺀ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻡ ﺇﺳﺤﺎﻕ ﺑﻦ ﻳﻮﺳﻒ ﺑﻦ ﺍﻹﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﳌﺘﻮﻛﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﺭﺿﻮﺍﻥ‬
‫ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺁﻣﲔ‬
‫]ﺹ ‪ [3‬ﺑﺴﻢ ﺍﷲ ﺍﻟﺮﲪﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ ﺍﳊﻤﺪ ﷲ ﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﳌﲔ ﻭﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﻴﺪﻧﺎ ﳏﻤﺪ ﻭﺁﻟﻪ‬
‫ﻭﺳﻠﻢ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻠﻬﻢ ﺃﳍﻤﻨﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﻚ ﻟﻌﻘﻮﺩ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ‪ ،‬ﻭ ﹼﻳﺴﺮ ﻟﻨﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺮﻳﺞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻀﺎﺋﻖ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺞ‪،‬‬
‫ﺍﶈﻤﺪﻳﹼﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻫﺪﻧﺎ ﺇﱃ ﺍﳍﺪﻱ ﺍﻟﻨﺒﻮﻱ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﻘﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﻱ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻭﺃﺻﺪﻕ ﻣﻨﺎ ﺍ ﹼﻟﻨﻴﺔ ﰲ ﹸﻧﺼﺢ ﺍﳌﻠﹼﺔ ﹼ‬
‫ﹼ‬
‫‪76‬‬
‫ﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﺁﻣﲔ‪.‬‬

‫ﻭﺍﺷﺮﺡ ﻣﻨﺎ ﺍﻟﺼﺪﺭ ﻟﺘﻠﻘﻲ ﺑﻴﻨﺎﺕ ﺍﳋﻄﺎﺏ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻗﺮ ﻣﻨﺎ ﺍﻟﻌﲔ ﺑﺎﺗﹼﺒﺎﻉ ﺍ ﹼ‬
‫ﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﻣﻼﻙ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻠﻮﻙ ﰲ ﺍﺗﹼﺒﺎﻉ ﺳﻴﺪ ﺍﳌﺮﺳﻠﲔ ﻫﻮ ﹸﺣﺴﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﻴﺔ ﻭﲨﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﻄﻮﻳﹼﺔ‪،‬‬
‫ﹼ‬
‫ﺍﻣﺮﺉ ﻣﺎ ﻧﻮﻯ«‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺼﺪ‬ ‫ﻗﺎﻝ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺁﻟﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﻢ‪» :‬ﺇﳕﺎ ﺍﻷﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻴﺎﺕ ﻭﺇﳕﺎ ﻟﻜﻞ ﹴ‬
‫ﻣﻘﻠﺪ ﻓﻼ ﺣﺮﺝ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ ﺃﻱ ﻗﻮﻝ ﺃﺧﺬ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ‬ ‫ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﺃﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺪﻕ ﰲ ﺃﻣﺮ ﺍﷲ ﻭﻫﻮ ﹲ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺘﺪﺍﻭﻟﺔ ﺑﲔ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ‪ ،‬ﻟﻴﺲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺇﻻ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﲟﺎ ﺑﲔ ﻳﺪﻳﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻱ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﻭﱂ‬
‫ﺳﻨﺔ ﺭﺳﻮﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﻟﻴﺲ ﰲ ﻭﺳﻌﻪ ﲢﺼﻴﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ‬ ‫ﻳﻜﻠﻔﻪ ﺍﷲ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻄﻠﺐ ﺍﻷﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﷲ ﺃﻭ ﹼ‬
‫ﻭﺇﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻭﻇﻴﻔﺔ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﺫﻛﺮﻩ ﲨﺎﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼﻑ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻓﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺇﻻ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﻭﺗﻜﻠﻴﻒ ﳌﺎ ﻻ‬
‫ﻳﻄﺎﻕ‪ .‬ﻭﺇﺫﺍ ﻓﺮﺿﺖ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻣﻲ ﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ ﻗﻮﻝ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻞ ﰲ ﺇﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﻤﺬﻫﺐ ﻭﺍﳊﺾ ﻋﻠﻰ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻴﻘﻮﻝ ﻟﻪ‪ :‬ﻗﺪ ﻗﺒﻠﺖ ﻗﻮﻟﻚ ﰲ ﻫﺬﺍ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﺎﺕ ﻋﻠﹼﻤﲏ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻭﺍﺟﻌﻞ ﱄ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎ ﰲ ﺍﻷﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﻣﺄﺧﻮ ﹰﺫﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﺑﺪ ﻭﺃﻥ ﻳﻘﻠﺪﻩ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻭﻳﻜﻮﻥ‬ ‫ﹰ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ ﻟﻪ ﻛﺴﺎﺋﺮ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺕ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﻫﻢ ﱂ ﻳﺼﻨﻌﻮﺍ ﺇﻻ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﻊ‪ .‬ﻓﻴﺼﲑ‬
‫ﻣﺬﻫﺒﺎ ﻛﻬﺬﻩ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺃﺭﺍﺩﻩ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺋﻞ ﻫﻮ ﻋﲔ ﻣﺎ ﺻﻨﻌﻪ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ‬‫ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﳌﻮﺿﻮﻉ ﹰ‬
‫ﺣﺮﺻﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺣﺘﻰ‬ ‫ﺩﻭﻥ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺃﺧﺬﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻭﻛﺎﻥ ﺃﺷﺪ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﹰ‬ ‫ﻣﺜ ﹰﻼ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﹼ‬
‫ﺻﺢ ﺍﳊﺪﻳﺚ ﻓﺎﺭﻣﻮﺍ ﺑﻘﻮﱄ ﺍﳊﺎﺋﻂ‪ .‬ﻭﻫﻜﺬﺍ‬ ‫ﺻﺢ ﺍﳊﺪﻳﺚ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﺬﻫﱯ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺎﻝ‪ :‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﹼ‬ ‫ﻗﺎﻝ‪ :‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﹼ‬
‫ﻭﺣﺴﻦ ﻇﻦ ﺑﺎﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ﺃﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺻﻨﻌﻬﻢ ﻭﺩﺃﺑـﻬﻢ‪،‬ﱂ‬ ‫ﺻﻨﻊ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﺋﻤﺔ ﻻ ﻳﺮﺗﺎﺏ ﻣﻦ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺼﲑﺓ ﹸ‬
‫ﻳﺴﻠﻚ ﺃﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﰲ ﻣﺴﻠﻚ ﺇﻻ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺮﺭ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻣﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﷲ ﻣﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻻ ﻳﻠﺰﻡ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺘﻔﻖ‬
‫ﺍﳌﻠﺔ ‪ :‬ﺍﻻﻣﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫‪76‬‬
‫‪B. Haykel, A. Zysow / Arabica 59 (2012) 332-371‬‬ ‫‪361‬‬
‫ﺍﻵﺭﺍﺀ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﻣﻦ ﺿﺮﻭﺭﺓ ﻭﺟﻮﺏ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻛﻞ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﲟﺎ ﹼﺃﺩﻯ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺭﺃﻳﻪ ﺃﻥ ﲣﺘﻠﻒ ﺍﻵﺭﺍﺀ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ ﻟﻮ‬
‫ﺫﻫﺐ ]ﺹ ‪ [4‬ﻛﻞ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺒﻌﺪ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﺳﻠﻮﻛﻪ ﺇﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﻓﻤﺎ ﲦﺮﺓ ﻧﻘﻠﻪ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﺇﱃ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ؟‬
‫ﻭﺃﺻﺢ‪ .77‬ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﻫﺬﺍ‬‫ﹼ‬ ‫ﻓﺈﻥ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﺑﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻨﻈﺮ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺍﻷﺭﺟﺢ‪ ،‬ﻭﳝزي ﺑﲔ ﺍﻷﺩﻟﺔ ﺃﻳﻬﺎ ﺃﻗﺮﺏ‬
‫ﺻﺮﺡ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﻭﺃﻓﺎﺩﻭﻩ ﻭﺣﻜﻤﻮﺍ ﲝﺴﻦ ﺧﺮﻭﺟﻪ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﳌﺎ‬ ‫ﺻﺤﻴﺢ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻷﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻪ ﻭﻗﺪ ﹼ‬
‫ﹴ‬
‫ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ ﻏﲑ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ‬ ‫ﻳﱰﺟﺢ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﻄﻊ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ ﺑﺎﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﻩ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺭﺟﺤﻪ ﻭﺗﺮﺩﺩ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﺒﻖ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺃﻥ ﻳﺘﺤﺮﻯ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﻴﻤﻦ ﻳﻘﻠﺪﻩ ﻭﻫﺬﻩ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻋﻘﻠﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺃﻥ‬
‫ﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ ﻳﻄﻤﺌﻦ ﺇﱃ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻈﻨﻪ ﺃﻋﻠﻢ ﻭﺃﻭﺭﻉ ﺃﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻃﻤﺌﻨﺎﻧﻪ ﺇﱃ ﻣﻦ ﻫﻮ ﺩﻭﻧﻪ‪ .‬ﹸﺛ ﱠﻢ ﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﻟﻨﺎ ﺃﺻ ﹰﻼ‬
‫ﺃﺻﻴ ﹰﻼ ﻫﻮ ﻛﺎ ﹶﳊ ﹶﻜﻢ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻃﻊ ﻟﻠﺨﻼﻑ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻮ ﺃﻧﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺗﻌﺎﺭﺿﺖ ﺍﻷﺩﻟﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺸﺒﻪ ﺭﺟﻊ ﺇﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‬
‫ﻋﻤﻞ ﲨﻬﻮﺭ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ﺃﻭﳍﻢ ﻭﺁﺧﺮﻫﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﺬﻟﻚ ﻛﺎﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻃﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻄﺄ ﳐﺎﻟﻔﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻴﺲ ﺫﻟﻚ‬
‫ﺑﺎﻹﲨﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﻃﻊ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﳐﺎﻟﻔﻪ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺴﺒﻴﻞ ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﺗﹺﻠﻮﻩ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﺍخملﺎﻟﻒ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺫ ﻫﻮ ﺍﳌﻤﻘﻮﺕ ﰲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻉ ﻭﻳﺒﻌﺪ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﳉﻤﻬﻮﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳋﻄﺄ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﺩ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻷﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻﻮﺍﺏ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻷﺻﻞ‬
‫ﻗﺪ ﺭﺟﻊ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﻗﺪﳝﹰﺎ ﻭﺣﺪﻳ ﹰﺜﺎ ﰲ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺩﻭﺩ ﺣ ﹼﺘﻰ ﺃﻥ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻘﻄﻊ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻛﺎﻑ‬
‫ﻋﻦ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺪﻻﻝ‪ .‬ﻭﺍﻧﻈﺮ ﺇﱃ ﻭﻗﻮﻉ ﺍﳋﻼﻑ ﻟﻠﺠﻤﻬﻮﺭ ﰲ ﺃﻣﻬﺎﺕ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ‬
‫ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻭﻗﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﰲ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﳏﺎﻻﹰ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﲝﺚ ﻷﻫﻞ ﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ‬
‫ﰲ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺪﻻﻝ ﻭﺍﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻋﺎﺭﺿﻬﺎ ﺍﳌﻨﺎﻇﺮ ﺭﺟﻌﻮﺍ‬
‫ﺇﱃ ﻋﻤﻞ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺝ ﺑﺎﻹﲨﺎﻉ ﺃﻭﳍﻢ ﻭﺁﺧﺮﻫﻢ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻋﻦ ﺧﻄﺄ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ‬
‫ﻭﺟﻬﻞ ﺑﻮﺟﻪ ﺍﳊﻖ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺍﺩﻋﺎﻩ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺫ‪ ،‬ﺛﻢ ﻣﺎ ﻭﻗﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻘﻴﺎﺱ ﺣﺘﻰ ﺫﻫﺐ‬
‫ﺟﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﻛﺎﺑﺮ ﻭﱂ ﳜﺮﺟﻮﺍ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺬﻭﺫ ﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﲨﻬﻮﺭ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺃﻭﳍﻢ‬ ‫ﺇﱃ ﺫﻟﻚ ﹲ‬
‫ﻭﺁﺧﺮﻫﻢ‪ ،‬ﺣ ﹼﺘﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺃﻋﻈﻢ ﻣﺎ ﺩﻓﻌﻮﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺷﺒﻬﻬﻢ ﺃﻥ ﻗﺎﻟﻮﺍ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﻟﻌﻤﻞ‬
‫ﺍﳉﻤﻬﻮﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﻴﺎﺱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﺫﺍ ﻧﻈﺮﺕ ﺇﱃ ﻛﻞ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻣﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻜﻠﻴﺎﺕ ﻭﺟﺪﺕ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﲡﺪ ﰲ ﺩﻓﻌﻪ ﺃﻧﻔﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺟﻮﻉ ﺇﱃ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻷﺻﻞ‪ .‬ﻭﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻣﻨﻊ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﻫﻲ‬
‫ﻗﺪﺭﺍ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ‪] .‬ﺹ ‪ [5‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﻣﺎﻝ ﺇﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺃﻓﺮﺍﺩ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﺘﻘﺪﻣﲔ ﻭﺍﳌﺘﺄﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﱂ ﳜﺮﺟﻮﺍ‬ ‫ﺃﻗﻞ ﹰ‬
‫ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺬﻭﺫ ﻭﳐﺎﻟﻔﺔ ﲨﻬﻮﺭ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ﺃﻭﳍﻢ ﻭﺁﺧﺮﻫﻢ‪.‬‬
‫ﺃﺻﺢ ‪ :‬ﺍﻭﺿﺢ‪.‬‬ ‫‪77‬‬
‫ﻧﻌﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻜﺎﺕ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﺑﺪﻋﻮﻯ ﻋﺎﻃﻠﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﱪﻫﺎﻥ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻛﺎﻟﺴﻔﺴﻄﺔ‬
‫ﺑﻞ ﻳﻌﺴﺮ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻠﺺ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﺎﻟﻮﺍ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﻫﻮ ﺍﳌﺮﺍﺩ ﺑﻘﻮﻟﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﴿ﺍﲣﺬﻭﺍ ﺃﺣﺒﺎﺭﻫﻢ ﻭﺭﻫﺒﺎﻧﻬﻢ‬
‫ﺃﺭﺑﺎﺑﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﷲ﴾ )ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺑﺔ ‪ (31‬ﻭﻛﻤﺎ ﺭﻭﻱ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳊﺪﻳﺚ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﱯ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺁﻟﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﻢ‬
‫ﻭﳛﺮﻣﻮﻥ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﻃﺎﻝ ﰲ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻭﺃﻧﺎ ﺃﻋﺠﺐ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﺃﻧـﻬﻢ ﱂ ﻳﻌﺒﺪﻭﻫﻢ ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻬﻢ ﻛﺎﻧﻮﺍ ﳛﻠﹼﻮﻥ ﳍﻢ ﹼ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﻋﺎﱂ ﻳﺮﻣﻲ ﲨﻬﻮﺭ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﺰﻛﻴﺔ ﲟﺎ ﺭﻣﻰ ﺍﷲ ﺑﻪ ﺃﺧﺒﺚ ﺍﻟﱪﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻮﻧـﻬﻢ‬
‫ﳛﻞ ﻭﱂ ﳛﺮﻡ ﺷﻴ ﹰﺌﺎ‬
‫ﻭﳛﺮﻣﻮﻥ ﺃﻧـﻬﻢ ﺷﺮﻋﻮﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﻳﺄﺫﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺍﷲ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﻣﺎ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﻓﻠﻢ ﹼ‬
‫ﳛﻠﹼﻮﻥ ﹼ‬
‫ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻋﺎﻣﻞ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻓﺮﺿﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﲟﺎ ﺃﺩﻯ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﻩ‪ ،‬ﻓﻌﻤﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﺟﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‬
‫ﻗﻄﻌﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪﻩ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﲤﺴﻚ ﺑﺸﺮﻉ ﺍﷲ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﻄﻊ ﺍﻟﺸﻜﻮﻙ ﻻ ﺑﺪ ﻣﻨﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻔﺎﺕ‬ ‫ﹰ‬
‫ﺍﳋﺎﻃﺮ ﺇﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﳜﺮﺝ ﺍﻹﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﺸﺬﻭﺫ ﻭﳐﺎﻟﻔﺔ ﺍﳉﻤﻬﻮﺭ ﻓﻴﻘﻊ ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺃﻋﻈﻢ ﳑﺎ ﹼﻓﺮ ﻣﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺷﺬ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺭ« ﻭ»ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺻﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺬﺋﺐ« ﻭ»ﻳﺪ ﺍﷲ ﻣﻊ‬ ‫ﺷﺬ ﹼ‬ ‫ﻗﻮﻟﻪ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺁﻟﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﻢ‪» :‬ﻣﻦ ﹼ‬
‫ﺍﳉﻤﺎﻋﺔ« ﻭﻏﲑ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻛﺜﲑ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﻗﺪ ﺭﻭﻯ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺍﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺃﻥ ﺍﷲ ﻳﻜﺮﻩ ﺍﻟﻮﺣﺪﺍﻧﻲ ﻭﻓﺴﺮﻩ ﺑﺎﳌﺘﻮﺣﺪ ﺑﺪﻳﻨﻪ ﺍﳌﻔﺎﺭﻕ‬
‫ﻟﻠﺠﻤﺎﻋﺔ ﻭﻫﻮ ﰲ ﺑﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﻭ ﻣﻊ ﺍﳊﺎﺀ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﳕﺎ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﺇﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺑﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻄﻊ ﺍﻟﺸﻜﻮﻙ ﺇﺫ ﻻ ﳜﻠﻮ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ‬
‫ﺑﺎﺏ ﰲ ﺃﻱ ﻣﺴﻠﻚ ﻭﺃﻋﻈﻢ ﻣﺴﻠﻚ ﻳﺮﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺎﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺸﻜﻮﻙ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻫﻮ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻚ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺃﻥ ﻛﻞ‬
‫ﻣﺴﻠﻚ ﳝﻜﻦ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﺩ ﺍﻟﺸﻜﻮﻙ ﻓﻴﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻨﺤﻦ ﻧﻮﺭﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳌﻨﻔﺮﺩ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺷﻜﻮ ﹰﻛﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻧﻈﺮ‬
‫ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺷﻚ ﰲ ﻣﺴﻠﻜﻪ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺇﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﳌﺎ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻋﲔ ﺍﻟﺸﺬﻭﺫ‪.‬‬
‫ﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻳﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﺥ ﺍﻟﻨﺒﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﺬﻛﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻲ ﺍﻟﺰﻛﻲ ﻭﻣﻦ ﺍﷲ ﺍﺳﺘﻤﺪ ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﺍﻋﺘﻤﺪ ﺃﻥ ﺍﷲ ﻗﺪ ﺭﻓﻊ ﺍﳊﺮﺝ‬
‫ﻋﻦ ﺍﳌﻜﻠﻒ ﰲ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﺩﻳﻨﻪ ﺃﻋﲏ ﻛﻞ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻓﺮﺩ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻜﺎﻟﻴﻒ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ ﻓﻜﻴﻒ ﻻ ﻳﺮﻓﻊ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺍﳊﺮﺝ‬
‫ﰲ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﺍﻟﻜﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﻨﺒﲏ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﲨﻠﺔ ﺍﻷﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﰲ ﺷﺮﻳﻌﺘﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﺑﲔ ﺭﺟﻠﲔ ﻻ ﺛﺎﻟﺚ ﳍﻤﺎ‬
‫ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﺃﻭ ﻣﻘﻠﺪ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﺩﻳﻨﻪ ]ﺹ ‪ [6‬ﻭﺷﺮﻳﻌﺘﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺃﺩﻯ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﻧﻈﺮﻩ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻷﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﳌﺘﺪﺍﻭﻟﺔ ﺑﲔ‬
‫ﻣﻴﺴﺮ ﻟﻪ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻻ ﳜﻔﻰ‪ .‬ﻭﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ ﺩﻳﻨﻪ‬‫ﺍﻷﺋﻤﺔ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﳜﺮﻕ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ‪ .‬ﻭﻻ ﺣﺮﺝ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺑﻞ ﻫﻮ ﹼ‬
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‫ﻭﺷﺮﻳﻌﺘﻪ ﻗﻮﻝ ﺃﻱ ﻋﺎﱂ ﻣﻦ ﳎﺘﻬﺪﻱ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﺍﶈﻤﺪﻳﺔ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﳜﺮﻕ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﻭﻣﻦ ﺃﻳﻦ‬
‫ﻟﻠﻤﻘﻠﺪ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻣﺎ ﳜﺮﻕ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ؟ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﻟﻴﺲ ﻓﺮﺿﻪ ﺇﻻ ﺇﺗﺒﺎﻉ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﺍﻟﻌﺪﻝ ﻭﻫﻮ ﻻ ﳜﺎﻟﻒ‬
‫ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ ﺑﺄﻱ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻗﺎﺋﻠﻬﺎ ﻗﺪ ﺧﺮﻕ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﻭﺟﺐ‬
‫ﺍﻷﺋﻤﺔ ‪ :‬ﺍﻻﻣﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫‪78‬‬

‫ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﺟﺘﻨﺎﺏ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ ﻭﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪﻩ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺪﻭﻝ ﺇﱃ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﺣﺮﺝ ﰲ ﺍﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻘﻠﺪ‬
‫ﻟﺘﻠﻌﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻷﻋﻤﺎﻝ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻴﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ ﺃﻧﻪ‬
‫ﻳﺴﻠﻚ ﺃﻱ ﻣﺴﻠﻚ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﳜﺮﺝ ﺑﻪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺇﱃ ﺇﺭﺍﺩﺓ ﺍ ﹼ‬
‫ﻟﻮ ﻋﻤﻞ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﻟﻌﺒﺎﺩﺍﺕ ﺑﻜﻞ ﻗﻮﻝ ﻗﻴﻞ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻭﺍﺣﺪﺓ ﻓﺄﺧﺬ ﺑﻬﺬﺍ ﻣﺮﺓ ﻭﺑﻬﺬﺍ ﺃﺧﺮﻯ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ‬
‫ﲬﺴﺎ ﺃﻭ ﻻ ﳛﺪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻓزيﻳﺪ‬ ‫ﺃﺭﺑﻌﺎ ﺃﻭ ﹰ‬‫ﻳﻜﱪ ﰲ ﺍﳉﻨﺎﺯﺓ ﹰ‬‫ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻋﺪﺍ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺍﺏ‪ .‬ﻣﺜﺎﻝ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺃﻥ ﹼ‬
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‫ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﻜﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺳﻮﺍﺀ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺄﻥ ﻳﺴﺠﺪ ﻟﻠﺴﻬﻮ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﺴﻠﻴﻢ ﺃﻭ ﺑﻌﺪﻩ ﺳﺠﺪﺗﲔ ﺃﻭ‬
‫ﻭﺍﺣﺪﺓ ﺃﻭ ﻳﺘﺨﻠﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﺴﻠﻴﻢ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﺇﱃ ﻏﲑ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﲨﻴﻊ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﻟﻌﺒﺎﺩﺍﺕ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﻣﺎ ﺍﳌﻌﺎﻣﻼﺕ‬
‫ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ ﺍﳋﺮﻭﺝ ﺇﱃ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﺁﺧﺮ ﻳﺒﻄﻞ ﺑﻪ ﺣﻖ ﺇﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻗﺪ ﻟﺰﻣﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺳﻴﺄﺗﻲ ﻓﻴﻪ ﲝﺚ ﰲ ﺗﻮﺟﻴﻪ‬
‫ﲢﺮﻳﻢ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻝ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﻻﻟزتﺍﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺄﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ ﺟﺮﻯ ﲨﻬﻮﺭ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﻓﻮﻕ ﺍﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﻭﲦﺔ ﺷﺬﻭﺫ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺷﻜﻜﻮﺍ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ‪ ،‬ﻭﺿﻴﻘﻮﺍ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﻟﻚ‪،‬‬
‫ﻓﺄﻟﺰﻣﻮﻫﻢ ﺍﺗﺒﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ‪ ،‬ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺻﺤﺎﺑﻨﺎ ﺍﳌﺘﺄﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺪ ﺍﳊﺴﻦ ﺍﳉﻼﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻘﻴﻪ ﺻﺎﱀ‬
‫ﺍﳌﻘﺒﻠﻲ‪ ،‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﲢﻘﻴﻘﻬﻤﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﺳﺒﻘﻬﻤﺎ ﺇﱃ ﳓﻮ ﻣﺎ ﺳﻠﻜﺎﻩ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺪ ﳏﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﺇﺑﺮﺍﻫﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﻮﺯﻳﺮ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﻫﻤﺎ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻌﻤﺪﺍ ﺳﻠﻮﻙ ﻃﺮﻳﻘﻪ ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﺷﺘﺎﻥ ﺑﲔ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻜﲔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻤﺎ ﰲ ﻣﻀﻴﻖ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻴﺪ ﳏﻤﺪ ﰲ‬
‫ﻓﺴﺎﺡ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻴﺲ ﳍﻤﺎ ﺍﻻﺷﺘﻤﺎﻡ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺮﻑ ﲢﻘﻴﻘﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻠﺴﻴﺪ ﺍﳊﺴﻦ ﺍﻟﻘﺼﻴﺪﺓ ﺍﳌﺴﻤﺎﺓ ﺑﻔﻴﺾ‬
‫ﻣﻔﻴﺪﺍ‪ ،‬ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﺃﻟﺰﻡ ﺍﳌﻜﻠﻒ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺻﺮ‪ ،‬ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻜﻠﻴﻒ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ‬ ‫ﺷﺮﺣﺎ ﹰ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺎﻉ ﻭﺷﺮﺣﻬﺎ ﹰ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻇﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻨﺖ ﻗﺪ ﻣﻠﺖ ﺇﱃ ﺍﺳﺘﺤﺴﺎﻥ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻭﺍﻋﺘﻤﺪﺗﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﺄﻳﺪ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ ﲟﺎ ﺃﻭﺭﺩﻩ ﺍﳌﻘﺒﻠﻲ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻣﺦ ﻭﺳﺎﺋﺮ ﻛﺘﺒﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻔﲑ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ‪ .‬ﻭﺑﻌﺪ ﺍﻋﺘﻘﺎﺩ ﺻﺤﺔ ﺫﻟﻚ ]ﺹ ‪ [7‬ﻭﺍﳌﻴﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ‬
‫ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﻭﺟﺪﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﻳﺪﻭﺭ ﺁﺧﺮﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻭﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﻌﻮﺩ ﺍﳋﺎﺭﺝ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﻓﻴﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻧﻪ ﻻ‬
‫ﺳﺒﻴﻞ ﺇﱃ ﺳﻠﻮﻙ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﻄﺮﻳﻖ ﻟﻐﲑ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ‪ .‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﺇﳕﺎ ﻗﺼﺪﺍ ﺃﻥ ﺍﳌﻜﻠﻒ ﻳﻨﻈﺮ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﰲ‬
‫ﺍﻷﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﻓﻴﻤزي ﺑﻨﻈﺮﻩ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻷﻗﺮﺏ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺍﺏ ﻻ ﺃﻥ ﳚﺘﻬﺪ‪ .‬ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻇﺮ ﺇﻣﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻤﻞ‬
‫ﻟﻪ ﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻭﻳﺴﺘﻮﰲ ﻣﺎ ﳚﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻞ ﺍﻷﻃﺮﺍﻑ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻣﺜ ﹰﻼ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﺬﺍ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﻝ‬
‫ﺑﺘﺒﻌﻴﺾ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﺗﻜﻠﻢ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻕ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ‬
‫ﻇﻬﺮﺍ ﻟﺒﻄﻦ‪ ،‬ﻭﺭﺍﺟﻌﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ ﲨﺎﻋﺔ‬ ‫ﻏﲑ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﱰﺟﻴﺢ ﻓﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ؟ ﻭﻗﺪ ﺿﺮﺑﺖ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﻝ ﹰ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺍﺟﺘﻨﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻢ ﺃﺟﺪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺸﻔﻲ ﺍﻟﻐﻠﻴﻞ ﻭﱂ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﱄ ﺇﻻ ﺇﻥ ﻣﺎ‬
‫ﻗﺎﻻﻩ ﻓﺮﺽ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﻻ ﳜﺎﻃﺐ ﺑﻪ ﺳﻮﺍﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﺫﻛﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻭﺟﻮﺏ ﺍﺗﺒﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﻭﺗﺮﻙ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻻ‬
‫ﻳﺴﺘﻘﻴﻢ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻠﻒ ﺑﻪ ﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺗﻌﲔ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺘﻔﻖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﲔ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻓﺈﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻨﻴﻊ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻬﻮﻳﻞ ﰲ ﺍﺗﺒﺎﻉ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ ﻏﲑﻩ‬
‫ﻋﻈﻴﻤﺎ ﻭﺗﻀﻴﻴ ﹰﻘﺎ‬
‫ﻓﻬﻮ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺧﻄﺎﺑﹰﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﺎﺱ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻮﻡ ﻓﺄﻧﺎ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻵﻥ ﱂ ﺃﺟﺪﻩ ﺇﻻ ﲢﺮ ﹰﳚﺎ ﹰ‬
‫ﰲ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻣﺒﻠﻎ ﻋﻠﻤﻲ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺸﻐﻒ ﻭﺍﶈﺒﺔ ﻣﲏ ﻟﺴﻠﻮﻙ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‪ ،‬ﱄ ﻭﻟﺴﺎﺋﺮ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ‪ ،‬ﻟﻜﲏ ﻭﺟﺪﺕ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻛﺎﻟﺘﻜﻠﻴﻒ ﲟﺎ ﻻ ﻳﻄﺎﻕ ﻭﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻮﻙ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺃﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺋﻨﺎ ﻧﻈﺮ ﰲ ﺍﺗﺒﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‬
‫ﺍﳍﻞ ﻭﻣﺎ ﺃﺣﺴﻦ ﻣﺎ ﺳﻜﻠﻪ‬ ‫ﻳﻜﻠﻒ ﺑﻪ ﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ ﻫﻮ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻓﻠﻴﻈﻬﺮﻩ ﻟﻨﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻨﺎ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺃﺷﺪ ﹼ‬
‫ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﻝ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺑﻞ ﺁﻝ ﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﺇﱃ ﺃﻥ ﺍﳌﻄﻮﻝ ﰲ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﱂ ﻳﺄﺕ ﺑﺸﻲﺀ ﻳﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻏﲑ‬
‫ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﻮﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻮ ﺃﻥ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﳚﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻭﺗﺮﻙ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻭﻫﺬﺍ‬
‫ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ ﻻ ﻣﻌﻨﻰ ﳋﻄﺎﺑﻪ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ‪ .‬ﻭﻣﻦ ﺷﺒﻪ ﺍﶈﺮﺟﲔ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻤﺬﻫﺐ ﻧﻬﻲ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻭﻗﺪ ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻭﺗﻜﺮﺭ ﻓﻴﻬﻤﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻨﱯ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‬
‫ﻭﺁﻟﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﻢ ﺇﱃ ﺃﻧﻪ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻫﻼﻙ ﺍﻷﻣﻢ ﺍﳌﺎﺿﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ‪ ،‬ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻪ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺁﻟﻪ‬
‫ﻭﺳﻠﻢ‪» :‬ﺇﳕﺎ ﺃﻫﻠﻚ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻠﻜﻢ ﻛﱶﺓ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻓﻬﻢ ]ﺹ ‪ [8‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻧﺒﻴﺎﺋﻬﻢ« ﻭﻏﲑﻩ‪ ،‬ﻓﻴﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ‬
‫ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻭﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺼﺪ ﺑﻪ‪ .‬ﻓﺄﻗﻮﻝ‪ :‬ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻫﻮ ﲣﻄﺌﺔ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﻌﺾ ﺍﻵﺧﺮ ﺃﻭ‬
‫ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﺁﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﻮﻓﺎﻕ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻢ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻟﺼﺎﺣﺒﻪ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ‬
‫ﻗﻮﻳﻢ ﻭﺇﻥ ﺍﺧﺘﻠﻔﺎ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻴﺲ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺍﳌﺬﻣﻮﻡ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﻳﺪﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻭﺟﻮﻩ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ‪ :‬ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻜﻠﻴﻒ ﺍﷲ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﲟﺎ ﺃﺩﻯ‬
‫ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﺃﻣﺮ ﻳﻘﺘﻀﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﻗﻊ‪ ،‬ﻓﻜﻴﻒ ﻳﻜﻠﻒ ﺍﷲ ﲟﺎ‬
‫ﺻﻮﺏ ﺍخملﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺼﺤﺎﺑﺔ ﻭﻫﻮ ﺍﳊﺠﺔ ﰲ ﺇﺻﺎﺑﺔ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻧﻬﻰ ﻋﻨﻪ؟ ﻭﻣﻨﻬﺎ‪ :‬ﺃﻥ ﺍﷲ ﻗﺪ ﹼ‬
‫ﻗﺒﻴﺤﺎ ﻟﺬﺍﺗﻪ ﱂ ﻳﺼﻮﺑﻪ ﺍﷲ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎﺗﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﻧﻬﻰ ﻋﻨﻪ‬ ‫ﻓﻠﻮ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﹰ‬
‫ﻭﻗﺒﺤﻪ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻪ ﻭﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ‪ .‬ﻭﻣﻨﻬﺎ‪ :‬ﺣﺪﻳﺚ ﺃﺑﻲ ﻟﺒﺎﺑﺔ ﻭﻋﻤﺮ ﻭﻫﻮ ﻣﺸﻬﻮﺭ ﰲ ﻛﺘﺐ‬
‫ﹼ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺼﺤﻴﺢ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻓﻬﻤﺎ ﰲ ﻗﺮﺍﺀﺓ ﺣﺮﻑ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﷲ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎﻧﺘﻬﻴﺎ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﻨﱯ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‬
‫ﻓﺼﻮﺏ ﻛ ﹰﻼ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﰲ ﻗﺮﺍﺀﺗﻪ ﻭﻧﻬﺎﻫﻤﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻛﺎﻟﺘﻨﺼﻴﺺ ﻋﻠﻰ‬ ‫ﻭﺁﻟﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﻢ ﹼ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺮﺍﺩ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺚ‪ ،‬ﻓﻴﻌﻮﺩ ﺍﻟﻜﻼﻡ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻨﻜﺮﻱ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻤﺬﻫﺐ ﻭﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﻧﺘﻘﺎﺻﻬﻢ‬
‫ﻭﻣﻘﺘﻬﻢ ﻫﻮ ﻋﲔ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﻣﺎ ﺃﻥ ﹼﻳﺪﻋﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻊ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﲟﺎ ﱂ‬
‫ﻳﺄﺫﻥ ﺑﻪ ﺍﷲ ﻓﻤﻤﺎ ﻳﺒﻌﺪ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺍﺏ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﻻ ﻳﺘﻌﲔ ﺍﳊﻖ ﰲ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﻓﻴﻌﻠﻢ ﺃﻥ ﻣﺎ ﺳﻮﺍﻩ‬
‫ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻊ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﻬﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺴﲑ ﻟﻼﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻳﻨـﺰﺍﺡ ﺍﻹﺷﻜﺎﻝ ﻭﺗﺘﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺍﻷﺩﻟﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻣﻨﻬﺎ‪ :‬ﺃﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﻋﻬﺪ ﺍﻟﺼﺤﺎﺑﺔ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻵﻥ ﱂ ﻳﺰﻝ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ ﺷﺎ ﹰﺋﻌﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻧﻜﲑ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺪ ﺻﺢ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻔﻌﻠﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﻮﱄ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻜﻮﺗﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻦ ﲡﺘﻤﻊ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺿﻼﻟﺔ ﻓﻴﺒﻌﺪ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻫﻮ ﺍﳌﺮﺍﺩ‬
‫ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻬﻲ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑﺎﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻬﻲ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺃﺻﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺻﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ ﻗﻄﻌﻲ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﻭﻗﻮﻉ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﰲ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﺃﻣﺮ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻗﻄﻌﻲ ﻗﺪ ﻭﻗﻊ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ ﻭﻭﺟﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ‬
‫ﻣﺄﻣﻮﺭﺍ ﲟﺎ ﺃﺩﻯ‬
‫ﻟﻀﺮﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻦ ﻳﻨﻬﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻤﺎ ﺃﻣﺮ ﺑﻪ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﹰ‬
‫ﺃﻣﺮﺍ ﻧﻬﻰ ﻋﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻦ ﲡﻤﻊ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺧﻼﻑ‬ ‫ﻳﺼﻮﺏ ﹰ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﻣﻨﻬﻴﺎ ﻋﻦ ﳐﺎﻟﻔﺔ ﻏﲑﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻦ ﹼ‬
‫ﹰ‬ ‫ﺇﻟﻴﻪ‬
‫ﻗﻄﻌﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﺎ ﺑﻘﻲ ﺇﻻ ﺗﻔﺴﲑ ]ﺹ ‪ [9‬ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺑﺘﺨﻄﺌﺔ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﹰ‬
‫ﺑﻌﻀﺎ‪ ،‬ﻛﻤﺎ ﻳﺪﻝ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺣﺪﻳﺚ ﻋﻤﺮ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺍﺀﺓ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎﳌﻨﻬﻲ ﻋﻨﻪ ﰲ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﳊﺪﻳﺚ ﻫﻮ ﺇﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﻛﻞ‬ ‫ﹰ‬
‫ﺃﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﺍﻵﺧﺮ‪،‬‬
‫ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻵﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺼﺤﺎﺑﺔ ﳜﺘﻠﻔﻮﻥ ﻭﻫﻢ ﻳﺘﻠﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﻻ ﳜﻄﺊ ﹲ‬
‫ﻣﺎ ﺫﺍﻙ ﺇﻻ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﳏﻤﻮﻝ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻄﺌﺔ ﻟﻠﻐﲑ ﻭﺇﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ‪.‬‬
‫ﻧﻌﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﺫﻛﺮﰎ ﰲ ﺷﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﻷﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻭﻉ ﻭﺍﳋﻼﻑ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ ﻓﺬﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺴﺆﺍﻝ ﰲ ﺍﻷﺑﻴﺎﺕ‬
‫ﺍﻟﱵ ﺃﺟﺎﺏ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ‪ 79‬ﲨﺎﻋﺔ ﻫﻮ ﺇﺷﻜﺎﻝ ﺻﻌﺐ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﺭﺃﻳﺘﻢ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻳﻨﺤﻞ‪ ،‬ﺇﻥ ﺷﺎﺀ ﺍﷲ‪،‬‬
‫ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﺇﱃ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ ﻣﻦ ﺭﻓﻊ ﺍﳊﺮﺝ ﻭﺗﻴﺴﲑ ﺃﻣﺮ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﺣﺴﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻈﻦ ﺑﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﻋﺪﻡ ﺇﻃﻼﻕ ﺍﻟﻠﺴﺎﻥ ﲟﻘﺘﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺩﺃﺏ ﺍخملﻠﺼﲔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺑﺄﻥ ﻳﻘﺎﻝ‪ :‬ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ‬
‫ﺍﻟﱵ ﻳﻘﺎﻝ ﻫﻲ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ ﺃﻧـﻬﻢ ﻳﻌﻨﻮﻥ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ ﺍﳍﺎﺩﻱ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﳕﺎ ﺍﺧﺘﺺ ﺇﺳﻨﺎﺩ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‬
‫ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺰﻳﺪﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺍﻧﺘﺴﺎﺑﻬﻢ ﺇﱃ ﲨﻠﺔ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺖ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﺃﻭﻝ ﺧﺎﺭﺝ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﻴﻤﻦ ﻭﺑﻪ ﲡﺪﺩ ﻫﺬﺍ‬
‫ﺍﻻﻧﺘﺴﺎﺏ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺎﻥ ﺃﺣﺪ ﳎﺘﻬﺪﻳﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎﻟﻘﺼﺪ ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﳎﺘﻬﺪﻱ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺖ ﺑﻘﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮ‬
‫ﰲ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻴﻒ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻭﻗﺪ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﻧﺼﻪ ﲞﻼﻓﻬﺎ؟ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﺃﻣﺎ‬
‫ﻣﺬﻫﺒﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻓﺎﳌﺮﺍﺩ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺮﺭﻩ ﺍﻹﻣﺎﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﳌﺆﻳﺪ ﺑﺎﷲ ﻭﺃﺧﻮﻩ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺎﺿﻲ ﺯﻳﺪ‬
‫ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﺴﺐ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﹰ‬
‫ﺟﻞ ﺍﻟﻔﻘﻬﺎﺀ‬
‫ﻓﺈﻧﻬﻢ ﻗﺪ ﺍﻋﺘﻨﻮﺍ ﰲ ﺧﺪﻣﺔ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻭﺗﺒﻴﲔ ﻭﺟﻮﻫﻪ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺘﻨﺒﺎﻁ ﻣﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﺒﻌﻬﻢ ﹼ‬
‫ﻭﺍﻷﺋﻤﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﻨﺤﻮ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﰲ ﻛﺘﺐ ﻫﺆﻻﺀ ﻭﺍﺗﻔﻘﻮﺍ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺃﻗﻮﻯ ﳑﺎ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﻟﻪ‬
‫ﱪﺍ‪ ،‬ﻓﺮﺩﻭﺍ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻉ ﺇﱃ ﺃﺻﻠﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻵﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﳌﻄﻠﻖ‬ ‫ﹰﻧﺼﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻧﻬﻢ ﻗﺪ ﳔﻠﻮﺍ ﻛﺘﺒﻪ ﻭﺑﻠﻮﻫﺎ ﹸﺧ ﹰ‬
‫ﺇﱃ ﺍﳌﻘﻴﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍ‪‬ﻤﻞ ﺇﱃ ﺍﳌﺒﲔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺭﺟﺤﻮﺍ ﺑﲔ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻟﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺎﺭﺽ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﻳﺘﻔﻘﻮﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺇﻻ‬
‫ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ‪ :‬ﻓﻴﻬﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫‪79‬‬
‫ﻋﻦ ﺑﺼﲑﺓ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈ ﹰﺫﺍ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﰲ ﻛﺘﺐ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﺍﳌﻌﺘﻤﺪﺓ ﻻ ﺷﻚ ﰲ ﺻﺤﺔ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻬﺎ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ‬
‫ﻭﻋﻤﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻠﺪﻩ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻋﲏ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﳌﻨﺼﻮﺻﺔ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺐ ﻻ ﺍﳌﻜﺘﻮﺏ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺻﻮﺭﺓ‬
‫ﺍﳍﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺎﺀ ﻣﻄﻠ ﹰﻘﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﺮﲟﺎ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﳌﺸﺎﺋﺦ‪ ،‬ﻭﺳﻴﺄﺗﻲ‪ .‬ﻓﺈﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻬﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ‬
‫ﺻﺤﻴﺤﺔ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺑﻞ ﺍﻻﻋﺘﻤﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ‪ .‬ﻭﻫﺆﻻﺀ ﺍﻷﺋﻤﺔ ﻗﺪ ﺻﺎﺭﻭﺍ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺇﱃ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻛﺎ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ‬
‫ﺍﻵﺧﺬ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺩﺃﺏ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺃﻧـﻬﻢ ]ﺹ ‪[10‬‬
‫ﻳﺴﺘﻨﺒﻄﻮﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺃﺋﻤﺘﻬﻢ ﻭﳛﻤﻠﻮﻥ ﺍﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳌﻘﻴﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳋﺎﺹ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻷﻭﻝ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻵﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﱰﺟﻴﺢ ﰲ ﺍﳌﺘﻌﺎﺭﺿﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﺇﱃ ﻏﲑ ﺫﻟﻚ ﳑﺎ ﻳﺼﻨﻌﻪ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻭﺇﻥ ﺷﻨﻊ‬
‫ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺍﳌﺘﺄﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺷﺎﺋﻊ ﻣﺸﻬﻮﺭ ﺑﲔ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﺍﻷﺭﺑﻌﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺴﻤﻮﻥ ﺻﺎﺣﺒﻪ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ‬
‫ﻣﺬﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟـﻬﻢ ﰲ ﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ ﲝﺚ ﰲ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﺍﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﻭﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‪ .‬ﻭﺃﻛﱶ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ‬
‫ﻭﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺍﺩﻋﻰ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ ﺍﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻧﻜﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﻣﻘﺘﺼﺮﻭﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﹼ‬
‫ﺍﺩﻋﺎﻩ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻓﺎﻹﻣﺎﻣﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺎﺿﻲ ﺯﻳﺪ ﻭﳓﻮﻫﻢ ﻫﻢ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﻘﺎﻝ ﻓﻴﻬﻢ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﳜﺘﺎﺭ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﻨﺒﻂ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺪﻫﻢ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻹﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﳌﻬﺪﻱ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻘﻴﻪ‬
‫ﻳﻮﺳﻒ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻘﻴﻪ ﺣﺴﻦ ﻭﳓﻮﻫﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﺎ ﻗﺮﺭﻩ ﻫﺆﻻﺀ ﻓﻼ ﺷﻚ ﰲ ﺻﺤﺔ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ ﺇﱃ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﻥ‬
‫ﺍخملﺮﺝ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺇﻻ ﻣﺎ ﲢﺘﻤﻠﻪ ﺍﻷﺩﻟﺔ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﺎﺭﺍﺕ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ‬
‫ﻛﺎﻥ ﲣﺮ ﹰﳚﺎ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺽ ﺃﻥ ﹶ‬
‫ﺍﶈﻤﺪﻳﹼﺔ ﰲ ﺍﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﻏﲑ ﺧﺎﺭﻕ ﻟﻺﲨﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻞ ﻗﻮﻝ ﻗﺪ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﰲ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﻓﻼ ﺣﺮﺝ ﻋﻠﻰ‬
‫ﻣﻘﻠﺪ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻻ ﻳﻜﺎﺩ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﻗﻮﻝ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﳌﺪﻭﻧﺔ ﰲ ﻛﺘﺐ ﺍﻟﻔﻘﻪ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻗﺪ ﻋﻤﻞ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﻗﻂ ﺇﻻ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺫﻛﺮﻩ ﻟﺒﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﻧﻘﺮﺍﺽ ﻗﺎﺋﻠﻪ ﻭﻭﻗﻮﻉ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻼﻓﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻻ‬
‫ﻳﺸﱰﻁ ﰲ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ ﺃﻥ ﻻ ﻳﺴﺒﻘﻪ ﺧﻼﻑ‪ ،‬ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻌﺮﻭﻑ ﻣﺒﲔ‪ .‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺍﶈﻔﻮﻅ ﻋﻦ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺸﺎﺋﺦ ﻓﻴﻘﻊ ﺍﻹﺷﻜﺎﻝ ﺣﻴﺚ ﳜﺘﻠﻔﻮﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺣﻴﺚ ﳜﺘﻠﻔﻮﻥ ﻻ ﺇﺷﻜﺎﻝ ﺃ ﹰﻳﻀﺎ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﻧﻔﺲ‬
‫ﺍﻷﻣﺮ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺍﳌﻘﺮﺭﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺇﱃ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﻛﺎﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ‬
‫ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻋﲏ ﺃﻥ ﻛﻼ ﻗﺪ ﺭﺩ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﳌﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺇﱃ ﺃﺻﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﺑﺄﻱ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ‪ ،‬ﻭﻭﻗﻊ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ‬
‫ﰲ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻫﻮ ﺳﺒﺐ ﺍﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﻣﻘﺮﺭﻱ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ ﻭﻏﲑﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻻ ﻳﱰﺩﺩ ﰲ‬
‫ﻫﺬﺍ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻌﺮﻓﻪ‪ .‬ﻓﺬﻟﻚ ﳏﻞ ﻧﻈﺮ‪ ،80‬ﻓﺎﳌﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺮﺭﻩ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﻣﻘﻴﺪﺍ‪ ،‬ﻓﻴﻜﻮﻥ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺮﺭﻩ ﺍﳌﻔﱵ ﻭﺍﻟﺸﺎﻣﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﺤﻮﱄ ﻭﺍﳌﺘﻮﻛﻞ‬ ‫ﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﺍ ﻣﻄﻠ ﹰﻘﺎ ﺃﻭ ﹰ‬
‫ﹰ‬ ‫ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‬
‫ﰲ ﺍﳍﺎﻣﺶ‪ :‬ﺃﻱ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻭﻗﻊ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﰲ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﻩ‪ ،‬ﻣﻨﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪80‬‬

‫ﻭﳓﻮﻫﻢ ﻣﻮﺛﻮ ﹰﻗﺎ ﺑﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﺎ‪ ،81‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﺇﻥ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﻫﺆﻻﺀ ﺇﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻫﻢ ]ﺹ ‪[11‬‬
‫ﹰ‬
‫ﻷﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﻭﻳﺼﺢ ﺃ ﹰﻳﻀﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻘﺎﻝ‪ :‬ﻫﻮ ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻫﻢ ﻷﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﻗﻮﺍﻋﺪ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﻛﻞ‬
‫ﻳﻘﺮﺭ ﻣﺎ ﳜﺘﺎﺭﻩ ﻭﻟﻴﺲ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻨﻴﻊ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺇﻻ ﺍﺳﺎﺀﺓ ﻇﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻋﺘﻘﺎﺩ ﺃﻧـﻬﻢ ﱂ ﻳﺘﺒﻌﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ‬
‫ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﰲ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺰﻛﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻭﲪﻞ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺤﺮﻱ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﻟﻎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍ‪‬ﺎﺯﻓﺔ ﻭﺍﳉﻬﻞ‬
‫ﲟﺎ ﳚﺐ ﷲ ﻭﻟﺮﺳﻮﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﺒﻮﺩﻳﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﳜﻔﻰ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺿﻴﻖ ﺍﻟﻌﻄﻦ ﺇﺫ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ ﺃﻭﺳﻊ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺃﻥ ﳛﺠﺮﻫﺎ ﺃﺣﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺮﻳﺞ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﻟﻜﻞ ﺃﺣﺪ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺇﻻ ﺍﳌﻔﻬﻮﻡ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﻣﻨﻄﻮﻗﻪ ﻭﻻ ﺷﻚ ﰲ ﺻﺤﺔ ﻗﻮﻝ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻘﻮﻝ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻠﻔﻆ ﹸﻳﻔﻬﻢ ﻣﻨﻪ ﻛﺬﺍ ﺑﺄﻱ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻄﺮﻕ‬
‫ﺍﳌﻌﺮﻭﻓﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﻦ ﺃﻧﻜﺮ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺮﻳﺞ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻳـ ﹶﺨ ﹺﹼﺮﺝ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻻ ﻳﺸﻌﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻮ‬
‫ﹸ‬
‫ﺑﺎﻋﺘﻘﺎﺩﻩ ﺃﻥ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻡ ﻛﻼﻡ ﻓﻼﻥ ﻳﻘﻀﻲ ﺑﻜﺬﺍ ﻭﺭﲟﺎ ﻳﺼﻴﺐ ﺃﻭ ﳜﻄﺊ‪.‬‬
‫ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪﺍ ﻟﻪ ﻛﺎﻷﻭﻝ«‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﺍﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ ﰲ‬‫ﺃﻣﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻳﺮﺩ ﺍﻟﺴﺆﺍﻝ ﰲ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ‪» :‬ﻛﺎﻥ ﹰ‬
‫ﻣﻨﺼﻮﺻﺎ ﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻻ ﺫﻛﺮ ﰲ ﻛﺘﺐ ﺃﺋﻤﺔ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ‬‫ﹰ‬ ‫ﻫﺬﺍ ﺃﻥ ﻫﺆﻻﺀ ﺇﳕﺎ ﻳﻘﺮﺭﻭﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺘﻘﺪﻣﲔ ﺑﺘﻨﺼﻴﺺ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﰲ ﻋﲔ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺍﳌﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻓﻴﺤﻜﻢ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻫﺆﻻﺀ ﺍﳌﺘﺄﺧﺮﻭﻥ ﺑﺄﻧﻪ‬
‫ﺭﺩﺍ ﻟﻪ ﺇﱃ ﺃﺻﻞ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺻﻮﻝ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺑﺔ ﰲ ﻋﻠﻮﻣﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺪﺭﻳﺔ ﲟﻘﺘﻀﻰ‬ ‫ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﹰ‬
‫ﻳﺴﻮﻍ ﳍﻢ ﺍﳊﻜﻢ ﺑﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻣﻦ ﲪﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳌﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﺍﻋﺪ‬ ‫ﻣﻨﻄﻮﻗﻪ ﻭﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﺎ ﹼ‬
‫ﺑﻄﺮﻕ ﺍﻟﻘﻴﺎﺱ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺴﺐ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﺮﻭﻑ ﻟﻠﻤﺨﺮﺟﲔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺇﻻ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻘﻬﺎﺀ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﺧﻼ ﹰﻓﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺤﺮﺟﲔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻥ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﳌﻘﺮﺭ ﰲ ﺃﻱ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﳚﻮﺯ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﻠﺪ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‬
‫ﳎﺘﻬﺪﺍ‪ ،‬ﺃﻭ ﻷﻱ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪﺍ ﻟﻠﻬﺎﺩﻱ ﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﺃﻭ ﻟﻠﻤﺨﺮﺝ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﹰ‬
‫ﹰ‬
‫ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﻗﺪ ﻗﺎﻝ ﺑﻪ‪ .‬ﺇﺫ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﺽ ﺃﻥ ﺍﳌﻘﺮﺭﺍﺕ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﺧﺎﺭﻗﺔ ﻟﻺﲨﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻮﻝ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳌﻘﺮﺭﺍﺕ‬
‫ﺇﻻ ﻗﺪ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻃﺎﺋﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﺍﳌﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﺃﻧﻚ ﲡﺪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﳌﻘﺮﺭ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺍﻓﻖ ﳌﺬﻫﺐ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ ﺃﻭ ﺃﺑﻲ ﺣﻨﻴﻔﺔ ﺃﻭ ﻏﲑﻫﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ‪ .‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﻓﺈﺫﺍ ﻭﺟﺪﻧﺎ ﻗﻮ ﹰﻻ ﱂ ﻳﻘﻞ ﺑﻪ ﺃﺣﺪ‪.‬‬
‫ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﺃﻣﺎ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻓﻤﺎ ﺃﺭﺍﻩ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﻥ ﻭﻗﻊ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﺫ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺩﺭ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻐﺎﻟﻂ ﺍخملﺮﺟﲔ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ‬
‫ﺻﺤﻴﺤﺔ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﺃﻣﻌﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻇﺮ ﰲ ﺗﺼﻔﺢ ﻣﺂﺧﺬﻩ ﺍﺗﻀﺢ ﻟﻪ ﻫﺬﺍ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﻭﻗﻊ ﰲ ﻛﻞ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﺷﺬﻭﺫ‬
‫ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﻳﻘﻮﻟﻮﻥ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ‪ :‬ﻫﺬﺍ ﺧﺮﻭﺝ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻹﲨﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﻭﺩﻳﻦ ﺍﷲ ﳏﻔﻮﻅ ﻭﺣﻔﺎﻇﻪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻳﻌﺔ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺞ ﻭﺍﻟﻨﻬﻲ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻤﺬﻫﺐ ﻗﺪ ﺭﻣﻮﺍ ﺍﻷﻣﺔ ﺑﺈﺿﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻭﺯﻋﻤﻮﺍ ﺃﻧـﻬﻢ ﻳﺮﻳﺪﻭﻥ‬
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‫ﺣﻔﻈﻪ ﻓﻴﺒﻌﺪ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﷲ ﻗﺪ ﺃﺿﺎﻉ ﺍﳉﻤﻬﻮﺭ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳊﻔﻆ ﻭﺍﻟﻮﻗﺎﻳﺔ ﻭﳊﻆ ﺇﱃ ﻫﺆﻻﺀ ﺑﻌﲔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﻨﺎﻳﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﺍﻋﻠﻢ ﺃ ﹰﻳﻀﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻨﺎ ﻫﻮ‪ 82‬ﻣﺎ ﺟﺮﻯ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﺍﻷﺭﺑﻌﺔ ﻓﻜﻞ ﺇﻣﺎﻡ‬
‫ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻟﻪ ﺃﺋﻤﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﺩﻭﻧﻮﺍ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻭﺣﺮﺭﻭﻩ ﻭﻗﺮﺭﻭﻩ ﻭﺭﺩﻭﺍ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻵﺧﺮ ﻭﺍﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﺇﱃ‬
‫ﺍﳌﻘﻴﺪ ﺇﱃ ﻏﲑ ﺫﻟﻚ ﳑﺎ ﻳﺼﻨﻌﻪ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﰲ ﺍﺳﺘﻨﺒﺎﻃﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻫﻮ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﺍﺧﺘﻠﻔﻮﺍ ﺃ ﹰﻳﻀﺎ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﻫﻢ ﻳﺮﺩﻭﻥ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﻳﻨﺺ‬
‫ﺣﺬﻭ ﺍﻟﻘﺬﺓ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺬﺓ‪،‬‬
‫ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺇﱃ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ ﺑﻄﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺮﻳﺞ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﺘﻨﺒﺎﻁ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺭﺃﻳﺖ ﰲ ﺃﻫﻞ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻨﺎ ﹶ‬
‫ﻭﻫﻜﺬﺍ ]ﺹ ‪ [12‬ﺍﳊﻨﻔﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﳌﺎﻟﻜﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻴﺔ ﻳﻘﻮﻟﻮﻥ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﺍﺑﻦ ﺣﺠﺮ ﻛﺬﺍ ﻭﻗﺮﺭ ﺍﻟﺮﻣﻠﻲ‬
‫ﻛﺬﺍ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﻮﻟﻮﻥ‪ :‬ﻫﺬﺍ ﻗﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻗﻴﲔ‪ ،‬ﻫﺬﺍ ﻗﻮﻝ ﺍﳋﺮﺍﺳﺎﻧﻴﲔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻋﻤﺪﺗـﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺋﻤﺔ‬
‫ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻬﻢ ﻛﺎﻟﺸﲑﺍﺯﻱ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺍﳌﻬﺬﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﻐﺰﺍﱄ ﻭﻏﲑﻫﻤﺎ ﳑﻦ ﻻ ﳛﺼﺮ ﳜﺘﻠﻔﻮﻥ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ‬
‫ﻛﺜﲑﺍ ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﰲ ﻏﲑ ﺍﳌﻨﺼﻮﺹ ﻟﻠﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺎﺭﻳﺞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ‪ .‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﻗﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﻘﺎﺿﻲ ﻃﻪ‬ ‫ﹰ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺩﺓ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺟﺒﻠﺔ ﺣﲔ ﺑﻠﻎ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺴﺆﺍﻝ‪ :‬ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺋﻦ ﰲ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺖ‬
‫ﻧﻈﲑ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻘﻬﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺴﺆﺍﻝ ﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻜﻞ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻳﺒﻘﻰ ﺍﻹﺷﻜﺎﻝ ﰲ ﺷﻲﺀ‬
‫ﺁﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻮ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻷﺻﻞ ﰲ ﺍﻻﻧﺘﺴﺎﺏ ﻟﻠﺸﻴﻌﺔ ﺍﻟﺰﻳﺪﻳﺔ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﺘﻤﺴﻚ ﲜﻤﻠﺔ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺖ‪ ،‬ﻓﻤﺎ ﺑﺎﻝ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻔﻘﻬﺎﺀ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻳﻘﺼﺮﻭﻥ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻮﻝ ﳛﻴﻰ ﻭﻳﻄﺮﺣﻮﻥ ﻗﻮﻝ ﺯﻳﺪ ﻭﻋﻤﺮﻭ‪ ،‬ﻓﻜﺎﻥ ﺍﻷﻧﺴﺐ‬
‫ﺃﻥ ﳚﻌﻞ ﺍﻷﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﰲ ﻣﻌﺮﺽ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺍﺀ ﻓﻴﺄﺧﺬ ﺍﳍﺎﺩﻭﻱ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻭﺍﳌﺆﻳﺪﻱ ﻭﺍﻟﺰﻳﺪﻱ ﻭﺗﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﳉﻤﻠﺔ‬
‫ﻛﺸﻲﺀ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻗﺪ ﻛﺮﺭﻩ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺍﳉﻮﺍﺏ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺴﺆﺍﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﳋﻄﺐ ﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻏﲑ‬
‫ﺍﳓﻞ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻓﺤﻠﻪ ﻳﺴﲑ‪ ،‬ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﺃﻥ ﺍﳌﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺍﻟﺸﻴﻌﺔ ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﲨﻠﺔ ﺃﻫﻞ‬ ‫ﻋﺴﲑ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﺫﺍ ﹼ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺖ ﻭﺃﻱ ﺇﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﺗﺒﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﻓﻘﺪ ﲤﺴﻜﻨﺎ ﺑﺎﳊﺒﻞ ﺍﳌﻮﺻﻞ ﺇﱃ ﺍﷲ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﻜﲑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺎﻟﻒ‬
‫ﻣﺬﻫﺐ ﳛﻴﻰ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻗﻮ ﹰﻻ ﳉﻤﻴﻊ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﺑﻞ ﻭﻻ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﻻ ﻳﻨﻜﺮﻩ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﻭﺇﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ‬
‫ﻧﺎﺷﺊ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﺼﺒﻴﺔ ﻭﻫﻮ ﺍﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﻋﺎﻣﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻣﺎ ﺍﳋﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻬﻢ ﲟﻌﺰﻝ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻹﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻠﺪ ﻏﲑ‬
‫ﺍﳍﺎﺩﻱ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺖ ﻭﺧﺎﻟﻒ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺍﳍﺎﺩﻱ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻨﻜﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﺃﺧﺬ ﺑﻘﻮﻝ ﻏﲑﻩ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻘﻠﺪ ﻗﻠﹼﺪ ﻏﲑﻩ‪ ،‬ﻓﻜﻮﻥ ﻋﻘﺪ ﺍﻟﻀﻤﲑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻤﺴﻚ ﺑﻮﻻﺀ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺖ ﻭﺍﻷﺧﺬ ﺑﻘﻮﻝ‬
‫ﺃﻱ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻭﺗﺮﻙ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺼﺐ ﻷﻫﻠﻪ ﻫﻮ ﺍﳌﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺍﻟﺼﺎﺩﻗﲔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺻﺪﻗﺖ ﺍﳌﻮﺍﻻﺓ‬
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‫ﺍﳌﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳋﻠﻖ ﻓﻼ ﻳﻀﺮ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺃﻫ ﹰﻼ ﻣﻦ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ‪ ،‬ﺇﳕﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺼﺪ ﻫﻮ‬
‫ﺻﺪﻕ ﺍﳌﻮﺍﻻﺓ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻤﺎ ﺑﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﻐﻠﺒﺔ ﻟﻐﲑ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﶈﻘﻘﲔ ﻭﻫﻼ ﺃﻇﻬﺮ‬
‫ﻭﺍﺣﺪﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﺋﻤﺔ؟ ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﲦﺔ ﻧﻜﺘﺔ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ‬‫ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻭﺑﻴﻨﻮﺍ ﺍﺳﺘﻮﺍﺀ ﺍﻟﻄﺮﻕ ﳌﻦ ﻗﻠﺪ ﹰ‬
‫ﻣﻘﺮﺭﺍ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻨﺒﻪ ﳍﺎ ﻭﻫﻲ ﺃﻥ ﺍﳉﺎﺭﻱ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﺩﺓ ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ ﻃﻮﺍﺋﻒ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﹰ‬
‫]ﺹ ‪ [13‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻘﻮﺍﻋﺪ ﺍﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮﺓ ﺍﳌﻌﺮﻭﻓﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﺎﺹ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﺫﺍ ﺍﺗﻔﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﺃﻣﺮ ﳐﺎﻟﻒ ﻟﻠﻘﻮﺍﻋﺪ ﺍﳌﺄﻧﻮﺳﺔ ﳑﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻨﺪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺋﻬﻢ ﻭﳏﻘﻘﻴﻬﻢ ﺻﺤﻴﺢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻮ ﻋﻨﺪ‬
‫ﻋﺎﻣﺘﻬﻢ ﺑﻞ ﻭﺧﺎﺻﺘﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﻘﺼﺮﻭﻥ ﻋﻦ ﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﺍﶈﻘﻘﲔ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻏﲑ ﺻﺤﻴﺢ‪ ،‬ﺃﻧﻜﺮ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺭﻣﺎﻩ‬
‫ﺃﻫﻞ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻗﻮﺱ ﻭﺍﺣﺪﺓ ﻭﱂ ﳚﺴﺮ ﺃﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺋﻬﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﺒﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻﺤﺔ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍخملﺎﻟﻒ‬
‫ﻭﺟﻬﺎ ﰲ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺭﻣﻮﻩ ﺃ ﹰﻳﻀﺎ ﲟﺎ ﺭﻣﻮﺍ ﺑﻪ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﻓﻴﺤﺘﺎﺝ ﺇﱃ‬‫ﳌﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ ﻭﺃﻥ ﻟﻪ ﹰ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻴﺔ ﻭﳑﺎﺷﺎﺓ ﺃﻫﻞ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﲟﺎ ﺗﻘﺒﻠﻪ ﻋﻘﻮﳍﻢ ﻭﻋﻠﻮﻣﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﰲ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ‬
‫ﺃﺷﺎﺭ ﺍﺑﻦ ﺩﻗﻴﻖ ﺍﻟﻌﻴﺪ ﺇﱃ ﺗﺮﻙ ﺍﻟﺮﻓﻊ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺍﻻﻋﺘﺪﺍﻝ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺴﺠﻮﺩ ﻭﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ ﺛﺒﻮﺕ ﺍﳊﺪﻳﺚ‬
‫ﺑﻪ ﺑﺄﻥ ﺍﻹﺑﻘﺎﺀ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺽ ﻭﺍﺟﺐ ﰲ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺑﻠﺪﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﺗﺮﻙ ﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻭﺍﺟﺐ‪ ،‬ﻫﺬﺍ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﻭﻫﻮ‬
‫ﺷﺮﻋﺎ ﻭﻋﻘ ﹰﻼ‪ ،‬ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﻟﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﻐﻠﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻮﺍﻡ ﻭﻣﻦ ﻳﻘﺼﺮ ﻋﻦ ﺑﻠﻮﻍ ﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﺍﶈﻘﻘﲔ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﺻﺤﻴﺢ ﹰ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻞ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻱ ﻓﺮﻗﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻕ ﻻ ﺑﺪ ﻭﺃﻥ ﺗﻠﺠﺌﻪ ﺍﳊﺎﻝ ﺇﱃ ﻛﺘﻢ ﺷﻲﺀ ﳑﺎ ﻳﺆﺩﻱ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮﻩ ﻟﺒﻌﺪ ﺍﻷﺫﻫﺎﻥ ﻋﻦ ﻗﺒﻮﻟﻪ‪ ،‬ﺳﻴﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺒﺤﺮ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﻭﻋﺮﻑ ﻣﺎ ﳚﻬﻠﻪ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻢ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﺫﻟﻚ ﳉﺒﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﻮﺱ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻳﻌﺮﻑ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛﻢ ﻭﻛﻢ ﻗﺪ ﻭﻗﻊ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ‬
‫ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﳜﺎﻟﻒ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺃﺻﺤﺎﺑﻪ ﻓﲑﻣﻮﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻻﺑﺘﺪﺍﻉ ﻭﺍﳋﺮﻭﺝ ﻋﻦ ﺩﺍﺋﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻉ‪ .‬ﻭﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺘﻬﺪ‬
‫ﺇﺫﺍ ﻭﻗﻊ ﻧﻈﺮﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﻲﺀ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﻟﱵ ﱂ ﺗﺆﻧﺲ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﺘﻤﻪ ﻭﻗﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻌﺮﺿﻪ ﻭﻟﻘﺼﻮﺭ ﺍﻷﻓﻬﺎﻡ ﻋﻦ‬
‫ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻗﺼﺪﻩ ﻟﻘﻮﻟﻪ ﺻﻠﻰ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻭﺁﻟﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﻢ‪» :‬ﺧﺎﻃﺒﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﺑﻘﺪﺭ ﻋﻘﻮﳍﻢ« ﻓﺮﲟﺎ ﻳﻠﺠﺄ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﺇﱃ ﻛﺘﻤﺎﻥ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻭﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻩ ﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﻟﻔﻬﻢ ﳌﺮﺍﺩﻩ ﻭﺇﺳﺎﺀﺓ ﺍﻟﻈﻦ ﺑﻪ ﺳﻴﻤﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺍﳌﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻌﻴﺪﺓ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻷﺫﻫﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻠﻴﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﺭﺍﻥ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﺫﻛﺮ ﻋﺪﺓ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻭﲡﺮﻣﻮﺍ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ‬
‫ﻋﺼﺮﻫﻢ ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻬﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎﻟﺴﻴﻮﻃﻲ ﻗﺪ ﺫﻛﺮ ﺷﻴﺌ ﹰﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺇﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﺃﻫﻞ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ ﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﺍﺗﻪ‬
‫ﺣﺘﻰ ﺃﻧﻪ ﺫﻛﺮ ﺷﻴﺌ ﹰﺎ ﻻ ﻳﺬﻛﺮﻩ ﻋﺎﱂ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻮ ﺃﻧﻪ ﺍﻋﱰﺽ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺴﺎﺭﻉ ﺇﱃ ﺍﻹﻓﺘﺎﺀ ﻭﻫﻮ ﺷﺎﺏ‪ ،‬ﺛﻢ‬
‫ﺗﻜﻠﻢ ﰲ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻭﺭﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺎﺋﻠﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻧﺎﻫﻴﻚ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻹﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻫﻮ ﲟﻌﺰﻝ ﻋﻦ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﳊﺎﺻﻞ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﻗﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺇﻧﻜﺎﺭ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﳌﻦ ﺍﻧﻔﺮﺩ ﺑﺸﻲﺀ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻟﻪ ﺩﻭﻥ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‬
‫ﺃﻫﻞ ﳏﻠﻪ ﻭﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻣﺸﻬﻮﺭ ﻣﺬﻛﻮﺭ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﻟﻠﻤﺘﻘﺪﻣﲔ ﺑﺎﻻﺧﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﻷﻫﻞ ﻛﻞ ﻋﺼﺮ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻨﺸﺄ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﺪﺍﻭﺍﺕ ﺑﲔ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ﻓﻠﻮ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﻳﱰﻙ ﻭﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ ]ﺹ ‪ [14‬ﺃﻭ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﻟﻈﻬﺮ‬
‫ﻛﻞ ﺃﺣﺪ ﲟﺎ ﺃﺭﺍﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﺃﻣﺮ ﻭﺍﻗﻊ ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ ﺍﻷﻗﻄﺎﺭ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻴﺔ ﻣﺜ ﹰﻼ ﻗﺪ ﺍﺳﺘﻘﺮ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺃﻫﻞ ﻣﺼﺮ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﳌﺘﺄﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﻛﺎﻟﺮﻣﻠﻲ ﻣﺜ ﹰﻼ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﻴﻤﻦ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ‬
‫ﻳﻌﺘﻤﺪﻭﻥ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﺑﻦ ﺣﺠﺮ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻮ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻧﺴﺎﻧﹰﺎ ﻋﻤﻞ ﰲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﲟﺎ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﻪ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﻴﻤﻦ ﱂ ﻳﺄﻣﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ‬
‫ﻭﺗﺸﺪﺩﺍ ﰲ ﺣﻔﻆ ﺍﳌﺮﺍﻛﺰ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺰﻳﺪﻳﺔ ﻭﻟﻦ ﲡﺪ ﺃﺳﻠﻢ ﻭﺃﻟﲔ‬ ‫ﹰ‬ ‫ﻭﺗﻌﺼﺒﺎ‬
‫ﹰ‬ ‫ﻧﻔﺴﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻫﻢ ﺃﺷﺪ ﻏﻠﻈﺔ‬
‫ﻭﺃﺑﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﻴﻤﻦ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻮ ﺃﻧﻲ ﺍﺳﺘﻘﺼﻲ ﺷﻴﺌ ﹰﺎ ﳑﺎ ﻗﺪ ﺭﺃﻳﺘﻪ ﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺮﻡ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻫﻞ‬ ‫ﹼ‬
‫ﻣﺬﻫﺒﻪ ﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻩ ﻣﺎ ﳜﺎﻟﻔﻬﻢ ﻟﺬﻛﺮﺕ ﺃﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﺍ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻌﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻋﺬﺭ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻻ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ‬
‫ﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﻫﻢ ﻭﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻫﻢ ﻷﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ ﻣﻊ ﺑﻠﻮﻏﻬﻢ ﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﺍﻟﻜﻤﺎﻝ ﻓﺈ ﹰﺫﺍ ﻳﻨـﺰﺍﺡ ﺍﻋﱰﺍﺽ ﻣﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻎ ﰲ‬
‫ﻣﻘﺘﻬﻢ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﻧﻘﻞ ﺍﻟﺴﻤﻬﻮﺩﻱ‪ 83‬ﻋﻦ ﺃﺑﻲ ﺯﺭﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻗﻲ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺎﻝ ﻣﺮﺓ ﻟﺸﻴﺨﻪ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﻘﻴﲏ‪ :‬ﻣﺎ‬
‫ﻳﻘﺼﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﻴﺦ ﺗﻘﻲ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﺴﺒﻜﻲ ﻋﻦ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ ﻭﻗﺪ ﺍﺳﺘﻜﻤﻞ ﺍﻵﻟﺔ؟ ﻭﻛﻴﻒ ﻳﻘﻠﺪ؟ ﻗﺎﻝ‪ :‬ﻭﱂ‬
‫ﺃﺫﻛﺮﻩ ﻫﻮ‪ ،‬ﺃﻱ ﺷﻴﺨﻪ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﻘﻴﲏ‪ ،‬ﺍﺳﺘﺤﻴﺎﺀ ﻣﻨﻪ ﳌﺎ ﺃﺭﻳﺪ ﺃﻥ ﺃﺭﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻓﺴﻜﺖ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﻠﺖ‪:‬‬
‫ﻣﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻱ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎﻉ ﻣﻦ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺇﻻ ﻟﻠﻮﻇﺎﺋﻒ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻗﺮﺭﺕ ﻟﻠﻔﻘﻬﺎﺀ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﺍﻷﺭﺑﻌﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻥ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺧﺮﺝ ﻋﻦ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻭﺍﺟﺘﻬﺪ ﱂ ﻳﻨﻠﻪ ﺷﻲﺀ ﻣﻦ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻭﺍﻣﺘﻨﻊ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻣﻦ ﺍﺳﺘﻔﺘﺎﺋﻪ ﻭﺳﻠﺐ ﺍﻟﺪﻋﺔ‪،‬‬
‫ﻓﺘﺒﺴﻢ ﻭﻭﺍﻓﻘﲏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ‪ ،‬ﺍﻧﺘﻬﻰ‪ .‬ﻭﺑﺒﻌﺾ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻳﺴﻮﻍ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺘﻬﺪ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻴﺔ ﻭﻫﻮ ﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻋﺎﻣﻞ ﰲ‬
‫ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳌﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺑﺎﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﻩ ﻭﻋﻤﻠﻪ ﻛﻠﻪ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺑﻴﻨﻪ ﻭﺑﲔ ﺍﷲ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻔﺮﻭﺽ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻴﺲ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺷﺮﻁ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﻩ ﻟﻠﻨﺎﺱ ﻭﻳﺒﲔ ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻩ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﰲ ﻋﲔ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺎ ﺫﻛﺮ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺗﺎﺑﻌﺎ ﰲ ﺷﻲﺀ ﻳﻨﻜﺮﻭﻥ ﺧﻼﻓﻪ‪ ،‬ﻛﻤﺎ ﻓﻌﻞ‬ ‫ﻏﻠﺒﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻮﺍﻡ ﻓﺮﲟﺎ ﻳﻀﻄﺮ ﺃﻣﺎﻣﻬﻢ ﺍﳌﺘﺒﻮﻉ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﳍﻢ ﹰ‬
‫ﺃﺭﺑﻌﺎ ﰲ ﺻﻼﺓ ﺍﳉﻨﺎﺯﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﻟﻪ ﺃﺻﺤﺎﺑﻨﺎ ﺃﻧﻪ ﳋﺸﻴﺔ ﺍﻧﻔﻀﺎﺽ‬ ‫ﳏﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ ﺍﷲ ﰲ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﺒﲑ ﹰ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻋﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻧﻪ ﻳﺴﻮﻍ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺘﻬﺪ ﺗﺮﻙ ﺍﺟﺘﻬﺎﺩﻩ ﻟﻠﻌﺬﺭ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﺣﻜﻰ ﺍﳌﺴﻌﻮﺩﻱ ﻣﻦ ﻏﻠﺒﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﻮﺍﻡ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻫﻞ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﻮﻝ ﻭﺍﻟﻜﻤﺎﻝ ﻏﺮﺍﺋﺐ‪.‬‬
‫ﺇﺫﺍ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻓﺘﻠﻚ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﻗﻌﺔ ﰲ ﺍﳌﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﻻ ﺣﺮﺝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﳌﻘﻠﺪ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺄﻳﻬﺎ ﺷﺎﺀ‪،‬‬
‫ﺇﺫ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺧﺎﺭ ﹰﻗﺎ ﻟﻺﲨﺎﻉ‪ ،‬ﻓﺒﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﻳﺼﺢ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﻠﺪ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻭﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ ﻗﺎﺋﻠﻬﺎ ﺍﳌﻘﺮﺭ‬
‫ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺪ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻳﺪ ﰲ ﺃﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪83‬‬

‫ﳍﺎ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﺽ ﺃﻧﻪ ﳎﺘﻬﺪ ﺳﻮﺍﺀ ﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﻪ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺃﻭ ﳑﺎ ﺧﺮﺟﻪ ﻹﻣﺎﻣﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﰲ ﺫﻟﻚ‬
‫ﻟﻠﻤﺨﺮﺝ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ‪] ،‬ﺹ ‪ [15‬ﻭﻗﺪ ﺗﺮﺩﺩ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺃﻫﻞ‬
‫ﻣﺬﻫﺒﺎ ﹼ‬‫ﺍخملﺮﺝ ﹰ‬
‫ﻣﺎ ﻭﻗﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻹﺷﻜﺎﻝ ﰲ ﻋﺪ ﹼ‬
‫ﺍﻷﺻﻮﻝ‪ ،‬ﺇﺫ ﻛﻼﻡ ﺍخملﻠﻮﻕ ﻏﲑ ﳏﺮﻭﺱ ﻋﻦ ﺃﻓﻬﺎﻡ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻳﺮﻳﺪﻩ ﺍﳌﺘﻜﻠﻢ‪ ،‬ﻭﻏﲑ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﻜﻮﻙ‪،‬‬
‫ﺑﻨﺎﺀ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﺪ ﺻﺎﺭ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﺍ‪‬ﺘﻬﺪ ﻛﺎﻷﺻﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻳﺼﻨﻊ‬
‫ﻭﻗﺒﻠﻪ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ ﹰ‬
‫ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺼﻨﻊ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻭﺇﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﰲ ﺍﳉﺰﻡ ﺑﻪ ﻭﻗﻔﺔ‪ ،‬ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻻ ﺣﺮﺝ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻗﻮﻝ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﲨﻠﺔ ﺃﻗﻮﺍﻝ ﺍﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ﺍﳌﺸﻬﻮﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﱵ ﻗﺪ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻃﻮﺍﺋﻒ‪ ،‬ﻓﺈﺫﺍﹰ ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺍﻹﺷﻜﺎﻝ ﻫﻨﺎ ﺇﻻ ﰲ‬
‫ﻣﺬﻫﺒﺎ ﻟﻔﻼﻥ ﻻ ﰲ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﻠﺪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﺇﺷﻜﺎﻝ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻜﻠﻤﺎﺕ ﺗﺮﺩ‬
‫ﺍخملﺮﺝ ﹰ‬
‫ﻛﻮﻥ ﺫﻟﻚ ﹼ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺇﺷﻜﺎﻻﺕ ﻭﺗﺸﻜﻴﻜﺎﺕ ﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ﲤﺸﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ‪ 84‬ﺇﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺟﻮﻉ ﺇﱃ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻷﺻﻞ ﻭﻫﻮ ﻋﺎﺩﺓ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎﺀ ﺍﳌﻘﺮﺭﻳﻦ ﻟﻠﻤﺬﺍﻫﺐ ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ ﺃﻗﻄﺎﺭ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ ﰲ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻓﻌﻲ ﻭﺃﺑﻲ ﺣﻨﻴﻔﺔ ﻭﻏﲑﻫﻤﺎ‪،‬‬
‫ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺭﺃﻳﺖ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﺑﻞ ﻭﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺃﻋﻈﻢ ﻣﻨﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﰲ ﻋﲔ ﺍﳌﺬﻫﺐ ﺍﻧﺘﻬﻰ‪ .‬ﻛﻤﺎ ﻭﺟﺪ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺧﻂ ﺍﳌﺆﻟﻒ ﺭﺿﻮﺍﻥ ﺍﷲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ‪.‬‬
‫ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ‪ :‬ﻣﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪84‬‬

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What Makes A Mad̠hab A Mad̠hab: Zaydī Debates On The Structure of Legal Authority

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What Makes A Mad̠hab A Mad̠hab: Zaydī Debates On The Structure of Legal Authority

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Arabica 59 (2012) 332-371 brill.

What Makes a Mad̠hab a Mad̠hab:

Bernard Haykel and Aron Zysow

In the year 1134/1722 the following anonymous verses began to circulate

doctrine, came to be widely accepted by both Caspian and subsequently

The question that al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad addressed was a persistent

Jettisoning the Mad̠hab: the Two-Pronged Attack of al-Qāsim

Despite this impressive and remarkable account of the structure of authority

learning in the Zaydī-Yemeni tradition. Because there is only one correct

this examination, al-Qāsim directs him to practice precaution (al-ʿamal bi-l-

The Lineage of the Mad̠hab Aﬃrmed

Qāsim b. Muḥammad sharply distinguishes between the mad̠hab on the one

Muḥammad al-Muʾayyadī, Lawāmiʿ al-anwār, Saada, Maktabat al-turāt ̠ al-islāmī, 1414/1993,

The Mad̠hab Questioned in Verse and Prose

Preserving the Mad̠hab: the argument from infallibilism

Zaydīs, then somewhere and at some time in the community of Muslims

Šud̠ūr al-d̠ahab: an addendum to Isḥāq b. Yūsuf

Another response to the poem is presented by its author, ʿAbd Allāh b.

Yūsuf ’s commentary, which he praises as the most signiﬁcant eﬀort to answer

A Simple Solution for a Complex Problem

The High Price of Preserving the Mad̠hab

A further response to the problem to the nature of the mad̠hab is that of

Elimination of the Mad̠hab

verses that al-Ṣanʿānī treats with particular vehemence is what he considers to

b. al-Ḥ usayn68 (d. 1090/1679) whom al-Šawkānī accuses of having expur-

for example, includes considerable elements of mere personal opinion (raʾy)

In Yemen in the 12th/18th century the controversy provoked by the short

‫]ﺹ ‪ [1‬ﺍﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﻚ ﻟﻌﻘﻮﺩ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ‬

‫ﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ ﺁﻣﲔ‪.‬‬

‫ﺍﻷﺋﻤﺔ ‪ :‬ﺍﻻﻣﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫‪78‬‬

‫ﰲ ﺍﳍﺎﻣﺶ‪ :‬ﺃﻱ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻭﻗﻊ ﺍﻻﺧﺘﻼﻑ ﰲ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮﻩ‪ ،‬ﻣﻨﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪80‬‬

‫ﻫﻮ ‪ :‬ﻭ‬ ‫‪82‬‬

‫ﻛﺘﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻌﻘﺪ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻳﺪ ﰲ ﺃﺣﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪83‬‬

‫ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ‪ :‬ﻣﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣﻌﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪84‬‬

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