Succession Cases For Midterms

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018
MARGIE SANTOS MITRA, Petitioner, v. PERPETUA L. SABLAN--

GUEVARRA, REMEGIO L. SABLAN, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
This treats of a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 dated

May 22, 2013 and Resolution3 dated August 15, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93671, which reversed the
Decision4 dated February 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 128 of Caloocan City in SP. Proc. Case No. C-3450.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On June 26, 2006, Margie Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the
probate of the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi y Reyes (Legaspi) with
prayer for issuance of letters testamentary before the RTC. It was alleged
that the petitioner is the de facto adopted daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi,
single, died on December 22, 2004 in Caloocan City; that Legaspi left a
notarial will, instituting the petitioner, Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan
Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees;
that Legaspi left real and personal properties with the approximate total
value of One Million Thirty-Two Thousand and Two Hundred Thirty
Seven Pesos (P1,032,237.00); and that Legaspi named Mary Ann Castro as
the executor of the will.5
Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan (respondents), who

claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs, opposed the petition. They aver that the
will was not executed in accordance with the formalities required by law;
that since the last page of the will, which contained the Acknowledgement,
was not signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will should
be declared invalid; that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages upon which the will was written; and that the will was executed
under undue and improper pressure, thus, Legaspi could not have
intended the document to be her last will and testament.6
THE RULING OF THE RTC
On February 23, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision7 admitting Legaspi's

will to probate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court having been satisfied that
the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the time of its execution
was of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace
and undue influence, or fraud, the petition for the probate of the Huling
Habilin at Pagpapatunay of the testator Remedios Legaspi is hereby granted.
The Huling Habilin at Pagpapatunay of the testator Remedios Legaspi dated

September 27, 2004 is hereby allowed.
In the meantime, the hearing on the issuance of [the] letters testamentary to

the named executor Mary Ann Castro is hereby set on April 23, 2009.
SO ORDERED.8
The probate court explained that the last page of the will is but a mere
continuation of the Acknowledgement portion, which the testator and the
witnesses are not required to sign.9 Also, it held that inasmuch as the
number of pages upon which the will was written was stated in the
Acknowledgement, the will must be admitted to probate.10 The
respondents' allegation of undue influence or improper pressure exerted
upon Legaspi was disregarded for failure on their part to adduce evidence
proving the existence thereof.11
Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the CA.

THE RULING OF THE CA
In its assailed Decision12 dated May 22, 2013, the CA reversed the judgment
of the RTC, as the CA adhered to the view of strictly complying with the
requirement of stating the number of pages of the will in the attestation
clause. Moreover, the CA detected another supposed fatal defect in the
will: the photocopy of the will submitted by the respondents on appeal did
not contain the signatures of the instrumental witnesses on each and every
page thereof. Thus, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated February 23, 2009 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128 of Caloocan City in Special
Proceeding Case No. C-3450 for probate of the last will and testament of
the deceased Remedios Legaspi y Reyes is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
The respondents filed their motion for reconsideration a day late. Thus, the
CA denied the same in a Resolution14 dated August 15, 2014.
ISSUES
Whether the CA erred in finding that the instrumental witnesses to the will
failed to sign on each and every page thereof on the left margin, except the
last, as required under Article 805 of the Civil Code
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the failure to state the number of
pages comprising the will on the attestation clause renders such will
defective
THE RULING OF THE COURT
To begin with, the importance of complying with procedural rules can not
be over emphasized these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases.15 These are set in place to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or
whimsicality in the administration of justice.16 Nevertheless, if a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of
substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.17 "Litigations should,
as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities."18
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,19 the Court allowed the perfection of the

appeal of the Republic, despite the delay of six (6) days, since the Republic
stands to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name. This
was done in order to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice. Also, in Barnes
vs. Padilla,20 the Court suspended the rule that a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-
day period to appeal. The Court held that the procedural infirmity was not
entirely attributable to the fault of the petitioner and there was lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. Similarly,
in Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Yeung,21 the Court permitted the
delay of seven (7) days in the filing of the motion for reconsideration in
view of the CA's erroneous application of legal principles to prevent the
resulting inequity that might arise from the outright denial of the petition.
In the present case, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA

decision was indeed filed a day late. However, taking into account the
substantive merit of the case, and also, the conflicting rulings of the RTC
and CA, a relaxation of the rules becomes imperative to prevent the
commission of a grave injustice. Verily, a rigid application of the rules
would inevitably lead to the automatic defeasance of Legaspi's last will and
testament- an unjust result that is not commensurate with the petitioner's
failure to comply with the required procedure.
One of the issues raised by the petitioner entails an examination of the

records of the case, as it pertains to the factual findings of the CA. As a
general rule, a petition for review on certiorari may only raise questions of
law, as provided under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, the Court will not hesitate to set aside the general rule when
circumstances exist warranting the same, such as in the present case, where
the findings of fact of the probate court and CA are conflicting.
Additionally, it appears that the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.22
According to the CA, while Legaspi signed on the left margin of each and
every page of her will, the instrumental witnesses failed to do the same, in
blatant violation of Article 805 of the Civil Code which states:
Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall

be interpreted to them. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner, in assailing the findings of the CA, argues that in the
original copy23 of the will that was offered before the probate court as
Exhibit "L," it is clear that the instrumental witnesses signed on the left
margin of every page of the will except the last, as did Legaspi.24 The
petitioner advances that the confusion arose when the respondents, in their
record of appeal, submitted an altered photocopy25 of the will to the CA, in
which the signatures of the instrumental witnesses were covered when
photocopied, to make it appear that the witnesses did not sign on every
page. This misled the CA to rule that the will was defective for the lack of
signatures.26
For their part, the respondents do not deny that the original copy of the
will, as opposed to its photocopy, bore the signatures of the instrumental
witnesses on every page thereof, except the last.27 However, they submit
that they did not cause any alteration to the photocopied version. They
explain that since the folder holding the records of the case was bound on
the left margin and the pages may not be detached therefrom, the left
portion of the will must have been unintentionally excluded or cut-off in
the process of photocopying.28
In any event, it is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the

instrumental witnesses signed on each and every page of the will, except
the last page. Such being the case, the CA erred in concluding otherwise.
There is no doubt that the requirement under the Article 805 of the Civil
Code, which calls for the signature of the testator and of the instrumental
witnesses on each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the
last, was complied with.
It should also be mentioned that the respondents take a skewed stance in

insisting that the testator Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses should
have signed on the last page of the subject will. When Article 805 of the
Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it
necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last
testamentary disposition ends.29 As the probate court correctly appreciated,
the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is
but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.30
As to whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the
attestation clause renders such will defective, the CA, citing Uy Coque vs.
Naves Sioca31 and In re: Will of Andrada, perceived such omission as a fatal
flaw.32 In Uy Coque, one of the defects in the will that led to its disallowance
is the failure to declare the number of its pages in the attestation clause.
The Court elucidated that the purpose of requiring the number of pages to
be stated in the attestation clause is to make the falsification of a will more
difficult. In In re: Will of Andrada, the Court deemed the failure to state the
number of pages in the attestation clause, fatal. Both pronouncements
were, however, made prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code on August
30, 1950.
Subsequently, in Singson vs. Florentino,33 the Court adopted a more liberal

approach and allowed probate, even if the number of pages of the will was
mentioned in the last part of the body of the will and not in the attestation
clause. This is to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by
purely technical considerations.34
The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article

809 thereof, which provides that:
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid
if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
Thus, in Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal,35 the Court allowed the probate of a will
notwithstanding that the number of pages was stated not in the attestation
clause, but in the Acknowledgment. In Azuela vs. CA,36 the Court ruled that
there is substantial compliance with the requirement, if it is stated
elsewhere in the will how many pages it is comprised of.
What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of

omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an examination of
the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence.
"However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause
and ultimately, of the will itself."37
An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause
indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the will. However,
as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied in the
Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is composed of four
pages, the Acknowledgment included. As with the will, the
Acknowledgment38 is written in Filipino, quoted in part below:
xxxx
Ang HULING HABILlNG ito ay binubuo ng apat (4) na dahon, kasama

ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong ito.
x x x x39
In sum, Legaspi's last will and testament has substantially complied with
all the formalities required of a notarial will. It has been proven that
Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses signed on every page of the will,
except on the last, which refers to the Acknowledgment page. With regard
to the omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause, this was
supplied by the Acknowledgment portion of the will itself without the
need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Contrary to the CA conclusion, such
omission does not in any way serve as hindrance to probate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 22,2013 and Resolution dated August 15, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93671 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23, 2009
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128 of Caloocan City in SP. Proc. Case
No. C-3450 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE

LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B.
LOPEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L.
TUAZON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the March 30, 2009
Decision1 and October 22, 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 87064 which affirmed the August 26, 2005 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 (RTC), in SP. Proc. No. 99-95225
disallowing the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Enrique S.
Lopez.
The Factual Antecedents
On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy
B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B.
Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana),
Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as
compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and
Testament4 on August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor and
administrator.
On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his
father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for
the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the
petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not
executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. The
said opposition was also adopted by Victoria.
After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements,

Richard presented the attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja;
Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo (Manalo); and the notary
public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco). The
instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed
the will on each and every page, they also read and signed the same in the
latter's presence and of one another. Photographs of the incident were
taken and presented during trial. Manalo further testified that she was the
one who prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final
copy of the will was made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more
than 20 years. Prior to August 10, 1996, the latter consulted him in the
preparation of the subject will and furnished him the list of his properties
for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance
with Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the attesting
witnesses signed it in the presence of one another, he translated the will
which was written in English to Filipino and added that Enrique was in
good health and of sound mind at that time.
On the other hand, the oppositors presented its lone witness, Gregorio B.
Paraon (Paraon), Officer-in-Charge of the Notarial Section, Office of the
Clerk of Court, RTC, Manila. His testimony centered mainly on their
findings that Atty. Nolasco was not a notary public for the City of Manila
in 1996, which on cross examination was clarified after Paraon discovered
that Atty. Nolasco was commissioned as such for the years 1994 to 1997.
Ruling of the RTC
In the Decision dated August 26, 2005,5 the RTC disallowed the probate of
the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which
requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used
upon which the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same
Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article
805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected
somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence
required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of
7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having
been executed and attested in accordance with law.
Aggrieved, Richard filed a Notice of Appeal which the RTC granted in the
Order dated October 26, 2005.6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 30, 2009,7 the CA issued the assailed decision dismissing the

appeal. It held that the RTC erroneously granted Richard's appeal as the
Rules of Court is explicit that appeals in special proceedings, as in this case,
must be made through a record on appeal. Nevertheless, even on the
merits, the CA found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the
RTC that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the
attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of the Civil Code
sanctions mere substantial compliance with the formal requirements set
forth in Article 805 thereof, there was a total omission of such fact in the
attestation clause. Moreover, while the acknowledgment of the will made
mention of "7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence
aliunde to explain the discrepancy. Richard's motion for reconsideration
from the decision was likewise denied in the second assailed
Resolution8 dated October 22, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition assailing the propriety of the CA's decision.
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles

805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
page.

be interpreted to them.1âwphi1 (underscoring supplied)
ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid
if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and
prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.9
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of
the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement
in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that
it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written"10 cannot be deemed substantial compliance.
The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but
through the presentation of evidence aliund.11 On this score is the comment
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be

supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every
page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was
notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or
even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons
required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially
appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will. Moreover, it

correctly ruled that Richard pursued the wrong mode of appeal as Section
2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that in special
proceedings, as in this case, the appeal shall be made by record on appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.

MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO,
VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly

establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the
time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to
give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the
manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006

Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which
reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial
will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed

with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September
2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition
for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.5
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6 which denied

the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm
the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and
testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala"7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will,
executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin),
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will
and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof.9
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin),
Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three
attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below its
attestation clause10 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the
presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as
notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon
F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa,
thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to

the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I
hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in
parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F.
LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE
LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal
age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan],
Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS
LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who
would decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the
properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing
and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa
and their two children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for
the repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala
and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio,
I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in
accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed.

Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son.
Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and
it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after
the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the
United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his
family until her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000,
Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the
probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC
issued an Order on June 13, 200015 allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on
June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the
instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament of
Paciencia on September 13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s
(Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses,
Francisco and Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.18 She likewise positively identified the
signature of her father appearing thereon.19 Questioned by the prosecutor
regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that
her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.20 The
judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of
this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.21
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar

(Antonio) filed an opposition22 to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that
the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo.23
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners
Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B.
Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan
filed a Supplemental Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null
and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred
and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049,
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the issuance of
Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was
disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the
USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued
in favor of Antonio.27
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended

Opposition28 asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the
following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to
make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the
Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the
Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by
Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of
Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be
genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did
not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an
Opposition and Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the
appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting
for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of

both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former
is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of
the properties subject of the Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will

continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the
petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter
notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the
time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the
event took place. 31
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took
the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his father’s
condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express
himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the
court to support this allegation. 32
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the
USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his
aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and
his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him
and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care
of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a
spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of
Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of
sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of
Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencia’s death through
Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when the Will was
executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three
different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar
with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in her
transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force,
intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the
Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same was executed.35 On
cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the
Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will
only after her death.36
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already

died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first
cousins.37 She claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house
of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until
evening and that during the period of her service in the said household,
Lorenzo’s wife and his children were staying in the same house.38 She
served in the said household from 1980 until Paciencia’s departure for the
USA on September 19, 1981.39
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring
"something" for Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house.40 Rosie admitted,
though, that she did not see what that "something" was as same was placed
inside an envelope.41 However, she remembered Paciencia instructing
Faustino to first look for money before she signs them.42 A few days after or
on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonio’s mother
and brought with her the said envelope.43 Upon going home, however, the
envelope was no longer with Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that
Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would
sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments
later.45 On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a
doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was
"magulyan" was based on her personal assessment,46 and that it was
Antonio who requested her to testify in court.47
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.48 He
identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said document before
because Paciencia brought the same to his mother’s house and showed it to
him along with another document on September 16, 1981.49 Antonio alleged
that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still
unsigned.50 According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents
pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands,51 and it was he who explained
that the documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and
sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA, and
a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon
her death.52 Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following
words: "Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who
is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should]
benefit from my properties. Why should I die already?"53 Thereafter,
Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want
to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about those,
throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them."54 After
which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the
unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56 denying the

petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24,
2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of
Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.57
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and
concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer
possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary
capacity.58
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of
the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s
conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the
Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a
person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a
Will."59 Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able
to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further,
no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that
Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the

CA in its Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on

Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL
DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT
PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE
WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the
notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for
probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from
the face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.64 This is expressly provided for in Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall
pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall
be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law.65 These formalities are enshrined in
Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
page.

be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain
a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the
testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are
all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly
states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the
witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator
and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature
of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state
of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said
act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was

"magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of
testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for
Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only "magulyan"
but was actually suffering from paranoia.67
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does
not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit
to execute a Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound
mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s
forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that
would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence
Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the
latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will.
"The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s
mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent."69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind
at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise
lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of
making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the
will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the
will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be

insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the
burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the
shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial
evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the
CA’s finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of

her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the
character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of
the document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her
faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired
the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to
LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third
child was born after the execution of the will and was not included therein
as devisee.70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and

improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as
basis to deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the

testator or testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her
earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia
was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats;
that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit;
and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was obtained
through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation
between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former
purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and
treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s
wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not
unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise
their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a
prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family
discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a
testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s

relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship
with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and
lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married
and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This
unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to
support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners’
allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper
influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in
nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on
record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if
not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the
Court to uphold said allegations.71 Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to
be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution
of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a
will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would
have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of
the deceased]."72
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will
was duly executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that

Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It
provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested.

– If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the
case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in
the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the
death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to
the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but
outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be
taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or
do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful
credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied
from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented
that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three

(3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the
absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should
have been presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still
living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and
testify before the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate
proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was
already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to
brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding
medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge
Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that
time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his
daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her
father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite
ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the
testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross
examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was
able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said
subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of
this the probate of Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra.
Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as
well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a]
testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses
declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily
allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its
legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence
before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must
testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required
by law."73 1âwphi1
Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any

of the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x
in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the
court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling."74 "The
very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed
[testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein
provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby."75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with
Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as
opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from
their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006
and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192916 October 11, 2010
MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu
City, which includes Lot No. 1956-A and Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On
September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel
Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.1 Manuel
accepted the donation.
In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in
favor of Dozen Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen
Corporation). In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale
over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.
On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s nephew,

filed a petition for the settlement of Vicente’s intestate estate. On the other
hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis causa in
his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in
favor of Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuel’s petition to approve the
donation and his action for annulment of the contracts of sale.2 The RTC
found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen
Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an
equivocal act that revoked the donation. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTC’s decision.3 The CA held that since the donation in favor
of Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for
the validity of wills should have been observed. The CA found that the
deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore
void.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari
Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on substantial
compliance in the construction of a will to Vicente’s donation mortis causa.
He insists that the strict construction of a will was not warranted in the
absence of any indication of bad faith, fraud, or substitution in the
execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. He argues that the CA
ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of donation, which
contains the "import and purpose" of the attestation clause required in the
execution of wills. The Acknowledgment reads:
BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay,
Cebu, personally appeared VICENTE S. Echavez with Res. Cert. No.
16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu known to me to be
the same person who executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of
Donartion Mortis Causa before the Notary Public and in the presence of the
foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument before and in the
presence of each other and of the Notary Public and all of them
acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and deed.
[Emphasis in the original.]
THE COURT’S RULING
The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with
the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills,4 "otherwise, the
donation is void and would produce no effect." 5 Articles 805 and 806 of the
Civil Code should have been applied.
As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in

the Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages on
which the deed was written.lavvphilThe exception to this rule in Singson v.
Florentino6 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,7 cannot be applied to the present
case, as the facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson and
Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that although the attestation
clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written,
the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the
factual situation in the present case.
Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation

clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and
an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in

two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that
serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a
deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is
his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the
instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the
instrument before them and to the manner of its execution.81avvphi1
Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of

the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the
avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the execution
of a decedent’s will. An attestation must state all the details the third
paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by
the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in
the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Finding no reversible error committed by the CA, the Court hereby

DENIES Manuel’s petition for review on certiorari.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
The deed of donation partly states that:
[T]he DONOR, VICENTE S. ECHAVEZ, for and in
consideration of the love and affection upon and unto the
DONEE, MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ, and of the uncertainty of life
and inevitableness of death that may strike a man at the most
unexpected moment, and wishing to give DONEE while able to
do so, to take effect after death, the DONOR, do hereby give,
transfer and convey by way of donation the following personal
and real properties to wit: x x x [Emphasis in the original.],
rollo, p. 90.
2
In SP Proc. No. 1776-CEB dated December 27, 1996, rollo, pp. 25-28.
3
In CA-G.R. CV No. 58328 dated May 29, 2000, id. at 84-97.
4
CIVIL CODE, Article 728, which states:
Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor
partake the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be
governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession.
5
Maglasang v. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, G.R. No. 131953, June 5,
2002, 383 SCRA 6, citing The National Treasurer of the Phils. v. Vda.
de Meimban, No. L-61023, August 22, 1984, 131 SCRA 264.
6
92 Phil. 161 (1952).
7
No. L-36033, November 5, 1982, 118 SCRA 195.
8
Tenefrancia v. Abaja, 87 Phil. 139 (1950).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA

MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION
MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO
DE MOLO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO
MALOTO, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is not the first time that the parties to this case come to us. In fact, two
other cases directly related to the present one and involving the same
parties had already been decided by us in the past. In G.R. No. L-
30479, 1 which was a petition for certiorari and mandamus instituted by the
petitioners herein, we dismissed the petition ruling that the more
appropriate remedy of the petitioners is a separate proceeding for the
probate of the will in question. Pursuant to the said ruling, the petitioners
commenced in the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Special Proceeding
No. 2176, for the probate of the disputed will, which was opposed by the
private respondents presently, Panfilo and Felino both surnamed Maloto.
The trial court dismissed the petition on April 30, 1970. Complaining
against the dismissal, again, the petitioners came to this Court on a petition
for review by certiorari. 2 Acting on the said petition, we set aside the trial
court's order and directed it to proceed to hear the case on the merits. The
trial court, after hearing, found the will to have already been revoked by
the testatrix. Adriana Maloto, and thus, denied the petition. The petitioners
appealed the trial court's decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
which, on June 7, 1985, affirmed the order. The petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the adverse decision proved to be of no avail, hence, this
petition.
For a better understanding of the controversy, a factual account would be a

great help.
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and
nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto,
and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing
that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four
heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then Court of
First Instance of Iloilo and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736.
However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1,
1964, the parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an
agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement
provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the
parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement
to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964. That
should have signalled the end of the controversy, but, unfortunately, it had
not.
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a

former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas,
discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN
(Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the
original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the
cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was
submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on
April 1, 1967. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs
in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and
more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by
virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed.
The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them
being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor.
Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees
and legatees named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a
motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and
for the allowance of the will When the trial court denied their motion, the
petitioner came to us by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the orders of the trial court . 3 As we stated earlier, we dismissed
that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the
alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters
raised by the petitioners.
Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter

on whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned by the
househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions
of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the
will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence
of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been
sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that
the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the
testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will
left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in
order to have a new will drawn up. For reasons shortly to be explained, we
do not view such facts, even considered collectively, as sufficient bases for
the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been effectively revoked.
There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the

due execution of the will. The heart of the case lies on the issue as to
whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.
The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in
Article 830.
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:

(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided

in case of wills: or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the

intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn
cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express
direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the
estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due
execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation,
or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis Supplied.)
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this
case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the
destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is
not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator
himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying
that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be

conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not
suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke
must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in
her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating
that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove
(presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a
will were burned.
The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the

private respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the
testimony of the two witnesses who testified in favor of the will's
revocation appear "inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in the
records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de
Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that
the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think,
believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because,
according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained
his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe
told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.
At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public

interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be
shaken to its very foundations ...."4
The private respondents in their bid for the dismissal of the present action
for probate instituted by the petitioners argue that the same is already
barred by res adjudicata. They claim that this bar was brought about by the
petitioners' failure to appeal timely from the order dated November 16,
1968 of the trial court in the intestate proceeding (Special Proceeding No.
1736) denying their (petitioners') motion to reopen the case, and their
prayer to annul the previous proceedings therein and to allow the last will
and testament of the late Adriana Maloto. This is untenable.
The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present

controversy. For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the
former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the second action, Identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. 5 We do not find here the
presence of all the enumerated requisites.
For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar
as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the
trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the
intestate settlement of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could
not in any manner be construed to be final with respect to the probate of
the subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment
on the merits of the action for probate. This is understandably so because
the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule
on the probate of the contested will . 6 After all, an action for probate, as it
implies, is founded on the presence of a will and with the objective of
proving its due execution and validity, something which can not be
properly done in an intestate settlement of estate proceeding which is
predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is
likewise no Identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding
and that in an action for probate. Be that as it may, it would be
remembered that it was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479
that the petitioners instituted this separate action for the probate of the late
Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the
private respondents on this score can not be sustained.
One last note. The private respondents point out that revocation could be
inferred from the fact that "(a) major and substantial bulk of the properties
mentioned in the will had been disposed of: while an insignificant portion
of the properties remained at the time of death (of the testatrix); and,
furthermore, more valuable properties have been acquired after the
execution of the will on January 3,1940." 7 Suffice it to state here that as
these additional matters raised by the private respondents are extraneous
to this special proceeding, they could only be appropriately taken up after
the will has been duly probated and a certificate of its allowance issued.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October
22, 1986, of the respondent Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for
the allowance of Adriana Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against
the private respondents.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-2538. September 21, 1951.]
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA

JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. LUZ, GLICERIA and
CORNELIO MOLO, Oppositors-Appellants.
Claro M. Recto and Serafin C. Dizon, for Appellants.
Delgado & Flores, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT WILL; EFFECT OF VOID

REVOCATORY CLAUSE. — A subsequent will containing a clause
revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was
not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of
annuling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void
(Samson v. Naval, 41 Phil., 838).
2. ID.; PROBATE; DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION. — Even in the

supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such
destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will where it is
founded on the mistaken belief that the later will has been validly executed
and would be given due effect. The earlier will can still be admitted to
probate under the principle of "dependent relative revocation." The theory
on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to
die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest where he executed two
wills on two different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal
heir.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal

admitting to probate the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano
Molo y Legaspi executed on August 17, 1918. The oppositors- appellants
brought the case on appeal to this Court for the reason that the value of the
properties involved exceeds P50,000.
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of

Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the
descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the
herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew,
the oppositors-appellants, Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo,
who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased
brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed
on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another executed on June 20, 1939,
(Exhibit I). The latter will contains a clause which expressly revokes the
will executed in 1918.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition, which was docketed as special proceeding No.
8022, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20,
1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon
petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the
will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at
which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision
denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to
prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the
widow on February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the
will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, which was docketed as
special proceeding No. 56, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors
filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that
petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2)
that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3)
that the will has been subsequently revoked. But before the second petition
could be heard, the battle for liberation came and the records of the case
were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but
the same was found to be impossible because neither petitioner nor
oppositors could produce the copies required for its reconstitution. As a
result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14, 1946, similar to the
one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition based on the
same grounds as those contained in their former opposition. Then, the case
was set for trial, and on May 28, 1948, the court issued an order admitting
the will to probate as already stated in the early part of this decision. From
this order the oppositors appealed assigning six errors, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. The probate court erred in not holding that the present petitioner
voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June
20, 1939, in special proceeding No. 8022, in order to enable her to obtain the
probate of another alleged will of Molo dated 1918.
"II. The court a quo erred in not holding that the petitioner is now estopped
from seeking the probate of Molo’s alleged will of 1918.
"III. The lower court erred in not holding that petitioner herein has come to
court with ’unclean hands’ and as such is not entitled to relief.
"IV. The probate court erred in not holding that Molo’s alleged will of
August 17, 1918 was not executed in the manner required by law.
"V. The probate court erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918 was
deliberately revoked by Molo himself.
"VI. The lower court erred in not holding that Molo’s will of 1918 was
subsequently revoked by the decedent’s will of 1939."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In their first assignment of error, counsel for oppositors contend that the
probate court erred in not holding that the petitioner voluntarily and
deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in order
to enable her to obtain the probate of the will executed by the deceased on
August 17, 1918, pointing out certain facts and circumstances which in
their opinion indicate that petitioner connived with witness Canuto Perez
in an effort to defeat and frustrate the probate of the 1939 will because of
her knowledge that said will was intrinsically defective in that "the one and
only testamentary disposition thereof was a ’disposición captatoria’." These
circumstances, counsel for the appellants contend, constitute a series of
steps deliberately taken by petitioner with a view to insuring the
realization of her plan of securing the probate of the 1918 will which she
believed would better safeguard her right to inherit from the deceased.
These imputations of fraud and bad faith allegedly committed in

connection with special proceedings No. 8022, now closed and terminated,
are vigorously met by counsel for petitioner who contends that to raise
them in these proceedings which are entirely new and distinct and
completely independent from the other is improper and unfair as they find
no support whatsoever in any evidence submitted by the parties in this
case. They are merely based on presumptions and conjectures not
supported by any proof. For this reason, counsel contends, the lower court
was justified in disregarding them and in passing them sub silentio in its
decision.
A careful examination of the evidence available in this case seems to justify

this contention. There is indeed no evidence which may justify the
insinuation that petitioner had deliberately intended to frustrate the
probate of the 1939 will of the deceased to enable her to seek the probate of
another will other than a mere conjecture drawn from the apparently
unexpected testimony of Canuto Perez that he went out of the room to
answer an urgent call of nature when Artemio Reyes was signing the will
and the failure of petitioner later to impeach the character of said witness
in spite of the opportunity given her by the court to do so. Apart from this
insufficiency of evidence, the record discloses that this failure has been
explained by petitioner when she informed the court that she was unable to
impeach the character of her witness Canuto Perez because of her inability
to find witnesses who may impeach him, and this explanation stands
uncontradicted. Whether this explanation is satisfactory or not, it is not
now for us to determine. It is an incident that comes within the province of
the former case. The failure of petitioner to present the testimony of
Artemio Reyes at the rehearing has also been explained, and it appears that
petitioner has failed because his whereabouts could not be found. Whether
this is true or not is not also for this Court to determine. It is likewise
within the province and function of the court in the former case. And the
unfairness of this imputation becomes more glaring when we take stock of
the developments that had taken place in these proceedings which show in
bold relief the true nature of the conduct, behavior and character of the
petitioner so bitterly assailed and held in disrepute by the oppositors.
It should be recalled that the first petition for the probate of the will
executed on June 20, 1939, was filed on February 7, 1941, by the petitioner.
There being no opposition, the will was probated. Subsequently, however,
upon petition of the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting said
will to probate was set aside, over the vigorous opposition of the herein
petitioner, and the case was reopened. The reopening was ordered because
of the strong opposition of the oppositors who contended that the will had
not been executed as required by law. After the evidence of both parties
had been presented, the oppositors filed an extensive memorandum
wherein they reiterated their view that the will should be denied probate.
And on the strength of this opposition, the court disallowed the will.
If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and
would make the testamentary disposition in her favor invalid and
ineffective, because it is a "disposición captatoria", which knowledge she
may easily acquire through consultation with a lawyer, there was no need
for her to go through the ordeal of filing the petition for the probate of the
will. She could accomplish her desire by merely suppressing the will or
tearing or destroying it, and then take steps leading to the probate of the
will executed in 1918. But her conscience was clear and bade her to take the
only proper step possible under the circumstances, which is to institute the
necessary proceedings for the probate of the 1939 will. This she did and the
will was admitted to probate. But then the unexpected happened. Over her
vigorous opposition, the herein appellants filed a petition for reopening,
and over her vigorous objection, the same was granted and the case was
reopened. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. Is it her fault that
the case was reopened? Is it her fault that the order admitting the will to
probate was set aside? That was a contingency which petitioner never
expected. Had appellants not filed their opposition to the probate of the
will and had they limited their objection to the intrinsic validity of said
will, their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the deceased
would have perhaps been accomplished. But they failed in their strategy. If
said will was denied probate it is due to their own effort. It is now unfair to
impute bad faith to petitioner simply because she exerted every effort to
protect her own interest and prevent the intestacy of the deceased to
happen.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is obvious that the court did
not commit the second and third errors imputed to it by the counsel for
appellants. Indeed, petitioner cannot be considered guilty of estoppel
which would prevent her from seeking the probate of the 1918 will simply
because her effort to obtain the allowance of the 1939 will has failed
considering that in both the 1918 and 1939 wills she was instituted by her
husband as his universal heir. Nor can she be charged with bad faith far
having done so because of her desire to prevent the intestacy of her
husband. She cannot be blamed for being zealous in protecting her interest.
The next contention of appellants refers to the revocatory clause contained

in the 1939 will of the deceased which was denied probate. They contend
that, notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is
valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior will of 1918.
Counsel for petitioner meets this argument by invoking the doctrine laid
down in the case of Samson v. Naval, (41 Phil., 838). He contends that the
facts involved in that case are on all fours with the facts of this case. Hence,
the doctrine in that case is here controlling.
There is merit in this contention. We have carefully read the facts involved
in the Samson case and we are indeed impressed by their striking
similarity with the facts of this case. We do not need to recite here what
those facts are; it is enough to point out that they contain many points and
circumstances in common. No reason, therefore, is seen why the doctrine
laid down in that case (which we quote hereunder) should not apply and
control the present case.
"A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having

been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with
the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the
making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void." (41 Phil., 838.)
Apropos of this question, counsel for oppositors make the remark that,
while they do not disagree with the soundness of the ruling laid down in
the Samson case, there is reason to abandon said ruling because it is archaic
or antiquated and runs counter to the modern trend prevailing in
American jurisprudence. They maintain that said ruling is no longer
controlling but merely represents the point of view of the minority and
should, therefore, be abandoned, more so if we consider the fact that
section 623 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which governs the revocation of
wills, is of American origin and as such should follow the prevailing trend
of the majority view in the United States. A long line of authorities is cited
in support of this contention. And these authorities hold the view, that "an
express revocation is immediately effective upon the execution of the
subsequent will, and does not require that it first undergo the formality of a
probate proceeding." (p 63, appellants’ brief).
While there are many cases which uphold the view entertained by counsel
for oppositors, and that view appears to be controlling in the states where
the decisions had been promulgated, however, we are reluctant to fall in
line with the assertion that is now the prevailing view in the United States.
In the search we have made of American authorities on the subject, we
found ourselves in a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps because of the
peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State on the
subject of revocation of wills. But the impression we gathered from a
review and study of the pertinent authorities is that the doctrine laid down
in the Samson case is still a good law. On page 328 of the American
Jurisprudence, Vol. 57, which is a revision published in 1948, we found the
following passages which in our opinion truly reflect the present trend of
American jurisprudence on this matter affecting the revocation of prior
wills:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 471. Observance of Formalities in Execution of Instrument. —

Ordinarily, statutes which permit the revocation of a will by another
writing provide that to be effective as a revocation, the writing must be
executed with the same formalities which are required to be observed in
the execution of a will. Accordingly, where, under the statutes, attestation
is necessary to the making of a valid will, an unattested nontestamentary
writing is not effective to revoke a prior will. It has been held that a writing
fails as a revoking instrument where it is not executed with the formalities
requisite for the execution of a will, even though it is inscribed on the will
itself, although it may effect a revocation by cancellation or obliteration of
the words of the will. A testator cannot reserve to himself the power to
modify a will by a written instrument subsequently prepared but not
executed in the manner required for a will.
"SEC. 472. Subsequent Unexecuted, Invalid, or Ineffective Will or Codicil.

— A will which is invalid because of the incapacity of the testator or of
undue influence can have no effect whatever as a revoking will. Moreover,
a will is not revoked by the unexecuted draft of a later one. Nor is a will
revoked by a defectively executed will or codicil, even though the latter
contains a clause expressly revoking the former will, in a jurisdiction where
it is provided by a controlling statute that no writing other than a
testamentary instrument is sufficient to revoke a will, for the simple reason
that there is no revoking will. Similarly where the statute provides that a
will may be revoked by a subsequent will or other writing executed with
the same formalities as are required in the execution of wills, a defectively
executed will does not revoke a prior will, since it cannot be said that there
is a writing which complies with the statute. Moreover, a will or codicil
which, on account of the manner in which it is executed, is sufficient to
pass only personally does not affect dispositions of real estate made by a
former will, even though it may expressly purport to do so. The intent of
the testator to revoke is immaterial, if he has not complied with the
statute." (57 Am. Jur., 328, 329.)
We find the same opinion in the American Law Reports, Annotated, edited
in 1939. On page 1400, Volume 123, there appear many authorities on the
"application of rules where second will is invalid", among which a typical
one is the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account of
not being executed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, or
where the testator has not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the
will is procured through undue influence, or the such, in other words,
where the second will is really no will, it does not revoke the first will or
affect it in any manner." Mort v. Baker University (1935) 229 Mo. App., 632,
78 S. W. (2d), 498."cralaw virtua1aw library
These treaties cannot be mistaken. They uphold the view on which the
ruling in the Samson case is predicated. They reflect the opinion that this
ruling is sound and good and for this reason we see no justification for
abandoning it as now suggested by counsel for the oppositors.
It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure)
provides that a will may be revoked "by some will, codicil, or other writing
executed as provided in case of wills" ; but it cannot be said that the 1939
will should be regarded, not as a will within the meaning of said word, but
as "other writing executed as provided in the case of wills", simply because
it was denied probate. And even if it be regarded as any other writing
within the meaning of said clause, there is authority for holding that unless
said writing is admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation.
(See 57 Am. Jur. pp. 329-330).
But counsel for oppositors contend that, regardless of said revocatory

clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the
presumption that it was deliberately revoked by the testator himself. The
oppositors contend that the testator, after executing the 1939 will, and with
full knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in said will, himself
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and that for this reason
the will submitted by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is only a
duplicate of said original.
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator

deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in
1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will was executed in
1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the
testator himself and apparently they remained in his possession until he
executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied
probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney to
look for another will, she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the
papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.
If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will
because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is
true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner,
the most logical step for the testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy
in order that it may likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown
by the fact that said duplicate copy remained in the possession of
petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21)
years since the first will was executed, the original of the will had been
misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed
it wise to execute another will containing exactly the same testamentary
dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this
chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct evidence
of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the testator. This
matter cannot be left to mere inference or conjecture.
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily
destroyed by the testator after the execution of the second will, which
revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said
earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that it was no
longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In
other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was but
the necessary consequence of the testator’s belief that the revocatory clause
contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given
effect? If such is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still
be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative
revocation."
"This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is

usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a
new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new
disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for some reason. The
doctrine is not limited to the existence of some other document, however,
and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a
mistake of law . . . ." (68 C. J. p. 799).
"The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with
the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator
meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional
and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any
reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in full force." (Gardner, pp.
232, 233.)
"This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of the

new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation
depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and
hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to
make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the
destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent
upon the valid execution of a new will." (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p.
233.)
We hold, therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the
original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the
petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of
defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the
mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would
be given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that
the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly
manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasions and
instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake
as to his intention of dying testate.
The remaining question to be determined refers to the sufficiency of the

evidence to prove the due execution of the will.
The will in question was attested, as required by law, by three witnesses,

Lorenzo Morales, Rufino Enriquez, and Angel Cuenca. The first two
witnesses died before the commencement of the present proceedings. So
the only instrumental witness available was Angel Cuenca and under our
law and precedents, his testimony is sufficient to prove the due execution
of the will. However, petitioner presented not only the testimony of
Cuenca but placed on the witness stand Juan Salcedo, the notary public
who prepared and notarized the will upon the express desire and
instruction of the testator. The testimony of these witnesses shows that the
will had been executed in the manner required by law. We have read their
testimony and we were impressed by their readiness and sincerity. We are
convinced that they told the truth.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., concurs in the result.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208197, January 10, 2018

ARACELI MAYUGA, SUBSTITUTED BY MARILYN MAYUGA
SANTILLAN FOR AND ON BEHALF OF ALL THE
HEIRS, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO ATIENZA, REPRESENTING THE
HEIRS OF ARMANDO* ATIENZA; BENJAMIN ATIENZA, JR.,
REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF BENJAMIN A. ATIENZA,
SR., Respondents.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated July 8, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals3 (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95599 which granted the appeal by the
respondents Antonio Atienza4 and Benjamin Atienza, Jr.5 and reversed and
set aside the Decision6 dated April 27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 82, Odiongan, Romblon (RTC) in Civil Case
No. OD-489.
Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
As culled from the CA Decision, the antecedents are as follows:
On May 4, 2000, Araceli Mayuga (Araceli, for short), as plaintiff, instituted

a petition for Cancellation and Recall of Free Patent Application (FPA) No.
11636 and FPA No. 11637 [and Reconveyance] against Antonio Atienza,
representing the heirs of Armando Atienza, Benjamin Atienza, Jr.,
representing the heirs of Benjamin Atienza, Sr., Community Environment
and Natural Resource Officer and Register of Deeds of Romblon, as
defendants. The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. OD-489, was raffled to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82[.]
In her Petition, Araceli, alleged, that [she, Benjamin A. Atienza, Sr. and
Armando A. Atienza are the surviving legitimate, legal and forced heirs of
the late Perfecto Atienza who died intestate on June 1, 19787, and:]
xxxx
3. That the said deceased Perfecto Atienza left estates, to wit:
(a) Lot 9819 Csd 341-D (known as Lot 61-A) with an area of 294 square
meters, and
(b) Lot 9820 Csd 341-D (known as Lot 61-B) with an area of 280 square
meters,
or a total area of 574 square meters, both lots are located at Budiong,
Odiongan, Romblon to which the three (3) compulsory/forced heirs are
entitled to an equal share of 1/3 [each].
4. That through manipulation and misrepresentation with intent to defraud

a co-heir, respondent Antonio L. Atienza[, son of deceased Armando
Atienza,8] was able to secure Free [P]atent (NRDN-21) 11636 while
respondent Benjamin A. Atienza was able to secure Free Patent (NRDN-
21) 11637, both patents dated February 28, 1992.
5. That Petitioner was not notified of the application filed with public
respondent Community Environment & Natural Resource Officer nor any
notice of hearings of proceedings as required by law, being a co-heir and
party- in-interest.
xxxx
Thus, she prayed [for],
xxxx
1. The recall and cancellation of FPA (NRD-IV-21) 11636 dated February 28,
1992 issued to Antonio L. Atienza.
2. The recall and cancellation of FPA (NRD-IV-21) 11637 dated February 28,
1992 issued to Benjamin A. Atienza.
3. [The division of] the two lots into three (3) equal parts among the three
(3) forced heirs, namely: the Petitioner, Benjamin A. Atienza and Armando
A. Atienza.
xxxx
On June 19, 2000, defendants filed a motion for bill of particulars because
the allegations of manipulation and misrepresentation were general, vague
and ambiguous on which they could not make an intelligent answer. In the
Order dated June 22, 2000, plaintiff was directed to submit a bill of
particulars.
Plaintiff submitted a Reply to Motion for Bill of Particulars, stating that the
allegations on paragraph 4 in her petition are based on the following
considerations:
xxxx
1. That petition/application for title filed by Respondents before the Bureau

of Lands dated June 22, 1973 was based on a "Confirmation Affidavit of
Distribution of Real Estate," allegedly executed by Perfecto Atienza,
allegedly confirming [an] alleged partition of 1960, was misrepresented to
Perfecto Atienza as mere compliance of Presidential Decree No. 76 of
December 6, 1972 for Real Estate Tax purposes;
2. That the Bureau of Lands [had] never notified the Petitioner, being one of
the Compulsory/Forced heirs about the petition/application for issuance of
title and the hearing thereon;
3. That Respondents took advantage of the absence of Petitioner in the

Philippines, who was in the United States then when they filed the
Petition/Application for issuance of title in the year 1989.
xxxx
On August 18, 2000, the RTC issued an Order admitting the Reply to Bill of
Particulars.
In their Answer, defendants denied the material allegations of the

complaint, and by way of affirmative defenses, averred that, the petition is
moot and academic; the Free Patent Titles have become indefeasible after
the lapse of one year from its issuance in 1992; fraud as a ground for review
of title under Section 38 of Act 496 is not applicable to a case where a
certificate of title was issued in pursuance of a patent application; that they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous
possession of the subject property for over 30 years; the basis for their
Application for Free Patent with the CENRO is a Confirmation Affidavit of
Distribution of Real Estate executed by their father, Perfecto Atienza,
confirming partition in 1960.
Defendant Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer

(CENRO, for short) also filed an Answer, alleging that, Free Patent No.
045909-92-141P was issued by then Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (PENRO), Dionico F. Gabay on February 28, 1992 by
virtue of the Free Patent Application No. (NRD-IV-21)-11636 filed by
Antonio L. Atienza at the CENRO Office in Odiongan, Romblon covering
Lot No. 9819, Cad. 341-D, Odiongan Cadastre which is identical to Lot 61-
A, Csd-04-008722-D; while Free Patent Application No. (NRD-IV-21)11637
filed by Benjamin A. Atienza with the CENRO Office covering Lot 9820,
Cad. 341-D, Odiongan Cadastre which is identical to Lot 61-B, Csd-04-
008722-D; it has no participation whatsoever in the processing and issuance
of free patents and/or titles in the names of Antonio L. Atienza and
Benjamin A. Atienza. It also prayed that it be excluded as a defendant in
the case.
On July 9, 2001, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to implead the Heirs

of Armando A. Atienza, namely, Antonio L. Atienza, Mae Atienza-Apostol,
Susan Atienza-Sumbeling and Heirs of Benjamin M. (sic) Atienza, Sr.,
namely, Benjamin M. Atienza, Jr., Antonio M. Atienza, Pewrpetuo (sic) M.
Atienza, Maribel M. Atienza and Cristina Atienza, as defendants.
Defendants moved to dismiss the original petition for failure of the
plaintiff’s counsels to state their IBP No. and P.T.R. No. and the amended
complaint for failure to attach a verification and certification against forum-
shopping but on September 13, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
The parties thereafter submitted their respective pre-trial briefs. A pre-trial

conference was conducted and later, trial ensued.
On April 27, 2010, the RTC ruled in favor of Plaintiff Araceli. It ruled that
the application by the defendants for a Free Patent with the CENRO is
tainted with fraud because said application was processed without the
plaintiff’s knowledge nor a notice of hearing of any proceeding was sent to
her. In fact, the defendants took advantage while the latter was in the
United States. Moreover, the titling of the fraudulently registered real
property will not bar the action for reconveyance.
Thus, the RTC decreed, that:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of Deeds [of] Romblon,

Romblon is hereby directed to Cancel the Certificates issued pursuant [to]
Free Patent No. 11636 in the name of Antonio L. Atienza and Free Patent
No. 11637 in the name of Benjamin A. Atienza. The defendants are hereby
ordered to reconvey the 1/3 share of Araceli A. Mayuga as the compulsory
heir of the late Perfecto Atienza on Lot 9819 which is identical to Lot 61-A
and 9820 which is identical to Lot 61-B all located at Budiong, Odiongan,
Romblon.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxx
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in
the Order dated July 29, 2010.
Aggrieved, defendants interposed an appeal [before the Court of Appeals]

assailing the decision of the RTC.9
The CA granted the appeal. It reversed and set aside the RTC Decision
dated April 27, 2010, and dismissed the Amended Complaint for Recall
and Cancellation of Free Patent Application (FPA) No. 11636 and FPA No.
11637 and Action for Reconveyance.10
On the procedural aspect of the appeal, the CA ruled that the RTC erred in
not dismissing the Amended Complaint for failure to append a certification
against non-forum shopping.11 On the substantive aspects of the appeal, the
CA ruled that the free patents issued in favor of the respondents can no
longer be assailed under the rule of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility
of the certificate of title upon the expiration of one year from and after the
date of the entry of the decree of registration pursuant to Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.12 The CA further ruled that the RTC erred in
its finding that fraud and misrepresentation attended the respondents'
applications for free patents.13 It noted that the basis for the respondents'
application was the Confirmatory Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate
dated June 22, 1973 executed by their father, the late Perfecto Atienza
during his lifetime and was at liberty to dispose of his property to anyone
he desired.14 The said document was duly notarized and the petitioner
could not impugn its validity by mere self-serving allegations. 15 Besides,
the records negate the claim of the petitioner that she was not notified of
the free patent applications because a Notice of Application for Free Patent
was "posted in conspicuous place on the land applied for, on the bulletin
board of the barrio where the land is located, and at the door of [the]
municipal building on the 2nd day of January, 1987 and remained posted
until the 18th of December."16 The respondents presented Romulo Fetalvero,
Management Officer III of the PENRO-DENR, Odiongan, Romblon who
testified that they complied with the requirements for the issuance of a free
patent.17 Thus, the petitioner's allegations of fraud, manipulation and
misrepresentation were unsubstantiated.18
Furthermore, the CA held that the RTC erred in ordering the reconveyance
of 1/3 of the subject properties to the petitioner since she failed to establish
her title and ownership over such portion.19 The CA gave due recognition
to the tax declarations dated as early as 1974 presented by the respondents
and the Report of Investigation by Emilio Firmalo, Deputy Land
Investigator/Inspector, which disclosed that Antonio Atienza and his
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the subject land since
1962, while Benjamin Atienza and his predecessors-in-interest fully
possessed the same since 1962.20
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated April 27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82 in Civil Case No. OD-489, and the
subsequent Order dated July 29, 2010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Amended Complaint for Recall and Cancellation of Free Patent
Application (FPA) No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637 and Action for
Reconveyance is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21
Proceedings Before the Court
Hence, the present Petition was filed after the Court granted the
petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review22 in its
Resolution23 dated September 16, 2013.
The respondents filed their Comments (To the Petition for Review)24 dated
December 16, 2013 (Comment). The Comment pointed as procedural flaw
the defective verification and certification of the Petition on account of the
lack of authority of Marilyn Mayuga Santillan, who verified the Petition
instead of petitioner Araceli Mayuga. The respondents also argued that the
petitioner has not explained the lack of verification and certification against
non-forum shopping in the original complaint which was one of the
reasons for the reversal of the RTC Decision by the CA.25 As substantive
flaws, the respondents argued that their titles have become indefeasible
one year after the date of entry of the decree of registration and the
petitioner's complaint for recall and cancellation of free patent application
and reconveyance, having been initiated eight years from the date of the
entry in the registration book of the Register of Deeds and beyond four
years from the discovery of the alleged fraud, was filed out of time.26 The
respondents further argued that the petitioner failed to prove that there
was fraud or misrepresentation in the acquisition of their titles.27
The petitioner filed a Reply28 dated April 11, 2014. The petitioner raised
therein that title emanating from free patent fraudulently obtained does not
become indefeasible,29 and the action for reconveyance was seasonably
filed based on implied or constructive trust.30
In a Manifestation31 dated October 30, 2015, the Court was informed of the

death of petitioner Araceli Mayuga in September 2015. The Court in its
Resolution32 dated January 18, 2016, required the petitioner's counsel to file
a motion for substitution of party together with the death certificate of the
petitioner.
The petitioner's counsel filed a Motion for Substitution of Party and

Compliance33 dated March 11, 2016, praying that Marilyn Mayuga Santillan
be substituted as petitioner on behalf of all the heirs of the original
petitioner Araceli Mayuga. In the Court's Resolution34 dated April 20, 2016,
the motion for substitution was granted.
Issue
Based on the Petition and the pleadings filed by the parties, the core issue
is:
Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision and dismissing the
amended complaint of the petitioner for cancellation of free patent and
reconveyance.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
To recall, the amended complaint filed by the petitioner was for "Recall and
Cancellation of FPA No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637 and Reconveyance."35
The RTC considered the said complaint mainly as an action for declaration
of nullity of the free patents and the corresponding certificates of title
issued to the respondents. The RTC Decision directed the Register of Deeds
of Romblon to cancel the certificates of title issued pursuant to Free Patent
No. 11636 in the name of respondent Antonio L. Atienza and Free Patent
No. 11637 in the name of Benjamin A. Atienza, Sr. and ordered the
respondents to reconvey the alleged 1/3 share of petitioner Araceli A.
Mayuga. On the other hand, the CA considered the separate merits of the
amended complaint's causes of action for declaration of nullity of the free
patents and reconveyance. The Court will follow the CA's path.
The Court in Spouses Galang v. Spouses Reyes,36 citing Heirs of Kionisala v.

Heirs of Dacut,37 observed the essential differences among an action for
declaration of nullity of free patents and the corresponding certificates of
titles issued pursuant thereto, an action for reversion and an action for
reconveyance, viz.:
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and

certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference
between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the
realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the
pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land. x x x
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent
and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership
of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate
of title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land
claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the
fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title
obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is
x x x the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the
parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant. x x
x
xxxx
With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is settled

that in this kind of action the free patent and the certificate of title are
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the defendant's name. All that must be alleged in
the complaint are two (2) facts which admitting them to be true would
entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the
plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally
dispossessed him of the same.38 (Emphasis omitted, underscoring in the
original)
Given the foregoing differences, an action for reconveyance and an action

for declaration of nullity of the free patent cannot be pursued
simultaneously. The former recognizes the certificate of title issued
pursuant to the free patent as indefeasible while the latter does not. They
may, however, be pursued alternatively pursuant to Section 2, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court on alternative causes of action or defenses.
The action for declaration of nullity of the free patents issued in favor of the
respondents must fail, as the CA correctly ruled.
As noted by the CA, the respondents satisfactorily complied with the
requirements for the issuance of a free patent. After quoting the pertinent
portion of the direct examination of Romulo Fetalvero, Management
Officer III of the PENRO-DENR, Odiongan, Romblon, on the respondents'
compliance with the requirements, the CA stated:
From the foregoing, the grant of free patents to defendants-appellants,

having been performed in the course of the official functions of the DENR
officers, enjoys the presumption of regularity. This presumption of
regularity was not successfully rebutted by plaintiff-appellee. All told,
there is no clear and convincing evidence of fraud and plaintiff-appellee's
failure to prove it is fatal to [her] own cause. And there being none, We will
have to sustain the issuance of [the] free patents to the defendants-
appellants.39
Regarding the petitioner's allegation of fraud, the CA correctly dismissed

the same, pointing out that her "averment that [she] was not notified of
[the] applications for the free patent as well as of the proceedings which
transpired leading to the granting and registration of the land in the
[respondents'] name is bare and self-serving,"40 and "the records negate this
claim because a Notice of Application for Free Patent was 'posted in [a]
conspicuous place on the land applied for, on the bulletin board of the
barrio where the land is located, and at the door of [the] municipal
building on the 2nd day of January, 1987 and remained posted until the
18th of December.'"41 The CA was likewise not convinced with the
petitioner's allegation of fraud and misrepresentation in the execution of
the Confirmation Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate dated June 22,
1973 (Confirmation Affidavit) by the petitioner's father, the late Perfecto
Atienza (Perfecto). Being a notarized document, the CA imbued it with the
legal presumption of validity, its due execution and authenticity not
having been impugned by the mere self-serving allegations of the
petitioner.42
The petitioner having failed to persuade the Court by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondents perpetuated fraud against her, the Court's
conclusion in Spouses Galang finds application in the present case, viz.:
x x x As between these two claims, this Court is inclined to decide in favor

of the Galangs who hold a valid and subsisting title to the property which,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes to have been
issued by the PENRO in the regular performance of its official duty.
The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for
cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed,
but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, with mere
preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact
which must be proved.
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no
evidence at all specifically showing actual fraud or misrepresentation. x x
x.43
Also, Lopez v. Court of Appeals44 supports the recognition of the respondents

as the absolute and exclusive owner of the disputed lots, being grantees of
free patents over them.
In Lopez, the homestead application of one Fermin Lopez had unfortunately

remained unacted upon up to the time of his death, being neither approved
nor denied by the Director of the (then) Bureau of Lands as the Bureau
failed to process it; the Court ruled that he could not have acquired any
vested rights as a homestead applicant over the property,45 and his heirs
did not inherit any property right from him.46 The other heirs of Fermin
had no right to be declared co-owners with Hermogenes Lopez, the eldest
child of Fermin, who filed a new application after Fermin's death and was
granted a homestead patent over the land which was subject of Fermin's
application because the land exclusively pertained to Hermogenes. The
Court reasoned out:
The failure of the Bureau of Lands to act on the application of Fermin up to
the time of his death, however, prevented his heirs to be subrogated in all
his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for.
Perforce, at the time Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant over the
disputed property, it was still part of alienable public land. As he applied
for it in his own name, his application inures to his sole benefit. After
complying with the cultivation and residency requirements, he became a
grantee of a homestead patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and
exclusive owner.47
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the
complaint for the recall and cancellation of the free patent applications of
the respondents.
Proceeding now to the determination of whether the petitioner has

succeeded in proving her cause of action for reconveyance, the petitioner
likewise failed in this respect. As correctly pointed out by the CA and
stated earlier, an action for reconveyance involving land that is titled
pursuant to a free patent is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner or to one with a better
title.48 As such, two facts must be alleged in the complaint and proved
during the trial, namely: (1) the plaintiff was the owner of the land or
possessed it in the concept of owner, and (2) the defendant illegally
divested him of ownership and dispossessed him of the land.49
Such facts, as the CA observed, were not only not alleged in the amended
complaint, the petitioner Araceli Mayuga (Araceli50) also failed to prove
that she was entitled to 1/3 of the two lots in dispute by succession.
Apparently, Araceli had taken the position that being one of the surviving
compulsory heirs of their late father, Perfecto, she was entitled to 1/3 of the
disputed lots on the assumption that the decedent left only three legal heirs
(his children Araceli, Benjamin, Sr. and Armando)51 and that the disputed
lots were part of the inheritance52 left by their father when he died in 1978.
Araceli, however, overlooked the fact that Perfecto executed the
Confirmation Affidavit dated June 22, 1973 almost five years prior to his
death on June 1, 1978. Araceli did not even bother to provide the Court a
copy thereof so that the Court could make a determination of its legal
import. And the CA correctly accorded the Confirmation Affidavit the legal
presumption of validity, being a duly notarized document, where its
validity could not be impugned by mere self-serving allegations.53
Assuming that Perfecto owned the disputed lots and the Confirmation
Affidavit was a deed of partition, Perfecto could have legally partitioned
his estate during his lifetime. Under Article 1080 of the Civil Code,
"[s]hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs."
Unlike in the old Civil Code, partition inter vivos is expressly allowed in the
present Civil Code. The rationale for the change is exhaustively explained
by recognized Civil Law Commentator, former CA Justice Eduardo P.
Caguioa,54 thus:
xxx This article allows the deceased to make a partition of his estate before
his death which partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the co-heirs. This partition may be made either by an
act inter vivos or by will. Whether one or the other, however, is followed,
the requirements of law as to form must be complied with.55 If the testator
should make it by will, then there is no doubt that the same is valid and
binding on the heirs. It the testator makes a partition inter vivos, should
such partition be after the making of a will and in accordance therewith or
can the testator make a partition inter vivos without any supporting will?
Under the old Civil Code the article employed the term "testator" 56 in lieu
of the term now used which is "person." Interpreting this provision of law
our Supreme Court in line with the opinion of the Spanish Supreme Court
and Manresa, ruled that the word "testator" in the article can have no other
meaning than that there must have been a previous will executed by the
decedent wherein the property was disposed of to the heirs. Subsequently,
the testator makes a partition by an act inter vivos in accordance with the
disposition made in such will. Hence, our Supreme Court ruled that where
the testator made a partition inter vivos but the will was declared null and
void, the partition was also null and void.57 The word "testator" in the Old
Civil Code was changed by the New Civil Code into the term "person,"
precisely to do away with the interpretation given to the article by our
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Spain and Manresa. Where the old
code uses the specific term "testator," the New Civil Code uses the broader
term "person." What is the effect of this change? There is no doubt that the
intention behind the change is to do away with the interpretation requiring
a valid will in order that there be a valid partition inter vivos.
Consequently, we may say that a partition inter vivos may be valid even
though there is no supporting will. However, in accordance with what
disposition shall said partition be made if made inter vivos? May the
deceased freely, in said partition inter vivos, designate the shares of the
heirs granting that the same does not prejudice the legitime of the co-heirs?
If this is so, is not this a will without the formalities of a will? Was that the
intention of the legislature in amending the article from the term "testator"
to "person"? If that is the intention, then property may pass through the
will of the testator without the formalities of a will. Hence, this will in
effect destroy the intention of the legislature in carefully providing for the
formalities of the will so as to safeguard the testamentary right of a person.
Any act inter vivos which will designate under this theory a partition of
the property will be valid disposition even though it is not a will.
It is submitted that this is not the intention of the legislature. A distinction

must be made between a disposition of property and its partition. The
disposition of property must be made in the manner allowed by law,
namely, by will. After the designation in the will, then comes the second
part, the division in conformity with that disposition and the testator may
make this division in the same will or another will or by an act inter
vivos.58Hence, in reality, partition is simply making concrete and particular
the apportionment already previously made by the testator in his will.
Since our law now does not require a valid will in order that the
partition inter vivos may be valid and as we submit that the partition
cannot make the designation of heirs or the designation of shares but
merely makes concrete, specific a designation previously made, according
to what designation will this partition inter vivos be made if there is no
will of the testator? It is submitted that this designation shall be in
accordance with the laws of intestacy. Inasmuch as the deceased did not
make a will, it is presumed that he wanted the disposition in accordance
with law, and this apportionment by the law must be interpreted to be the
presumed will of the deceased; hence, the partition inter vivos must be in
accordance with the designation laid down by law in case of intestacy. Said
partition shall be valid so long as it does not impair the legitime of the co-
heirs. That there can be a prejudice to the legitime of the co-heirs in
intestate succession has been previously explained inasmuch as whether
the succession is testamentary or legal, compulsory succession must always
take place. From what has been explained, it is clear that should the
testator institute a stranger as heir, he cannot make a partition inter
vivos without making a designation by a valid will because the stranger
cannot inherit by the laws of intestacy.
Since the Civil Code allows partition inter vivos, it is incumbent upon the
compulsory heir questioning its validity to show that his legitime is
impaired. Unfortunately, Araceli has not shown to what extent the
Confirmation Affidavit prejudiced her legitime.
Araceli could not also claim preterition by virtue of the Confirmation

Affidavit on the assumption that the disputed two lots pertained to
Perfecto's inheritance, he had only three legal heirs and he left Araceli with
no share in the two lots. Article 854 of the Civil Code partly provides: "[t]he
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious."
As explained by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa:

x x x Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of a
compulsory heir in the direct line or anyone of them either because they are
not mentioned therein or although mentioned they are neither instituted as
heir nor expressly disinherited. The act of totally depriving a compulsory
heir of his legitime can take place either expressly or tacitly. The express
deprivation of the legitime constitutes disinheritance. The tacit deprivation
of the same is called preterition. x x x59
x x x In order that there be preterition, it is essential that the heir must be

totally omitted. This is clear from the wording of this article in conjunction
with Article 90660. x x x61
xxxx
Summarizing, therefore, total omission means that the omitted compulsory

heir receives nothing under the will, whether as heir, legatee or devisee,
has received nothing by way of donation inter vivos or propter [nuptias],
and will receive nothing by way of intestate succession.62
Although Araceli was a compulsory heir in the direct descending line, she
could not have been preterited. Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As
contemplated in Article 854, the presence of a will is necessary. Secondly,
before his death, Perfecto had properties in Limon, Rizal which was almost
50 hectares, part of which was developed for residential and agricultural
purposes, and in Odiongan.63 Araceli could not have been totally excluded
in the inheritance of Perfecto even if she was not allegedly given any share
in the disputed two lots.
If Araceli's share in the inheritance of Perfecto as claimed by her was

indeed impaired, she could have instituted an action for partition or a
settlement of estate proceedings instead of her complaint for cancellation of
free patent and reconveyance.
Furthermore, as the persons who applied for and were awarded free
patents, the respondents are the rightful, legal owners of the disputed lots.
The free patents having been issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources on February 28, 1992 and recorded in the Book of
Entries at the Office of the Registry of Deeds in June 1992,64 the
respondents' certificates of title have already become indefeasible pursuant
to Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property Registration
Decree), which pertinently provides: "Upon the expiration of said period of
one year [from and after the date of entry of the decree of registration], the
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible."
Given the foregoing, the resolution of the procedural issues pertinent to the
Petition has become superfluous.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court

of Appeals Decision dated July 8, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 95599 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Reyes, Jr., J., on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198994, February 03, 2016
IRIS MORALES, Petitioners, v. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO

JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL
ROSA OLONDRIZ AND FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA
OLONDRIZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Iris Morales from the May
27, 2011 decision and October 12, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.1 The CA denied Morales' petition
for certiorari from the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) July 12, 2007 and
October 30, 2007 orders in SP. Proc. No. 03-0060 and SP. Proc. No. 03-
0069.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Antecedents
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was
survived by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children:
Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa
O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the
respondent heirs.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a
petition with the Las Piñas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate
and the appointment of a special administrator on July 4, 2003. The case
was raffled to Branch 254 and docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060.
On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as
special administrator.
However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the
RTC alleging that the decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales
prayed for the probate of the will and for hex appointment as special
administratrix. Her petition was also raffled to Branch 254 and docketed
as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069.
The pertinent portions of the decedent's will

reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the
executor hereof and administrator of my estate until its
distribution in accordance herewith, x x x
2. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be

distributed equally among and between (1) IRIS MORALES
OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ,
JR., (3) ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5)
ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their mother (6) MARIA ORTEGAS
OLONDRIZ, SR.3
Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an

illegitimate son of the decedent.
On September 1, 2003, Morales filed a manifestation in Sp. Proc. Case No.

SP-03-0060 and moved to suspend the intestate proceedings in order to
give way to the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069. The
respondent heirs opposed Morales' motion for suspension and her petition
for allowance of the will.
On November 27, 2003, the RTC consolidated Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-
0060 with Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069.
On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate

proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the will.
On January 10, 2006, Morales agreed to the holding of an evidentiary

hearing to resolve the issue of preterition. Thus, the RTC ordered the
parties to submit their factual allegations to support or negate the existence
of preterition. Only the respondent heirs complied with this order.
After several postponements at the instance of Morales, the reception of

evidence for the evidentiary hearing was scheduled on May 29, 2006.
However, Morales failed to appear, effectively waiving her right to present
evidence on the issue of preterition.
On June 23, 2006, the RTC, through Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub,
suspended the intestate proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and
set the case for probate. The RTC reasoned that probate proceedings take
precedence over intestate proceedings.
The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the suspension order

but the RTC denied the motion on September 1, 2006. The RTC also
summarily revoked the Letters of Administration previously issued to
Alfonso Jr.
The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the summary

revocation of the Letters of Administration. They also moved for the
inhibition of Judge Aglugub of Branch 254.
On November 16, 2006, the RTC granted the motion for inhibition. The case
was transferred to Branch 253 presided by Judge Salvador V. Timbang, Jr.
On July 12, 2007, the RTC resolved (1) the respondent heirs' motion for
reconsideration of the revocation of the Letters of Administration and (2)
Morales' motion to be appointed Special Administratrix of the estate. The
RTC noted that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will not
hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if it appears that the probate of the
will might become an idle ceremony because the will is intrinsically void.
The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco
Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco
was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary
hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated
Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in
intestacy.
Morales moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on October 30,
2007, for lack of merit.
On February 7, 2008, Morales filed a petition for certiorari against the orders

of the RTC. Morales alleged that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in proceeding intestate despite the existence of the will. The
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.
On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales' petition for certiorari. The CA

reasoned that while probate proceedings take precedence over intestate
proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line annuls
the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into
intestate succession.4 Thus, the continuation of the probate proceedings
would be superfluous and impractical because the inheritance will be
adjudicated intestate. The CA concluded that the RTC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion.
Morales moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on October 12,

2011. Hence, she filed the present petition for review on certiorari on
December 5, 2011.
The Petition
Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when
it ordered the case to proceed intestate because: (1) the probate of a
decedent's will is mandatory; (2) the RTC Branch 254 already ordered the
case to proceed into probate; (3) the order setting the case for probate
already attained finality; (3) the probate court cannot touch on the intrinsic
validity of the will; and (4) there was no preterition because Francisco
received a house and lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.
The respondent heirs counter: (1) that it is within the RTC's jurisdiction to
reverse or modify an interlocutory order setting the case for probate; (2)
that the petitioner failed to mention that she did not appear in any of the
evidentiary hearings to disprove their allegation of preterition; (3) that the
RTC and the CA both found that Francisco was preterited from the will;
and (4) that Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of heirs and
opened the case into intestacy. They conclude that the RTC did not exceed
its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated
Alfonso Jr. as the administrator of the estate and ordered the case to
proceed intestate.
Our Ruling
We join the ruling of the CA.
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will,

either because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son,
etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate
without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of his
legitime.5 Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir
did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.6
In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a

compulsory heir from the testator's inheritance without the heir's express
disinheritance.
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of

preterition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation, (emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct
line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall
remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a
will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.7
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco

Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son,
Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could
show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion
of his preterition.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to

present evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances
on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear
during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence
on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the reasonable
conclusion that there was preterition.
We will not entertain the petitioner's factual allegation that Francisco was
not preterited because this Court is not a trier of facts. Furthermore, the CA
concurred with the RTC's conclusion. We see no cogent reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the lower courts.
The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the will during probate proceedings and (2)
order the case to proceed intestate because of preterition.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court's
inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the
probate court will only determine the will's formal validity and due
execution.8 However, this rule is not inflexible and absolute.9 It is not
beyond the probate court's jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.10 When practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon
even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.11
The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and
Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment
effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy
of the inheritance.12 The decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be
superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error - much less grave abuse of
discretion - on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.
Finally, there is no merit in the petitioner's argument that the previous

order setting the case for probate barred the RTC from ordering the case to
proceed intestate. The disputed order is merely interlocutory and can never
become final and executory in the same manner that a final judgment
does.13 An interlocutory order does not result in res judicata.14 It remains
under the control of the court and can be modified or rescinded at any time
before final judgment.15
Certiorari is a limited form of review confined to errors of jurisdiction. An

error of jurisdiction is one where the officer or tribunal acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.16 As discussed, it is well within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
will if probate proceedings might become an idle ceremony due to the
nullity of the will.
On the other hand, grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of positive duty,
or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.17 It is present
when power is exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance, of
passion and hostility. Morales failed to show that the RTC acted in such a
capricious and despotic manner that would have warranted the CA's grant
of her petition for certiorari. On the contrary, the RTC acted appropriately
in accordance with the law and jurisprudence.cralaw-red
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.

SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D.
SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES
D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the
nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the
petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled,
"In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D.
Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the

settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of
private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed

the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in
full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general
power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and
exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3)
Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator
of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4)
Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting
one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the
decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate
of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of

Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners
before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings
should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is

quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores

St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon
ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang
paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan
sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid
niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni
Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako
nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan

para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los
Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad
at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga
may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na

mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at
ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at
hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si
Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa

harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP.
Proc. No. 99–93396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be
the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will
only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest
son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition
which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents
maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on
the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that:

1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a
determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents
question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4)
the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the
petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy

Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only
heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being
omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar
as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply,
she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise

would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of
Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its
position clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will
and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be
intrinsically void … would have been an exercise in futility. It would have
meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court
could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity
of the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is
hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order
dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION

OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER
1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH

SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE
PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL
HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND
THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED
RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED
ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS

THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF
THE TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT
THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID;
AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE

PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS
A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time
and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest
the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be
published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a
newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to
the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but
rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply
contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition
in the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically
void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and
private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his
estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were
preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will
that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was
mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work
injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of
Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by

petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting.
Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any
issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably

showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir
to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was
disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that
the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor
shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that
were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the
incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of
Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause
for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil
Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of
children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt

against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or

concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or

undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or

ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or

descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful
life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil

interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed

by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It
is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines,
and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere

disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the

testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law,
must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is
only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public
policy that it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not

learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed
more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the
document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was
intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the
will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the

compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in
the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all
his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo
did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs.
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name
was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and
his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will,

and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the
right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial

Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999,
are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc.
No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio.
The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
RENATO C. CORONA
GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2
Records, p. 20.
3
Id. at 17.
4
Id. at 63.
5
Id. at 65.
6
Id. at 82.
7
Id. at 96.
8
Emphasis supplied.
9
Article 783 of the Civil Code states: "A will is an act whereby a
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control
to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death."
10
Tolentino, Arturo M., "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code of the Philippines," Volume III, p. 30.
11
Id. at 38.
12
Id. at 37-39.
13
In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues
to be resolved are: 1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed,
the decedent’s last will and testament; 2) whether said will was
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; 3)
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the
time the will was executed; and, 4) whether the execution of the will
and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedents. As a general
rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in
exceptional circumstances, courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of
the will (Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106720, September 15,
1994, 236 SCRA 488).
14
Supra note 10.
15
Article 854 of the Civil Code states: "The preterition or omission of
one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,

the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right
of representation."
16
Article 841 of the Civil Code states: "A will is valid even though it
should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should
not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so
instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be
incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in accordance

with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate
shall pass to the legal heirs."
17
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57848, June 19, 1982, 114 SCRA
478.
18
Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-24742, October 26, 1973, 53 SCRA
360.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI
and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS
OANES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed
the Orders dated July 21, 20002 and July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille
Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed
a petition for letters of administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and
entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged

illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on
October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of
real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all
surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a
regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They
likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of
the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached
to private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum
Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the

petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his
estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private
respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground
that the certification against forum shopping should have been signed by
private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios
should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as
mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to

Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim
had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of
Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in
exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima
Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and
Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that
she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no
renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules,
the trial court also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification
against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the
Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby

DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of
merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July
17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby
DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of
the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille
Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate
of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration,

hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on

certification against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim
executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the
estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private
respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for
letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the
lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be
considered substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-
forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the
reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition

should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of
non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim
precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights; and
3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving
their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-
forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the
case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher
interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled
that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-
forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice.12 So it is in the present controversy where the merits13 of the case
and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should
be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the
rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar
private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a
right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The
Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance
and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x
x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the
document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary
share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights
of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article
1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may
accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be

accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the
persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and
distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in
Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their
wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to
an alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right,
there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given
under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived
their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has
consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus
be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when
petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's
invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that
private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code
took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate
children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from
the finding of the document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent
died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a
period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right
was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which
superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of

the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall

be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive

notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in

Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established

by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an
admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may
be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is
based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends

on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving
their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in
this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a
trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial
Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for
letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving
evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the
status of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff
can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as
a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the
character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be
answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions
justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present
in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have
been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the
action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action
to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly

formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by
our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the
doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a
right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact
acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division
of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5;
Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his
deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil.,
135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855).
In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the
plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The
obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings
the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court;
and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January

22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the
denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25,
2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let
the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 138 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario,

J.J., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of

DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed
MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA
GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs,
CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS,
ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS
SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS,
JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a

reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and
by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2)
Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area
of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of
respondent Julia Delos Santos5 (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other
hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria
Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga

Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio,
Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria,
Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of
Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the
other hand, are Valentin’s children. Petitioners alleged that the properties
were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death,
it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After
Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate
and without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent,
who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the
sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that
the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and
must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as

these did not originate from petitioners’ familial line and were not
originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the
properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso
Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in
possession of the properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit
in petitioners’ claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by
Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision
dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the

three (3) parcels of land subject of this action in the name of the
plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint including intervenor Maria
Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the property described in the
old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the

name of Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-
149035(M) and reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees and damages

and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case
No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same
per Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to
establish that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The
CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously
owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease
Exequiel.11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE
PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE
OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT
TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON
RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is

sufficient that the properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it
to be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in
representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were
the brothers of Exequiel.13
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions
of law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which
is when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court.14 This
being the case in the petition at hand, the Court must now look into the
differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues
that arise – one, whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties
and two, whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these
properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property
came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation,
from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The
second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other
ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last
transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who
must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came.15
The lineal character of the

reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva

troncal is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous
premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the
Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject
properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was
received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the

property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by
the reservor.16
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be
reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first
transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in
dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property.17 It was also immaterial for
the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga
or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that
Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the
properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the
descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been
acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous
or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when
the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties
in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and

collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should
be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather,
she is Gregoria’s collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and
descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons
who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common
ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her

grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s
descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and
great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and
Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line
of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to
the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s
collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to
her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is,
Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,
her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative
within the third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the

descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they

are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the
properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is
the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.19 It
is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and

Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the
relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came.
The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the
prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and
mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within
the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there

are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and
for the exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives,
within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them
as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of

reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the
case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties
are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal.
First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the
other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and
second, because petitioners are not Gregoria’s relatives within the third
degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC
should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should
apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of
the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among

them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the

proper distribution of Gregoria’s estate at this point as the cause of action
relied upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based
solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily
entail reception of evidence on Gregoria’s entire estate and the heirs
entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed specifically
for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of

the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC’s
disposition of the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the
properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to
petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC
should have done, assuming for argument’s sake that reserva troncal is
applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on
respondent’s titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to
reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on the
title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus,
whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance
by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the
attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the
reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The
transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor.
The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the
time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,27 that a

reservatario becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the
fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in
dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16,

2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint
in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without
prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination
of ownership of the properties in question.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 163362, July 08, 2015
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO

ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER
ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD, ANTONIETA
ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS
VENTULA, AND NILA ARADO, PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA V.
ARADO, Petitioners, v. ANACLETO ALCORAN AND ELENETTE
SUNJACO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on February 28,

2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered
on January 15, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, in Dumaguete
City (RTC)2 dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim for being
without merit.
Antecedents
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado

(Joaquina), and their marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran
(Nicolas).3 In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia)4 but
their union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had
an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to
respondent Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 19515 during the
subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia.6 In 1972, Anacleto married
Elenette Sonjaco.7redarclaw
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died m 1954. Likewise, Florencia

died in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981.8redarclaw
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica

Limpahan.9 Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia
and Melania, all surnamed Arado.10 Nemesio had six children, namely: (1)
Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was
married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria;11 and (6)
Felicisima.12 During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was
substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and his spouse,
Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and
his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza;
and (5) Nila.
On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and

Tomasa filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and damages
(with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) against
Anacleto and Elenette.13 Named as unwilling co-plaintiffs were Sulpicio,
Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, along with Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria
and Felicisima.
The properties subject of the action were the following: (1) Lot No. 4100,
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OV-1379; (2) Lot No.
4054, covered by OCT No. OV-1380; (3) a parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 6065; (4) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
20470; (5) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 11-028-A; (6) Lot
No. 709 covered by OCT No. OV-7784; (7) a parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 87-011-215-A; (8) a parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 87-011-217; (9) Lot No. 5234 covered by OCT No. 3489-A;
and (10) Lot No. 5224 covered by Tax Declaration No. 8-201.14 The parties
later stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had previously
belonged to Raymundo, while the last two had been the paraphernal
properties of Joaquina.15redarclaw
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939,
his properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as it was during the
period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not inherit but only a
share of the usufruct, which was extinguished upon the death of the
usufructuary;"16 that when Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his
properties were inherited by his wife, Florencia, and the other half by his
mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings
Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and
Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from which affair
Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether he was the spurious son
of Nicolas; that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child
during Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from
Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the properties as
the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that the
will was void for not having been executed according to the formalities of
the law, and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina; that the
supposed testator did not acknowledge the will, which was not submitted
for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the properties; that
notwithstanding their repeated demands for the return of the properties,
the defendants persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction should issue to prevent the defendants from further violating
their rights in the properties; and that the defendants should be ordered to
reconvey the properties, and to pay; P20,000.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's
fees.17redarclaw
In their answer,18 the defendants (respondents herein) countered that

Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact
evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus had the
right to inherit the properties from Nicolas; that because Anacleto was still
too young when Nicolas died, the administration of the properties passed
to Anacleto's grandmother, Joaquina; that Joaquina executed a last will and
testament in Anacleto's favor; that Joaquina's possession of the properties
was for and in behalf of Anacleto, who had been living with her since his
birth; that such possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and continued
until Joaquina's death in 1981; that Anacleto then took over the possession
of the properties to the exclusion of all others; that granting for the sake of
argument that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the same were
already lost through laches, estoppel and prescription; and that Anacleto
was the rightful owner of the properties, and his ownership and possession
should not be disturbed.
By way of counterclaim, the defendants prayed that the plaintiffs be

ordered to pay 50,000.00 as moral damages, 1,000.00 "as initial expenses as
costs of this litigation which will increase as the case progresses"19 and
10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Veronica Limpahan and Sulpicio Limpahan likewise filed their answer20 to

the complaint, stating that they were not interested in pursuing any claim
of ownership in the properties; that assuming that they were entitled, they
were abandoning their rights, interests, title and participation in the
properties; and that they be excluded from further court processes.
Judgrnent of the RTC
On January 15, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, decreeing

thusly:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint and the counterclaim for lack of merit.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth of
Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of
Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit 3), which proved that Nicolas
had himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth by providing the
details thereof and indicating that he was the father of Anacleto. It
observed that the name of Nicolas appeared under the column "Remarks"
in the register of births, which was the space provided for the name of the
informant; that because the plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute the
entry in the register of births, the entry became conclusive with respect to
the facts contained therein; that Anacleto's claim of recognition was
bolstered by his baptismal certificate (Exhibit F), in which was indicated
that his parents were Nicolas Alcoran and Francisca Sarita; that also
presented was a picture taken during the wake of Nicolas (Exhibit 5)
showing the young Anacleto being carried by Joaquina, and also Nicolas'
wife, Florencia; that in addition, the school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6)
showed that Joaquina stood as his guardian during his grade school years;
that when Anacleto got married, it was Joaquina who gave consent to his
marriage because he was then still a minor (Exhibit 8); and that Joaquina
executed her will in 1978 (Exhibit 9), bequeathing the subject properties to
Anacleto, but the will was yet to be probated.
As the case was filed during the effectivity of the Family Code, the RTC
ruled that Articles 172,22 17323 and 17524 of the Family Code allowed Anacleto
to establish his filiation during his lifetime through the record of his birth
appearing in the civil register. It further ruled that because there were no
legitimate children of Nicolas who contested Anacleto's right to inherit, the
rule on the separation of the legitimate from the illegitimate family was
rendered irrelevant; and that, accordingly, Anacleto was entitled to possess
the subject properties upon having established that he was the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. Consequently, it also dismissed
the defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient basis.
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA.25redarclaw
Decision of the CA
On February 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision,26 affirming the

judgment of the RTC in this wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 43 stands.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto was an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It agreed that the Register of
Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that Nicolas
was the father of Anacleto, and that the former had supplied the
information on the latter's birth. It declared that the plaintiffs did not rebut
the filiation of Anacleto by contrary evidence; that the baptismal certificate
of Anacleto and the picture taken during the wake of Nicolas further
showed that Anacleto had been acknowledged by Nicolas; that based on
the Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, the law applicable at the
time of the filing of the case, Anacleto's filiation was established by the
record of his birth appearing in the civil register; and that Anacleto
possessed rights in the subject properties.
Anent the successional rights of the parties, the CA pronounced that after
Raymundo died in 1939, his wife, Joaquina, and his son, Nicolas, inherited
his properties; that when Nicolas died in 1954, he was survived by
Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his legitimate wife), and Anacleto (his
illegitimate son); that Joaquina was entitled to one-half of Nicolas' estate,
and the remaining half should be divided between Florencia and Anacleto;
that in 1960, when Florencia died without issue, the share she had inherited
from Nicolas was inherited by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica;
and that when Joaquina died in 1981, she was survived by her sibling
Alejandra; her nieces Jesusa,27 Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima; her
nephews Pedro and Teodorico; and her illegitimate grandson, Anacleto.
The CA declared that the plaintiffs were already barred from asserting
their rights in the properties by estoppel by laches; that Joaquina had
executed her last will and testament on April 19, 1978, whereby she
bequeathed her properties to Anacleto; that the properties were thus
transmitted to Anacleto upon her death in 1981; that the plaintiffs filed
their complairtt in the RTC only on January 14, 1992; that it would be
unjust to award the subject properties to the plaintiffs who had slept on
their rights for a long time; and that the plaintiffs could probably pursue
their claim in the appropriate intestate or testate proceedings.
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration,28 but the CA denied their

motion on March 24, 2004.
Issues
In this appeal, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners,29 implore the Court to
nullify the assailed rulings of the CA, and to determine once and for all the
following issues:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran x x
x; and
(b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.30

The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas'
illegitimate son; that inasmuch as Anacleto was born to Francisca during
the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia, Anacleto could only be
the spurious child of Nicolas; that there was no law for the
acknowledgment of a spurious child; that even if Anacleto would be given
the benefit of the doubt and be considered a natural child. Article 278 of
the Civil Code states that "[r]ecognition shall be made in the record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing;"
that the appearance of the father's name in the certificate of birth alone,
without his actual intervention, was insufficient to prove paternity; that the
mere certificate by the civil registrar that the father himself registered the
child, without the father's signature, was not proof of the father's voluntary
acknowledgment; that the baptismal certificate was insufficient proof of
paternity; and that if there was ground for Anacleto's recognition, the
period to claim recognition already prescribed.
The petitioners reject the claim of Anacleto that Joaquina bequeathed the
subject properties to him by last will and testament. They assail the validity
and due execution of the will, which was not submitted for probate; that
the joint affidavit allegedly executed in favor of Anacleto by Sulpicio,
Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, with Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima
Arado, whereby they ceded their rights in the subject properties in favor of
Anacleto, was unwarranted; and that the veracity of the affidavit was
doubtful because it was purportedly inconsistent with Anacleto's stance
that he had inherited the properties in his own right.
In tum, the defendants, herein respondents, counter that Nicolas
recognized Anacleto as his illegitimate child because Nicolas had himself
caused the registration of Anacleto's birth; that the petitioners' allegation of
prescription lacked basis inasmuch as Anacleto was not seeking
compulsory recognition; and that Anacleto had already been voluntarily
recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC, albeit for
different reasons.
The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the subject
properties is properly characterized as an accion reivindicatoria. According
to Cañezo v. Bautista,31 an "[a]ccion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the
proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby
plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its
full possession." In essence, the petitioners seek to put an end to Anacleto's
possession of the properties on the basis of their being the rightful heirs
considering that Anacleto, being the spurious child of Nicolas, held no
successional rights in the estate of Nicolas.
The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by

preponderance of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the plaintiffs. In
that regard, we have discoursed on preponderance of evidence in Amoroso v.
Alegre, Jr.,32 thusly:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a right granted or
created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of
that of his opponent. (Bold underscoring for emphasis)
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.
At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the
provisions of the Family Code33 should apply because the petitioners'
complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the RTC during the effectivity
of the Family Code. Under the Family Code, the classification of children is
limited to either legitimate or illegitimate.34 Illegitimate filiation is proved
in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code, to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article I72, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established m accordance with
Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code, which state:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or laws.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding

the death of either or both of the parties.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas
had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth
certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the
Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed that
Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The
showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column
"Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births.
Based on the certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the Register of
Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was the space provided for the
name of the informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering that
Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the
birth certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of
his paternity was fully warranted.35redarclaw
Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in

determining his filiation. We have already held in Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals36 that "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with
respect to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal certificates were "per
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]." Hence,
we attach no probative value to the baptismal certificate as proof of the
filiation of Anacleto.
The weight accorded by the RTC and the CA to the picture depicting the
young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of the
departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also undeserved. At best, the picture
merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her
filiation with Anacleto. Cautioning against the admission in evidence of a
picture of similar nature, we have pointed out in Solinap v. Locsin,
Jr.37 that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan
C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly
set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction
fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before
a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased.
The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that Joaquina
was the guardian of Anacleto in his grade school years, and the marriage
contract between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C), which indicated
that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not have the
evidentiary value accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent
recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for, as we stressed in Cenido v.
Apacionado,38 the recognition "must be made personally by the parent
himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the
concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, of if
the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or
maternity of children born outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative

evidence notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate
child remained beyond question in view of the showing that Nicolas had
personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the

respective rights of the parties in relation to the specific properties subject
of the complaint?
To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties
had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the remaining two had been
the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was the
governing law on succession. Under Article 807 thereof,39 Joaquina and
Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the legitimate son of Raymundo,
were the forced heirs who acquired legal title to Raymundo's estate upon
his death. In accordance with Article 834 thereof,40 Nicolas was entitled to
inherit the entire estate of Raymundo, while Joaquina was entitled to a
portion in usufruct equal to the one third portion available for betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was already in

effect.41 Under Article 1000 thereof,42 the heirs entitled to inherit from
Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his surviving
spouse), and Anacleto (his acknowledged illegitimate son). Said heirs
became co-owners of the properties comprising the entire estate of Nicolas
prior to the estate's partition in accordance with Article 107843 of the Civil
Code.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate

included the first eight of the subject properties that had previously
belonged to Raymundo. Anacleto became a co-owner of said
properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954.44 Likewise, Joaquina
succeeded to, and became a pro indiviso co-owner of, the properties that
formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in 1981, her
hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her
share in the estate of Nicolas. In as much as Joaquina died without any
surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or spouse,
Article 100345 of the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives should
inherit her entire estate.
Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by law
from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto could
not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the
legitimate son of Joaquina.46 Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such
children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As
certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,47 the right of representation
is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto could not
inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will and
testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento) (Exhibit K). Article 838 of
the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. We have clarified in Gallanosa v. Arcangel48 that in order
that a will may take effect, "it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in
the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory."
It appears that such will remained ineffective considering that the records
are silent as to whether it had ever been presented for probate, and had
been allowed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged
this fact in their complaint, and the respondents did not controvert the
allegation. In the absence of proof showing that the supposed will of
Joaquina had been duly approved by the competent court, we hold that it
had not been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain the CA's ruling to the
effect that Joaquina had bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by will, and
that the properties had been transmitted to him upon her death.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are
the ones entitled to inherit from her estate.
Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not
establish that the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been
respectively settled with finality through the appropriate testate or intestate
proceedings, and partitioned in due course. Unless there was a proper and
valid partition of the assets of the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas
and Joaquina, whether extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not
adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions of their estates,
because, as we have declared in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:49
x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim
ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition,
either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir
cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned
in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs
becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the
part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs
while it remains undivided.
Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and
Joaquina had been previously partitioned, the Court concludes and holds
that none of the parties herein can lay claim over any of the disputed
specific properties. The petitioners cannot contend, therefore, that they
were the rightful owners of the properties of the late Joaquina to the
exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the dismissal of the petitioners'
complaint for recovery of such properties.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February

28, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183448 June 30, 2014
SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA

PERALTA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO
ABALON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183464
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO

ABALON, Petitioners,
vs.
MARISSA ANDAL, LEONIL AND AL, ARNEL AND AL, SPOUSES
DOMINDOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA, and HEIRS of
RESTITUTO RELLAMA, represented by his children ALEX,
IMMANUEL, JULIUS and SYLVIA, all surnamed RELLAMA.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before us are the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 30 May 2007 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542. The
CA had reversed the 14 April 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Fifth Judicial Region of Legaspi City, Branch 5, in Civil Case No.
9243.
The civil case before the RTC of Legaspi City involved a parcel of land
registered under the name of Bernardina Abalon and fraudulently
transferred to Restituto Rellama and who, in turn, subdivided the subject
property and sold it separately to the other parties to this case – Spouses
Dominador and Ofelia Peralta; and Marissa, Leonil and Arnel, all
surnamed Andal. Thereafter, Spouses Peralta and the Andals individually
registered the respective portions of the land they had bought under their
names. The heirs of Bernardina were claiming back the land, alleging that
since it was sold under fraudulent circumstances, no valid title passed to
the buyers. On the other hand, the buyers, who were now title holders of
the subject parcel of land, averred that they were buyers in good faith and
sought the protection accorded to them under the law.
THE FACTS
The RTC and the CA have the same findings of fact, but differ in their legal
conclusions. There being no factual issues raised in the Petitions, we adopt
the findings of fact of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 85542, as follows:
The subject parcel of land, described as Lot 1679 of the Cadastral Survey of
Legaspi, consisting of 8,571 square meters, was originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (O) 16 and registered in the name of
Bernardina Abalon (Abalon). It appears that a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed over the subject property in favor of Restituto M. Rellama
(Rellama) on June 10, 1975. By virtue of such conveyance OCT No. (O) 16
was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
42108 was issued in the name of Rellama. The subject property was then
subdivided into three (3) portions: Lot 1679-A, Lot 1679-B, Lot 1679-C. Lot
1679-A was sold to Spouses Dominador P. Peralta, Jr. and Ofelia M. Peralta
(Spouses Peralta) for which reason TCT No. 42254 was issued in their
names. Lot 1679-B, on the other hand, was first sold to Eduardo Lotivio
(Lotivio) who thereafter transferred his ownership thereto to Marissa
Andal, Arnel Andal, and Leonil Andal (the Andals) through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated October 9, 1995. On even date, TCT No. 42482 was
issued in the name of the Andals. The Andals likewise acquired Lot 1679-C
as evidenced by the issuance of TCT No. 42821 in their favor on December
27, 1995.
Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of

Rellama was a forged document, and claiming further that they acquired
the subject property by succession, they being the nephew and niece of
Abalon who died without issue, plaintiff-appellees Mansueta Abalon and
Amelia Abalon filed the case below against Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and
the Andals, the herein defendants-appellants and the Bank of the
Philippines [sic] Islands which was later dropped as a party defendant.
It was alleged in their Complaint and subsequent Amended Complaint,

under five separate causes of action, that Rellama was able to cause the
cancellation of OCT No. (O) 16, and in lieu thereof the issuance of TCT No.
42108 in his own name from which the defendants-appellants derived their
own titles, upon presentation of a xerox copy of the alleged forged deed of
absolute sale and the order granting the issuance of a second owner’s
duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in his favor in Miscellaneous Cadastral
Case No. 10648, which he had filed on the pretext that Lot 1679 covered by
OCT No. (O) 16 was sold to him and that the owner’s duplicate copy of the
said title got lost in 1976 after the same was delivered to him. They averred
that the owner’s duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) 16 had always been with
Abalon and that upon her death, it was delivered to them. Likewise, they
alleged that Abalon had always been in possession of the subject property
through her tenant Pedro Bellen who was thereafter succeeded by his wife,
Ruperta Bellen, and then his son, Godofredo Bellen. On the other hand,
they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he was claiming. They
further alleged that after the ownership over the subject property was
transferred to them upon the death of Abalon, they took possession thereof
and retained Godofredo as their own tenant. However, they averred that in
1995 the defendants-appellants were able to wrest possession of the subject
property from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the defendants-
appellants are not buyers in good faith as they were aware that the subject
land was in the possession of the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they made
the purchase. They thus claim that the titles issued to the defendants-
appellants are null and void.
In his answer, Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by
Abalon is genuine and that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 had been
delivered to him upon the execution of the said deed of transfer.
As for Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate answers to
the complaint, they mainly alleged that they are buyers in good faith and
for value.
During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was substituted by his heirs.
After the plaintiffs-appellees rested their case, instead of presenting their

own evidence, the defendants-appellants and the Heirs of Restituto
Rellama, on different occasions, filed a demurrer to evidence.
On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs-appellees and ordered the restoration of OCT No. (O) 16 in the
name of Abalon and the cancellation of the titles issued to the defendants-
appellants. The fact that only a xerox copy of the purported deed of sale
between Rellama and Abalon was presented before the Register of Deeds
for registration and the absence of such xerox copy on the official files of
the said Office made the court a quo conclude that the said document was a
mere forgery. On the other hand, the court a quo noted that the duplicate
copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in the hands of the plaintiffs-appellees bears [sic]
the perforated serial number B 221377, which it held is a convincing proof
of its authenticity and genuineness. It thus stated that "Miscellaneous
Cadastral Case No. 10648 is a (mere) strategem [sic] fraudulently concocted
... for the issuance of a fabricated (second) owner’s duplicate certificate of
Oct No. (O) 16" since the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 has not
been lost at all. It said that any subsequent registration procured by the
presentation of such forged instrument is null and void. The dispositive
portion of the court a quo’s decision reads: WHEREFORE, [p]remises
[c]onsidered, judgment is rendered as follows, to wit:
1. Ordering the restoration of Original Certificate of Title No. (O) 16

embracing Lot 1679 in the name of Bernardina Abalon into the official
files of the Registry of Deeds of Legaspi City – a copy of the owner’s
duplicate certificate embodying the technical description of Lot 1679
forming official part of the record as Exhibit "D" – as well as ordering
the cancellation of any and all transfer certificates of title succeeding
Original Certificate of title No. (O) 16 – including Transfer
Certificates (sic) of Title Nos. 42108, 42254, 42255, 42256, 42821 [,] and
42482;
2. Ordering the defendants Marissa Andal, Leonil Andal, Arnel

Andal[,] and the spouses Dominador and Ofelia Peralta to vacate Lot
1679 and to peacefully surrender such lot to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of

₱50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
The counterclaims by [sic] the defendants are all dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Peralta and the Andals filed their separate Notices of Appeal and
thereafter, upon approval, filed their respective Defendants-Appellants’
Briefs. The Heirs of Rellama, on the other hand, opted not to challenge the
ruling of the lower court.3
The Andals and Spouses Peralta – appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 –

raised several issues, which the CA summarized as follows:
1. Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of
Rellama was spurious
2. Whether the Andals and Spouses Peralta were buyers in good faith
and for value
3. Who among the parties were entitled to their claims for damages.4
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On 30 May 2007, the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals

promulgated its assailed judgment setting aside the RTC Decision. The CA
ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the subject property
showed badges of fraud or forgery against Rellama. It found that Abalon
had not parted with her ownership over the subject property despite the
claim of Rellama that they both executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. As proof,
the CA pointed out the existence of a notarized contract of leasehold
executed by Abalon with Ruperta Bellen on 11 June 1976. The genuineness
and due execution of the said leasehold agreement was uncontroverted by
the parties. On this basis, the appellate court concluded that Abalon could
not have leased the subject parcel of land to Bellen if the former had parted
with her ownership thereof.5
The CA also found no evidence to show that Rellama exercised dominion

over the subject property, because he had not introduced improvements on
the property, despite claiming to have acquired it in 1975.6 Further, the CA
noted that he did not cause the annotation of the Deed of Sale, which he
had executed with Abalon, on OCT No. (O) 16. It observed that when the
original copy of OCT No. (O) 16 was allegedly lost in 1976, while Rellama
was on his way to Legaspi City to register the title to his name, it took him
almost 20 years to take steps to judicially reconstitute a copy thereof. To the
appellate court, these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of Rellama’s
claim of ownership over such a significant property, which was almost a
hectare.7
The CA also ruled that the heirs of Bernardina Abalon had the legal
standing to question the sale transaction between Rellama and their
predecessor-in-interest. It concluded that the heirs of Abalon had acquired
the subject property by ordinary acquisitive prescription and thus had
every right to attack every document that intended to divest them of
ownership thereof,8 which in this case was the Deed of Sale that Bernardina
executed in favor of Rellama. Lastly, the appellate court considered the
Spouses Peralta as buyers in bad faith for relying on a mere photocopy of
TCT No. 42108 when they bought the property from Rellama.9 On the other
hand, it accorded the Andals the presumption of good faith, finding no
evidence that would rebut this presumption.10
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.

85542 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and a new judgment is

rendered as follows:
1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42482 and Transfer Certificate of

Title No. 42821, both in the names of Andals, are held legal and valid.
2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42254 registered in the names of

Spouses Peralta is cancelled for being null and void. Hence, they are
ordered to vacate the land covered thereby and to surrender
possession thereof in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.11
The heirs of Abalon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 May 2007
Decision, insofar as the CA declared the Andals to be buyers in good faith
of the subject property and, thus, that the land title issued in their favor
was valid. Spouses Peralta, for their part, filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the said CA Decision pertaining to the portion that
declared them as buyers in bad faith which accordingly nullified the title
issued to them.
On 10 June 2008, the CA denied the Motions for Partial Reconsideration of
the movants for lack of merit.12
On 11 August 2008, Spouses Peralta filed with this Court a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 30 May 2007
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542.13 On the same day, the heirs of
Bernardina Abalon, represented by Mansueto Abalon, filed a similar
Petition questioning the portion of the mentioned CA Decision declaring
the validity of the title issued to the Andals, who were adjudged by the
appellate court as buyers in good faith.14 THE ISSUES
The Petition filed by Spouses Peralta, docketed as G.R. No. 183448, lists the
following issues:
a) The case for annulment should have been dismissed because the
purported Deed of Sale executed by Abalon and Rellama was not
introduced in evidence and thus, forgery was not proven.
b) The heirs of Abalon are notforced heirs of Bernardina Abalon;

hence, they do not have the legal personality to file the action to
annul the subject Deed of Sale.
c) The heirs of Abalon failed to prove that they had inherited the
subject property.
d) Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith and, thus title to their
portion of the subject property must be upheld15
As for the heirs of Abalon, their Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183464,
raises the following issues:
a) The Andals cannot be considered as buyers in good faith by simply

applying the ordinary presumption in the absence of evidence
showing the contrary.
b) The CA erred in applying in favor of the Andals, the doctrine that
a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, because Abalon never parted
with her possession of the valid and uncancelled title over the subject
property
c) The CA erred in declaring the validity of the title issued in the

names of the Andals, because Rellama was bereft of any
transmissible right over the portion of the property he had sold to
them.16
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions and affirm the ruling of the CA.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether a forged instrument

may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the
genuine title, which is valid and has not been cancelled.
It is well-settled that "a certificate of title serves as evidence of an

indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of
land registration is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any
question as to the legality of the title."17
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,18 we explained the purpose of the

Torrens system and its legal implications to third persons dealing with
registered land, as follows:
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of

title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title
thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard
such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of
such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the
title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to
go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to
be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later
that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair
to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in
the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be
attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and
proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts
could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and
possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first
to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid
down by the law are satisfied.
The Torrens system was intended to guarantee the integrity and

conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but the system cannot be
used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered
land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. It
cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of
transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes
allowed or recognized by law. Thus, the Torrens system cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner or to shield the commission of fraud
or to enrich oneself at the expense of another.19
It is well-established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who is

dealing with a registered parcel of land need not go beyond the face of the
title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens and claims that
are annotated on the title.20 This rule, however, admits of exceptions, which
we explained in Clemente v. Razo:21
Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in

the absence of any suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond the certificate
to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate.
And, he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title.
We do acknowledge that the rule thus enunciated is not cast in stone. For,
indeed, there are exceptions thereto. Thus, in Sandoval vs. CA, we made
clear the following:
The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person

dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the
party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has
knowledge ofa defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts
to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of
the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or
arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of
said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good
faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.22
Thus, the determination whether one is a buyer in good faith or can be

considered an innocent purchaser for value becomes imperative. Section 55
of the Land Registration Act provides protection to an innocent purchaser
for value23 by allowing him to retain the parcel of land bought and his title
is considered valid. Otherwise, the title would be cancelled and the original
owner of the parcel of land is allowed to repossess it.
Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who

buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at
the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest
of some other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property
with the belief that the person from whom they receive the thing is the
owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not close their
eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim
that they are acting in good faith.24
The assailed Decision of the CA held that the Andals were buyers in good
faith, while Spouses Peralta were not. Despite its determination that fraud
marred the sale between Bernardina Abalon and Rellama, a fraudulent or
forged document of sale may still give rise to a valid title. The appellate
court reasoned that if the certificate of title had already been transferred
from the name of the true owner to that which was indicated by the forger
and remained as such, the land is considered to have been subsequently
sold to an innocent purchaser, whose title is thus considered valid.25 The
CA concluded that this was the case for the Andals.
The appellate court cited Fule v. Legare26 as basis for its ruling. In the said
case, the Court made an exception to the general rule that a forged or
fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. A fraudulent document
may then become the root of a valid title, as it held in Fule:
Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the
fact remains that he was able to secure a registered title to the house and
lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein
petitioners. We have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a
nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19).
However, we have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances
when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title.
One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred
from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that
way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then,
the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate
(Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).
We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because
under the Torrens system, "registration is the operative act that gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land
Registration Act). Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate
of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther
than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden
defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If
the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of
title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and
nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs.
Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its
foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration
Act. In the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced and
prejudiced immeasurably.
Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the

name of John W. Legare, and thereafter registered the same, John W.
Legare, insofar as third parties were concerned, acquired valid title to the
house and lot here disputed. When, therefore, he transferred this title to the
herein petitioners, third persons, the entire transaction fell within the
purview of Article 1434 of the Civil Code. The registration in John W.
Legare's name effectively operated to convey the properties to him.
After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under fraudulent
circumstances, Rellama succeeded in obtaining a title in his name and
selling a portion of the property to the Andals, who had no knowledge of
the fraudulent circumstances involving the transfer from Abalon to
Rellama. In fact, the Decisions of the RTC and the CA show no factual
findings or proof that would rebut the presumption in favor of the Andals
as buyers in good faith. Thus, the CA correctly considered them as buyers
in good faith and upheld their title.
The Abalons counter this ruling and allege that the CA erred in relying on
Fuleto justify its assailed Decision. They argue that Torres v. Court of
Appeals27 is the applicable ruling, because the facts therein are on all fours
with the instant case.28
In Torres, the subject property was covered by TCT No. 53628 registered in
the name of Mariano Torres. His brother-in-law Francisco Fernandez,
misrepresenting that the copy of the title had been lost, succeeded in
obtaining a court Order for the issuance of another copy of TCT No. 53628.
He then forged a simulated deed of sale purportedly showing that Torres
had sold the property to him and caused the cancellation of TCT No. 53628,
as well as the issuance of TCT No. 86018 in his name. Soon, Fernandez
mortgaged the property to Mota. Upon learning of the fraud committed by
Fernandez, Torres caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the
former’s copy and succeeded in having Fernandez’s title declared null and
void. Meanwhile, Mota was able to foreclose on Fernandez’s real estate
mortgage, as well as to cause the cancellation of TCT No. 86018 and the
issuance of a new one– TCT No. 105953 – in her name. The issue to be
resolved in Torres was whether Mota can be considered an innocent
mortgagee for value, and whether her title can be deemed valid. Ruling in
the negative, the Court explained:
There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres performed any act
or omission which could have jeopardized his peaceful dominion over his
realties. The decision under review, however, in considering Mota an
innocent mortgagee protected under Section 65 of the Land Registration
Law, held that Torres was bound by the mortgage. Inevitably, it
pronounced that the foreclosure sale, where Mota was the highest bidder,
also bound Torres and concluded that the certificate of title issued in the
name of Mota prevails over that of Torres'. As correctly pointed out by
Torres, however, his properties were sold on execution, and not on
foreclosure sale, and hence, the purchaser thereof was bound by his notice
of adverse claim and lis pendens annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT.
Moreover, even if We grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee, the
doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may
become the root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the owner still
holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in a
realty. The doctrine would apply rather when, as in the cases for example
of De la Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144 [1916], Fule v. De Legare, No. L-17951,
February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 351, and Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687,
April 10, 1989, the forger thru insidious means obtains the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, and subsequently sells
or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for in such a
case the new certificate is binding upon the owner (Sec.55, Act 496; Sec. 53,
P.D. No. 1529). But if the owner holds a valid and existing certificate of
title, his would be indefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of
the innocent holder's. "Prior tempore potior jure" as We have said in
Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, No. L-17641, January 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 46, citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil.590, Roman Catholic
Bishop v. Philippine Railway, 49 Phil. 546, Reyes v. Borbon, 50 Phil.
791.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
We do not agree with the contention of the Abalons that the ruling in
Torresis controlling in this case. They quoted a portion in the said case that
is clearly an obiter. In Torres, it was shown that Mariano had annotated an
adverse claim on the title procured by Fernandez prior to the execution
sale, in which Mota was the highest bidder. This Court declared her as a
mortgagee in bad faith because, at the back of Fernandez’s title, Torres
made an annotation of the adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens. The
annotation of the adverse claim was made while the forged document was
still in the name of the forger, who in this case is Fernandez. That situation
does not obtain in the instant case.
The records of the RTC and the CA have a finding that when Rellama sold
the properties to the Andals, it was still in his name; and there was no
annotation that would blight his clean title. To the Andals, there was no
doubt that Rellama was the owner of the property being sold to them, and
that he had transmissible rights of ownership over the said property. Thus,
they had every right to rely on the face of his title alone.
The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot
convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land
Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the
innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here is that there
must be a complete chain of registered titles.30 This means that all the
transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder
for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger – must be duly
registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. Contrary
to what the Abalons would like to impress on us, Fuleand Torresdo not
present clashing views. In Fule, the original owner relinquished physical
possession of her title and thus enabled the perpetrator to commit the
fraud, which resulted in the cancellation of her title and the issuance of a
new one. The forged instrument eventually became the root of a valid title
in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. The new title under the
name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent
purchaser for value. Hence, it was clear that there was a complete chain of
registered titles.
On the other hand in Torres, the original owner retained possession of the
title, but through fraud, his brother-in-law secured a court order for the
issuance of a copy thereof. While the title was in the name of the forger, the
original owner annotated the adverse claim on the forged instrument.
Thus, before the new title in the name of the forger could be transferred to
a third person, a lien had already been annotated on its back. The chain of
registered titles was broken and sullied by the original owner’s annotation
of the adverse claim. By this act, the mortgagee was shown to be in bad
faith.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles
was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither were they proven to have
knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of
Rellama’s ownership over the subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the
CA’s ruling that the Andals were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the
validity of their title to the parcel of the land bought from Rellama must be
upheld.
As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA that they are indeed
buyers in bad faith. The appellate court made a factual finding that in
purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of
the title provided by Rellama. The CA concluded that a mere photocopy of
the title should have made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some
flaw in the title of Rellama, because he was not in possession of the original
copy. This factual finding was supported by evidence.
The CA pointed out Spouses Peralta’s Answer to the Complaint of the

Abalons in Case No. 9243 in the RTC of Legaspi City, Branch 5. In their
Answer, they specifically alleged as follows:
2- These defendants [Spouses Peralta] acquired lot No. 1679-A by

purchase in good faith and for value from Restituto Rellama under
Doc. No. 11212, page No. 26, Book No. 60, Series of 1996 of Notary
Public Atty. Otilio Bongon, Legaspi City on March 2, 1995 copy of
which is attached as and made part of this answer as Exhibit "1;"
3- That these defendants were handed over by Rellama xerox [sic]

copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42103 issued by the
Register of Deed of Legaspi City on the 2nd day of August 1995 copy
attached and made integral part as Exhibit "1-A" and also Original
Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 as Exhibit "1-B"31
We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the CA because it is

supported by the evidence on record. Spouses Peralta filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which allows only questions of law to
be raised. It is a settled rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in this
kind of appeal. Under Rule 45, Section 1, "petitions for review on certiorari
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."32 A
question of fact arises when there is "as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when there is a need to calibrate the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to
the whole, and the probability of the situation."33 It is further pointed out
that "the determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual
issue, which generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in
a petition for review."34
Whether or not Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith, is without a

doubt, a factual issue. Although this rule admits of exceptions,35 none of
these applies to their case. There is no conflict between the factual findings
and legal conclusions of the RTC and those of the CA, both of which found
them to be buyers in bad faith. The fact that they did not participate in the
proceedings before the lower court does not help their case either.
On the issue of the legal standing of the Abalons to file this case, we find
that the CA correctly upheld their standing as heirs of the deceased
Bernardina Abalon. The appellate court ruled that during her lifetime,
Bernardina Abalon had promised her heirs - siblings Mansueto and Amelia
- that she would give them the subject property. A duplicate copy of OCT
No. (0) 16 was delivered to them upon her death. Thus, the CA concluded
that the two siblings acquired the subject property by ordinary
prescription. Further, it deduced that the mode of transmission of the
property from Bernardina to her nephew and niece was a form of donation
mortis causa, though without the benefit of a will.36 Despite this omission,
it still held that Mansueto and Amelia acquired the subject property
through ordinary acquisitive prescription because, since the death of their
aunt Bernardina, they had been in possession of the property for more than
10 years that ripened into full ownership.37
Under Article 97538 of the Civil Code, siblings Mansueto and Amelia
Abalon are the legal heirs of Bernardina, the latter having had no issue
during her marriage. As such, they succeeded to her estate when she
passed away. While we agree with the CA that the donation mortis causa
was invalid in the absence of a will, it erred in concluding that the heirs
acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription.
The subject parcel of land is a titled property; thus, acquisitive prescription
is not applicable.39 Upon the death of Bernardina, Mansueto and Amelia,
being her legal heirs, acquired the subject property by virtue of succession,
and not by ordinary acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 183448 and 183464 are DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION
FELIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the

decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68319 entitled "Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and
Anunciacion Feliano," which affirmed with modification the decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated
August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No. R-2878. The resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well
established.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of
land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and children
Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto
sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for ₱2,000.00, with
right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the
proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of ₱666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note ("vale")
from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of ₱300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio

and Albino tendered their payment of ₱666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But
Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro
after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including
his "vale" of ₱300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-
spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for ₱8,000.00. The Deed of Sale
provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO

THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00)
corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito
Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of this instrument are held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon
reaching the age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued

Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names
of respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an
affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount
of ₱176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21
considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido ₱966.66 for the obligation
of petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto, i.e., ₱666.66 for his share in the
redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his "vale" of ₱300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt
of the sum of ₱1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the
former’s share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went

back to his father’s hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he
learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In
1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject land during a
barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their
respective shares in subject property when they were minors, petitioners
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a
complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were

estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering that (1)
petitioner Rito had already received the amount corresponding to his share
of the proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner
Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of the redemption
price necessary for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the
case on the grounds of laches and prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on

August 11, 2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that (1)
Alberto or, by his death, any of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost
their right to subject land when not one of them repurchased it from Dr.
Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the rights and
interests of Alberto when she paid for Alberto’s share as well as his
obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3) petitioner Rito had no more right to
redeem his share to subject property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal
guardian pursuant to Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly
valid; and it was shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the
sale on July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It
held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Rito’s undivided share to the
property was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation
but that the contract was effectively ratified by petitioner Rito’s receipt of
the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner
Nelson is co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as
Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto’s rights when she repurchased his
share to the property. It further directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate
of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount of ₱966.66, representing the
amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner Nelson’s late
father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelson’s claim for
redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the redemption
money within the period prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court
of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner
of subject land but denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not
recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with
similar right of legal redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6)
children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito,
survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides
that "[i]f a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are
left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of
each of the children." Verily, the seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject
property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelson’s father, inherited
in their own rights and with equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation
of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were
transferred to his legal heirs – his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the
rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and co-
owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-
indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his
share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his
heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show
that it was Saturnina, Alberto’s mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased
for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not
subrogated to Alberto’s or his heirs’ rights to the property when she
repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,3 we held that a co-owner who redeemed

the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The
property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did
not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.4 But the one who
redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and
until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount
due.5 Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for Alberto’s heirs who had
then acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject property, it did not vest in
her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But she had the
right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien upon the
property for the amount due until reimbursement. The result is that the
heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained
ownership over their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to
respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were
then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the
proceeds were held in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and
delivered to them upon reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly

held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil
Code6 state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother
shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s
property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules
of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her
parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the
property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos.7 Corollary to
this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to
this case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child
without need of any judicial appointment in case the latter’s property does
not exceed two thousand pesos,8 thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. – When the property of the child under

parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian x x x x9
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of

court appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-
seventh of subject property was ₱1,143.00, which is less than two thousand
pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 110 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. – A guardian appointed shall

have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management
of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The
guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all
the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that
in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of
the minor’s property. It does not include the power of alienation which
needs judicial authority.11 Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of
petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did
not have the legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner

Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it.
This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale
was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all
the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his
undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina
and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-
spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares
and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over
their undivided share of subject property.12
But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses?

Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-

owners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the
property held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided
share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his ratification on
July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of

petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they were not
divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the
subject property from respondents-spouses. But they must do so within
thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In
reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,13 thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a
way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in

consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In
doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker’s will.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that
matter)14 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the
sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day
period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to
begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of
only a day or two.1awph!1
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years
after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that
petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless,
the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was
informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the
appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in
1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject property during a
barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal
redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty
days from learning about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance
of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written
notice of the sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of
knowledge thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose,
i.e., the notification of redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to
petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993,
after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem
his property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint
for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had
already expired.
As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant
case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render justice.15
Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer

redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain co-owners thereof
with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must
include them.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23,
2004 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of
Southern Leyte is ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No.
17035 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of
respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion,
and petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7
portion, pro indiviso.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD,
MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated October 19, 1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of
Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners' extra-judicial
partition of the decedent's estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa

Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate
estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then Court of
First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de
Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants
or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972,
petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties
covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to
the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner
being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court
appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of
Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement

of the estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the
technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and
64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-
mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof,
TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in
the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of
Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate
mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife
of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside
proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings No.
86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the
common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his
death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during this period, their union had
produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad
Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie
Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman,
Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving
children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents
charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said three
children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo
Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first
motion and, in lieu thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that
Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial
court denied private respondents' motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as
administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish
their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to

cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-
judicially partitioning their mother's estate. Accordingly, on October 4,
1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial
partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and
108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671,
and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said
properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the
following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and
Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural children
of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children,

namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and
Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of
the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled
to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased,
subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any,
as co-owner of any of the property of said estate
that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts
with the deceased during the period they lived
together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedent's collateral

relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M.
Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as
heirs and excluding them from participating in the
administration and settlement of the estate of
Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the

administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new

administratrix all property or properties, monies
and such papers that came into his possession by
virtue of his appointment as administrator, which
appointment is hereby revoked. 1
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect
to the latter's motion for annulment of certain documents. On November
19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors' Motion for
Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious and
accordingly —
1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described

in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered
in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT
No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad,
TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of
Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the
residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San
Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of
the late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of

the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed
on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book
No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial book of
Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de
Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void
from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT

Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu
thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel

TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No.
108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No.
108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in
lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding
certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the
beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages
executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner
Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145,
Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, (b)
petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc.
No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; and
(c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as
Doe. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of
1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of
Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and
orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the
registration or annotation thereof from the back of
the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law

associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to
the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT
Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision

was denied by the trial court. Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on
the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Because of this ruling,
petitioners, instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court
of Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2,
1974, the appellate court granted petitioners' petition and ordered the
lower court to give due course to the latter's appeal. The trial court,
however, again dismissed petitioners' appeal on the ground that their
record on appeal was filed out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the
November 19, 1974 ruling of the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal
was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again

instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The appellate court affirmed
the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to appeal to the
Supreme Court. On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give
due course to petitioners' appeal from the order of November 2, 1973
declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the
order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining to
the intestate estate of deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the
appellate court. On October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal

is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of the court a quo in SP
No. 86792, to wit:
1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in

substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all
surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural
children and the only surviving heirs of the
deceased Ricardo Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in

substance that the six (6) parcels of land described
in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the
properties of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial
partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de
Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and void
from the beginning, the cancellation of the
aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the Register
of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or issue the
corresponding Certificates of Title in the name of
Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal

of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of
time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against
petitioner-appellants.
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following

grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL

COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E.
ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF
THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE

SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS
OWNED BY THE DECEASED RICARDO DE
MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE
MOTHER OF PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE
MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation,

submit the startling theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose
Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in 1948
and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria
Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced
three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia
and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in
1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in
1971, and given that he was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the
presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not Ricardo Abad's
children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.
Article 256, the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the

mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. 4
To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application

for enrolment at Mapua Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao,
accomplished in 1956, which states:
Father's Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: engineer (mining)
Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado5
as well as Cesar Libunao's 1958 application for enrolment at the

Mapua Institute of Technology, which states:
Father's Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: none
Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado6
Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when
said applications were accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children
would have stated so. These not being the case, they conclude that Jose
Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao

and Alejandro Ramos 7 stating that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had
died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and that the
former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas,8 Ricardo

Abad's physician, declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad
and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had
become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian
Abad are not the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the
legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity
of the trial court's finding of facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule
that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal.9 Petitioners, however, argue that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are not binding on this Court when there appears in the record
of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has
been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted,
that if considered, would affect the result of the case. 10
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case
at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao

died in 1971 are, to say the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate
on an enrolment form that one's parent is "deceased" is not necessarily
proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was
being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao
and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is
not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time, being
merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate
would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners
have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is
no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be
unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao's death. More telling, while the
records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain
Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person
appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado's first husband, the
latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is
different. Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the
wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private

respondents as being privileged communication under Section 24 (c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 11 The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the
action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be
used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed
between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and
the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information
was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the
patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his
professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to
blacken the reputation of the patient. 12
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites.
They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility"
does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently
forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted
gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact,
given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the
attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease,
would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus
hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains
inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.
As stated by the trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99

N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: "The privilege of secrecy is
not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in
established precedents. It is an established rule that the
purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy
intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death
removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and
disclosures which a patient should make to his physician.
After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to
impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to
light communications and disclosures made under the seal of
the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have

failed to establish their claim by the quantum of evidence required by
law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private respondents
overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children
of Ricardo Abad. We quote with approval the trial court's decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the

calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all his individual income
tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970,
he has declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria
Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent children,
Cecilia, Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs.
12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).
x x x x x x x x x
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters
Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and Marian, then (5) years
old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34
and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp.
7-20).
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund

account of P100,000,00 with the People's Bank and Trust
Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to
either of them in the event of death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On
January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of
P100,000.00 with the same bank, payable to his daughter
Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his
sister Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their
PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their
P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the
account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account
No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad
(Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund intended for
Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973,
pp. 21-36). Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the
Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his
daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under
Savings Account 17348 which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28
as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B). . .
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of
Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of
their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or

ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (Emphasis supplied).
As to petitioners' claim that the properties m the name of Ricardo Abad

actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and
the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private
respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad.
As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great
weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better
position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying in the case. 13 In fact, petitioners seem to
accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to the
subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila
de Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order dated March 21, 1975
denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco
on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is
erroneous, for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same
was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum that the rulings of
the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower
court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184
dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of
Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of
time is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 TSN, November 2, 1973. pp. 19-20.
2 Records, pp. 109-111.
3 Rollo, pp. 55-56.
4 The Family Code has a substantially similar provision, thus:
Art. 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although

the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.
5 Records, p. 152.
6 Records, p. 153.
7 Records, p. 151.
8 Records, p. 156.
9 GSIS vs. CA, G.R. No. 128471, March 6, 1998
10 Lee vs. CA, 201 SCRA 405 (1991).
11 Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
x x x x x x x x x
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or

obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by
him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient;
xxx xxx xxx.
12 Francisco, Evidence, 3rd ed., pp. 159-162.
13 Pruducers' Bank vs. CA, G.R. No. 110495, January 29, 1998.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116775 January 22, 1998
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE,

MADRILYN and LOURDES URIARTE, and FELOMINA BUNIEL
URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF
GREGORIO ARNALDO, represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO
SULLANO and LUPECINO ARNALDO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of

Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate court's resolution
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. At issue is the right of
the parties to a 2.7 hectare piece of land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del
Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on March 31, 1989.
The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza,

whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of
Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another
daughter, the decedent Justa.2 Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is
thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the
widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of
Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte,
was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo
Arnaldo and Justa's father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers.3 Petitioners are
thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of
consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her
brother Gregorio.4 The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside
from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio,
all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva's
brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and
Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives
within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio
Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.
Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional

Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The
land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5
hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil,
and 2.2 hectares by purchase.5 Private respondent claimed to be the sole
surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue.
He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land
as Justa's tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the
harvest. 6 He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of
Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa
had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.7
Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his
heirs. 8 In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of
Justa9 but the latter's heirs entitled to her entire land.
They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally
owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, 10 their great granduncle. It was allegedly
bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio's nephews, in a
holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908. 11 Domingo was to
receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third. 12 The heirs claimed
that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime
Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received
her share of the harvest from it. 13 They alleged that private respondent
did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of
Ambrocio Arnaldo, 14 the original owner of the property.
The trial court sustained petitioners' contention. In its decision rendered

on November 8, 1991 it ruled:
As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left

to his two nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .
5481 hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square
meters to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to
Juan. The area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares
because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired
by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the
latter's death. The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax
declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter
however died intestate and without issue. Her nearest
surviving relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo
Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death
by operation of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives.
Thus, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code).15
Accordingly, the court ordered:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

defendants and the intervenors [herein petitioners] and
against the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the
defendants and the intervenors, together with the other heirs
of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel
of land described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent
revising tax declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering.
No cost.
SO ORDERED. 16
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial court's

finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired
by Justa's parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their marriage.
As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent
was held to be entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive
portion of its decision the appellate court ordered:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby

REVERSED and another is hereby entered —
Ordering the partition of the property described in the second

amended complaint in the following manner:
(1) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and
(2) 2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff.

For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed
with the partition in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of

Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo. Petitioners allege:
I — THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK
AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF AGATONA
ARREZA, THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO
SERING;
II — THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

PREFERRED TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY
WHEN IT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY
THE DECEASED AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS
REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III — THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR

WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES
IS MERITORIOUS;
IV — AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED

WITH MERIT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.18
After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As

already stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7 hectares. Half of
this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly was
conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The
rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of
her parents. Accordingly, the division of Justa's property should be as
follows as private respondent contends:
A — The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the
share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue to petitioners and
the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will
accrue to private respondent.
B — As to the second portion of the area of the land in

question which as already stated was consolidated with the
1/2 hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership
of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to
private respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and
who is only three degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas
petitioners who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and
Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from Justa
Arnaldo.19
The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private
respondent is entitled to Justa's estate as her nearest relatives within the
meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.
As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals

gravely abused its discretion in holding that private respondent is the
son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo.
Petitioners are raising this issue only now. It is well-settled, however,
that questions not taken up during the trial of a case cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a
question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this
Court. 20
It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of

Appeals, 21 petitioners admitted that private respondent is Justa's
nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justa's half-sister. Apparently they
are now questioning private respondent's filiation because, as explained
by the Court of Appeals, private respondent is the nearest relative of
Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate.
Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged
to the conjugal partnership of Justa's parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125
hectares of the half hectare land as her father's (Juan Arnaldo's) share in
the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125
hectares. In addition, Justa inherited her mother's (Ursula Tubil's) share
consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in
her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7 —
hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent
Benedicto Estrada as Justa's nearest surviving relative. As the Court of
Appeals held:
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every

inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares,

subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to
relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987,
paragraph 2, concerning division between paternal and
maternal lines.
The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are

provided by Articles 963 — 966 of the Civil Code. They
provide:
Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined

by the number of generations. Each generation
forms a degree.
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which

may be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of

degrees among persons who are not ascendants
and descendants, but who come from a common
ancestor.
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or

ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with

those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom

he descends.
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted

as there are generations or persons, excluding the
progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common

ancestor. Thus the child is one degree removed
from the parent, two from the grandfather, and
three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the

common ancestor and then descent is made to the
person with whom the computation is to be made.
Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his
brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of
his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of

Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons
and daughters of Justa's cousin. They are thus fifth degree
relatives of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest,

then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his
mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment. 22
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent

is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursula's daughter not by Juan
Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private
respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her
estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private

respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's
half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is
considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant,
ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. 23 That private respondent is
only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify
him from being his aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out, "The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half
blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the
survivors."24
Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth
grounds of the petition for review must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order

issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA
ROSALES, NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA
ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter

residential lot (identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre,
located along Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City).
Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise a
right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to
the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March
1956.
During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel
Burdeos and the second, following the latter's death, with Canuto Rosales.
At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A.
Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela
Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage,
namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora
Rosales.
Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time
after Macaria's death, died intestate without an issue.
In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely,

his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon,
Jr., sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot
supposedly for the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale,
dated 14 November 1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold
for only P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended
merely to save on the tax on capital gains.
Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City
Treasurer's Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the
Lupong Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of
the property. She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter
refused to accept the amount for being much less than the lot's current
value of P80,000.00. No settlement having been reached before the Lupong
Tagapayapa, private respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated against
petitioner an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction"
before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.
On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court handed
down its decision holding, in fine, that private respondents' right to redeem
the property had already lapsed.
An appeal to the Court of Appeals was interposed by private respondents.

The appellate court, in its decision of 22 April 1993, reversed the court a
quo; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed

from is hereby REVERSED, and a new one is accordingly
entered declaring plaintiff-appellant, Socorro C. Rosales,
entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art. 1088, NCC)
or pro indiviso share (Art. 1620, NCC) of the Heirs of Ramon
Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre, within
the remaining ELEVEN (11) DAYS from finality hereon, unless
written notice of the sale and its terms are received in the
interim, under the same terms and conditions appearing under
Exhibit "J" and after returning the purchase price of P23,000.00
within the foregoing period. No cost.1
In her recourse to this Court, petitioner assigned the following "errors:"

That —
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring Socorro C.

Rosales is entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Article
1088, NCC) or pro-indiviso share (Article 1620, NCC) of the heirs
of Ramon Burdeos, Sr. in Lot 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre,
for being contrary to law and evidence.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the peculiar

circumstance, in that, the respondents' actual knowledge, as a
factor in the delay constitutes laches.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in concluding that

Socorro C. Rosales, in effect, timely exercised the right of legal
redemption when referral to Barangay by respondent signifies
bona fide intention to redeem and; that, redemption is properly
made even if there is no offer of redemption in legal tender.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the

running of the statutory redemption period is stayed upon
commencement of Barangay proceedings.2
Still, the thrust of the petition before us is the alleged incapacity of private
respondent Socorro C. Rosales to redeem the property, she being merely
the spouse of David Rosales, a son of Macaria, and not being a co-heir
herself in the intestate estate of Macaria.
We rule that Socorro can. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for
that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her
parents-in-law;3 however, Socorro's right to the property is not because she
rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir
of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his
mother's inheritance.
David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When

Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving
children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of
the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which
included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria,
passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on
succession.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and

ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall
inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any,
under article 1001.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive

with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.4
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of

David Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that
originally descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to
petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents;
thus:
Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon

the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the
place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in
payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is
transmitted by onerous title.
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of

redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of
any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only
a reasonable one.
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private

respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the
Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners5 required under Article 1623 of
the Civil
Code —
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall

not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of safe shall not be recorded in the Registry
of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence

when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of
redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale
from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case
was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial court.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the
rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still
entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy
and status.6
Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,7 relied upon by petitioner in

contending that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a written
notice of sale, the Court made it clear that it was not reversing the
prevailing jurisprudence; said the Court:
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are

deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent
court understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no
competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in
the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly
stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and
Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an
exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.8
In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years,

not just days or months, after the consummation of the contracts of
sale. The complaint for legal redemption itself was there filed more
than thirteen years after the sales were concluded.
Relative to the question posed by petitioner on private respondents' tender

of payment, it is enough that we quote, with approval, the appellate
court; viz.:
In contrast, records dearly show that an amount was offered, as

required in Sempio vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 1 and Daza
vs. Tomacruz, 58 Phil. 414, by the redemptioner-appellant
during the barangay conciliation proceedings (Answer, par. 8)
but was flatly rejected by the appellee, not on the ground that it
was not the purchase price (though it appeared on the face of
the deed of sale, Exh. "J-1"), nor that it was offered as partial
payment thereof, but rather that it was
All given, we find no error in the appellate court's finding that private
respondents are entitled to the redemption of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians,

AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.2
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of

Letters of Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-
5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the
donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of
Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which
donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime"
of petitioner.
Respondent’s nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as

Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.3
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati,
which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it
"may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court,
acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the
validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated

property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedent’s estate,4 the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in
light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went
on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New
Civil Code which reads:5
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate

estate. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring that:
1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds
of Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;
3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine

and the 3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the
estate of Angel N. Pascual;
4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N.

Pascual:
a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal
Village Makati TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental
income thereon;
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters
located at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No.
119063;
c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at

Puerta Galera Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the

following Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906,
A006087, A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316,
C54824, C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218,
A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;
e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the

following Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309,
A006708, 07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;
f. ¼ share in Eduardo Pascual’s shares in Baguio Gold Mining

Co.;
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in
the name of Nona Arellano;
i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered

by TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;
j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by

Branch 64 of the Court on November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:
a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No.

181889;
b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real

properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by
OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally between them up to the
extent that each of their share have been equalized with the
actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the
value of which shall be determined by an independent
appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N.
Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not
sufficient to equalize the shares, then Francisco’s and Miguel’s
shares may be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of
stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall
be divided equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding
that
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL

ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO

COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF

DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL

JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE
HEIRS.6 (underscoring supplied)
By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioner’s

appeal "partly meritorious." It sustained the probate court’s ruling that the
property donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on

equality of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter
vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be
considered a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under the
circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in the
concept of advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net
hereditary estate. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error
when it included the said property as forming part of the estate of Angel N.
Pascual.8 (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvph!1
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the
probate court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of
shares of stocks owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in
the inventory submitted by the administrator."
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY

GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of
properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as
the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in

accordance with the disquisitions herein.9 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration10 having been denied by the

appellate court by Resolution11 of October 7, 2009, the present petition for
review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its
ruling
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO

PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO

COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED
TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL,

JR. EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS
LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS.12 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to

petitioner is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate
should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to
the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the
hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator
during his lifetime.13
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory

heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding
the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.14
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no
compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.15
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who
are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime –
that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the
law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.16
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and
(3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have
precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children
and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory
heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The
concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the
primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and
the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.17
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was
left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid,18 is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate.19 There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedent’s remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among

his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents,
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring
supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision

ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N.
Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch
135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms
part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally
among the parties.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132681 December 3, 2001
RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner,
vs.
GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and
JOSE REYES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real

Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land
located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of 94 square meters, and
registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the
Register of Deeds for Manila.
The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first
page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom
portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two
instrumental witnesses.1 The second page contains the Acknowledgment,
which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the
notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and
voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the
second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses,
and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the
other witness.2 The Acknowledgment reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon,

Philippines, this 20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared
CATALINA QUILALA, with Residence Certificate No. 19055265
issued at Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known to me and to me
known to be the same person who executed the foregoing
instruments and acknowledged to me that the same is her own free
and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2) pages,

including the page on which this acknowledgment is written, has
been signed by CATALINA QUILALA and her instrumental
witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-hand margin of page 2
and both pages have been sealed with my notarial seal.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of

Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.
(SGD.) NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)
DOC NO. 22;
PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.
The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due
course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in
the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died

on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving
son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes

and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-
described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and

Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the
declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of
TCT No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17.
Subsequently, respondents withdrew their complaint as against Guillermo
T. San Pedro and he was dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both
Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the
donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the
donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and
void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalina's SSS
records does it appear that Violeta was Catalina's daughter. Rather, Violeta
was referred to therein as an adopted child, but there was no positive
evidence that the adoption was legal. On the other hand, the trial court
found that respondents were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However,
since it appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled that
respondents' deed of extrajudicial settlement can not be registered. The
trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes
and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as follows:
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property inter
vivos executed on February 20, 1981 by Catalina Quilala in favor of
Violeta Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and 11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala and to
issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Estate of Catalina
Quilala;.
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration of the

deed of extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B and B-1,) and the issuance by
the Register of Deeds of Manila of a transfer certificate of title in the
names of the plaintiffs; and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of
the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action
without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged
last will and testament.4
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the

following MODIFICATION:
(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action without

prejudice to the filing of the necessary probate proceedings by the
interested parties so as not to render nugatory the right of the lawful
heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals

denied on February 11, 1998.5 Hence, this petition for review, raising the
following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

DEED OF DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS NOT
REGISTRABLE.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON UPHOLDING THE

LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT
THE DAUGHTER OF CATALINA QUILALA.6
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by

Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the
donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to
be valid,7 specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of
the acceptance by the donee,9 provided the donee is not disqualified or
prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,10 and the donee becomes
the absolute owner of the property.11 The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.12 It may be
made in the same deed or in a separate public document,13 and the donor
must know the acceptance by the donee.14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the
certificate of title as well as the technical description of the real property
donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration
of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and
as an act of liberality and generosity."15 This was sufficient cause for a
donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it."16
The donee's acceptance of the donation was explicitly manifested in the

penultimate paragraph of the deed, which reads:
That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and donation
made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby expresses her
appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and generosity of the
DONOR.17
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and
their witnesses affixed their signature. However, the Acknowledgment
appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala.
Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge her
acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a
private instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree

No. 1529, which states:
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney

and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting registered or
unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in the form of
public instruments shall be registrable: Provided, that, every such
instrument shall be signed by person or persons executing the same in the
presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and shall
be acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person or persons
executing the same before a notary public or other public officer
authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where the instrument so
acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon
acknowledgment is written, each page of the copy which is to be registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not
contemplated, each page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except
the page where the signatures already appear at the foot of the instrument
shall be signed on the left margin thereof by the person or persons executing
the instrument and their witnesses, and all the pages sealed with the
notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages shall be stated in
the acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a
sale, transfer, mortgage or encumbrance of two or more parcels of
land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said
acknowledgment." (italics supplied).
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the
Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on
the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right
hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their
witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not
absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and
every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The
requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the
same has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting
party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he
is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely

directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the
page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the
page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is
deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the
notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The
instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a
private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact
that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of
donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment.
To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which
contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set
forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a
public instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not make
a determination of whether Violeta was the daughter of Catalina, or
whether petitioner is the son of Violeta. These issues should be ventilated
in the appropriate probate or settlement proceedings affecting the
respective estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the
donation, which we declare herein to be valid, will still be subjected to a
test on its inofficiousness under Article 771,18 in relation to Articles 752, 911
and 912 of the Civil Code. Moreover, property donated inter vivos is subject
to collation after the donor's death,19 whether the donation was made to a
compulsory heir or a stranger,20 unless there is an express prohibition if
that had been the donor's intention.21
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The

appealed decision of the Court of Appeals , is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and a new judgment is rendered dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 118449. February 11, 1998
LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Petitioner, v. , COURT OF APPEALS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G.
NICOLAS, Respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had
two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one
of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas.
The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon
Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent.
Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow,
Zenaida, and their four children.
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an
area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela
property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty
Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng
Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734.1 In view
thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to
Estrellita.2 On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to
Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four
Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).3 In
June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a
parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes,
Paraaque (hereafter Paraaque property) using a portion of the proceeds
was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred.

Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June
30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the Vizconde Massacre. The
findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita
died ahead of her daughters.4 Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein
petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela
and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters.
Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of
Shares,5 with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial
settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her
two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The
properties include bank deposits, a car and the Paraaque property. The
total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses
in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000.00).6 The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total
amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael,
except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which
involves a token amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to
petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car were also given to petitioner
with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heirs7 in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita

instituted an intestate estate proceeding8 docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679,
with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing
as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida) and children of
Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafaels
estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of
Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein private
respondent Ramon filed an opposition9 dated March 24, 1993, praying to be
appointed instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three weeks
passed, Ramon filed another opposition10 alleging, among others, that
Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for
not les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder.
Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legality and
validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his
children,11 Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled InMatter Of The
Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that
their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties
distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime.12 Ramon stated
that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as
the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of
Estrellita.13cräläwvirtualibräry
In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed
Ramon as the Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was
appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order
did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs.14 Neither was the
Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the
estate.15 Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed
Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property
without the courts knowledge and permission.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner
ten (10) days x x x within which to file any appropriate petition or motion
related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file
any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the
counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon. In response, petitioner
filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing tha the was neither
a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its
Order dated February 2, 1994.17 Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through
a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque property, as well as
the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
property, be collated.18 Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March
10, 1994 granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
xxx
On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in

instant case and considering the comment on hi Manifestation, the same is
hereby granted.19
xxx
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which
Ramon opposed.20 On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. It provides:
xxx
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde

were then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a
valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased
Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with
the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the
argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States
in, de-facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the
Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her
two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially

incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde
claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi
business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing. However, no
competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably support the
business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the

property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita

by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which
was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the
deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED.21 (Underscoring added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent

Court of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of
Appeals22 denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated
the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the
probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of
its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the
deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court).23 Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima
facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which
respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the
Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque
property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.
Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article

1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs

who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into
the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the
division may be made according to law and the will of the
testator.24 Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with
other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by
donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent.25 The
purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor
in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to
give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and
that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of
any expression to the contrary.26 Collation does not impose any lien on the
property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to
collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such
property at the time it was donated,27 the rationale being that the donation
is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence
any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account
of the heir or donee.28cräläwvirtualibräry
The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the
probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed
reversible errors.
First : The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of
Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this
point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate

parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with

respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those

in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,
shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.
With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even
shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a
stranger.29 As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate
proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has
no personality or interest in the said proceeding,30 which petitioner
correctly argued in his manifestation.31cräläwvirtualibräry
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title
or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings.32 Such determination is provisional in character and is subject
to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.33 In the case at bench,
however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the
transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was
gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the
contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are
matter outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be
ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:
x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance
of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not
final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the
interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the
ownership or existence of the right or credit.34cräläwvirtualibräry
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to

collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate
proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate
that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant
collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-
14, to wit:
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with

the provisions of article 103535 of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the
plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants
were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitimate or
hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to
that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis
therefor.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the

probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of
the Paraaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by
way of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property
which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the
Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason
thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory
basis.36 The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque
property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records
indicate, however, that the Paraaque property was conveyed for and in
consideration of P900,000.00,37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael,
the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited
and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of
Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner
is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the
heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels
estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque property is improper for, to
repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent
during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain
anent the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public
instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership
and participation as heir38 in the Paraaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not
the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be
stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from
Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela
property.39 Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be
collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela
property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any
determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and
binding purpose.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is

hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018

MARGIE SANTOS MITRA, Petitioner, v. PERPETUA L. SABLAN--

This treats of a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 dated

Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan (respondents), who

THE RULING OF THE RTC

On February 23, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision7 admitting Legaspi's

The Huling Habilin at Pagpapatunay of the testator Remedios Legaspi dated

In the meantime, the hearing on the issuance of [the] letters testamentary to

Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the CA.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,19 the Court allowed the perfection of the

In the present case, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA

One of the issues raised by the petitioner entails an examination of the

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall

In any event, it is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the

It should also be mentioned that the respondents take a skewed stance in

Subsequently, in Singson vs. Florentino,33 the Court adopted a more liberal

The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article

What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of

Ang HULING HABILlNG ito ay binubuo ng apat (4) na dahon, kasama

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE

The Factual Antecedents

After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements,

Ruling of the RTC

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On March 30, 2009,7 the CA issued the assailed decision dismissing the

The petition lacks merit.

The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be

Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will. Moreover, it

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.

It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6 which denied

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already

and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56 denying the

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

We deny the petition.

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was

We are not convinced.