JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN SCIENCE TEACHING VOL. 24, NO. 8, PP.

773-780 (1987)

THE ROLES OF OBSERVATION IN SCIENCE:

A RESPONSE TO WILLSON

STEPHEN P. NORRIS
Institute for Educational Research and Development, Memorial University
of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada A l B 3x8

I have argued (Norris, 1985) that the science education field’s view of
scientific observation is inadequate because it fails to take account of three
features of observation: (i) “that the distinction between observation and infer-
ence is context bound” (p. 817), that is, “that observation [cannot] be sharply
distinguished from inference . . , without regard for the contexts in which
observations and inferences are made (p. 826); (ii) that “scientific observation
is . . . not necessarily linked to human sense perception and to certain infor-
mation-carrying mechanisms” (p. 817), that is, “that scientific observation and
human sense perception are [not] inextricably linked” (p. 827); and (iii) “that
scientific observation is often not at all simple” (p. 817) and “that at least some
scientific observations cannot be equated with simple mental processes” (p.
828).
Victor L. Willson (1987) has objected to my analysis concerning the first
two of these features. He has formulated these objections using two philosophi-
cal distinctions, one between theory-building and theory-confirming observa-
tion and the other between observation in naturalistic and experimental re-
search. In addition, he has used cognitive psychology research on novice and
expert physics problem-solvers to object to the implications for science educa-
tion which I have drawn from my analysis of observation.
In this response, I shall attempt to show that Professor Willson’s philo-
sophical distinctions do not hold up under scrutiny. Furthermore, even if he is
granted his distinctions, they do not bear on the conclusions which I have
drawn. Finally, I shall argue that the conclusions for practice which he draws
from the novice-expert research do not follow from that research.

Theory-building and Theory-confirming Roles of Observation

Willson maintains that I concentrate on theory-confirming observation
rather than theory-building observation with the result that, along with many
philosophers of science, I have been led down the path of exaggerating “the

0 1987 by the National Association for Research in Science Teaching

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0022-4308B71080773-08$04.00
774 COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

role of comprehensive theory in scientific advance and have made experimental

evidence seem almost irrelevant” (p. 281). I will respond with a number of
points.
First, I have made a distinction between roles of observation which is akin
to the one Willson makes between kinds of observations, and I clearly indicated
that any general theory of observation would have to explicate both roles. For
example, I argued that observation has “a foundational role in building knowl-
edge in the field” (p. 824), that it is “the basis upon which other knowledge
rests” (p. 824), and that observation serves “as the basis for testing specific
claims to knowledge and for arbitrating between conflicting claims’’ (p. 824).
Regarding a general theory of observation I stated that it must be able to
explicate the astrophysical and starlight deflection observations which Willson
described as theory-confirming observations, as well as what Willson would
classify as theory-building observations such as “the sorts of observations
found in science textbooks” (p. 823) and ”Darwin’s observing the different
shapes of the beaks of finches” (p. 831).
However, by focussing on the kinds of observation as Willson has done,
instead of upon the roles of observation, one does not make a useful or tenable
distinction. It is just not the case that individual observations can once and for
all be classified as either theory-building or theory confirming. For instance, if
we look at Willson’s example of the work of J. J. Thomson, it might be con-
ceded that Thomson’s observations were theory-building for Einstein’s theory
of relativity. However, it must also be conceded that those very same observa-
tions were theory-confirming for the theory that cathode rays consisted of
negatively charged particles and not electromagnetic waves. If an observation
can at one time and in one context be theory-building and at another time and
another context be theory-confirming, then any fallout resulting from a focus
on theory-confirming observations would also result from a focus on theory-
building observations. Thus, euen i f I had focussed solely on theory-confirm-
ing observations, it would not be legitimate to conclude that, because of this
focus rather than a focus on theory-building observations, I had “exaggerated
the role of comprehensive theory in scientific advance and . . . made experi-
mental evidence seem almost irrelevant” (p. 281). A focus on what Willson calls
theory-building observations would of necessity lead to the same exaggeration,
since the very same observations in other contexts would be theory-confirming
observations.
This latter point is revealed in Willson’s own writing. In attempting to
explicate how the role of theory is exaggerated by focussing on theory-confirm-
ing observation, he speaks of the “accumulation of facts which are available to
the scientist” (p. 281). These facts are not always used, Willson maintains, but
are ignored “if the dominant theory explains many other facts well” (p. 281). He
continues by saying that “ignored facts often become important when another
theory comes along which can explain them as well as facts explained by the
superseded theory” (p. 281). Ironically, these remarks by Willson form part of
the basis for the arguments by postpositivist philosophers of science for the
need to emphasize the role of theory as opposed to observational facts in
scientific advance. Thus, Willson was unable to avoid the fact that it is the role
of observations which is the crucial feature. Their role changes as the demands
 COMMENTS AND CRITICISM 775

of existing theory changes, and it is thus the state of theory that determines
which facts are important and how they are important.
It is not perfectly clear, but Willson seems to want his discussion of theory-
building and theory-confirming observation to bear upon my second conclu-
sion, namely, that scientific observation is not necessarily linked to human
sense perception and certain information-carrying mechanisms such as photons
or sound waves. As described above, he first concluded that a focus on theory-
confirming observation leads to an exaggeration of the role of theory. He then
proceeded to discuss an alternative emphasis on the facts, as opposed to the-
ory, of science. These facts are, Willson contends, “by and large . . . accumu-
lated by scientists ‘mucking about’ in an area [using as] the primary instruments
. . . their eyes” (p. 281). Furthermore, he continues by emphasizing the rela-
tively superior quality of observation made with the human senses compared to
those made with instrumentation. “The further the scientist is away from the
primary data in terms of preprocessing, the greater the potential for egregious
error in interpretation” (p. 281). Thus, Willson highlights the importance of
human sense perception in science.
I wish to reply with several points. First, I never said or implied that
observation made with the human senses was not important to science. What I
did say, and continue to maintain, is that it is wrong to link necessarily human
sensing to scientific observation because many observations rely, not on the
capability of humans’ senses, but on the sensing capability of instruments they
have constructed.
Second, it is simply not the case that observations made with instrumenta-
tion are necessarily more subject to error than observations made directly with
the human senses. Sometimes, the human senses can lead to more reliable
observation than any known instrument, but sometimes instruments are more
reliable. For example, there are instruments far more reliable than human
senses for determining altitude, for distinguishing the relative intensity of
sound and light, for determining speed, and for measuring pulse rate. In addi-
tion, there are instruments which can make observations not even in principle
accessible to human senses. Thus, even if instrumentation were less reliable, it
would provide access to phenomena otherwise inaccessible, and would lead to
more profound understandings of the world than could be had using the human
senses alone. Such payoffs may be worth any risk of decreased reliability in
observation (Pinch, 1985).
Third, it must be noted that these latter two points do not in any way
denigrate human beings. It is no shame that on many occasions instruments are
far more dependable than human senses. However, in the phrase “good scien-
tific observation by humans who used their primary senses” (p. 281) Willson
suggests that observations made with instruments are somehow less good or
less worthy of science. But why? Surely, it is a monument to scientists the
extent to which they are able to overcome the limitations of observation im-
posed by the human body!
The above arguments provide a strong case against the claim that an undue
emphasis on theory-confirming observation has led me to misinterpret scientific
observation. However, I wish to make a final argument which grants Willson
his theory-confirminghheory-building distinction, but shows that there was no
716 COMMENTS AND CRITlCISM

Fig. 1. Apparatus for measuring cathode ray deflection.

particular logical reason for using the examples of observing starlight deflection
and observing the center of the sun in building my original case. Many other
examples could have been used to make the same points. In fact, J. J. Thom-
son’s observations, which Willson says were theory-building, can be used. In a
paper published in 1897, Thomson described a number of experiments “under-
taken in the hope of gaining some information as to the nature of Cathode
Rays,” and in particular of seeing whether “there might be a chance of detect-
ing the deflexion of the cathode rays by an electrostatic force.” He understated
the significance of his work, because the experiments eventually led to the
discovery of the electron. Before making this discovery, however, Thomson
had made many observations, one of which was that “the deflexion [of cathode
rays] was proportional to the difference in potential between the plates.” He
described his observation as follows (see Figure 1):

The rays from the cathode C pass through a slit in the anode A , which is a metal plug
fitting tightly into the tube and connected with the earth; after passing through a
second slit in another earth-connectedmetal plug B , they travel between two parallel
aluminum plates about five cm. long and two broad and at a distance of 1.5 cm. apart;
they then fall on the end of the tube and produce a narrow well-defined phosphores-
cent patch. A scale pasted on the outside of the tube serves to measure the deflexion
of this patch. At high exhaustions the rays were deflected when the two aluminum
plates were connected with the terminals of a battery of small storage-cells . . . the
deflexion was proportional to the difference of potential between the plates.

It must be noted that the rays from the cathode were not visible to human
eyes. All that could be seen was the phosphorescent patch near the scale end of
the tube. Thus, when Thomson claims to have observed the deflexion of cath-
ode rays, he did not actually see with his eyes the rays deflecting. He saw the
patch change position. Thus, some might conclude that he inferred that the rays
deflected from the movement of the patch, but such talk would not coincide
with either Thomson’s or Willson’s way of speaking. Thus, we see from this
example that observation cannot be sharply distinguished from inference with-
out regard for context. In addition, the deflection observations required sensing
apparatus other than human senses. Voltmeters for observing potential differ-
ence and barometers for measuring degree of vacuum were also needed. Thus,
we can conclude from the example that the making of scientific observation
cannot be equated with human sense perception. Finally, there is no denying
that the observation was a complex activity requiring considerable planning,
 COMMENTS AND CRITICISM 777

the construction and coordination of complicated apparatus, and much thought

in conceiving in the first place what observations to expect.
Thus, the conclusions about the nature of scientific observation reached in
my earlier paper and described at the outset of this paper are not an artifact of
my focus on what Willson identifies as theory-confirming observations. The
same conclusions result when one examines what he identified as a theory-
building observation.

Observation in Naturalistic and Experimental Research

The second philosophical distinction Willson makes is between observa-
tion in naturalistic and experimental research. As Willson indicates, those who
espouse naturalistic methods over experimental ones do so because they view
experimental research as preordinate. When a methodology is preordained in
this sense, the researcher goes into the activity with a particular view of which
assumptions to make, which inferences are legitimate, what observations to
make, and what the observations will mean. In naturalistic research the re-
searcher goes into the activity in such a way as to “be able to see with ‘fresh
eyes’ what there [is] to observe” (p. 28 1). Naturalistic research, Willson further
maintains, is characterized by theory-building observation.
It seems, though it is not explicitly stated, that these remarks are directed
primarily at my first conclusion, namely, that the distinction between observa-
tion and inference is context bound. However, the controversy over the ade-
quacy of naturalistic and experimental methods of inquiry actually supports the
conclusion. This sort of controversy is a natural consequence of there being a
contextualized, rather than a sharp, distinction between observation and infer-
ence. When the cutting point between observation and inference “is based on
what scientists working in a particular field and having a particular set of
background beliefs are willing to take for granted and what they take to be open
to question” (Norris, 1985, p. 826), then the exact position of the boundary will
always be in dispute.

. . . the boundary is going to be hazy to a degree, because at the forefront of any field
there is always some uncertainty about the amount of confidence to place in certain
claims to knowledge. Scientists will disagree, and even individual scientists will from
one day to the next alter their judgments. (Norris, 1985, p. 826)

What we see in the debate over naturalistic and experimental methodolo-

gies in educational research is, to some extent at least, a dispute over the
boundary in educational research between what is observable and what must be
inferred. There is a dispute over what can be taken for granted and over what
must be left open to question. In short, there is a dispute over where the
starting points for theory lie. Such disputes cannot, of course, be settled by fiat.
It is only through a god’s eye view that “the same facts are available to all” (p.
282). What one researcher considers factual, the other does not, and there is no
perspective outside of human contexts for arbitrating the disagreement. This
illustrates the truth of the claim that the distinction between observation and
inference is context-dependent, not its falsity.
778 COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

In addition, it is not correct to equate, as Willson has done, naturalistic

methodologies with theory-building rather than theory-confirming observation.
Willson cites Piaget as a researcher using naturalistic methods and conse-
quently, one would assume, as someone not using theory-confirming observa-
tion. However, it is not difficult to find throughout Piaget’s writing the use of
observations as theory-confirming. Good examples are found in his discussion
of children’s ideas about breathing (Piaget, 1930, pp. 52-59). Piaget begins by
describing three stages which he had identified in children’s thinking about
breathing, beginning with an initial stage in which the child believes to be both
making air and attracting the wind when breathing and ending in a final stage
which is essentially the adult view. He then illustrates children at each of these
stages by including protocols of children responding to questions about the
nature of breathing. Finally, Piaget argues that the protocols provide “warrant
for the soundness of our interpretation.” Furthermore, upon the assumption
“that the central ideas of primitive peoples have their origin in the mentality of
the child,” Piaget claims that the protocols make it “impossible not to . . .
conjecture” that when primitive people think of breath as the transmitter of life
they are really talking about gasses internal to the body. Thus, Piaget sees his
observations of children as confirming of certain theories which he and others
held, as well as building blocks for his theory in the first place. We thus arrive
again at the realization that particular observations play a theory-building role
in one context and a theory-confirming one in another.

The Question of Expertise

A further objection raised by Willson is that I have failed to take into
account the difference between expert scientists and public school students.
Research on physics problem-solving has shown that expert physicists differ
from novice physicists in their solution attempts. It is quite reasonable, Willson
maintains, to extrapolate from this research to the conclusion that expert scien-
tists would go about observing quite differently from science students. But
what is to be concluded from this extrapolation?
In the first place, I argued in my paper that scientific observation lies on a
continuum of simple to complex. I further argued that to portray observation at
the simple end of the spectrum at all levels of science education risks passing
on undesirable lessons about the nature of scientific enquiry (1985, pp. 831-
832). However, none of this suggests jumping in at the deep end right from the
beginning. There is a continuum of observational complexity through which
students can be led. We would be wrong to assume expertise of students right
from the beginning, but we would be equally wrong to confine them to the
simplest forms of observation throughout all of their public school careers. The
specific levels of observational competence which students can obtain is, of
course, an eminently researchable issue.
In the second place, by examining the expert-novice research in more
detail, support can be found for the type of instruction in observation which I
have proposed. It is not surprising, as Willson points out, that one of the
differences consistently discovered between experts and novices is the amount
of knowledge possessed by each. To the extent that an observational task
 COMMENTS AND CRITICISM 779

requires the knowledge base of an expert scientist, then the task will be inac-
cessible to students and it would not be educationally sound practice to foist it
on them. In addition, it would not make sense to try to provide them with the
knowledge before engaging the task, because the knowledge of an expert is not
easily or quickly obtained, ten years being a conservative estimate.
However, looking more closely at the research, differences between ex-
perts and novices which do not involve a knowledge base, but the use of
metacognitive or executive skills have also been discovered (Good, 1984). Such
skills are involved in planning how a task is to be done, monitoring progress
toward the end result, and revising procedures when warranted. Differences at
the metacognitive level are also revealed in studies of good and poor readers
(Brown, 1978). To the extent that an observational task requires planning,
monitoring progress, and modifying plans (Norris, 1985, p. 831), then it seems
to me that the research on expertise provides very important insights for teach-
ing novices. Instruction on planning, monitoring, and modifying plans has been
shown by research in the reading field to be effective even with elementary
school children (Baker & Brown, 1984). Thus, rather than illustrate that my
proposals for instruction in observational ability are beyond the grasp of public
school science students, the research on experts and novices provides exam-
ples of just the sort of things which can be successfully and fruitfully taught to
make students better observers.

Concluding Remarks
My research on scientific observation (Norris, 1982; 1984; 1985) has led me
to conclude that it often is a complex mental activity involving detailed plan-
ning, information collection, interpretation, and reporting. Science curricula
often portray observation as the simplest activity in which scientists engage, as
something which can be done in a flash. To teach this about observation is to
badly misconstrue scientific investigation. My proposal is not to throw out
everything that we do, for much of it is sound (Norris, 1985, pp. 829-831).
Neither is my proposal to aim our instruction beyond the capabilities of stu-
dents. My proposal is that, in realizing that the nature of observation has often
been distorted in science curricula, we raise our sights about instruction in
observation. There is no justification for presenting high school students the
same story on observation as is presented to primary and elementary school
students.

References
Baker, L., & Brown, A. L. (1984). Metacognitive skills and reading. In
P. D. Pearson (Ed.), Handbook of reading research. New York: Longman,
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Brown, A. L. (1978). Knowing when, where, and how to remember: A
problem of metacognition. In Glaser, R. (Ed.), Advances in instructional psy-
chology (Vol. Z), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Good, R. (1984). Scientific problem solving by expert systems. Journal of
Research in Science Teaching, 21, 331-340.
780 COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

Norris, S. P. (1982). A concept of observation statements. In DeNicola,

D. R. (Ed.), Philosophy of education 2981. Normal, IL: The Philosophy of
Education Society.
Norris, S. P. (1984). Defining observational competence. Science Educa-
tion, 68, 129-142.
Norris, S. P. (1985). The philosophical basis of observation in science and
science education. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 22, 817-833.
Piaget, J. (1930). The child’s conception of physical causality. London:
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Thomson, Sir J. J. (1897). Cathode rays. Philosophical Magazine, 44(5),
293.
Willson, V. L. (1987). Theory-building and theory-confirming observation
in science and science education. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 24,
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Manuscript accepted October 10, 1986