The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping

Author(s): Marrack Goulding

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 3
(Jul., 1993), pp. 451-464
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2622309 .
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 of UnitedNations
The evolution

peacekeeping

MARRACK GOULDING

Thefollowingis an editedtextof theCyrilFoster*lecturedeliveredby Marrack

Gouldingat theExaminationSchools,OxfordUniversity, on 4 March 1993. The
textrepresentsMarrackGoulding'sviewsonly,and in no way commits the United
Nationsor its Secretary-General.
Mr Gouldingceasedto be Under-Secretary-
GeneralforPeace-keeping Operationson 1 March 1993 beforetakingoverthepost
PoliticalAffairs.The lecturewas a personal
of Under-Secretary-Generalfor
statement.
valedictory

The title,'The evolutionof peacekeeping',was chosenabout a yearago. At the

time, it seemed to make sense; with the phasing out of the Cold War, the
United Nations had been given new opportunitiesto help controland resolve
conflicts.As a result,new tasksand new methodshad evolved fromwhat had
previously been a fairly homogeneous activity. The biological metaphor
seemed an accurateway of describingwhat was going on.
However, the word evolution implies a comparativelyleisurelyprocess in
which,by trialand error,organismsdevelop more efficient ways of responding
to a changingenvironment.A yearlater,themetaphorseemslessapt. I992 saw
an almost five-foldincreasein United Nations peacekeepingactivity;we had
some II,OOO militaryand police personneldeployed at the beginning of the
year; by its end the total was over 52,000. Today 'the forceddevelopmentof
peacekeeping' mightbe a bettertitle.
I propose firstto analyse what peacekeeping had become by the time the
Cold War ended; thento classifythe different types(I would have referredto
'species' if the evolution metaphor was still appropriate) of peacekeeping
operationswhich are currentlydeployed or being planned; thento discussthe
currenttrendfrompeacekeepingto peace-enforcement and the implicationsit
has for the United Nations ability to develop into an effectivesystem of
collectivesecurity;and finallyto draw some briefconclusionsabout theheavy

* CyrilFosterwas a retired
confectioner
who, in I956, lefthisestateto OxfordUniversity
withthe
requestthatit be usedto enable'a prominentand sincerespeaker'to deliveronce a yeara lectureon
theelimination of war and thebetterunderstandingof thenationsof theworld.

International
Affairs
69, 3(I993) 45I-464 451
MarrackGoulding

responsibilitieswhich bear upon the Secretary-Generaland the Security

Council.

What is peacekeeping?
Peacekeeping is a techniquewhich has been developed, mainlyby the United
Nations, to help control and resolve armed conflicts.There is no agreed
definitionof it nor even agreementon when the firstpeacekeepingoperation
was set up. ProfessorAlan James,in a carefullyresearchedwork publishedin
iggol, traces its origins back to the delimitationcommissions which were
establishedin theearly1920S to redrawa numberofEuropean frontiers afterthe
FirstWorld War.
The officialview in the United Nations is that the United Nations Truce
SupervisionOrganization(UNTSO) was thefirstUnited Nationspeacekeeping
operation. It consisted of unarmed military observers who were sent to
Palestinein June I948 to supervizea trucenegotiatedby Count Bernadottein
the firstwar between Israel and its Arab neighbours.It stayed on when, a
month later,the SecurityCouncil, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
'ordered' a ceasefire.A similar group was deployed a few months later in
Kashmir.A major stepforwardwas takenwhen thefirstarmedUnited Nations
force- theUnited Nations EmergencyForce (UNEF)-was deployedin Egypt
following the Anglo-French-Israeliattackon that countryin October I956.
The key role played by UNTSO in the difficult task of implementingthe
Arab-IsraeliArmisticeAgreementsof I949 and UNEF's successin defusingthe
Suez crisisled to furtherdemandsforthe Organization'speacekeepingservices.
The golden age dare I say the firstgolden age?-of United Nations
peacekeepingwas from I956 to I974, though therewas a hiatusfor six years
afterthe disasterthatbefellUNEF in I967. Those I8 yearsgave birthto I0 of
the I3 peacekeeping operationsestablishedbefore the revival of demand for
peacekeepingin the late I980s. On thewhole theysucceededwell in helpingto
controlregionalconflicts,especiallyin the Near East, at a time when the Cold
War made it difficult forthe SecurityCouncil to takeeffective action to resolve
them.
The Congo operation (I960-64) deserves special mention. It is often
describedas a failure,but in factit succeeded in its objectives,albeit at a very
high cost,includingthe lifeof Dag Hammarskjbldand a major constitutional-
cum-financialcrisisat the United Nations. It is interestingin the contemporary
context for three reasons. First, it was deployed in a country where the
institutionsof state were collapsing-the firstcase of what the Foreign
Secretaryrecentlycalled 'painting a countryblue'. Second, it was the first
peacekeepingoperationto include very substantialcivilianelements.Third, it
was initiallydeployed as a peacekeepingoperation; but when it became clear

1
AlanJames,Peacekeeping in international Institute
(London: MacmillanforInternational
politics for
StrategicStudies,I990).

452
The evolutionof UnitedNationspeacekeeping

thatthe peacekeepingmode would not enable it to achieve its objectives,the

SecurityCouncil authorizedit to use force on a considerablescale to end the
secessionof Katanga-the first,and until Somalia the only, case of a transition
frompeacekeepingto peace-enforcement.
The Near East war of October I973 gave rise to two other remarkable
achievements:theinterpositionof thesecond United Nations EmergencyForce
between the Egyptian and Israeli armies in an exceedingly dangerous and
complicated militarysituation;and, eight monthslater,the deploymentof a
United Nations force (UNDOF) to control an agreed bufferzone between
Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights in Syria. That force is still
there-unpublicized because it does itsjob so well.
Afterthose two successes,the line went almost dead until in I988 the new
readinessof the United Statesand the Soviet Union to work togetherrevived
opportunitiesforresolvingregionalconflictsand createda reneweddemand for
peacekeeping.
During the intervening I4 years, only one new operation was set
up-UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL also is interestingin the
contemporarycontext. It is an operation about whose viability the then
Secretary-General and his senioradvisershad doubts.It was nevertheless pushed
through the SecurityCouncil by the United States for pressing,if passing,
political reasons: PresidentCarter was launchingthe negotiationswhich were
to lead to the Camp David Accords and did not want thatprocessderailedby
the Israeliinvasion of Lebanon which had just taken place.
UNIFIL has not been able to carry out its mandate because it has never
enjoyed the necessarycooperation from all the parties concerned. But its
presence has brought succour to the people of southern Lebanon and its
withdrawalwould certainlylead to an intensification of hostilities.It has thus
become a quasi-permanentfixture.It illustrates how much easierit is to get into
-apeacekeepingoperationthanto get out of it-and the need thereforeforthe
SecurityCouncil to satisfyitselfthatconditionsexistforsuccessfulpeacekeeping
beforetakingthe decision to set up a new operation.
The I 3 operationsestablishedduringthe Cold War (of which fiveremainin
existence)fosteredthegradualevolutionof a body of principles,proceduresand
practices for peacekeeping. Few of them were formally enacted by the
legislativeorgans of the United Nations. But theycame to constitutea corpus
of case law or customarypractice which was by and large accepted by all
concerned,though untilthe mid-ig8os Moscow continuedfromtime to time
to grumbleabout peacekeeping'slack of legitimacybecause it was not explicitly
provided for in the Charter.

The establishedprinciplesof peacekeepingcan be summarized under five

headings.
First,peacekeeping operationswere UnitedNationsoperations.Their United
Nationsnessderivedfromvarious factors:theywere establishedby one of the
legislativeorgansof the United Nations (unlikethe enforcementoperationsin

453
MarrackGoulding

Korea or (subsequently)Kuwait and Somalia where the SecurityCouncil's role

has been only to authorizecertainmember statesto undertakemilitaryaction
for a specificpurpose); they were under the command and control of the
Secretary-General, who acted with authoritydelegatedto him by the Security
Council and reported regularlyto the Council; and their costs were met
collectivelyby the member states as 'expenses of the Organization' under
Article I7 of the Charter-a principle which was establishedwith much
difficulty during the I96os. It was this United Nationsnesswhich had made
United Nations peacekeeping operations acceptable to member states who
would not otherwisehave acceptedforeigntroopson theirterritory. Suspicions
that peacekeepers were acting as instrumentsof their governments'policy,
ratherthanof the collectivewill of theinternationalcommunity,could be fatal
forthe credibilityof an operation.It had been learntthehard way thatit could
also-literally-be fatalfor the peacekeepersthemselves.
Second, it had become establishedover time that peacekeeping operations
could be set up only with the consentof thepartiesto theconflict in question. It
had also been learntthattheycould succeed only with the continuingconsent
and cooperationof thoseparties.This had turnedout to be both a strengthand
a weakness.
It was a strengthin that,fortheparties,it made peacekeepinglessthreatening
and more acceptable.For the troop-contributing countries,it reducedto a very
low level the risk of combat casualties. It was supposed also, in theory,to
improve the chances of success; the partieswould have agreed in advance to
what the peacekeeperswere going to do.
In practice,the consentprinciplehad sometimesturnedout to be more of a
weakness than a strength.Consent once given could later be withdrawn.
PresidentNasser'swithdrawalof Egypt's consentto thepresenceof UNEF I on
Egyptian territoryin May I967 had been the classic example. It tragically
illustratedthe perennialtruththatif one of the partiestakesthe decisionto go
to war thereis very littlethat peacekeeperscan do to preventwar. In other
cases, cooperation promised was later reduced or withheld. This could be
especiallydifficultfor the peacekeeperswhen theyfound that they,not those
who had brokentheirpromises,were blamed fortheresultinghuman suffering
and/or humiliationof the United Nations.
Third, it had been established that the peacekeepers must be impartial
betweentheparties.They were not thereto advance the interestsof one party
againstthose of the other.It was not like Korea where the United Statesand
itsallieshad been authorizedby the SecurityCouncil to use forceagainstNorth
Korea forthe benefitof South Korea. This principleof impartialityarose from
the fact that peacekeeping operations were interimarrangementsset up, as
UNEF had been, withoutprejudice to the claims and positionsof the parties.
Of course, the peacekeepers had to criticize, use pressure, mobilize
internationalsupport,even in certaincircumstancestake more forcefulaction
when a partyviolated agreed arrangements.But, beyond that,theycould not
take sides. Otherwise they themselveswould violate the termson which the

454
The evolutionof UnitedNationspeacekeeping

operation had been accepted by the parties. This requirementfor absolute

impartialitysometimesobliged peacekeepersto maintainnormalrelationswith
a party whose behaviour was being censured by most of the international
communityand thusexposed themto the chargeof condoningthatbehaviour.
The fourth principle related to the troopsrequiredfor United Nations
peacekeeping operations.It was recognizedthatit would not be practicablefor
the United Nations to maintaina standingarmy. National armies and police
forcescould be theonly sourcefortheuniformedpersonneltheUnited Nations
required. The Charter provided for member states to enter into binding
agreements with the Security Council under which they would commit
themselvesto provide it with troops. There had been no agreementbetween
the major powers on the conclusion of such agreementsfor peacekeeping
operations-or indeed for peace enforcement.Successive Secretaries-General
had perforce,therefore,to rely on member statesto provide the necessary
personneland equipment on a voluntarybasis. Member stateshad responded
readilyto the call.
The fifthprincipleconcernedtheuseofforce. More thanhalftheorganization's
peacekeeping operationsbefore I988 had consistedonly of unarmed military
observers.But when operations were armed, it had become an established
principlethattheyshould use forceonly to the minimumextentnecessaryand
thatnormallyfireshould be opened only in self-defence.
However, since I973 self-defencehad been deemed to include situationsin
which peacekeeperswere being preventedby armed persons from fulfilling
their mandate. This was a wide definitionof 'self-defence'. In practice
commandersin the fieldhad only veryrarelytakenadvantageof the authority
to open fireon, forinstance,soldiersat a roadblock who were denyingpassage
to a United Nations convoy. This reluctancewas based on sound calculations
related to impartiality,to theirreliance on the continued cooperation of the
partiesand to the fact that theirforce'slevel of armamentwas based on the
assumption that the parties would comply with their commitments.The
peacekeeperscould perhaps win the firefightat that firstroadblock. But, in
lands of the vendetta,mighttheynot findthemselvesout-gunnedin the third
or fourthencounter?
On the basis of theseprinciplesestablishedduring the firstfour decades of
United Nations peacekeeping,a definitionof peacekeepingcould perhapsread
as follows:
by the UnitedNations,withthe consentof the parties
Field operationsestablished
to
concerned, help controland betweenthem,underUnitedNations
resolveconflicts
commandand control,at the expensecollectively of the memberstates,and with
militaryand other personneland equipmentprovidedvoluntarilyby them,acting
betweenthepartiesand usingforceto theminimumextentnecessary.
impartially

455
I8 IAF 69
MarrackGoulding

Six typesof peacekeeping operation

The revival of peacekeepingsince I988 has officiallyseen the establishmentof
I3 new operationsso far.My personalcount is i6. One of the I3, the United
Nations ProtectionForce (UNPROFOR) in theformerYugoslavia, thelargest
operationyet fielded,is in facta conglomerateof threeseparateoperations.I
would also add the electoral mission in Haiti in I990. At the request of the
Haitian authorities,it was not called a peacekeeping operation, nor was it
establishedor financedas such, but it included substantialnumbersof military
and police personneland operatedin accordancewith peacekeepingprinciples.
During thesehecticfiveyearsof forceddevelopment,the Secretary-General
and his staffhave applied the establishedprinciples,proceduresand practicesof
peacekeeping.On the whole theyhave stood the testwell and have been able
to accommodate a much wider range of activitiesthan-with one or two
exceptions-peacekeepers had undertakenduringthe Cold War years.
Peacekeeping operationshad previouslybeen largely militaryin task and
composition.Their principaltask was to help the partiesstop fightingand to
preventany resumptionof hostilities,thushelpingto createconditionsin which
the peacemakerscould negotiatea lastingsettlement.Apart fromthe Congo,
the only major exception to this model was the operation in West Irian in
I962-3, whose task was to help implementa settlementalreadynegotiated.
Since I988 this emphasis on the militaryhas changed and peacekeeping
operationsfrequentlynow containsubstantialcivilianelements.This is mainly
because the United Nations is more ofteninvolved in internalconflictsthanin
inter-stateones. As it had alreadylearnedin the Congo, theseare messyaffairs
in which successis hard to achieve and more than militaryskillsare required.
Helping to end a civil war is likely to involve a thirdpartyin a whole range
of civilianactivitieswhich are less oftenrequiredin theinterstatecontext.Such
settlements almostalways, forinstance,include some electoralact which needs
to be impartiallymonitored. In some cases reformor replacementof state
institutionscan also be a part of the settlement.Even in interstateconflicts,
experiencehas shown thatthereis a greaterrole forcivilianpeacekeepersthan
had been apparentin earlieryears.
Before I988, peacekeepinghad been regarded,not entirelyaccurately,as a
ratherhomogeneous activity.It is now possibleto identifyat leastsix different
types of peacekeeping. This taxonomy is based on the functions the
peacekeepersperformand is thus different from the taxonomy in Professor
James'sbook which is based more on analysisof the political circumstancesin
which each operationwas set up.

Type One is the preventivedeployment of United Nations troops before a

conflicthas actually begun, at the request of one of the parties and on its
territoryonly. The troops' functionis partly early warning but mainly to
increasethe politicalprice thatwould be paid by the potentialaggressor.This
idea, which came originallyfrom Mikhail Gorbachev, was adopted by the

456
The evolutionof UnitedNationspeacekeeping

presentSecretary-General in his reportAn agendafor

peace. It is currentlybeing
applied for the firsttime in Macedonia.

Type Two is traditional peacekeeping.The functionis to supportpeacemaking

effortsby helping to create conditions in which political negotiation can
proceed. It involves monitoringceasefires,controllingbufferzones, and so on.
These are supposedto be interimarrangements but theycan lastfora verylong
time if the peacemaking effortsare slow to succeed: UNTSO has been
deployed in the Near East foralmost45 yearsand UNFICYP in Cyprus for29
years. Slow progressin peacemaking does not necessarilycreate a case for
ending the peacekeeping; a long-standing peacekeeping operation may
sometimesbe the least bad option available to the internationalcommunityif
renewed war is to be avoided.
There are threesub-types:unarmedmilitaryobservergroupsas currentlyin
the Near East, Kashmir and Western Sahara; armed infantry-basedforces
which are deployed in cases where the taskis to controlterritory,as in Cyprus,
Syria, southernLebanon (in theoryonly, alas) and Croatia; and operations,
armed or unarmed,which are establishedas an adjunctof, or sequel to, a peace
enforcementoperation,as on the Iraq-Kuwait border. This thirdsub-typeis
arguablya typein its own rightbecause, being deployed underChapter VII of
the Charter,it does not formallyrequirethe consentof the partiesconcerned;
in practice,though,it cannot succeed without theircooperation.

Type Three consists of operations set up to support implementation of a

comprehensive settlementwhich has alreadybeen agreed by the parties.This has
been the area of most rapid growth since I988, largelybecause the end of the
Cold War and the new effectiveness of the SecurityCouncil have made it
possible to negotiatepartial or comprehensivesettlementsof several regional
conflicts.In the case of comprehensivesettlements, the peacekeepershave had
to undertake a wide range of functionsold and new. These can include:
monitoring ceasefires,the cantonment and demobilization of troops, the
destructionof weapons and the formationand trainingof new armed forces;
monitoringexistingpolice forcesand formingnew ones; supervizing,or even
in Cambodia controlling,existingadministrations; verifyingrespectforhuman
rights; observing, supervizing or even conducting elections; undertaking
informationcampaignsto explain the settlement, the opportunitiesit offersthe
people concernedand the role of the United Nations.
The paradigm is the very successfuloperationin Namibia in i989-90. The
United Nations is currentlyconducting similar operations in El Salvador,
Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique. It will do so in WesternSahara also, if
conditionscan be agreed for holding the planned referendum.
There is one respectin which therehas been some difficulty in applyingto
thesetypeThree operationsthe principlesestablishedbefore I988. It relatesto
theprincipleof impartiality.As I have said, thatprincipleresultedfromthe fact
thatpeacekeepingwas an interimactivityestablishedwithoutprejudiceto the

457
I8-2
MarrackGoulding

claims and positionsof the parties,which would, it was hoped, be resolved

througha processof politicalnegotiation.Type Three operations,however,are
deployed afterthe negotiatingprocess has been completed. The claims and
positionsof thepartieswill have been reconciledin a comprehensivesettlement
agreedbetweenthem.Suppose thatthereafter one of thepartiesfailsto comply
fullywith its obligationsunderthe agreed settlement.Can the United Nations
remainimpartialbetween thatpartyand the other? Should it not take action
againsttheoffending partyto persuadeor compel it to honouritscommitments?
Perhapsso. But ifit takesthatcourse and allows itselfto become the perceived
adversary of the offendingparty, does it not risk forfeitingthat party's
cooperation,on which the successof the whole enterprisemay well depend?
Fortunately-or perhapsunfortunately-thedilemma is veryrarelyas stark
as I have just describedit. The normalpatternis thatall partiesfail,to a greater
or lesserextent,to comply perfectlywith the agreementtheyhave signed.The
United Nations thereforehas to chastiseeveryoneto some extent.But even if
one partywas wholly virtuous,the United Nations would stillhave to think
verycarefullybeforemakingtheotherpartyitsenemy.Formallyspeaking,that
mightbe a justifiablecourse.But it would not be the rightcourseif,as a result,
it became more difficult to achieve the overall objective of implementingthe
agreed settlement.Non-confrontationalpersuasionmight offerbetterresults.
Such dilemmas cannot be resolved through formal interpretationof the
mandate. They require carefullyjudged political decisions-by the Chief of
Mission on the ground and the Secretary-Generaland, sometimes,by the
SecurityCouncil itself.

Type Four (a new one) consists of operations to protectthe deliveryof

humanitarian reliefsuppliesin conditionsof continuingwarfare.This has been
triedin recentmonthsin Somalia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Somalia
it failed. This was not, as is often alleged, because of inadequate rules of
engagement. It was mainly because of the absence of recognized political
authoritieswith whom theUnited Nations could reliablyconclude agreements
for the deployment and activities of the peacekeepers, and because the
unrecognizedpretendersto power who controlleddifferent parts of Somalia
were not willing or, in some cases,able to provide the cooperationneeded for
the United Nations to succeed.
When the Secretary-General recognizedthatpeacekeepingwas not going to
work in Somalia, he recommendedto the SecurityCouncil thatmore forceful
methodsbe employed. The Council thenauthorizedvarious states,led by the
United States, to field what was called the Unified Task Force. This was
supposed to establisha secure environmentfor humanitarianoperationsand
thenhand over to a United Nations peacekeepingforce.It subsequentlybecame
clear that the Unified Task Force would not succeed in establishinga secure
environmentof the kind envisagedby the SecurityCouncil and thata degree
of compulsionwould continueto be required.The Secretary-General therefore
recommendedto the SecurityCouncil that it set up a new United Nations

458
The evolutionof UnitedNationspeacekeeping

force,under Chapter VII of the Charter,with the mandate and armament

necessaryto enforce secure conditionsfor humanitarianoperations.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations peacekeepershave had more
successthanis generallyacknowledged in protectinghumanitarianoperations.
But theretoo local warlordshave denied themaccessto manyareasof need and
have continuously harassed and obstructed their efforts.Their rules of
engagementpermitthem to use forceagainstsuch obstructionbut forreasons
already explained their commanders have judged that 'fighting the aid
through' is not a practicableproposition.
A feature common to Somalia and Bosnia is the difficultyof making
peacekeeping work vis-a-visarmed groups outside the control of recognized
politicalauthoritieswith whom the United Nations can conclude thenecessary
politicaland practicalagreements.This problem will grow as the organization
becomes involved more frequentlyin internalconflicts.It is one of theimpulses
pushingit stronglyin the directionof a greaterreadinessto use force.

Type Five is arguablynot peacekeeping at all because it is likely to involve

enforcement.It will also involve peacemaking (that is the fashioningof a
political settlement)and what the Secretary-Generalhas called post-conflict
peacebuilding.This is thedeployment ofa UnitedNationsforce in a country
where
theinstitutionsofstatehave largelycollapsed,anarchyand lawlessness abound, the
breakup of the countrymay be imminentand some externalagency is needed
to put it togetheragain. It is Foreign SecretaryHurd's scenarioof 'painting a
countryblue'. It requires an integratedprogramme including humanitarian
relief,a ceasefire,demobilization of troops, a political process of national
reconciliation, the rebuilding of political and administrativestructures,
economic rehabilitationand so on. As alreadymentionedthe United Nations
undertookthis task successfullyin the Congo in the I960s. The new United
Nations forcein Somalia will have the same taskand, like itspredecessorin the
Congo, is likely to have to use forceto achieve it.

Type Six is, again, not really peacekeeping but I include it because it is
currentlyunder active discussion in the Bosnian context and because it
illustratesthe extentto which, in the public and the politicalmind at any rate,
peacekeeping's evolution is taking it across the threshold into peace-
enforcement.It can be called ceasefire enforcement and is essentiallya forceful
variantof the traditionalpeacekeepingwhich I have classifiedas Type Two. A
United Nations forcewould be deployed,afteran agreementhad been reached
between the parties,with the authorityand armamentto use forceagainstany
partywhich violated the ceasefireor otheragreed militaryarrangements.The
mandate would be analogous to peacekeepingin thatthe partieswould agree
to the initialdeploymentof the force and the force would act impartiallyin
enforcingthe agreed arrangements.But it would differfrompeacekeepingin
thatthe forcecould open firein situationsotherthanself-defence, forexample
to silence guns thatpersistedin violatingthe ceasefire.

459
MarrackGoulding

This is a concept which is currentlyunder discussionin the context of the

Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina where it would formpart of
the implementationof a wider settlement.It is assumed thateven though the
leaders of the three factionswould have accepted the plan, various of their
partisansmight(to put it generously)turna blind eye to instructions
to comply
with it. In such circumstancesforcewould have to be used if the plan was not
to sufferthe fate of the dozens of other agreementsconcluded between the
various combatantsin the formerYugoslavia.

From peacekeeping to peace-enforcement:desirable,practicable?

During the lastfiveyearsthe establishedprinciples,proceduresand practicesof
peacekeepinghave, as I have said,stood up remarkablywell to an unprecedented
increasein the demand for United Nations peacekeeping services.
In spiteof thebudgetarydifficultiescreatedformemberstatesby thesize and
unpredictabilityof demands for peacekeeping funds,and in spite of the fact
that certain large member states owe several hundred million dollars for
previousyears'assessments, theflow of fundshas been sufficient,
just, to enable
the Secretary-Generalto carry out the tasks given to him by the Security
Council. The costs of peacekeeping increased five-foldduring I992, to an
annual rate of about $2.8 billion. But the increasein unpaid dues that year,
expressedas a percentageof the increasein peacekeepingcostsduringthe year,
was only 28 per cent, much less than the 74 per cent which was the
corresponding figure in I99I. This shows that, contrary to the general
perception,member stateshave respondedwell to the increaseddemands for
peacekeepingfinance.The backlog of arrears,currentlysome $670 million,is
neverthelessa major complicationwhich impactsdirectlyon the organization's
abilityto reimburseto the troop-contributing countriesthe sums due to them.
The increasein activityhas neverthelesshighlightedsome shortcomingsin
existing arrangements.By common consent, the departmentsconcerned at
United Nations Headquartersin New York need to be strengthened iftheyare
to have the planning and command and control capability to support
operationson the scale currentlydeployed. Financial and logistic procedures
need to be streamlined.There needs to be a working capital fund for
peacekeepingand a reservestockof basic peacekeepingequipmentto enable the
Secretary-General to respondmore quicklywhen the SecurityCouncil decides
to establishnew peacekeepingoperations.Presentarrangements by which a few
memberstatescommitthemselvesto have troopson stand-byto servewith the
United Nations at specifiedtermsof notice need to be refinedand extendedto
many more countries.The United Nations needs to do more to help member
statestraintheirpersonnelfor peacekeepingserviceand perhapsto undertake
more trainingitself.
Much work is in hand in New York on all theseissues,in spiteof thecrushing
pressureof theday to day managementof existingoperations.I believe thatthe

460
The evolutionof UnitedNationspeacekeeping

wind standsfairfor peacekeeping to continue as an effectiveUnited Nations

instrumentfor the controland resolutionof conflicts.
However, in recent months governmentsand public opinion in many
countrieshave increasinglyquestioned whether peacekeeping is enough. Its
relianceon the consentand cooperationof thepartieshas, it is said, shown it to
be incapable of taking the forcefulaction required in situationslike those in
Bosnia and Somalia. Perhaps that is partlydue to the fact that the Security
Council may sometimeshave deployed peacekeeping operationsin situations
where it was not entirelyclear that conditionsactually existed for successful
peacekeeping.Be thatas it may, the currenttendencyin the SecurityCouncil
is to give peacekeeping operations more muscle. Last month the Council
decided to add infantryto UNIKOM, the militaryobservermission on the
Iraq-Kuwait border,despitethe factthatits unarmedpersonnelhad promptly
alertedthe Council to Iraqi incursionsand had thusenabled the Council to take
effectivecounter-measures. Later thesame monththeCouncil decided to move
UNPROFOR, the very large operation deployed in the formerYugoslavia,
fromChapter VI to Chapter VII of the Charter,thoughonly in the contextof
the protectionof its own personnel.
Creatingthiskindof greyarea betweenpeacekeepingand peace-enforcement
can give riseto considerabledangers.In political,legal and militaryterms,and
in termsof the survivalof one's own troops,thereis, on the one hand, all the
differencein the world between being deployed with the consent and
cooperation of the parties to help them carry out an agreementthey have
reachedand, on theotherhand,being deployed withouttheirconsentand with
powers to use force to compel them to accept the decisions of the Security
Council.
To take thatview, however,is not to say thattheUnited Nations should not
use force. On the contrary,if the organizationis to evolve into an effective
systemof collectivesecurity,it must,as was recognizedin the Charter,have an
enforcement capability.In thatcontext,thegreaterreadinessof theinternational
communityto contemplateenforcementaction by the United Nations is to be
welcomed and could representa decisive moment in the developmentof the
organization.It neverthelessgives riseto a numberof questionswhich need to
be urgentlyaddressed.

i. By what criteriadoes the SecurityCouncil decide to use force,which in

effectmeans going to war, against countriesor groups which fail to comply
with its decisions? There may be sound reasons why it is rightto use force
againstIraq and the Bosnian Serbs,but not againstothermember stateswhich
continue to occupy their neighbours' territorycontrary to the Security
Council's wishes,or againstothermovementswhich failto heed the Council's
decisions.But ifthe SecurityCouncil is to escape thechargeof double standards
it-and especiallyits Westernmembers-need to be more carefulin defining
thosereasonsand gettingthemaccepted. The same questionof criteriaarisesin
relation to forcefulinterventionfor humanitarianpurposes. Why Bosnia,

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KurdishIraq and Somalia, but not Angola, or Liberia or southernSudan where

equally atrocioussituationsexist?
2. How can the SecurityCouncil ensurethatitsuse of forcewill succeed? The
credibilityof the organizationalready sufferswhen a peacekeeping operation
fails.During the Reagan era the inabilityof UNIFIL, throughno faultof its
own, to implement its mandate was used remorselesslyin Washington to
discreditthe United Nations. Think how much greaterthe damage will be if
resortto forceby the SecurityCouncil does not succeed or if it gets bogged
down in an interminableconflictlike Britain'sin NorthernIrelandor India's in
Kashmir (which seem more appropriate analogies than the often quoted
Vietnam).
The answer to that question must lie, first,in very careful military
appreciation of the task to be performedand, second, in deployment of
forcesto ensureits accomplishment.Equally, it is necessaryto define
sufficient
a credibleand practicableend-game, so thatthe United Nations forcecan be
withdrawnwithoutleaving behind chaos, tyrannyor some otherresultwhich
causes continuedsuffering or otherwisediscreditsthe United Nations.
These are demanding requirements.They mean that,in the face of public
pressureforforcefulintervention, governments,and especiallythoseof theFive
PermanentMembers,will oftenhave to explain thatconditionsdo not existfor
the successfuluse of forceand that othersolutionsmust be tried.
3. Is theinternationalcommunityreadyto pay forpeace-enforcement? This is
a vastlymore expensiveactionthanpeacekeeping.During Desert Storm,on the
basis of press estimatesof its cost, we calculated that one day's expenditure
on that operation would have been more than enough to finance United
Nations peacekeeping for the whole of I99I. There is also the question of
whether the costs of peace-enforcementoperationsshould, as in the case of
Kuwait, be borne by the governmentscontributingthe troops,with financial
support from their friendsand allies, or whether they should be borne
collectivelyby the member statesas a whole. The latterprinciplewas, with
great travail, established for peacekeeping during the I96os. If pface-
enforcementis to strengthenthe credibilityof the United Nations as a world
system of collective security,it is desirable that it too should be financed
collectively.
4. Will enough member statesbe willing to contributeto peace-enforcement
operationswith the increasedrisk of casualtieswhich they entail? And how
many of those who are willing will have the armamentand trainingnecessary
to engage in combat operationsin unfamiliarterrain?Member statesso farhave
been admirably willing to contributemilitaryand police personnel to the
organization'speacekeepingoperations,in whichalmost40 per centof themare
currentlyrepresented.If the credibilityand effectiveness
of the United Nations
are to be strengthened,it is desirablethat peace-enforcementoperations,like
peacekeeping,should include a wide enough spreadof memberstatesto reflect
the compositionof the organizationas a whole.

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5. How should command and controlof peacekeepingoperationsbe organized

in the future?As alreadymentioned,peacekeepingoperationstake place under
the command and controlof the Secretary-General, who is responsibleto the
SecurityCouncil. Existingstructuresin New York have found it increasingly
difficultto plan, command and control the greatly increased peacekeeping
activitiesof recentyears.When the SecurityCouncil authorizedthe despatch
of additionaltroops to protectthe deliveryof humanitariansuppliesin Bosnia
and Herzegovina, it was decided to take 'off the shelf' elementsof a NATO
headquartersto establishthe new command in Bosnia. This has not been an
entirelyhappy experiment.A bettersolution may lie in greatlystrengthening
the staffin New York, and especiallythe militarystaff,to give it the resources
not only to plan new operationsbut also to provide the core elementsof their
headquarters.This would both enhance the Secretary-General'scontrol of
United Nations operations and ensure the uniform application to all such
operations of the establishedprinciples,procedures and practices of peace-
keeping.
The command and control demands of war are immeasurablygreaterthan
those of peacekeeping. No enforcementoperation has yet taken place under
United Nations command and control. Instead, in Korea and Kuwait and,
initially,Somalia, the SecurityCouncil has authorizedcertainmemberstatesto
use force to ensure compliance with its decisions. However, the Secretary-
General recommended that the new United Nations operation in Somalia,
which is under Chapter VII of the Charter,should be under United Nations
command and control,though using elementsfrom the headquarterswhich
had alreadybeen establishedby theUnited States-ledforcein Somalia. But, like
the command in Bosnia, thisarrangementmay raisequestionsabout the extent
to which the operation is-or is perceived to be- really under the United
Nations and not controlledin realityby the memberstatescontributingto the
bulk of its troops.
It is to be assumed thatthe SecurityCouncil will continueto move in the
directionof more forcefulaction,especiallyin responseto civil wars involving
intolerablehuman suffering. There is thereforelikely to be continuingdebate
about whetherthisis betterdone by national forcesand coalitionsauthorized
by the SecurityCouncil or by forcesunder the command of the Secretary-
General,and about how such operationsshould be financed.The outcome of
thisdebate will have major implicationsforthe futureevolution of the United
Nations as a systemof collectivesecurity.

Conclusion
The future development or evolution of peacekeeping-and peace-
enforcement-lies in the hands of two of the principalorgans of the United
Nations: the SecurityCouncil and the Secretary-General. They carrya heavy
responsibility.
During the firstfourdecades of the United Nations' existence,peacekeeping

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evolved in a less than benign environment.The Cold War blighted the

organization'sability to performmany of the tasks envisaged for it in the
Charter; and the Soviet Union maintainedconsiderablereservationsabout the
legitimacyof peacekeeping.On some occasions,notablyin I956 and I973, the
establishmentand efficientfunctioningof a peacekeeping operation clearly
served Soviet national interestsand objectionswere not raised. But therewas
always hesitationabout the Secretary-General's politicalrole and oppositionto
his acquiring a militarystaff,let alone any stock of militaryequipment.
During those yearsRalph Bunche and thenBrian Urquhart, togetherwith
the Secretaries-General whom theyservedwith such distinction,nurturedthe
evolution of peacekeeping and, with resourcefulness,and even stealth
sometimes,establishedits credibilityas a United Nations techniqueforconflict
control and resolution.
These days, as the Secretary-Generalhas observed,the United Nations has
almost too much credibility.On some recentmornings,every singleitem on
the BBC World Service news has related to a situationin which the United
Nations is engaged in peacemakingor peacekeepingor humanitarianrelief.The
problem now is often not to persuade the Security Council to set up a
peacekeepingoperation,but to dissuadeit fromrushinginto doing so when the
conditionsfor successdo not yet exist.
This places a greatburden of responsibilityon the Secretary-General. He is
the guardian or trusteeof a precious and carefullynurturedresource,whose
usefulnessdependson itscontinuingcredibility.Preservingthatcredibilityis no
easy task: on the one hand, the Secretary-Generalhas to try to ensure that
peacekeepersare not deployedin conditionswherefailureis likely; on theother
hand, he has to avoid appearingso cautious as to createdoubts about the real
usefulnessof the United Nations or provide a pretextfor member statesto
returnto the bad old ways of unilateralmilitaryaction.
This is not a responsibilitywhich the Secretary-Generalshould be asked to
bear alone. The power of decision in these mattersrestswith the Security
Council. It is importantthatthe membersof the Council should,if necessary,
standup to theclamourof domesticor regionalpressuresand takecare to satisfy
themselves in advance that conditions do really exist for a proposed
peacekeepingoperationto succeed.
Those conditionsare well known, but theybear repeating.The mandate or
task must be clear, practicableand accepted by the parties; the partiesmust
pledge themselvesto cooperatewith thepeacekeepersand theirpledgesmustbe
credible;and thememberstatesof theUnited Nations mustbe readyto provide
thehuman and materialresourcesneeded to do thejob. On any particularday,
unfortunately, only a minorityof the actual or potentialconflictsin the world
fulfilthoseconditions.It is oftenfrustratinglynecessaryto wait untila conflict
is ripefortheUnited Nations peacekeepingtreatment.But when theconditions
are fulfilled,thereis almost no limit to what peacekeeping can achieve.

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