Mīr Dāmād

Kitāb al-Qabasāt:
The Book of Blazing Brands

‫ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﻘﺒﺴﺎت‬
A Provisional English Translation,
Introduction, and Notes.
Including Selections from Sayyed
Aḥmad ‘Alawī’s
Sharḥ Kitāb al-Qabasāt
 by

Keven Brown
E-Published by Keven Brown
 Copyright © 2014 by Keven A.
Brown.

All rights reserved. Except as

permitted under the United States
Copyright Act of 1976, no part of
this publication may be reproduced
or distributed in any form or by any
means, or stored in a data base or
retrieval system, without the prior
written permission of the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-
Publication Data
Damad, Muhammad Baqir ibn
Muhammad, d. 1631?
[Qabasat. English]
Kitab al-qabasat : the
book of blazing brands / Mir
Damad ; a draft English translation,
introduction, and notes by Keven
Brown.
p. cm.
"Including Selections from
Sayyed Ahmad ‘Alawi's Sharh
Kitab al-Qabasat."
Includes bibliographical
references.
ISBN 978-1-59267-068-
0 (alk. paper)
1. Philosophy, Islamic--Iran--Early
works to 1800. I. Brown, Keven.
II. Title. III. Title: Book of blazing
brands.
B743.I7D36513 2009
181'.5--dc22

2009006062
 Dedication

To my mother, Barbara Brown, with

gratitude for unfailingly supporting
me in all
my endeavors from childhood into
adulthood, and for trusting me
and encouraging me to follow my
dreams
 Contents

Translator’s
Introduction ix
Mīr Dāmād’s
Introduction 1
The First Qabas
On the kinds of creation (ḥudūth)
and the divisions of existence
according to them, establishing
the bases of judgment, and
defining the area of
dispute 3
The Second Qabas
 On the three kinds of essential
antecedence and constructing the
demon​stration by way of essential
priority (taqaddum bi’l-
dhāt) 43
The Third Qabas
The two kinds of separate
posteriority and constituting the
demonstration by way of eternal
priority 93
The Fourth Qabas
Quotations from the Book of God
and the Traditions of His
Messenger, and from the
traditions of the lofty and pure
Imāms 135
The Fifth Qabas
Concerning the mode of existence
of the unqualified natures and the
path of the demonstration by the
mode of the existence of the
nature 157
The Sixth Qabas
On the continuity of time and
motion; setting up the course of
the demon​stra​tion with respect to
the continuity of the magnitude of
time according to the natural
system in two ways; establishing
the finitude of extended con​-
tinuous quantity; and invalidating
a numerical infinity with respect
 to successive tem​poral
creatures 199
The Seventh Qabas
A series of abridged arguments,
unsound dialectical arguments,
and criti​cism of certain
syllogisms and controversial
sophistical doubts according to
the two extremes of the two
groups 259
The Eighth Qabas
Inquiry into the power of God and
His will after completing what
remains in the care of the
intellect, through the use of
decisive utterance, to solve some
 of the difficulties and dilemmas
caused by doubt and the
confusions arising from idle
fancies 303
The Ninth Qabas
On establishing the intelligible
substances and the stages of the
system of existence in the two
chains of beginning and
return 365
The Tenth Qabas
The decisive doctrine on the
secret of predetermination
(qaḍā’) and fate (qadar), how
evil is related to
predetermination, the colocynth of
 truth on prayer and its granting,
and the return of the command to
God in the begin​ning and the
end 425
Glossary 495
Bibliography 503
 Translator’s Introduction[1]

Post Avicennan Intellectual

Trends
To better understand the position of
Mīr Dāmād and his most famous
work, al-Qabasāt, in the history of
Islamic Philosophy, it is important
to first review the main intellectual
trends that developed in Muslim
lands after the time of its most
celebrated philosopher, Ibn Sīnā
(Avicenna) (d. 1037), whose
philosophi​cal works, like the Shifā’
and the Ishārāt, became the subject
of numerous commentaries over the
centuries. The influence of Ibn Sīnā,
known as the Master (al-shaykh)
and the Chief (al-ra’īs) by subse​-
quent generations of Mus​lim
scholars, on both the development
of Islamic philosophy and kalām
(scho​lastic theology) was so great
that reference to his works became
critical to the practice of either.
When the Ash‘arite
mutakallim, or theologian, al-
Ghazālī (d. 1111) wrote his famous
critique of the Peripatetic
philosophers, by whom he means
Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī (d. 950),
called the Tahāfut al-Falāsifa (The
Incoherence of the Philosophers), in
which he undertook to refute twenty
doctrines of the phi​losophers,
including the alleged belief that the
Creator emanates the world
necessarily in the same way that
fire produces heat, according to Van
Den Bergh, by this event
“philosophy was defeated” in the
lands of Islam and reached its
culmination in the monumental
exposition of Aristotelian philoso​-
phy by Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (d.
1198), who had attempted but failed
to heal the declining reputation of
philosophy by his counter attack on
al-Ghazālī known as the Tahāfut al-
Tahāfut (The Incoher​ence of the
Incoherence).[2] If Van Den Bergh’s
claim is true for philosophy in the
western lands of Islam, including
Spain, it is certainly not true with
respect to the legacy of Ibn Rushd
in Europe, where his work was
translated into Latin and became the
inspiration of the philosophical
movement known as Scholasticism.
It is also certainly not true with
respect to the develop​ment of
philosophy in the eastern half of the
Muslim world, where al-Ghazālī’s
attack on the Peripatetics, although
known, did not impede phi​-
losophical pursuits. Philosophy in
the east under Ibn Sīnā’s
philosophical successors, who
valued original and critical
approaches to phi​losophical texts,
continued to flourish and develop
new ideas. Ibn Rushd’s counter
attack and rejoinder to al-Ghazālī’s
Tahāfut al-Falāsifa was apparently
unknown to both the successors of
Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī in the east.
This may be the reason why, despite
the fact that he is addressing the
same ques​tions that occupied al-
Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd, Mīr Dāmād
only men​tions al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut
once in Kitāb al-Qabasāt [3] and
places more impor​tance upon the
criticisms of Ibn Sīnā made by the
Ash‘arite Fakr al-Dīn al-Rāzī a
century later.
It is true that Muslim
philosophers were under attack by
Muslim theologi​ans insofar as they
were perceived to be placing
reason above Revelation, such as in
the problem of the eternity of the
world vs. its crea​tion. The founder
of the Illuminationist school of
philosophy, Shihab al-Dīn al-
Suhrawardī, was executed at the
age of 36 at the instigation of the
ortho​dox establishment on the
charge of heresy and corrupting the
youth. Mullā Ṣadrā, Mīr Dāmād’s
most famous student, was forced
into exile for a time due to the
systematic harass​ment of the
‘ulamā’. There was also a popular
distrust of philosophical works due,
in part, to the fact that the
philosophical style of al-Fārābī and
Ibn Sīnā was difficult to understand.
The condemna​tion of philosophy by
Sufi mystics, who had an innate
hostility to rational discourse, was
also common. The use of reason as
a tool to understand Revelation,
however, was never discouraged in
Islam, except by a fanatic minority,
so there was nothing in philosophy
to inherently hinder its har​mony
with Revelation.
Although the al-Ghazālī-Ibn
Rushd debate does not appear to
have been known to the
philosophers and theologians of
Iran, there was another polemic
which took place in the thirteenth
century involving the Ash‘arite
theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.
1209) and the Shī‘ite Avicennan
phi​losopher Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī
(d. 1274) which held great
significance to both groups. Both
al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī had studied
Hellenic philosophy in order to
master it well enough to refute the
philosophical doctrines they
disagreed with, such as the eternity
of the world, the doctrine that God
only knows particulars through their
universals, and the denial of bodily
resur​rection. Al-Rāzī wrote two
works to which al-Ṭūsī responded,
one called al-Muḥaṣṣal, which is a
comparative analysis of the ideas of
the ancient Greek philosophers,
Muslim philosophers, and the
theology of the Kalām, and another
called Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, which is a
commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s last
work, al-Ishārāt wa’l-Tanbīhāt. In
both books he made many specific
criticisms against Ibn Sīnā, most of
which, according to Izutsu, are “due
to misunderstandings and hasty
judgments.”[4] Al-Ṭūsī re​sponded
by writing his own commentary on
Ibn Sīnā’s Ishārāt, known as Sharḥ
al-Ishārāt, and a critique of al-
Rāzī’s Muḥaṣṣal titled Naqd al-
Muḥaṣṣal. In both books he
concisely elucidates Ibn Sīnā’s
philosophical positions and defends
him against the criticisms of al-
Rāzī. Mīr Dāmād frequently quotes
passages from these works of al-
Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī in al-Qabasāt, in
which he usually sides with al-Ṭūsī
but corrects him when he thinks al-
Ṭūsī has erred in his reasoning. Al-
Ṭūsī also wrote the Tajrīd
al-‘Aqā’id in which he provides
Shī‘ī theology with a Peripatetic
meta​physical foundation. This last
work, like his Sharḥ al-Ishārāt,
became the subject of a
considerable number of
commentaries written by both Shī‘ī
and Sunnī theologians.
The importance of al-Ṭūsī to
the subsequent development and
accep​tance of Islamic philosophy
cannot be overestimated. Through
his clear writing style, containing
“no trace of unnecessary concepts
or difficult words,”[5] and his
reasoned defense of Ibn Sīnā, he
revived Peripatetic philoso​phy and
gave it a fresh impetus. Most
significantly, al-Ṭūsī was himself a
theologian,[6] and his championing
of Ibn Sīnā marked the begin​ning of
a new cycle of scholasticism in
Islam. After him the practice of
philosophy will be carried on
primarily by theologians. One of al-
Ṭūsī’s brightest students in
philosophy, ‘Allāmah Ibn Muṭahhar
al-Ḥillī (d. 1325), was a Shī‘ite
jurisprudent who himself trained
many other theologian-
philosophers, both Shī‘ī and Sunnī.
At the same time that Fakr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī was criticizing the
Peripa​tetics, a new movement arose
from among the ranks of the
philosophers themselves. This was
the Illuminationist school founded
by Shihab al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d.
1191), who had been trained in
Peripatetic philosophy in his youth.
After the occurrence of a dream in
which Aristotle appeared to him
and revealed to him the concept of
“knowledge by presence” and the
superiority of the ancient sages,
Suhrawardī subordinated
discursive phi​losophy to
philosophy based on illumination
by unveiling and intuition. He also
identified his philosophy not with
Aristotle, but with pre-Aristotelian
sages, like Plato, among the Greeks,
Hermes Trismegistus among the
Egyp​tians, and ancient Persian
sages and kings. Suhrawardī is
known for estab​lishing a genuine
doctrine of Platonic Forms in
Islamic philosophy, which he
interpreted as self-conscious
angelic lights, each of which is “the
lord of a species” or “the lord of an
image.” He also clarified that the
distinction between essence and
existence in concrete entities, which
he thought Ibn Sīnā had taken
literally, is a purely conceptual
distinction. In other words, it is the
essences which are real, and
“existence” is a mental construct
which is predicated upon and
signifies the actualized essences.
This doctrine of the principality of
the essence, or the quiddity, was
accepted by nearly all Islamic
philosophers until the time of Mīr
Dāmād’s famous student, Mullā
Ṣadrā, who espoused the contrary
doctrine of the principality of
existence.
Another important movement
that appeared around the same time
among the Sufis was centered
around the work of Ibn al-‘Arabī
(d. 1240), who spent the last sixteen
years of life living in Damascus,
where he com​pleted his famous
encyclopedia of Islamic sciences
Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya. His ideas
are so rich and cover such a vast
array of themes that it is hard to
summarize them, but one of his
major ideas which became a
significant source of inspiration to
Mullā Ṣadrā concerns the principal
reality of exis​tence in the sense of
act and the unbounded possibility of
the essences of things to become in
their journey towards reunion with
God.
In sum, prior to the time of Mīr
Dāmād and the founding of the
school of philosophers that became
known as “the school of Iṣfahān” in
the six​teenth century, there were
four major intellectual trends
prevalent in Islamic lands: (1) the
Peripatetic philosophy of Ibn Sīnā
as expounded by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-
Ṭūsī and his students, (2) the kalām,
or scholastic theology, of Fakr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī and other theologians,
both Shī‘ī and Sunnī, (3) the
Illumina​tionist philosophy of
Suhrawardī and his followers, and
(4) the mystical theosophy of Ibn
al-‘Arabī and his followers. It
should be kept in mind that this is a
general classification, and that
many thinkers belonged to more
than one category.

Ḥikmat and the School of Iṣfahān

The founding of the Ṣafavid dynasty
in Persia by Shah Ismā’īl at the
begin​ning of the sixteenth century
was an event with long-lasting
consequences for the peoples of the
region. Ismā’īl established the
borders that have defined Iran until
the present day, and under the
Ṣafavids Twelver Shī‘ism, for the
first time, became the official state
religion, which was institution​-
alized in support of the state. The
Ṣafavid state-building program
came to its height under Shah
‘Abbas I (1588-1629), who chose
Iṣfahān to be his new capital city.
Iṣfahān soon became an
economically thriving, adminis​-
tratively powerful, and culturally
rich center for Iranian Islam. By
1666, according to a European
visitor, Iṣfahān had 162 mosques,
48 colleges, 182 caravansaries, and
273 public baths.[7] It was an
environment conducive to cultural
and intellectual creativity. As stated
by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “just as
Ṣafavid art is one of the high points
of Muslim art, so is the intellectual
life of Shī‘ism in this period one of
the apogees of Muslim history,”[8]
produc​ing figures like Mīr Dāmād,
Shaykh Bahā’ī, Mīr Findiriskī,
Mullā Ṣadrā, Sayyid Aḥmad
‘Alawī, and ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-
Lāhījī to mention just a few among
the many prolific ḥukamā’ in this
period.
The phrase “the School of
Iṣfahān” was coined in the 1950s by
Henry Corbin and Seyyed Hossein
Nasr, according to Newman, “to
stress the uniqueness of the
contribution of these figures within
the broader dimen​sions of Islamic
philosophical thought, and to call
attention to the early seventeenth
century as a period of philosophical
renaissance in Iran.”[9] As
mentioned earlier, after the time of
al-Ṭūsī, who is the prototype of this
new generation of philosophers,
philosophy was mainly conducted
by theologi​ans, who were usually
proficient in other branches of
learning as well. It would neither
have been safe nor prudent to claim
oneself to be a pure philosopher.
Instead of using the Greek word
“philosophy” to describe their
profession, the philosophers now
used the term ḥikmat, which means
“wis​dom.” This gave them a means
to further legitimize their profession
in the eyes of religious skeptics by
associating it with the Prophets sent
by God, since in the Qur’ān it is
implied that God had revealed
ḥikmat to the Proph​ets and sages of
old. For example, the Qur’ān states:
“We bestowed wisdom on
Luqmān,”[10] and in another verse
it is said: “Commemorate Idrīs in
the Book; for he was a man of truth,
a Prophet; and we uplifted him to a
place on high.”[11] It was well-
known that Idrīs was identical to
Hermes Trismegis​tus (or Thoth),
who had revealed religion,
philosophy, and sci​ences to the
Egyptians. Thus, Mullā Ṣadrā
would write: “Know that wisdom
(ḥikmat) originally began with
Adam and his progeny Seth and
Hermes, i.e., Idrīs, and Noah,
because the world is never
deprived of a person upon whom
the science of unity and eschatology
rests. And it is the greatest Hermes
who propagated it (ḥikmat)
throughout the regions of the
world….He is the ‘father of the
philosophers’ and the master of
those who are the masters of the
sciences.”[12] Muslim historians
like Abu’l-Fatḥ al-Shahristānī
(1076-1153) and ‘Imād al-Dīn
Abu’l-Fidā’ (1273-1331) had
reported that Empe​docles had
acquired wisdom from Luqmán, and
that Pythagoras had acquired
wisdom from Solomon, the son of
David.[13] The purpose of such
statements was to show that the
fundamentals of philoso​phy had
proceeded from the Prophets and
that philosophy, or ḥikmat, rests on
a divine founda​tion. As explained
by Nasr, “Ḥikmat consists of
several threads knit together by the
matrix of Shī‘ism. The most
important of these elements are the
esoteric teachings of the Imāms,
especially as contained in the Nahj
al-Balāghah by the first Imām ‘Alī,
the ishrāqī wisdom of Suhrawardī
which contains in itself aspects of
ancient Persian and Hermetic
doctrines, the teachings of the
earlier Sufis, especially the Gnostic
doctrines of Ibn ‘Arabī, and the
heritage of the Greek
philosophers.”[14] Those who
practiced ḥikmat were called
ḥukamā’ (s. ḥākim). Dabashi
writes: “The ultimate objective of
the Shī‘ī philosophers of the
Ṣafavid period was to demonstrate
the central and meta-
epistemological harmony among all
these discourses. In his per​son, Mīr
Dāmād exemplified this synthetic
ambition of the ‘School of Iṣfahān’.
As a Shī‘ī
philosopher/jurist/mystic, he wrote
logical treatises and juridical edicts
with the same ease and competence
with which he com​posed mystical
poems.”[15]

Mīr Dāmād
Mīr Burhān al-Dīn Muḥammad
Bāqir Dāmād, or Mīr Dāmād as he
is com​monly known, is considered
by Nasr and Corbin to be the
leading figure of the School of
Iṣfahān and along with his student
Mullā Ṣadrā the greatest ḥākim of
the period.[16] He was known in
Ṣafavid times by his pen name
“Ishrāq,” and he was honored with
the title “the Third Teacher” (after
Aristotle and al-Fārābī) and “the
Master of the Erudite” among the
philoso​phers. He was the son of
Mīr Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad
Astarābādī, known as Dāmād (son-
in-law) because he was married to
the daughter of ‘Alī Ibn ‘Abd
al-‘Ālī, known as Muḥaqqiq-i
Karakī, one of the most prominent
Shī’ī clerics of the early Ṣafavid
period. Accordingly, Mīr Dāmād
was the grand​child of Muḥaqqiq-i
Karakī, and he continued to bear the
honorific title of “Dāmād,” although
it was his father who was the son-
in-law.
Mīr Dāmād was born in
Astarābād in 1543 but was raised
in Mashhad, where he spent a
number of years engaged in
acquiring the traditional and
intellectual sciences, and where he
studied the philosophical works of
his predecessors, especially the
Shifā’ and Ishārāt of Avicenna. His
two most prominent teachers were
Ḥusayn Ibn ‘Abd al-Ṣamad
al-‘Āmilī, the father of Shaykh
Bahā’ī, and Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karakī,
his own maternal uncle. After that
he lived for a time in Qazvīn and
then in Kāshān, finally settling
down in Iṣfahān. He spent his
abundant life engaged in teaching
and writing, and passed away in
Najaf in 1631, where he was
buried.
During his lifetime, Mīr
Dāmād was recognized not only as
an accom​plished philosopher but as
a skilled mathematician,
jurisprudent, Qur’ān commentator,
poet, and natural scientist. Nasr
notes that it is reported that Mīr
Dāmād studied the life of bees and
recorded observational data about
them.[17] As a philosopher, he was
primarily a Peripatetic philosopher
follow​ing in the tradition of Al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, whom he
frequently calls his “two
companions in instruction and in
leadership,”[18] though he differed
with them substantially on the issue
of the creation of the world. It is
evi​dent from his writings that he
considered himself their equal in
philosophy, and even their superior
on some questions. Mīr Dāmād sees
himself as guided first and foremost
by the wisdom of the Prophets and
the Shī‘ī Imāms, who taught the
doctrine of creation, and he
maintains in al-Qabasāt that
Aristotle, al-Fārābī, and Ibn Sīnā
failed to use their sound
philosophical premises to come up
with the right conclusion.
In Iṣfahān, Mīr Dāmād
attracted a large number of students,
the most famous of whom were
Mullā Ṣadrā (the author of the
encyclopedic al-Asfār al-Arba‘a),
Sayyid Aḥmad ‘Alawī (who is
known for his commentaries on the
Shifā’ and the Qabasāt), Mullā
Khalīl Qazvīnī (who wrote a
commen​tary on the Uṣūl al-Kāfī),
and Quṭb al-Dīn Ashkiwārī (the
author of a uni​versal sacred
history).
One of Mīr Dāmād’s friends
and close associates was Shaykh
Bahā’ī, both of whom enjoyed
prestigious positions at the court of
Shah ‘Abbās. The following story
by one of Mīr Dāmād’s biographers
illustrates their friendship:
One day Shah ‘Abbās was
riding his horse in the company
of Mīr Dāmād and Shaykh
Bahā’ī. Because Mīr Dāmād
was fat and heavy, he and his
horse would regularly fall
behind. Shah ‘Abbās is reported
to have approached him and in
jest suggested that Shaykh
Bahā’ī is not polite and
reverential enough because he
gallops fast ahead of Mīr
Dāmād. “That is not true, your
Majesty,” Mīr Dāmād is said to
have responded. “His horse is
so happy for having such a great
man riding it, it cannot control
itself and jumps and pushes
ahead of everyone else.” Shah
‘Abbās goes to Shaykh Bahā’ī
and this time complains of Mīr
Dāmād’s weight and says he is
so fat he cannot keep up with the
entou​rage. “That is not the
reason, your Majesty,” Shaykh
Bahā’ī is reported to have said.
“The poor animal cannot bear
the weight of so much
knowledge that it carries.
 Mountains would break carrying
the weight of Mīr Dāmād’s
knowledge.”[19]
Mīr Dāmād was a prolific
writer in both Persian and Arabic.
He is known, however, for having a
difficult style of writing and
employing obscure Arabic words,
which makes it initially hard to
understand the contents of his
works. Tabrīzī Khiyābānī lists 48
books by Mīr Dāmād, including the
two divans of his poetry, one for
Persian and one for Arabic.[20]
Five important books for which he
is often discussed, according to
Ashki​wārī, are al-Rawāshiḥ al-
Samāwiyyah (a commentary on the
traditions of the Shī‘ī Imāms), al-
Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm (on theology and
philosophy), al-Ufuq al-Mubīn (on
theology and philosophy), al-
Qabasāt (on theology and
philosophy), and al-Jadhawāt
(which he wrote for Shah ‘Abbās,
being a treatise on the disconnected
letters of the Qur’ān and why
Moses’ body did not burn on Mt.
Sinai, while the stones around him
did).[21] Some of his other books
include the Sidrat al-Muntahā (a
commentary on the Qur’ān), al-
Taqdīsāt and al-Ḥabl al-Matīn
(both on philosophy), Taqwīm al-
Īmām (expounding various
philosophical questions), and
Shāri‘ al-Najāt (on the principles
of religion and jurisprudence). He
also wrote a commentary on the Ibn
Sīnā’s Shifā’ and al-Ṭūsī’s Istibṣār.
Among his philosophical works, his
al-Qabasāt, however, is recognized
as his magnum opus, which
contains the essential features of his
metaphysics.

Kitāb al-Qabasāt
I made my heart the treasure of
Divine Secrets.
In the world of Intellect I reigned.
In al-Qabasāt I became the sea of
 certitude.
The script of doubt and
uncertainty I destroyed.[22]
With these words, Mīr Dāmād
describes his accomplishment in al-
Qabasāt. The complete title of al-
Qabasāt is Qabasāt Ḥaqq al-Yaqīn
fī Ḥudūth al-‘Ālam, which means
“Blazing Brands of Objective
Certainty on the Crea​tion of the
World.” Mīr Dāmād began to write
this book in Rabī‘ al-Awwal in the
year 1034 A.H on the day of the
birth of the Prophet (Decem​ber 23,
1624), and he finished it on the 6th
of Sha‘bān the same year (May 13,
1625). Mīr Dāmād arranged the
Kitāb al-Qabasāt into ten chapters,
calling each chapter a “blazing
brand” (qabas). Each blazing brand
contains short sections which he
designated a “flash” (wamḍa) or
“gleam” (wamīḍ) of light. The word
qabas means “a live coal” or “a
firebrand.” It is likely that he was
thinking of the following verse from
the Qur’ān concerning Moses’
sighting of the burning bush on Mt.
Sinai when he thought of the title of
his book. It is related: “‘Behold!’
Moses said to his family, ‘I
perceive a fire. I will bring you
tidings from there, or I will bring
you a blazing brand (qabas) that
you may warm yourselves’.”[23]
As Mīr Dāmād indicates in his
introduc​tion to al-Qabasāt, it is
hoped that through the “flashes” and
“gleams” emanating from these
firebrands, the reader “may obtain a
glimpse of the face of God.”[24]
The goal of Mīr Dāmād in
writing al-Qabasāt, in brief, is to
demon​strate by means of the
rational methods of the Peripatetics
and based upon principles
established by the Peripatetics
themselves that the universe in its
entirety, in both its material and
immaterial dimensions, is created
by God at the level of perpetuity
and preceded by its real non-
existence. He does not believe, like
Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā, and most of the
Peripatetics that the universe as a
whole is eternal, nor does he
believe like most of the early
Mu‘tazilite and Ash‘arite
theologians that it was created in
time. It is a fundamental doctrine of
Mīr Dāmād that reality is divided
into three con​tainers (wi‘ā’), each
of which sustains and encompasses
the container directly following it.
These three containers are: (1) the
realm of eternity (sarmad), which
has neither beginning nor end and
no cause for its exis​tence, (2) the
realm of perpetuity (dahr), which
has a beginning and a cause but not
an end, and (3) the realm of time
(zamān), in which things have both
a beginning and an end in time. The
first realm pertains only to the
essence of God, which alone has no
cause for its existence.[25] The
second realm applies to the whole
of everything other than God in
relation to Him, which being His
effect is caused, but not temporally
caused. The third realm applies to
the relationship of temporals to
each other. Insofar as these
temporals are subject to
progression and change, elapsing
and renewal, and quantifiable
priority and posteriority, they are in
time. But insofar as they are created
and exist, they are not in time but in
perpetuity, the domain where all
things exist in relation to God
without the flow of time. Mīr
Dāmād devotes the first six
chapters of al-Qabasāt to
demonstrating, through a series of
demonstrations, his alternate thesis
of perpetual creation (ḥudūth
dahrī). In all, according to his own
account, he presents eight different
principles upon which he builds his
demonstrations for the creation of
world[26] in the domain of
perpetuity preceded by its real,
unquanti​fiable non-existence. He
says:
By the leave of God, His grace,
and His mercy, we have
investigated the eight principles
which are the principles for the
demonstrations of the creation
of the world in this book. The
first is the knowledge of the
containers of existence, namely,
time, perpetuity, and eternity;
the sec​ond is the knowledge that
existence is identical to the
essentially neces​sary Being but
added to the possible
quiddities; the third is the
knowledge of the three kinds of
essential priority and their
characteris​tics; the fourth is the
knowledge of the two kinds of
separate priority, the eternal and
the temporal, and their
characteristics; the fifth is the
knowl​edge of the three kinds of
creation and their requirements;
the sixth is the knowledge of
quantitative relation and
everlasting relation and the
distinction between them; the
seventh is the knowledge of the
mode of existence of the
unqualified natures and the
settling of their affair; the eighth
 is the knowledge of the
continuity of motion and time
and what is associated with that.
[27]
In the Seventh Qabas, Mīr
Dāmād responds directly to
specific argu​ments of the
philosophers for the eternity of the
world, and in the last three qabasāt
he addresses subsidiary subjects,
such as the power of God and His
will, the chains of beginning and
return, the secret of
predetermination and fate, the
question of evil, and the wisdom of
prayer and its granting.
Like Suhrawardī, Mīr
Dāmād’s placed strong emphasis on
yamanī wisdom, the wisdom of the
Prophets, and he greatly admired
Plato, whom he calls “the seal of
the divine philosophers,” by which
he means that Plato was the last of
“the seven noble philosophers who
acquired the light of philosophy
from the niche of prophethood.”[28]
He is clear in the First Qabas that it
is the divine philosophers, not the
followers of Aristotle, who taught
the perpetual creation of the
universe. Ironically, however, Mīr
Dāmād believes that Aristotle, via
the Theology mistakenly ascribed to
him by early Muslim thinkers, is a
wellspring for his ideas on time and
perpetuity. His frequent references
to and admiration of the words of
“Aristotle” in the Theology
demonstrate Mīr Dāmād’s
unrecognized debt to Plotinus,
whose Enneads are the source of
the Theology.
Al-Qabasāt is not only the
epitome of Mīr Dāmād’s thought in
the area of metaphysics, it also
contains a wealth of quoted
passages and critical commentary
on the positions of other thinkers on
a variety of philosophical subjects.
In laying out the above themes, Mīr
Dāmād gives special attention to the
works of Ibn Sīnā, such as the
Shifā’, the Ishārāt, the Najāt, the
Ta‘līqāt, the ‘Uyūn al-Ḥikmat, and
al-Mabda’ wa’l-Ma‘ād. He refers
fre​quently to Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s
Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, Sharḥ Risāla
Mas’ala al-‘Ilm, and Naqd al-
Muḥaṣṣal. He quotes from al-
Fārābī’s al-Jam‘ bayna al-Ra’ayn
and Fuṣūṣ; Suhrawardī’s
Muṭāraḥāt, Talwīḥāt, and Ḥikmat
al-Ishrāq; from the Muḥākamāt of
Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī; from
Baghdādī’s al-Mu‘tabir; from the
Taḥṣīl of Bahmanyār; from Fakhr
al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Muhaṣṣal and
Sharḥ al-Ishārāt; and from
numerous other works and com​-
mentaries. He quotes often from and
places a lot of emphasis on the
Theol​ogy ascribed to Aristotle. In
addition, he often cross references
his readers to his other books for
more details on specific themes
mentioned in al-Qabasāt.
Besides the importance of al-
Qabasāt as a major work in the
philoso​phical literature addressing
the debate of whether the universe
as a whole is created or eternal,
and one which resolves the debate
favorably on the side of creation
through demonstrations based on
Peripatetic premises, al-Qa​basāt
contains many of Mīr Dāmād’s
profoundest insights into the nature
of time. As Netton rightly observes:
“What is true is that many of the
concep​tions of time in modern
philosophy are just as radical,
thought-provoking and complex as
anything ever devised by Mīr
Dāmād.”[29] For example, Mīr
Dāmād’s recognition of the
inseparable connection between
time, space, and motion and their
inherence in temporal objects
presages Einstein’s general theory
of relativity, which recognizes the
mutability of space-time in
response to mass and energy. Mīr
Dāmād’s idea of perpetuity as the
domain where the past, the present,
and the future all exist as a single
timeless whole, where time exists
like a frozen river without its
extension and flow, conforms to
Einstein’s statement: “For we
convinced physicists, the distinction
between past, present, and future is
only an illusion, however
persistent.”[30]

The Text and Translation

The text of al-Qabasāt which has
been used for this translation is the
criti​cal edition prepared by M.
Mohaghegh, T. Izutsu, A. Mūsavī
Behbahānī, and I. Dībājī, which
was published by the Institute of
Islamic Studies, McGill University,
in collaboration with Tehran
University in 1977. This edition
was corrected based upon
comparing the Shīrāz 1897
lithographed edition and three
different manuscript copies.[31]
Besides the text, the 1977 edition
includes an introduction to the First
Qabas by Mehdi Mohaghegh, a
short analytical essay by ‘Alī
Mūsavī Behbehānī on Mīr Dāmād’s
theory of perpetual creation, five
biographies on Mīr Dāmād, an
English introduction by T. Izutsu,
and indexes of the names of
individuals, groups, and books
mentioned by Mīr Dāmād in al-
Qabasāt. As noted by Mohaghegh,
“because the volume of this edition
is already large, a study of Mīr
Dāmād’s ideas, an introduction to
his works, annotations, and
explanations from various
commentaries of al-Qabasāt,
differences in the texts use, and a
detailed subject index are planned
for another volume.”[32] This
volume appeared in 1997 in the
form of the publication of Sayyid
Aḥmad ‘Alawī’s Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt, edited by Hāmed Nājī
Isfahānī with Persian and English
introduc​tions by Mehdi Mohaghegh.
As other scholars have noted,
Mīr Dāmād’s style of writing and
pen​chant for “rare and unusual
terms and expressions” make his
works chal​lenging to read.[33] His
ideas are rich and complex, and his
allusions to philosophical and
theological concepts require of the
reader a sound knowl​edge of
Islamic philosophical and
theological discourses. It is because
of the difficulty of his style, the
complexity of his ideas, and the fact
that a great deal of time is needed to
study and befittingly translate Mīr
Dāmād’s words with clarity and
precision, time which this translator
has not yet acquired, that the present
translation is being published as a
“provisional translation.” It is the
goal of the translator to gradually
perfect this translation of al-
Qabasāt by correcting the errors
and unclear renderings that remain
in it. (If you can be of assistance to
me in this regard, please contact me
by sending an email to
kevenbrown2006@yahoo.com.)
Further​more, time is needed to
study and translate the passages in
Mīr Dāmād’s other works to which
he refers in al-Qabasāt and in
which he elaborates upon certain
themes treated summarily in al-
Qabasāt. The works of Ibn Sīnā in
good English translation, such as
those recently completed by
Michael Marmura and Jon
McGinnis, will provide needed
background for improving this
translation.
My effort to translate al-
Qabasāt has benefited greatly by
having on hand a copy of Sayyid
Aḥmad ‘Alawī’s commentary on al-
Qabasāt known as Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt, which is useful in
providing additional explana​tions
on various themes. ‘Alawī was a
student of Mīr Dāmād and his son-
in-law, and he wrote this
commentary in accord with the
desire of Mīr Dāmād and at his
bidding.[34] Wherever it seems
helpful I have included commentary
from ‘Alawī in the footnotes that
accompany the translation. A
thorough study of ‘Alawī’s
commentary and completing its
translation needs to be done in
conjunction with any sufficient
translation of al-Qabasāt. The
excellent article by Fazlur Rahman
titled “Mīr Dāmād’s Concept of
Ḥudūth Dahrī” also provided me
with valuable insights into Mīr
Dāmād’s ideas.
The 1977 critical edition
of al-Qabasāt did not include
numbering to distinguish the
sections of each Qabas, called
wamḍa, from the subsections called
wamīḍ. Therefore, in the course of
my translation of al-Qabasāt, I
have provided numbering for each
section and each subsection. For
exam​ple, the First Qabas has seven
wamḍa, the fourth of which has
seven wamīḍ and the seventh of
which has seven wamīḍ. Therefore,
the third wamīḍ of the fourth
wamḍa of the First Qabas is
numbered 1.4.3, and according to
the same pattern the other wamḍa
and wamīḍ in al-Qabasāt are
numbered.
 [Mīr Dāmād’s Introduction]

In the name of God, the Merciful,

the Compassionate!
Divine guidance is from God,
the Mighty, the All-Knowing. Praise
be to God, the One, the Peerless,
the Everlasting, the Protector of all
things, the Maker of every existent,
and blessings be upon the One who
followed Him among the concourse
of the Prophets and served Him
with full devotion among the
assemblage of the Messengers,
Whom He sent forth with the
Preserved Tablet in the station of
Maḥmūd. And blessings be upon the
chosen ones among His holy family,
who are infallible in their testimony
and in their deeds.
Now then, this neediest of
creatures and poorest of the
servants of God, the Most Praised,
the Self-Subsisting, His humble
servant, Muḥammad Ibn
Muḥammad, called Bāqir Dāmād
al-Ḥusaynī (may God make his end
blessed in both worlds), affirms
that one of the spiritual companions
whom I was not able to dissuade
with a refusal asked me with great
insistence to unfold for him by
means of citation (al-dhikr)[35]—
with the clarity of ‘objec​tive
certainty’ (ḥaqq al-yaqīn)[36] by
means of demonstrations, and with
decisive propositions set forth
according to accepted principles
and rules—what has become clear
to the eye of my intellect, to the eye
of my heart, and to the vision of my
soul through the manifest light of
God and His irresisti​ble power,
namely that the Lord of primary
origination and generation is alone
in preexistence (qidam), prior to
perpetuity (dawām), solitary in pre-
eternity (azaliyya), and the
exclusive possessor of eternity
without begin​ning or end
(sarmadiyya),[37] while the
universe with all its elements and
parts, its compounds and members
—whether these be intelligences,
souls, matters, forms, bodies, or
accidents—is preceded by non-
existence, new in creation, subject
to destruction, and afflicted with
nullification.
By the life of the Beloved: the
execution of a clear demonstration
and a proper exposition through
rational methods on this theme is a
difficult affair and it has not yet
been achieved. The temperaments
of thoughts are sick for the desire of
it, and the loins [2] of minds are
bereft of its counte​nance. There is
no easy path thereto from the
beginning until the end of time.
Even one of the pillars among the
eminent philosophers and one of the
luminaries among the great minds,
our foregone companion in this
endeavor, the master of the
philosophers of Islam and their
chief [i.e., Ibn Sīnā], in the Topics,
which is a book on the art of
dialectic (al-jadal) among the arts
of logic in the Kitāb al-Shifā’, has
stated, in emulation of what is in the
First Discipline,[38] that this
problem is, from whichever
position one takes, dialectical and
not based on demonstration, due to
the lack of demon​strative proofs on
either side,[39] and he considered
the question of whether the world is
created (ḥādith) or eternal (azalī)
[40] a dialectical question hav​ing
two contrary positions.
But, lo! I shall carry out what
the questioner has requested and
fulfill his hopes through these
“blazing brands” (qabasāt), each of
which contains “flashes” (wamḍāt)
and “gleams” (wamīḍāt), in hopes
of obtaining a glimpse of the face of
God, the All-Bountiful. The
recompense thereof is with God.
How glorious is His remembrance
and how abundant His reward! He,
verily, is the Lord of wondrous
grace and ancient bounty, the
Fountain​head of knowledge and
wisdom. By Him all things are
preserved and in Him is our best
defense. [3]
 The First Qabas
On the kinds of creation and the
divisions of existence according to
them,
establishing the bases of judgment,
and defining the area of dispute

Wamḍa [1.1]
In Book Six, Chapter Two of
the Metaphysics of the Shifā’, he
[Ibn Sīnā] tries to define the
concept of creation (ḥudūth)[41]
and to make three​fold its primary
classification, which is
comprehensive in accordance with
the comprehensiveness of its three
primary divisions. Thus he tells us:
The meaning of that which is
called “primary origination”
(ibdā')[42] by the philosophers
is causing something to exist
“after” an absolute non-
existence (lays muṭlaq),[43] for
it belongs to the effect through
itself (fī naf​sihi) that it is non-
existent, while [at the same
time] it belongs to it through its
cause that it is existent. That
which belongs to something by
virtue of itself is more prior for
the mind, essentially (‘ind al-
dhihn bi’l-dhāt), not
temporally, than that which
belongs to it from something
else. Therefore, every effect is
existent after being non-existent,
where “after” means essentially
(or: logically) [and not
temporally] posterior.[44]
If the term “creation”
(al-ḥadath) is applied [in this
manner] to everything which
possesses existence after non-
existence, then every effect is
created (muḥdath). If, however,
the term is not applied in this
way, but rather the condition of
a created thing is that a time
precedes it which ceases with
its coming into existence, since
temporal posteriority cannot
coexist with temporal priority,
but rather is distinct from it in
existence, then not every effect
is created, but only those which
are pre​ceded by time and,
without doubt, movement and
change. This you know, and we
will not dispute the terms.
Now, a created being in the
sense which does not
necessitate time is such that its
existence must either come after
an absolute non-exis​tence or
after a non-absolute non-
existence (lays ghayr muṭlaq),
that is to say, after a contrary,
specific privation (‘adam) in an
existing matter, as you know.
[45] If its existence comes after
an absolute non-existence, its
emanation from its cause is
called “primary origination”
(ibdā‘). This is the most
excellent form of giving
existence, because privation is
cate​gorically excluded here [4]
and existence is imposed upon it
[ex nihilo]. For if priva​tion[46]
were allowed to precede [its]
existence, its coming-into-being
(tak​wīn) would be impossible
except through matter, and the
 power of giving existence
would be weak and deficient
from the beginning.
In the Ta‘līqāt (Annotations),
also, he comments on this theme:
“The meaning of ‘absolute non-
existence’, here, is a non-existence
which is simple and unqualified, as
compared to that non-existence
which is quali​fied by not being able
to coexist with actual existence and
which is contrary to it, and not
conjoinable with it in the thing itself
whatsoever.”
As for creation “in the
sense which does not necessitate
time,” which is the existence of
something “after” its real, absolute
non-existence, it is of two kinds:
[47] (1) It is either the existence of
something essentially following its
absolute non-existence, since the
stage of its actual existence
“follows” [logically] the stage of
its absolute non-existence with
respect to its own essence (dhāt).
This is not incompatible with the
actualization of the essence by the
Agent, for actual existence is
realized by the Agent emanat​ing it.
This kind of creation is called
“essential creation” (ḥudūth dhātī)
and its permanent emanation, in this
manner, is called “primary
origination” (ibdā') by them. There
is no conflict between the
actualization and existence of the
thing itself, with respect to
depending on the emanation of the
Agent, and the nullification and
non-existence commensurate with
the substance of the quiddity
(māhiyya) itself as such.[48] Does
it not follow clearly that the thing
itself is more encompassing than the
stage of the quiddity as itself?
(2) Or it is existence
preceded by real non-existence
(‘adam ṣarīḥ), which is contrary to
the occurrence of actual existence
in the real world (matn al-wāqi‘).
This is what he intended by the
statement: “After a non-absolute
non-existence, that is to say, after a
contrary, specific privation in an
existing matter.” This kind of non-
existence has no essential priority
but a separate, distinct, atemporal,
non-flowing, unmeasurable,
unquantifiable priority. This kind of
creation is nothing but perpetual
creation (ḥudūth dahrī). The
emanation of existence following
real unquantifiable non-existence is
called “production” (iḥdāth) and
“fashioning” (ṣun' )[49] by the
philosophers, and real non-
existence and actual existence
cannot coexist in the same matter or
place with respect to the thing itself
whatsoever.
As for creation in the sense
which requires time, it is of only
one kind. This is the existence of
something in time being preceded
by its temporal, quantifiable, and
flowing non-existence, which
occurs in the time quantifia​bly and
temporally prior to it. Bringing
something into existence in time
after its temporal, quantifiable,
flowing non-existence, which is
included in the genus of extension
and non-extension, duration and
non-duration,[50] is called
generation (takwīn). [5]
This is the way of making the
primary categories of creation
three, as explained in the Shifā’. Let
it be recognized. In the Metaphysics
of the Najāt, he [Ibn Sīnā] states:
Know that just as something
may be created (muḥdath) in
relation to time, so likewise
may it be created in relation to
essence, for created beings exist
after they were not existing, and
posteriority, like priority, may
be either temporal or
essential....Every effect is firstly
non-existent through itself,
hence accidental in relation to
its cause, and secondly existent
[through its cause];
consequently, every effect is
created; that is to say, it
receives its existence from
something besides itself “after”
being non-existent by virtue of
itself. Therefore, every effect,
by reason of itself, is created.
Even if it exists for the whole
duration of time, for example,
receiving that existence from the
Giver of Existence, it is still
created, for its existence after
its non-existence is an essential
posteri​ority, in the way we have
explained, and its creation is not
 merely for a period of time, but
rather it is created with respect
to the whole of time and
perpetuity (dahr). It is not
possible for it to be created
after it was non-existent unless
the matter out of which it was
created preceded it.[51]
He is stating clearly here
that creation, in accordance with the
terminol​ogy of the discipline [of
philosophy], can be applied in three
differ​ent ways: (1) essential
creation, (2) temporal creation, and
(3) perpetual creation. It is also
evident that existing after not
existing takes place in perpetuity, if
one were to reflect.
In the Ishārāt, near the end
of Namaṭ Five, he [Ibn Sīnā] says:
“No state (ḥāl) is distinguishable in
real non-existence (‘adam ṣarīḥ). It
is fun​damental that it does not cause
anything to exist whatsoever, or that
things are not caused to exist by it
in any way, for any state is
absolutely contrary to it.” The
author of the Muḥākamāt[52]
states:
Since there is no distinction in
real non-existence—otherwise
the re​straint of the Agent from
giving existence would be more
suitable to some states than to
 others, or the non-emanation of
the effect from the Agent would
be more suitable to some states
than to others—the qualifi​cation
of non-existence by “real” is a
precaution against the temporal
non-existence of a created thing
preceded by matter. [6]

Wamḍa [1.2]
Among the noteworthy
arguments for establishing perpetual
creation (ḥudūth dahrī), with
respect to the priority of real non-
existence in the empirical world,
without consideration of extension
and non-extension, is what the
master, Abu’l-Barakāt, recounted
from the philosophers in his
Mu‘tabir. He says:
They said to one who required a
period of non-existence (‘adam)
pre​ceding the existence of a
creature, as a way of instruction
and admo​ni​tion: “Is this period
limited and determined, as a
day, a month, or a year is
determined, or does any period
of time suffice it?” The ques​-
tioner responded: “Indeed, any
period of non-existence
preceding exis​tence is sufficient
to create a creature.” They
asked: “Is one year of non-exis​-
tence preceding its existence a
reasonable conception?” “Yes,”
he an​swered. They continued:
“If the year was changed into
one month, would this still be
sufficient or not?” “A month
would certainly suffice just as a
year suffices.” Then the
question was transferred to a
day, an hour, part of an hour, and
a minute. The result of this chain
of questions was to show that
time has no causative influence
upon creation, because a large
amount of the causation of a
cause is not like a small amount
of it. Rather, all of the cause is
 necessary for all of the effect.
Therefore, if some of the time
hypothesized for creation is
removed, and a thing is not
removed from its status of being
“created,” then removing the
whole of time will not alter the
fact of creation. It is only
influential in a weak sense, such
that the progression of time
certainly actualizes creation, but
if it is removed, creation is not
removed.[53]

Wamḍa [1.3]
Is it not a fact that extension
and non-extension, divisibility and
non-divisibility, quantification and
non-quantification all pertain to
fixed con​tinuous quantities and their
principles, that is to say, volume,
plane, line, and point, and to an
unfixed continuous quantity and its
imaginary divider, in other words,
time and the now? But existence,
insofar as it is existence, and non-
existence (‘adam), insofar as it is
non-existence, do not pertain to any
of this in any way. None of this is
admissible for existence and non-
existence whatsoever, except
accidentally with respect to a
subject. Whenever it enters under
the genus of quantification and non-
quantification, and insofar as its
occurrence coincides with what is
measurable or non-measur​able,
there is a corresponding association
which points without doubt to its
“in-ness” [in space and time].
Furthermore, these conditions
belong to the accidents of matter
and its attachments. But that [state
of the subject] which the
attachments and encumbrances of
matter do not embrace is certainly
sanctified from all of these
limitations.
[7] Therefore, three
containers (wi‘ā’ ) are required for
existence with respect to the thing
itself: (1) time (zamān), which is
the container of meas​urable,
flowing existence or measurable,
continuous non-existence belong​ing
to changeable beings insofar as they
are changeable; (2) perpetuity
(dahr), which is the container of
real existence preceded by real
non-exis​tence, beyond the horizon
of quantification and non-
quantification, belong​ing to
changeless things insofar as they are
changeless, and it is the inner
dimension of the real world (ḥāqq
matn al-wāqi‘)[54]; (3) eternity
(sarmad), which is the container of
pure, real, changeless existence
utterly sanctified from the
occurrence of change and exalted
above any precedence of non-
existence whatsoever. It is pure,
real, unqualified actuality in every
respect. Just as perpetuity is more
exalted and more encompassing
than time, so is eternity more
exalted, more lofty, more sanctified,
and greater than the world of
perpetuity. Therefore, when real
non-existence is understood to
precede creation (ḥudūth), the most
appropriate and best name for it is
“perpetual creation.”
Our companion [Ibn Sīnā]
has made the following points [on
this theme] in the Ta‘līqāt
(Annotations):[55]
The intellect perceives
three states of being. The first is
the existence of a being in time.
This is the temporal dimension
of changeable things which have
a beginning and an end, where
the beginning is unlike the end.
Indeed, these temporal creatures
are passing away, constantly in
a state of flux, and complete one
state only to enter another state.
The sec​ond is the existence of a
being with time, which is called
perpetuity (dahr). This state of
being surrounds time, and is the
heavenly sphere which exists
together with time. Time is
connected to this state of being
because it is produced from the
motion of the sphere. This is the
relation of the changeless to the
changeable. Nevertheless, the
estimative faculty (wahm) is
unable to grasp it, since it views
each thing in a particular time,
and the notions of “was” and
“will be,” of past, present, and
future, possess it.[56] The third
is the existence of a changeless
being with the changeless,[57]
and this is called eternity
(sarmad), which encompasses
per​petuity.
A temporal thing has a
beginning and an end where the
beginning is unlike its end.
The estimative faculty fixes
a particular time for each thing,
but it is impossible that time
itself should have a particular
time.
The heavenly sphere does
not change in itself, but motion
is a state contin​gent upon it.
That which is in something
and encompassed by that thing
is such that it changes with the
change of that thing. Hence,
something existing in time
changes with the change of time,
the accidents of time supervene
upon it, and its periods vary
according to it. Therefore, this
time which is the beginning of
its existence or the beginning of
its action is different from that
[8] time which is its end, for the
former time has slipped away
and been overtaken. But that
which is with a thing does not
change with its change and its
accidents do not affect it.
Perpetuity is the container
of time, because it encompasses
it.
Time is a weak mode of
existence due to its being
unfixed and flowing.
The heavenly sphere is the
bearer of time, and its motive
power is the agent of time.
He also states in the Ta‘līqāt:
By our saying “when” and
“where” is not meant something
being in place or time
compoundly. We mean here by a
“composite” the subject
(mawdū‘ ) together with a
relation. Indeed, the relations
themselves are intended.
Therefore, the relation itself is
“where,” not the related and the
object of relation, and not the
sum of the relation and the two
things related. Similarly, the
state (ḥāl) pertains to a relation,
like fraternity.
“When” is being in time,
and one time in fact may be a
time for a large number [of
things] in actuality. But the
“when” of each of them is con​-
trary to the “when” of each
other, so that each one of them
being in that time is different [in
some way] from the being [in
that time] of the other. “Where”
is something being in place,
meaning its existence in it,
where “existence” is a
relational existence, not an
absolute existence which is
contrary to it. Therefore, Zayd’s
being at the market is different
from ‘Umar’s being at it. Being
in time is not the same as time
itself. If one thing’s being in a
particular time ceases, the being
of another in it does not cease.
Time does not exist in a
particular time. Similarly, it
does not cease to exist in a
particular time.
The relationship of the
First (exalted be He) to the
active intellect or to the
heavenly sphere is not a
quantifiable or temporal
relationship, but an eternal one.
The relationship of eternals to
eternals is called eternity
(sarmad) and perpetuity (dahr).
Time includes within it that
which is changeable. The
relationship of eter​nals to time
is perpetuity. Time is
changeable while eternals are
unchangeable.
Whatever is located in time
is divisible, such as motion and
what pos​sesses motion.
Contiguity (mumāssa) occurs at
the divider (ṭaraf) of time, and
the divider itself is not
 divisible. Non-contiguity only
occurs in time because it is the
parting of contiguity, and parting
is a motion.
He says in the Shifā’, in more
than one place:
Extension is inconceivable in
perpetuity (dahr) and in eternity
(sarmad); [9] otherwise it
would be a measure for motion
[as time is for the movement of
the sphere]. Therefore, time is
like an effect of perpetuity, and
perpetuity is like an effect of
eternity. If the relationship of the
causes of bodies to their
principles were not perpetual,
the bodies could not exist, let
alone their motions; and if the
relationship of time to the
principle of time were not
perpetual, time could not be
realized.[58]
 In his ‘Uyūn al-Ḥikmat, he
states:
The essences (dhawāt) of
changeless things and the
essences of things which are
changeable in one respect and
changeless in another, if con​-
sidered from the point of view
of their changelessness, do not
exist in time, but rather with
time. The relationship of that
which is with time but not in
time [to that which is in time] is
called perpetuity (dahr). The
relationship of that which is not
in time to that which is not in
time, by virtue of not being in
 time, is better called eternity
(sarmad). Perpetuity in its
essence belongs to eternity, but
in relation to time is called
“per​petuity.”
And in the Ishārāt, he
explains: “It is required for the
Necessary Being’s knowledge of
particular beings to not be a
temporal knowledge; otherwise the
past, present, and future could be
added to it [as a new factor] and
change could occur to an attribute
of His Essence. Rather, His knowl​-
edge of particular beings must be
through a means sanctified and
exalted above both time and
perpetuity.”
By the term “relationship”
(nisba) used above, “simultaneity”
(ma‘iyya) and “priority” (qabliyya)
are meant. In Namaṭ Five [of the
Ishārāt], after explaining the types
of priority, posteriority, and
simultane​ity, he says: “If it is
possible for something to be in an
identical state in rela​tion to each
thing, and it has an effect, it is not
improbable that eternity (sarmad)
is a requisite of it.”
The [Seal of] the Most
Excellent Scholars[59] in his
commentary of this has said:
He has described that
relationship by “eternity”
(sarmad) because, just as his
usage requires the application
of “time” (zamān) to the
relation​ship which exists
between one changeable thing
and another in the world of
extension, it requires the
application of “perpetuity”
(dahr) to the relationship which
exists between changeable
things and changeless things,
and “eternity” to the
relationship which exists
between one changeless thing
and another.
In the Physics of the Najāt,
he has set forth the same theme he
has repeated in the Shifā’:
“Whatever exists with time is not in
it. We exist with a grain of wheat
but we are not in it.” He considers
it impossible for its existence to
have a relation to time by in-ness
(fī’iyya). Then he says:
That which is outside of this
[temporal] whole is not in time.
Rather, if its estimation of being
with time is accepted and
acknowledged, and it has [10]
an unchanging nature coinciding
with the unchanging nature of
time and what is in time, this
relationship and this
 consideration toward time is
called perpetuity. Consequently,
perpetuity encompasses time.
His student[60] wrote in the
Taḥṣīl:
It is evident that time does not
exist in time, so that its non-
existence would be in another
time, and that time is among
those things, like motion and
matter, which are deficient in
existence. As for temporal
things, they are those things
which have a before and an
after, a past and a future, a
beginning and an end, such as
motion or things possessing
motion. As for that which is
outside of time, it exists with
time. The “withness” that we
mention pertains to an object of
relation; I mean a relation
occurring to a particular time
(matā). Thus it necessarily has
a natural connection to time, so
that an actual mutual
relationship exists between
them, not a hypothetical one—
because one is those things that
bear time and the other is its
agent—or a kind of connection
whereby this “withness” is
possible. If this “withness” is
the relationship of an
unchanging thing to a
changeable thing, it is perpetuity
(dahr), and it encompasses
time. If it is the relationship of
the unchanging to the
unchanging, it is best called
eternity (sarmad). Indeed, this
being of the changeless with the
changing, and the changeless
with the changeless,
corresponds exactly to the
existence of temporal beings in
time.[61] This “withness” is
like the “when” (matā) of
changeless things, and the being
of temporal things in time is
their particular “when.” Neither
 perpetuity nor eternity have
extension, whether conceptually
or in actuality; other​wise these
domains would be a measure
for motion.
He also states: “Existence has
no beginning and no end, for
whatever has a beginning and an
end has a conceptual difference
between these two states, like the
difference between genus and
species; or a quantitative
difference; or a numerical
difference. Existence cannot be
differentiated in this way.”
The Master of Illumination
[Suhrawardī] in the Physics of the
Muṭāraḥāt states:
If it is said: “A state of rest is in
time,” this is permissible. If it is
said: “A body is in time,” this is
with respect to its motion.[62] If
it is said: “The now is in time,”
this is permissible, if the
instantaneous now is meant, and
the now which is a short span
(waqt) is in time so long as it is
a part and it is counting. The
relationship of time to motions
is like the relationship of a
measuring stick to what is
measured.
[11] After explaining time,
perpetuity, and eternity, he says:
Perpetuity (dahr) is on the
horizon of time. Time is like an
effect of perpetuity, and
perpetuity is like an effect of
eternity (sarmad). If the
relationship of incorporeal
things to their principles were
not absolutely constant, bodies
could not exist, let alone their
motions. If the relationship of
time to the principle of time
were not constant, time could
not be realized. Hence, it is
certain that eternity is the cause
of perpetuity, and perpetuity is
the cause of time.
Then he says:
That simpleton known as Abu’l-
Barakāt, when he wanted to say
something on the question of
time, in his carelessness and
confusion, stated that time is the
measure of existence. I wish I
knew what measure existence
has! How many cubits does it
extend? To how many cubits
does it correspond? He even
advanced as one of his
incredible arguments what some
of the people say to each other:
“May God lengthen thy
existence!” Time is too precious
for it to be wasted in
considering such things.
 In sum, what we have recited
for you is agreed upon by the
masters of philosophy and their
teachers.[63] Aristotle, the teacher
of the Greeks, made frequent
references to this theme, but he fell
short of working out its
implications. In the Theology, with
regard to the main principles, he
affirms that every intelligible is
outside of time, because every
intelligible and intelligence belongs
to the domain of perpetuity, not to
the domain of time. He affirms that
the intelligible things in the higher
world are not subject to time, nor
are they generated one after another.
He states that the Universal Soul,
also, does not belong to the domain
of time but to perpetuity, and
therefore becomes the agent of time.
He declares that the active words
affect things simultaneously because
they do not occur in time, while the
receptive words do not receive
everything all at once, but one after
another.[64] He believes that the
soul is a circle having no
dimensions between its center and
its circumference, and that the
intellect is a circle which does not
move, while the soul is a circle
which moves motivated by its
desire for something.
 In Mīmar Two he states:
If the human soul is transferred
from the domain of time to the
domain of perpetuity, it has
returned to the intelligible
world and resides with the
intelligible substances, where it
can behold all things plainly.
This is provided it is pure and
unsullied, and not content to
look at this world or anything
within it but constantly holding
its gaze upon the higher world.
Then he says:
Every science which exists in
the higher world occurs in
perpetuity, not in time, [12]
because the things in that world
come into existence without
time. Therefore, the soul did not
come to be through time, and the
soul knows things, which it
reflected upon here, also
without time. It has no need to
recall them, because they are
like something present with it.
Thus, both higher and lower
things are always present with
the soul and not hidden from it,
since it belongs to the higher
intelligible world. The proof for
this lies in [the nature of] the
objects of its knowledge, for
they are not separated from one
another there, nor do they
change from one state to
another. Since the objects of
knowledge in the higher world
do not possess such [temporal]
attributes, all of them are
simultaneously present, and
there is no need for the soul to
recall them since it “sees” them
clearly. Nothing prevents the
soul, since it belongs to the
higher world, from knowing
something all at once, whether it
be one or many. It knows a
composite thing at once and
altogether, not one part after
another, because it knows it
without time. It only knows
something without time because
it is beyond time, and it is only
beyond time because it is a
cause unto time.
In Mīmar Five, he explains:
We say that every effect whose
agent is the First Maker is
complete and perfect, because
He is a complete cause before
which there is none other. It
does not beseem anyone to think
of one of His actions as
deficient, because this does not
befit secondary agents, i.e., the
intelligences, how much less the
Prime Agent. Rather, one must
think of the actions of the Prime
Agent as subsisting with Him,
and something with Him is not
last. Instead, that which is with
Him is first, while what is here
below is last. Something that is
last is only so because it is
temporal. The temporal thing
will only be in that time which
is suitable for it to be in. As for
the Prime Agent, He has always
been, because there is no time
there. So, if something
encountered belongs to a future
time, in which it subsists, then
no doubt it is existent and
subsistent there [with the Prime
Agent] as it will be in the future.
If it is thus, then the thing
existing in the future is an
existent subsisting there without
any need of being completed or
perfected by something else.
Things with the Creator,
therefore, are complete and
perfect, whether they be
temporal or atemporal, and they
are with Him always. Thus they
were with Him in the beginning
just as they will be with Him in
the end. But some temporal
things exist for the sake of
others; that is to say, when
things are extended, unfolded,
and separated from the First
Maker [13], some of them are
causes of the generation of
others. If all of them were
together and did not extend,
unfold, and separate from the
First Maker, some of them
would not be the cause of the
generation of others, but rather
the First Maker would be the
cause of the generation of all of
them.
In Mīmar Eight, he states:
The higher world is a perfect
living being containing all
things, because it was created
perfect by the First Maker. In
the higher world every soul and
every intelligence exists, and
there is no poverty there or
need, because everything there
is imbued with richness and
life, a life that is abundant and
overflowing. The flowing of the
life of those things issues from
only one spring. It is not like
one brook or one breeze of
wind by itself, but all things
there partake of one state in
which every state exists.
Then he says:
Every wayfarer there, whether
an intelligence or a living being,
no matter what path he travels,
always travels it to its end
without having left the
beginning, contrary to what is
experienced in the world below.
Here if a traveler on a certain
road comes to the end of that
road, the place of the end and
all the parts in between are
separate from that of the
beginning, so that the traveler is
only at the end, that is at the
place wherein he is. But the
traveler in the domain of life
can travel to the utmost reaches
of that realm without having left
his point of departure, so that he
is simultaneously at both the end
and the beginning and in all the
states in between.
He also explains:
We say that inasmuch as the
First Maker is superabundant in
virtue (faḍīla), and His virtue is
fuller and more perfect than the
virtue of all others, since He is
the reason of the virtues of those
beneath Him, and He being their
cause and they His effects, it is
necessary that He should be the
One who first bestows life and
virtue upon all things beneath
Him. They are His effects and
His overflowing bounty
emanates upon each of them in
accordance with their rank and
station.
Then he says:
Furthermore, that world does
not need to progress or change
in any way, since it is already in
the utmost state of perfection
and completion. Thus all of His
virtues always occur with
perpetuity, not with time. The
state of subsistence there is
perpetual, without a past or
future time. That is to say, the
future there is the same as the
present, and so is the past,
because things there ever
continue in one unchanging
state.
[14] He continues:
It behooves you to dismiss from
your imagination every incident
of time, if you truly desire to
know how the noble, perpetual,
and hidden individual existents
(anniyyāt) were created by the
First Maker, for they were
called into being entirely
without time. They were created
and received the action of the
Creator without any
intermediary, so how can they
be connected to time? Rather,
they are the cause of time and of
 the beings in time, and of their
order and their rank. The cause
of time is not in time, but is of a
more exalted and lofty nature,
like the relation of the shadow
to what casts the shadow.
The splendor of this noble
theme shines as if from the Real
Intellect in such a manner that no
one in the circle of the learned is
able to deny its significance. Even
the Leader of the Doubters[65] in
the Metaphysics of his Sharḥ ‘Uyūn
al-Ḥikmat, where he enumerates the
categories of being (al-mawjūd),
has stated: “Fourteenth: Being is
either a place or a time, or it is not
like this, but it is spatial or
temporal; or it is neither a place,
nor a time, nor spatial, nor
temporal.” This is a worthy
division containing much wisdom.
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars[66] says in
Ajwiba al-As’ila al-Qūnawiyya:
“Since they have negated from Him
being with respect to place, they
made the relation of all places to
Him one equal relation; and since
they have negated from Him being
with respect to time, they made the
relation of all times to Him,
whether past, present, or future, one
relation.” And he states in his
Sharḥ Risāla Mas’ala al-‘Ilm:
Inquiry into this subject, as it is
said, requires a refined
intellect; so let us proceed to
explain what is needed to
understand it. We say: The
multiplicity of things is either
due to their realities or it is due
to their plurality together with
their participation in one reality.
The units of real, accidental
multiplicity are either unfixed,
that is, not existing
simultaneously, or fixed, that is,
existing simultaneously. The
first of these two categories can
only exist with time or in time.
The first cause of change, in this
respect in existence, is an
existent unfixed by reason of
itself which elapses and is
renewed continuously, and this
is time. What is in time or with
time changes in accordance with
it in the way we have
mentioned.
The second category can
only exist in place or with
place. The first cause of
multiplicity, [15] in this respect
in existence, is an existent
which receives position by
virtue of itself; that is to say, it
can be indicated by the senses,
and the positions require
division into different parts, in
the sense mentioned, and in the
sense that each part has a
relation to other parts, inasmuch
as it is in one of its directions
and has a linear extension
different than that direction and
linear extension. Any existent
whose nature is like this is
material (māddī). As for the
intellected natures, when they
are actualized in many
individuals and are the first
causes of the individuation of
those individuals and their
specification, they are either in
time, as is the case with
movements, or in place, as is
the case with bodies, or in both,
as is the case with the multiple,
changeable individuals
occurring under one species.
But what is not spatial or
temporal is not conditional upon
these two things, and the
intellect is averse to its
dependence upon either of them.
As it is said: “Does “when” or
“where” exist for man, with
respect to his nature
“humanity”? In what time does
“five being half of ten” exist and
in what place? The answer is
 yes only if an individual is
individuated from one of these
natures, like “this man” or “this
five and ten,” so that they are
dependent upon time and space
by reason of their individuation.
Then he returns, after setting
forth this principle, to inquiring into
the principle of the question [we
are investigating] and explaining the
doctrine concerning it.
Although I would like to
continue this line of inquiry and
exposition and to report the sayings
of our peers in this profession on
this theme in the most thorough and
complete manner, this is in the
custody of [our books] al-Ṣirāṭ al-
Mustaqīm, al-Ufuq al-Mubīn, and
al-Īmāḍāt wa’l-Tashrīqāt. God
(glorified be He) is the benefactor
of confirmation and bounty.

Wamḍa [1.4]
Since you recognize that
eternity (sarmad) transcends
perpetuity (dahr), and perpetuity
transcends time (zamān), know that
if the temporal non-existence
belonging to a certain temporal
thing, insofar as it is temporal, is
posited to be continuous for the
whole extension of time, then
without a doubt its perpetual real
non-existence is necessitated as
well. Otherwise, it would be
necessary for that temporal thing to
be existent in the domain of
perpetuity, not in time, and it would
then be among the entities separated
(mufāraqāt) from time and space,
which is contrary to its assumed
temporality. But if its non-existence
is particularized to only a part of
the extension of time in its
particularity, its non-existence in
perpetuity is certainly not
necessary. In this case, would not
its subject (ma‛rūḍ) be existent in
what is outside of the time of its
non-existence belonging to time?
Perpetuity is more encompassing
and more universal [16] than any
part of time, than the extension of
the whole of time, and than the
domain of the real world separated
from the dimensions of time and
space.
Analogous to this is the
stage of the quiddity (māhiyya)
itself, as itself, in relation to
concrete entities (ḥāqq al-a‘yān)
and the sphere of the thing itself
(nafs al-amr)[67]. For just as non-
existence in the stage of the
substance of the quiddity, insofar as
it is itself, [68] does not require
non-existence in the actual thing
itself, and does not conflict with
existence in the world of objective
reality—even though that stage is
one of the modes of the thing itself,
not a fabricated aspect, because the
thing itself is more encompassing
and more universal than that stage
and than the stage of concrete
actuality,[69] as a result of which it
is possible for existence to be
excluded in that stage [of the
quiddity] in its particularity, but not
excluded [from it] in the real world
—in like manner, the non-existence
belonging to a temporal thing in a
part of time does not require its
non-existence in perpetuity, due to
the fact of its temporal existence in
perpetuity not in that time.
Furthermore, the non-existence of
an immaterial entity (al-shay al-
mufāraq) in the whole extension of
time does not require its non-
existence in perpetuity, nor does it
conflict with its perpetual existence
in objective reality and the actual
world not in any time or place at
all. Therefore, it is possible for the
existence of something to be
removed from a part of time, but it
cannot be removed in perpetuity
from the whole extension of time; or
it can be removed from the whole
extension of time [in the case of
separate, incorporeal things], but
not removed in the domain of
perpetuity from actual reality.
Is it not clear to you that
the unqualified nature (al-ṭabī‘a al-
mursala) is realized through the
realization of any individual among
its individuals, and it is not negated
except through the negation of all its
individuals? The affirmative
(mūjab) of the unqualified
propositions (mursalāt al-‘uqūd) is
in the power of a particular
affirmative, and their negative is in
the power of a universal negative.
Therefore, it is clear that the
temporal non-existences belonging
to changeable and corruptible
things, insofar as they are
changeable and corruptible, only
refer to the absence of a particular
existent, which exists for a definite
duration within the extension of
time, from other than the time of its
[temporal] existence, not to its
absence in perpetuity from the
whole of time; and they refer to the
absence of a temporal from another
temporal [extension], not its
absence from the One Who is
exalted above the dimensions of
time and space, and Who
encompasses all times and all
places, and what is in them and
with them, in all their details, with
an eternal, unchanging,
unquantifiable relation, and through
a law which subsists equally and
unchanging.

Wamīḍ [1.4.1]
It can be summed up from all
of this that the true Creator and
Necessary Being (lauded be He), in
all His aspects and attributes, exists
in the domain of eternity (sarmad),
not in time, and not in perpetuity
(dahr). Nay, He is exalted above
both of them and sanctified from
[17] their concomitants, their
affections, their properties, and
their laws. He is the ever-living,
eternal in the past, eternal in the
future.
The immutable substances,
insofar as they have attributes and
affections consisting of obligatory
and supererogatory perfections,
exist in perpetuity, and not in
eternity nor in time in any respect
whatsoever.
The changeable things
subject to flux, elapsing, and
renewal, insofar as they are
changing, only exist in time, and not
in eternity or perpetuity. In this
respect, they have absolutely no
share of existence in perpetuity. But
insofar as each of them exists
unchanging during its time, its
realization never vanishing during
the time of its existence, since the
time of the existence of something,
by natural necessity, cannot be the
same as the time of its non-
existence, then, from this point of
view, they exist in perpetuity, and
not in eternity or in time. Let is be
established.

Wamīḍ [1.4.2]
Perchance you recognize,
therefore, that the priority of non-
existence with respect to essential
creation (ḥudūth dhātī) is an
essential priority. It is not that
existence has been preceded by a
non-existence contradictory to it,
for the negation of existence in the
station of the quiddity itself, insofar
as it is itself, is not contradictory to
the existence acquired in real world
from the efficient cause; indeed, it
coexists with it.
In the same way, the
priority of non-existence with
respect to temporal creation
(ḥudūth zamānī) is a temporal
priority. It is not that a created
existence is preceded by a non-
existence contradictory to it in the
extension of time, for the priority of
the prior non-existence is distinct
from the posteriority of the
subsequent existence on account of
the separateness of their times in
existence, for they belong to two
different times, and the boundary of
prior non-existence is other than the
boundary of posterior existence,
and these two boundaries cannot
come together in the extension of
unfixed time. Rather, they can only
coexist in the domain of perpetuity,
with a perpetual, unquantifiable
coexistence. Among the kinds of
oneness inferred from the
opposition between temporal
affirmation and temporal negation is
the oneness of time.
Consequently, for these
two kinds of creation [i.e., the
essential and the temporal] there is
no opposition between priority and
posteriority at all. But the matter
differs for the third kind of creation,
which is perpetual creation (ḥudūth
dahrī). Inasmuch as the estimation
of extension and divisibility does
not occur in perpetuity at all, the
boundary of prior real non-
existence (‘adam ṣarīḥ) [18] in
perpetuity is not separate in the
estimation from the boundary of
existence created after that. That is
to say, the proposition of perpetual
negation is simply nullified, and the
proposition of unchanging,
perpetual affirmation occurs in its
place. Abandon, then, the
insinuations of the Satan of fancy,
tread upon the path of the clear
intellect, and endeavor in the
refinement of intellectual skill.

Wamīḍ [1.4.3]
Since the kinds of creation
(ḥudūth) have been made three for
you by means of the compound
intellect[70], it is certain that the
kinds of eternity (or: preexistence
qidam) can also be classified as
three: (1) Essential eternity (qidam
dhātī) is actuality not being
essentially preceded by the non-
being of potentiality and
nullification whatsoever and
existence not being essentially
preceded by the non-being of
privation and negation at all. Its
prerequisite is the essential
necessity of the essence and its
existence, just as the prerequisite of
essential creation is the possibility
of the essence and the nature of
essential contingency (al-imkān
bi’l-dhāt).[71]
(2) Perpetual eternity
(qidam dahrī), also called “eternal
pre-eternity” (azaliyya
sarmadiyya), is existence ocurring
actually without being preceded by
real non-existence in the realm of
perpetuity. It is pre-eternal
existence in the real world.
(3) As for temporal
eternity (qidam zamānī), this
pertains to a temporal thing whose
existence is not restricted to a
particular time preceded, with
respect to beginning, by a time of
non-existence. But rather it
continues to exist for the whole
extension of time. Consequently, it
has no temporal beginning for the
time of its existence. Its
prerequisite is freedom from
dependence upon dispositional
possibility (imkān isti‘dādī)[72]
and the movement of matter with
respect to its dispositions. This is
contrary to how it is with temporal
creation, for it consists of the
particularization of the existence of
something to a particular time
preceded, with respect to a
beginning, by the time of its non-
existence. Its basis is the connection
between dispositional possibility
and the movement of matter for the
dispositional possibilities. But that
which is not temporal—like time
itself, its substrate, the bearer of its
substrate, and the incorporeal
substances, for example—cannot be
either temporally eternal or
temporally created at all, for its
existence is not in time; otherwise it
would be possible to say that its
existence is in the whole of time or
in a particular time. Therefore, if it
is asked: “Is time, or the outermost
sphere, or the separate intelligence,
for example, temporally eternal or
temporally created?” these are idle
words, for the answer is the
negation of both positions, because
it is outside of the genus.
Comparable to this is the question
of one who asks: “Does the
incorporeal intelligence exist in all
places or in this place in its
particularity?” Nay, rather the
correct question is: “Are any of
these things perpetually eternal or
perpetually created?[73] Let it be
known. [19]

Wamīḍ [1.4.4]
These divisions [of
creation] only differ in meaning
with respect to different notions, but
they are not contrary in reality with
respect to coexistence in one
subject, for every temporally
created thing unites within itself
each of the three kinds of creation.
It is essentially created insofar as
its actual existence is essentially
posterior to an absolute non-
existence in the stage of its own
essence (dhāt), in accord with the
nature of essential possibility. It is
perpetually created insofar as the
occurrence of its actual existence is
perpetually posterior to the priority
of real non-existence in perpetuity.
And it is temporally created insofar
as the particularization of its actual
existence is in a time temporally
posterior to the time of its
continuous non-existence in the
extension of time, in accord with
the connection of dispositional
possibility and the movement of
essentially disposed, receptive
matter to successive dispositions.
As for the kinds of eternity
(qidam), with respect to their
different meanings: Among them
essential eternity necessarily
corresponds to eternal eternity
(qidam sarmadī), also expressed as
“real eternal pre-eternity” (azaliyya
ṣarīḥa sarmadiyya), which is
sanctified from temporal eternity. In
truth, is not essential eternity none
other than the essentially Necessary
Being immensely exalted above the
worlds of time and perpetuity?
Consequently, without a doubt, it is
impossible to ascribe to Him
temporal eternity, whereas He must
have the permanence of real eternity
(dawm al-qidam al-ḥaqq) and the
eternity of real pre-eternity
(sarmadiyya al-azaliyya al-
ḥaqqa). In like manner, the
temporally eternal can only be
associated with time and place, and
it is impossible for it to be
qualified by essential eternity or
real unquantifiable eternity.

Wamīḍ [1.4.5]
The essential creation
belonging to every effect has been
expressed in the wise Qur’ān by his
exalted utterance: “Every thing is
perishing (hālik) except His
Face.”[74] This means “except His
Essence” (exalted be His
remembrance), or “except His
necessary being” (magnified be His
sovereignty).
Our foregone companion in
leadership [Ibn Sīnā] gave a proof
for this in the Ishārāt, along the
lines of what he set forth in the
Shifā’, where he says:
You know that the state of
something which belongs to it
with respect to its essence,
when isolated from anything
else, is essentially prior to its
state as derived from another.
 Every existent which derives its
existence from another requires
non-existence (‘adam) if it
stands alone; that is to say, it
will not possess existence if it
stands alone, for existence only
belongs to it through another
outside of itself. Consequently,
it cannot have existence before
[20] it has existence. This is
essential creation.[75]
In like manner, our
foregone companion in instruction
[Al-Fārābī] states in the Fuṣūṣ al-
Ḥikam (Ringstones of Wisdom):
It belongs to the caused quiddity
(māhiyya ma‘lūla) from itself
 that it does not exist, while it
belongs to it from another that it
exists. That which is from itself
is [essentially] before that
which is not from itself. Thus, if
the caused quiddity does not
exist in relation to itself before
existing, then it is a created
thing (muḥdath) without a time
which preceded it.
Some doubts arise here to
the mind. The first is that if the
effect stands alone, it does not
require either existence or non-
existence. Rather, it only requires
existence with the existence of its
cause, and it only requires non-
existence due to the non-existence
of its cause. Consequently, it does
not belong to the caused quiddity
from itself that it does not exist. So
if the consideration of its essence,
insofar as it is itself, is the intent of
the effect standing alone, then in this
regard it does not require privation
or non-existence. But if the
consideration of it essence together
with the non-existence of its cause
is intended, then the “standing
alone” is not a true standing alone.
Secondly, if the effect with
regard to its essence were to
require privation or non-existence,
it would be impossible essentially.
How then could it be caused?
Thirdly, if it belongs to the
essence of the effect that it is non-
existent prior to its existence with
an essential priority, one of the two
contradictories [of existence and
non-existence] will precede the
other essentially, but essential
priority (taqaddum bi’l-dhāt)[76]
can only belong to a cause. This
would imply a relation of cause and
effect between the two
contradictories, which is absurd.
I say [in response]: Haply
insofar as a lightning flash of
confirmation and attainment has
illumined your vision, you may be
guided to the right path. It belongs
to the unqualified quiddity of the
effect by virtue of the nature of
possibility that it is non-existent in
the stage of the quiddity itself as
such, not in the real world, with an
absolute non-existence by means of
simple negation (salb basīṭ), not a
fixed non-existence by means of
obverse negation (salb ‘udūlī).[77]
Is not the contradictory of existence
in the stage [of the quiddity] the
negation of existence in that stage,
as in negation qualified by relation,
not negation qualified by
description? Simple non-being with
respect to this stage in its
particularity is always true, despite
the actualization of existence in the
real world through its cause. There
is no mutual exclusivity between
them whatsoever.
The requirement of non-
existence in the sense of simple
negation in this stage does not
require the impossibility of
existence in the real world. It is
such that it precedes the existence
of the effect in the real world from
the efficient cause, [21] on account
of essential possibility being the
first of the prior successive stages.
Therefore, if the effect is isolated
from its cause in the real world, it
needs real non-existence. But if it is
isolated absolutely from any
consideration of what is outside of
it in the stage of its own unqualified
quiddity, it is necessary for it to not
exist in that stage in terms of
absolute simple negation, even
though it may be actually existent in
the real world through the
emanation of the efficient cause.
[78] Let it be known with certainty.

Wamīḍ [1.4.6]
The Master of Illumination in
the Muṭāraḥāt and the Talwīḥāt
turned from non-existence to the
non-necessity of existence, and
stated that it is essentially prior to
the necessity of existence.
The Leader of the Doubters
imitated him in his commentary
upon the Ishārāt, where he said:
“The possible does not require
existence of itself, and it is not
necessary for it to require non-
existence, for that which requires
non-existence is the impossible.
Therefore, its existence is preceded
by the non-necessity of existence,
not by non-existence or non-being.”
In my opinion, what he has
concluded is not correct. If it had
led to the simple negative, and not
the obverse, and to the distinction
between an actual thing and the
stage of the unqualified quiddity as
such, the question would have been
firmly established in its seat. But he
has completely corrupted the
discourse on non-existence and the
non-necessity of existence.

Wamīḍ [1.4.7]
One who has expatiated
this subject[79] among the imitators
is confused by the permissibility of
excluding the two contradictories in
that stage, due to the stage of the
unqualified quiddity itself as such
being non-conditioned by anything
and free from both existence and the
negation of existence, for negation,
also, is one of its accidents, not one
of its essentials. The quiddity,
insofar as it is nothing except itself,
possesses nothing in this
circumstantial mode (ḥaythiyya)
except its essential constituents
(jawhariyyāt). Therefore, all the
affirmatives with respect to this
stage are false, and all of the
negatives are true.
He does not apprehend that
the contradictory of every concept
is its negation by means of simple,
pure negation, not by obverse
negation and not by the affirmation
of simple negation, for with
singular concepts the contradictory
of the negation of existence is the
negation of the negation of
existence. Existence is the
concomitant of the contradictory,
not it itself. With propositions
(‘uqūd) the contradictory of the
negative [22] is the negative of the
negative. The affirmative is the
concomitant of the contradictory,
not it itself.
Therefore, we say in that
stage [of the quiddity] existence is
excluded and the affirmation
(thubūt) of the negation of
existence, but these two are not
contradictories. Hence, the
exclusion of the two contradictories
in that stage is not possible by this,
since simple negation is true in that
stage and the negation of negation is
definitely false, for all of the
affirmatives with respect to that
stage are false. As for the negatives,
the odd numbers of them—like the
negative, and the negative of the
negative of the negative, and all the
other odd numbers of them—are
true. But the even numbers of them
—like the negative of the negative,
and the negative of the negative of
the negative of the negative, and all
the other even numbers of them—
are false. If what they imagined
were possible, this would mean the
coexistence of the two
contradictories in that stage, not
their exclusion. The former is pure
sophistry, while in the latter there is
no doubt.
It has therefore become clear
that the manner of the essential
possibility of the essentially
possible (mumkin bi-dhāt),
whenever its essence (dhāt) is
determined and obtains actual
existence in objective reality and
the real world by the agency of its
Maker, is the truth of the negation of
its determination (taqarrur) and its
existence in the stage of its own
unqualified essence as such. The
reality of essential possibility is the
annihilation of the determined and
actually existent essence, and its
nullification and its non-being in the
stage of its unqualified self as such.
Consequently, it is nearer to
potentiality (quwwa) than it is to
privation (‘adam).[80] The
emanating Agent produces the
determination of the caused essence
and its existence, drawing it from
non-being into being with respect to
the real world and the real thing
itself (ḥāqq nafs al-amr), not with
respect to the stage of itself [i.e. as
quiddity] insofar as it is itself, even
though it is also one of the stages of
the thing itself, not an imaginary
fabrication, for such are essential
impossibilities which cannot be
made real by the action of the
Agent. Consequently, every effect,
with the speech of the substance of
its essence and the tongue of the
stage of its own quiddity, testifies
against itself to its creation, its
nullification, its annihilation, and its
non-being.

Wamḍa [1.5]
The qualification of
creation (ḥudūth) belonging to the
essence of the created (ḥādith)—
that is to say, its existence being
after its non-existence (‘adam)—is
only due to the deficiency of the
substance of the essence and its
incapacity to merit receiving pre-
existence and eternity, and not on
account of the creative power of the
Agent. The modes of creation in this
regard are equal. As for describing
its determination and its existence
by continuance and persistence, this
is due to the perpetuity of the
Agent’s action, and not by reason of
any concomitants of the essence, as
some [23] verbose commentators
who blindly imitate others have
imagined. The place where this
principle is examined and the
doctrine concerning it is explained
is in al-Ufuq al-Mubīn and the
books which are in that category.

Wamḍa [1.6]
Essential creation (ḥudūth
dhātī) and perpetual creation
(ḥudūth dahrī) each have but one
meaning, under which there are no
different kinds. Temporal creation
(ḥudūth zamānī), on the other hand,
is of three kinds: (1) Gradual
(tadrījī), which is the occurrence of
one thing, like terminal motion, in
the extension of a particular time,
such that that thing coincides with it
and is divisible by its divisibility.
(2) Instantaneous (duf‘ī), which is
the occurrence of an existent thing
in its entirety not in the extension of
time but rather in an indivisible
now among the nows that are the
boundaries and dividers [of time].
(3) Temporal (zamānī), which is
the occurrence of one thing, like
medial motion, in a particular time
bordered by a beginning and an end,
not by coinciding with it or being
divisible by its divisibility, but
rather in such a manner that it
occurs in its entirety in each of its
parts and each of its nows, except
for the bounding now (ān ṭaraf),
that is to say, the instant of the
beginning and the instant of the end.
Its occurrence does not have a first
now nor a last now. We have
explained and elaborated upon this
subject fully in al-Ṣirāṭ al-
Mustaqīm, al-Īmāḍāt wa’l-
Tashrīqāt, and al-Ṣaḥīfa al-
Malakūtiyya.

Wamḍa [1.7]
One of the philosophical
principles is that every creature is
undoubtedly preceded in existence
by a matter which bears the
possibility of its existence. This is
only with respect to temporal
creation, however, not its two
essential and perpetual brothers,
because it [i.e., being preceded by
matter] is a requisite of
dispositional possibility, not of the
nature of essential possibility. Our
companion in leadership has
alluded to this in one place in the
Najāt and in several places in the
Shifā’ and the Ta‘līqāt. The Seal of
the Most Excellent Scholars has
explained this in the Naqd al-
Muḥaṣṣal and in the Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt. By the leave of God
(glorified be He) we have also
explained the doctrine on this
subject and expounded it in detail in
al-Īmāḍāt wa’l-Tashrīqāt and in
al-Mu‘allaqāt ‘alā Illahiyyāt al-
Shifā’.

Wamīḍ [1.7.1]
Perchance you are aware
through what we have informed you
that a temporal creature (ḥādith
zamānī), like this creature or this
day, for example, insofar as it is a
temporal creature, only follows
after quantitatively and in flow, and
is only temporally and spatially
posterior to, [24] another temporal,
whose existence is peculiar to a
definite time in an extension of time
before the time of the existence of
this creature. As for that which
transcends the dimensions of time
and space, inasmuch as it
encompasses all times and all
places, and what is in them and
with them, according to one non-
multiple relation, the
particularization of the existence of
this creature to its specific time is
definitely not a basis for requiring
its posteriority to it [i.e., to that
which transcends time].[81] The
insight of those who are open-
minded will increase through this
principle, if God Almighty wills.
Then it is evident, and the
company of the philosophers and
the wise have agreed upon its
explanation one and all, that the
eternal First Maker, whose
necessity and existence are
essential, necessarily precedes this
creature in existence in concrete
reality, and He (magnified be His
sovereignty) is far exalted above
occurring in the extension of time.
Is it not certain by the compound
intellect that the Agent of time,
which is the agent of its substratum
and the agent of the bearer of its
substratum, as well as the agent of
its other causes, and the agent of the
immaterial substances and both the
sensible and intelligible lights,
cannot by any means be
encompassed by time and connected
to it in existence. Consequently, the
following after of this creature and
its posteriority in the real world to
the True Creator (exalted be His
remembrance) refer only to its
perpetual creation and the
precedence of real non-existence to
its created existence in perpetuity.
Let it be pondered.

Wamīḍ [1.7.2][82]
It is widely known and
confirmed by unbroken traditions,
both oral and written, transmitted
over the course of centuries and
ages, that there has been continuous
and widespread disagreement
between the respected philosophers
regarding the creation (ḥudūth) of
the world and its eternity (qidam)
and the First Maker being the
Fashioner (ṣāni‘) of the whole
system in its entirety or its
Originator (mubdi‘).
The leader of philosophy,
the divine Plato, and the six
philosophers preceding him, are the
seven primary philosophers.[83]
These philosophers and others who
followed them believed that this
Great Man, which is the cosmos—
with all of its parts and members,
whether concrete or intelligible,
material or spiritual, in other
words, everything in the two realms
of Command and creation—was
created (ḥādith) and not eternally
existent (mutasarmad al-wujūd),
and that the true Creator is both its
Originator and its Fashioner.
The teacher of the Greek
Peripatetics, Aristotle, and a
number of his followers and
supporters, like the Greek Master
[Plotinus], Proclus, Themistius,
Alexander of Aphrodisias, and
Porphyry, and their followers, [25]
believed that part of the cosmos,
like the individual originated
existents and the unqualified natures
of the species and the genera, is
eternally existent (qadīm al-wujūd)
and eternally perpetual
(mutasarmad al-dawām) in
actuality, and that the First Maker is
their Originator, while the only
created part of the cosmos are the
individual generated, material
existents, which are subject in
essence and existence to
dispositional possibilities, and
nothing else, and that the Agent
Maker is their Fashioner.[84]
We say: There is no doubt
that it is not possible for one
possessed of insight to imagine that
the area of dispute is confined to
essential creation (ḥudūth dhātī),
for it has been made clear to you
that essential creation is proven by
demonstration to belong to the
possibilities of things in their
entirety. The philosophers have
agreed that it is established for
every possible thing, so how is it
possible to ascribe the denial of
this to Aristotle and others like him
among the superior minds?
Moreover, he states in the
First Discipline on the art of
dialectic that the question of the
creation (ḥudūth) of the world and
its eternity (qidam) is, from
whichever position one takes,
dialectical, due to the lack of a
demonstrative proof on either side.
Therefore, it is definitely not
correct that essential eternity and
essential creation are meant by
these two positions, nor is it correct
to imagine that the area of dispute is
temporal creation (ḥudūth zamānī).
Is it not realized from studying the
creation of the world that time
itself, its substrate, the bearer of its
substrate, and the intelligible
substances all transcend the
domains of time and space? So how
could it be imagined of Plato and
Socrates and those of their rank
among the respected philosophers
and their leaders, that they maintain
the temporal creation of the cosmos
and say that time itself, its substrate,
and the separate substances are
preceded in existence by time and
exist essentially in time? No one in
the circle of the learned and the
scholars proposes this.
Our companion in
leadership truly hit the mark when
he said in his Ta‘līqāt: “The
question which is asked about
eternal things is: ‘Was there a time
during which nothing existed?’”
Similarly, it is asked: “Was there a
time during which there was no
time?”
Therefore, it is understood
from the followers of Aristotle that
the First Maker (exalted be His
praise) only essentially precedes
one part of the cosmos, namely, the
originated existents (mubda‘āt),
with respect to the intelligible order
only, but He does not precede them
separately in existence with respect
to the positively real world.
Consequently, they are posterior to
Him in the intelligible order with
respect to essential creation, but
they are not posterior to Him in the
objective world outside of mental
intellection [26] and the inner
dimension of the real world (ḥāqq
al-wāqi‘ al-ṣarīḥ) with respect to
creation in perpetuity. And He
essentially precedes the other part,
namely the generated beings
(mukawwanāt), with respect to the
intelligible order, due to what they
have of essential creation within the
boundary of the substance of the
essence through the quiddity itself
and its effect-ness in existence in
relation to the self-subsistent
Creator, and He also precedes it
separately in the positively real
world and the heart of the objective
realm due to what they have of
perpetual creation with respect to
the priority of real non-existence to
their existence in perpetuity.
Consequently, they are posterior to
Him both in the intelligible order
and in the inner dimension of the
objective realm.
It is clear from the path of
the Platonists, however, that these
two priorities (the essential and the
separate) and these two
posteriorities (the mental and the
real) both encompass the two
categories, such that the universe in
its entirety with all of its parts,
including the worlds of Command
(al-amr) and [the physical] creation
(al-khalq),[85] and the realms of
the visible and the invisible, is in
relation to the true Creator
(glorified be He), with respect to
essential posteriority and separate
posteriority, in the position of this
temporal creature. This is only with
respect to the two creations: the
essential and the perpetual, which
belong to everything in the worlds
of Command and [the physical]
creation, and the realms of the
visible and the invisible,
universally and without exception.
This is the clear path upon
which the law-giving Messengers
among the infallible Prophets and
Chosen Ones agree, and the ranks of
the Near Ones, who are assisted by
Revelation and infallibility among
both the earlier and the later
generations. By them it is
established that “God was alone
and nothing was with Him.” Other
clear verses in the Noble Book, the
Sacred Law, and the traditions of
the pure and holy Family support
this theme.
It is therefore clear that the
area of dispute concerns perpetual
creation (ḥudūth dahrī) and no
other. In our view, every essential
creation is a perpetual creation as
well, and the two types of creation,
the essential and the perpetual,
though differing conceptually are
inseparable in reality. As for
temporal creation, it is restricted to
things connected to dispositional
possibilities belonging to material
existents. The emanation (fayḍ) of
the Agent Maker (magnified be His
sovereignty) with respect to the
contents of perpetuity is termed
“primary origination” (ibdā‘) and
“fashioning” (ṣun‘), and with
respect to temporal creatures, it is
termed production (iḥdāth) and
generation (takwīn). But they [the
followers of Aristotle] say that
every perpetual creation is a
temporal creation as well, and that
the two creations, the perpetual and
the temporal, are inseparable in
reality, though different in concept.
Essential creation is in fact common
to both of them due to its complete
inclusion of possible things in their
entirety. [They call] the emanating
action of the Maker with respect to
eternal things [27] primary
origination, and with respect to
generated entities fashioning. Let it
be ascertained.

Wamīḍ [1.7.3]
Our companion in
instruction among the philosophers
of Islam [Al-Fārābī], states in his
book al-Jam‘ bayna’l-Ra’yayn
(The Harmony Between the Views
of Plato and Aristotle):
An example of this is the
question of the eternity of the
world and its creation, and
whether it has a Fashioner who
is its efficient cause or not? And
how should one account for
Aristotle’s holding the view that
the world is eternal (qadīm),
while Plato holds the opposite
view, believing that the world is
created (muḥdath) and has an
agent?
I say: What led these
people to this perverse and
objectionable opinion about
Aristotle is his statement in the
Topics that a particular question
may be conceived of whose two
sides may both be supported by
a syllogism with generally
accepted premises. An example
of this is the question: Is the
world eternal or not eternal?
[86] It has escaped these
contrivers, as far as the first
position is concerned, that what
he presented as an example may
not correspond to his belief, and
furthermore, that the purpose of
Aristotle in the Topics is not to
explain the question of the
world, but rather to explain the
subject of syllogisms composed
of generally accepted premises.
For he had found the people of
his time debating the question of
whether the world is eternal or
created, just as they were
debating whether pleasure is
good or evil. In each case, they
were supporting both sides of
the question by using a
syllogism with generally
accepted premises. Aristotle
has explained in that book, and
in other books of his, that with
the generally accepted premise
truth and falsity are not
considered, for what is
generally accepted may be
false, and it is then not
submitted in dialectic on
account of its falsity. Or it may
be true, in which case it is used
in dialectic on account of its
wide acceptance, and in
demonstration on account of its
truth. It is clear then that it is not
possible to attribute to him the
belief that the world is eternal
on the basis of this example
which he has presented in this
book.
Among the things
which also led them to this
assumption is what he stated in
his book On the Heavens, that
the universe (al-kull) has no
temporal beginning.[87] They
assume from this that he is
advocating the eternity of the
world, but it is not so. For he
has set forth and explained in
that same book, as well as in the
Physics and the Metaphysics,
that time is no more than the
number of the movement of the
sphere, and it is produced from
it. That which is produced from
another thing cannot contain that
thing. The meaning of his words
that the world has no temporal
beginning is that its parts are not
called into being gradually, as a
house is constructed, [28] for
instance, or an animal, whose
members develop gradually, so
that some of its parts precede
other parts in time. Time is
produced by the movement of
the whole. Consequently, it is
impossible for its creation to
have a temporal beginning.
It is confirmed by this
that the world only came into
existence through the primary
origination of the Creator
(exalted be His glory), who
created it instantaneously
without time, and from its
motion time was generated. By
examining his heavenly words
in his famous book the
Theology, there is no doubt that
he there establishes the
Fashioner and Originator of this
world. Furthermore, He
expresses this theme so clearly
that it cannot be mistaken. There
he explains that the Creator
originated matter (hayūlā) from
nothing, and that it materialized
by the sheer agency of the
Creator and His will, and was
subsequently set in order.
He also explains in the
Physics that it is impossible for
the universe to have been
created by luck or by accident,
and the same applies to the
world in every respect. He
states in On the Heavens: “This
is demonstrated by the
wonderful order which exists
between some parts of the
world and others.” He explains
there the question of causes and
their number, and demonstrates
the efficient cause. He also
explains in that book the
question of the generator and the
mover, and it is other than the
generated and the moved.
 In like manner, Plato
explains in his book called the
Timaeus that every generated
thing only comes into being
through a generating cause
which belongs to it of necessity,
and that the generated cannot be
the cause of its own generation.
Similarly, Aristotle explains in
the Theology that “one” is
present in every multiplicity.
Then he advances to the
discourse on the corporeal and
incorporeal parts of the cosmos.
He explains clearly that all of
them were created by the
Creator’s act of primary
origination, and that He is the
Efficient Cause, the One, the
Real, the Originator of all
things. This is in accord with
that which Plato set forth in his
divine books.
Then he states:
But for the fact that this path
which we are following in this
discourse is the middle way,
and that whenever we deviate
therefrom we are as one who
forbids a certain course yet
commits the like himself, we
would not have been remiss in
speech and would have
declared that none of the
 religious groups and sects, or
followers of other paths, have
the measure of the knowledge of
the creation of the world, the
proof of its Fashioner, and the
gist of the question of primary
origination, as possessed by
Aristotle, and before him by
Plato, and by those who
followed in their way.
We say: Methinks, with the
clear intellect you have been given,
you will not doubt that the creation
of the world [29] in its entirety in
the sense of its essential creation
and its dependence for the
actualization of the essence upon
the Efficient Cause of existence is
unanimously held by the
philosophers to be established by
indisputable demonstration, whose
strength no one who follows in their
path denies, much less Aristotle and
his supporters. Nor will you doubt
that the creation of the world in its
entirety in the sense of temporal
creation, meaning that its existence
should have a temporal beginning
preceded by a prior time and an
extended non-existence, is a
deceptive fiction, whose rejection
by a sound mind is a natural
intellectual response in the
estimation of proficient thinkers and
those who tread their path, not to
mention Plato, his teachers, and his
companions. Wherefore, neither of
these two senses is fit to be taken as
the area of dispute nor to provide
an example of a dialectical question
having two sides, both of which are
bereft of demonstrative proof, as
reported in the First Discipline in
the Topics of the Shifā’.
Therefore, it only reasonable
that the area of dispute and an
example of a dialectical question
having two sides, with respect to
what Aristotle and his followers
asserted, concerns the third
meaning, in other words, perpetual
creation, and its dependence upon
the Originator, the Fashioner, who
has extracted the system of the
world in its entirety from real non-
existence and brought it into
existence in the realm of perpetuity,
through the cancellation of non-
existence and the origination of
existence all at once perpetually
(duf‘atan wāḥidatan dahriyyatan),
not in a period of time or through
matter, not through a tool or
instrument, and not through exertion
or motion. This is a proposition for
which no demonstration has yet
been composed by rational methods
down to our own time and age.[88]
 Those who had this opinion
about Aristotle were led to it by
explicit statements of his in his
books on metaphysics and physics,
saying that the noble primary
originated beings are not preceded
by any non-existence in the real
world, but are only preceded by the
First Agent himself and no other,
that their posteriority to the Real
and the First (glorified be He) is an
essential posteriority in the
intelligible order, that the true
Agent is related to them with
respect to primary origination and
giving existence, while the
generated beings are generated by
the true Agent after that due to their
being in the external world and
posterior to Him both essentially
and actually, and that His relation to
them is through fashioning and
generation. The primary originated
things exist in the realm of eternity
(sarmad), while the generated
beings in their relation to the
changeless world are in the realm
of perpetuity (dahr) and in their
relation to one another are in the
realm of time (zamān). He holds
further that the three roots from
which the universe derives, which
are the principles of generated
beings, are prime matter, form, and
privation not in time and space.[89]
There is no false attribution to him
in any of this.
[30] Yes, what our companion,
the [Second] Teacher, has reported
from him, namely, the claim that he
is walking the path of belief in the
doctrine of creation according to
the third disputed sense [i.e.,
perpetual creation], is like the path
of his master, the divine Plato.
Some reporters have also reported
the equivalent of this from him in
his earlier teachings. Consequently,
the statements of Aristotle
concerning this question are
contradictory and opposed to each
other. The knowledge of the secrets
of hearts and the hidden contents of
minds is with the Knower of the
unseen and the seen.

Wamīḍ [1.7.4]
Shahrastānī, the most erudite
of the theologians, has stated in his
book Nihāyat al-Aqdām:
The belief of the people of truth
in every religion is that the
world was created and
fashioned. It had a beginning
which the Creator (exalted be
He) created and originated after
it was not. “God was alone, and
nothing was with Him.” A
 number of the pillars of wisdom
and the ancient philosophers,
such as Thales, Anaxagoras, and
Anaximenes from Miletus, and
Pythagoras, Empedocles,
Socrates, and Plato from
Athens, as well as a number of
other sages, poets, and ascetics
agree in this regard. We have
explained the particulars of
their beliefs on the manner of
creation and the differences of
their views on the first
principles in our book named
al-Milal wa’l-Niḥal.
In al-Milal wa’l-Niḥal, in
expounding upon the words of
Proclus and mentioning his
arguments for the eternity of the
world, he says:
The doctrine of the eternity of
the world and the pre-eternity of
motions, after establishing the
Fashioner and the doctrine of
the First Cause, only appeared
following Aristotle, because he
clearly differed from the ancient
philosophers [on this question],
and he devised this theory based
on syllogisms which he
considered to be a proof and a
demonstration. Several of his
students followed in his
footsteps and elaborated upon
 his doctrine, such as Alexander
of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and
Porphyry. Proclus, who is
affiliated with Plato,[90] wrote
a book on this subject in which
he presented these arguments.
However, the ancient
philosophers only expressed
about it what we have already
reported.
A similar report can be found in the
Kitāb al-Muṣāra‘a, which the Seal
of the Most Excellent Scholars
considers to be true in his Maṣāri‘
al-Muṣāri‘.

Wamīḍ [1.7.5][91]
 The suppositions of those
who burden themselves with that
which does not concern them,
known as the Mutakallimūn, by
whom I mean the Mu‘tazila and the
Ash‘ariya, [31] were biased in
favor of the temporal creation of the
world. They believed that between
the true Creator and the beginning
of the world there was a
hypothetical, pre-eternal, flowing,
extended non-existence, whose
hypothetical continuation extended
in the direction of pre-eternity
(azal) without any end, but which
ended in the direction of
everlastingness (abad) with the
creation of the beginning of the
world. They do not realize that this
is a delusion and deception of a
clouded mind and an idle fancy and
imagination of a confused intellect.
First, you are certainly
aware that no series of boundaries
is conceivable in perpetuity (dahr),
no elapsing or renewal, no falling
behind or overtaking, no extension
or termination, no continuation or
flow, as these are among the
concomitants of the existence of
motion, the continuity of change,
and the gradual progression of one
thing after another. If this is the
case, then how is it possible to
imagine for pure, real non-existence
and sheer, absolute non-being any
distinction of boundaries,
succession of states, variation of
moments, and difference of time
spans, so that continuation and flow,
finite and infinite might be
conceived?!
Second, if what they
imagine regarding non-existence
were possible, it would be time
itself or motion itself, since it is
quantifiable, flowing, its whole
certainly greater than a part thereof,
and its parts succeeding one
another, not simultaneous. Either it
is essentially in this form, in which
case it is time, or it is accidentally
in this form, in which case it is
motion. They have only applied to
time or to motion the name “non-
existence.” I would like to know by
what fault time and motion have
deserved the negation of name and
attributes by non-existence?
Third, in that case, the true
Creator (glorified be He) would
exist within a boundary which itself
belongs to that extension of non-
existence. Exalted is He from that!
And the world would exist within
another boundary in its
particularity, so that the
interposition of that hypothetical
extension between God and the
world would be admissible, and the
posteriority of the world and its
coming after Him in existence
would similarly be admissible.
However, if that extension is an
infinite continuity, the infinite
would be confined between two
confines, which would be its
borders and edges, [which is
absurd].
Fourth, if the boundaries of
that extension are equal and alike,
since there is no difference in non-
existence and no particularization
of a disposition, or motion, or
anything else, then for what reason
did He single out the world for this
boundary but not single out its
creation for another boundary
before it?
Fifth, if that which
transcends encumbrances and
conditions exists with any extension
assumed, [32] and with all of its
parts and all of its boundaries, with
an unquantifiable simultaneity in
one way, encompassing all of its
parts and boundaries in one
relation, whether that extension be
real or hypothetical, as has been
repeatedly recited to you, then the
singling out of the world to one of
the boundaries in that hypothetical
extension will not result in its
posteriority to its true Creator at
all. If the extension of time exists in
relation to Him (glorified be He) in
this way, then imaginary time is
more appropriate for this.
Sixth, time and space are
twin brothers nurtured in attributes
by the same milk from the same
breast. Therefore, just as beyond
the extension of space, in other
words, beyond the outermost sphere
which bounds the directions of the
world, there is pure non-existence,
not void or plenum, extension or
non-extension, finitude or infinitude
—and were a man to reach that
convex surface he would not be
able to extend his hand and enlarge
it, not because of resistance or any
concrete obstacle, but due to the
non-presence of space and
dimension and the absence of place
and direction—in like manner,
beyond the extension of time, there
is real non-existence, not extension
or non-extension, duration or non-
duration, finitude or infinitude,
increase or decrease. Hearken to
these words, adhere to what is true,
and be not of the ignorant.

Wamīḍ [1.7.6]
Our companion in
leadership truly hit the mark when
he stated in the Ta‘līqāt:
According to their assumption,
it is possible that before the
existence of time there was a
hypothetical thing, like an
extension, but it was not time.
This is indeed a hypothetical
thing. Nevertheless, it is
possible for motions to be
created in that thing which
coincide with part of it and
other motions which coincide
with the rest of it. Since in
itself it is unfixed, and since
fewer and more and elapsing
occur in it, it itself must be
time. All of these are attributes
of time.
If it is possible to assume in
absolute non-existence two
motions, a greater and a lesser,
and it is impossible for them to
begin and end simultaneously,
then without a doubt the lesser
lacks something in relation to
the greater. What it lacks [33]
in relation to it is magnitude
(miqdār), which gives rise to
priority and posteriority. This
is the property of time, and no
other.
It is not possible to remove
time from the estimative
faculty (wahm), for if you
imagine it removed, the
estimative faculty then
compels the existence of
another time in which time is
removed. For this reason the
Mu‘tazila asserted a fixed
extension between the First
(exalted be He) and the
creation of the world, which
they called “non-being” (al-lā-
wujūd). This is like the case of
those who assert a void in
which the world exists, and if
the world is presumed to be
removed, still require the
existence of dimensions. They
believe in a continuous infinite
space and also a fixed
extension, but both of these are
impossible. In the
impossibility of their removal
from the estimative faculty is a
proof that time is eternal and
the world is eternal, and that
the First (exalted be He) only
precedes it essentially. It is not
possible for the estimative
faculty to conceive of time
except as something elapsing
and flowing, not as something
fixed in one state. But
according to them, this fixed
extension is the container of
time. Yet this is impossible,
because it is time itself,
inasmuch as it elapses,
becomes renewed, and flows.
Without a doubt that extension
in which the Flood took place,
for example, is different from
the part of time in which this
time exists [but they are both
part of the same time].
For all that has a beginning and
an end, there lies between
them a difference either of
magnitude, number, or
meaning. That of magnitude is
like one time span and another,
or one dividing point and
another; that of number is like
one and ten; and that of
meaning is like genus and
species. Existence in itself has
neither a beginning nor an end.
If we suppose a beginning for
the creation of the world in the
manner the Mu‘tazila hold, an
impossibility follows
necessarily, for they
hypothesize something before
this event. In that thing which
they hypothesize, they assume
the possibility of different
motions. But the different
motions can only be true with
the possibility of measuring
 them, and the possibility of
measuring them must coincide
with the existence of time.
Consequently, the hypothesis
of the possibility of the
existence of different motions
[in that thing before creation]
presupposes the existence of
time. Hence, another time
would exist before time.
I say: If it is unreasonable to
hypothesize that existence, in
essence, has a series of boundaries,
dividing nows, a beginning and an
end, and measure and extension,
then how is it admissible to
hypothesize this for real non-
existence?
Further, this misleading and
false proposition is not an original
contrivance of the Mu‘tazila.
Rather, [34] a group of agitating
philosophers, in their muddling of
philosophy and their lack of
intellectual maturity, were holding
these idle suppositions and pursuing
them. The Mu‘tazila imitated them
and tread in their footsteps.
As for his statement, “In the
impossibility of their removal from
the estimative faculty is a proof that
time is eternal,” he only means by
this a dialectical proof following
from their assumed postulates, not a
demonstrative proof based upon
sound principles and rational
foundations. For just as the
impossibility of removing a fixed
dimension and a spatial extension
from the estimative faculty is not a
proof that linear dimensions are
infinite and that beyond the
container of the directions there is
another continuous space and
extended dimension, in like manner,
the impossibility of removing an
extended, unfixed dimension and
temporal, flowing extension from
the estimative faculty is not a proof
that time is eternal or that before
time another extension and measure
existed. God willing, this will
shortly become clear to you in the
simplest and clearest way.

Wamīḍ [1.7.7]
If you were to ask me:
“What is your opinion of your
companion, the Chief [Ibn Sīnā]?
Do you consider him, with respect
to this question, among the
followers of Plato or among the
followers of Aristotle? Or is he like
your companion, the Teacher [Al-
Fārābī], who says that Aristotle did
not deviate from the path of his
master and his leader?”
To this I would answer: It can
be shown that he believes that the
proofs raised against the denial of
the creation of the world [in time]
are dialectical syllogisms based
upon the postulates of these
thinkers. These postulates are that
the priority of the Creator (glorified
be He) is a quantifiable priority,
that before time there was a
hypothetical extension between God
and the beginning of the existence of
the world, and that the existence of
bodies and motions before the
existence of the world is possible.
He has given a clear explanation of
this in the Metaphysics of the
Shifā’, in the Topics, in the Sam‘
al-Kiyān, and in other of his books
and treatises.
Moreover, he states in the
Shifā’, at the end of the conclusion
after the composition of the proof:
“The truth of what we have
submitted has become clear
concerning the existence of a
motion which has no beginning in
time, but whose only beginning is
with respect to the Creator.” This is
an explicit statement that his aim is
the negation of a temporal beginning
and his affirmation that creation has
a beginning from the Creator.
He states in his treatise on
the subject of the eternity of the
world that the proofs raised against
the eternity of the world are
dialectical syllogisms [35] and
sophistical arguments.
Then in the chapter
composing the proof, the eleventh
chapter in that work, he advocates
certain dialectical syllogisms
composed of premises which his
opponents have accepted. He lists
those premises, composes a proof
from them, then concludes on their
basis the eternity of the world
according to the principle of
dialectic.
If you should ask: What is
his aim in the Najāt, when he states
that “the opponents are obliged to
posit one time span before another
without end and an infinitely
extended time. This is a dialectical
argument, which if investigated
carefully will lead to
demonstration.” Similarly, what is
his aim in his book al-Mabda’
wa’l-Ma‘ād, when he states: “It
follows from the premise of these
suspenders [of God’s attributes]
that God (glorified be He) would
be prior to time and motion in
another time.” Then he says: “Let us
give now a dialectical argument,
which if investigated carefully can
be turned into a demonstration in
such a manner that the suspenders
will be forced to admit one time
span before another without end and
an infinitely extended time in the
past.”
I would say: He is here
upon one of two paths. Either he
means by “careful investigation” the
clear refutation of the [temporal]
creation of the world or of its
eternity by making this argument a
proof for invalidating the
hypothetical infinite extension the
estimative faculty imagines, which
places the creation of the world
somewhere in the middle and
allows for the creation of body and
motion in a prior time span before
this event, so that it becomes a
demonstrative proof not requiring
presupposed postulates.[92] The
invalidation of creation (ḥudūth), in
the sense of being preceded by real
non-existence, does not follow from
this. Or he intends that this argument
with respect to [supporting] eternity
only transfers from the sphere of
dialectic to the sphere of
demonstration if it is established by
careful investigation that creation
requires a fixed, extended, infinite
non-existence before the world and
between the Creator and the
beginning of the world with respect
to the thing itself, as it is required
by the postulation of these thinkers
and their presupposition.
In sum, his intention is that
the shortcoming of this argument
from attaining the rank of
demonstration is only because the
generally accepted premises
inferred from what they postulate
and presuppose are not true with
respect to the thing itself, not due to
any other respect, not with respect
to the matter [of the syllogism] and
not with respect to its form.
Therefore, if the premises leading
to a certain conclusion, which is
desired in the dialectical syllogism
arranged from them, are correct in
leading to it, [36] and clearly
necessitate it with respect to the
nature of the thing itself, even if in
themselves they are generally
accepted premises, not
demonstrative, and unverifiable
presuppositions, the syllogism,
which the logician has correctly
composed from them in accord with
the thing itself, will be dialectical
through its premises. But if their
leading to it [the conclusion] and
their necessitating it are in accord
with the concession of the
opponents, not in accord with the
thing itself, either because of the
matter, due to its being dependent
upon another premise which is not
generally accepted and not
presupposed; or because of the
form, due to its corruption from
inattention to the mode of the
predicate in the premises and the
conclusion, for instance; or because
of another aspect corrupting the
form, even if this is not realized by
these opponents, then that syllogism
consequently will be dialectical in
premises, dialectical in execution,
dialectical in matter, and dialectical
in form. Furthermore, [he intends]
that the syllogism composed from
the postulates of these people to
establish the eternity of time, its
substratum, and the bearer of its
substratum, upon the assumption of
the flowing, temporal priority of a
continuous, extended non-existence
to its existence, is only dialectical
in matter, not dialectical in form,
and dialectical in premises, not
dialectical in execution, since its
leading to the desired conclusion is
demonstratively correct with
respect to the thing itself, without
any corruption in it with respect to
the form and absolutely no need of
another premise which the
execution with respect to the matter
would need or be caused to need.
So they are obliged to accept
eternity based upon their own
postulates, which were made into
the premises of their syllogism,
without any way for them to escape
or avoid this at all.
Consequently, according to
what has been explained and
become clear, there is no
contradiction between the
statements of our companion in the
Shifā’, the Najāt, the Ta‘līqāt, the
Mabda’ wa’l-Ma‘ād, and the
treatise on this question. Since we
have finished defining the area of
dispute and determining what the
people of truth desire to establish,
let us return, by the leave of God
(glorified be He), to presenting the
demonstrations.
 The Second Qabas
On the three kinds of essential
antecedence and constructing
the demonstration by way of
essential priority (taqaddum bi’l-
dhāt)[93]

Wamḍa [2.1]
Are you not of them that
clearly perceive, by reason of what
we have recited to you in our other
books, that the existence of
something, in whatever vessel or
container it may be, is the
occurrence of that very thing in that
vessel, not the attachment or
addition of another thing to it?
Otherwise, the simple interrogative
(hal basīṭ) would be turned into the
compound interrogative (hal
murakkab)[94] and the affirmation
(thubūt) of the thing in itself would
be the affirmation of something
belonging to another thing. Thus
whoever considers the existence of
the quiddity (māhiyya) a particular
property (wasf) among concrete
properties, or a particular thing
among mental things, apart from the
notion of predicated existence
(mawjūdiyya maṣdariyya), he is
not among those worth talking to,
and he is not one of the companions
of the truth, as our foregone
companions in this profession have
said. If the thing were as he
imagines it to be, existence itself
would be a particular quiddity
among other quiddities, and its
existence, without a doubt, would
be superadded to its own quiddity,
as with the other possible
quiddities,[95] and its existence
also would be its predicated
affirmation, as with the existence of
other things.
Therefore, existence in the
real world is the very becoming
(ṣayrūra) of something in the real
world, not that which by qualifying
it becomes something in the real
world. In like manner, existence in
the mind is the same as its very
occurrence in the mind. The
existence of every accident is its
existence in its subject, but the
existence of existence is the
existence of its subject. The caused
thing is its very essence and its
quiddity as made by the Maker’s
simple act of making, and existence
is the signification (ḥikāya) of the
substance of its actually created
essence.[96]
[38] The stage of the
actually created essence itself is
called “the stage of the
determination (taqarrur) and the
actualization (fi‘liyya),” and the
question which corresponds to it is
called “the real simple
interrogative,” that is to say, the
interrogative of the thing (al-shayʾ).
The stage of predicated existence
abstracted from it is called “the
stage of existence,” and the question
which corresponds to it is called
“the general simple interrogative,”
that is to say, the interrogative of the
thing existent without qualification.
The end result of these two
questions is ultimately the same
with respect to the object signified.
As for the meaning of the negative
in simple interrogatives: the
meaning of the “real” is the
negation of the essence in itself, and
the meaning of the “general” is the
negation of existence without
qualification. The end result of
these two is also ultimately the
same with respect to the object
signified. As for the affirmation of a
certain notion to the essence,
whatever the notion may be,
whether belonging to the essential
constituents (jawhariyyāt) of the
quiddity or to its accidental
attributes (‘araḍiyyāt),[97] it
belongs to the sphere of the
compound interrogative, that is to
say, the interrogative of the thing as
something. The object signified, [in
this case], is the affirmation of
something belonging to another
thing, and in the negative, it is the
negation of something from another
thing.
Existence, therefore, is the
appearance of the determined
essence itself, while non-existence,
which is the negation of its
existence, is the nullification
(buṭlān) of the hypothesized
essence and its non-being. Its notion
does not correspond to anything; it
is not that there is some thing whose
notion corresponds to non-
existence.

Wamḍa [2.2]
A party of those who
meddle with what does not concern
them, i.e., the Mu’tazila, have
averted the eyes of their intellects
and hold a position at variance with
the people of truth, for they
consider the determined essence in
the real world to be separate from
existence, yet they call its
determination an “affirmation”
(thubūt). Their argument is so
baseless that it is not worth
spending the time to refute it.
“Existence” (wujūd) is a synonym
for “predicated affirmation”
(thubūt maṣdarī), for affirmation
without existence in the real world
is no more than an impression in
someone’s mind, which is mental
existence.

Wamḍa [2.3][98]
Existence in the real world
is the principal realization
(taḥaqquq muta’aṣṣil) in concrete
reality outside of the mind.
Accordingly, it is the unqualified
nature (ṭabī‘a mursala) completely
blended with its singular instance
and not distinct from it, and it is the
substrate-essence (dhāt malzūma)
encompassed by its concomitants
and its accidents, not separated or
detached from them in any way.[99]
Existence in the mind, however, is
the occurrence of a mental
impression (ḥuṣūl irtisāmī) which
corresponds with the unqualified
nature unconditioned by anything
and distinct from its singular
instance [39] and with the
predicated substrate-essence, which
is its very substance insofar as it is
itself, detached and isolated from
its concomitants and its
accidents.
Existence in the thing itself (fī
nafs al-amr) is the affirmation of
the thing and its realization within
the boundary of itself, not by the toil
of the mind, in whatever vessel or
container it may be. Hence, it is
more general than existence in the
real world and than in any mental
aspects (laḥāẓāt), except the
fabricated aspects which are an
invention of the mind and a
contrivance of the intellect.
Consequently, the objective reality
and non-fabricated mental aspects
are all modes of the thing itself, but
not with respect to a mental or
external particularity (khuṣūṣiyya),
since particular characteristics
(khuṣūṣiyyāt) do not apply to the
nature of the thing itself. In other
words, insofar as they [the
objective reality and non-fabricated
mental aspects] in their entirety are
the realization of the thing, not a
fabrication of the mind, their
particular characteristics have no
role whatsoever with respect to the
thing itself, even if those particular
characteristics do not conflict with
existence in the thing itself.
Existence is not a fabrication of the
mind, whether it happens to be
external or in the mind. The same
applies, without reservation, to the
relation between the natural form
and the natural thing, in other
words, the unqualified nature as
such in relation to the particular
characteristics of the individual
instances. However, its external
particularity is the most complete of
the particularities, the most
excellent of them in relation to
absolute existence,[100] not by the
fabrication of the mind, and the
most deeply rooted in the soil of the
thing itself by reason of its primacy
with respect to the nature of the
actualization and its principality
with respect to the subsistence of
the realization.
 Wamḍa [2.4]
Do not forget what you
have ascertained in the pages of our
other books. The original substance
of the quiddity and its essential
constituents (jawhariyyāt) are
necessarily conserved in all the
modes of existence and all the
containers of realization. Are not
all the existences among the
accidents of the quiddity?[101] The
accidents do not alter the substance
of the reality (ḥaqīqa) or change the
original quiddity (māhiyya). The
unqualified quiddity itself and all of
its essential constituents are
conserved unchanged in the external
world, in the mind, and in all the
stages and the aspects (laḥāẓāt)
without exception. Only the
particular characteristics of the
modes of existence, the
individuations, the concomitants,
and the accidents change with
respect to it, but nothing else.
This principle extends to
all substances and all accidents.
The concept (ma‘qūl) of a
substance is a substance, and the
same applies to the entities
(huwiyyāt) of the individual
substances. In the same manner, the
concept of an accident is an
accident, and the same applies to
the entities [40] of the individual
accidents, since substantiality and
accidentality correspond with the
particular properties of existences
and individuations.
One of the things that is
clear in the opinion of the firmly
grounded philosophers is that the
category of substance (jawhar),
belonging to the species of
substances and their genera, is the
qualified quiddity whose reality in
the real world—that is to say,
within the boundary of its own
unqualified quiddity with respect to
itself as such, without consideration
of the particular characteristics of
existences and individuations—is
such that it subsists essentially not
in a subject. And the category of
accident, belonging to the species
of accidents and their genera, is the
qualifying nature whose reality—
with respect to both its own
unqualified quiddity as such and the
particular property of the
individuation—is such that it
subsists essentially in a subject.
Hence, the accident is that which
within the boundary of itself—
insofar as it is its reality both with
respect to its very quiddity and the
particularity of its individuation—
is such that its determination and its
existence in itself is the same as its
determination and its existence in a
subject. The substance is that which
within the boundary of its essence
—insofar as it is its reality with
respect to its very quiddity but not
with respect to the particularity of
the mode of its existence and its
individuation—is such that its
determination and its existence are
not in a subject. The substrate
(maḥall) is only a subject due to
inherence in it, since it is an
essential element for both its
individuation and its quiddity.
Consequently, the categories of
possible things have two supreme
genera,[102] and every principal
reality among the possible
quiddities is without a doubt under
one of these two supreme genera.
Let it be established.

Wamīḍ [2.4.1]
Since you are acquainted
with the meaning of that which we
have assigned to the category of
substance and the meaning of that
which we have assigned to the
categories of accidents, these two
being mutually incompatible natures
in essence, it is clear to you that it
is impossible for the same thing to
be classified under both of these
genera and for substance or
accident to be predicated of one
thing in two contrary ways.[103]
That which Porphyry and
his followers held in justification of
this involves the existence of two
circumstantial modes in this
question, namely, that (1) the
individual substantial form inheres
in prime matter with respect to its
individuality, but (2) it is
independent of it with respect to the
original quiddity. Prime matter is
formed by it [the individual
substantial form] in accord with the
quiddity itself, but it [prime matter]
is formative of it with respect to the
individuality. Consequently, the
term “accident” can be applied to it
with respect to its individual
particularity, [41] while the term
“substance” can be applied to it
with respect to its original quiddity.
If the accident is existent in a
subject, and the subject is the
formed substrate, not by that
inhering thing for which it is a
subject in its particularity, this is
the meaning of “the locus formed by
itself.” Although the substantial,
intelligible quiddity subsists in a
subject with respect to mental
existence, it is independent of a
substrate with respect to itself and
with respect to its existence in the
external world. Consequently, the
term “accident” can be applied to it
with respect to its existence in the
mind, while the term “substance”
can be applied to it with respect to
itself and with respect to its
existence in concrete reality, since
the mind is the subject-substrate for
it with respect to the particularity of
its mental existence, though not with
respect to its original self and not
with respect to its absolutely
unqualified existence.
This is an example of what
leads to a fallacy, for you are aware
that substantiality and accidentality
concern the original quiddity, not a
mode of existence or a particular
characteristic of an individuation.
Since accidents are subsequent to
the stage of the quiddity, then how
can the very essence of the subject-
substrate be cancelled by them?
[104]
Therefore, the individual
substantial form within the
boundary of itself is a substance in
all respects, even if it is accidental
with respect to individuality, in that
its individuality is in a substrate. In
like manner, the intelligible form of
a substance is a substance within
the boundary of itself in all
respects, even if it is accidental
with respect to the mode of its
existence in the mind, in that its
mental existence is in a substrate.
[105] The only implication here is
that knowledge of it, which is its
existence impressed in the mind, is
an accident, not the essential object
of knowledge in reality, which is
the very substance of the quiddity.
Have a care with your
intellect and consider that anyone
who has listened to what we have
recited to the ears of hearts, and
then denied that accident is the
highest genus belonging to the
categories of accidents just as
substance is for the genera of
substances, and has justified the
entrance of the same reality under
both substance and accident in two
respects, has blocked the ears of his
heart even if his genius is vast.

Wamīḍ [2.4.2]
The decisive doctrine is
that the term “substance” is
applicable in two senses: (1) the
existent not in a subject, and there is
no doubt that this sense is not a
definition (ḥadd) for the category of
substance, rather it is one of the
consequent accidentals. [42] (2)
The principal quiddity which,
within the boundary of its
substance, qua its reality, is such
that it, with respect to its own
unqualified nature, subsists
essentially not in a subject.[106]
This [second] sense is the
definition of the supreme genus
belonging to the genera of
substances, inasmuch as this
definition includes, with respect to
these substances in relation to the
quiddity itself, the essential
attributes of what possesses the
essential, for did it [this definition]
not consist of the essentials
(dhātiyyāt), but of the concomitants
(lawāzim) of the quiddity, it would
certainly [yet] have an essential
principle (mabda’) in the very
substance of the quiddity. That
principle is that which we assigned
to the category of substance and
named “the supreme genus,”
because it is a common nature
shared by all substances, and it is
impossible for them within the
boundary of themselves to be
separated from it. It is a permanent
nature, not a negative notion or a
privative concept. For if it were
one of the accidental natures which
are the concomitants of the quiddity,
it [too] would need a common
principle shared between them
corresponding to it, and this
undoubtedly would lead to another
essential shared nature, [which is
absurd]. This, in our view, is the
supreme genus.
In the same way, the term
“accident” is applicable in two
senses: (1) the existent in a subject,
and it is not correct for it to be a
definition for the category of
accident, for it is certainly among
the consequent accidentals. (2) The
qualifying nature which, within the
boundary of itself, qua its reality,
with respect to both its
individuality and its own
unqualified nature, is such that it
subsists essentially in a subject.
This common nature shared
between all accidents is the
supreme genus for the category of
accident, by virtue of the irrefutable
demonstrations of these three
methods, just as with the substance,
without any distinction.
Our companion in
leadership [Ibn Sīnā] has tread our
path in the Shifā’ and in the Ta‘līqāt
in more than one place. In Book
One, Chapter Six of the Categories
of the Shifā’, he commences:
A chapter in refutation of the
argument of he who says that
one thing can be an accident and
 a substance in two respects.
Astonishing beliefs have arisen
concerning the question of
accident and substance which
were caused by ambiguity
concerning the difference
between accident and form and
the assumption that form is also
an accident.
He mentions the kinds of
difficulties, then he says:
A certain group has become
confused and imagined that one
thing can be both a substance
and an accident. But we say this
is impossible and false, for all
of these standards of judging
[43] are unsound. We say, first,
that we mean by “substance”
something the reality of whose
essence exists without being in
a subject at all; in other words,
the reality of its essence does
not exist in another thing in any
way, like as a part of it, existing
together with it in such a manner
that it would be impossible for
it to be separate from it, for it
[the subject] subsists by itself.
And we mean by “accident”
something whose existence
without a doubt is such that it is
in another thing by this
characteristic, such that its
quiddity will not become
existent unless it has something
which is in that thing by this
characteristic.
Consequently, things
belong to two categories: (1)
something whose essence and
reality is independent from
being in another thing, like the
existence of something in its
subject, and (2) something
which is certainly in another
thing by this characteristic. Thus
each thing is either a substance
or an accident. If it is
impossible for the quiddity of
one thing, with respect to
 existence, to require a certain
other thing which it is in, like
something in a subject, and for
its quiddity, nonetheless, to not
at all require a certain other
thing in which it is in, like
something in a subject, then that
certain other thing is neither an
accident nor a substance. Let us
return to the difficulties of these
people. We say that the form has
absolutely no subject in which it
subsists.
Then he said:
Just as substantiality does not
exist because something in
relation to another thing is not in
a subject, but rather because it
in itself is like this, in the same
manner, the accidentality of
accidentality is not due to the
fact that it in relation to a
specific thing is either in a
subject or not in a subject, but
rather because it in itself needs
a certain subject, however it is
and whatever thing it is. If this
is how it is, it is an accident. If
that thing is not this thing, but it
is in this thing, not in the sense
that it is in a subject, this does
not prevent it from being in
itself in a subject.[107] It is
only an accident because it in
itself is in a subject. Indeed, by
accidentality and substantiality I
mean something being
accidental to something or
substantial to it. That is insofar
as it is according to this respect.
Therefore, if it is added to
something, so it is in it, and it is
like something in a subject, then
it is an accident or accidental.
As for an accident, since its
essence has become existent in
a subject, because it is existent
in this subject, this proves that it
has need in itself of a certain
subject, since it needs this
subject. As for an accidental, it
is a certain aspect (amr) which
belongs to it [the accident] in
relation to this subject. So if it,
in relation to this subject, is not
an essential element
(muqawwim) of it nor a part of
its existence, it is an accidental.
[44] Therefore, something is an
accident because it in itself
needs a subject, and it is an
accidental insofar as it is in a
state like that due to something
else. Although these two senses
need each other in this place,
their respect is contrary, and
each of them has another
contrary through one of its
 contrary aspects. The contrary
belonging to the accident is the
substance, and the contrary
belonging to the accidental is
the substantial, namely, the
essential, whether this be a
substance, like “animal” in
relation to “man,” or an
accident, like “color” in
relation to “black.”
Then he said:
We say at the beginning also that
were we to say that if something
is related to another thing which
it is in, it is clear that either it is
in it in the sense that it is its
subject, or it is not [in it in this
sense]. If it is like this, it is an
accident. If it is not like this, yet
it is in it, it is a substance in it,
so that this doctrine would be
correct. But we do not say this.
Rather we say that if something
in itself does not need a subject
at all, whether that which it is in
be one thing or another, it is a
substance. But if it in itself
needs a subject which it is in,
whatever thing that subject may
be, whether it be this or that, it
is an accident. I believe that
someone who has heard this,
and then sought to establish that
a single thing can be both a
 substance and an accident, has
forsaken equity.[108]
He states in Book Three, Chapter
One of the Categories:
If the substance (jawhar) is only
a substance, as we have set
forth to you, by virtue of its
quiddity (māhiyya), which is
necessitated by concrete or
mental existence, it is not
insofar as it is existent in
concrete reality. Otherwise the
notion of the term “substance”
would be equivocal, not
univocal, as they say. Rather,
we only mean by “substance”
that thing in which the true
existence of its specific quiddity
belongs to it in concrete reality,
such that it is not in a subject,
and this requires that this
quiddity, like man for instance,
will be a substance due to its
reality. Therefore, man is only a
substance because he is a man,
not because he is existent in
concrete reality as a mode of
existence. If he is a substance
because he is a man, then
whatever associated attributes
(lawāḥiq) are attached to him—
such as being individual or
universal, and occurrence in the
real world or conception in the
mind—these are things which
are attached (or added) to a
substance. The substantiality of
a substance is not nullified with
the nullification of its
associated attributes, its
concomitants (lawāzim), or it
accidents, as a consequence of
which its essence would be
nullified.…Consequently, the
individuals in the real world are
substances, and the universal
intelligible is also a substance,
since it is true of it that it is a
quiddity whose reality in the
real world is such that it is not
in a subject, not because [45] it
is the intelligible of the
substance, for the intelligible of
a substance may be doubted, for
it is thought to be an intellection
(‘ilm) and an accident. Indeed
its being an intellection is
something accidental to its
quiddity, so it is an accident. As
for its quiddity, it is the quiddity
of the substance, and what
shares its quiddity with the
substance is a substance also. In
like manner, the definition of an
“accident” insofar as it is a
nature, the definition of a
“species” insofar as it is a
nature, and the definition of a
genus, also insofar as it is a
nature, are predicated of
individuals, which are without
doubt substances. Consequently,
whatever shares with them in
their definition is a substance. If
they were substances because
they exist in the real world
encompassed by accidents, the
substantiality of things would be
accidental to their quiddities,
since it is true that existence is
an accident with respect to these
quiddities, and the accidents
would make what is not in itself
a substance a substance, as a
consequence of which they
 would be something accidental
to it if it is a substance, and the
substantiality would be
accidental to another thing. But
since this is impossible,
therefore the universals of
substances are [also] substances
with respect to their quiddities.
[109]
This is the clear truth upon
the evident path. It is possible to
find statements in the Shifā’ whose
literal sense is at variance with this
path but whose inner meaning does
not conform to their literal sense.
Lifting the veil from these
statements, therefore, is necessary
to attain a state of deeper
understanding. As for those who
blindly imitate others, they have
deviated from the path and turned
toward absurd beliefs and
misleading ways.

Wamīḍ [2.4.3]
In Book Two, Chapter Two
of the Categories there is an
investigation of what has been said
in denial of accident being a genus.
Examine their feeble proofs and
study them with discernment. He
states, for example:
There is no help for the likes of
these deluded people, for they
say that accident is not a genus.
Even if it were admissible that
accident is not a genus, they still
say something else, which is
that the accident does not point
to the nature of whiteness or
blackness, or the natures of
other accidents. But it points to
the fact that it has a relation to
what it is in, and that its essence
depends upon this relation. But
genus indicates the nature of
things and their quiddities in
themselves, not what is attached
to their quiddities through
relation. This is a sound
argument. The evidence is that
the term “accidentality” either
indicates (1) that something is
existent in a subject, so that it
signifies this [46] relation, or
(2) that it in itself is such that it
must have a subject. This also is
an accidental attribute, and this
is because the relation of this
attribute to the majority of
accidents, like quality, quantity,
and position, is the relation of a
non-essential element to their
quiddities, since their quiddities
represent intelligible cognitions.
Moreover, many of them may be
doubted for it is not known if
they need a subject, whether it
 is demonstrated in the discipline
of First Philosophy or some
people have made these things
substances. Therefore, the
relation of the accident to them
is the relation of the existent to
the quiddities of the ten
categories, as it does not enter
into the quiddity.
His words “even if it were
admissible that accident is not a
genus” are given in a hypothetical
manner, as an assumption. In other
words, “if we were to assume and
concede that it is true…” As for his
statement “this is a sound
argument,” this is in relation to
those deluded people, not that it is
sound in itself. How can this be
possible when in itself it is a
baseless inquiry and a weak doubt,
which he mentions in a number of
places. One of them concerns the
object of relation (muḍāf) being a
genus, which is consequently
superior due to the relation being
repeated with respect to it. How
then can intelligibility in relation to
something else be essential to the
quiddity?
Our foregone companion
mentioned this in the Categories and
in the Metaphysics, and he said in
solution to this problem that the
quiddity of the object of relation,
which is one of the genera, is the
circumstantial mode of something
being within the boundary of its
own quiddity such that if it is not
taken as an object of intellection, it
still requires intelligibility in the
intellect in relation to something
else, not something being an object
of intellection in relation to another
in actuality.
The question is similar
here, and it is easier. Its quiddity is
the accident which is the genus of
the categories of accidents. It is the
circumstantial mode of the quiddity
being itself in relation to itself, such
that even if it does not exist, it is
still essentially subsistent in a
subject, though not a relation to the
subject nor actual existence in the
subject.
In like manner, the
ambiguity (tashkīk) is due to the
fact that the essential clearly
belongs to the quiddity, but that for
which a question arises concerning
its affirmation to the quiddity does
not belong to its essentials. So it is
lesser and inferior. It is commonly
asserted with respect to most of the
quiddities. As it is said: If the
human soul is an incorporeal
substance, it is not proper to
question it, so that it might be
claimed that it is the same as the
temperament (mizāj). It is refuted
by the fact that there is only a
question when the quiddity and
what is essential to it in its essential
being is not intellected.
[47] The Master of
Illumination spoke rightly when he
stated the following in the
Muṭāraḥāt:
Accidentality is a concomitant
belonging to accidents like
blackness and whiteness. They
reasoned that we intellect
blackness first, then we intellect
its relation to a substrate. Thus,
its relation to the independent
substrate is subsequent to an
accidental quiddity belonging to
it. This explanation is the most
valid part of their argument. We
may intellect blackness or
another kind of accident, and we
may question its accidentality.
Accidentality, therefore, is not
an essential element. This
explanation applies to the
substance itself, for they
maintain through arguments that
forms are substances, differentia
are substances, and the
universals of substances are
substances. But one can say:
 “We intellected them, and we
questioned their substantiality.”
So substantiality is also
accidental, and it is said that it
is a genus. If they accept this,
then it may be difficult for them
to establish many of the genera.
Then he says:
If an apologist among them
pleads in defense that one who
questions the substantiality of a
differentia or a form is only
doubtful because of his lack of
understanding of the meaning of
the substance or the meaning of
that differentia or that form, then
let them advocate this for
 blackness and other accidents,
for he only questions the
accidentality of blackness who
doesn’t understand its concept,
or the concept of substance or
body or accidentality.
So let it be established and not
brought down.

Wamīḍ [2.4.4][110]
Have we not recited unto
you that which if pondered carefully
will make it clear that the absolute
container of principality (ta’aṣṣul),
i.e. concrete existence, is not more
encompassing than the real
intelligible stage with respect to
that container, in contrast to the case
of the absolute thing itself (nafs al-
amr) with respect to the real
intelligible stage which is not a
contrivance of the intellect? Does
not the substrate-essence (dhāt
malzūma) exist for the sake of its
external concomitants when it is
determined in objective reality,
when its effects and attributes
emanate from it and its
concomitants and properties
completely envelop it? Its own
unqualified essence as such is
blended (makhlūṭa) in objective
reality with its existence and the
concomitants of its existence
without any separation or
disjunction from them whatsoever.
Therefore, the substance of
its unqualified essence as such
occurs in the external world.
However, the stage of its
unqualified essence distinct from
the stage of its composition with its
concomitants, which are subsequent
to the substance itself, is an
intelligible stage with respect to the
thing itself. It is not a concrete stage
in the external domain.
Consequently, although the stage of
the essence itself [48] as such in
objective reality is apart from the
stage of being encompassed by the
concomitant accidents, nevertheless
the two stages are intermingled and
not distinct from each other in the
real world. Therefore, the stage of
the essence itself, insofar as it is
itself, in objective reality is an
intelligible stage belonging to the
concrete, principal essence.
However, insofar as it is the
concrete essence, it is not a
separate concrete stage. In like
manner, the unqualified nature not
conditioned by anything is existent
with respect to its unqualified self
in the real world.[111] However,
upon blending with a natural thing,
in other words, with its singular
instance, which is a nature
conditioned by something, when it
happens that it becomes in existence
the same as its singular instance,
then the stage of the unqualified
nature existent with respect to itself
in concrete reality is an intelligible
stage belonging to the concretely
existent nature, not an unqualified,
separate concrete [stage] in the real
world.
As for the container of
occurrence (ḥuṣūl) designated by
the term “the thing itself” (nafs al-
amr), its case is different, for the
unqualified substrate-essence
belongs to the intellect when it is
considered as such without any of
its concomitant encompassing
accidents. Hence, it is, in this
aspect, isolated from all the
accidents which belong in their
totality to this aspect. Since this
aspect is one of the modes of
existence and not a contrived aspect
—indeed it is one of the stages of
the thing itself, for the quiddity as
such only exists with respect to the
thing itself—then the unqualified
essence considered as such is
blended with this aspect with
respect to the real thing itself and
separated from it with respect to the
particularity of this [mental] stage.
Consequently, the thing itself is
vaster than this stage, just as a city,
for example, is vaster than a house
within it. The thing itself is like a
city and this stage is like one of its
houses. Therefore, this very stage is
a container of composition and
disjuncture in two respects.
Thus it belongs to the
intellect to consider the unqualified
nature as such unconditioned by
anything and to distinguish it from
the natural thing which is one of its
singular instances, which is that
nature conditioned by something. So
in this aspect, which is a particular
mode among the modes of the
realization of the thing in the thing
itself, the nature conditioned by
something is separated from the
nature not conditioned by anything
in accordance with the distinction
of determination (ta‘ayyun) and
indetermination (ibhām). Their
intermingling is also by virtue of
occurrence in this aspect, for the
existence of the nature conditioned
by something, in whatever container
it may be, is itself [49] the
existence of the nature
unconditioned by anything in that
container with respect to the thing
itself. Consequently, this aspect in
its particularity is one of the aspects
which are the modes of the thing
itself, a container for mutual
separation and blending in two
respects. So let it be pondered.

Wamīḍ [2.4.5]
Do you possess a
sanctified intellect and a heavenly
nature? Let it be recited to your ears
and infused into your heart that
existence impressed in the mind is
only possible because the existence
[of something] is not the same as its
quiddity.[112] Therefore, it is
impossible for the quiddity of that
whose quiddity is the same as
existence to occur in a particular
mind and for its essence to be
represented in a particular
perception. This is impossible in
two ways.
The first is that you have
certain knowledge that it is
necessary without a doubt for the
quiddity and its essential
constituents (jawhariyyāt) to be
completely conserved in whatever
mode of the modes of existence it
might be in, and that it is impossible
for something to be separated from
itself or from any of its essentials in
any of the modes of existence and in
any of the containers of
determination whatsoever. It is
inconceivable by natural necessity
for the determination of something
and its existence to be cancelled out
by reason of the substance of its
essence and nullified due to its
original quiddity. Is not the mode of
existence subsequent to the
substance of the essence? Then how
can the modes of subsequent
existences and occurring
individualizations be cancelled out
by the substance of the essence to
which they are attached and
nullified by the original quiddity to
which they occur?
It is impossible for man,
for instance, to exist in a mode of
existence or to be individualized in
a mode of individualization which
is separated with respect to that
existence and individualization
from “humanity” or “animality.”
Otherwise, that existence and
individualization would not be
attached to the essence of man and
his quiddity. Rather, it would be an
essence and a quiddity other than
the essence of man and his quiddity.
Is it not evident that real existence
(wujūd aṣīl) in the real world and
its shadowy impression in the tablet
of the mind are two corresponding
modes among the modes of
existence? A mental existent,
insofar as it is existent in the mind
and represented in the intellect,
cannot be principal in existence and
determined in concrete reality.
It is therefore clear that if
something has a quiddity apart from
existence, it is possible for its
quiddity to exist as a reflected
existence by impression in
someone’s mind. Hence, its
quiddity, [50] by virtue of this
impressed existence, is separated
from the real determination and
principal existence (wujūd
muta’aṣṣil) in the external world
and in concrete reality. But if the
quiddity of something were itself
that real existence in the external
world and in concrete reality, and
the relation of that real concrete
existence to its essence were [like]
the relation of humanity to the
essence of man, it would not be
within the compass of
conceivability or the circle of
possibility for its essence to exist
as a mental existence and its
quiddity to be a representation in
someone’s mind. Otherwise, either
it would be necessary for its
quiddity to be separated from itself
and its essential attributes, or it
would be necessary for the
reflected mental existence to be
transformed into a real concrete
existence, or that something, insofar
as it is a reflected existent
impressed in the mind, be a real
determined existent in the real
world as well. But all of this is
absurd and impossible.
The second way is that it
has been established in the science
of metaphysics that existence is
either the same as the
individualization or is its
concomitant. We have investigated
this topic in the Kitāb al-Taqdīsāt.
Existence in the real world is the
concrete individualization itself,
whereas existence in the mind is the
same as a mental individualization
and no more. Since it is possible
for the quiddity of something to
have both existence in the real
world and representation in the
mind, its quiddity cannot be
prevented from being shared
between two singular concrete and
mental instances. But then it
certainly must be a universal
quiddity suitable for predication
upon those two singular instances.
Therefore, if a quiddity
apart from existence belongs to
something, the stage of its quiddity
is apart from the stage of existence
which is the stage of
individualization or its concomitant.
In this case it is possible for it to
have a universal quiddity to which
the stage of individualization,
which is the stage of existence
itself, is connected. Thus it is
possible for it [the quiddity] to have
two corresponding singular
instances in terms of its two
concrete and mental existences. But
if real existence in the real world
were the same as its own quiddity,
then it would certainly be
inconceivable for it to have either a
universal or an individualization,
except for the particularity of its
concrete individualization with
respect to its principal existence in
the real world, since its concrete
individualization in existence in the
real world would be the same as its
quiddity and no different. In this
case, it would not be possible for
its quiddity to have an existence in
the mind, which would necessitate
accordingly a mental singular
instance. The wings of your
intellect have been unfolded
towards the truth, and you are not of
those who are ignorant.

Wamīḍ [2.4.6]
[51] Just as it has become
clear to you by these two ways, it is
clear also that the intelligible stage
belonging to the concrete essence is
only possible if the real existence
of the concrete essence in the real
world is not the same as the
substance as itself and the stage of
its essence as such. For were the
stage of the essence itself as such
the same as existence in the real
world, the intelligible stage, which
corresponds to the quiddity of the
real essence itself with respect to
its unqualified self, would itself be
existence in the external world and
a determination in concrete reality.
The intelligible stage and the entity
would then be the same, but this is
contrary to their nature, since
existence is superadded to the
quiddity. These are two principles
among the fundamental principles
which are the pillars of the science
of metaphysics.[113]

Wamīḍ [2.4.7]
Perchance through these
rules and principles which have
been imparted to you, you will have
confidence in the doctrine of the
pure intellect and will be assured
that the stage of the determination
and the actualization precede the
stage of existence with respect to its
attributive conception, which is not
multiple except through the
multiplication of subjects, whose
singular instance (fard) is
inconceivable except as a portion
(ḥiṣṣa) which is not distinguished
save through a relation, and not
before it.[114]
This is true: Man becomes,
then he exists. I do not say: Man
becomes a man, then he becomes
existent in the manner of complex
becoming, whose notion requires
both what becomes and the object
of becoming. Rather, I say: Man
becomes in the manner of simple
becoming, whose notion only
requires what becomes. In other
words, the substance of his essence
is substantialized and his original
reality is determined, then he exists.
This means that attributive
existence (mawjūdiyya
maṣdariyya) is abstracted from it,
for it is the first thing to be
abstracted from the substantialized
essence and the determined reality,
from the consequent accidents and
the subsequent notions, for nothing
is signified by it except the actual
essence itself and its substance in
the container of that existence.
Therefore, the stage of abstracted
posterior existence is a
signification of the stage of the real
prior object of abstraction and is
subsequent to that very stage of
which it is a consequence. The
basis of existence, in the sense of
attributive existence, being an
accident of the quiddity, and not the
same as its substance and not one of
its essential constituents, [52] and
the standard for this and its
criterion, nay its origin and its end,
is the quiddity being non-
determined (ghayr mutaqarrura)
by virtue of itself. Rather it is
determined by a Maker, Agent,
Originator, and Emanator, who
produces its essence, makes its
identity, originates its root, and
emanates its substance. Then come
the inseparable attributes of the
quiddity with respect to its
substance, whose cause and origin
is no other than the substance of the
quiddity itself in the stage of
determination and actualization.
This is prior to the final stage of
abstracted existence. As for the
remaining consequent accidents and
their affections which belong to the
quiddity and their attachment to it,
they only follow upon the stage of
existence. A reliable explanation of
this subject can be found in the
Ufuq al-Mubīn.
Our companion, the Chief,
walks our path in this completely.
He states in Book One, Chapter
Two of the Logic of the Shifā’ in the
Isagoge (Madkhal):
The quiddities of things may
exist in the concrete instances of
things and they may exist in
conception. These quiddities,
therefore, have three aspects
(i‘tibārāt): (1) The aspect of
the quiddity insofar as it is that
quiddity, not connected to one of
these two [mental or concrete]
existences and not attached to
them as such. (2) The aspect of
the quiddity insofar as it is in
the real world with accidents
 also attached to it which are
particular to this existence. (3)
The aspect of the quiddity
insofar as it is in conception
with accidents attached to it
which are particular to this
existence, such as being subject
and predicate, and such as the
universal and the particular in
predication, and the essential
and the accidental in
predication.[115]
Furthermore, he states in Chapter
Six:
It has already been set forth to
you that things have quiddities
and that those quiddities may be
existent in individuals and they
may be existent in thought. But
the quiddity does not require the
actualization (taḥṣīl) of one of
these two modes of existence,
for each of these two existences
is only asserted after the
affirmation of that quiddity, and
each of the two existences
attaches to the quiddity certain
properties and accidents which
belong to the quiddity together
with that existence, and it is
possible that they do not belong
to it in the other existence. It
may be that certain concomitants
belong to it which are necessary
 with respect to the quiddity, but
the quiddity is determined first,
then it requires them. Thus,
“marriage” requires “twoness,”
and triangle requires that its
three angles are equivalent to
two right angles, not to one of
the two existences, for it is a
triangle.
He puts forward a similar argument
in the Ishārāt[116] and in the
Ta‘līqāt in a number of places.
Among the meticulous
imitators is one who is perplexed
and does not hold fast [to Ibn Sīnā].
Sometimes he adheres to the truth,
and sometimes [53] he flees from
this path to the path of necessary
accompaniment (musāwiqa)
between the stage of existence and
the stage of actualization (fi‘liyya).
The falsity of this is not clear to him
despite the strength of its
evidentness.
Among the imitators is one
who has reversed his steps and
tread in the opposite direction of
the sincere. He has made the stage
of existence precede the stage of
actualization, and is not concerned
at having made the accident precede
the subject. Thus he says: “He
existed and then he became man,”
and he ascribes this to the Seal of
the Scholars in the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt
and the Maṣāri‘ al-Muṣāri‘. He
predicates an unintelligible
common nature between the two
supreme genera, substance and
accident, which assigns either
substantiality or accidentality to the
particular nature of one of the two
existences. In the prime of life and
the extravagance of youth we
refuted his arguments and set forth
the proper solution in annotations
and commentary. But now time is
too precious for that.

Wamḍa [2.5]
Have we not taught you in
the Ufuq al-Mubīn that being-an-
effect (ma‘lūliyya) is of two kinds:
(1) by emanation and (2) by
composition. Being an effect by
emanation is dependency upon the
cause required for determination
and existence, and this cause is
undoubtedly outside the constitution
of the quiddity of the effect, since
the constituent parts of the quiddity
are obtained from the side of the
effect, and they are not considered
whenever the quiddity’s
dependency on the cause is
considered, for a composite thing
does not have a renewed
dependency on its cause over and
above the dependencies of its parts
altogether, nor does the cause have
a new influence on it after affecting
the parts altogether. Therefore, the
emanation of a component of the
effect from the cause is implied in
the effect’s emanation from it.[117]
Being-an-effect by
composition is the composition of
the constitution of the quiddity of
the effect from the parts which are
its essential constituents from which
its substance is constituted.
In like manner, causality
also is of two kinds: (1) causality
by means of emanation and (2)
causality by means of composition.
The cause with respect to
composition is within the locus of
the effect dependent on emanation
and is internal to it. It is its effect
with respect to composition, and the
effect of its cause with respect to
emanation, for its cause with
respect to emanation is separated
from the root of its essence and
outside of the substance of its
quiddity. The basis of dependency
upon a cause by means of emanation
is the nature of essential possibility,
while the basis of dependency upon
a cause by means of composition is
the essence (dhāt) being [54] a
twofold reality unlike the oneness
of the quiddity (māhiyya).[118]

Wamīḍ [2.5.1]
Our companion in this
discipline states in the Logic of the
Ishārāt:
Know that among the predicates
there are those that are
constitutive of their subjects. By
“constitutive” I do not mean the
predicate which the subject
requires for the realization of its
existence. Rather I mean a
predicate which the subject
requires for the realization of its
quiddity, and which enters into
its quiddity as a part of it, such
as “figure” for “triangle” and
“corporeality” for “human
being.”
Then he says:
Know that each thing has a
quiddity, and it is realized as an
existent in the real world or as
conceived in the mind only
insofar as its constituent parts
are present with it. If it has a
reality other than its being
existent in one of these two
modes of existence, and it is not
constituted by it [i.e. existence],
then existence is a concept
added to its reality—either
necessarily or not necessarily.
Also the causes of its existence
are other than the causes of its
quiddity. Humanity, for
example, is in itself a particular
reality or quiddity, and its
existence in individuals or in
minds is not an essential
constituent of it; rather it is
something added to it. If
concrete existence were an
essential constituent of it, it
would be impossible to
represent the concept of
humanity in the soul free from
that which is its constitutive
part.
He states in Namaṭ Four:
Something may be an effect with
respect to its quiddity and its
reality, or it may be an effect
with respect to its existence.
Consider this with regard to a
triangle, for example. Its reality
is constituted by a plane and a
line which forms its sides, and
these two constitute it insofar as
it is a triangle and the reality of
triangularity. These two are its
material and formal causes. But
insofar as it exists, it is
connected to another cause
besides these two. This cause is
not a cause which contributes to
the constitution of its
 triangularity and is a part of it
definition. It is the efficient
cause or the final cause, which
is an efficient cause belonging
to the causality of the efficient
cause.
He says in Book Four, Chapter
One of the Metaphysics of the
Shifā’:
It is not a condition of the
existence belonging to what is
one that the multiple be existent,
nor is it a condition of the
existence belonging to the
multiple that the one be existent.
It is not that what is one
provides or does not provide
 existence to the multiple, but
rather it is needed for existence
to be provided to the multiple
by composition from it. [55]
He states in Book Three,
Chapter Six of the Metaphysics of
the Shifā’: “It is only required of
the multiple that it is understood to
be from oneness, since it is an
effect which belongs to oneness in
itself, in other words, in the
substance of its quiddity, in the
sense that the multiple is constituted
and composed from it.” And he
explains in Book One, Chapter
Eleven of the Physics of the Shifā’:
The efficient and final causes
are not the two proximate
causes of the composition of the
effect. The efficient cause either
prepares matter, as a result of
which it is a cause of the
proximate matter of the effect
existing, or it provides the form
so that it is a cause of the
proximate form existing. The
final cause is a cause belonging
to the efficient cause insofar as
it is an agent. The cause
belonging to form and matter is
due to the efficient cause and the
composer moving them. The
proximate causes of something
are primary matter and form,
 and there is no intermediary
between these two and between
the thing. They are its two
causes in the sense that they are
the two components which
constitute it without a third thing
between them, although the
manner of constituting of each of
them is different. Therefore
these two causes are unlike each
other.
He means that the only way
the cause of the existence of the
composite can emanate it is to issue
the existence of its constituent parts
altogether. The sum of the causes
responsible for constituting its
reality depends upon an emanating
cause. Its giving existence to the
constituent parts altogether,
therefore, results in the existence of
the composite, which is the sum of
the constituent parts by virtue of the
concomitance of the mode of
composing. What appears, then, to
be most worthy of reason, is that the
cause emanates existence by first
giving existence to the constituents
[of the composite] altogether, then
to the sum of the constituents from
which the composite is composed,
not by the repetition of another act
of giving existence, but by the same
act of giving existence to the
constituents altogether. Thus the
cause which gives existence to the
composite first only effects the
constituents altogether and then the
composite whole itself as a
necessary consequence.
He does not mean, as might
be literally construed from his
words, that the efficient cause
causes the constituent parts [of the
composite] to exist, and then the
constituent parts cause the
composite to exist. How is this
possible when he has clearly
invalidated that with his statement:
“They are its two causes in the
sense that they are the two
components which constitute it
without a third thing between
them”? It is evident to an
uncontaminated intellect and a clear
mind that the constituent parts in the
reality of the composite are omitted
from consideration whenever its
dependency upon the efficient cause
is meant to be considered.
Consequently, they belong to the
sphere of dependency and are
among those mentally posited things
inferred on the side of the effect,
such as contingency and need, but
they do not belong to the sphere of
what is depended upon and are not
among the beings of reason
considered on the side of the
efficient cause. [56]
Similarly, it was explained
in the Ufuq al-Mubīn on the subject
of making (ja‘l) that the Maker
(jā‘il) emanates the made (maj‘ūl)
by originating (yubdi‘u) the
quiddity itself. Then it is required
of the quiddity by that same act of
primary origination (ibdā‘) that it
become properly existent, since
existence (mawjūdiyya) is
abstracted from it, and existence is
no other than the signification of its
own made and determined essence.
It is not that it itself is originated
and then it is needed to be existent
as an intermediary in the creative
action, for how can it be thought
that the quiddity be a cause of its
own existence?
Since this has become
clear, it is evident that the cause of
needing the emanating cause is
without reservation essential
possibility.[119] With regard to the
simple (basīṭ) [i.e., the quiddity],
its possibility in itself is due to
itself as such; and with regard to the
composite, the possibility of its
constituent parts and the possibility
of the substance of its essence is
due to the state of its constituent
parts. Let it be pondered.
 Wamīḍ [2.5.2]
Therefore, something
twofold of essence made of certain
composed constituent parts only
needs its constituent parts for the
sake of itself and with respect to the
substance of its quiddity. As for
needing what is outside of the
constitution of its reality, this is
commensurate with the need of its
constituent part, for needing the
constituent part is the need of the
substance of the twofold essence
itself. As for needing the cause and
every cause outside of the
constitution of the essence, this, in
truth, is the need of the constituent
part or the constituent parts
altogether. The need of a part of a
constituent part belongs to the
essence itself, although through the
constituent part itself, for none of
the constituent parts is repeated in
the constitution of the real essence.
It may happen to both the
matter and the form that it is a cause
by being an intermediary and
without being an intermediary
simultaneously in two respects, but
according to causality in two ways,
not by one kind of causality only.
[120] As for matter, if the
composite is not a species but a
variety (ṣanf), and the form is not
that which is peculiar to the name
“form” but is an accidental shape,
then in this case, the matter is
constitutive of that accident which
constitutes the quiddity of the
variety as such. Therefore, it is a
certain cause by way of emanation
belonging to the cause by way of
composition, but this is insofar as it
is a form which is a constituent part
of the composite and a material
cause. Thus there is no intermediary
between these two with respect to
constitution and composition.
As for the form, if it is a
real form, in other words, that
which belongs to the category of
substance, and it [57] forms the
existence of the matter in actuality,
and the matter is a cause with
respect to the quiddity of the
composite, then it is a certain cause
by way of emanation belonging to
the cause of the composite by way
of composition, but this is insofar
as it is a form which is a constituent
part of the composite and a formal
cause, not an intermediary between
these two.

Wamīḍ [2.5.3]
Now a difficult problem
arises here, which is that there is no
doubt that the whole, insofar as it is
a whole, is another existent above
and beyond the existents which are
its constituent parts altogether, and
it is certainly a particular possible
among the things essentially
possible, just as the constituent
parts altogether are possibles.
Since every possible thing of itself
is non-existent, insofar as it is itself
as such, and absolutely contingent,
there is no question that its non-
existence is prevented by a
necessitating cause of existence, not
accidentally but essentially, so that
its existence is necessarily realized
through that cause. However, the
existence of the whole as such is
not possible if the non-existence of
itself as such is prevented through a
necessitating cause when
disregarding the non-existences of
its constituent parts. But how can it
not have essential dependency upon
its cause apart from the
dependencies of its constituent
parts?
This difficult and abstruse
problem can only be solved by two
principles which have been
explored in the Ufuq al-Mubīn and
in the books of this kind on the
principles of metaphysics.
One of them is that the
essentially possible is that whose
essence is not incompatible with
either the nature of existence or the
nature of non-existence, not that in
which all the modes of existence
and all the modes of non-existence
are possible with respect to itself.
The essentially necessary is that
which requires by virtue of itself
the nature of existence, not all the
modes of existence. The essentially
impossible is that which requires
by virtue of itself the nature of non-
existence, not all the modes of non-
existence. For it may be [referring
to the essentially possible] that a
certain mode among the modes of
existence in its particularity, or a
certain mode among the modes of
non-existence in its particularity, is
impossible with respect to a certain
possible among the essentially
possibles.
Another principle, which
is called a “fundamental law” and
which is a requisite of its
demonstration, is that the possibility
of the singular individual or its
necessity in its particularity
necessarily accompanies the
possibility of the unqualified nature
or its necessity, but not vice versa,
and the impossibility of the
unqualified nature requires the
impossibility of the singular
individual in its particularity, but
not vice versa.
As for explaining the solution
to this problem, the way to explain
it is to say: the whole as such, being
a certain possible among the things
essentially possible apart from the
possibles [58] which are its
constituent parts altogether, only
requires that the nature of non-
existence as such be compatible
with respect to itself. This does not
contradict the fact that a particular
non-existence in its particularity—
in other words, its non-existence
along with the existence of its
constituent parts altogether—is
impossible with respect to its
essence as such. Its existence does
not require that non-existence to be
prevented through a necessitating
cause other than its own essence. Is
it not the requirement for the
realization of existence, that non-
existence be prevented by a cause
apart from the essence of the effect
itself, only with respect to the
possible non-existences related to
its own essence, not absolutely?
The Satan of idle fancy has
alarmed you. Therefore, if the non-
existence of the whole as such
together with the existence of its
constituent parts altogether is
impossible with respect to its own
essence, then without a doubt its
existence together with their
existence is required by virtue of its
essence and through its own
essence. This requires that one of
the two contradictories be
absolutely prevented with respect
to the essence itself through the
power of the necessity of the other
over it. Its Satan is driven away
from you through your
understanding that the contradictory
of the non-existence of the whole,
with the existence of the constituent
parts altogether, is the negation of
that non-existence, and its negation
is the same whether it be by its
existence together with their
existence or by its negation together
with their negation.[121] Therefore,
if its non-existence together with
their existence is impossible with
respect to its essence, it necessarily
has, in its own essence, the nature
of this common thing. It has been
established through the fundamental
law that the necessity of the nature
of the unqualified universal does
not require the necessity of the
particular in its particularity, but the
possibility of the particular in its
particularity or its impossibility is
correct along with the necessity of
the unqualified nature within the
boundary of its being unqualified.
Therefore, the necessity of negating
the non-existence of the whole as
such, with the existence of its
constituent parts altogether, with
respect to the essence of the whole
itself, does not contradict the
essential possibility of its existence
along with their existence.
Consequently, there is no
alternative to the dependency of its
existence—with the existence of its
constituent parts in their entirety—
due to its being essentially
possible, upon an efficient cause
which necessitates it. This is
necessary for preventing what is
possible with respect to its essence
and its unqualified nature from the
modes of non-existence, even
though its non-existence with the
existence of its constituent parts
altogether is impossible for it with
respect to the substance of its
essence.[122] Be not then of the
ignorant and pay no heed to those
who have gone astray.

Wamīḍ [2.5.4]
Are you not certain that the
essential constituents of the quiddity
in their entirety, in detailed
consideration, are the definition,
and that the whole of the essential
constituents, in summative
consideration, is the object
defined?[123] Summary and detail
are among the attributes [59] of
perception. There is no difference
whatsoever between these two
forms with respect to the object
perceived, but detailed
consideration is a mode of
discovery stronger than the mode of
discovery of summative
consideration. The discovered,
which is the connecting link of the
two considerations and the object
of the two perceptions, is
essentially one but different with
respect to mental aspect. The two
aspects differ decidedly from each
other with respect to the thing itself
(nafs al-amr). For this reason, the
aspect of the whole of the
constituent parts is above and
beyond the aspect of the constituent
parts altogether. The constituent
parts altogether are essentially
different from the concrete singular
whole, and unlike the subject-whole
of the constituent parts due to the
inference of simultaneity and
synthesis (ta’līf). As for the subject
and the accident taken together, this
is a mentally posited thing which
the mind infers, and it is outside of
what we are considering here.
The constituent parts
altogether are the constituent
antecedents, while the whole of the
constituent parts is the constituted
and composed posteriority.
Therefore, the constituent parts
altogether are the details for the
substance of the whole, and the
complete cause for its total
acquisition with respect to
conceptualization and the perfection
of its quiddity with respect to
constitution and composition.[124]
This general rule encompasses all
composite quiddities without
exception. It is not specialized in
application to what has a formal
part only, as some fastidious
imitators imagine, for they do not
perceive that the material and the
formal parts in their entirety only
pertain to what has a formal part in
the station of the units of the
constituents altogether and to what
is differentiated by the material
parts. This is the case also with all
kinds of number composed only
from the units themselves without a
formal constituent part at all.[125]
Let them recognize this and
ascertain it.
 Wamīḍ [2.5.5]
We say, in accord with the
company of firmly grounded
philosophers, that summary and
detail pertain to the whole of the
constituent parts and to the
constituent parts altogether
respectively, as is the relation
between the defined and the
definition, which are two different
modes of perception without any
distinction in the object perceived.
By perception and the perceived is
meant no more than knowledge and
the object of knowledge. With one
of these two significations a third is
mutually incompatible and
essentially different, and this is the
mental form of knowledge
impressed in the soul as compared
with the possessor of the form,
which is the original reality of the
object of knowledge, corresponding
to the substance of the quiddity
itself. These two do not refer to the
attributive (maṣdarī) discovering
and the thing discovered, nor do
they refer to the perceptual state
belonging to the cognizing soul,
which is the divider which
separates knowledge into
conception [60] and assent. But the
connecting link of this state, which
is the mental form of knowledge
impressed in the soul, is both
knowledge in relation to the
substance of the reality of the object
of knowledge and the object of
knowledge in relation to the
knowledge connected to it. By this I
mean the perceptual state is
specifically different in the two
forms of knowledge, in other
words, conceptual knowledge and
knowledge by assent. Consequently,
the mental form impressed in the
soul is both knowledge and object
of knowledge in two respects.
This is what we mean
when we say: “Knowledge and the
object of knowledge are essentially
united but different from each other
in rational consideration (i‘tibār).
It is one in summative knowledge
but multiple in detailed knowledge.
As for the object of knowledge in
the sense of the substance of the
reality of the object of knowledge,
which is the possessor of the form
of knowledge, it contains no
distinction whatsoever with respect
to the two forms of summary and
detail. The essential object of
knowledge discovered by primary
intention is the mental form, while
the accidental object of knowledge
discovered by secondary intention
is the concrete objective thing. Let
it then be established and not
brought down.

Wamḍa [2.6]
Are you of those whose
reason is sound? Ponder then with
your heart and trust with your soul
what the wise have established,
namely, that every possible thing is
encompassed by two necessities:
the prior and the subsequent. Each
of these two is necessary through
the other, not in essence, and they
both together encompass the two
stages of determination and
existence, and similarly the two
extremes of affirmation and
negation. That which is
characterized by prior necessity is
the essence itself, and that which is
characterized by subsequent
necessity is the essence as
conditioned by the aspect of
determination and existence, either
with respect to affirmation or
negation. In compound
interrogatives the subject itself is
conditioned by qualification by the
predicate or conditioned by its
absence.
All agree upon this
principle except for a group of the
meddlers. It belongs to the state of
the prior the non-necessity of any
kind of preponderation (rājiḥiyya).
This is evident in the view of the
people of God and the sons of truth.
We have already provided a
detailed argument on this subject,
investigated it thoroughly, and
elaborated upon it in due measure
by the leave of God, the Almighty,
the Omniscient, in the Ufuq al-
Mubīn and in the Taqwīmāt wa’l-
Taṣḥīḥāt. The surety for
ascertaining this in detail, therefore,
rests in their custody. As for the
general rule for the subsequent
stages, in summary it is as follows:
A possible thing is possible, hence
it needs. [61] Then it is necessitated
and becomes necessary. Then it is
made, determined, becomes
existent, and is necessary.[126]

Wamḍa [2.7]
Have you not heard them
say that the nature of the notion of
priority and posteriority unites all
the kinds [of priority] in a common
predicate, not in a univocal way,
but equivocally? This means that a
particular notion among notions or a
particular state (sha’n) among
states has two things which are
united together within it. It is not a
product of one of the two unless it
is also realized through the other
and is a product of that other. It is
not a product of this one [alone].
Consequently, this common factor is
general to the seven kinds [of
priority][127] in an equivocal way.
The basis of each kind [or
priority] is a concept to which both
priority and posteriority pertain.
Hence, two things participate in it.
There belongs to it from one of the
two things what does not belong to
it from the other, but what belongs
to it from the other is also through
this one. Accordingly, this one is
prior and the other is posterior. The
basis of priority and posteriority
pertains to that common notion.
 With regard to priority in
order (rutba),[128] for example,
which includes the category of
spatial priority, its basis is a
sequential relation to a starting
point (mabda’)—whether by nature,
by position, or by postulation—
through nearness to or remoteness
from it. What is nearer to the
starting point is prior and what is
farther from it is posterior. Hence,
it belongs to the prior to be near to
that starting point insofar as the
posterior is not near to it. The
posterior is not near to it unless the
prior is nearer to it.
With regard to priority in
nobility,[129] a notion assigned in
place of the starting point pertains
to it. [In this division], the prior
possesses what the posterior does
not possess unless it is less perfect
than what the prior possesses. For
example, a power of decision
(ikhtiyār) belongs to a leader
which does not belong to his
subordinate except in an inferior
way. I am not saying that it occurs
to the leader and not to his
subordinate, but it only occurs to
the subordinate after it has occurred
to the leader, as a result of which he
is set in motion by virtue of the
decision of the leader, as our
companion has stated in the
Metaphysics of the Shifā’. This is
taking it out from priority in nobility
and adding it to the category of
essential priority (taqaddum bi’l-
dhāt).[130] Consequently, the basis
of priority in nobility is the
variation of the notion assigned in
place of the starting point in terms
of perfection and imperfection,
strength and weakness, excess and
deficiency, just as the basis of
priority in order is the difference in
the ordered relation to the starting
point in remoteness from and
nearness to it. Therefore, the
criterion for weighing priority in
nobility is the superiority of the
prior with respect to virtues over
what is preceded, [62] even be it in
terms of another notion besides
virtue, as considered in the Shifā’,
whether by nature with respect to
mental realities—as in the gradual
descent of species to the lowest
species, and the gradual ascent of
genera to the highest genus, and
similarly in the ordered stages in
the two chains of beginning and
return—or with respect to natural
position, as in the levels of the
spheres belonging to the corporeal
world, in the two directions of
above and below from the center to
the circumference and from the
circumference to the center—or
with respect to placing, as in spatial
priority in relation to the location of
the prayer niche [indicating the
direction of prayer]—or with
respect to postulation, as in the
difference in nearness or
remoteness to a now postulated in
time. When a starting point is
assigned in an ordered relationship,
the prior and the posterior in order
can be reversed by conversion
(tabaddul), if the assigned notion is
converted to a starting point. Let it
be recognized.
 Wamīḍ [2.7.1]
Since you know that the
difference in the kinds of priority
and posteriority corresponds to the
difference in the notion to which
priority and posteriority pertain and
the difference of its basis, know that
among the kinds is (1) that whose
priority concerns the difference of
an ordered relation to something
posited as a starting point. It is of
one kind only, which is priority in
order. Among the kinds is (2) that
whose priority concerns the
difference of the prior and the
preceded, with respect to the notion
to which priority and posteriority
pertain, in excess and deficiency,
superiority and subordination. It is
also of one kind only, and it is
priority in nobility. Among them is
(3 & 4) that whose priority
concerns the separation and
isolation of the prior from the
posterior in the container of
existence and the vessel of
occurrence and the posterior
succeeding the prior in that
container with respect to the real
world, not with respect to the
particularity of the intelligible
stage, although it is one of the
stages of the thing itself. This
category consists of two different
kinds, which are temporal priority
and eternal priority. The path will
become clear to you regarding these
two shortly, if God, the Almighty,
the All-Knowing, wills it. These
four kinds have nothing at all to do
with the essential connective
relation between the prior and the
preceded with respect to need and
dependency [i.e., they are not
related to essential priority].
Among them is (5, 6, & 7)
that which concerns the essential
connective relation between the
prior and the posterior with respect
to need and dependency. Priority
and posteriority only pertain to this
category by reason of isolation and
subsequence with respect to
determination and existence, not
with respect to the real world, [63]
but with respect to the particularity
of the intelligible order. I mean by
this the stage of the prior itself and
the stage of the posterior itself. This
is no other than essential priority,
and it consists of three kinds:
priority by nature, priority in
quiddity, and priority in causality.
[131]
Are you not convinced by
what we have established for you
that (1) the stage of existence and
(2) the stage of its affection, i.e.
necessity, which is the certainty of
existence and determination, and
(3) the stage of its subject, i.e. the
quiddity itself, its determination,
and its substantialization, are each
different concepts and different
consequent stages in the process of
mental inference with respect to the
thing itself. Therefore, since
priority and posteriority pertain to
each one of these three stages, the
three posited kinds [of essential
priority] will certainly follow
[from them]. Be not of those who
are uninformed of this theme.

Wamīḍ [2.7.2]
 Consequently, the notion to
which priority pertains in “priority
by nature,” with respect to the
objective world, is existence in
concrete reality, but not with
respect to the sphere of concrete
reality and real objective existence,
for priority by nature with respect
to the objective world is not
incompatible with simultaneity in
existence in the objective world,
but rather only with respect to the
intelligible order corresponding to
the objective world. Therefore, the
posterior by nature does not have
concrete existence in the stage of its
concrete essence unless the prior by
nature actually exists in concrete
existence with respect to that stage,
and the prior by nature has concrete
existence in the stage of its concrete
essence. The posterior by nature
does not exist actually in that stage,
since the cause exists in the stage of
the effect itself. This is in contrast
with the effect, for it definitely does
not exist in the stage of the cause
itself.
With respect to priority in
quiddity, the notion to which
priority pertains is strictly the
quiddity itself and its constitution,
its substantialization, and its
actualization, not with respect to the
actual world, since it does not
prevent simultaneity with respect to
it, but rather with respect to the
intelligible order. As for the
posterior in quiddity, the prior in
quiddity is actually constitutive of
its quiddity and assuredly
substantializing with respect to it in
the stage of its quiddity. The matter
is different for the prior in quiddity,
for the posterior in quiddity is not
actually constitutive of or
substantializing with respect to the
stage of its quiddity.
As for priority in causality,
the notion to which priority pertains
[in this category] is the necessity of
determination [64] and the necessity
of existence, not with respect to the
real world—for simultaneity
applies in the real world, a
simultaneity which the very
substance of the posterior in being-
an-effect implies—but with respect
to the intelligible order.[132] The
prior in causality consists of the
necessity of determination and
existence with respect to the stage
of the essence of the posterior in
being-an-effect. This contrasts to
the case of the posterior in being-
an-effect, for it has no necessity
with respect to the stage of the
essence of the prior in causality.
This is because necessity is
connected to the essence of the
posterior in being-an-effect through
the essence of the prior in causality;
it is not connected to the essence of
the prior in causality through the
essence of the posterior in being-
an-effect. Consequently, priority in
causality refers to the priority of
one of the two simultaneities with
respect to the necessity of
determination and existence in the
real world. Simultaneity is not
impossible for the essence of these
two with respect to the occurrence
of necessity in the intelligible order
not by a fabrication of the mind.
This is the mature discourse on this
subject, and what exceeds this is
immature and unripe.

Wamīḍ [2.7.3]
The prior by nature is
solely the general incomplete
emanating cause.[133] It is not the
efficient cause of the completing
things (mutammimāt) and the
anticipated things (muntaẓarāt),
such as the conditions, the
quiddities, and the subjects of
accidents. As for the incomplete
efficient cause, inasmuch as it is
[the partner of] the agent of the
substance of the quiddity and the
emanator of its existence, it is prior
certainly in two modes of priority:
priority by nature with respect to
existence and priority in quiddity
with respect to the determination
(taqarrur). Both of these concern
the intelligible order with respect to
occurrence in the objective world.
[134]
In like manner, the
constituent parts of the constitution
of the composite of matter and form,
and the essential constituents of the
substance of the quiddity, i.e.,
genera and differentiae, insofar as
they are the constituent parts of the
definition and the object defined
with respect to determination
(ta‘ayyun) and indetermination
(ibhām), have two modes of
priority: (1) priority in quiddity
with respect to the stage of the
constitution and substantialization
[of the quiddity], and (2) priority by
nature with respect to the stage of
existence, not because they are
among the complements of the
efficient cause and the complements
of the emanating cause, for that is a
mistaken assumption, of whose
falsity we have informed you, but
rather because the bringing into
existence of the composite is by
means of bringing into existence its
constituent parts, and the primary
origination of the quiddity is
through the primary origination of
its essential constituents. Thus, the
intellect judges, after mental
analysis, that what emanates from
the agent first is the existence of the
constituent parts, which give rise to
the existence of the composite, and
the substantialization of the
essential constituents which give
rise to the substantialization of the
quiddity. Yes, the substantial form
in species composites is one of the
complements of the emanating cause
[65] in relation to matter, and the
subject-substrate in individual [lit.
varietal ṣinfiyya] composites is one
of the complements of the emanating
cause in relation to accidents, as
you know.
As for the prior in
causality, it is no other than the
complete efficient cause, which
brings together the things
anticipated by the act of agency and
the conditions of the emanation,
since it is necessary for the effect to
be together with it in the real world,
a simultaneity which the substance
of the effect itself implies. It has
priority over the essence of the
effect in terms of the necessity of
existence obtained in the real
world, but this is with respect to the
intelligible order corresponding to
its essence and the essence of the
effect. This is the reality of the
nature of priority in causality. Only
the complete efficient cause is in
accord with this description, for
whatever is other than this does not
require simultaneity in the real
world at all, although it is also not
incompatible with it.
It is established, therefore,
that essential priority, which refers
to essential relations, is the
common factor between what is
[prior] by nature, what is [prior] in
quiddity, and what is [prior] in
causality. This is the generally
accepted usage for this, and it is
worthy of consideration.
It may be that our
companion in leadership favored
another usage in the application of
names, and he made what concerns
existence and what concerns the
quiddity two kinds of what is
[prior] by nature. The term “prior
by nature” then is the common
factor between the two kinds and is
a partner to that which is [prior] in
causality. He says in the Ta‘līqāt:
The prior to something by nature
is that which is the cause of that
thing with respect to its
quiddity. For example, the
number one is the cause of two
with respect to its twoness, the
lines of a triangle are its cause
with respect to its being a
triangle, and the parts of a
definition are the cause of the
definition with respect to its
being itself.
As for the prior in
causality, it is that it is the cause
of the existence of the quiddity.
The quiddity (māhiyya:
whatness) of something is,
therefore, different from its
existence (anniyya: thatness). A
man’s being a man is different
 from his being existent. Priority
may be priority with respect to
existence, like the priority of
one over two, and it may be
with respect to concept, like the
priority of substance over
accident in the predication of
the concept of the existent to
these two.
His student [Bahmanyār] states in
the Taḥṣīl:
As for the prior by nature, it is
like the priority of one over two
and lines over the triangle. If the
lines are removed, the triangle
also disappears. But the lines
do not [necessarily] disappear
 with the destruction of the
triangle. What is being
considered in this priority is
what pertains to the quiddity
apart from existence. The
difference between [66] the
prior by nature and the prior in
causality is that in the prior by
nature the existence of the prior
is not the cause of the existence
of the posterior. But in the prior
in causality, just as it is prior in
existence, its existence is also
the cause and reason of the
posterior.
There is yet a third usage,
which our companion adopts in the
Categories of the Shifā’, which
restricts essential priority to
priority in causality. The Seal of the
Scholars says in the Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt:
The posterior in being-an-effect
is not separated from the prior
in causality in time. Each one of
these disappears with the
disappearance of its mate,
except that the disappearance of
the effect is a consequence and
effect of the disappearance of
the cause, not the converse. The
posterior by nature requires the
prior in existence, but not the
converse, for it is possible for
the prior to exist without the
posterior. It is not possible,
however, for the posterior to
exist without the prior.
It may be said that
“posteriority by nature” is the
common notion and to restrict
posteriority in being-an-effect to
the term “essential posteriority.”
The Master also used both of
these in the Categories of the
Shifā’, where he said when he
mentioned priority in causality
that even if it is said that the
prior by nature corresponds to
the prior in causality and
essence, in this book, what is
common is called essential
posteriority.
He said in the Naqd al-
Tanzīl that the genus is prior to
its species, not because of its
being a constituent part of it, so
that it is prior to it by nature, for
insofar as it is a constituent, it is
not predicable of the whole of
it. Therefore, it is not a genus.
The genus must be predicable of
its species, but not because of
its being a complete cause of it.
This is evident. And it is not
due to each of these being in
time, nor in an intelligible or
sensible stage, for the genus of
 something does not require
another genus above itself, and
it is not due to its being nobler
than its species. Therefore, it is
due to its being a possible
universal that is existent and
cognizable, even if the
determinate species is not
existent and cognizable. Thus
the priority of the universal over
the particular is another kind of
priority other than the five well-
known kinds.
I agree that it is another
kind other than the five well-known
kinds. It is nothing but priority in
quiddity with respect to the
intelligible order through an
analysis with respect to
determination and indetermination.
Let it be refined. [67]

Wamīḍ [2.7.4]
Have you listened to the
Master of Illumination? In the
Muṭāraḥāt he seeks to establish the
analogical gradation (tashkīk) of
essentials in perfection and
deficiency in the substance of the
quiddity itself:
Since it is clear that existence is
a mentally posited thing, and
that a cause does not precede its
effect except in its quiddity, then
the substance of the effect is the
shadow of the substance of the
cause, and the substantiality of
the cause is more prior than the
substance of the effect. Cause
and effect are common to each
thing, and that which pertains to
the effect is acquired from the
cause. It is like the shadow of
intelligible things. How then can
it be equal to it in
substantiality? Existence is a
mental thing. Therefore, it can
only be prior in quiddity, for the
priority of the substantiality of
the cause is over the
substantiality of the effect. This
 is the doctrine of Plato and the
ancients. They agree that one
soul may be more praiseworthy
than and superior to another
soul in its substance.
We say: Priority in
quiddity is only possible with
respect to the efficient cause, not
the other causes. The effect is only
the shadow of that which is an
efficient cause of its essence and an
efficient cause of its quiddity. It is
not the shadow of the preparatory
conditions (shurūṭ) and
dispositions (mu‘iddāt), for
instance.[135]
Moreover, existence being
among the abstracted, mentally
posited things does not rule out the
priority of the essence with respect
to the stage of its abstracted
existence, which is posterior to the
stage of the substance of the
essence. It [the essence] is the stage
prior to abstracted existence.
To limit [substances] to
priority in quiddity is not sound. It
is surely necessary to ascertain two
modes of priority to the efficient
cause: (1) priority in quiddity with
respect to the stage of the substance
of the essence, and (2) priority by
nature with respect to the stage of
abstracted existence. Truly, the
doctrine of Plato and the ancient
philosophers affirms priority in
quiddity also; there is no reduction
of priority by nature to priority in
quiddity. The leaders of the
Peripatetics and their teachers also
agree in affirming priority in
quiddity—methinks a clear mind
and a sound intellect is incapable of
denying this—to the Originator of
the substance of the quiddity and the
Maker of its essence in relation to
what He has made. They also affirm
it to the essential constituents of the
quiddity in relation to itself, to the
stage of the actualization (fi‘liyya)
of the quiddity in relation to the
stage of existence, to the quiddity
itself in relation to its concomitants,
and to what adheres to the quiddity
itself in the stage of its substance in
relation to what adheres to it
through other than itself.[136] [68]
In regard to the view of
one soul being more praiseworthy
and superior to another soul with
respect to the soul’s reality, and the
intellect being a more perfect
substance than the soul, this stems
from a lack of understanding of the
difference between
substantialization (tajawhur) and
substantiality (jawhariyyat), and
also between being more perfect in
common nature and being more
perfect with respect to the
perfection of the non-shared reality.
The substantialization of the
substance is its simple interrogative
depending upon the Maker in its
real and generally accepted form.
Its substantiality, by the consensus
of the learned, is its compound
interrogative[137] independent of a
cause due to the affirmation of the
essential being to what is essential
to it without depending on a cause
at all. Thus, the substantialization of
man is his simple interrogative, that
is to say, the becoming of himself;
and his substantiality is his
compound interrogative, namely, his
becoming a man. If one substance
precedes another substance, or one
man precedes another man in
quiddity, the meaning of this is his
preceding him with respect to the
simple interrogative. But with
respect to the compound
interrogative, the individual
instances of the quiddity are all
equal. Since the category of
substance is a qualified quiddity not
subsisting in anything, there is no
analogical gradation (tashkīk)
pertaining to it at all, and there is no
substance more perfect with respect
to its substantiality than any other
substance. Indeed, the primary
substance is only more primary and
more prior than the secondary
substances with respect to
substantialization and existence, but
not with respect to substantiality. It
may be that a certain substantial
reality is a complete and perfect
reality with respect to its particular
essence in relation to another
reality whose substance is
[comparatively] deficient, like the
intellect in relation to matter, or
man in relation to horse, but this is
not true with respect to the
characteristic of common essential
substantiality.[138]
 We have expounded upon
the distinction between
substantialization and substantiality
in our book al-Taqdīsāt, and our
companion has done so in the
Interpretation and the Categories of
the Shifā’.

Wamīḍ [2.7.5]
You may ask: Is it not so
that if one thing precedes another
thing in existence, it precedes it
also in necessity, since necessity is
an attribute of existence, while
something which is not necessary
[i.e., the possible] need not exist at
all? Similarly, if it precedes it in
necessity of existence, it precedes it
in existence as well. Why then do
you not consider these two together,
such that the priority in the prior by
nature and the prior in causality
both pertain to it?
It may be replied:
Necessity of existence does not
belong to the posterior by nature,
insofar as it is posterior by nature,
at all, so that its inclusion in the
basis of priority [by nature] might
be inferred, since by this inference
it would not be dependent upon a
complete necessary cause. [69]
Necessity of existence only belongs
to the posterior in being-an-effect
as such, for it is dependent upon a
complete necessary cause.
Therefore, the existence of the prior
in causality and its negation are
assuredly the necessary cause of the
existence of the posterior in being-
an-effect and its negation in the real
world, and the existence of the
posterior in being-an-effect and its
negation are certainly a proof of the
existence of the prior in causality
and its negation in the real world as
well. For this reason, necessity of
existence, which has priority in the
intelligible order, is assigned
strictly to the prior in causality
itself.
 If you ask: Does not the
existence of form (ṣūra) require the
existence of the actual composite,
and with regard to the differentia,
does it not complete the acquisition
of the substance of the quiddity? I
would reply: This is true, but
insofar as the form is the final of the
constituent parts [of the composite]
and the differentia the final of the
essential constituents [of the
quiddity], not insofar as the form is
prior by nature and the differentia
prior in quiddity.

Wamīḍ [2.7.6]
Now a difficult and
abstruse problem arises for you
with respect to the fact that the
differentia is essentially predicated
to the species, though it is clear
through what has been established
that the differentiae of species are,
without reservation, derivative
concepts. They are definitely not
included essentially in any of the
categories which fall under the two
supreme genera: substance and
accident. Therefore, it is necessary
that substantial species, like man
and horse, with respect to the stage
of their quiddity, be outside of the
category of substance.[139] In like
manner, accidental species [with
respect to the stage of their
quiddity] must be outside of the
category of accident.
Pay heed to what we shall
recite to you. The logical differentia
is, without qualification, abstracted.
Such, for example, are “rational,”
“sensible,” “three-dimensioned,”
“continuous,” and “discrete.” The
accidentals are also derivative,
such as “writing” and “laughing”
[with respect to “man”]. A
derivative concept is a certain
indeterminate essence (dhāt
mubhama) to which the source of
derivation is related, in such a way
that the relation to it is considered
as qualifying (taqyīd), but not as a
condition (qayd). The notion
“rational,” for example, which is
the differentia of “man,” is a certain
indeterminate essence whose reality
is rationality, that is to say, [the
ability] to apprehend universals,
such that the relation of rationality
[to man] is considered to be
qualifying, but not a condition.
The differentia of any
genus is the whichness (ayyiyya) of
the species of the genus, and it is no
more than one of the circumstantial
modes (ḥaythiyyāt) of the
determinate species (naw‘
muḥaṣṣal) and one of the aspects
implicit in the nature of the genus,
for, [70] within the boundary of its
nature, it possesses an
indeterminate oneness in relation to
the differentiae and species which
themselves pertain to existence. The
differentia is only predicated to the
species essentially, not as whatness
(mā’iyya), but as whichness.
Consequently, the differentia is not
itself a principal quiddity; rather it
is an aspect contained within the
principal quiddity. The quiddity and
its principality (ta’aṣṣul) are an
aspect of the substance of the reality
with respect to whatness, but not
with respect to whichness. A thing
only enters into a category [of the
two supreme genera] insofar as it is
a quiddity, not insofar as it is the
whichness of a quiddity. Therefore,
the differentia being an essential
predicate of the species is not by
way of “What is it?” but by way of
“Which thing is it in the substance
of its whatness?” The placement of
the species in a particular category,
therefore, is not required by that
aspect, nor is its lack of being in a
category by that aspect at all
contradictory to its being, with
respect to its whatness, in the
category of substance.
Furthermore, that which is
included in a category essentially is
whatever belongs to its determinate,
principal reality, a determinate
species unity after a generic unity.
All the accidentals and the
differentiae of the species without
exception are outside the sum of the
categories. Their relation to the
categories of the two supreme
genera is the relation of a nomadic
tribe to the dwellers of a city, as he
says [by way of analogy] in the
Categories of the Shifā’. So let it be
established.

Wamīḍ [2.7.7]
You are aware, by the
standards of reason and
demonstrative criteria, that it is
impossible to separate the
concomitants of quiddities from
their quiddities in the real world,
for they are substantialized and
determined (mutaqarrara). I mean
to say, the concomitants of the
determination, apart from the
concomitants of existence, are of
three kinds.
The first kind are the
concomitants of the quiddity
according to generally accepted
philosophical usage. These are
concepts in addition to the
substance of the quiddity and apart
from its essential constituents. The
cause of the mixture of the quiddity
with them is the very substance of
the quiddity as such in the stage of
absolute determination (mutlaq al-
taqarrur), just as “evenness”
belongs to four and “angularity”
belongs to triangle. By making here
a certain amount of inclusion in
causality and necessity for the
absolute one of two existences, it
may be that a group of the imitators
has become confused by him
[Dawānī], for he does not
understand the difference between
the concomitants of the quiddity and
the concomitants of existence.
 The second kind are the
concomitants of the determined
quiddity in the stage of its own
substance as such, not through any
external necessity and not with
respect to a requirement of the
substance of the quiddity, like the
characteristic of essential
possibility, [71] or [a requirement
of] its effect, which is the essential
need of an agent belonging to the
substance of the quiddity of the
possible thing. Therefore, although
they are among the accidents, not
among the essential constituents of
the substance of the quiddity, they
are a sister-in-law of the essentials
and their partner, since it is
impossible for the stage of the
quiddity itself to be separated from
them, neither by a cause outside the
quiddity nor by a causality within
the quiddity. In truth, there is no
reality belonging to the concept of
essential possibility, except for the
simple negation of the two extremes
of the determined essence with
respect to its own quiddity as such
at the time it is determined by the
Maker. Hence, it is a simple
negation of the two extremes, but in
favor of a determination and an
existence, not in favor ofa lack and
non-being. Therefore, it is, in
relation to potentiali ty ,
more similar than it to privation
(‘adam). The assertion of simple
negation, insofar as it is simple
negation, is not bound to any
requisite or necessity, but rather its
denotation is only the lack of the
negated concept being affirmed
with respect to the substance of the
quiddity itself.
The third kind are
concomitants from which the
determined quiddity cannot be
separated, however, not with
respect to the substance of the
quiddity itself as such, but due to
dependency upon the efficient cause
for the necessity of the
determination, the necessity of
existence, and existence itself.
Consequently, the priority
of the quiddity itself to these
accidents, and the priority of these
accidents to other consequent
accidents, belongs to the sphere of
priority in quiddity. From this the
priority in quiddity of the negation
[of the two extremes] to existence
with respect to essential creation is
established. Be not then
uninformed.

Wamīḍ [2.7.8]
The insight of our
companion in leadership reached
the utmost degree of truth with
respect to this standard. He
investigated it, as we have
investigated it, in many places in
the Shifā’. He states in the Ishārāt,
in Namaṭ Four:
The quiddity of something may
be a cause for one of its
attributes, although one of its
attributes may also be a cause of
another attribute, like the
differentia (faṣl) in relation to
the property (khāṣṣa).[140] But
it is not possible for the
attribute which is existence to
belong to something
 [essentially]. Rather it [the
belonging of an attribute] is due
to its quiddity, which is not
existence, or due to another
attribute, for this cause is prior
to existence, but not prior in
existence before existence.
His statement “the cause is
[not] prior in existence [before
existence]” means that the cause is
undoubtedly blended with existence
in the stage [72] of causality, even
though existence does not enter into
that which is the cause, which is
itself the determined quiddity,
because existence is the
signification of the determination,
while the object signified, which is
the stage of the determination,
corresponds to it. Thus existence is
the first thing to be abstracted from
the determined quiddity. But it is
not possible that it is one of the
necessary concomitants belonging
to the quiddity itself, as are
concomitants in conventional
philosophical usage.
Yet there is a doubt which
afflicts those who are not
proficient, which is that the quiddity
itself being a cause of its
concomitants necessitates that
something simple be both agent and
patient. This is absurd, because act
is a relation by necessity, while
receptivity is a relation by
possibility. This doubt arises from
the error of taking the same term in
a different sense [which is not
applicable to the context], an error
which was first committed by the
Master of Illumination in the
Muṭāraḥāt, and the Seal of the
Scholars followed him in his
confusion in the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt.
The proficient know that
the two terms “receptivity” (qabūl)
and “act” (fi‘l) have three different
meanings in philosophical usage.
[141] That which the relation by
possibility apart from necessity
pertains to is only receptivity in the
sense of dispositional potentiality,
not receptivity in the sense of
something being qualified by a
certain attribute, even though it be
with respect to the necessity of the
substance of the essence. Our two
companions in instruction and
leadership have confirmed this,
each in his annotations with the
same expression. They say that with
the simple [or uncompounded], the
“from it” (‘an-hi) and the “in it”
(fī-hi) are the same. We have
explained this thoroughly, with
God’s permission, in the books al-
Īmāḍāt wa’l-Tashrīqāt and Taqwīm
al-Īmān. Let it be pondered.

Wamīḍ [2.7.9]
Since we have recited it to
the ear of your heart, you should be
certain with a compounded intellect
and objective certainty that the
absolute existence (wujūd muṭlaq)
shared between all existents, which
in the case of the Necessary Reality
is identical to His essence, is
superadded to the quiddity of
possible quiddities. Thus the
quiddity of the essentially
necessary, Self-Subsisting One
(exalted be His mention) is the very
same as His existence, while the
quiddity of every possible existent
is other than its existence. Is it not
in a definite division circling
between negation and affirmation?
An existent is either a determined
essence by reason of itself, or it is
not a determined essence by reason
of itself, in which case it is from a
Maker who originates the substance
of its essence. If it is a determined
reality by reason of itself, then it is
essentially necessary, but if it is not
a determined reality by reason of
itself but is determined through
another, then it [73] is possible in
quiddity.
You know that existence
(wujūd) is the same as the
attributive existence (mawjūdiyya
maṣdariyya) abstracted from the
determined essence, and its
correspondent (muṭābiq) is the
substance of the essence itself.
Thus, if an essence is determined by
virtue of itself, certainly it is
correct to say that the abstraction of
attributive existence from it and the
predication of the notion of
“existent” to it depend upon itself,
not upon a qualifying circumstantial
mode nor upon a causal
circumstantial mode, for the
relation of “existent” and
“existence” to it [this essence] is
like the relation of “rational
animal” and “humanity” to the
essence of man. This is the criterion
of identity [or sameness] (‘ayniyya)
and its basis. But if it is not
determined by reason of itself, but
is from a Maker who originates it, it
is not correct to say the abstraction
of existence and the predication of
“existent” to it is due to anything but
a causal circumstantial mode, even
if this is not dependent upon a
qualifying circumstantial mode.
This is the criterion of addition
(ziyāda) and its standard.
Therefore, it is established
that concrete, principal existence is
the same as the reality of the
essentially necessary Self-
Subsistent One, while it is
superadded to the quiddity of the
possible essence. By another way,
however, you recognize that it is not
possible for existence to be one of
the concomitants of the quiddity
according to conventional
philosophical usage. Therefore, it is
necessary that the existence of the
Existent by reason of itself in
concrete reality be the same as its
essence and its very reality, in the
same way that the human reality is
identical to the essence of man, not
one of the concomitants of its
quiddity, like “evenness” in relation
to four. Therefore, it is clear that
real existence in the actual world
and objective reality is identical to
the stage of the Essence of the
essentially necessary Self-
Subsistent One (exalted be His
sovereignty).[142]

Wamīḍ [2.7.10]
Have you not heard the
Leader of the Doubters raise this
objection against the philosophers?
They agree that it is impossible
for some of the individuals of
the solitary species nature to be
devoid of matter while others
require it. Based upon this, they
invalidated the separate
dimensions which the exponents
of the void had affirmed along
with the affirmation of primary
matter belonging to the bodies
of the spheres, although its
separation from them is
impossible. They also agree that
it is necessary for the species of
the separate realities
(mufāriqāt) to be in their
individuals, and they
invalidated the Platonic Forms.
If this is proven, then I say that
existence is also a solitary
nature, so that if it is
 independent from conjunction
with the quiddity, then let it be
[74] like this unconditionally,
and if it is in need of it, then let
it be like this unconditionally.
But if it is possible for it to be
free sometimes and conjoined at
others, then why is it not
possible for the species nature
to be material sometimes and
incorporeal at others? This is
one of those things for which
distinction (farq) is not
possible?[143]
This is his raising of a forced
problem. But we say: Perchance
you will be convinced by what we
have established for you in the book
al-Taqdīsāt. We respond to him:
Are you not aware that existence is
no more than attributive existence
abstracted from existents?[144] It is
inconceivable for it to have an
instance (fard), save for the portion
(ḥiṣṣa), and it is not particularized
except by relation to a subject, and
not before the relation. The
correspondent of the abstraction,
from whichever essence or quiddity
it may be, and its basis, its
standard, and its prerequisite, is the
connection of that essence and
quiddity with real Existence (wujūd
ḥaqq) by virtue of itself, a
connection of emanation and
dependency. The particularity
(khuṣūṣiyya) of a certain quiddity
is not involved in the realization
(taṣḥīḥ) of the abstraction at all, for
the particular properties of
quiddities in their entirety are of no
account with respect to this. The
abstraction of existence from the
quiddities is only realized by
reason of their dependency upon
that real Existence which is the
True Existent by virtue of Himself.
The reality of existence, in this
case, is the realization of itself, not
the realization of some thing.
Between the abstracted from and
the correspondent of the abstraction
there is an obvious difference.
Therefore, that which corresponds
to absolute existence in its
absoluteness is the very essence of
the True Existent, and it is
dependent upon Him, no other.
Thus, He (exalted be His glory) is
the existence of every existent in the
sense of the correspondent of the
abstraction in reality. Every existent
other than Him is existent through
Him and non-existent through itself.
In like manner, the doctrine
of individualization (tashakhkhuṣ)
springs from the spring of existence.
Individualization belongs to the
sphere of the question “Who is he?”
The question “who?” is related to
whatness in terms of the species
reality, just as the question
“which?” is related to whatness in
terms of the generic nature.[145]
The True Existent by reason of
Himself (exalted be His
sovereignty) is individualized by
reason of Himself, and through Him
all other individuals are
individualized. Therefore, He
(exalted be His glory) is the
individualization of every
individual, in the same way that He
is the existence of every existent.
The difference between the nature
of existence and the species natures
has now been explained. Let it be
pondered.[146]

Wamīḍ [2.7.11]
Do you not possess a
heavenly nature and a spiritual
disposition? Wherefore, I shall
compose for the reflection of your
intellect a demonstration [75] of the
creation of the Great Man, which is
the Great World in its
comprehensive order and its natural
system—including all of its parts,
members, elements, and
components—by the method of
finding the causes, which is a
demonstration that gives certainty in
accord with reality.
Is it not evident to you,
therefore, that the essential priority
of the essence of the cause, in
particular the efficient cause, to the
essence of the effect, with respect
to the intelligible order, is one of
the self-evident premises of clear
intellects and mature minds? This is
something upon which the entire
company of the philosophers and
the learned agree. The effect is not
existent in the stage of the essence
of the efficient cause, since
existence comes to the essence of
the effect from the essence of the
cause. Simultaneity in existence
only occurs between the cause and
the effect in the stage of the essence
of the effect, and with respect to the
real world, not with respect to the
stage of the essence of the cause.
This Great World with all
the parts of its total system is
definitely posterior to the level of
the essence of the Agent Maker
(exalted be His remembrance).
Since it is clear that real existence
(wujūd aṣīl) in the actual world is
the same as the quiddity of the True
Creator and His very reality, and
the intelligible stage and real
concrete existence, in His case, are
one and the same, and His existence
(glorified be He) in the core of
concrete reality and the heart of the
extra-mental world, is the same in
every respect as the intelligible
stage belonging to His real essence,
therefore, principal existence in the
heart of actual reality in the divine
world is in the station of the stage
of the essence of man or the
quiddity of the intellect, as such, in
the world of contingency.
Therefore, the posteriority
in being-an-effect of the world to
the intelligible stage belonging to
His real essence (exalted be His
sovereignty) is itself a separate
posteriority to Him with respect to
His existence (lauded be He) in the
heart of the real world. And His
causal priority to the world with
respect to the essential order is also
itself a separate priority (taqaddum
infirādī) in the inner dimension of
the real world. The same applies to
the doctrine concerning priority in
quiddity, indeed, essential priority
in general.
Consequently, essential
posteriority to the true first Creator
(glorified be He), whether this be
posteriority in being-an-effect, in
quiddity, or by nature, returns
without reservation to perpetual
separate posteriority (ta’akhkhur
infikākī dahrī). And His essential
priority, whether this be causal,
[76] by quiddity, or by nature,
returns without reservation to
eternal separate priority (taqaddum
infirādī sarmadī).[147] It is not
correct that this state of affairs can
be compared to the sun and its rays
and the essential priority and
posteriority which is between them
with respect to the intelligible
order, and simultaneity in existence
with respect to the real world, as
the tongues of some contend and the
mouths of others exclaim. For you
know that the intelligible stage
belonging to the sun itself as such is
not the same as its existence in the
real world, as it is the way of the
matter in the divine world. The
same applies to the motion of the
hand and the ring, for example.
Open the wings of your intellect to
the truth, and be not of those who
are uninformed.

Wamīḍ [2.7.12]
Similar to this
demonstrative exposition can be
found in the statements of our
companions in leadership and
instruction, where they demonstrate
that it is not possible for the reality
of essential necessity to be either a
generic nature or a species nature.
[The Chief] has expounded upon
this in the Shifā’, the Najāt, and the
Ta‘līqāt, and we have summarized
him in our books al-Taqdīsāt and
al-Taqwīmāt wa’l-Taṣḥīḥāt in these
words:
It is correct for us to say
without reservation that for every
nature, whether it be a genus or a
species, it is not permissible for the
species differentia or the particular
property of the variety or the
individual to enter into its root
notion and give [existence] to its
universal, unqualified essence.
Rather, the basis of its
determinateness (taḥaṣṣul) and the
prerequisite of its actual existence
and essential necessity is no other
than the determination (taqarrur)
and existence itself, along with the
impossibility of nullification and
the preclusion of non-existence with
respect to its very notion and the
nature of its core concept.
Therefore, actual existence can be
likened in this case to colorness and
humanness. How then can it be
dependent upon differentiae,
particular properties, or accidents
in any way?
The essentially necessary
is the absolutely Independent One,
and He does not have a second
existence after what He has in the
stage of His essence corresponding
to His own notion, for existence
does not occur to Him from outside
but rather it is the same as the stage
of His own essence. A color or a
man, aside from colorness or
humanness, has an existence which
depends upon its causes.
Consequently, it is clear that it is
not possible whatsoever for the
essential necessity of determination
and existence to be a characteristic
predicated in common. In sum, it is
necessary for the essentially
necessary Self-Subsisting One to be
one in His reality and individual in
His essence. [77] I do not say
“through the concomitants of His
reality” or “through the accidents of
His essence.” Otherwise His
quiddity would not be identical to
His existence. Therefore, it is not
permissible to say that He is an
unqualified nature, nor that He is an
individual through an unqualified
nature, nor through any
particularizing, individualizing
concomitants. Rather, in His own
essence, He is isolated and
separated from anything which is
not His essence. It is impossible for
His reality to be due to anything
other than His solitary being. He
cannot be qualified as a universal
or an unqualified nature, nor as a
particular or an instance of an
unqualified nature. Rather He is the
Real Unity (wāḥid) in every respect
and the Absolute One (aḥad) in
every way.[148] In like manner, it
is not possible for Him to have a
determinateness and an
individualization after the stage of
His quiddity, because His actual
determinateness is identical to the
stage of His essence. Similarly, it is
inconceivable for Him to have a
posteriority to the stage of His
essence and the stage of His
existence in the inner dimension of
the real world, since [His]
existence in the inner dimension of
the real world is the same as the
stage of His essence and His
quiddity as such. He is isolated in
His essence due to His distinction
in reality from everything else. He
is also isolated in His essence due
to His priority in the inner
dimension of the real world to
everything else. Be not of those
who doubt.

Wamīḍ [2.7.13]
O people! I am supremely
amazed by our two companions in
leadership and instruction, and by
the teacher of the Greek
Peripatetics who gave them this
science, how with their high degree
of skill and excellence and the
superiority of their consciousness
and brilliant intellect, they
advanced far in establishing this
demonstrative proof and verifying
its certain premises, with respect to
sanctifying the First Creator
(glorified be His remembrance)
from a universal quiddity and from
the possibility that His reality
should have a mental existence in
any mind whatsoever, but they then
neglected to apply it to [the
question of] the creation of the
world and the priority of the True
Creator to it, a priority which is
existentially separate in the center
of the real world!
Moreover, I am utterly
dumbfounded that our companion,
the Chief, and the teacher of the
Greeks, should have made a
definitive judgment on the question
of the creation of the world and its
eternity, saying that it is a
dialectical question having two
sides due to lack of demonstrative
proofs on either side. But then on
the question of sanctifying the
essentially necessary Being from a
universal quiddity, they rely upon
this demonstration, which is itself a
demonstration of the creation of the
world in the opinion of those who
reflect and are awakened, and they
repeatedly make statements which
establish it, summarize it, and
clarify its premises and its
definitions. [78]
In brief, their argument in
summary is this. It is impossible for
the reality of essentially necessary
existence to be a universal species
nature or a universal generic nature.
This is because the stage of the
universal quiddity is prior to the
stage of individualization and
determinateness (taḥaṣṣul), since
individualization and
determinateness do not enter into
the stage of the quiddity itself;
rather they enter into the stage of the
existence of the quiddity with
respect to a determinate essence
(dhāt muḥaṣṣal).[149] Thus, there
is no doubt that the stage of
individualization and
determinateness which is identical
to the stage of actual existence in
the real world follows after the
intelligible stage belonging to the
universal quiddity itself. This is
only conceivable insofar as actual
existence in the real world is not
identical to the original substance
of its quiddity. Otherwise, it would
be necessary for the
individualization and the
determinateness to be inferred in
the stage of the universal quiddity
itself, which is groundless and
absurd.
It has been established by
demonstration that actual existence
in the real world is the same as the
reality of the essentially necessary
Being himself. It is not possible in
this case for there to be a second
existence in a posterior stage
following the stage of the reality of
the essentially necessary Being,
neither in the concrete world nor in
the mind, for the intellect is unable
to separate the quiddity from the
core of its essence and the
substance of itself. Thus actual
existence in the real world in this
case [i.e., the case of God’s
existence] is like colorness itself
and humanness itself, for example.
Therefore, it is not possible for the
reality of the essentially necessary
Being to be a generic nature
determined (mutaḥaṣṣala) by a
differentia or a species quiddity
individualized by particular
accidents posterior to the stage of
the universal quiddity, for it is
impossible for the differentia to
give [existence] to the generic
nature itself or for the individual
properties to give [existence] to the
original species quiddity, since the
determinateness, the
individualization, and the real
existence in this case are the stage
of the quiddity itself.
This is their doctrine on
this subject in brevity and summary.
But what happened to them that they
should understand this truth with
respect to differentiae, properties,
and accidents, but neglect it with
respect to other essential and
consequent truths? Remain steadfast
as you are bidden and be not of
those who are heedless.

Wamīḍ [2.7.14]
To express this another
way, if the First Emanated (al-ṣādir
al-awwal) were eternally existent
(sarmadī al-wujūd) in the real
world together with its essentially
necessary Perfect Maker, whose
existence in the inner dimension of
the real world is identical to the
stage of His essence and the root of
His quiddity, then it would be
necessary for the made to be in the
stage of the essence of the Maker
and with Him in the real world in
an essentially simultaneous way
with respect to the stage of His
essence and His quiddity, and it
would be utterly inconceivable for
the essence of the Maker [79] as
such to have an intelligible stage
essentially prior to the essence of
the made and its existence. Is not
the existence of the Maker in the
real world, which the simultaneity
[of the made] corresponds with on
this assumption, identical to the
stage of the essence of the Maker
and the very root of His quiddity,
which is the foundation under the
First Emanated’s reality as such?
Then how is it conceivable for the
essence of the Maker and His
quiddity to have an intelligible
stage apart from the stage of
occurrence (ḥuṣūl) in the real
world, which is what the
simultaneity corresponds with?
[Since this is not conceivable,] it is
then necessary for the stage of the
quiddity of the Maker as such to be
that which the eternal simultaneity
of the Maker and the made pertain
to in the real world, just as it
pertains to the stage of the
occurrence of existence in the real
world. As a result, the essential
priority of the essence of the Maker
to the essence of the made with
respect to the stage of the quiddity
itself would be invalidated. In other
words, the occurrence of existence
in the real world would belong to
the essence of the made
simultaneously with the stage of the
essence of the Maker, which is
itself the stage of the occurrence of
existence belonging to the essence
of the Maker in the real world, a
simultaneity in the essential stage
neither essentially posterior to it
nor posterior in being-an-effect. In
this case, the possible in essence,
which is non-existent within the
boundary of itself, would be
permanently existent in every
respect in the stage of the essence
of the real Necessary Being, and
this would require it to be one of
His essentials, for it is necessary
that whatever does not belong to the
essentials of something not be
affirmed in the stage of its essence.
To accept any of this is
nothing more than relinquishing the
pure innate intellect, departing from
its path, rejecting the consensus of
the learned, and breaking their staff.
It is divesting oneself of a rational
nature and parting company with
human intelligence. Consequently, it
is clear that the priority of the
essentially necessary, eternal Maker
to His first made thing and to the
Great World, which is the sum of
whatever He has made, in terms of
existence in the real world, is an
eternal separate priority, and it is
one of the necessary concomitants
belonging to the particularity of His
essentially necessary Reality, which
is itself principal existence in the
true inner dimension of the real
world. Otherwise, it would be
necessary for the effect to be
included among the essential
constituents of the quiddity of the
agent as such, and the essentially
possible to be one of the essentials
belonging to the reality of the
essentially necessary Being, for it is
necessary for nothing to be in the
stage of the quiddity but its
essentials, while its concomitants
and accidents belong strictly to a
posterior stage by natural necessity.
Adhere to the truth and be
not of them that transgress its
bounds.
 The Third Qabas
The two kinds of separate
posteriority and
constituting the demonstration by
way of eternal priority.

Wamḍa [3.1]
It is known to those who
are educated that extension
(imtidād), which is a continuum of
unfoldment in which it is possible
to hypothesize common parts within
common boundaries, is of two
kinds. The first, which has a
position that can be sensibly
indicated with respect to an ordered
relation between the parts and
extension in various directions, is
called a “fixed extension.” Its
reality is continuous quantity,[150]
which is the measure of the
extension of the corporeal form. It
is continuously extended by reason
of itself in its unfolding dimensions,
which proceed into the directions of
the world of [the physical] creation
(khalq), in other words, the
corporeal world, which includes
the outermost sphere and the totality
of the bodies and corporeal things
contained within it. The second,
which has neither a position that
can be sensibly indicated with
respect to an ordered relation
between its hypothesized parts nor
extension in various directions, is
called “unfixed extension.” By it the
duration of lapsing and renewal is
measured, and the movements of
moving bodies in general. Its reality
is continuous quantity extended by
reason of itself. It is the measure of
the universal circular motion which
is the motion of the outermost
sphere encompassing the whole
universe.
Just as the real directions
belonging to fixed extensions are
two: up and down, which the
outermost sphere delimits with its
circumference and its center, in like
manner, the directions with respect
unfixed extensions are two: past
and future. The outermost sphere
demarcates these two by the
measure of its motion, which is
time. The substratum of time is the
motion of the outermost sphere,
although absolute motion is
measured by it without
qualification.[151] The reality of
absolute motion is nothing more
than going from potency [82] to act
one movement after another by
means of inclining toward
something. It has no quantity except
with respect to distance and time,
and it is only measured by time.
Therefore, only bodies and
corporeal dimensions can occur in
a locus, position, place, and
direction, while only motion and
time are subject to flow and
duration, lapsing and renewal. And
nothing has extension and flow
except through change and
transformation by means of motion
and time.

Wamḍa [3.2]
It is necessary for the
substratum of time to be the fastest
of the motions and the most superior
of them in order for all motions in
their entirety to be measured by it,
and it is necessary for the bearer of
that motion which is the substratum
of time to be a universally
encompassing body in order for all
temporal and spatial things to be
located within it. Time, therefore,
was certainly made to be the
measure of the motion of the
outermost sphere and to inhere
within it. Thus you call the parts of
the area of its motion, by which all
the heavenly things are moved and
which is the regulator of the phases
of the day, “periods” (azmān), and
you call the measure of the rising of
its fifteen parts a “sidereal hour”
(sā‘at mustawiyya).
It is clear to us from the
rules of astronomy that what is
moved by it intersects the number of
degrees belonging to the concave
surface of the outermost sphere (the
number of its declinations is
9,343,093) in a third of a fifth of a
sidereal hour and in one nine-
hundredth of it. This is in the same
measure that someone who counts
from one to thirty intersects the
number of its declinations 155,718
and one-sixth times, and in the same
measure that someone who says
“one” moves 5,196 declinations,
and he is 732 parasangs from its
concave surface. God knows what
its convex surface moves, as there
is no way for mankind to figure out
the measure of the thickness of the
outermost sphere and its exterior
convex dimension from the center
of the earth. No one knows it save
its Fashioner, the Almighty, the
Omniscient. In the opinion of some
astronomers, it moves 2,400
parasangs from its concave surface
in this time. According to what we
mentioned, it moves 36,372,000
parasangs from its concave surface
in a sidereal hour. By that
reckoning, [83] 50,400,000
parasangs.

Wamḍa [3.3]
They say that the outermost
sphere, insofar as it contains bodies
and accidents, and insofar as
powers, souls, spirits, and natures
are connected to it, is a Great Man,
which is obedient to God (exalted
and glorified be He) in its motions,
its positions, its actions, and its
perceptions.
The author of the
Muḥākamāt states:
The sphere may be likened, with
respect to its west-to-east
motion, to a man lying upon his
back, his head in the direction
of the south pole, his right side
facing east, and his face looking
toward the center of heaven.
Thus, the south pole will be
higher and the north pole will
be lower, the east to his right
and the west to his left, the
center of heaven in front and its
opposite behind him. It may be
likened with respect to its east-
to-west motion to a man whose
head is in the direction of the
north pole, his right side facing
west, and so on. We reverse the
four directions but not the front
and the back. Consequently, no
direction belongs to the fixed
dimensions, in reality, except
for up, which is the extension
going from the center to the
circumference, and down,
which is the extension going
from the circumference to the
center. And no direction belongs
to the unfixed, flowing
extensions except for the past
and the future, in other words,
lapsing and renewal with
respect to the two directions of
the beginning and the end. These
are the two extended and
flowing directions of pre-
eternity (azal) and post-eternity
(abad). The outermost sphere
limits the directions of the fixed
extensions by virtue of its
corporeality, and it limits the
flowing extensions by the
measure of its motion. The
supreme sphere contains all
bodies and corporeal things
with respect to themselves and
their directions by means of its
corporeal extension, and it
contains them with respect to
their phases and their motions
by means of the quantity of its
motion.

Wamḍa [3.4]
 Since it is clear that the
substance of the reality of time is
only the measure of a continuous
unfixed state, then it is an entity
which is elapsing and being
renewed in its own reality. It has no
quiddity except for the continuity of
elapsing and renewal, no being
other than the quantity of falling
behind and overtaking, and no
essence besides the measure of the
flow of change. Therefore, it is in
its very reality a continuous unfixed
quantity.
If you should hypothesize
that time has common parts within
common boundaries, which are its
dividers and its nows, [84] it would
be impossible, with respect to
itself, for two of its hypothesized
parts to coexist in any particular
now, as with a continuous fixed
quantity. For if you should
hypothesize that a continuous
quantity has common parts within
common boundaries, which are its
dividers and its points, it would be
impossible, with respect to itself,
for two of its hypothesized parts to
coexist in any particular point.
Therefore, any two parts of time are
the two edges of a particular now,
just as any two parts of a continuous
fixed quantity are the two edges of a
particular point. One of these two
parts, which is the one which is in
the direction of lapsing, is a past in
itself, and it is in its own being
(huwiyya) both prior and a priority
in two respects, not by a priority
added to its being or accidental to
it. The other, which is the one
which is in the direction of
renewal, is a future in itself, and it
is in its own being both posterior
and a posteriority in two respects,
not by a posteriority added to its
being and accidental to it. The same
applies to any two parts of a
continuous fixed quantity. One of
them is prior in spatial extension in
its own being, and the other is
posterior in spatial extension in its
own being.

Wamḍa [3.5]
Just as motion[152]
corresponds precisely to time by in-
ness[153] and is related to it by
being measurable, the same applies
to rest, since it is not the privation
of motion by way of negation but by
way of lack of possession.[154]
Just as it is inconceivable for the
existence of motion to be in a now,
since the only container of its
occurrence is time, the same
applies to rest. It is also measurable
by time and only occurs in time.
Whatever is not in space and time is
sanctified from rest, just as it is
sanctified from motion. Let is be
known.

Wamḍa [3.6]
Know that motion is an
actuality which contains potency in
two ways: (1) With respect to
arriving at that toward which the
motion tends, since there is no
arrival at it as long as there is
motion; (2) with respect to the
completion of its individual being,
since the individual being of every
motion is only complete when it
reaches its goal in the sum of its
individual times confined by the
instant of the beginning and the
instant of the end, and it is not
complete except in the presence of
the end.
Therefore, the substrate
during the time of rest in its state of
dispositional potentiality has three
perfections: (1) motion itself, (2)
the completion of its individual
being with respect to actual arrival,
and (3) the arrival at that toward
which the motion tended. [85] If it
is attired in motion, it has reached
the actuality corresponding to the
first of the perfections which
belonged to it potentially, which is
motion itself. There remains to it
each of the other two perfections
which depend upon actual arrival at
the time of the end. Therefore,
motion has a potential meaning in
these two ways in addition to the
notion of potentiality derived from
the substance of the essence with
respect to the characteristic of
essential possibility, which pertains
as well to all other things which are
essentially possible.
The same applies to the
bearer of the dispositional
potentiality, in other words, prime
matter,[155] which is an actual
existent whose actuality comprises
absolute potency, equivalent to the
absolute disposition within the
boundary of its individual
indeterminate oneness. The
individual indeterminate oneness
belonging to individual existents
has no other substrate than prime
matter. But prime matter does not
actually occur except as an
individual indeterminate essence
which is the bearer of absolute
dispositional potentiality in two
ways.[156] Its essence also has the
notion of potentiality belonging to
the substance of the essence with
respect to the characteristic of
essential possibility whenever it
becomes actual by means of the
efficient cause, as with the essences
of all essential possibilities. The
surety for explaining this doctrine
fully is in the custody of our books
Khulsat al-Malakūt, al-Ufuq al-
Mubīn, and al-Īmāḍāt wa’l-
Tashrīqāt.
It is therefore clear what
they meant by their statement:
“Motion is the first perfection
belonging to what is potential with
respect to what is potential.” And it
is evident that nothing is suitable to
be the substrate of that motion
whose actuality is the actualization
of potency except for prime matter,
the corporeal materiality, which is
the spring of what is potential and
the bearer of absolute potentiality.
[157] Its [motion’s] actuality within
the boundary of its
substantialization is nothing more
than the actualization of absolute
potentiality.

Wamḍa [3.7]
Does not a clear intellect
and an enlightened mind recognize,
prior to the testimony of intuition
and the decree of demonstration,
that an existent in mental
predication is patently either (1)
matter in essence and in existence,
and an object of predication in
entity with respect to dispositional
potentiality in the first creation (al-
fiṭra al-ūlā), and if it becomes
attired with new perfections and
renewed attributes in the second
creation (al-fiṭra al-thāniyya), it is
the substrate of motion and rest, and
connected [86] in reality to time
and space,[158] or (2) it is
immaterial in essence and in
existence, and not connected in
entity to matters and their darkness,
potentialities and their relations. It
has no expected attributes, no
anticipated perfections; it is not
possible for it to be attired in a
particular state of motion or rest,
and it is not connected to space and
time, but rather it is connected to all
times and places, directions and
dimensions, in the same way.

Wamīḍ [3.7.1]
Perchance, by what has
been recited to the ear of your heart
and intoned to the ear of your
intellect, you are assured that the
First Maker, the Necessary Being,
and the Most Holy Essence
(magnified be His sovereignty and
exalted be His testimony) is much
more exalted and lofty than merely
being described by sanctity from
matter and form and transcendence
from time and place, for He, verily,
with respect to the limitations of the
worlds of time and space and the
individual entities of time and
perpetuity with all their details, has
one unquantifiable relation, which
He is not in by entering nor from by
exiting. Nothing of them is in Him
by attachment nor from Him by
manifestation.
Has it not been
demonstrated to you through a lucid
exposition that He (glorified be He)
is identical to real Existence
transcending quiddity, and that
whatever has a quiddity in addition
to existence is an effect? If He is
like this in relation to quiddity, then
what do you think Him to be like in
relation to prime matter (hayūlā)
and its darkness, secondary matter
(mādda)[159] and its accidents,
and duration and its relations?
To express this another
way, is it not evident to every sound
mind that the locus of something, its
bearer, its cause, it maker, it
originator, and its inventor cannot
reasonably be related to it by
occurrence in it or contained in it
by entering it? If time itself is not
existent in time at all, then this is
also impossible for its substrate and
the bearer of its substrate. Since the
transcendent principles, the
heavenly powers, and the
intelligible lights are even more
entitled to this impossibility, then
how do you think it is with the
Creator of the universe and the
Originator of all things?
Therefore, elapsing and
renewal, past and future, extension
and flow, are utterly inconceivable
in the divine world. Nevertheless,
the imagination can only compose
here or there, and was, will be, or
now. It is very difficult for doubting
minds and materialistic souls to
believe in an existence which is
sanctified from [87] dimensions,
exalted above extensions, separated
from all places and limits, times
and nows, and which has a single
relation to all of these things.
However, the whisperings of idle
fancy will not be important after the
completion of the proof.
Moreover, our companion
in leadership states in Book Ten,
Chapter Two, of the Metaphysics of
the Shifā’ on establishing prophecy
and the nature of the mission of the
Prophet:
It is not befitting for him to
occupy them with anything of
the knowledge of God apart
from the knowledge that He is
the Real One, whom nothing is
like. Now if he takes them
farther than this and charges
them to believe in His
existence, which cannot be
pointed to in place, which is not
subject to verbal categorization,
which is neither outside nor
inside the world, and for which
there is no genus, then he has
made their task too great,
complicated their religion, and
suffered them to fall into that for
which there is no escape, except
for one who is assisted and
 confirmed by Him whose
existence is isolated and whose
being is beyond compare.
We have previously related similar
things in our annotations [of the
Shifā’].

Wamīḍ [3.7.2]
Since what we have
established is established for you,
then it is settled that separate
priority does not pertain to essential
relation or dependent connection,
but is only with respect to the
posterior following the existence of
the prior in the real world, not in
the intelligible order. This separate
priority is of two kinds. The first
kind concerns the separation of the
prior and the posterior in temporal
existence, in such a manner that it is
possible for the intellect to
conceive of an extension running
between these two, as a result of
which there will certainly be
something essentially extended
interposed between them, or an
essentially extended boundary
(ṭaraf). This kind of separate
priority is called “quantifiable
priority,” “flowing priority,” and
“temporal priority,” and its object
of relation is called “quantifiable
posteriority,” “flowing
posteriority,” and “temporal
posteriority,” on account of the
subject of this priority and
posteriority, which are essential
and real, not accidental or
figurative, being the entities
(huwiyyāt) of the parts of time
within the boundary of themselves,
and no other. Corresponding to this
mode of priority and posteriority is
extended simultaneity, which is
called “quantifiable simultaneity,”
“flowing simultaneity,” and
“temporal simultaneity.” It is a
concomitant which results in
relation to time or the now by “in-
ness.”
 The other kind concerns
the separation of the prior and the
posterior, not within the horizon of
lapsing and renewal, but in the heart
(ḥāqq) of the real world and the
inner dimension (matn) of the extra-
mental domain, with respect to the
priority of definite real non-
existence to the essence [88] of the
posterior along with the actual
determination (taqarrur) of the
essence of the prior, not in a
particular time and now, and not in
a physical dimension and place, but
in the core (kabd) of the actual
world and the center of the thing
itself. It is not possible to posit an
extension running between these
two, an extended interposition, or
an extended boundary between
them. This kind of separate priority
is called “absolute priority,”
“unquantifiable real priority,” “non-
flowing priority,” and “eternal
priority,” and its object of relation
is called “absolute posteriority,”
“non-flowing real posteriority,”
“unquantifiable posteriority,” and
“perpetual posteriority,” on account
of this mode of priority and
posteriority pertaining to the
eternalness of the prior and the
creation of the posterior in
perpetuity. Corresponding to this
kind of priority and posteriority is
perpetual simultaneity (ma‘iyya
dahrī), which is called
“unquantifiable simultaneity,”
“absolute simultaneity,” and “fixed,
non-flowing simultaneity” due to
the coexistence of two
simultaneities in the heart of
concrete existence, the inner
dimension of the external world,
and the container of real existence,
which is called perpetuity.

Wamīḍ [3.7.3]
Do you possess a mature
and competent mind, unlike the
ordinary minds of the masses?
Apprehend then the similarities and
differences between these two
kinds of priority and posteriority.
The similarities are with
respect to separation (infikāk) in
terms of the isolation of the prior
from the posterior and the
subsequence of the posterior to the
prior, but with respect to the
quantifiable in the temporal
extension and with respect to the
eternal in the real pure world.[160]
This being so is due to considering
isolation and subsequence
themselves, not with respect to an
essential relation and a dependent
connection between the isolated and
the subsequent. Isolation and
subsequence in this case pertain to
objective reality, not the intelligible
stage belonging to the essence itself
as such.
There are a number of
differences. The first is the
reception of intensity and remission
in the quantifiable temporal in
contrast to the pure unquantifiable
absolute. In temporal quantifiable
posteriority, for example, Moses in
relation to Noah is more intense in
posteriority than he is in relation to
Abraham. This is not possible in
real perpetual posteriority, since all
real perpetual posteriorities in the
domain of perpetuity are in the
position of a single posteriority. As
for eternal priority, according to the
people of truth and the partisans of
pure intellect, it is not subject to a
plurality of subjects at all, since
nothing fits this description except
the one true Creator [89] (exalted
be His sovereignty). Yet they [the
Peripatetics] believe by their
whims and conjectures in the
eternalness (tasarmud) of the
primary originated things
(mubda‘āt), and they place the
priority of the eternals to the
perpetually created one and all in
the position of one priority.
 The second is that the
subsequent existence and prior non-
existence of the posterior in time
are two temporalities neither of
which occur within the locus of the
other with respect to the boundary
of priority and posteriority, for they
have two different borders each of
which is separate and distinct from
its opposite. Thus the two
propositions of affirmation and
negation are without reservation
simultaneously true of the temporal
universal. This is not true, however,
of the posterior in perpetuity with
respect to real perpetual
posteriority, because no extension
or succession of boundaries is
conceivable in it. Therefore, in
perpetuity its created existence
certainly falls within the locus of its
prior real non-existence.
The third is that it is
possible for both the prior and the
posterior in time to be existent or
non-existent in time, since both of
these occur in the extension of time.
Temporal non-existence as such
does not require non-existence in
perpetuity, but existence in time is
more particularized than existence
in perpetuity. As for the posterior in
perpetuity, it can only be existent,
since it is not possible for existence
to end and non-existence to reoccur
in perpetuity.[161]
The fourth is that it is not
necessary for the posterior in
perpetuity to be posterior in time
also. As for the posterior in time, if
existence is posterior to non-
existence, it is necessary for it be
perpetually posterior to it also. But
if non-existence is posterior to
existence [in time], it is not
posterior to it in perpetuity as well.
Rather posteriority only pertains to
non-existence within the horizon of
lapsing and renewal.
The fifth is that the
posteriority of existence to non-
existence in time only pertains to
the temporally posterior whose
existence follows what temporally
precedes it in existence, not that
whose entrance into the horizon of
time and whose description by
temporal priority is impossible,
inasmuch as it is inconceivable to
interpose a period of time, an
extended now, or an extended
boundary, whether existential or
imaginary, between a particular
temporal and that which is outside
of the world of change and flow,
which encompasses all times and
limitations in one relation.[162]
Therefore, it is utterly impossible
for it to follow it in this way. As for
the posteriority of existence to non-
existence in perpetuity, it pertains to
the posterior in perpetuity in terms
of a real posteriority (takhalluf
ṣarīḥ) to that which eternally
precedes it in existence, [90] not in
the manner of quantifiable, temporal
posteriority as the deluded minds of
some have imagined.

Wamīḍ [3.7.4]
There is no reality to
eternal simultaneity (ma‘iyya
sarmadiyya) in the opinion of the
Family of God and the partisans of
reality, inasmuch as the first real
Existent (exalted be His
sovereignty) is the sole possessor
of eternal priority. He has eternal
priority in relation to the secondary
existents created in perpetuity,
which are the whole of what is
other than Him dependent upon His
essence (glorified be He). But there
is a real perpetual simultaneity
which belongs to the essences of the
secondary existents, which one and
all exist after their non-existence in
perpetuity.
They [the Peripatetics]
believe in the eternity (sarmad) of
the primary originated things
(mubda‘āt) and claim that His
essence (glorified be He) has an
eternal simultaneity with respect to
the unchanging, primary originated
things. This is a groundless,
misguided conjecture conceived by
a self-deceiving opaque mind. In
the judgment of a clear and logical
mind, however, only God, the true
First Maker, exists in eternity prior
to perpetuity with an eternal
essential priority. All the possible
things (mumkināt), which are His
effects and the things He has made
in their entirety, whether changeless
or changing, exist by reason of His
fashioning (ṣun‘) and His primary
origination (ibdā‘) in perpetuity
posterior to eternity with a
perpetual posteriority. Nothing of
the possible things exists in eternity,
since they in their entirety are
posterior to eternity and
encompassed by it. Nor does the
essentially necessary real Existent
exist in perpetuity, because He is in
eternity prior to perpetuity,
encompassing it, and transcending
it. You know that perpetuity is the
container for the entire extension of
time, and it is encompassed by
eternity and follows it. The eternal
real Existent exists in eternity prior
to both time and perpetuity, and
prior to all things. He is exalted
above occurrence in time and
perpetuity. Let is be reflected upon.

Wamīḍ [3.7.5]
I am astounded by the
author of the Muṭāraḥāt[163] and
his followers, how they were able
to bring it upon themselves to
reduce temporal priority to priority
by nature, holding to the idea that a
prior time is the cause of a latter
time, since creatures result from the
circular motion [of the spheres],
and the motion of each prior part of
it is the cause of a subsequent part
and prior to it by nature. So were it
not for motion from point A to point
B, it would be impossible for
motion to go from point B to point
C, for how can the moved be moved
by what has not yet reached it?
Similar to this is the measure [91]
of this motion by time naturally
preceding the measure of that
motion by time. Is it not clear to
them that the measurable parts
belong to a single continuous
quantity united in existence and
homogeneous in quiddity, and that
their quiddity and their existence is
identical to the quiddity of that
continuous quantity and its
existence. In their entirety they are
hypothetical parts belonging to one
existent, so how is it possible for
there to be a difference between
them with respect to causality and
being-an-effect? Is it not clear to
you that the basis of temporal
priority pertains to a quantifiable
separation between the prior and
the posterior, not an essential
relation and connection of
dependency between them? Were it
possible for causality and being-an-
effect to exist between the parts of
time, it would be possible for them
to have two modes of priority and
posteriority: a temporal one by way
of a quantifiable separation and one
by nature by way of causality and
being-an-effect. Therefore the
reduction of one of them to the other
is a baseless supposition in two
ways. Be not uninformed. They
have posited similar to this for
priority in order as well. Be not
unaware.

Wamīḍ [3.7.6]
I am even more amazed by
those meddlers known as
Mutakallimūn, how it was they
determined to detach the prior in
time essentially from its essential
attribute and make it dependent in
reality upon something which
qualifies it accidentally by an
intellectual figure of speech. This is
because they made the temporal
existents associated with the parts
of time prior and posterior in
reality, and they made the particular
times which try to overtake each
other and follow each other closely
in mutual succession, detached in
reality from the separate, flowing
prior and posterior things, although
they are identical to the entities of
those times as such.
They think that they have
another mode of priority, which is
essential priority, but they do not
understand that there is only a
quantifiable, flowing separation
between temporal things, which
correspond solely to the entities of
the particular times associated with
them. These suppositions do not
deserve to be addressed, yet let it
be established.

Wamīḍ [3.7.7]
The leader of the
Mutakallimūn said in opposition to
the partisans of reality: “The
difference is due to the fact that
time is elapsing by virtue of itself.
For this reason priority and
posteriority, which are accidental to
it [time], are able to dispense with
another time, while priority [92]
and posteriority which are
accidental to something else [i.e.,
motion] are not able to dispense
with it.” There is no advantage to
this, because if the parts of time are
alike in quiddity, the specialization
of some of them to priority but not
the others would be impossible. But
if they are not alike, the separation
of each part from the other would
be by its quiddity. Then time would
not be a continuous quantity but
rather a composite of nows. He
said: “The assertion of the
simultaneity of time with motion
also requires, in similarity to this
explanation, the occurrence of time
in another time.”
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars explains in the
Sharḥ al-Ishārāt:
The answer is that time does not
have a quiddity apart from the
continuity of elapsing and
renewal. This continuity is not
divisible except in the
estimative faculty (wahm), for it
does not have actual parts and it
does not contain any priority or
posteriority in it prior to its
[mental] division. Therefore, if
it is hypothesized to have parts,
priority and posteriority are not
accidents occurring to the parts,
which by reason of these two
accidents become prior and
posterior. Rather, the conception
of non-fixity, which is the
reality of time, necessitates the
conception of priority and
posteriority belonging to the
hypothesized parts due to time’s
non-fixity, not due to anything
else. This is the meaning of the
essential attachment of priority
and posteriority to time. As for
that which has a reality other
than non-fixity with which non-
fixity is associated, like motion
and such things, it only becomes
prior and posterior by
conceiving their occurrence to
it. This is the difference
between what priority and
posteriority attach to by reason
of itself [i.e., time] and what
they attach to by reason of
another [i.e., motion and the
like]. So if we say: “Today and
yesterday,” there is no need for
you to add “today is posterior to
yesterday,” because their very
conception includes this
posteriority. Now if we say:
“non-existence and existence,”
we need to associate the notion
of priority with one of these two
so that it will become prior. As
for simultaneity, the simultaneity
of what is in time in relation to
time is not a temporal
simultaneity, by which I mean
the simultaneity of two things
occurring in one time, for the
first [type of simultaneity]
requires one relation belonging
to a thing which is not time to
time, which is the “when” of
that thing; and the second
requires two relations belonging
to two things which share one
object of relation, which is a
particular time. Therefore, the
first does not require a time
which differs from the two
 objects described as
simultaneous, but it is needed in
the second.
It is clear that as long as a
hypothetical division is not applied
to time, there is nothing in this case
but one entity which is continuously
extended in its own essence, which
exists in the container of perpetuity
as one individual existence. [93]
But if the estimative faculty divides
it into distinct parts, not with
respect to position (waḍ‘), it is
permissible for the entities of these
parts with respect to themselves to
have a quantifiable mode of priority
and posteriority in the flowing
extension of lapsing and renewal,
due to not coexisting in one of the
boundaries of that extension.
Consequently, this mode of priority
and posteriority belongs strictly to
the entities of those parts on account
of the reality of time itself and the
particular characteristics of those
entities, and it only attaches to what
is outside of them belonging to the
remainder of temporal things due to
their association with them, not due
to other than this association. This
mode is called “temporal priority.”
If one of the nows is made a starting
point, another mode of priority and
posteriority applies to those
hypothesized parts as well due to
the difference of their ordered
relation to that starting point by
proximity to or remoteness from it.
This is priority in order. Let is be
recognized.

Wamīḍ [3.7.8]
Therefore, it is not
possible for body, insofar as it is
body, to occur in time, nor insofar
as it is existent, since only the
unfixed state occurs in time, and
this is motion.[164] Thus body,
insofar as it is body, is in place;
insofar as it is existent, it occurs in
perpetuity; and insofar as it changes
and moves, it occurs in time.
Motion with respect to itself occurs
in time essentially, and insofar as it
is existent, it is in perpetuity, as
with time itself. It has continuity
through time, and continuity is
related to it also through continuous
distance. Temporal priority and
posteriority without a doubt
correspond to time, either through
the parts of time, which is itself
both the before and the after, or
through something else, but with
respect to time encompassing the
before and the after. As for
simultaneity, the simultaneity of
motion with respect to time is not
the simultaneity of two temporal
things in their relation to time and
their relation to each other, for the
simultaneity of motion and time is
simply the “when” of motion, that is
to say, motion being in a particular
time. The simultaneity of two
temporal things with respect to
time, and similarly the simultaneity
of one of them with respect to the
other, is that the “when” of one of
them is identical to the “when” of
the other, that is to say, their being
in a single time. The first
simultaneity does not need a time
which is outside of and different
from the two simultaneous things, in
contrast to the second [which does
need a time which is outside of and
different from the two simultaneous
things], since the fact of motion
being in a particular time does not
imply motion and time being in a
particular time. [94]

Wamīḍ [3.7.9]
It is clear to you through
the principles we have set forth that
the relation of a particular existent
to the other existents, i.e., the whole
of what has entered into existence
in general, is either (1) a
quantifiable relation of distance, in
which distances and “wheres”
differ with respect to that relation
by proximity to or remoteness from
it [the particular existent]; or (2) a
quantifiable, temporal, flowing
relation, in which its state in
existence in relation to them [the
other existents] differs with respect
to that relation by simultaneity and
non-simultaneity, because it is
together with some of the individual
things, but not together with others,
and it is not together with the
whole; hence an unfixed,
quantifiable, flowing extension must
certainly occur within that whole;
or (3) an everlasting,
encompassing, unquantifiable, non-
flowing relation, which is outside
of the genus of quantification and
non-quantification, extension and
non-extension, in which the whole
of places, spatial things, “wheres,”
and distances in relation to it [the
particular existent] are, with
respect to that relation, in one way.
Within the boundary of themselves,
they are qualified by quantity and
non-quantity, directions, and
dimensions, but nothing of that is
possible for it, nor in the relation
itself. In like manner, the entities of
time and all temporal things are
equal in existence with respect to it,
for no quantification or extension
occurs in the relation itself
whatsoever, even though part of the
object of relation, within the
boundary of itself, is qualified by
extension and quantification.
It is clear then that those
things separate from the world of
matter, like the universals belonging
to affirmed propositions and their
conceptual parts, and the realities
which we admit in their unqualified
natures only, and the transcendent
incorporeal lights in their natures
and their individualities, are one
and all free from “where” and
“when” and incompatible with a
quantifiable relation of distance or
a quantifiable relation of time. How
much more worthy and deserving
then is the Creator of the heavens
and the earth, in His splendor, His
sanctity, His glory, and His
transcendence, to be exalted and
sanctified above all of this, since
He is the Originator of the
intelligences and souls, the Inventor
of space and time, the Maker of the
quiddities and existences [of
things], and the Creator of the
universe who encompasses all
things.[165]

Wamīḍ [3.7.10]
Does not your innate
knowledge apprise you that a thing
only follows after another temporal
like itself which precedes it in time
in a temporal way? The horizon of
temporal extension unites them, and
they are specialized to two different
boundaries among its boundaries.
But it is not possible or admissible
for that which transcends the
dimensions of time and space [95]
to have priority or posteriority in
time, nor temporal simultaneity. In
like manner, it is not possible or
admissible for it to have priority or
posteriority in place. Similarly, it is
only possible for a temporal
creature (ḥādith zamānī), insofar as
it is a temporal creature, to be
quantifiably posterior to another
temporal creature which was
created before it. There is no other
way for it, insofar as it is a
temporal creature, apart from this.
Moreover, is it not evident and
clear to those endowed with
intelligence, and by the consensus
of all the philosophers and the
learned, that the true First Creator
(exalted be His remembrance) is
prior in existence to this day and to
this daily phenomena, for example,
by reason of a separate priority in
the direction of eternity apart from
His essential priority, with respect
to a causal relation, and that this
creature is posterior to Him in
existence in the direction of
creation in the real world apart
from its essential posteriority, with
respect to a relation of being caused
and with respect to essential
creation. It is clear then that an
absolute, changeless, eternal,
unquantifiable priority belongs to
the Prior by virtue of its eternity in
existence, and a real, perpetual,
unquantifiable posteriority belongs
to the posterior by virtue of its
perpetual creation and the absolute
antecedence of real non-existence
to it in the domain of perpetuity. It
is also clear that the eternally Prior
in existence is prior in eternity to
all temporally generated things, not
insofar as they are temporal
creatures temporally following
quantifiable non-existence, but
insofar as they are perpetual
creatures perpetually following real
non-existence in perpetuity. It is
with respect to His eternal
existence eternally prior to them,
and with respect to their existence
perpetually simultaneous with
themselves.

Wamīḍ [3.7.11]
That which we have
recited to you is agreed upon by our
companions who have preceded us
in this profession. The teacher of
the Greek Peripatetics, Aristotle,
states in Mīmar One of his
Theology, after mentioning what is
in the domain of perpetuity and the
domain of time: “That which
produces one thing after another is
certainly under time, and this is
only in connection to sensible
things. Intelligible existence is a
realm which is entirely without
[temporal and spatial] dimensions.”
Then at the end of the chapter, he
relates this about his master, the
leader of philosophy (praise be
upon him):
We say that when Plato saw that
the majority of the philosophers
had erred in their description of
beings (anniyyāt)—and that
[96] was because when they
desired the knowledge of
unseen beings, they sought it in
this sensible world, since they
dismissed intelligible things and
placed attention upon the
sensible alone, desiring to give
to the sensible all the properties
belonging to both the transient
and the perpetual—when he
saw that they had strayed from
the path which would lead them
to truth and guidance, and that
the material world had
dominated them, he took pity
upon them, bestowed upon them
his grace, and guided them to
the path which would lead them
to the realities of things. Then
he distinguished between the
intelligible and the sensible,
between the natures of
[intelligible] beings and
sensible things; he made the
unseen beings perpetual, never
ceasing from their state; and he
made the sensible things
transient and subject to
generation and corruption.
When he had finished with this
distinction, he said: “The cause
of the unseen beings which have
no bodies and the sensible
things which have bodies is one
and the same, and it is the first
real Being.” He means by this
the Maker, the Creator
(glorified be He).
Then he said: “The
First Maker, who is the cause of
both the perpetual intelligible
beings and the perishable
sensible beings, is the Pure
Good, and nothing is worthy of
the Good except itself.
Whatever good is in the higher
world and the lower world is
not from their nature, nor from
the nature of the intelligible
beings, nor from the nature of
corruptible, sensible beings, but
it is from that higher Nature, and
every intelligible and sensible
nature has its beginning from It.
The Good only issues from the
Creator into the world, because
He is the Originator of things.
From Him life and soul is
spread into this world, and this
world only holds together by
reason of that life and soul
which proceed from the higher
into this world.”…
 Then he said: “The
first real Being is the One who
pours forth life first upon the
Intellect, then upon the Soul, and
then upon natural things. He is
the Creator who is the Pure
Good.”
What is more excellent
and befitting than the way this
philosopher described the
Creator when he said: “He is
the Creator of the Intellect, the
Soul, Nature, and all other
things.” However, it is not
befitting for the hearer of the
philosopher to look at his words
and presume that he is saying
the Creator only created the
creation in time, for, if this is
presumed to be in his words, he
has only expressed this in order
to adhere to the custom [97] of
the ancients, for they were
obliged to mention time at the
beginning of creation, since they
wanted to describe the
generation of things. Thus they
were forced to include time in
their description of generation
and their description of
creation, which is definitely not
in a particular time. The
ancients were only obliged to
mention time in their description
of creation in order to
distinguish between the
transcendent first causes and the
secondary inferior causes.
This is because if a
man desires to explain the cause
and to define it, he is obliged to
mention time, because it
certainly belongs to the cause to
precede its effect. As a
consequence, however, the
hearer imagines that the priority
is in time and that every agent
only produces its effect in time.
But not every cause precedes its
effect in time. If you wish to
know: Is this effect in time or
 not, look to the agent. If it is
subject to time, then the effect is
undoubtedly subject to time. If
the cause is temporal, then the
effect is also temporal. The
[nature of the] agent and the
cause indicate the nature of the
effect, whether it is subject to
time or not.
This concludes the words of
Aristotle in this chapter. In Mīmar
Five, he states: We say that the First
Maker didn’t originate anything by
deliberation (rawiyya) or
meditation (fikr).” Then he says:
“They mean by this that all things
were originated according to the
state they are in now by His primal
wisdom.”[166]
Then he says:
Every effect which the First
Maker produces is complete
and perfect, because He is a
perfect cause beyond which
there is no other cause….It is
befitting for a thinker to think
that the acts of the First Agent
subsist with Him, but nothing is
with Him which is last [or
later]. Rather, the thing which is
with Him is first, while here it
is last, and something is only
last [or later] if it is temporal. A
temporal thing can only be in the
time in which it is proper for it
to be in. As for the First Agent,
He has always been, because
there is no time there. Now if
something is encountered
subsisting in a future time, then
it will certainly only be existent
and subsistent there, just as it
will be in the future. If this is
the case, then that thing existing
in the future is existent and
subsistent there without needing
for its extension or its
completion one of the things.
Things, [98] therefore, with the
Creator (glorified be His
remembrance) are complete and
perfect, whether they be
temporal or atemporal. They are
with Him always. Just as they
were with Him in the beginning,
so likewise they will be with
Him in the end.
In Mīmar Three, he states:
We indeed say that God is the
cause of the Intellect, and the
Intellect is the cause of the Soul,
and the Soul is the cause of
Nature, and Nature is the cause
of all the particular beings.
However, even though some
things are causes of other things,
God (exalted be He) is the
cause of all of them. He is the
cause of some of them without
any intermediary, and these
things are made to be causes, as
we explained previously.
Evidence of this is what we are
now going to explain (God
willing) that something potential
cannot become an actual thing
unless there is another actual
thing which draws it into
actuality. Otherwise, it cannot
be extracted from potentiality
into actuality, since the potential
is unable to become actual
through itself. If it is not
something actual, how can the
potential find its vision? As for
the actual Existent, when He
wills to extract something from
potentiality, He only turns
toward himself, not outside;
then He draws that potentiality
into actuality. He always
remains in the same state,
because He has no need to
become another thing, since He
is what He is actually. When He
wills to extract something from
potentiality into actuality, He
does not need to turn from
himself to outside; rather, He
only looks toward himself, and
then He extracts something from
potentiality into actuality.
 Then he says:
As for the Creator (exalted and
glorified be He), He creates the
existences (anniyyāt) of things
and their forms. However, He
creates some of the forms
without an intermediary, and He
creates other forms with an
intermediary. He only creates
the existences of things and their
forms. He truly is the actual
Existent; indeed, He is pure
actuality. When He acts, He
only looks toward himself, then
He produces His effect (fi‘l) all
at once….As for the First
Agent, He is pure actuality. He
only produces His effect while
He is looking toward himself,
not outside of himself, because
nothing is outside of him which
is higher than him or lower than
him.
It is clear, therefore,
and it is correct, that the
Intellect is before the Soul, the
Soul is before Nature, and
Nature is before those things
which are subject to generation
and corruption. And the First
Agent is before all of these
things. He is the Originator and
the Completer at the same time,
and there is no distinction or
 separation between His act of
primary origination and His act
of completing at all. [99]

In Mīmar Eight he states:

“Subsistence there is perpetual,
without a past time or a future time.
That is because the future there is
present, just as the past there is
present.”
This is what we wanted to
convey from his words and
statements. How very great is his
way in the Theology! He also said
in one of his daily consultations
with Alexander:[167]
He did not bring the creation
into being from any existents
(mawjūdāt), nor did He create
it from prior things. He created
the first principles (ru’us)
according to His desire, and
then created the universal
natures from those principles.
The principles are the origin of
creation and the beginning of
what the Creator called into
being. The natures and what
results from the variation of the
natures are derived from these
principles. The principles are
three. The first and most
excellent of them is form;[168]
the second is matter; and the
third is privation, not in time or
place.[169] The Creator is far
above these things, for He is
their Author and their
Originator.[170] Too exalted is
He for the mind of man to
encompass His grandeur. His
grandeur is not in a place, and
His existence is not in time. His
attributes are beyond
affirmation, His greatness is
immeasurable, and His power
incomparable. Exalted is His
might and peerless His
dominion. According to His
will all things are carried out.
Neither motion nor rest apply to
 Him. Words fall short from
describing His majesty and
human speech is too limited to
reach His essence.
Our companion in
instruction [Al-Fārābī] states in the
Fuṣūṣ:
He is the First inasmuch as
every existence belonging to
other than himself emanates
from Him. He is the First
because He is the first in
existence, and He is the First
due to the fact that every
temporal is related to it [time]
by generation (kawn), as a
consequence of which a time
 existed in which that thing
didn’t exist and then it existed.
In other words, the True One,
the Necessary Being is with
time, not in it….And He is the
Last because every temporal
exists in a time to which He is
posterior and does not exist in a
time posterior to the True One.
He says in his Ta‘līqāt:
“Whatever has a beginning and an
end has a measurable, numerical, or
conceptual difference between
these two. The measurable is like
one time to another, or one now to
another; the numerical is like one
and ten; and the conceptual is like
genus and species. Existence has
neither beginning nor end by virtue
of itself.” Our companion in
leadership [Ibn Sīnā] states in the
Ta‘līqāt:
The cause may be more prior
in existence than the effect,
like the father. [100]
Now two things may be either
simultaneous in existence, in
time, or in a third thing to
which they are related. Cause
and effect are simultaneous
and inseparable, but it is not
possible for them to be so in
existence, because the cause is
prior to the effect in it, nor is it
possible in time, if they are
non-temporals. Hence, they are
simultaneous in correlation,
which is the simultaneity of
necessity, not of existence.
The Necessary Being requires
that His concomitants, which
are His effects, not be
temporally posterior to Him.
He sees each one of the
individual beings, the
accidents, and the forms at
once, and all of them are
distinct in His presence with
their accidents and their forms.
You and I are both distinct in
His presence with our forms,
our accidents, and our
derivative characteristics. In
like manner, all of the
particular solar eclipses are
distinct in His presence with
their forms and their accidents.
He knows each thing according
to how it is in existence,
whether it be universal or
particular, eternal or temporal.
[171] Since He knows
something with its
concomitants, and time with its
concomitants, then He knows
all things together with their
particular times.
Priority in place is when you
posit a rank, like the rank of a
king. All who are closer to him
will be stronger in priority.
Priority in excellence pertains
to ends (or goals ghāyāt); all
who are nearer to them are
stronger in priority. Priority in
time pertains to the now, so
every time which is remoter
from it is stronger in priority.
The priority of the Creator,
who transcends the universe, is
priority in existence and in
relation to it. It is not that
existence is a third thing, but
rather it is itself. You can only
postulate it in the mind as a
 third thing.
In the Book Two, Chapter
Three, of the Demonstration of the
Shifā’, he states: “That which
belongs to one thing and not to
another, and does not belong to the
other unless it belongs to it, belongs
to the first thing first and before
belonging to the other. If you
investigate the kinds of things which
may be said to be “first” or “prior,”
you will find them categorized
under this characteristic either by
nature, by causality, by place, by
time, by nobility, or by something
else.”
His words “or by something
else” clearly allude to other
priorities besides these five. He
intends by this “absolute,
unquantifiable priority” and
“priority in quiddity,” according to
what he has mentioned in a number
of other places. In Book Four,
Chapter One, of the Metaphysics of
the Shifā’, he says concerning the
prior and the posterior, after his
discourse on causal priority [101]:
“The existence of every effect,
therefore, is necessary with the
existence of its cause, and the
existence of a cause necessitates the
existence of the effect. They are
simultaneous in time, in perpetuity,
or in something else. However, they
are not simultaneous with respect to
the occurrence of existence.” He
means by “or in something else,”
here, eternity, as he believed in the
existence of eternal simultaneity.
[172]
Then he said in the chapter on
potentiality and actuality: “These
chapters which we have set forth
give the impression that potentiality
is, without exception, before
actuality and prior to it, not in time
alone.[173] This view was favored
by many of the ancients. Some of
them gave existence to matter
before form, and said that the Agent
then clothed it in form.”
In Book Nine, Chapter One, he
gives a dialectical exposition,
according to their own postulates,
on the falsity of the doctrine of the
Mu‘tazila concerning the creation of
the world. He says: “According to
them, the First precedes the creation
of the world, but not absolutely, for
this notion is posited to the Creator
as extended not from a beginning,
and it is permitted that He create
previously any creation imaginable.
If this is so, this priority is
measurable and quantifiable.”
In the Ta‘līqāt he frequently
characterizes real non-existence
(‘adam ṣarīḥ) as the “absolute non-
thing” in which no quantifiable,
flowing distinction is conceivable,
and he also uses the terms “real
posteriority,” “flowing, quantifiable
posteriority,” “quantifiable, flowing
relation,” and “everlasting,
unquantifiable relation.”
In the Physics of the Shifā’, he
says more than once that only
motions and moved things can be in
time.
As for motion, time belongs to it
through its substance. As for the
moved thing, time belongs to it
through motion. As for the other
things, they are not in time,
although they are with time, like
the universe itself. It is with a
mustard seed, not in it. That
thing which is existent with
time, but it is not in time, and its
existence is together with the
duration of the whole of time, is
perpetuity (dahr). The whole
duration of one existence is in
perpetuity, and I mean by
“duration” (istimrār) here its
existence just as it is
continuously identical through
one point of time after another.
It is as though perpetuity is the
relation of the unchanging to the
changing, and the relation of this
 “with-ness” to perpetuity is like
the relation of that “in-ness” to
time. The relation of some
unchanging things to others, and
the simultaneity (or “with-
ness”) which they have in this
respect, is the meaning of
“beyond perpetuity,” [102] and
it seems that it is the most
deserving to be called
“eternity” (sarmad). Whatever
has permanence (istimrār) of
existence in the sense of the
absolute negation of change,
without being related to one
time after another, is eternity.
His words conclude at the end of
Book Two of the Sam‘ al-Kiyān of
the Physics. He says:
I am amazed at those who say
“Perpetuity is a period of rest,”
or “Time is not measurable by
motion.” A period is not
reasonable, nor a time, which is
not in itself a before and an after
in a quantifiable way. If it has a
before and an after in it in a
quantifiable way, the elapsing of
one state and the renewal of
another is required, as we stated
previously. Therefore, it is not
void of motion, and rest
produces this priority and
posteriority in it, in the way we
 have explained, no other.
In the Physics of the Najāt, he
says:
Whatever exists with time is not
in it. We exist with a grain of
wheat, not in it. But something
existing in time is either
primary, namely, its parts, like
the past and the future and its
dividers, which are the “nows”;
or it is secondary, namely,
motions; or tertiary, namely, the
objects moved, since the objects
moved are in motion, and
motion is in time. Therefore, the
objects moved are in this
respect in time. The “now” is in
time in the same way “one” is in
number. The past and the future
are in it in the same way the
divisions of number are in
number, and the objects moved
are in it in the same way objects
counted are in number.
Whatever is outside of this is
not in time, but, if it may be so
regarded and conceived, with
time. Therefore, it has a
permanence corresponding to
the permanence of time and
what is in it. This relation and
this aspect toward time is called
perpetuity, and consequently
perpetuity encompasses time.
 His student states in the
Taḥṣīl: “These two, namely, cause
and effect, are simultaneous in time
or in perpetuity, but not with respect
to the occurrence of existence.”
The Master of Illumination
states in the Muṭāraḥāt in the
chapter on the prior and the
posterior:
The posterior corresponds to
the prior, and similar to this is
the “with”. Two particular
things which do not have a
temporal priority and
posteriority between them are
simultaneous in time. The
separate universal does not
 precede Zayd in time, nor is it
posterior to him. It is not with
him in time either. The same
applies to others. If two things
are simultaneous in time, it is
necessary for them to be
temporal, in the same way that
that which is simultaneous in
position and place must be
spatial. [103]
He says in the Ḥikmāt al-
Ishrāq: “The cause has logical
priority over the effect, but not
temporal priority. This is called
‘essential priority’. Therefore,
these two, namely, cause and effect,
may be simultaneous in time.”
 One of his commentators
said: “This is true if these two are
temporal. That is why he said “they
may be” like that, because they
equally may not be like that, as with
incorporeal things. However the
case may be, the existence of the
effect is not posterior to the
existence of the complete cause,
whether these two be temporal or
not. From this it is known that its
priority to the effect is not
temporal.”
Then when setting forth the
categories of the prior and the
posterior, the commentator said:
In like manner, the effect
corresponds to the prior and the
posterior. As for [the
simultaneous] in time, this is
clear, like cause and effect. This
does not pertain to incorporeal
things, since they are atemporal.
As for [the simultaneous] in
essence, this is like two effects
of one cause. As for [the
simultaneous] by nature, this is
like two correlates with respect
to the requirement of existence
without one of them being a
cause of the existence of the
other, like double and half, for
instance. As for [the
simultaneous] in position, this is
 like two worshippers in one
line. As for [simultaneous] in
nobility, this is like two students
in the presence of a teacher. It is
not possible for two bodies to
have spatial simultaneity
between them in all respects,
due to the impossibility of their
coexistence in one place.
The commentator of the
Talwīḥāt states, after mentioning the
kinds of priority:
…insofar as the knowledge
belonging to the prior knows the
state of the posterior and the
effect. However, temporal
simultaneity does not apply to
 the separate with respect to the
universal because it is not
temporal. It is not possible for
two bodies to have spatial
simultaneity between them in all
respects, due to the
impossibility of their
coexistence in one place.
The author of the Shajara
al-Ilāhiyya[174] says:
If there is no temporal priority
or posteriority between the
separate from matter by
universalness and another thing,
it follows that these two are
simultaneous, for [temporal]
priority, posteriority, and
 simultaneity in relation to it do
not apply to whatever is not
temporal. Two things to which
temporal simultaneity applies
must be temporal, in the same
way that two things together in
position and place must be
spatial, although it is not
possible for spatial simultaneity
to be between them in all
respects.

Wamīḍ [3.7.12]
Do you not see how he
who prides himself in his
leadership of the doubters[175] is
unable to distinguish between
temporal, quantifiable non-
existence [104] and perpetual real
non-existence. He does not
recognize that the entity (huwiyya)
of this creature subject to
generation and corruption, insofar
as it is a temporal creature whose
existence is specialized to a
particular time, is preceded by its
temporal, durational non-existence
prior to the time of its existence, not
by the non-existence at the core of
the real world. Therefore, in this
respect, the temporal things existent
in time before it only precede it by
means of a temporal order, not an
order transcending the worlds of
time and space. So in this respect, it
is neither with the First Maker
(exalted be His remembrance) nor
posterior to Him in existence,
because, in this respect, it is, from
the start, outside of the genus of
relation to Him (lauded be He) by
priority, posteriority, or
simultaneity. However, insofar as it
is a perpetual creation, whose
existence is preceded by real non-
existence in perpetuity, its essence
is perpetually and unquantifiably
posterior to the essence of the true
Creator in existence, and all the
other creatures before it or after it,
with respect to their real
posteriority in existence to the
existence of the Agent Maker
(glorified be He), are in its station.
He is only caviling against
the intuitive philosophers
(muta’allihūn),[176] because they
have no way out of this narrow
strait. He has related the Most Holy,
the True One, to His temporal
effects, and time to the temporal
things which are in it or with it. He
says the following in most of his
books, like the Mulakhkhaṣ, the
Muḥaṣṣal, the Sharḥ ‘Uyūn al-
Ḥikmat, the al-Mabāḥith al-
Mashriqiyya, and others: “It is
known that the non-existence of a
temporal creature is prior to its
existence. There is no doubt that the
Creator was existent with the non-
existence of this creature, as He is
now existent with its existence. So
if the non-existence of the creature
is prior to its existence in time, the
non-existence of each of the parts of
time would be prior to its existence
in time, and the Creator would be
prior in time to this part of time,
such as this day, and to this
creature, for instance, in this day.
Therefore, it follows that God
(exalted be He) is temporal, and
that time is temporal.” These are
two absurd conclusions.
 The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars demolished the
edifice of his confusion with these
words of his in the Naqd al-
Muḥaṣṣal:
The philosophers and the wise
say that priority and posteriority
are attached to time by virtue of
itself, and to other than time by
reason of time. Since time does
not enter into the conception of
existence and non-existence,
these two require a particular
time in order for them to be
after or before. As for the parts
of time, they only need
themselves. Non-existence in
 relation to them [105] is only in
its being after or before them.
As for the Creator and whatever
is the cause of time or a
condition of its existence, it is
neither in time nor with it,
except in the imagination, since
the estimative faculty compares
them to temporals. This is what
they say on this subject.
The Leader of the
Doubters responds in the Muḥaṣṣal,
saying:
If you say: The relation of the
changing to the changing is time,
the relation of the changing to
the unchanging is perpetuity, and
the relation of the unchanging to
the unchanging is eternity, I say:
This exaggeration (tahwīl) is
void of substance (taḥṣīl),
because I have proved that if the
notion of “was” and “will be”
were something existent in the
real world, it would either be
essentially fixed, requiring it not
to exist among the changing
things; [or it would be
essentially unfixed, requiring it
not to exist with the changeless
things]. If it is essentially
unfixed, [its existence among the
changeless] is impossible; and
if it is changing, its existence
 among changeless is
impossible.[177] This division
cannot be refuted.
The Seal of the Most Excellent
Scholars responds back in the Naqd
al-Muḥaṣṣal, saying:
I say: There is no doubt that the
occurrence of motion with time
is not like the occurrence of an
essentially fixed, continuously
existing body with time, nor like
the occurrence of a fixed
enduring essence with a fixed
enduring essence, like the
heavens with the earth. This
distinction is an inferred
concept, whether it be an
exaggeration or not. However,
the simultaneity of the changing
with the unchanging is not
impossible, since we say that
Noah lived for one thousand
years, and the period of his
persistence (baqā’)
corresponds to one thousand
revolutions of the sun. If a
difference of meanings is
acknowledged, then it belongs
to those who establish technical
terminology to express each
meaning with one word, seeing
that it is suitable to that meaning
and not meaning by “acquiring
knowledge” (taḥṣīl) anything
 but the pointing of words to
meanings.
The crux of his inquiry is
that the changing is changing insofar
as it occurs in time, not insofar as it
occurs in perpetuity. The
simultaneity of the unchanging in
relation to it is with respect to
perpetuity, not with respect to time.
He has made similar investigations
more than once. Now the truth has
come to light and the doubt has
faded away.
The Leader of the
Doubters in the Muḥaṣṣal returns
once again to his deviations from
the straight path, and he does not
recognize that the priority of some
of the parts of time to others is a
temporal priority belonging to the
essence of the prior and the
posterior itself [i.e., time] on
account of time being an elapsing
and renewing reality [in itself]. God
(glorified be He) is far exalted in
His essence above that. [106] Thus,
he says with respect to making the
creation of the world possible: If it
is possible for some of the parts of
time to precede others not in time,
then why is it not possible for the
essence of God to precede the
world not in time?[178]
The Brilliant Scholar
responds to him with a decisive
word on priority according to the
custom of inquiry. He says:
His answer is that the priority of
the Creator transcending the
world is like the priority of
some of the parts of time to
other parts, and what is asserted
against this position has been
mentioned. The truth is that the
Creator (exalted be He) is not a
temporal thing. Time itself is
one of His primary originations.
The estimative faculty compares
what is not in time to what is in
time, the same as with transit in
space. Just as the intellect
 rejects the application of spatial
priority to the Creator, in like
manner it rejects the application
of temporal priority to Him.
Indeed, it is necessary to say
that the Creator has a priority
outside of the two categories [of
space and time], although it is
difficult for the estimative
faculty to apprehend it.
He also states in the
Muḥaṣṣal in denial of the existence
of relations: “Every creature is
created, for God indeed is existent
with it in that time. Were that
simultaneity an existential attribute
[as opposed to temporal], the
creation of the attribute in the
essence of God would be
required.”
The Brilliant Scholar
points out the falsity of this
statement, saying: “The
philosophers say that God has
relational attributes, like First and
Last, Creator, Provider, Originator,
Fashioner, and others.[179] They
pledge themselves to uphold these
attributes, which are neither
simultaneous nor temporal, for
God.”

Wamīḍ [3.7.13]
The Leader of the
Doubters in the Mulakhkhaṣ
walked upon his path, and he said:
It should not be said that the
simultaneity of two changing
things is time, that the
simultaneity of the changing
with the unchanging is
perpetuity, and that the
simultaneity of the unchanging
with the unchanging is eternity.
We say that there is no dispute
regarding these dreadful names,
but we affirm that simultaneity
is a concept, for this state is not
realized except for the sake of
another existent. Whether you
call it “time,” “perpetuity,” or
 “eternity,” an infinite series is
entailed.[180] Otherwise, the
doctrine of the existence of time
is invalidated.
The commentator of the
Mulakhkhaṣ stated in imitation:
Know that the Master set forth
in the Shifā’ what is thought to
be [107] an answer to this
doubt. The Leader mentioned it
in this way. We will explain
what the Master stated with
clear words, and we will make
known thereby what the Leader
mentioned. Therefore, we say
about existents: either (1) a
priority belongs to some of their
parts over others, as with all the
species of changing things and
motions, or (2) it is not like this,
but rather their parts exist
continuously and they coexist
together.
If it is the first option,
its existence is in a particular
time, that is to say, its existence
corresponds to a particular
time, the existence of what is
prior to it corresponds to a
particular time, and the
existence of what is posterior to
it corresponds to yet another
time posterior to the time to
which the existence of the prior
corresponds. It is not possible
for the existence of the prior or
the existence of the posterior to
correspond to the divider of
time, which is the now, nor for
the prior and the posterior to
correspond simultaneously with
one time, whether prior or
posterior. Indeed, the
assumption of parts belonging to
that existent corresponds to the
assumption of parts belonging to
that time. It may be said that this
thing is existent in time, and the
relation of some of these
existents to others by
simultaneity, priority, and
posteriority is time.
If it is the second
option, which is that of existents
whose parts exist continuously
and coexist together, their
existence is not in time. In other
words, nothing in them
corresponds to the prior
belonging to time, and nothing in
them corresponds to the
posterior belonging to time, for
their existence is a continuous,
unchanging existence. It may not
be said that any part of them
exists in time, but it may be said
of the whole of them that it
exists with time. There is a
distinction between these two.
Thus, each one of the existing
individuals belonging to “man”
exists with another individual,
though nothing of them exists in
it. The relation of these existents
to the first category, in other
words, to the changing existents
which require parts by
simultaneity, priority, and
posteriority, is called
perpetuity. It may be said about
the likes of these existents that
they exist in perpetuity. As for
eternity, it consists of the
permanent relation of some
primary originated things to
 others by simultaneity, priority,
or posteriority, like the relation
of certain intelligences to others
in one of these three ways.
This is what the
commentator said in interpretation
of the Master’s discourse, and this
is how he set it forth also in his
commentary of the Muḥaṣṣal. Next
he elucidated the doctrine of his
leader, the author [Rāzī], in arguing
against him [Ibn Sīnā], and he
explained the reason for his
refutation. [108]
We say that the relation of
the changeless to the changing by
posteriority to it in perpetuity is
unintelligible, for its relation to it
can only be by priority or
simultaneity. In like manner, the
relation of some of the intelligences
to others by priority and
posteriority is inconceivable,
because the relation of some of
them to others in only by an
unquantifiable simultaneity, no
other. And their relation in their
entirety to their Agent Maker is by
perpetual posteriority due to the
priority of their real non-existence
in perpetuity, or by perpetual
simultaneity due to their existence
occurring in perpetuity. According
to the opinion of those who believe
in the eternity of primary originated
things, their relation to their true
Originator is by eternal
simultaneity. Furthermore, the
object of relation of eternal priority
is perpetual posteriority, not eternal
posteriority, just as the object of
relation of causal priority is
posteriority in being-an-effect, not
causal posteriority.
These are the reasons for
the errors committed by the
commentator of the Mulakhkhaṣ
and the Muḥaṣṣal with respect to
understanding the meaning of this
august and lofty subject. In
salvation from some of them, one of
the honored followers in the Sharḥ
al-Muwāqif, where the author went
far in following the Leader of the
Doubters in deviation from the true
path, said in reporting the argument
of the people of truth:
If an existent has a continuous,
unfixed being, like motion, it
includes the non-coexisting
prior and posterior. Therefore,
it has, in this respect, an unfixed
quantity, which is time. That
being, therefore, corresponds to
that quantity, and the prior part
of it corresponds to a prior
time, and the posterior part of it
corresponds to a posterior time.
This kind of existent, called “the
gradually changing,” does not
exist without corresponding to
time. The instantaneously
changing only occurs in a
“now,” which is the divider of
time. It also does not exist
without time. As for the
changeless things in which there
is no change at all, neither
gradually nor instantaneously,
although they are with the time
occurring to changing things,
nevertheless, they are
independent from time within
the boundary of themselves, in
such wise that were their
essences to be examined, it
would be possible for them to
exist without time. Therefore, if
one changing thing is related to
another changing thing by
simultaneity or priority, then
time without a doubt will be on
each of its two sides. If a
changeless thing is related to a
changing thing by these two,
then time without a doubt will
be on one of its two sides but
not on the other. If a changeless
thing is related to a changeless
thing by simultaneity, then both
of its sides will be independent
of time, even if they are
 associated with it.
These are differing
intelligent notions, which he
expressed with different
expressions to indicate their
difference. If [109] they are
pondered, what Abu’l-Barakāt
believed will be refuted, namely
that time is the measure of
existence. This is where he said:
“The persistence (baqā’) of the
persisting is inconceivable except
in time. Certainly the persistence of
that whose occurrence is not in
time, and which is persistent, has a
measure belonging to time.”[181]
One of the meticulous
among the imitators stated in his
epistle Unmūdhaj al-‘Ulūm:
The doctrine of the philosophers
is that among the existents is that
whose existence is temporal,
like motion; and among them is
that whose existence is in a
“now.” Indeed, among them,
according to them, is that whose
existence is contained neither by
time nor by the “now,” but they
ascribe its existence to
perpetuity and eternity. They say
that the relation of the changing
to the changing is time, the
relation of the changeless to the
changing is perpetuity, and the
relation of the unchanging to the
unchanging is eternity, as is
clear to those who know their
principles. Since existence is
more general than the four
categories, the claim of its
restriction to two of them is
absurd.
Then he said:
The priority of the Necessary
Being is not a temporal priority,
since He is not in a particular
time. The philosophers also
recognize this, for they say that
incorporeal things are not in
time, but are in perpetuity,
which is the container of time
and encompasses it. Just as the
denial of anything beyond
spatial extension does not
require its infinity, in like
manner, the denial of anything
prior to temporal extension does
not require its infinity, for time
is restricted to where the world
exists. Temporal priority and
temporal posteriority only
belong to the parts of the
corporeal world, some of them
together with others. As for
what is other than bodies and
corporeal things, they do not
have any temporal priority or
posteriority in them, just as they
do not have any spatial priority
or posteriority in them. Just as
there is neither void nor plenum
above the encompassing sphere,
inasmuch as there is nothing
above it, in like manner, there is
no time before the existence and
non-existence of the world,
[182] inasmuch as it has no
before. The infinity of time is
not implied by this, just as the
infinity of space was not
implied by the former. Rather,
time is finite, just as space is
finite, without any separation
[between them]. For the
estimative faculty to maintain
the infinity of time is the same
as maintaining the infinity of
space. Just as there is no benefit
in maintaining it for space, there
is no benefit in maintaining it
for time. This is the narrow path
which some of the learned
tread, such as our Leader, the
Proof of Islam, in some of his
writings, Shahrastānī, ‘Ayn al-
Quḍāt, and others among the
Mutakallimūn and the Sufis. He
has alluded to this in the Tajrīd.
[110]

Wamīḍ [3.7.14]
Have you heard him say in al-
Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyya:
In this regard, there is another
problem, and it is that they
claim that the categories of
simultaneity correspond to the
categories of priority and
posteriority. Thus they claim
that the categories of priority
and posteriority are five, as a
consequence of which the
categories of simultaneity are
five. Moreover, they establish
these two kinds of simultaneity
as well: simultaneity in
perpetuity and simultaneity in
eternity. This contradicts what
is said.
 Why not say to him: What
has happened to you, O leader of
your companions? Does not making
the categories of priority and
posteriority seven agree with what
we have recited to you? This is
something which has been
repeatedly mentioned, established,
expounded in detail, and clarified
in their discourses, their arguments,
their writings, and their treatises.
We do not think that you are
uninformed, with your broad range
of interests and your ample study of
their books and writings, in your
ascription to them of only five
categories, but methinks in this you
are affecting ignorance. If the
problem is pressed, that
establishing two kinds of
simultaneity, which are perpetual
simultaneity and eternal
simultaneity, will require the
categories of simultaneity to be
eight, and the restricting of priority
and posteriority to seven kinds is a
rational, logical restriction, it
follows then that among the
simultaneities there will be one
which does not have a
corresponding priority and
posteriority.[183] Thus their
judgment that the kinds of
simultaneity correspond to [all] the
kinds of priority and posteriority is
refuted. Hearken to that which is
going to be recited to you.
We have already apprised
you that the difference of the kinds
of priority corresponds to the
difference of the notion which is the
basis of the priority. In like manner,
know that the difference of the kinds
of simultaneity corresponds to the
difference of the notion which is the
basis of the simultaneity. Consider
this: If the basis of priority in a
separate, extensional priority
requires the interposition of a
particular time or “now” between
the prior and the posterior, then this
separate priority is a quantifiable,
temporal priority and posteriority.
If the basis [of priority] is not
coexistence in the real world, nor
within the horizon of extension and
non-extension, in such wise that the
interposition of a particular time or
now between them cannot be
imagined whatsoever, then this
separate priority, which is absolute
and unquantifiable, is an eternal
priority and a perpetual
posteriority. In the same way, if the
basis of simultaneity is the
coexistence of two simultaneous
things in a particular time according
to progression, as with terminal
motions, or not according to
progression, as with medial
motions,[184] or in a now which is
the divider of time, as with
instantaneous things, then this
simultaneity is a quantifiable, [111]
temporal simultaneity. If the basis
[of simultaneity] is coexistence in
the real world with respect to
absolute, real, changeless existence
in perpetuity, then this simultaneity
is a real, absolute, unquantifiable
simultaneity, either perpetual, if the
existence of one of the two
simultaneous things is preceded by
its real non-existence in perpetuity;
or eternal, if the two simultaneous
things are eternal in existence.
Therefore, the notion of
unquantifiable simultaneity in
perpetual simultaneity and eternal
simultaneity has the same meaning.
In like manner, the basis of real,
non-extensional simultaneity with
respect to these two is a single
attribute in accord with one way.
Eternity and non-eternity
(sarmadiyya wa lā sarmadiyya)
consist of the difference of the state
of the two simultaneous things by
reason of preexistence (qidam) or
origination (ḥudūth). This does not
require a difference in the notion
which is the basis of simultaneity
and the criterion of their belonging
to one kind. This is like when two
simultaneous things in quantifiable,
temporal simultaneity are two
preexistents in time or two
creatures in time, and equal or
different in the length of the time of
existence or its shortness. The kind
of temporal simultaneity in all this
is not different at all. Rather, the
only difference is in the state of the
two simultaneous things, and this
does not require a difference in the
basis of the kind of simultaneity.
Therefore, it is settled that
simultaneity is of to seven kinds
with respect to priority and
posteriority. Let it be considered
carefully.

Wamīḍ [3.7.15]
Priority in causality and
posteriority in being-an-effect
correspond to simultaneity in
causality or simultaneity in being-
an-effect, but establishing this
requires a recondite inquiry, since it
is not possible for a single
complete cause to have two effects
in the same stage. It is not at all like
a single effect of two complete
causes. The path has become clear
in this regard in the Īmāḍāt wa’l-
Tashrīqāt. Perhaps the argument
will carry over to it presently, if
God, the Almighty, the All-
Knowing, wills it.[185]

Wamīḍ [3.7.16]
Methinks the time has
come to compose a demonstration
of the creation of the Great Man,
which is the Great World with all of
its parts in its natural system, by
way of eternal priority, for the
consideration of your discerning
mind. Now reflect! If it is clear that
the Agent Maker (magnified be His
sovereignty) is absolutely and
eternally prior to this temporal
creature (ḥādith yawmī), for
example, and that this creature is
really and perpetually posterior to
Him, it would be impossible to
interpose between it and the true
Creator a time, now, hypothetical
extension, or [112] extended
hypothetical boundary. Otherwise,
it would be necessary for the Real,
the Most Holy, to be temporal,
material, and encompassed by the
attachments of matter and the
accidents of nature. Immeasurably
exalted is He from that! It is evident
then that all of the objects of His
knowledge from primary originated
things to generated things in their
entirety are necessarily in the
position of this temporal creature
with respect to their real
unquantifiable posteriority to the
Originator and Agent due to the
antecedence of real non-existence
in perpetuity. Otherwise, it would
be necessary to conceive of
extension in perpetuity, and
perpetuity would consequently be
transformed into time. The
changeless would become
changeable, the fixed flowing, and
the everlasting relation a
measurable one. All of this is
absurd and groundless by innate
judgment and logical necessity.
If you divide the world
into generated things and primary
originated things based upon
perpetual creation and existential
eternity, would not the emanating
Maker have in relation to the
primary originated a pre-eternal,
eternal simultaneity, and in relation
to the generated a created, perpetual
simultaneity? Consequently, the
boundary of that pre-eternal
simultaneity in perpetuity would be
distinct and separate from the
boundary of this created
simultaneity. Thus one boundary
and another would occur in
perpetuity due to the eternity of the
primary originated things and the
creation of the generated things
which exist all together in
perpetuity. Then measure and
extension would be implied in
perpetuity due to the two
boundaries which are distinct from
each other, since a boundary which
is the antecedence of pre-eternal,
permanent simultaneity in existence
in perpetuity first is certainly
distinct from a boundary which is
the subsequence of changeless,
created simultaneity in actual
existence later. It would be
necessary, therefore, for the relation
of the true Creator (exalted be His
glory) to what is outside of His
essence to be a quantifiable
relation, and for the relation of the
primary originated and the relation
of the generated to be two attributes
belonging to His real essence in
every respect according to
antecedence and subsequence.
Moreover, progression and flow
would be implied in His conditions,
His emanations (ifāḍāt), and His
relations. Thus His emanation could
not be by virtue of relation to each
thing according to an everlasting
relation and a changeless mode.
Granting this is indeed persistence
in error, turning aside from wisdom,
affirming eternity to the possible,
caused essence, making partners
with God, and association with the
Maker.

Wamīḍ [3.7.17]
If the estimative faculty
should disturb you with the idea that
extension should exist in perpetuity
and renewal should pertain to
attributes of the Lord, the singling
out of eternity to the primary
originated would not be faulty, for
the consequence would fall upon
every state, since God, according to
[113] the theory of the [temporal]
creation of the world is also
existent first with the non-existence
of the world in perpetuity and then
He is existent with the world after
its creation in perpetuity later.
Therefore, the estimation of
extension in perpetuity follows with
respect to this and the renewal of
the attribute of emanation belonging
to the Lord after non-emanation. [If
you should affirm this,] we hold
firm against you in the path of truth
by the leave of God, lauded be He.
In the first place, non-
existence is not a thing, so it is
impossible to posit simultaneity in
relation to it, for its reality is sheer
non-being and absence, not a thing
which is characterized by “non-
being” and “absence,” contrary to
how it is with regard to existent,
changeless, primary originated
things.
In the second place, the
existence of God is not in
perpetuity, for His essence
transcends time and perpetuity. The
primary originated things, on the
other hand, exist in perpetuity.
Although perpetuity and eternity
share in the attribute of pure
changelessness and transcendence
from the horizon of elapsing and
renewal, extension and non-
extension, nevertheless, they differ
with respect to the predication of
the antecedence of real non-
existence in perpetuity, either
actually or possibly, not in eternity.
For this reason, changing things in
their entirety do not exist in eternity
but in perpetuity, but only insofar as
they are changeless, not insofar as
they are changeable, for insofar as
they are changeable, they exist in
time.
It is evident and clear then
that eternity is restricted to God
(glorified be He), and no possible
things exist there at all. Perpetuity
is specialized to the essential
possibilities of things. The
Necessary Being is essentially
exalted above occurrence in
perpetuity. Time is specialized to
material things and possible things
with respect to dispositional
possibility. No aspect of the
existence of the purely separate
things is related to it [time] by in-
ness or simultaneity leading to in-
ness.
Consequently, since the
primary originated and the
generated exist altogether in
perpetuity, were they to differ by
eternity (qidam) and creation
(ḥudūth) in perpetuity, it would be
necessary to allow the postulation
of extension in perpetuity, and the
relation between the existents in
perpetuity would be different with
respect to the true Creator by virtue
of simultaneity and non-
simultaneity, as a result of which it
would necessarily be a
quantifiable, extensional relation.
But if they in their entirety exist in
perpetuity after real non-existence,
neither existing in eternity in pre-
eternity nor in post-eternity, they
would be one and all, by reason of
that simultaneity, in a single relation
and in one stage, and the Agent
Maker would be, with respect to
His real, eternal, emanating
essence, eternally prior to all of
them without His existence
occurring at all in perpetuity, but
rather encompassing perpetuity
[114] and time, and absolutely
exalted above occurrence in them
and connection to them. But with
respect to their caused essences
permanently existing in perpetuity
after their real non-existence, He is
perpetually with them. Hence, there
is no extension in perpetuity and no
quantification in the relation.
In the third place, the
negation of one thing from another
thing requires the realization of
something negated and an object of
negation prior to the negation, and
the affirmation of the object of
negation alone is not sufficient for
it. The same applies to the relation
of one thing to another thing and the
qualification of one thing by another
thing. For these are things which are
not realizable with the existence of
one thing only; rather the existence
of certain things preceding them are
necessary above and beyond a
single essence.[186] Therefore,
since only the true Maker exists in
His eternity, His relation to a thing
is not realizable, and there can be
no negation of something from Him
whatsoever. Moreover, He
originated all the existents and
caused them to emanate all at once
in the container of existence and
immutability which is perpetuity, as
a result of which the truth of a
proposition which predicates
“being” (mawjūd) to them pertains
wholly to the general absolute[187]
in perpetuity. Consequently, how
can His real essence have two
attributes which are claimed to
have antecedence and subsequence
in perpetuity and whose common
factor is characterized by
occurrence by means of trying to
overtake each other and following
each other closely? This is that
which they designate as “change,”
“transformation,” “progression,”
and “succession.”
For this reason, he [Ibn
Sīnā] asserted in the Categories and
in the Metaphysics of the Shifā’ that
with respect to priority and
posteriority in time, and with
respect to what resembles them—
and he means by “what resembles
them” eternal priority and its object
of relation which is perpetual
posteriority—that only the priority
and the posteriority of two
correlatives are realized. If the
existence of the essences of the two
subjects is fully realized, there is
not a moment in which the two
extremes of the relation are not
existent together. Therefore, it is
only possible to qualify the prior
existent by actual priority when the
prior enters into existence.
Consequently, it is that by which the
posteriority of the posterior is its
prior non-existence together with
the existence of the prior, and that
by which simultaneity is its
subsequent existence actually
occurring together with the
existence of the prior.
In the fourth place, the
existence of all made things without
exception is based upon the
assumption that perpetual creation
encompasses them, and that it
occurs in place of real non-
existence in the container of
immutability which is perpetuity,
occurring within its domain, not in a
posterior boundary distinct and
separate from its boundary. The
boundary of emanation in perpetuity
is not separate from the boundary of
non-emanation. Trying to overtake
each other and following each other
closely with respect to two
boundaries [as occurs in time] is
inconceivable in perpetuity,
contrary to how it would be if [115]
some of the made things and not
others were eternal, for this would
necessitate two existent emanations
having two separate boundaries in
perpetuity, even if the determination
(taqarrur) of the two emanations is
in the essence of the real Emanator.
The occurrence of two emanations
in this regard would definitely be
through antecedence and
subsequence. In short, between the
two cases of creation in perpetuity
encompassing all possible things
and its specialization to the
generated among them apart from
the primary originated there is a
clear distinction in an evident way
which may be settled by exposition
and demonstration. Therefore, that
which remains to the estimative
faculty over which it has power is
that it may be asked and said: “Why
did not the agent Emanator emanate
the things He has made and His
effects altogether in eternity?” To
this it may be replied that this is not
due to the Maker holding back, but
rather it is due to the deficiency of
the made things themselves and the
inadequacy of their quiddities to
receive the emanation, on account
of the nature of possibility. Let it be
pondered.

Wamīḍ [3.7.18]
Since the truth has become
clear to you in an evident way, it is
manifest that the question of the two
kinds of separate priority, which
are temporal priority and eternal
priority, concerns the dependency
of priority and posteriority upon the
essence of the before and the after
themselves, in one way, for this is
another commonality between them
apart from the commonalities which
we already mentioned.
This, as has been
demonstrated, is in the same way
that only the entities of the parts of
time deriving from the substance of
the elapsing and renewing reality
can be described by priority and
posteriority in time in reality.
Therefore, it is impossible for the
prior in time to exchange places
with the posterior in time, although
this is possible for the prior and the
posterior in order with respect to
the conversion of the starting point
in mental postulation. In the same
manner, only the essence of every
essentially possible thing can be
described by perpetual posteriority
in its substance, since it is
incompatible with eternity in itself
by virtue of the deficiency of the
nature of possibility. Only the
essentially necessary Self-
Subsisting Being (exalted be His
remembrance) can be described by
eternal priority, for His very
essence is compatible with eternity
by virtue of the perfection of His
necessary reality. Further, it is
impossible for any possible thing,
due to the characteristic of being-
an-effect, to exist in the stage of the
essence of its essentially necessary
cause and the stage of the essence
of the essentially necessary Being,
which is itself real, actual existence
in the objective world and concrete
reality. Therefore, it is necessary
for every essentially possible thing,
by reason of the characteristic of
being-an-effect, to be existentially
posterior in [116] perpetuity to the
existence of its necessary Maker,
who is eternally in His own essence
in eternity, and for its Maker to
exist together with its existence as it
occurs in perpetuity.
Consequently, the
essentially necessary true Creator
(exalted be His majesty), insofar as
He is the agent of the world and the
agent of each of its parts, is, with
respect to His own essence,
eternally prior in existence in
eternity to the existence of the
world in perpetuity, whereas with
respect to the substance of the
world itself, He exists perpetually
with the existence of the world in
perpetuity. The world, insofar as it
is an effect of and made by the
essentially necessary Creator, is,
with respect to its real non-
existence in perpetuity, together
with the existence of its essentially
necessary Maker in eternity, but
perpetually posterior in essence and
existence in perpetuity to the
existence of its real Maker in
eternity. And with respect to its
created, changeless existence in
perpetuity the occurrence of actual
existence is perpetually with the
existence of its true, necessary
Maker existent in eternity. All of
this is by necessity with respect to
the essence itself. Walk upon the
straight path, and be not of them that
go astray.

Wamīḍ [3.7.19]
Since you know that
eternal priority is an attribute of the
Holy Creator (exalted be His
sanctity), no existent besides Him
can apprehend Him nor can anyone
other than Him describe His nature.
It is not within the power of the
resplendent, transcendent,
intelligible lights to attain the height
of His majesty and the true nature of
His being. How then is it possible
for veiled undeveloped minds and
clouded human intellects to fathom
His station and apprehend His
reality? Even if an unsullied human
intellect has a vast intelligence,
lofty vision, and penetrating and
profound acumen, the utmost degree
of knowledge it can attain,
whatever description of its Creator
it may be and whatever name of its
Fashioner is admissible, is to
uphold with conviction by the
compounded intellect the
affirmation of His reality and to
attest by the demonstrative form that
the eyes of intellects and the visions
of minds have no path, by the
criteria of philosophical
speculation and the profundity of
thought, to the court of His being.
For this reason He is outside of the
two boundaries, the boundary of
negation (ta‘ṭīl) and the boundary
of comparison (tashbīh), nor can
the two summits, the summit of
invalidation (ibṭāl) [of Him] and
the summit of comprehension
(taknīh) [of Him] be reached.[188]
[117]

Wamīḍ [3.7.20]
Insofar as it is settled by
the rational method that the
container of the changeless, which
is the domain of perpetuity, is free
of the estimation of extension and
non-extension, division and non-
division, and insofar as it is
established by way of
demonstration that the essentially
necessary Being is necessary in all
respects, and that He is pure
actuality transcending the impurities
of potentiality in all circumstantial
modes, it is evident that what is
admissible to Him with respect to
general possibility exists with Him
actually and is essentially
necessary. It is utterly
inconceivable for Him to have a
motion, a change, or a transference
from one attribute, state, or
condition to another attribute, state,
or condition. His relation to the
totality of what is outside Himself,
which is the sum of the things He
has made and His effects, is an
everlasting encompassing relation,
unquantifiable, immutable, without
any progression or renewal on the
side of the true Agent, for renewal,
subsequence, progression, and
succession are only on the side of
the effects. The renewed is the
effect itself, not a state or a
condition belonging to its
emanating, eternal Maker.
It is clear that the entire
system of existence derives from
the effects created in perpetuity
from the front of pre-eternity to the
rear of post-eternity, and from the
beginning of primary origination to
end of generation. The true Efficient
Cause and Originator produced
them and originated them in the
domain of perpetuity all at once
perpetually, just as He will continue
to produce them perpetually and
without interruption, not according
to the temporal flow. As for the
relations of position and when
belonging to generated things, these
are in the fixed spatial extension
occurring from the center of the
world until the circumference of the
outermost sphere, certainly not in
His locus and His place, and in the
unfixed, temporal, flowing
extension, consisting of the motion
which regulates the day from the
beginning until the end of time,
certainly not in His time and His
when. As for the things which are
separate from the worlds of time
and space, including the intelligible
lights, the spiritual substances, and
other primary originated things,
these belong to the heart of
objective reality and the real world,
certainly not to His pure being and
His pure existence, which is not in
a particular time, place, position,
locus, where, and when. He, God,
is the agent of existence and the
perpetual sustainer of the system of
existence in this way. Were He to
withhold Himself from making and
emanating, the immutability of
perpetuity would disintegrate and
the structure of the universe would
collapse. Blessed then be God, the
Lord of all the worlds.

Wamīḍ [3.7.21]
Just as it is not possible
for the parts of the fixed extension
to coexist within a single boundary
of the boundaries of space, like the
point, which is the divider of the
linear dimension, and whose parts
are existentially fixed in the
container of time, which is the
horizon [118] of elapsing and
renewal, due to their unity in
existence in the now, which is the
divider of the temporal extension,
in like manner, the hypothetical
parts of the unfixed, flowing
temporal extension cannot coexist
in one now of the nows which are
the boundaries of time and its
dividers. However, they are fixed
in occurrence, constant in existence,
and united in realization in the
container of the existence of time,
which is perpetuity. Consequently,
each of the two spatial and
temporal extensions, in its own
continuous being, is a changeless
existent in its entirety in perpetuity.
God is with each thing via
an encompassing, unquantifiable
withness, without a spatial
extension or the divider of a spatial
extension between Him and any of
the possible things. Similarly, there
is no temporal extension nor the
divider of a temporal extension
between Him and any of the
temporal things. He is the
encompasser of each thing.
 Wamīḍ [3.7.22]
The author of al-Milal
wa’l-Niḥal said, in translation of
the Mu‘tazilite, Ibrāhīm Ibn Sayyār
al-Naẓẓām:
His doctrine is that God created
the existents all at once as they
are now, minerals, plants,
animals, and humans, and that
the creation of Adam did not
precede the creation of his
descendents, but that He
concealed some of them in
others. Priority and posteriority
only occur with respect to [the
order of] their manifestation out
of their places of latency, not
 with respect to their creation
and their existence. He
borrowed this doctrine from the
advocates of latency and
manifestation among the
philosophers. He was usually
inclined favorably towards the
views of the natural
philosophers among them, not
the divine philosophers.
I say to him: O most
erudite of your people! From where
do you conjecture in this passage
what you conjecture? Why do you
not say that he borrowed this
doctrine of his from the divine
philosophers?[189] Is it not
borrowed from them? If it is, then
he does not mean by “all at once”
all at once as it pertains to a now or
to time, but rather he means by it a
perpetual, implicate
instantaneousness which contains
all the temporal moments and nows
until the utmost reach of existence
and everlastingness. He is saying
that priority and posteriority only
occur with respect to their temporal
creation, not their perpetual
creation, and with respect to their
manifestation in time, not their
existence in perpetuity. When he
said [priority and posteriority]
“only occur with respect to their
manifestation out of their places of
latency, not with respect to their
creation and their existence,” he
truly hit the nail on the head and
attained the tongue of utterance, the
colocynth of truth, and the essence
of wisdom. He, indeed, acquired
this doctrine from the divine
philosophers, who are firmly
grounded in knowledge, not from
the natural philosophers among the
advocates of the doctrine of latency
and manifestation. [119]
Are not the utterances of
Aristotle in the Theology in
agreement with this same path?
Does he not say in Mīmar Three:
“God created the existences of
things and all of their forms, and
produced what he effected all at
once.” And does he not say in
Mīmar Five:
The world is a composite of
things some of which are
connected to others, as a result
of which the world is like one
thing in which nothing is
contradictory. And if you know
what the world is, you will
know why the world is; that is
to say, every part of it is related
to the whole, so you will not see
it only as a part, but you will
see it like the whole. In other
 words, you will not
consequently take the parts of
the world as if some of them
derive from others, but you will
perceive all of them as if they
are one thing, without one of
them being prior to another.
He also states in Mīmar Five:
“If things are extended and
unfolding, and they are separated
from the First Maker, some of them
are causes of the generation of
others. But if all of them are
simultaneous and not extended or
unfolding, and not separated from
the First Maker, some of them are
not causes of the generation of
others, but rather the First Maker is
the cause of the generation of all of
them.” This completes his words.
If you are certain on this
question,[190] the meaning of the
following statement of theirs will
dawn upon you: “The general
absolute proposition is either
altogether true from pre-eternity to
post-eternity or it is always false
and unverifiable from pre-eternity
to post-eternity.” If it results in what
Themistius acquired from the Giver
of the Craft,[191] and Ibn Sīnā
concurred with in the Shifā’, where
he made the general absolute with
respect to the modality of the
proposition the opposite of taking
the modality into consideration, the
opposition of privation to
possession, then it is a sign for the
non-consideration of any of the
modalities, not qualification by a
certain modality which is said to be
“the general absolute.” Sometimes
the absolute in modal propositions
is considered in an extended sense
(tawassu‘), just as the negative is
considered in categorical
propositions. The perpetuity of the
truth of the general, perpetual
absolute is therefore clear.
As for what he undertook
in correction of its notion, with his
unawareness of this principle, it
does not avail him. The exacting
among the balancers (mīzāniyyīn)
[i.e., logicians] have stated that the
purport of the general, actual and
perpetual absolute proposition is
only being true with respect to a
particular time, and with respect to
all times and moments in temporal
subjects, not with respect to time
itself nor with respect to what is
negated from it. Let it be known.

Wamīḍ [3.7.23]
It is clear then that all of
the parts of the Great Man, which is
the Great World—including
changeless and fixed things;
changing, renewing, progressing
things; instantaneous things [which
exist in the now]; and temporal
things occurring in the extension of
time neither instantaneously nor
gradually, with all their details,
small and large, [120] moist and
dry—are made by the True Maker
and created by the Creator without
qualification without His
origination and existentiation of
them being gradual, corresponding
to extended time, as are terminal
motions; or instantaneous, occurring
entirely in a certain indivisible
boundary among the boundaries of
time, as are instantaneous things; or
temporal, connected to occurrence
in the extension of time, not by
correspondence to it, as are medial
motions and what is like them, but
by another mode beyond the
capacity of the estimative faculty
and sanctified from all of this. In
truth, His emanation of the
incorporeal intelligences and purely
separate things from the seal of real
non-existence is primary origination
(ibdā‘); with respect to the
heavenly bodies, it is invention
(ikhtirā‘); and with respect to those
things preceded by extended non-
existence and subject to
dispositional possibility, it is
generation (takwīn).[192]
If you understand this and
are assured therein, it is manifest to
you that the statement of the Jews:
“He has terminated the Command,”
is a deviation and an error, absurd
and inconceivable. This would only
be reasonable if an extension could
be imagined and boundaries
postulated in the world of
perpetuity and the sanctuary of the
Divine Being, as a result of which
there could be fashioning and
existentiation within one boundary
and emptiness and negation within
the other boundaries. This is one of
the deviations of veiled intellects
and incitements of clouded minds.
The Command is only in accord
with the rule of pure immutability
and the convention of pure actuality,
as a result of which the emanation
and the fashioning are everlasting
and the outpouring and the activity
are perpetual without a void and
negation being conceivable nor an
extension and flow being
imaginable. All things are created
by reason of Him (glorified be He)
and proceed from Him endlessly by
way of changeless, perpetual
duration (dawām) and fixed, real
continuity, in accord with a law
exalted above the comprehension of
ordinary minds, apart from the
duration of extensional flow and
measurable, temporal continuity. He
says (glorified be the speaker):
“The Jews say: ‘The hand of God is
chained up.’ Their own hands are
chained up, and they are cursed for
that which they say! Nay, rather
both His hands are
outstretched.”[193]
 The Fourth Qabas
Quotations from the Book of God
and the traditions of His Messenger,
and from the traditions of the lofty
and pure Imāms

Wamīḍ [4.1]
He says (exalted be the
speaker) in the Sūra of Luqmān:
“Your creation and your issuing
forth are as a single soul. God,
verily, is the hearing, the
seeing.”[194]
The erudite Zamakhsharī says
in his al-Kashshāf [a commentary
on the Qur’ān]:
This means that few and many,
one and all are equal with
respect to His power with no
difference. That is to say, one
soul and many souls would only
be differentiated were one state
after another, or one act after
another, to engage Him. But He
is exalted above that. Also, he
hears every sound and sees
everything seeable in a single
state. The perception of one
thing does not distract Him from
the perception of another thing.
The same applies to His
creation and issuing forth.
 Wamīḍ [4.2]
He says (exalted be His
sovereignty) in the Sūra of Mercy:
“Every day He is in a state
(sha’n).”[195] In the Kashshāf [he
explains]:
In other words, at every instant
and moment He is producing
things and renewing states. It is
related about the Messenger of
God (may God bless him and
his family) that he recited this
and was then asked: “What is
that state?” He answered that
He forgives sin, dispels grief,
uplifts one people and lays low
another. It is related from Ibn
‘Uyayna: “Perpetuity with God
is two days. One of them [122]
is the day which is the duration
of the world. His state with
respect to it is the command and
the prohibition, summoning to
death and summoning to life,
and bestowing and denying. The
other is the day of resurrection.
His state with respect to it is
calling to account and
dispensing justice.”
And it is said: It was
revealed concerning the Jews
that they said: “God does not
decree anything on the
Sabbath.” One of the kings
asked his minister about this.
The minister asked him to wait
until the next day and went away
worried to think about it. A
black slave said to him: “O
master! Tell me what happened
to you. Perchance God will ease
your perplexity through me.” So
he told him. The slave replied:
“I will explain it to the king and
instruct him.” The next day he
said [to the king]: “O king, the
state (sha’n) of God is such that
He interposes the day into the
night and interposes the night
into the day. He brings forth life
from death and brings forth
death from life. He heals the
sick and makes sick the healthy.
He afflicts the privileged and
relieves the afflicted. He honors
the abased and abases the
honored. He enriches the poor
and makes poor the rich.” The
king said: “You have answered
me well.” Then he commanded
the minister to confer upon him
the robe of ministership. He
declared: “O master! This is
through the affair of God.”
Further, it is related from
‘Abdu’llāh Ibn Ṭāhir that he
summoned Ḥusayn Ibn al-Faḍl
 and said to him: “I have
summoned you to unravel three
verses which are difficult for
me to understand. Among them
is his statement: “Every day He
is in a state (sha’n),” and it is
possible “the Pen has run dry of
what is called into existence
until the Day of Resurrection.”
Ḥusayn answered: “As for the
verse ‘Every day He is in a
state,” these are states which He
manifests, not states by which
He is manifested.
There is nothing unchanging or
changing, fixed or progressing,
instantaneous or temporal but its
existence is made by God and
dependent upon Him (glorified be
He). But the progression and
succession of progressing and
changing things only pertains to
themselves and their existence in
time, not their relation to God and
not their existence in perpetuity, as
you have been informed numerous
times.

Wamīḍ [4.3]
He says (exalted be His
remembrance) in the Sūra of Iron:
“He is with you wherever you may
be.”[196] By this he is negating
quantification and distance [from
God] and making all places with
whatever spatial things are in them,
through this simultaneity, as one
place. The pronoun is addressing
the whole, since it is not singled out
to the sons of one age in particular,
but rather is general to the company
of the people of all ages and cycles.
Indeed, the skulls of the night
dwellers of the world of
contingency from the beginning to
the end, and from pre-eternity [123]
to post-eternity, one and all negate
temporal quantification and unite all
times, including the temporal beings
within them until everlasting, in a
single moment having a single
relation.
The same idea is found in
his statement (exalted be His
majesty) in the Sūra of the Woman
who Argues: “There is not a secret
conversation between three but He
makes a fourth among them, nor
between five but He makes a sixth,
nor between fewer or more, but He
is with them wherever they may
be.”[197] In other words, His
being a fourth and a fifth among
them is by simultaneity not by
number due to the non-inclusion of
His real oneness in the domain of
numbers. The relation of being
(kawn) to them in “wherever they
may be” and “wherever you may
be,” not to Him (glorified be He), is
an indication of the fact that
perpetual simultaneity is in relation
to them with respect to their
existence, while eternal priority to
them pertains to His existence
(glorified be He), for the cause is
certainly existent in the stage of the
essence of the effect, but the effect
is not existent in the stage of the
essence of the cause. This is in
accord with what we have recited
to you. Therefore, the things are and
God is with them, yet God is, and
nothing is with Him.
In short, the simultaneity
stipulated is neither spatial nor
temporal. Rather, it is an
unquantifiable encompassing
relation and a non-elapsing, non-
flowing, everlasting simultaneity.
The unfolding spatial extension
from the center of the world to the
circumference of the outermost
sphere is in relation to the
Sovereign who encompasses it like
a single point, and the unfolding
temporal dimension from the pre-
eternal beginning of the motion of
the regulator of the day to its never-
ending end, with respect to His
actual presence with it, is like a
single now. The totality of the
dwellers of the world of possibility
with respect to this relation and this
presence are like a single existent
with constant parts. Their Creator
does not differentiate them in a
discontinuous way nor does He
conjoin them as an indistinguishable
spatial or temporal clump. As he
says (exalted be His grandeur):
“God is the encompasser of each
thing.”

Wamīḍ [4.4]
He says (exalted be the
speaker) in the Sūra of Thunder:
“God erases or records what He
pleases. With Him is the Mother
Book.”[198] The book of erasing
and recording is the domain of time,
in which God erases the corrupted
things and records the generated
things. The Mother Book, which is
with Him, is perpetuity, since
nothing is called into being which is
not recorded in it actually with the
pen of creation (takwīn) [124] with
the most excellent commentary and
interpretation.
He says (glorified be He)
in the Sūra of Ḥijr: “Nothing exists
whose treasuries are not with Us,
and We have not sent it down but in
a known measure”[199] Through
the predetermination (qaḍā’) the
treasuries [of things] are present in
a purely changeless state in
perpetuity, and the quantifiable
sending down is through fate
(qadar) with respect to quantitative
things in time.
He says (exalted be His
majesty) in several places: “His
command when He desires a thing
is to say to it: ‘Be!’ and it is.” He
has expressed the act of primary
origination and existentiation, in
other words, His bringing forth
from the abyss of real non-existence
and sheer non-being into the domain
of existence and changelessness in
perpetuity, by “the command” (al-
amr) and the word “Be!” (kun).
Often it is referred to as “the Breath
of the Merciful” among other terms.
And he has expressed the act of
generation, which is production in
the horizon of elapsing and
renewal, i.e., time, by “the sending
down” (inzāl and tanzīl). These are
among the most consummate
allusions and the most perfect
expressions. The referent of “when”
is definite, necessary applicability
to the multiplying, repeating,
progressing “whatever,” since the
estimation of progression and
change in conditions and states in
relation to the court of God is not
permissible.
He says (exalted be the
speaker) in the Sūra of the
Inevitable: “Say: Verily, the former
and the latter generations are
gathered together at the appointed
time of a known day.”[200] It is the
day of gathering because it is a
perpetual day in which the past and
the future, the first and the last,
coexist together, not a temporal day
in which the future is posterior to
the past and the new is posterior to
the elapsed. The reality of
corporeal death is the transferal of
the substance of the rational soul
from the domain of time to the
world of perpetuity, from apparent
life to real life.
He says (exalted be His
sovereignty) in the Sūra of the
Cave: “They will say: ‘Woe to us!
What a book is this! It leaves
nothing out, small or great, but it
takes account thereof. They will
find all that they have done present
before them. Thy Lord does not
treat anyone unjustly.”[201] This is
because the book is a perpetual
book, not a temporal book. The soul
will return to the vastness of the
intelligible world from the narrow
confines of the sphere of nature.
That which the wise
Qur’ān expresses using the past
tense for events expected to occur
in future time—such as “We have
separated them,”[202] “We have
sent to them,”[203] “The
companions of the garden have
called out to the companions of the
fire,”[204] [125] “Your prayer has
been granted, O Moses,”[205] and
other numerous examples—conceal
the basis of the affair and the
criterion of the secret. In other
words, all of these events have
occurred actually in perpetuity,
even though they do not yet exist in
time. The past, the future, and the
present are all present to the real
Seer, who encompasses all things in
one stage and in one way.
We have explained to you
that the agent Emanator ever pours
the water bucket of bounty and the
sprinkling of generosity into the
container of changeless existence
which is perpetuity as one pouring
forth. Consequently, He never
ceases to originate, fashion, act, and
make, not by flow or starting anew,
but with constancy and
changelessness. Thus He emanates
the worlds in their entirety
simultaneously in a single
atemporal moment. As for the
world of Command and Praise,
[206] it is in the core (kabd) of the
real world and the heart (matn) of
objective reality, not in time, or in a
now, or in a spatial substratum or
place. As for the world of [the
physical] creation (khalq and
mulk), it occurs in times, nows,
spatial substratums, and places, and
every entity in its individuality
occurs in a certain time and a
certain spatial substratum in its
particularity.

Wamīḍ [4.5]
It is authenticated by
unbroken transmission from the
Prophet Muḥammad (may God
bless him and his family and grant
them salvation) that he said: “The
pens have run out of ink, and the
scrolls are rolled up.” And he said
(upon him be peace): “The first
thing God created was the Pen. He
said to it: ‘Write!’ and it asked:
‘What shall I write?’ He said:
“Write the fate of what was and
will be and of what is called into
existence until everlasting.” And he
said (may God’s blessings be upon
him and his pure family): “There is
not any generated living creature
until the day of resurrection that is
not existing.” And he said
(blessings and salutations be upon
him and his family): “The Pen has
run dry of what is called into
existence.” Then he was asked: “In
what then is the work, O Apostle of
God?” And he answered: “Work ye,
for each is facilitated to that for
which he was created.” And he said
(may God bless him and his family
and grant them salvation): “Nothing
is from you but its abode of fire and
its abode of paradise has been
written.” So they asked: “In this
case, O Apostle of God, should we
not rely upon our book and give up
a course of action?” He answered:
“Work ye, for each is facilitated to
that for which he was created. As
for one who belongs to the people
of felicity, he will be facilitated to
the work [126] of the people of
felicity, and as for one who belongs
to the people of wretchedness, he
will be facilitated to the work of
wretchedness.” Then he recited:
“As for him who is bountiful, fears
God, and believes in the best, we
will indeed facilitate for him the
path to felicity.”[207]
He was asked (peace be
upon him): “Are we in an affair
which is finished, or in an affair
which is beginning?” He replied
(may the blessings of God and His
angels surround him and his
family): “In an affair which is
finished and in an affair which is
beginning.”
The most erudite of the
doubters and their leader states in
his al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr:
A speaker asked: “Are you not
asserting that the measures
(maqādīr) are first and the Pen
has run dry of them, and the
affair is not disdained? How
can recording and erasing be
correct with this meaning?” We
say: This erasing and recording
are also among the things of
which the Pen has run dry.
Nothing becomes erased except
 it preceded in His knowledge
and its erasing is in His
predetermination.
Then he says:
The Arabs call whatever
functions as the root of
something its “mother” (umm).
For example, “the mother of the
head” refers to the brain, “the
mother of villages” refers to
Mecca, and every city is a
mother in relation to the villages
which are around it. In like
manner, “the Mother Book” is
that which is the root of all
books. There are two doctrines
concerning it. The first is that
the Mother Book is the
Preserved Tablet, and all the
things created in the higher and
lower worlds are recorded
within it. It is related from the
Prophet (peace be upon him)
that he said: “God was and
nothing was with Him. Then He
created the Preserved Tablet
and recorded therein the states
of the entire creation until the
Day of Resurrection.”
According to this assumption,
God has two books. The first is
the book which the angels
inscribe concerning the
creation. That book is the place
of erasing and recording. The
second book is the Preserved
Tablet, which is a book that
contains an impression of all the
higher and lower states of
being. It is permanent. Abu’l-
Dardā’ related from the Prophet
(upon him and his family be
peace) that “God (exalted be
He), in three hours remaining of
the night, looks in the Book in
which no other looks, then He
erases what He desires and
records what He desires.” The
philosophers have marvelous
statements and abstruse
explanations of these two
 books. The second doctrine is
that the Mother Book is God’s
knowledge (exalted be He) of
every object of knowledge,
whether existent or non-existent,
so that even if they change,
God’s knowledge (exalted be
He) of them is permanent and
free from change. The intention
of the Mother Book is this.
I say: The Preserved
Tablet, therefore, is the book of the
system of existence from its
beginning to its end. It is the Lucid
Book of God, which lacks nothing,
green or withered, belonging to the
worlds of existence. It is the realm
of perpetuity, which [127] only its
Agent, its Maker, its Originator, and
its Fashioner encompasses. He is
God, glorified be He.
I find what their leader al-
Ghazālī has stated in his book Iḥyā’
al-‘Ulūm to be most excellent,
namely that the world, which is the
system of existence in its entirety, is
“the composition (taṣnīf) of the
Creator” (exalted be He). How
sweet and agreeable is this
statement. Accordingly, the entire
system of the worlds of existence is
the Lucid Book of God, which does
not leave out—from whatever is
subject to the potentiality of the
nature of possibility and which the
power of the worthiness of
quiddities and the disposition of
matters sustain—a single detail, no
matter how great or insignificant,
but it encompasses it. God
(glorified be He) is the author
(muṣannif) of this great book and
its Maker, its Originator, and its
Inventor.
However, this erudite
leader of the doubters has tread the
path of presumption and fabrication,
for he states:
The dissenters (rāfiḍa) say:
“Alteration (badā’) is possible
for God (exalted be He), and it
 is that He believes something,
then it appears to Him that the
matter is contrary to what He
believed.” They cling to His
words (exalted be He): “God
erases and records what He
pleases.”[208] This is false,
because His knowledge is one
of the concomitants of His
particular essence, and
whatever is like this cannot be
subject to change and alteration.
This is his statement in his
familiar words and expression. I
say to him: O leader of your
companions and most erudite of
your people! Are you not aware of
the good reputation of what you are
opposing? The question of the
alteration of God’s will (badā’) is
not singled out to the rāfiḍa and the
sayings of their holy leaders, rather
it is mentioned repeatedly in the
traditions of the Apostle of God
(may God bless him and his
family). The two Ṣaḥīḥ (authentic
collections of ḥadīth) of al-Bukhārī
and Muslim, and other of your
authentic collections and sources,
agree with its transmission and
confirm it. Moreover, its meaning,
according to the rāfiḍa, is not the
occurrence of regret and the
appearance of the contrary, but its
intention is to affirm the
dependence of the things which do
change and alter, with respect to the
stages of creation and the principles
of existentiation, upon the Creator
(exalted be He). The occurrence of
alteration does not pertain to the
predetermination nor to perpetuity,
rather it pertains to time and to
some of the stages of fate without
requiring any change, alteration, or
succession in relation to the Giver
of existence and the Existentiator of
things (exalted be His sovereignty).
Further, its intention is to invalidate
the saying of the Jews that the
command of giving existence and
calling into being is used up. You
and your companions, in this case,
are in palpable error. We have
examined this subject thoroughly, by
the leave of God (glorified be He),
in our book Nibrās al-Ḍiyā’ fī
Sharḥ Bāb al-Badā’ wa Ithbāt
Jadwa al-Du‘ā’ (The Brilliant
Light Explaining the Subject of
Alteration and Establishing the
Benefit of Prayer). [128]

Wamīḍ [4.6]
There are numerous
traditions containing eloquent
expressions and bountiful meanings,
whose texts have been handed
down in unbroken succession and
whose chains of transmission are
corroborated. Among them is one
passed down by means of the Chief
of Transmitters, Abū Ja‘far al-
Kulaynī (may God, the Exalted, be
pleased with him) in his
compendium al-Kāfī in the Ṣaḥīḥ
from Ṣafwān Ibn Yaḥyā from
‘Abdu’l-Raḥmān Ibn Ḥujjāj, and by
a number of chains of transmission
from al-Ḥasan Ibn Maḥbūb from
Muḥammad Ibn Mārid, and from al-
Ḥasan Mūsā al-Khashshāb from one
of his men, from Abū ‘Abdu’llāh al-
Ṣādiq (peace be upon him), that he
was asked about the words of God
(exalted and magnified be He):
“The All-Merciful is seated upon
the Throne.” He replied: “He is
equal in relation to each thing, so
that one thing is not nearer to Him
than another. The remote is not
remoter from Him, and the near is
not nearer to Him, but He is equal
in relation to each thing.” Al-Ṣadūq
(may God, the Exalted, be pleased
with him) has related it in the Kitāb
al-Tawḥīd in the Ṣaḥīḥ in a number
of ways.
Among them is one passed
down by al-Ṣadūq, the Sure Handle
of Islām, Abū Ja‘far Ibn Bābawaih
(may God, the Exalted, be pleased
with him) in the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd in
the Ḥasan from Abū Baṣīr from
Abū ‘Abdu’llāh al-Ṣādiq (peace be
upon him) that he said: “God
(blessed and exalted be He) cannot
be qualified by time, place, motion,
transferal, or rest, for He is the
creator of time, place, motion, and
rest. Immeasurably exalted is He
above what the oppressors ascribe
to Him!”
Among them is one passed
down by means of al-Ṣadūq in the
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd from Ya‘qūb Ibn
Ja‘far al-Ja‘farī from Abū Ibrāhīm
Mūsā Ibn Ja‘far (peace be upon
him) that he said:
God (blessed and exalted be
He) is always without time and
place. He is now as He has ever
been. He is not in need of a
place, He does not occupy a
place, and He does not enter
into a place. “There is not a
secret conversation between
three but He makes a fourth
among them, nor between five
but He makes a sixth, nor
between fewer or more, but He
is with them wherever they may
be.”[209] There is no veil
between Him and His creation
other than His creation. He is
veiled without the veil of the
 veiled and concealed without
the curtain of the concealed. No
God is there save Him, the
Great, the Most
Exalted.
I say: His words, “God is
always without time and place. He
is now as He has ever been,” mean
that God (glorified be He) is
always existent in eternity, not in
perpetuity, without time and place,
and nothing at all is in existence
there other than His real essence,
not perpetuity or time, not
dimension or place, not the
permanent [129] or the changing,
not the fixed or the flowing.
Through His command and His
creation, His primary origination
and His fashioning, all things enter
into existence, both changeless
things and changing things, fixed
things and flowing things. They
occur in their entirety in perpetuity
after their real non-existence, both
primary originated things in the
domain of perpetuity and generated
things in the extensions of time and
space. None of them occur in
eternity. The occurrence of things is
not considered the occurrence of the
existence of the Creator (glorified
be He) in perpetuity, for He
(exalted be His sovereignty) is now
exalted above time and perpetuity,
and above place and direction, just
as He was before the existence of
things in their entirety. Just as
eternity is singled out to God, the
Necessary, the Real, in like manner,
perpetuity is singled out to possible
things, and time is singled out to the
changing. Nothing of eternity,
perpetuity, and time is shared in
common between the Creator and
the created. Eternity encompasses
perpetuity, and perpetuity
encompasses time. The meaning of
the words: “God was alone and
nothing was with Him. He is now
as He has always been,” is
therefore clear. Let it be known.
Among them is one passed
down by means of the Chief of the
Transmitters in the Kāfī in the Ṣaḥīḥ
from Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn
Abū Naṣr. He said:
A man came to Abu’l-Ḥasan al-
Riḍā (peace be upon him) from
beyond the river of Balkh. He
said: “I will ask you a certain
question. If you answer me in
accord with my capacity, I will
profess your leadership.”
Abu’l-Ḥasan (peace be upon
him) replied: “Ask what you
wish.” He said: “Tell me about
your Lord, when (matā) is He
and upon what thing does He
rely for support?” Abu’l-Ḥasan
(peace be upon him) answered:
“God (blessed and exalted be
He) causes where to exist
without another where, He
fashions quality (kayf) without
another quality, and He relies
upon His own power.” The man
then stood up before him and
acknowledged his authority,
saying: “I testify that there is no
God but God, that Muḥammad is
the Apostle of God and that ‘Alī
is the appointed vicegerent of
the Apostle of God and the
caretaker after him of that which
 the Apostle of God endorsed
(may God bless him and his
family and grant them
salvation). You indeed speak the
truth and you are their legitimate
successor.”
I say: The meaning of his
words (peace be upon him) in
answer to the question of the man is
that He who causes where to exist
without another where and fashions
quality without another quality is
exalted above entering into a when
(matā).
Among them is one by
means of the Kāfī which al-Ḥusayn
‘Alī Ibn Muḥammad reported from
Zurāra, who said:
I asked Abū Ja‘far (peace be
upon him): “Did God exist and
nothing else?” He replied: “Yes.
He was and there was nothing.”
I asked: “Where did He exist?”
He said: “He was a support,
and He was seated as one who
sits.” Then he said: “O learned
one, you have permitted and
asked about place when there is
no place.” I said: “He changed
into a man, performed the
inconceivable, and spoke to
him.” [130]
Among them is one by
means of the Kāfī, with its authentic
chain of transmission from al-
Ya‘qūbī, who is Dāwud Ibn ‘Alī al-
Hāshimī, from one of our authors
from ‘Abdu’l-A‘lā, the master of
the House of Shem, from Abū
‘Abdu’llāh (peace be upon him).
He said:
A Jew called Subkhut came to
the Apostle of God (may God
bless him and his family and
grant them salvation) and said:
“O Muḥammad, I have come to
ask you about your Lord. Grant
me an answer about what I ask
you. If not, I will return.” He
replied: “Ask what you please.”
He said [to the Prophet]:
“Where is your Lord?” He
answered: “He is in every
place, but He is not limited by
any place.” He asked: “How
does He exist?” He answered:
“How can I describe my Lord
by quality (or: howness kayf)?
Quality is created, and God
[cannot] be described by His
creation.” He asked: “Who
discerns that you are a
prophet?” He replied: “Not a
stone abides around him, nor
anything else except it
proclaims with a clear Arabic
tongue ‘O Subkhut, he verily is
the Apostle of God!’” Subkhut
 said: “I have never seen
anything more manifest than
this.” Then he said: “I testify
that there is no God but God and
that you are the Apostle of
God.”
Al-Ṣadūq has related it in the
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, and he has related
it also in another way. In it he said:
“How does He exist?” He
answered: “He has neither howness
nor place, because He (exalted and
magnified be He) is the fashioner of
howness and the maker of where.”
Among them is one by means
of the Kāfī which a number of our
authors have reported from Aḥmad
Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khālid from his
father. He said:
The Jews gathered together and
went to the chief of the Jālūt.
They said: “This man is a
knower.” They mean the
Commander of the Faithful
(peace be upon him). “It is
spoken by us to ask him.” So
they went to see him, and they
were told that he is in the
fortress. They waited for him
until he came out. The chief of
the Jālūt said to him: “We have
come to you to ask you.” He
said: “Ask, O Jew, what you
desire.” He said: “I would ask
you about your Lord, when does
He exist?” He replied: “He is
without coming into being
(kaynūna) and without how
(kayf). He is always without
quantity (kamm) and without
quality (kayf). He has no before.
He is before the before without
a before. He has no final cause
and no end. Final cause is
severed from Him, for He is the
final cause of every final
cause.” The chief of the Jālūt
said: “Let us depart, for he is
more knowledgeable than what
is ascribed to him.”
Among them is one by
means of the Kāfī reported by
‘Abdu’llāh Ibn Sannān from Abū
‘Abdu’llāh (peace be upon him),
who said:
God is Great and Exalted. His
servants are unable to describe
Him and do not have the power
to attain the essence of His
grandeur. “The eyes do not
perceive Him, but He perceives
the eyes. He is the Kind, the
All-Informed.”[210] He can
neither be qualified by how, nor
by where, nor by when. How
can I describe Him by how,
when He is the One who
fashioned howness, so that it
became howness, as a result of
which I recognize howness by
the howness that He fashioned
for us. Or how can I describe
Him by where, when He is the
One who called whereness into
being, so that it became
whereness [131], as a result of
which I recognize whereness by
the whereness that He fashioned
for us? Or how can I describe
Him by when, when He is the
One who created whenness, so
that it became whenness, as a
result of which I recognize
whenness by the whenness that
He fashioned for us. God
 (blessed and exalted be He)
enters into every place, yet He
is removed from each thing.
“The eyes do not perceive Him,
but He perceives the eyes.” No
God is there besides Him, the
Exalted, the Great. He is the
Kind, the All-Informed.
Among them is one by
means of the Kāfī reported by
Muḥammad Ibn Isma‘īl Ibn Bazī‘
from Muḥammad Ibn Zayd, who
said:
I came to al-Riḍā’ (peace be
upon him) and asked him about
the profession of divine unity
(tawḥīd). He dictated to me:
“Praise be to God, the Maker of
all things with respect to
creation and their Originator
with respect to beginning
through His power and His
wisdom, not from some thing (lā
min shay’), which would
invalidate invention, and not
due to a cause, which would
invalidate primary origination.
He created what He desired
without anything besides Him
by reason of the manifestation of
His wisdom and the reality of
His lordship. Minds cannot
apprehend Him, and
imaginations cannot reach Him.
The eyes do not perceive Him,
and no measure encompasses
Him. Before Him the faculty of
utterance is speechless; before
Him the vision is dimmed, and
in relation to Him the effusion
of attributes goes astray. He is
veiled without the veil of the
veiled and concealed without
the curtain of the concealed. He
is recognized without need of
sight, described without a
picture, and characterized
without a body. No God is there
but God, the Mighty, the
Exalted.”
Among them is one by means
of the Kāfī, on the subject of the
principles of the profession of
divine unity (tawḥīd), which
Muḥammad Ibn Abū ‘Abdu’llāh and
Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥyā both
ascribed to Abū ‘Abdu’llāh (peace
be upon him), and which al-Ṣadūq
has related in the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd,
as transmitted from al-Ḥaṣīn Ibn
‘Abdu’l-Raḥmān from his father
from Abū ‘Abdu’llāh (peace be
upon him) from his father from his
grandfather (peace be upon them),
that the Commander of the Faithful
(peace be upon him) aroused the
people to fight against Mu‘awiyya a
second time, and when the people
had gathered together, he arose and
addressed them, saying:
Praise be to God, the One, the
Self-Subsisting, the Eternal, the
Peerless, Who not from
something (lā min shay’) exists,
and Who created what exists not
from something through a power
by which He is separated from
things and the things are
separated from Him. He has no
attribute which may be attained
and no boundary within which
likenesses may be made for
Him. Without His attributes the
informing power of language is
powerless, and therefore the
effusions of attributes are in
vain and the profundities of
contemplative thought with
respect to His kingdom are
diminished; without grounding
in His knowledge the principles
of commentary are cut off; and
without His hidden concealment
the veils of the invisible are
subverted, and the yearnings of
minds for the subtleties of things
are perplexed with respect to
the least of the least of them.
Blessed be the One whom the
aspirations of the high minded
cannot attain and the penetration
of intelligences cannot reach.
Exalted be the One for whom
there is no calculable period of
time, no extended duration, and
no limited characteristics. [132]
Glorified be the One who has
no first beginning, no final goal,
and no end which perishes.
Glory be to Him who is like one
who describes himself, while
the describers grasp not His
nature. He restricted all things
belonging to His creation to
their manifestation of His
likeness and His manifestation
of their likeness, for He does
not enter into them, as a result of
which He could be said to exist
within them, and He is not
distant from them, so that it
could be said He is separate
from them, and He is not
isolated from them, so that it
could be said of Him where?
But His knowledge (glorified be
He) encompasses them, His
fashioning perfects them, and
His memory reckons them.
Their secret desires are not
concealed from Him, nor are
their secret thoughts hidden in
the darkness of gloom, nor
whatever resides between the
highest heaven and the lowly
earth. Every one of them has a
protector and a keeper, and each
thing among them has another
thing which encompasses it. The
Encompasser of all of them is
the One, the Peerless, the
Eternal, whom the elapsing of
times changes not and the
fashioning of anything which
exists disturbs not. He only has
to say for what He desires
“Be!” and it is. He originated
what He created without a prior
model, and without toil and
exertion. Everyone who
fashions something produces it
from another thing, but God not
from something is the fashioner
of what He has created. Every
knower learns what he knows
after ignorance, but God was
neither ignorant nor did He
learn. He encompassed all
things with His knowledge
before their existence, and His
knowledge was not increased
due to their coming into being.
His knowledge of them before
He calls them into existence is
the same as His knowledge of
them after calling them into
existence. He did not call them
into being due to intensifying
His dominion, fear of vanishing,
or a deficiency, nor by reason of
seeking help against a hostile
opponent, a competing rival, or
a contending peer, for His
creatures are objects of His
lordship and contemptible
[before His grandeur]. Glorified
be the One whom the creation of
what He has originated and the
design of what He has created
aid Him not. Neither any
weakness nor any lassitude with
respect to what He created is
sufficient. He knew what He
created, and created what He
knew, not through cogitation
(tafkīr), which applies to the
new knowledge of created
things. He had no doubt
concerning what He did not
create, but an irrevocable
decree, a perfect knowledge,
and a consummate command. He
is alone in lordship, assigned
oneness to himself, and
reserved for himself distinction
and praise. He is solitary in His
unity, grandeur, and splendor,
the sole object of praise, and
magnified in glorification. He is
immeasurably exalted above
having sons, sanctified and
purified above contact with
women, and exalted and
magnified above speaking with
partners. He has no opposing
adversary with respect to what
He created and no rival with
respect to His dominion. No one
shares His sovereignty with
Him. The One, the Solitary, the
Eternal, the everlasting
Destroyer, the absolute Lord is
He who has ever been and will
remain in His pre-eternal
oneness before the
commencement of the ages and
after the elapsing of things, He
who will not perish and will not
come to an end. This is how I
describe my Lord. No god is
there but God. Of the great, who
 is greater than Him, of [133] the
glorious, who is more glorious
than Him, and of the mighty,
who is more mighty than Him.
Immeasurably exalted is He
above what the oppressors
ascribe to Him.
Abū Ja‘far al-Kulaynī
(may God illumine his resting
place) says:
This sermon is one of his
famous addresses (peace be
upon him), such that the masses
make trite of it. But it is
sufficient to the one who seeks
the knowledge of divine unity,
should he reflect upon it and
comprehend what it contains. If
the tongues of the Jinn and
humans were joined together,
there is not a prophetic tongue
among them that could profess
the divine unity like he [‘Alī]
professed it. By my father and
my mother (may God bless him
and his family), they are not
equal to it, and were it not for
his exposition (peace be upon
him), the people would not
understand how to tread the path
of professing God’s oneness.
Do you not understand his
[‘Alī’s] words: “He exists not
from something, and He created
what exists not from something
(lā min shay’)”? The notion of
origination (ḥudūth) is negated
[from Him] by his words “He
exists not from something,” and
how He caused the attribute of
creation and invention to apply
to what He created without a
root (aṣl) or a model (mithāl) is
in negation of the doctrine of
those who say that all things are
originated from one another, and
in rebuttal of the doctrine of
dualists who claim that He does
not create anything except by a
root and does not bring about
order except by copying a
model. Thus he has refuted all
the proofs of the dualists and
their doubts by his words “He
created what exists not from
something,” because the most
that the dualists believe in with
respect to the origination of the
world is to say: “It is clear that
the Creator created (khalaqa)
the things from something (min
shay’) or from nothing (min lā
shay’).” Their statement “from
something” is an error, and their
statement “from nothing” is
contradictory and impossible,
because the preposition “from”
requires something, and
“nothing” negates it. The
Commander of the Faithful,
therefore, replaced this phrase
with the most excellent and most
correct of phrases, for he said
(peace be upon him): “He
created what exists not from
something (lā min shay’).” He
negated the preposition “from,”
because it requires “something”
[as an object], and he negated
“something,” because each
“thing” is created not from a
root which the Creator has
created. This is what the
dualists say: that He created
from an eternal root and that He
 does not bring about order
except by copying a model.
I say: Our chief and our
leader (may God bless him and
grant him salvation) has made it
clear by this noble and eloquent
phrase of his that the response [of
the dualists] here does not close the
cracks and does not complete the
categories. It is evident that the
opposite of “from something” is
“not from something,” such that the
simple negation falls on the
preposition “from” cutting the
relation completely, not “from
nothing,” such that the negation is a
part subordinate to the preposition
“from” and the copula is an obverse
affirmative or the affirmation of the
negation attached to the predicate,
according to what is ascertained in
logic, since it is settled that the
contradictory of each thing is its
negation, and there is no
contradiction between two
affirmatives whatsoever. [134]
It is correct, then, that God
has brought things into existence
and created them not from
something (lā min shay’), not that
He has brought them into existence
and created them from nothing (min
lā shay’) or from something (min
shay’). Therefore, if it is asked:
“Did the Creator create things from
something or from nothing?” this
does not merit an answer. The truth,
instead, is the negation of both sides
of the question and the choice of a
third category. It is that He created
them not from something. There
should be no doubt that “non-
existence” and “nothingness” only
mean pure non-being and absolute
negation. That is to say, there is no
thing at all [from which God
creates]. It is not that there is some
“thing” which is characterized by
negation and nothingness [from
which He creates]. Consequently,
their words “from nothing” is an
incoherent, contradictory statement.
Only “not from something” is
correct.
It is necessary to know that
this judgment, which encompasses
every creature, can only be settled
through perpetual creation. God
(glorified be He) has brought things
into existence and created them in
their entirety in perpetuity, not from
matter and not from anything at all,
as we have previously stated
decisively on this. As for temporal
creation, it is nothing but the
particularization of the existence of
a temporal thing to the time which it
is in, not its existence after its real
non-existence in the center of the
real world. Its temporal creation,
without a doubt, is only through
God bringing it into existence in its
particular time from a matter
existent in a prior time and a
dispositional possibility subsisting
in the prior temporal matter. The
Creator (exalted be He) has
invented both matter and what
possesses matter in perpetuity, not
from another matter and not from
anything, but after real non-
existence, not in any time or place
at all.[211] Let it be pondered.
Furthermore, our master Abū
Ja‘far al-Kulaynī states:
The Commander of the Faithful
(peace be upon him) has
explained that his words “He
has no attribute which may be
attained and no boundary within
which likenesses may be made
for Him” mean that He
(glorified be He) is one (wāḥid)
and without explanation
(kayfiyya), and that hearts
recognize Him without
description and comprehension.
The same explanation applies to
his words (peace be upon him):
“the One whom the aspirations
of the high minded cannot attain
and the penetration of
intelligences cannot reach.”
Also his words (peace be upon
him): “He does not enter into
them, as a result of which He
could be said to exist within
them, and He is not distant from
them, so that it could be said He
is separate from them,” for he
has negated [from Him] by these
two statements the attributes of
accidents and bodies, since one
of the attributes of bodies is
mutual distance and separation
from each other and one of the
attributes of accidents is being
in bodies by penetration due to
the non-contiguity and
 separation of bodies despite
diminishing distance. Moreover,
he said “But His knowledge
encompasses them, and His
fashioning perfects them,”
meaning He has a relation to
things by encompassment and
directing (tadbīr) but not
through contact. [135]
I say: His words (peace be
upon him) “Exalted be the One who
has no calculable period of time
and no extended duration” mean that
He (glorified be He) is exalted
above time and duration,
quantification and mensuration in
His essence and His attributes, and
in His actuality and His relation. In
short, [He is exalted above them] in
all His circumstantial modes, His
aspects, His relations, and His
associations.
His words (peace be upon
him) “He encompassed all things
with His knowledge before their
existence” mean that His knowledge
(glorified be He) of all things is
through His perfect knowledge of
His own real essence, which is the
complete efficient cause of the
system of existence in every aspect.
The existence of the effect, or the
object of knowledge, has no role in
His knowledge of its quiddity and
its existence. Therefore, His
knowledge of each thing prior to its
existence and its being is certainly
the same as His knowledge of it at
the time of its existence and its
being. His knowledge and
cognizance is not increased by the
existence of things and their
generation.
His words (peace be upon
him) “Neither any weakness nor any
lassitude with respect to what He
created is sufficient. He knew what
He created, and created what He
knew, not through cogitation
(tafkīr), which applies to the new
knowledge of created things” mean
that the absolute knowledge of the
Creator of what is outside of His
essence is an efficient knowledge
via His knowledge of His own
essence, for His very essence
(glorified be He) is identical to His
knowledge of each thing. The
prerequisite of His primary
origination and His existentiation is
the non-being of something which
He wills. He (glorified be He),
through His own real essence,
knows it as good for the system of
existence, so He emanates it and
existentiates it out of mercy and
generosity. Hence, that which He
knows as good and perfect for the
world he has created to confer
benefit and bounty. This is because
the emanating Creator (exalted be
His remembrance) is in himself the
principle of the emanation of the
good and the diffusion of mercy.
His motive to bring [things] into
existence is nothing but His primal
providence, which is His
knowledge of the most perfect
system. Therefore, the essential
possibility belonging to the most
perfect system of existence is
enough for its emanation from the
All-Powerful through His
knowledge and His will. The same
applies to all the primary originated
things which are the parts of the
system, such as the luminous
intelligences and the spiritual
substances. Another system of
existence superior to this system in
completeness and perfection is an
essential impossibility.
Consequently, the omniscient
Creator has not created anything
other than what He has created, and
the agent Fashioner has not
fashioned anything but what He has
fashioned.
Among them is the
tradition of the Yemenite Dhi‘lib
(by making the Dhāl voweled with
kasra, and making the ‘Ayn
unpointed and the Bā’ united after
the Lām voweled with kasra). It has
numerous paths in the sources of the
authors and the common traditions.
[136] By means of the Kāfī,
Muḥammad Ibn Abū ‘Abdu’llāh
reports it from Abū ‘Abdu’llāh
(peace be upon him), who said:
While the Commander of the
Faithful (peace be upon him)
was giving a sermon from the
pulpit in Kūfa, a man named
Dhi‘lib, who had an eloquent
tongue and a courageous heart,
arose before him and asked: “O
Commander of the Faithful,
have you seen your Lord?” He
replied: “Woe to you, O
Dhi‘lib! I do not worship a god
whom I have not seen.” He
asked: “O Commander of the
Faithful, how did you see
Him?” He replied:
Woe to you, O Dhi‘lib! The eyes
cannot see Him with the vision
of the eyes. Rather, the hearts
see Him through the truths of
faith. Woe to you, O Dhi‘lib!
Verily, my Lord is the kind of
kindness, who is not
describable by kindness; the
magnificent of magnificence,
who is not describable by
magnificence; the great of
greatness, who is not
describable by greatness; and
the sublime of sublimity, who is
not describable by coarseness.
He is before each thing, and
nothing can be said to be before
Him; He is after each thing and
it cannot be said to be after
Him. He willed things not by
design and is percipient [of
them] without being mistaken.
He is neither intermixed with all
things nor is He separate from
them. He is evident without the
disclosure of direct contact,
manifest not by the faculty of
sight, remote not by distance,
near not by proximity, subtle
without being embodied,
existent not after non-existence,
an agent not by necessity,
empowering not by a motion,
willing not by a resolution,
hearing not by an instrument,
and seeing not by an organ of
sight. Places cannot contain
Him, times cannot enclose Him,
attributes cannot restrict Him,
and years cannot overtake Him.
His being obviates the ages, His
existence negates non-existence,
and His preeternity forestalls
beginning. By His giving the
power of sensation to the
senses, it is understood that He
has no sensory faculty; by His
giving substance to the
substances, it is recognized that
He has no substance; by His
causing opposition between
things, it is understood that He
has no opposite; and by His
causing association between
them, it is recognized that He
has no associate. He made light
to be the opposite of darkness,
dryness the opposite of
moisture, rough the opposite of
soft, and cold the opposite of
hot. He is the composer of their
enmities and the separator of
their compatibilities. Their
separation is a proof of their
separator, and their composition
is a proof of their composer.
This is His word: “And from
each thing We have created
pairs; that ye may be
mindful.”[212] [By them] He
distinguished before from after
so that it could be recognized
that He has no before and no
after. Their natural dispositions
bear witness that the Giver of
their dispositions has no natural
disposition, and their reckoning
of time testifies that He who
appointed their times has no
 time. He veiled some of them
from others that it might be
recognized that there is no veil
between Him and His creation
[other than His creation]. He is
the Lord when there is no
servant, God when there is no
creation, the Knower when
there is no object of knowledge,
and the Hearer when there is
nothing to hear.
By means of al-Ṣadūq, in
the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, it is traced
back by unbroken transmission to
al-Aṣbagh Ibn Nubāta, who said:
When ‘Alī (peace be upon him)
acceded to the caliphate and the
people swore allegiance to him,
he went to the mosque
commonly used by the Apostle
of God [137] (may God bless
him and his family and grant
them salvation) dressed in the
mantle of the Apostle of God,
wearing his sandals, and girded
with his sword. There he
ascended the pulpit and sat upon
it as master. Then he spoke
(peace be upon him): “Woe to
you, O Dhi‘lib! My Lord can
neither be described by after,
nor by motion, nor by rest, nor
by standing upright, nor by
coming, nor by going.” Then he
 said: “He is within things
without mixture and outside of
them without separation. He is
above each thing, but it cannot
be said something is above
Him; He is in front of each
thing, but ‘in front’ cannot be
said of Him. He is within all
things, but not like something
contained in another thing; and
He is outside of them, but not
like something outside of
another thing.” [Upon hearing
these words,] Dhi‘lib fell to the
ground unconscious.
In another more detailed
report, he said:
The eyes cannot perceive Him
with the vision of the eyes, but
the hearts perceive Him through
the truths of faith. He is near to
things without contact and
remote from them without
separation. He speaks without
deliberation, wills without
resolution, and fashions without
limbs. He is subtle, though not
describable by hiddenness; vast,
though not describable by
tangibility; seeing, though not
describable as having sensation;
and merciful, though not
describable by tenderness.
Faces are humble before His
 grandeur, and hearts are
tremulous in fear of Him.
In this way our master, the
martyr, wrote it in his al-Qawā‘id.
Then he said: “This noble discourse
contains the principles of the
attributes of loftiness (jalāl) and
bounty (ikrām), around which the
science of the Kalām revolves.” I
say: The contents of this noble
tradition contain the secrets of
divine philosophy, nay, the divine
truths of the science of metaphysics,
apart from the interpretation of this
tradition and its commentary.
Among them is one passed
down by means of the two Abū
Ja‘fars (may God the exalted be
pleased with them)—the Chief of
the Transmitters, Abū Ja‘far al-
Kulaynī, in the Kāfī and the Sure
Handle of Islam, Abū Ja‘far al-
Ṣadūq, in the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd—in
a great number of ways. [It reads:]
He is single and alone in
essence and separate from His
creation. His knowledge,
power, understanding, and
sovereignty encompass what He
created. His knowledge of what
is on earth is not less than His
knowledge of what is in heaven.
Nothing is remote from Him,
and all things are equal before
 His knowledge, His power, His
sovereignty, His dominion, and
His understanding.
Among them is one passed
down by means of al-Ṣadūq in the
Ṣaḥīḥ from Muḥammad Ibn Isma‘īl
al-Barmakī related on the authority
of [138] Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Riḍā’
(peace be upon him) and by means
of the Kāfī related on the authority
of Abū ‘Abdu’llāh (peace be upon
him), that when the Commander of
the Faithful (peace be upon him)
addressed the people in Kūfa, he
said:
Praise be to God, who has
enjoined upon His servants to
praise Him. He has endowed
them with the knowledge of His
lordship; He has indicated His
existence through His creation,
through the novelty of His
creation contrary to His
preeternity, and through their
resemblance [to Him], despite
the fact that He has no likeness;
and by His signs He has given
evidence of His power. His
essence is interdicted through
attributes, His vision through
eyes, and His understanding
through estimative faculties.
There is no end for His being
and no final goal for His
existence. Human faculties
cannot contain Him, and veils
cannot conceal Him. The veil
between Him and His creation
is His very creation of them due
to what is impossible for their
essences being possible Him,
and due to the separation of the
Fashioner from His handiwork,
the Bounder from the bounded,
and the Lord from the creature.
He is the One without reference
to number, the Creator without
the implication of motion, the
Seeing without an instrument of
sight, and the Hearing without
an organ of hearing. He is
present not by proximity, hidden
not by concealment, manifest not
by being before us, and separate
not by an increase in distance.
His preeternity is something
prohibited to the occupation of
minds, and His perpetuity is
denied to the cravings of
intellects. His true nature has
fatigued the penetrations of
eyes, and His existence has
stymied the efforts of
conjectures. Therefore,
whoever describes God has
limited Him, whoever limits
Him has reckoned Him, and
whoever reckons Him has
 invalidated His preeternity.
Whoever says “where” has
restricted Him, whoever says
“upon what” has removed
himself from Him, and whoever
says “in what” has confined
Him.
Furthermore, Abū Ja‘far
al-Kulaynī states:
Muḥammad Ibn Ḥusayn reported
it from Ṣāliḥ Ibn Ḥamza from
Fatḥ Ibn ‘Abdu’llāh, the chief of
the tribe of Hāshim, who said:
“I wrote to Abū Ibrāhīm (peace
be upon him) and asked him
about something concerning the
profession of God’s oneness
(tawḥīd). He wrote back to me
in his own handwriting: ‘Praise
be to God, who has enjoined
upon His servants to praise
Him,’ and he recounted the like
of what has been passed on. But
he related an addition to it [and
a variation] as follows”:
The beginning of belief in Him
is the recognition of Him, the
perfection of recognizing Him is
the profession of His unity, and
the perfection of professing His
unity is the negation of attributes
from Him, for the testimony of
every attribute is that it is not
the object described, and the
testimony of the described is
that it is not the attribute. The
testimony of both of them
together by reason of duality
prohibits preeternity from them.
Therefore, whoever describes
God has limited Him, whoever
limits Him has reckoned Him,
and whoever reckons Him has
invalidated His preeternity.
Whoever says “how” has sought
to qualify Him, whoever says
“in what” has confined Him,
whoever says “upon what” has
imposed a burden upon Him,
whoever says “where” has
removed himself from Him,
 whoever says “what is He” has
characterized Him, and
whoever says “until what” has
restricted Him. He is the
Knower when there is no object
of knowledge, the Creator when
there is no creation, and the
Lord when there is no servant.
“This is how he describes our
Lord, though He is above what
the describers describe of
Him.” [139]
Among them are his words
(the blessings of God and His
salvation be upon him) passed
down in the Nahj al-Balāgha:
“Praise be to God in whom one
state does not precede another state,
as a result of which it would be
first before being later and manifest
before being hidden. He does not
enter into things, so that it could be
said He is existent in them, and He
is not distant from them, so that it
could be said He is separate from
them.”
And [among them] are his
words (the blessings of God be
upon him) in the Khuṭbat al-
Ashbāḥ:
The passage of time does not
touch Him, as a result of which
His state would vary, and He is
not in a place, so that
translocation would be possible
for Him. He created the kinds of
things without a premeditated
thought eventually resulting in
them, without an innate genius
which resolves upon them,
without a deputy who benefits
them through the events of fate,
and without a partner who
assists Him to invent the
wonders of the universe, as a
result of which His creation
would be completed, His
benevolence acknowledged, and
His call answered. The delay of
the delayer and the hesitation of
the hesitant do not impede Him.
 In another sermon which
contains the principles of the
profession of His unity and joins
together the meeting points of
glorification, he says:
Time is not associated with
Him, and instruments do not
assist Him. His being prevents
time, His existence non-
existence, and His pre-eternity
beginning. Motion and rest do
not apply to Him. How can that
which he causes to occur, which
He makes manifest, and which
He creates apply to Him? His
essence, therefore, is indeed
dissimilar, His nature separate,
 and His being inaccessible for
all eternity. He indeed would
have a before if He had an after,
and He would seek for
perfection if imperfection were
required of Him. He is not
changeable through a state, and
He does not alter in His states.
Days and nights do not cause
Him wear, and light and
darkness do not affect Him. He
is not within things by entering,
and He is not apart from them
by removal.
In another sermon he says
(peace be upon him): “He is with
each thing, not by conjunction, and
He is apart from each thing, not by
separation.” In another of his
sermons, he says (peace be upon
him):
Minds can neither specify Him
by limits and motions nor by
limbs and organs. “When” is not
ascribable to Him, and an end
cannot be set for Him by “until.”
He is not near to things by
contact, and He is not remote
from them by a connection.
Immeasurably exalted is He
above what the limiters ascribe
to him of the attributes of
measure and the limitations of
dimension, of the possession of
 abodes and places, for limit is
appointed to His creation and is
not associated with Him.
In another of his sermons,
he says (the blessings of God be
upon him): “No affair distracts Him
[from any other], time does not
change Him, and place does not
contain Him.”
Among them is one by
means of al-Ṣadūq (may God the
Exalted be pleased with him) in the
Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, by a number of
chains of transmission from our
inspired, infallible, holy, and
righteous Lord, Abu’l-Ḥasan al-
Riḍā’ (peace be upon him):
Al-Ma’mūn sent a messenger to
him [140], and he came to him.
Then the sons of Hāshim said:
“O Abu’l-Ḥasan! Ascend the
pulpit and set forth for us a
knowledge whereby we may
worship God.” So he ascended
(may the blessings of God be
upon his spirit and his body),
and he remained seated with his
head bowed for a long time
without speaking. Then he came
to himself, stood upright, uttered
praise and glorification to God,
and asked for blessings upon his
prophet and the people of his
house. Then he said:
The beginning of the worship of
God is the recognition of Him,
the root of recognizing Him is
the profession of His unity, and
the foundation of professing His
unity is the negation of attributes
from Him through the testimony
of minds that every description
and object of description is
created, through the testimony of
every created thing that it has a
creator Who is neither an
attribute nor an object of
attributes, through the testimony
of every attribute and object of
attributes to association
(iqtirān), through the testimony
of association to newness
(ḥadath), and through the
testimony of newness to the
impossibility of preeternity,
which cannot be qualified by
newness. God is not one whose
essence can be known through
comparison. Whoever claims to
have grasped Him has not
acknowledged His unity,
whoever has made likenesses
for Him has failed to attain Him,
whoever has restricted Him has
not believed in Him, whoever
has indicated Him has not
turned toward Him, whoever
has compared Him has not
remembered Him, whoever has
divided Him into parts has
waxed proud before Him, and
whoever has conceptualized
Him has not purposed Him.
Every object of knowledge is in
itself fashioned, and every
subsisting thing other than Him
is an effect. By His handiwork
the existence of God is inferred,
by reason His recognition is
firmly held, and by innate sense
His proof is established. The
composition (khilqat) of God is
the creation, which is a veil
between Him and them. His
unlikeness to them is in his
separation from their
whereness. His causing them to
begin is a proof to them that He
has no beginning, for everything
with a beginning is powerless to
cause the beginning of
something else. His providing
them with instruments is a proof
to them that He has no
instrument, due to the testimony
of instruments to the neediness
of their users. His names are a
characterization, and His acts
are an instruction. His essence
is a reality, His being is a
distinction between Him and
His creation, and His otherness
is a delimitation of what is other
than Him. Whoever asks for a
description of God is ignorant
of God, whoever confines Him
has turned aside from Him, and
whoever claims to have grasped
Him is mistaken about Him.
Whoever says “how” has
compared Him, whoever says
“why” has explained Him,
whoever says “when” has set a
time for Him, whoever says “in
what” has contained Him, and
whoever says “until what” has
limited Him. Whoever has
limited Him has taken
partnership with God, whoever
has taken partnership with God
has particularized Him,
whoever has particularized Him
has described Him, and
whoever has described Him has
transgressed against Him. God
does not change with the
changeability of the created, just
as He is not limited by the
delimitation of the limited. He
is one without reference to
number, evident without being
tangible, manifest not by the
faculty of sight, concealed not
by being apart, separated not by
distance, near not by proximity,
subtle without being embodied,
existent not after non-existence,
an agent not by necessity,
predetermining without the
engagement of thought,
arranging without motion,
willing without resolution,
perceiving without the faculty of
sensation, [141] hearing without
an instrument, and seeing
without an organ of sight. The
passage of time does not affect
Him, places do not contain Him,
years do not overtake Him,
attributes do not restrict Him,
and instruments do not benefit
Him. His being obviates the
ages, His existence negates non-
existence, and His preeternity
forestalls beginning. By His
giving the power of sensation to
the senses, it is understood that
He has no sensory faculty; by
His giving substance to the
substances, it is recognized that
He has no substance; by His
causing opposition between
things, it is understood that He
has no opposite; and by His
causing association between
them, it is recognized that He
has no associate. He made light
to be the opposite of darkness,
clarity the opposite of obscurity,
dryness the opposite of
moisture, and cold the opposite
of hot. He is the composer of
their enmities and the separator
of their compatibilities. Their
separation is a proof of their
separator, and their composition
is a proof of their composer.
This is His word (exalted and
glorified be He): ‘And from
each thing We have created
pairs; that ye may be
mindful.’[213] By them He
distinguished before from after
so that it could be recognized
that He has no before and no
after. Their natural dispositions
bear witness that the Giver of
their dispositions has no natural
disposition, their diversity
proves that the Bestower of
their diversity has no diversity,
and their reckoning of time
testifies that He who appointed
their times has no time. He
veiled some of them from others
that it might be recognized that
there is no veil between Him
and them other than them. He
has the meaning of Lordship
when there is no servant, the
reality of Godhood when there
is no creation, the meaning of
Knower when there is no object
of knowledge, the notion of
Creator when there is no
creature, and the signification of
the Hearer when there is nothing
to hear. It is not that since He
created things He is worthy of
the notion of Creator, and it is
not by His production of
creatures that He obtained the
signification of Maker. How
could it be so? “Since” does not
restrict Him, “already” does not
draw Him closer, “perhaps”
does not apply to Him, “when”
does not temporalize Him,
“where” does not contain Him,
and “with” does not connect
Him. Instruments in themselves
are limited, for a tool works for
that which is like itself, and its
action exists through things,
which prohibits it from
preexistence and bars it from
preeternity.
Then he said (peace be upon
him):
There is no belief (diyāna)
except after recognition
(ma‘rifa), there is no
recognition except through
sincerity (ikhlāṣ), there is no
sincerity in the company of
comparison (tashbīh), and there
is no negation together with the
affirmation of the attributes of
glorification. For whatever
exists in the world of creation
does not exist in its Creator, and
whatever is possible in it is
denied in its Fashioner. Motion
and rest do not apply to Him.
How can that which He causes
to occur, occur in Him, or that
which He begins apply to Him?
Therefore, His essence is
dissimilar, His being is
separate, and His true nature is
forever inaccessible. What
belongs to the Creator is a
meaning unlike [the meaning of
what belongs to] the created.
Before would exist for Him if
 after is defined for Him, and He
would be seeking perfection if
imperfection is required of Him.
How can one who is not
immune from newness merit
preeternity, and how can one
who is not immune from
origination originate things?
Therefore, the sign of the
fashioned arises through Him,
and it becomes an indication
[142] after it is indicated.
This is a befitting selection
from their traditions which brings
together the secrets of knowledge
and the mysteries of wisdom. I
swear by God that, after the Noble
Book and the Wise Remembrance
[i.e., the Qur’ān], they are worthy to
be considered the transcendent
Word of God, the supreme Wisdom
of God, the sure Handle of God,
and the blessed Elixir of God (may
God’s consummate blessings be
upon them). They are the proofs of
God by reason of their knowledge
of the Book and the decisive
Decree in both this world and the
next. Praise be to God, the Lord of
the worlds.
These are my forefathers. Bring me
their likes
When the places of meeting gather
us, O Jarīr!
 The Fifth Qabas
Concerning the mode of existence
of the unqualified natures and
the path of the demonstration by the
mode of the existence of the nature.

Wamḍa [5.1]
Have you not heard with
respect to the universal natures of
the science of metaphysics that the
quiddity—by which I mean the
absolute nature whose notion is
shared as a predicate between
multiple concrete beings (huwiyyāt)
and not just by one particular
individual—has four aspects when
considered by the mind. The first is
its aspect as the blended substance
(makhlūṭa al-jawhar) by inclusion
in its indeterminate oneness with
respect to itself as such of a unitary
mixture. It is the aspect of being
conditioned by something (bi-sharṭ
shay’iyya). In this aspect, it is the
determinate essence (mutaḥaṣṣalat
al-dhāt), completely and actually
determined in existence. This
aspect, therefore, is an affirmative,
qualifying circumstantial mode
belonging to the nature, inferred
from its notion with respect to both
the object signified and the
signification. That which is
actualized with respect to it is the
natural thing, which is the inclusive
individual connected to the nature.
[214]
The second is its aspect of
pure simplicity by itself, the
isolated essence (munḥāzat al-
dhāt), absolutely cut off from what
is other than itself, which cannot be
predicated whatsoever to anything
associated with it or to the
composite of it and that associated
thing due to the association being a
conjunctive, non-unitary
association, despite the fact that it
is actually conjoined or suitable for
conjunction, not by way of unity by
inclusion in its own concept with
respect to its indeterminate oneness.
It is the aspect of being negatively
conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā’iyya). It is
a negative qualifying circumstantial
mode, which is also the
consideration of the concept itself
with respect to both the object
signified and the signification. That
which is determinate in this aspect
is either matter or form. [215]
The third is its aspect as
itself as non-conditioned by either
actual unitary mixture [144] by
inclusion in its indeterminate
oneness [i.e., the first aspect] or by
non-mixture [i.e., the second
aspect], but in the sheerness of its
indeterminate essence, absolutely
unqualified with respect to the
inclusions under its substance in its
indeterminate oneness. It is the
aspect of being unqualified (irsāl)
and non-conditioned (lā bi-
sharṭiyya). This aspect, therefore,
is also a qualifying circumstantial
mode belonging to the nature,
inferred from its notion, but with
respect to the characterization
(ta‘bīr) and the signification
(ḥikāya) [i.e., that which
characterizes and signifies the real
essence], not with respect to the
object characterized and the object
signified. This aspect is the
condition of absoluteness and non-
qualification in the interest of
depicting the substance of the
unqualified indeterminate nature
and signifying its own absolute
essence, not the condition of
qualification by absoluteness and
non-qualification in the manner of
particularizing qualifications and
qualifying aspects. Therefore, the
object of consideration in this
aspect is the unqualified nature
itself, whether pertaining to the
species, the genus, or the
differentia, as isolated, within the
boundary of its non-qualification, in
the mind by analytical consideration
from the natural things which are
under it. It itself is in existence
through the species and the
individuals, and it is more general
than the object of consideration in
the first two aspects, i.e., the
conditioned by something and the
conditioned by nothing.[216]
The fourth is the aspect of
its own substance as such,
regardless of whether it be blended
with the natural things under it
which are its individuals, blended
by way of unity in existence, or
separated from them in the mind in
analytical consideration. Although
this aspect is the object of the
aspect of being non-conditioned,
since the object signified (mashrūḥ
maḥkīy ‘an-hi) by these two
aspects is the unqualified nature
itself as such, not something apart
from the nature itself as such in two
forms, nevertheless the aspect of
non-qualification and being non-
conditioned, which is the state of
the separated nature itself, is here
considered with respect to
signifying that which is unqualified
and non-conditioned by anything.
The aspect of “insofarness” is not
taken into consideration with
respect to the nature itself as such,
not with respect to the depicted,
signified object nor with respect to
the depiction and the signification at
all. The aspect here, therefore, is
seemingly broader than it is there,
and the object of consideration in
this aspect is more general than it is
in that aspect, more general in
mental consideration (i‘tibār), not
more general in inclusion
(tanāwul). For this reason the
unqualified nature not conditioned
by anything [i.e., the third aspect] is
the natural species, or the natural
genus, or the natural differentia, not
the nature as such.[217]
 Just as that which is not
associated with the most general
subject by inclusion in its generality
is associated with the most specific
subject by inclusion in its
specificity, in the same manner, that
which is [not] associated with the
most general aspect in its generality
is associated with the most specific
aspect in its specificity.
Consequently, the subject of the
natural species [proposition], for
example, the nature [145] of man as
unqualified and non-conditioned by
anything, is distinct from its
particulars, its individual instances,
and its portions, and apart from the
nature of man as predicated upon
the individuals and blended with
the particulars. The subject of the
natural generic [proposition] is the
nature of animal as unqualified and
non-conditioned by anything, not
“animal” insofar as it is animal.
The subject of the natural
propositions is the nature
corresponding to the most specific
aspect. The subject of the
embracing, universal determinate
[proposition] is the nature insofar
as it corresponds, due to
applicability of the proposition to
it, to both the sum of the most
specific things under it by inclusion
and the most specific in aspect. The
subject of the particular determinate
[proposition] is the nature insofar
as the proposition applies to it with
respect to the most specific things
by inclusion, whether in whole or in
part, or to only the most specific in
aspect. The subject of the
unqualified propositions (mursalāt
al-‘uqūd)[218] is the nature itself
as such, such that either a universal
determinate [proposition] or one of
the particular [propositions]
requires it, whether an inclusive
particular or one most specific in
aspect. As for the subject of
individual [propositions], their
subject is the individual entity in its
individuality.
Consequently, just as [the
propositions] “Man is a species”
and “Animal is a genus,” for
example, are true in a natural
[proposition], in like manner, they
are true in an unqualified and a
particular [proposition] also with
respect to the mentally posited most
specific instance by a kind of
mental consideration (i‘tibār).[219]
Just as [the propositions] “Not any
species is man” and “Not any genus
is animal” are not true, since it is
true that “One species is man” and
“One genus is animal,” with respect
to the most specific [instance] by
inclusion, in like manner, [the
propositions] “No man is a
species” and “No animal is a
genus” are not true, since it is true
that “One man is a species” and
“One animal is a genus” with
respect to the most specific
[instance] by a kind of inference
(i‘tibār). Just as [the proposition]
“No inclusive instance of man is a
species” is true, in like manner, [the
proposition] “No species is an
inclusive instance of man” is true.
And just as [the proposition] “No
inclusive instances of animal are a
genus” is true, in like manner, [the
proposition] “No genus is an
inclusive instance of animal” is
also true. Be not of those who are
uninformed.
Our companion in
leadership has referred to this and
expatiated upon it in a number of
places in the logical arts (funūn) of
the Shifā’. In Book Nine, Chapter
Seven, in Art Four on Prior
Analytics, he says: “This art
pertaining to generality is such that
its generality does not concern
individuals but rather states. You
have been informed about this
several times.” [146]
In Book Ten, Chapter Two,
in Art One introducing the
Categories, he says: “Generality
varies with respect to general
things. Thus, generality includes
what pertains to particular subjects.
For example, the generality which
is ‘animal’ is more general in
generality than ‘man’. And it may
include subsequent mental
considerations. For example, the
generality which is ‘animal’ is more
general in generality than ‘animal’
taken as a genus, a species, or an
individual.”
In the Categories he set
forth a problematic syllogism,
namely: [“Zayd and man are animal,
and animal is a genus; therefore,
Zayd and man are a genus.”] The
proposition “Zayd and man are
animal, and animal is a genus,” is
true, but the proposition “Zayd and
man are a genus” is not true. He
solved it by not repeating the
middle term. What is predicated of
Zayd and man, for example, is
“animal” as such, but the predicate
“genus” is “animal” as non-
conditioned. We have mentioned
this subject in al-Ufuq al-Mubīn,
where we expounded upon it in
detail by the leave of God, glorified
be He.
 Wamḍa [5.2]
Methinks it is clear to you
that what is most specific in
something, like “man” for example,
can only be part of the definition of
the substance of its essence if it is
one of its essential constituents
(jawhariyyāt), like “animal,”
“substance,” “rational,” and
“sensible” [in “man”] for example.
As for the most specific of the
accidental notions predicated to
him, like “white,” “laughing,” and
“writing,” these are in a stage
subsequent to the stage of his
essence, where portions of these
notions occur to him, as a
consequence of which they are
included under the essence, but they
occur in an accidental manner to its
individuals.
The only way essentials
and accidentals can be predicated
to the unqualified, indeterminate
nature is by means of inclusion in
its indeterminate oneness. So if they
are implicit in it in the stage of the
substance of the essence, the
predication is an essential
predication and the specificity is an
essential specificity, albeit with
respect to the stage of the essence
itself. But if they are subsequent to
the stage of the essence, the
predication is not an essential
predication but an accidental one,
and the specificity is not an
essential specificity, according to
reality, but an accidental one,
according to a mental figure.
Just as the differentia,
which is an essential constituent of
the quiddity, is only a derivative
concept,[220] like “rational,” in
other words, an indeterminate
essence required for the
comprehension of universals, in
like manner, an accidental
belonging to the quiddity is only
[147] a derivative concept, like
“white” and “writer,” that is to say,
an indeterminate essence to which
“whiteness” or “writing” are
related by way of qualification, not
as a condition. Therefore,
“whiteness” and the qualifying
relation are outside of the concept
itself. It is the absolute qualified
essence because it is the subject for
“whiteness” or “writing,” for
example. The predication of
“white” to this white is an essential
predication, but its predication to
this man, who happens to become
the same as this white, is an
accidental predication, due to this
white being one of the inclusions
contained essentially in the
indeterminacy of the nature of the
unqualified white, while this man is
one of the inclusions contained
accidentally in it.

Wamḍa [5.3]
The indeterminacy of the
differentia, like “rational,” in
relation to the genus and the
species, like “animal” and “man,”
pertains only to the concept itself,
which is the absolute unqualified
essence qualified by “rationality”;
it does not pertain to existence. For
it needs to be, insofar as it is the
differentia, particularizing in
existence to the species, even
though it is one of the aspects of the
nature of the genus included in its
indeterminacy, since the reality of
the differentia, the “whichness” of
the species, is derived from the
genus. It is not possible, therefore,
for it to exist under anything besides
this genus nor for it to belong to
other than this species of the genus.
As for the indeterminacy of the
genus, like “animal,” in relation to
the various species, and the
indeterminacy of the species, like
“man,” in relation to the
individuals, this pertains both to the
concept itself and to existence, for
the nature of the genus within the
boundary of its substance, insofar
as it is itself, has an indeterminate
oneness which does not preclude its
being, in terms of existence,
identical to multiple species. In like
manner, the quiddity of the species
within the boundary of its
determinate essence (dhāt
muḥaṣṣala), insofar as it is itself,
has an indeterminate oneness which
does not preclude its being, in terms
of existence, identical to multiple
individuals. Therefore, the
differentia is not attached to the
nature of the genus from outside and
added to it, as a result of which the
quiddity of the species becomes
determinate through addition, but
rather it is one of the implications
(muḍammināt) in the nature of the
genus and part of its indeterminate
oneness and unqualified quiddity
within the boundary of its
substance. The genus, the
differentia, and the species are
intelligible circumstantial modes
which belong to a determinate
quiddity, which the intellect infers
in analytical consideration when it
considers a single nature among the
unqualified natures as indeterminate
(mubhama) and determinate
(muḥaṣṣala).[221] Let it be
recognized.
 Wamḍa [5.4]
Are you not one of the
scholars who perceive clearly that
numerical oneness, which is one of
nine divisions [148] of absolute
oneness, is of two kinds: (1)
individual numerical oneness,
whose subject is the entities
(huwiyyāt) of individuals which
cannot be predicated upon many,
regardless of whether it be an
individual indeterminate oneness,
as belongs to the individually one
prime matter of the world of
generation and corruption, or an
individual determinate oneness, as
belongs to the other individuals in
the system of existence; (2)
universal, indeterminate numerical
oneness, whose subject is the
unqualified natures. Every nature,
as distinct from the other natures,
certainly has a numerical oneness in
its own stage with respect to itself
as distinct from the others and with
respect to its relation to the natures
above it by inclusion under them.
On the basis of this consideration, it
is one of the natures of which some
are isolated from others, but if it is
compared to certain quiddities and
individuals which are beneath it,
the intellect judges that the
numerical oneness which belongs to
it in the stage of its substance is
completely indeterminate in relation
to those quiddities and individuals
due to their being included in their
multiplicity and in their entirety in
that oneness itself. Is not then this
solitary nature compatible within
the boundary of its oneness in such
a way that it is identical in
existence to those quiddities and
individuals arranged under it?
Consequently, its numerical oneness
is indeterminate in relation to those
quiddities and individuals in their
multiplicity.
 Wamīḍ [5.4.1]
Methinks you are fully
aware that if a certain individual
entity exists in the real world or in
the mind, without a doubt that mode
of existence itself is the existence of
all the essentials of that entity
essentially and the existence of its
accidentals accidentally. He who
allows that the nature conditioned
by something (bi-sharṭ shay’),
designated the “individual instance”
(fard) and the “natural thing,” can
exist without the unqualified nature
non-conditioned by anything,
designated the “natural universal,”
being existent with that selfsame
existence, can be considered among
those minds deprived of innate
human intelligence. Is it not
required, if the individual instance
exists and the nature does not exist,
for the thing to be separated from
the substance of its quiddity and
divorced from the root of its
essence?
Furthermore, unqualified
animal is part of this animal, for
example, with respect to
determinateness and
indeterminateness. Absolute
existence is one of the accidents of
the quiddity, and the change of
accidents does not change the
constitution of the quiddity of the
subject or nullify the substance of
its essence. The constitution of the
substance of the quiddity and its
essential constituents are
necessarily and positively
conserved in all the modes [149] of
existence, as has been recited to
you more than once. Consequently,
whenever this animal exists, it is
implicit that the substance of
unqualified animal as such is
conserved in the constitution of its
essence. However, the attributes of
particularity and concreteness are
accidental states corresponding to
the particular properties of the
modes of existence. Thus, no harm
is done if they change with the
change of the mode of existence.
The unqualified nature as such,
therefore, is part of the quiddity of
the individual with respect to the
aspect of determinateness and
indeterminateness[222] and
identical to its essence in other
modes of existence. It is essentially
prior to the individual, which is the
natural thing, as the simple is prior
to the composite.
From a third perspective,
if the conditions anticipated for the
existence of something are realized,
is not the occurrence of its actual
existence certain? The only purpose
of the unqualified nature with
respect to existence, such as
“animal” insofar as it is animal
non-conditioned by anything, and its
only end and goal, is the occurrence
of the substance of animal, for
example, whether it be realized
under one condition or a thousand,
or not realized under any condition
apart from the essence of “animal”
itself. Consequently, if the existence
of “animal” conditioned by
something is admitted, then there
certainly is fulfilled by this that
upon which the existence of
unqualified animal as such non-
conditioned by anything depends
and by which it is realized.
Unqualified animal as such,
therefore, is necessarily existent
through the existence of this animal.
From a fourth perspective,
is not the nature of unqualified
animal as such, for example, among
those things whose essences are not
dependent upon matter and duration
and whose existence is not subject
to dispositional possibility and a
material bearer? But essential
possibility, in this case, is a
prerequisite for the outpouring of
existence via the Regulator of the
world and the Mainstay of the
system of existence, in other words,
the primal divine Providence.
Therefore, if the existence
of this animal emanates from the
bounty of the real Emanator
(exalted be His remembrance) due
to the necessitation of the
preparedness (isti‘dād) of matter,
unqualified animal as such is even
more entitled to emanate from the
providence of the Emanating
Creator due to the necessitation of
the possibility of the essence [i.e.,
essential possibility]. It is evident,
then, that the unqualified nature as
such is existent through the
existence of this natural thing, but it
is an existent distinguished by the
fact that its existence is divine
existence and existence prior to the
many, since its determination
(taqarrur) and its existence are
only through the providence of God
[150] (glorified be He). As for this
individual, which is enveloped by
the attachments of matter and the
accidents of nature, although the
cause of its existence is the
providence of God, nevertheless,
that which makes possible
(muṣṣaḥiḥ) its dependency upon
God’s providence is the need of the
particular nature and the
preparedness of receptive matter.
For this reason, it is an existent
whose existence is particular,
natural existence and existence with
the many.
Therefore, the composition
of the proof which is commonly
accepted is alleged to come from
“Socrates” and “Plato.” Our
companion has related it in al-
Madīna al-Salāmiyya, namely that
the unqualified nature non-
conditioned by anything has two
modes of existence in the real
world: (1) a natural existence
together with the many with the
same existence as the individuals
with respect to the mixture of
individual properties and the
conjunction of accidents, and (2) a
divine existence, prior to the many,
separate from the existences of the
individuals in their entirety, and not
blended with any of the individual
properties or conjoined with any of
the accidents. This is one of the
meanings of the “Platonic Ideas,” as
is current upon the tongues of the
masses and well-known to them, for
the demonstration requires that the
natural universal shared between
all the individuals with a divine
existence prior to the many be
solely dependent upon the primal
divine Providence. Consequently, it
would be necessary for the
unqualified nature not conditioned
by anything, which is the power
shared between all its individuals,
to be existent in the real world as
its unqualified self with an
existence separate from all the
individuals and isolated from all
the accidents and derivative
characteristics.
Methinks, as we have
instructed you more than once, this
proof of theirs is untenable, because
the mixture of the existent
unqualified nature, as itself, with
the individual properties and its
conjunction with the accidents by
the correspondence of the
individuals will not remove it from
the state of being non-conditioned
to the state of being conditioned by
something, nor does this necessitate
its being existent within the
boundary of itself as such with a
divine existence prior to the many.
If it should happen that the
generation of its existence occurs
within the boundary of itself, it
would become identical to the
existence of the individual, which is
a natural existence and with the
many, since being absolutely non-
conditioned is not incompatible
with that. Let your vision be clear
on this question, and be not
negligent.

Wamīḍ [5.4.2]
Perchance you will say:
Did we not hear you say, O
concourse of intuitive philosophers,
that according to your principles
and your rules, something which is
not individualized does not exist,
and that which does not exist is not
individualized?[223] What has
happened to you, that you are
revoking your rule [151] and
holding to the affirmation of
existence for the unqualified nature?
It may be replied to you: By the
“individualized” in our expressions
is meant what can be predicated
only upon a single entity, and by it
is intended what is blended by
individualization. So when we say
“Something which is not
individualized does not exist,” we
only mean by this “that which is not
blended in its existence by
individualization.” Consequently,
the indeterminate, unqualified
nature cannot have existence,
according to the doctrine of the
demonstration, so long as it is in the
sheerness of its indeterminacy and
its non-qualification. But if it
becomes determinate by
individualization, it exists with the
same existence as its individual
determinate instance, which cannot
be predicated upon more than one
entity, and it is not separate in
existence from its individual
instances. Indeed, the individual
instance and the unqualified nature
are blended together in existence in
the sense that an essence distinct
from other essences is produced in
the real world, suitable for the mind
to analyze it into an individual
entity and an unqualified nature.
If you say: This animal is a
material, sensible entity, whereas
the unqualified nature as such is an
intelligible nature unattainable by
sensation; how then can the unity of
the intelligible and the sensible be
reasonable? I say: This animal has
both a sensible being and an
unqualified nature, and sensation
cannot attain it in all its aspects, for
it only has sensibility with respect
to its individual being, not with
respect to its unqualified nature.
The subject of the sensible and the
non-sensible are different in
analytical consideration. That
which is impossible is only the
unity of the completely separate
substance and the material
essences, not the unity of the
unqualified natures isolated within
the boundary of their non-
qualification and their sensible,
material individual instances within
the boundary of their individual
beings in the real world, in the
sense of mixture without any
separation and distinction with
respect to the particularity of
existence in the external world.
Separation and distinction occur in
the intellect in analytical
consideration, since the existent in
the external world is neither solely
the individual instance nor the
unqualified nature. Yet the existent
in the real world is only one thing
which is obtained from the mixture
of two things, which are the
individual instance and the nature. It
is suitable for the intellect to
analyze it into both of them in
analytical consideration true to the
thing itself.
Consequently, the
unqualified natures are without
exception perpetual things, and the
same applies to the individual
spiritual substances. As for the
material individuals, with respect
to their individual beings, if they
are considered insofar as they are
determined (mutaqarrara) and
existent in the real world, while
disregarding their occurrence in the
horizon of change and flow,
overtaking and falling behind,
within boundaries [152] subject to
priority and posteriority, they are
perpetual, changeless existents,
even though their existence in
perpetuity is by their existence in
time within specific, successive
boundaries. But if they are
considered insofar as their
existence is connected to their
boundaries subject to priority and
posteriority, they are temporal
existents changing with elapsing
and renewal. This is just like the
existence of something with respect
to the thing itself, which is its
existence within the boundary of
itself, not by a fabrication of the
mind, while averting the gaze from
the particular properties of the
containers and vessels. If it should
happen that this is the same as its
occurrence in a certain boundary in
its particularity, the particularity
would be altogether void of
consideration with respect to this.
The same applies to the intelligible
form impressed in the mind, which
is the essential object of knowledge
corresponding to the aspect of the
original thing itself, and the
acquired knowledge corresponding
to the aspect of the impressed,
mental particularity.

Wamīḍ [5.4.3]
Since you know that
individuation, in the sense of
impossibility of predication upon
many, has no stage prior to the stage
of existence, it is evident to you that
what is individualized in its own
essence can be no other than that
whose quiddity is identical to its
existence.[224] Consequently, its
existence and its individuation must
both be in the stage of its essence.
Otherwise, its individuation would
be in the stage of its essence, and its
existence would be in a posterior
stage, as a consequence of which
the stage of its individuation would
be prior to the stage of its existence,
which is absurd and impossible.
Consequently, that which is not
individualized in its own essence,
in the sense of impossibility of
predication upon many, belongs to
the stage of the essence in the world
of contingency. Indeed, it only
occurs to the possible quiddity
through the conjunction of the
universals with the properties and
the accidents individualized in the
sense of separation and distinction
from existential commonalities.
Then existence and individuation
are obtained, in the sense of
impossibility of predication upon
many, through dependence upon the
Agent of the substance of the
essence and the Maker of the reality
of existence and individuation, Who
is the true Existent, the absolutely
One, Who is individualized in His
own essence. Every contingent
essence is a composite pair
consisting of quiddity and existence
(lit. “whatness” and “thatness”),
reality and individuation, genus and
differentia, unqualified nature and
individual being. There is no [real]
unity and oneness in the world of
contingency, for particular essences
only have unity and unification [of
parts], not unity and oneness in the
real sense.
In short, just as existence
is added to a possible essence, so
likewise is individuation. The
conjunction [153] of the unqualified
natures [with their individuals]
does not prevent their predication
upon many essentially; rather the
utmost is that it provides separation
from existential commonalities. The
strict basis of impossibility of
predication upon many is the
dependence of the entity, separated
by the conjunction of properties and
accidents from all existential
commonalities, upon the true
Existent individualized in Himself,
with a dependency which is
separate from the dependencies of
the other entities. The individual
accidents are the signs and tokens
of individuation, not the cause
which gives individuation. The true
Creator, Who is individualized by
virtue of Himself, is the agent of the
individualization of the system of
existence, designated as the “Great
Man,” through His essential primal
providence and in accord with a
primal intention. Its essential
dependency is the most perfect and
complete system, and there is no
system in the range of possibility
more perfect and complete than this
system. He is the agent of the
individualizations of the individuals
of existence insofar as they are the
constituent parts of this complete,
perfect, comprehensive, and
individual system. This abstruse
theme is also explained in the Kitāb
al-Taqdīsāt.

Wamīḍ [5.4.4]
Methinks you are aware that
the three aspects: the conditioned
by something, the negatively
conditioned, and the non-
conditioned, according to this
usage, are not applicable to
determinate realities (ḥaqā’iq
muḥaṣṣala) which are distinct from
each other in determinateness
(taḥaṣṣul), like the sphere in
relation to man, not to mention an
accident, like white, in relation to a
substance, like body. Rather, they
are only applicable to the
indeterminate unqualified natures in
relation to the things included
within their indeterminate oneness
—either essentially, as with
individuals, species, and
differentiae in relation to the
natures of the genera; or
accidentally, as with subjects in
relation to the natures of concepts
which are their accidental
predicates. The non-conditioned,
therefore, is the basis of making
general predication possible,
whether essentially or accidentally,
while the negatively conditioned is
the basis of the absolute
impossibility of predication. The
subject of the aspect of being non-
conditioned, insofar as it is its
subject, is predicable to the two
subjects of the conditioned by
something and the negatively
conditioned, insofar as they are
their two subjects. But it is not like
this with respect to their two
subjects insofar as they are their
two subjects.
However, these aspects,
according to another usage, with
respect to conjunction and non-
conjunction, are applicable to any
nature, whether determinate or
indeterminate, in relation to any
reality, whether determinate or
indeterminate. But they have no role
at all in making predication or non-
predication possible. [154] This is
the standard of the law of
predication with regard to the
essential natures and the accidental
predicates. The imitators have
strayed far from the path of
attainment into error, regardless of
whether they have expatiated upon
this theme in detail or not.

Wamīḍ [5.4.5]
It has become clear to you
from what we have informed you
that all individual beings are the
subject of individual numerical
oneness, while the unqualified
nature existent through their very
existence is the subject of
indeterminate, universal numerical
oneness. The individuals, therefore,
are many in number and in
individual being, while the
unqualified nature existent through
their existence is one in number, but
not in individualization and not in
particularization (ta‘ayyun) and
determinateness (taḥaṣṣul).
Among the imitators is he
who says: “The natural universal
existent with the same existence as
the individuals is essentially
multiple in the real world by reason
of the multiplicity of the
individuals,” clinging to the fact
that the basis of essential
multiplicity in the real world is the
multiplicity of the mode of external
existence. So if the nature is
essentially existent in the real
world through the very existences
of the multiple individuals, then
without a doubt it would have
multiple essential existences in the
real world, as a consequence of
which it would be multiple in the
real world in accordance with the
multiplicity of individuals.
Therefore, just as the individuals
are not describable by oneness in
the real world, the same would
apply to the nature. He is saying
here that just as the truth of the
affirmative in unqualified
propositions, such as saying “The
animal is a man,” is admissible
with the truth of a particular
affirmative proposition, in the same
way, the truth of the unqualified
negative proposition, such as “The
animal is not a man,” is admissible
with the truth of a particular
negative proposition. But he does
not realize that the nature is realized
with the realization of any
particular individual among its
individuals and is only negated with
the negation of all its individuals.
If you reflect deeply, it
will become clear to you that the
basis for the multiplicity of
something in the real world is the
multiplicity of the mode of
existence by which it exists as such
distinct from what is other than it.
The nature, with respect to
existence in the real world, is not
separate from the individuals,
rather it is blended with them in a
unitary way. Although the
individual is also blended with the
nature in the real world,
nevertheless, if they are
distinguished in the intellect with
respect to determinateness and
indeterminateness, it is correct that
the mode of multiple existence in
the real world is dependent upon
the individual insofar as it
separated in the mind from the
nature, but it is not true that that
existence qualified by multiplicity
is dependent upon the nature insofar
as it [the nature] is distinct in the
intellect from the individuals. Let it
be understood. [155]
Therefore, the individuals
are essentially multiple with
respect to existence in the real
world, while the nature is
accidentally multiple through their
multiplicity. There is no accidental
multiplicity except for the
multiplicity of the nature through the
multiplicity of its individuals.
Moreover, there is a third
position which may be inferred
from the Seal of the Most Excellent
Scholars in the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt. It
is that the nature of humanity
(insāniyya) as such, for example,
cannot be qualified either by
oneness or by multiplicity, because,
insofar as it is itself, it is neither
particular nor universal. What is
clearly meant by this is that the
nature of unqualified humanity as
itself is neither one nor many,
neither particular nor universal.
This is a truth in which there is no
doubt. Whoever denies this has
departed from his innate
intelligence. The quiddity as itself
is, indeed, nothing but itself.
Were someone to ask about
the two extremes of contradiction,
the answer is the absolute negation
of the affirmation of everything
belonging to that circumstantial
mode other than the essential
constituents, provided that the
negation occurs before “insofar as”
(min ḥaythu), not after it. If it
occurs before the connective
relation, the aim is also obtained.
Although it is not a postulation of
obverse affirmation, as some of the
imitators have supposed, due to the
negation, in this case, falling upon
the copula of the proposition, so
that an affirmative is hardly
conceivable at all, nevertheless,
this also is assuming that the
correspondent of the negation is the
circumstantial mode of humanity.
But this is not possible since the
circumstantial mode of humanity is
only the correspondent of its
essential constituents, while the
negation is not one of its essential
constituents. Therefore, it is correct
that the negation only falls upon the
copula belonging to that
circumstantial mode. If it is meant
that numerical indeterminate
oneness does not apply to the nature
of humanity as such posterior to the
stage of the essence as such when
the intellect regards it separated
from all the individuals, just as
individual numerical oneness
applies to the singular entity
posterior to the stage of the essence
of the subject when the intellect
regards it separated from the
unqualified nature, the pure intellect
judges this to be false. Our
companion has followed in our way
in the Shifā’ in his explanation of
all of this. Let it be recognized.

Wamīḍ [5.4.6]
He says in Chapter Eleven,
Book One, of the Demonstration of
the Shifā’:
The most prior to us are those
things which we acquire first.
The most prior by nature are
those things which cause other
things after them to be removed
if they are removed, but not vice
versa. [156] The better known
to us is also the most prior to us.
The better known by nature are
those things which nature aims
toward in existence. Therefore,
if universals are arranged
opposite of sensible particulars,
the sensible particulars, to us,
are both more prior and better
known. This is because the first
thing which we acquire and
know are the sensible objects
from which mental images are
derived, and then from them we
attain to the immediate
apprehension of mental
universals.
But when species
universals are arranged
opposite of generic universals,
the generic universals are more
prior by nature, though not
better known by nature. The
generic universals are also
more prior and better known to
our minds, while the species
universals are more posterior
and less known in relation to us.
This is because if the nature of
the genus is removed, the
natures of the species are
removed, even though the nature
of the genus, insofar as it is a
universal, not insofar as it is a
nature alone, subsists through
the species. Consequently, the
natures of the genera are more
prior in this respect than the
natures of the species, but the
better known to nature are the
natures of the species, because
nature does not have as its goal
the nature of the genus so that it
will exist but the nature of the
species. Thus, the nature of the
genus requires it [i.e., the
species] to be the object
intended either necessarily or
accidentally. This is because the
species is a complete
determinate notion (ma‘na
kāmil muḥaṣṣal). As for the
nature of the genus by itself, it is
not possible to posit its
determination (taḥṣīl) in
existence. Nature aims at the
complete determinate thing,
which is its goal. Furthermore,
if the object intended were the
nature of the genus by itself, the
species of the genus could not
be multiple in nature, and it
would be restricted to a single
species. It is absurd for a
thinker to think that the nature of
color is better known to nature
than white, black, and other
colors. Rather, the universal
nature, which maintains the
system of the world, has the
species natures as its goal,
while the particular natures,
which are not essential to the
system of the world, aim at the
individual natures.[225] The
genus is included in the goal
(qaṣd) necessarily or
accidentally.
It is evident that the
natures of the species are better
 known than the natures of the
genera with respect to nature,
although the genus is more prior
by nature than the species.
However, the natures of the
genera are more prior to us than
the natures of the species, in
other words, in relation to our
minds.
After this he expounds
upon the better known and the more
prior to us and to nature with
respect to simples and composites,
[157] saying:
It is necessary for these
principles to be examined in
this manner. If someone should
say: “That which one of them
has said, that the notion of the
genus is better known to nature,
because even though it is not
known through some thing, it is
in itself and in relation to the
truth better known,” it may be
replied to him: “There is no
meaning to your statement “it in
relation to the truth is better
known,” because something
only becomes known through its
knower, and its knower is either
us through our mind, whatever
possesses a mind, or nature with
respect to its intending the
system of the whole. Hence, the
better known to it [nature] is
that which it aims at for the
system of the whole. If we
consider true knowledge, the
generic nature is not known by
itself, except potentially, and it
is known actually when it is
known by the mind. It is only
known by itself potentially in
the mode which it desires to
become known actually. No one
can deny that the generic nature
is better known to the mind. The
demonstrative procedure infers
from what is better known to the
mind to what is better known to
nature, as the First Teacher
 explains in the commencement
of his instruction on the natures.
He states in the Physics:
“The universal nature which orders
the system of existence and
maintains the foundation of the
world intends the ends of the good
with respect to the system of the
whole through primary intention.”
He repeats in the Metaphysics,
especially in the chapter devoted to
the final cause (ghāya), that the
expression “the universal nature
which orders the system of
existence” applies to the
Providence of God[226] (glorified
be He), which is the principle
directing the outflow of the good
with respect to the system of
existence and the foundation of the
world, while the expression “the
particular natures” applies to the
near angels of God, inclusive of the
substances which are the lights of
the separate intelligences and the
incorporeal managing souls.
I say: The connection
validating this application is that
the system of the whole in their
view is the Great Man, and there is
no doubt that the primal divine
Providence controls it through
direction (tadbīr) and subjugation
(taskhīr). The fashioning (ṣun‘) and
the emanation (ifāḍa) are the
universal, effusive, maintaining,
ordering nature. For this reason,
you have heard them say:
“Whatever is in the world of
existence is natural in relation to the
system of the whole.” May your
insight into this subject be
increased, if God, the Almighty, the
All-Knowing, wills it.

Wamīḍ [5.4.7]
Have you heard what is
ascribed to the Leader of Wisdom,
the divine Plato, and his master,
Socrates? It is said that they [158]
hold that just as the substances of
the unqualified natures of the
material species have an existence
which is blended with matter and
its accidents in the very existence of
their material individuals, in like
manner, they have, within the
boundary of their non-
conditionedness, another existence
in perpetuity separate from matter,
free of the existences of their
individuals, and separate from
place, time, locus, and position in
the real world, as with the purely
separate things.[227]
Our companion states in
Chapter Twelve of the
Demonstration of the Shifā’:
There is no demonstration
(burhān) of corruptibles nor a
definition (ḥadd) of them. The
sensibles also have no
demonstration, nor are they
definable insofar as they are
sensible and individual, but
rather with respect to another
intelligible nature.
Demonstration, therefore, is not
based upon the sun insofar as it
is this sun, but rather insofar as
it is a sun free from the
accidents associated with it and
the individuality occurring to it.
In like manner, definition does
not belong to it insofar as it is
this sun. If this is the case, then
demonstration pertains to
intelligible forms abstracted
from matter, so that they will not
be sensible and liable to
corruption. The same applies to
definition. Some of them [the
philosophers] posited this for
numerical forms only, while
others posited it for numerical
and geometrical forms, and
mathematical forms in general,
though not natural forms, and
they raised the natural forms to
them. The basis of
argumentation of these
philosophers is another thing,
which is that these forms are
independent of matter in
definition and also in existence.
They say: “As for what the
mathematicians posit with
respect to a sensible line and
shape, it is false, for the real
line and shape are mental and
demonstrable.” Another group
composed geometrical forms
from numerical forms, and made
the latter the principle of the
former.
As for Plato, he made
the separate intelligible forms
existent for every intelligible,
even the natures. If they were
free (mujarrada), he called
them “ideas” (muthul), and if
they were attached to matter, he
called them “natural forms.” All
of this is wrong, for natural
forms are not identical to
themselves if they are
abstracted from matter, and
mathematical forms cannot
subsist without a matter, even if
they are defined without matter.
The argument in refutation of
these ideas and the syllogisms
inducing them is only in the
discipline of first philosophy
[i.e., metaphysics], not in logic
or other sciences.
 He states in Book Seven,
Chapter Two, of the Metaphysics of
the Shifā’:
From the moment they shifted
from the sensible to the
intelligible they became
confused. One group thought that
the division necessitates the
existence of two things in each
thing, like two “men” in the
notion of “humanity”: a
corruptible, sensible man and an
intelligible, separate,
everlasting, unchanging man.
They assigned [159] an
existence to each one of these
two, and they called the
separate existence “ideal
existence” (wujūd mithālī).
They assigned to each one of the
natural things a separate form,
which is the intelligible which
the mind receives, for the
intelligible is something which
is incorruptible, while every
sensible thereof is corruptible.
They made the sciences and
demonstrations lead to and treat
these [intelligible forms]. Plato
and his teacher Socrates went
too far in this doctrine. They say
that “humanity” has one existent
idea (ma‘na) in which its
individuals participate and
which remains despite their
destruction. Since it is not a
sensible, multiple, corruptible
idea, it is therefore a separate
intelligible.
Another group do not
regard these forms as separate,
but rather only their principles.
They made the mathematical
things which are separate in
definitions subject to separation
in existence, and they made
those natural forms which are
not separable in definition not
separate in essence. They made
the natural forms generated
solely through the connection of
those mathematical forms with
matter, as with concavity, for it
is a mathematical idea which
when joined to matter becomes
“snub-nosed” and becomes a
natural idea. Concavity, insofar
as it is mathematical, is
separate, but insofar as it is
natural, it is not separate. Plato,
for the most part, inclined
toward the forms being
separate. He considered
mathematicals to be ideas
between the forms and material
things. Although they are
separate in definition, it is not
possible in his view for a
[mathematical] dimension to
subsist without matter, because
it [the dimension] will either be
finite or infinite. If it is infinite
and this is a consequence of its
being nothing but a nature, then
every dimension would be
infinite. If it is a consequence of
its being free of matter, then
matter becomes that which gives
limitation and form. But both of
these ways are impossible.
Indeed, the existence of an
infinite dimension is
impossible. If it is finite, then its
being confined within a definite
boundary and measurable shape
 is only due to a state of being
affected occurring to it from
outside, not due to its own
nature. The form would only be
affected through its matter.
Hence, it would be both
separate and not separate,
which is impossible. Therefore,
it is necessary for
[mathematicals] to be
intermediary.
I say: The Platonic Forms,
according to the general belief
circulating upon the tongues, are
explained in this place as (1)
unqualified natures existent in the
domain of perpetuity and the real
world in their state of being non-
conditioned insofar as they are
themselves, isolated in the world of
Command from their individuals
and apart from what they have of
existence in the world of [the
physical] creation through the very
existence of the individuals, [160]
which are blended with them and
not distinct from them. In another
place [they are explained] (2) with
respect to affirming God’s
knowledge of things through
suspended forms existent neither in
a subject, nor in a substratum, nor in
a time or place[228]; in another
place (3) with respect to dividing
the worlds by the world of
similitudes (‘alām al-mithāl)
intermediate between the invisible
and visible worlds as a barrier
(barzakh) between the incorporeal
and the material; and in another
place (4) with respect to
establishing the species forms as
intelligible substances which are
the lords of the species (arbāb al-
anwā‘)[229] in charge of all the
bodies of the individuals of the
species through management
(tadbīr) and subjugation (taskhīr),
just as the incorporeal soul manages
a certain individual body. It [the
soul] is nothing but a kind of
incorporeal angel and the
vicegerent for the separate lord of
the species. The particular
corporeal nature and the substantial
impressed form is a kind of
corporeal angel.
Let it be known that, with
the exception of the last
explanation, these explanations are
invalidated through rational
demonstrations. We will now speak
according to the path we are upon.
In the first place, the unqualified
nature as existent in the real world
is certainly blended in actuality
with the existence which it, within
the boundary of its unconditioned
nature as such, is related to, and it
is certainly not possible for it to be
separated or distinguished from it,
except when the mind regards it as
itself not conditioned by anything. If
its separation and its freedom from
corporeal accidents and material
attachments is possible in the real
world, then how is its existence in
the external world in its pure
unqualifiedness and its sheer
absolute non-conditionedness to be
conceived?
In the second place, since
it is clear to you that the stage of
existence is identical to the stage of
individualization, if the unqualified
nature exists, it is definitely
blended in its existence with the
individualization. How then can its
existence in the external world, in
its unqualifiedness and its non-
conditionedness, be considered
separate from the individual entity
and not blended with the
individualization? Furthermore, its
oneness in number, in this case, is a
numerical individual oneness,
while the nature with which it
shares its oneness in number is a
numerical indeterminate oneness.
How is it possible to derive that
from this? Let it be pondered.
In the third place, if it is
established that the unqualified
nature with respect to itself is
individual without being
encompassed by corporeal
accidents and material attachments,
as with the purely separate things,
[161] it would be impossible for it
to be dependent for its
individuation upon matter, as Plato
argued in refutation of incorporeal
linear dimension. In sum, just as the
variation of one nature is absolutely
impossible in substantiality and
accidentality, in like manner the
variation of the determinate species
nature is impossible in
incorporeality and materiality.
 In the fourth place, the
existence of one quiddity in
perpetuity at two different times,
once in perpetuity not in a time or a
place, and another time in
perpetuity with respect to existence
in time and place, since perpetuity
is the container of all times and
places including everything that is
in them and with them, is something
a sound mind and a balanced
intellect cannot accept.
This is the path of mature
inquiry in accord with rational and
demonstrative methods. In regard to
what our companion has stated in
the Shifā’, it is in accord with this
assumption: non-conditionedness
returns to being negatively
conditioned, and simple negation
returns to obverse negation. There
is no basis for it, as it is clear.
Just as the blending of
individual properties and the
conjunction of accidents by
occurrence (ittifāq)[230] through
the individual does not extract the
substance of the unqualified nature
itself as such from unqualifiedness
and non-conditionedness into being
conditioned by something, in the
same manner, non-blending and
non-conjunction by occurrence
through the necessity of the primal
divine Providence with respect to
the existence of the nature itself as
such separated from all individuals
and free of all attachments does not
extract it from non-conditionedness
into being negatively conditioned.
In brief, nothing of being blended or
non-blended, conjoined or non-
conjoined, enters into the
consideration of the quiddity itself
as such. There is no aspect of
unqualifiedness and non-
conditionedness contrary to the
realization of anything of it by
occurrence. Methinks our
companion in leadership has
feigned forgetfulness of this in what
he has explained in the Shifā’ on
this subject.
He says after the discourse
just quoted:
If you were to reflect, you will
find that there are five principle
reasons for the errors these
people have committed. The
first of them is their supposition
that if something is separated in
such a manner that the
consideration of nothing else is
associated with it, it is
separated in existence from it
[as well]. It is as if something is
turned toward alone without
turning toward its mate, as a
result of which it is made non-
adjoined to its mate. In short, if
it is regarded [162] as non-
conditioned by conjunction, it is
thought that it may be regarded
as conditioned by non-
conjunction, so that it is only
proper for it to be so regarded,
because it is not conjoined, but
separate. But it is not like this,
for each thing of itself has one
aspect, and with respect to its
relation to an associated thing it
has another aspect. The blended
as such is not conjoined by way
of negation, nor by way of
obversion, by which is
 understood separation in
subsistence.
We say: I do not know
from where he learned of their
arrival at this conjecture. Their
position is only that the unqualified
natures with respect to themselves
are not conditioned by conjunction
or non-conjunction. Just as they are
existent in the real world through
the very existence of their material
individuals, blended with them in
existence in a unitary way, in like
manner, they are with respect to
themselves as such, as non-
conditioned by conjunction and
non-conjunction, existent in the real
world separated from their material
individuals. From what we have
said the question is clear with
respect to the remaining four of the
five reasons.[231] The basis,
therefore, for refuting these Forms
is what we have recited to you. The
falsity of the suspended Forms is
evident from this as well. There is
an extensive discourse on this in
our book Taqwīm al-Īmān.

Wamīḍ [5.4.8]
Our companion in
instruction, in his book al-Jam‘
bayna al-Ra’yayn (The Harmony of
the Two Views) rejects the
ascription of these ideas and forms,
as commonly understood, to Plato.
He believes that Plato and Aristotle
hold the same doctrine in regard to
them. He says:
Among them also are the forms
and ideas attributed to Plato,
who established them, and that
Aristotle was opposed to them.
In other words, Plato in most of
his sayings alludes to the fact
that existents have separate
forms in a divine world, which
may be called “divine ideas.”
They are not subject to
annihilation and corruption, but
are immutable (bāqiya), while
that which is liable to
annihilation and corruption are
existents whose existence is
generated. Aristotle gives a
discourse in the Metaphysics in
which he denounces the
advocates of the ideas and the
forms which are said to be
existent and to subsist in a
divine, incorruptible world, and
he explains the abominations
these would entail, such as
requiring that lines, planes,
bodies, stars, and spheres
should exist there, and the
motions of those spheres, and
that sciences should exist there,
like astronomy, mathematics,
music, medicine, geometry,
[163] proper measures, cold
and hot things; in short, active
and passive natures, universals
and particulars, matters and
forms.
But we find that
Aristotle in his book on divinity
known as the Theology confirms
the heavenly forms, and he
explains there that they are
existent in the divine world. It is
evident that if these two books
are accepted according to their
literal meaning, one of three
explanations is possible: (1)
Either they are contradictory, or
(2) one of them is by Aristotle
and the other is not, or (3) they
can be interpreted in such a way
that their inner meanings are
congruent and complementary,
even though they differ in their
literal sense. Now if it is
thought that Aristotle, despite
his proficiency, his superior
knowledge, and the loftiness of
these ideas in his view, in other
words, the heavenly forms, yet
contradicts himself in one
science, which is the divine
science, this is far fetched and
objectionable. As for the
 possibility that one of these
works is not his and falsely
attributed to him, it is also a
remote possibility, because the
books containing these passages
are very well known. It remains
then that they have
interpretations and meanings
which, when understood, will
dispel doubt and perplexity.
The Master of
Illumination, in the Muṭāraḥāt and
the Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, and his
followers, such as the author of the
al-Shajara al-Ilāhiyya, hold that
the ascription to Plato of Platonic
Forms, in the sense of the existence
of natural universals in their
unqualified natures in the real
world, not blended but separate and
isolated from their individuals, is
false and objectionable.[232] As
for suspended forms belonging to
natural things and to the
mathematicals, in short, Platonic
Forms in every sense but the first
sense, [they believe] this is the
doctrine of Plato, Socrates, and
others among the moderns and
ancients.
As for us, we say that the
truth is in what our companion, the
Teacher [Al-Fārābī], stated. It is
improbable and objectionable for
the leader of wisdom, the divine
Plato, and those who are
comparable to him among the great
heavenly minds, to postulate that a
solitary individual entity or a
single, existing species nature
should have two essentially
incompatible and different kinds of
existence in the real world:
incorporeal and material, perpetual
and temporal. It is clear to you that
existence is the signification of the
determined essence (dhāt
mutaqarrara). It [existence] is not
found in portions except in relation
to a subject, and its portions are
only differentiated with the
difference of the subjects. This
[idea of two essentially
incompatible kinds of existence
belonging to one thing in the real
world] is therefore only an
invention fabricated by the
translators [164] which has
succeeded in complicating
philosophy. The beginning of its
translation and transmission from
Greek into Arabic, or after that,
was due to someone whose sum of
knowledge was such that he
conceived this delusion and then
ascribed it to the most eminent
philosophers in order to spread his
false and baseless theory. This is
like saying the created spatial
dimension is incorporeal, and Plato
has refuted this through
demonstrations. Our companion, the
Chief, has quoted this from him in
the Shifā’, and the two
commentators on the Ishārāt, the
Leader of the Doubters and the Seal
of the Scholars, have both quoted it.
However, a group of the contrivers
has ascribed its affirmation to him,
and likewise a temporal extension
free of matter and the priority of the
soul to the body in existence, and
other such baseless beliefs.
Let is be known that the
path of interpretation, according to
what our companion, the Teacher, in
al-Jam‘ bayna al-Ra’yayn, has
taken, is that they have designated
the changing corruptible natures and
the temporal material things with
respect to their immutable presence
with God, their non-escaping His
[consciousness], and their perpetual
appearance within the compass of
His knowledge, His power, and His
will according to an everlasting,
non-quantitative relationship, and
with respect to their constant
occurrence in perpetuity and their
abiding subsistence in the real
world in a changeless, unextended
state, as the “divine ideas”
subsisting in a divine world without
annihilation or corruption and as the
“heavenly suspended forms” in the
domain of perpetuity, not in time or
in place. This is because the
material individuals with respect to
their unqualified natures are
intelligibles completely free of
matter and its accidents. With
respect to their particular
individualities, they are sensible in
relation to one who contemplates
them with a passive temporal
intellection, but they are intelligible
to the All-Knowing, the All-Wise,
who knows them with an active
knowledge which is exalted above
time and perpetuity, by means of
encompassing their causes and their
principles which lead to their
individual particular properties.
Therefore, what is sensible to us in
a particular time is itself
intelligible in relation to an
atemporal active intellect belonging
to One who intellects it through its
causes and its principles, and who
perpetually encompasses it in its
time and place and all times and
places simultaneously with an
atemporal, placeless simultaneity.
In like manner, the temporal entities
with respect to their quantification
and their flow, their change and
their corruptibility, are
unquantifiable perpetual things and
incorruptible real beings with
respect to their very existence in the
real world and their original
occurrence in the domain of
perpetuity. Every material sensible
is, in another respect, an
incorporeal intelligible; every
changing temporal is, in another
respect, a changeless perpetual; and
every unfixed extended [165] is, in
another respect, a fixed non-
flowing. It is in accord with this
path that it is befitting to understand
the question of the immutable divine
ideas and the suspended heavenly
forms, while not deviating from the
true path by reason of the literal
words. The words of the ancients
are full of symbols and the
countenances of realities are hidden
from the eyes of those who wander
in the darkness of idle fancies.

Wamīḍ [5.4.9]
Aristotle also penetrated
very far in establishing the divine
ideas and the heavenly forms in
accord with this path. In the
Theology, at the end of Mīmar Four,
he states in this regard: “The
spiritual souls only contemplate a
perpetual intelligence, which does
not have the free disposition to
affirm at one time or deny at
another. Their intellects are
constant, pure, and unsullied
without any baseness in them
whatsoever.” Then he says:
We say that apart from this
world there is another heaven
and another earth and sea with
heavenly animals, plants, and
people. All who are in that
world are heavenly, and nothing
is earthly there. The spiritual
beings in that place are
disposed to harmony and
fellowship; they have no
aversion toward one another.
Each one supports his
companion and does not oppose
him, but associates with him
with joy. This is because their
origin is the same source, and
their abode and their substance
is one. They see the things
which do not occur in the realm
of generation and corruption,
and each of them beholds
himself in the self of his
companion…because the things
there are lights within lights.
For this reason all of them see
each other and nothing in them
is concealed from each other.
They do not see with the
perishable corporeal vision
which exists in the plane of
generated bodies; rather they
only see by means of an
intelligible, spiritual vision
which unites in one sense all of
the faculties belonging to the
five sense together with a sixth
sense. The sixth sense is
sufficient in itself, and it has no
need for differentiation into
fleshly instruments, because
between the center of the circle
of the intellect and the center of
the circle of its dimensions
there are no surface dimensions.
There are no external lines from
the center to [the circumference
of] the circle, because these are
the properties of corporeal
shapes. The spiritual shapes are
the opposite of this; that is to
say, their centers and the lines
which circle around them are
the same without any
dimensions between them.
He says in Mīmar Five:
That is because “what it is”
[i.e., the formal cause] and
“why it is” [i.e., the final cause]
with respect to the intelligence
(‘aql) are the same thing,
because if you know what the
intelligence is, you know why it
is. “What it is” and “why it is”
only differ [166] with respect to
the natural things which are the
images of the intelligence. I say
that sensible man is only the
image (ṣanam) of intelligible
man, and in intelligible,
heavenly man, the place of the
eye is no different than the place
of the hand, and the places of all
of the members do not differ, for
they are all in one place. For
this reason it cannot be said
there: “Why is there an eye?” or
“Why is there a hand?” But here
it is because each of the
members of man occurs in a
 different place than the place in
which its companion occurs that
“Why is there an eye?” and
“Why is there a hand?” may be
asked. But there, since all the
members of intelligible man
occur together and in one place,
“what something is” and “why
something is” become one thing.
I say: His meaning and
intention is that sensible man, which
is this material man, with respect to
his relation to us and to our
perception of him, and with respect
to his occurrence in the domains of
time and space, which are climes of
the world of [the physical] creation,
is an image of intelligible man,
which is this material, sensible man
himself with respect to his relation
to his Maker and His sovereignty
over him, his relation to His
knowledge and His consciousness
of him, with respect to knowing his
causes and comprehending his
principles, and with respect to his
occurrence in the inner land of
reality and his appearance in the
container of perpetuity, which is the
spacious domain of the world of
Command. Consequently, in this
individual man—insofar as he is
sensible, spatial, changeable, and
temporal, the place of each of his
members is different from the
places of his other members due to
the intervention of a spatial
extension between them, and the
time of his childhood is different
from the time of his youth, and the
time of his youth is different from
the time of his old age, due to the
intervention of a temporal extension
between them—but insofar as he
himself is an intelligible in relation
to his omniscient Maker, and a
perpetual reality in relation to the
real world, the place of each of his
members is identical to the places
of the other members, and the time
of each of his states is identical to
the times of the other states. It has
been explained to you several times
that the spatial extension extending
from the center of the world to the
circumference delimiting the
directions, with respect to this
consideration, is like a single point,
and the temporal extension
extending from pre-eternity toward
post-eternity is like a single now.
He alludes to this idea in
Mīmar Eight, where he said:
Let him who has seen this
sensible world and the sensible
things which are in this lower
world ascend by means of his
intellect to the higher real world
 of which this world is only an
image, and let him cast his eyes
upon it, so that he may behold
all the things which he saw
[167] in this world as
intelligible, perpetual, and
continuous.
It might be said: “Perhaps
he means by ‘intelligible man’ the
lord of the species, whose relation
to all the individuals is like the
relation of the incorporeal soul to
the individual body.”[233]
However, his explanations and
clarifications in this Mīmar and in
others confirm what we have said.
Let him who desires to thoroughly
investigate this question seek it
from this source.

Wamīḍ [5.4.10]
Is not the incorporeal
(tajarrud) altogether separate from
spatial substratum, position,
direction, dimension, time,
limitation, and extension due to
their being among the accidents of
matter? The world of similitudes
(‘alām al-mithāl), according to
those who endeavor to establish it,
is not affected by all of this.
Consequently, the intermediary
between the incorporeal and the
material certainly does not return to
a determinate path. Yes, if they
mean by this a kind of refinement
and divestment from the accidents
of other corporeal things, as with
the forms impressed in the vitreous
humor with respect to divestment
from external matter, and the forms
belonging to the retentive
imagination with respect to their
being more intensely divested, then
what they intend by it has returned
to the way of determinateness
(taḥṣīl). Let it be ascertained.

Wamīḍ [5.4.11]
Haply you have now
polished your heart, prepared your
mind, and divested your intellect
from the vesture of imagination, so
that the demonstration of the
perpetual creation of the
unqualified natures belonging to the
species of material beings in
perpetuity may be carried out for
you by means of the intellect and its
natural order in accord with the
conventions of science and the rules
of wisdom. Is it not so that if the
material species is a succession of
unlimited individuals in the
extension of time, not from a
temporal beginning, as is the way of
those who believe in the eternity of
the world,[234] and each of these
unlimited individuals is a temporal
creation with which generation
(takwīn) is associated after its
quantifiable, temporal non-
existence, by universal inclusion,
then without a doubt it is a
perpetual creation as well, with
which fashioning (ṣun‘) is
associated after its real
unquantifiable non-existence in
perpetuity, by rational necessity and
the consensus of the body of the
learned?[235]
Therefore, in summative
consideration, the assertion of the
priority of real non-existence in
perpetuity is applicable to all the
individuals in their entirety,
inasmuch as there is no individual
outside of them. Consequently, it is
definitely necessary to apply the
priority of perpetual real non-
existence to [168] the unqualified
nature [as well]; otherwise, the
unqualified nature would be
existent in perpetuity despite the
lack of existence of any of its
individuals. Thus, it would be
existent in the real world first, not
blended with matter nor blended
with the individual, but in its purely
unqualified and absolutely non-
conditioned state. Then it would be
blended with matters in existence
and united with individuals last.
This is the doctrine of the Platonic
Forms according to the supposition
of the contrivers, and its falsity has
been clarified through
demonstrations. The establishment
of the perpetual creation of the
natures belonging to the existents
subject to generation and corruption
is therefore evident, and it is not
necessary from this to posit their
creation in time after an extended,
temporal non-existence, as the
imaginations of those who meddle
with what does not concern them
became preoccupied with in order
to keep the existence of the species
in the domain of time, according to
this assumption, by a chain of
successive individuals, not from a
temporal beginning.
Let this question be
considered by the existence of roses
during the season of Spring, and let
us appoint two months for the
succession of individuals. Just as
the common non-existence of all of
the individual roses prior to two
months necessitates the non-
existence of the rose nature due to
the impossibility of the realization
of the nature except by the
realization of any of its individuals,
in like manner, the non-existence of
all the individuals in perpetuity
necessitates the perpetual real non-
existence of the nature. And just as
the existence of the rose nature is
conserved constantly for two
months through the continuous
succession of individuals, in like
manner, the existence of the nature
is conserved continuously in time
by the chain of its successive
individuals, not from a beginning or
a temporality. In sum, since there
are no boundaries and no extension
in perpetuity, there is no end of
successive individuals with respect
to existence in time despite real
non-existence preceding all of them
in perpetuity, such that it is
absolutely futile to assert the
eternity of the existence of the
nature in perpetuity. Inasmuch as
time is extended, each of the
continuous temporal individuals,
which try to overtake and succeed
each other, has a boundary among
its boundaries. Therefore, if the
individuals existing in this way are
unlimited in their succession in the
extension of time, the
particularization of the existence of
each of them to a particular
boundary among the temporal
boundaries has no effect upon the
existence of the nature being
continuously conserved for the
whole extension of time. Let it be
recognized.

Wamīḍ [5.4.12]
The author of al-Milal
wa’l-Niḥal[236] said in translation
of the divine Plato: “The universe
has an eternal Originator, [169]
Creator, and Fashioner, who is
necessary by virtue of himself, who
knows all the objects of His
knowledge by the attributes of the
universal causes. He is in pre-
eternity, and there is no trace or
sign of him in existence.” Then he
said: “His student, Aristotle,
differed from him on the creation of
the world. Plato considers the
existence of creatures (ḥawādith)
without a beginning to be
impossible, because if you say:
‘Each of them is created,’ you have
affirmed a beginning to each of
them, and what is affirmed of each
one must be affirmed of the whole.”
Then he said:
Although their forms are
certainly created, the argument
concerns their matter and their
foundation (‘unṣur), for he
affirmed a foundation before
their existence. Consequently,
some of the learned supposed
that he was asserting their pre-
eternity and eternity. But when
he affirmed Him who is
necessarily existent by virtue of
himself, he applied the terms
“origination” and “fashioning”
to that foundation, effectively
removing it from pre-eternity,
for he said: “Its existence by
means of the Necessary Being is
like that of the other principles
which are not temporal, and
whose existence and creation
are not temporal. Therefore, the
creation of the simples is
through primary origination
(ibdā‘) and not in time. The
creation of the composites by
means of the simples, however,
is in time.” He also said: “The
world as a whole is not subject
to corruption.”
It is related of him that
he asked of Timaeus: “What is
the thing which has no creation,
what is the created thing which
does not remain, and what is the
actually existent thing which is
everlastingly in one state?” The
first only refers to the existence
of the transcendent Creator; the
second refers to the existence of
corruptible beings which do not
persist in one state; and the third
refers to the existence of the
simples and the principles,
which are immutable. Among
his questions was: “What is the
generated thing which has no
existence; and what is the
existent thing which has no
generation?” He means by the
first spatial movement and time,
because he does not associate
them with the term “existence,”
and he means by the second the
Creator and the intelligible
substances, which are above
time, motion, and nature. The
term “existence” is suitable for
them, since they have eternity,
 permanence, and perpetuity.
Our companion in
leadership states in Chapter Three,
Book One, of the Physics of the
Shifā’:
The universal is not subject to
generation and corruption; in
other words, it does not exist
with respect to a particular time
in the world. It is at the
beginning of a time in which a
first individual or a number of
first individuals exist to which
that universal is predicated.
Before it there is another time in
which not one of those
individuals exists. What
 pertains to corruption is the
opposite of this. In this regard,
among the people are those who
say: “These common principles
are neither generated nor
destroyed.” They are the ones
who require the world to have
perpetual generation,
corruption, [170] and motion as
long as the world exists.
We say: The basis for
establishing a beginning for the
creation of all creatures is what the
divine Plato relied upon: If you
affirm a beginning for each one of
the creatures, you have affirmed it
for the whole as well. We have
apprised you that this is settled by
perpetual creation, regardless of
whether the number of creatures be
finite or infinite. The case is not
like this for temporal creation, for
the distinction in this case between
the finite and the infinite is clear, as
we have explained. Those who
meddle with what does not concern
them, however, distort his words
from their true meaning, and they
endeavor to apply this rule to
temporal creation. We shall
presently prove the impossibility of
an infinite quantity of time and an
infinite series of successive
temporal creatures by
demonstration, if God, the
Almighty, the All-Knowing, wills
it, through our knowledge that
finitude and infinitude in time
neither necessitates nor averts
creation or eternity in perpetuity.
Are not space and time comparable
in their concomitants and equivalent
in their characteristics, like two
twin brothers born of the same
father and nursed from the same
breast? The spatial dimension
neither necessitates nor averts
creation or eternity in existence
with respect to finitude and
infinitude in quantity. The same
applies to temporal extension. Let it
be recognized.

Wamīḍ [5.4.13]
The Leader of the Doubters
states in the Muḥaṣṣal:
As for his statement: “the pre-
eternal is the species of motion,
not its individuals,” we say that
this is false, because the
quiddity of motion
corresponding to its species is
composed of one thing which is
elapsing and one thing which is
arriving. Its quiddity, therefore,
is dependent upon being
preceded by another. The
quiddity of pre-eternity is
 contrary to this meaning. Thus,
unity between them is
impossible.
The Seal of the Scholars
said in criticism of him:
The author of the book sought to
explain the quiddity of pre-
eternity so as to determine the
meaning of his words: “If the
body is pre-eternal, it is either
like this or like that.” Some of
the Mutakallimūn have
interpreted pre-eternity as the
denial of a beginning, and some
of them have interpreted it as
the continuation of its existence
for an infinite duration of time
in the direction of the past.
There is no doubt that each one
of the motions is not pre-eternal,
no matter how pre-eternity is
explained, as he stated in
refutation of the first category of
the first wahj. The argument
strictly pertains to the sum of the
motions, which have no
beginning, as the author of the
book clearly stated in
opposition to this [171] proof,
with his words: “Why do you
say that pre-eternity precludes
the existence of one motion
prior to another motion which is
not toward a beginning?” His
answer to this is that “the
quiddity of motion
corresponding to its species is
composed of one thing which is
elapsing and one thing which is
arriving. Its quiddity, therefore,
is dependent upon being
preceded by another.” There is
no profit here, because the
species remains the same
despite the elapsing things and
the arriving things. He did not
adduce a proof in such a manner
that that species is preceded by
non-existence. It is possible to
describe the quiddity of motion
as perpetual, but it is not
 possible for its individuals.
From this it is evident that the
composition of an elapsing thing
and an arriving thing returns to
its individuals, not to its
species. Its species, therefore,
does not preclude pre-eternity.
We say that temporal pre-
eternity consists of the existence of
the temporal thing not being
preceded in any way in the
extension of time by another section
of time and motion. Temporal post-
eternity means that another time and
motion do not follow in any way the
entire time of its temporal
existence. As for eternal pre-
eternity, it is the being of changeless
existence without any beginning in
perpetuity. It means that real non-
existence has not preceded the
existence of the changeless thing in
the real world. Eternal and
perpetual post-eternity mean that the
changeless thing is not removed
from actual existence. Annihilation
does not occur to it through the
occurrence of real non-existence in
perpetuity. This is the meaning of
remaining permanently in eternity or
in perpetuity.
Our companion states in
the Ta‘līqāt: “If ‘pre-eternal’ is
predicated of the First Cause
(exalted be He), this negates [His]
creation or an existence dependent
upon time.”
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars states in his
criticism of the Muḥaṣṣal:
The inquiry with respect to
persistence (baqā’), namely,
that persistence is conjoined in
existence with more than one
time after the beginning time, is
incomprehensible because it is
not temporal. He has
acknowledged that the whole is
greater than its part. It is not
possible to say that it occurs in
a particular time or in all times,
 just as it may not be said to
occur in a particular place or in
all places. If the judgment is
like this, that which the
judgment is dependent upon,
such as the conceptions, is more
entitled that it be so. The cause
of time is not temporal. How
then can the principle of the
whole be temporal?
Consequently, its qualification
by “persistence” is a kind of
allegory (tashbīh) with respect
to temporal things.
I say: The question does
not require, in this case, taking the
path of allegory, for the truth is that
[172] it may be said that
“persistence” is only applicable to
Him (lauded be He) due to what is
more exalted and lofty than this in
this case being unchanging with
Him (lauded be He). For His
existence is conserved and His
perpetuity (dawām) in the real
world and in the domain of eternity
cannot be removed from the real
world in any way. He is more
exalted and lofty with respect to
persistence than the mere
conservation and continuance of
His existence in the extension of
time in its particularity, which is the
meaning of temporal persistence.
 In short, it is ascertained,
therefore, that temporal pre-eternity
belonging to the species of motion
and to all motions [in sum] is not
contrary to the creation of each one
of its individuals in time.[237]
However, for the quiddity of motion
and all motions [in sum] to have
pre-eternity of existence in
perpetuity is clearly impossible due
to the predominance of the priority
of real non-existence with respect
to perpetual creation to each of its
individuals in a universal embrace.
It is consequently established that
motions in their entirety: their
individuals and their species—
among which is the circular motion
which is the locus of time, namely,
the quickest of the motions, the most
apparent, the most inclusive, and
the most extensive, which is no
other than the motion which
regulates the day—are created in
perpetuity after their real non-
existence. It follows from this that
all of the spheres moving in their
circular motion are created in
perpetuity. Otherwise, their rest
would be necessary first before the
creation of the quiddity of absolute
motion, and motion would occur to
them afterwards since the quiddity
of motion was not included in their
existence. This is impossible,
because it would necessitate
extension and divisibility in
perpetuity, and because rest, which
belongs to the category of death,
does not apply to the spheres. Let it
be pondered.

Wamīḍ [5.4.14]
Is it not clear to you that
the object of dependence of the
primal Providence, which is the
regulator of the system of existence,
the mainstay of the world, and the
basis of the effusion of mercy,
essentially and by primary
intention, is solely the individual of
the Great Man, which is the temple
of the whole of existence and the
physical constitution of the system
of the universe, from the very
beginning to the utmost end, and
from the original emanation to the
ultimate goal.[238] Since the means
of the existentiation of the
composite is through the
existentiation of its parts, as you
know, and it is not within the
capacity of the nature of the many
for its emanation from the real One
to be realized in every respect in
one stage, as will be made clear to
you through demonstration, God
willing, then certainly the first thing
to emanate from the Maker, the
Originator, the One Essence
(exalted be His remembrance) is a
stage which is the most excellent of
the parts of the Great Man [173] in
essence, the simplest of them in
reality, and the most perfect in
existence. It is the intelligible
substance which is the primary,
divine, spiritual foundation
(al-‘unsur al-awwal al-amrī al-
rūhānī) in the world of intellect,
which is characterized as “the
Preserved Tablet” and “the Hidden
Book” in which all the forms of the
existents from the heights of the
world of Command to the depths of
the world of [the physical] creation
are impressed. Its essence has
multiple interdependent
circumstantial modes, which are
essential possibility, necessity
through another, its intellection of
the essence of its Cause, and its
intellection of itself as quiddity and
existence. Thus, through this
relationship various interdependent
and complementary conditions and
aspects become multiplied in a
single stage, accidental to the
essence of the Originator, the real
One (exalted be His sovereignty).
[239] In this regard, a plurality
inseparable (mutalāzima) in
existence and interdependent in
aspects emanating from Him
(glorified be He) in a single stage is
possible, and simultaneity in being-
an-effect is true in this case. This
plurality subject to simultaneity in
being-an-effect is an intelligible
substance, which is the second
intelligence, a psychic substance,
which is the first soul, and a
heavenly body, which is the
supreme, outermost sphere and the
confiner of the directions. These,
then, are simultaneous in being-an-
effect.
If this is acknowledged,
and since it is evident that the
supreme sphere, which is the bearer
of the locus of time (i.e., the
primary circular motion which all
of the heavenly bodies follow), is
created in essence in perpetuity
from the beginning of existence,
preceded by perpetual real non-
existence in the real world, then it
is certainly evident that whatever is
simultaneous with it in that stage
and complementary in rank is also
created in existence in perpetuity
and definitely preceded by
perpetual real non-existence. Thus,
that which precedes it in existence
only pertains to the intelligible
order in mental consideration, and
it is the primary intelligible
foundation in the world of
Command. It is clear, then, that the
entire world of contingency is
created in perpetuity, and the
existence of the changeless in
actuality is preceded by perpetual
real non-existence. This is among
the things which my Lord has
instructed me through His grace,
and God is the possessor of great
bounty.

Wamīḍ [5.4.15]
Haply through what we have
acquainted you by the leave of God,
your mind is blessed through the
refinement of your insight, for you
recognize that for the primary
originated effect, insofar as it is an
essential creation, absolute non-
existence in the stage of itself
commensurate with essential
possibility is inevitably one of the
principles of its essential creation
and its primary originated
existence; that for the fashioned
effect, insofar as it is a perpetual
creation, real non-existence [174]
contrary to its existence in
perpetuity with respect to the real
world is unavoidably one of the
principles of its perpetual creation
and its fashioned existence, not
essentially but accidentally; and
similarly that for the generated
effect, insofar as it is a temporal
creation and a phenomenal existent,
its continuous temporal non-
existence in a prior time is
unavoidably one of the accidental
principles of its temporal creation
and its generated existence
occurring in a later time.
Equal by way of legal opinion
on this question among the
concourse of the People of Truth
are the firmly grounded divines, the
preeminent thinkers, the intuitive
philosophers, and the inspired
mystics who comprehend the
prophetic wisdom and the eight
principles[240]; the exclusive
ascription of eternal pre-eternity to
the Maker, the Originator, the
Fashioner, the One, the Real; the
complete inclusion of essential
creation, perpetual creation,
primary originated causation, and
fashioning production to the pillar
of the world of contingency; the
connection of temporal creation and
generating existentiation as well to
one part in its particularity from the
sum of the fashioned effects, which
are no other than the existents
occurring in the realm of generation
and corruption. They belong to the
People of Error who entertain a
kind of partnership with God and
who conjecture the theory and
supposition that the primary
originated things are describable by
eternity (sarmadiyya), that
fashioning (ṣun‘) is not connected
to them, that among the kinds of
creation only essential creation
fully encompasses the pillar of the
world of contingency, and that the
two creations, the perpetual and the
temporal, only occur to entities in
the realm of generation and
corruption, albeit in two respects
different in notion but inseparable
with respect to realization in
matters and subjects, and fashioning
and generation are connected to
them by these two respects. Let it
be understood.

Wamīḍ [5.4.16]
The Giver of the Craft [of
philosophy], Aristotle, in his books
and his writings, is clear that the
privation (‘adam) which is one of
the principles of the natures is real
non-existence (‘adam ṣarīḥ)
outside of occurring in the genus of
extension and non-extension,
quantification and non-
quantification. He says in a sermon
ascribed to him in one of his daily
conversations with the king of the
Greeks, Alexander, the son of
Philip, while at war with the
Persians:
Thanksgiving belongs to God.
His is the grace of bestowal to
all mankind, and might is with
Him. He is the most praised. He
is my refuge, and to Him do I
urgently turn for assistance in
all my affairs, great and small.
My thanks to Him is the thanks
[175] of one who acknowledges
His favors, His inestimable
blessings, and who confesses
that He is one with no
beginning, whose dominion is
without cessation. He did not
bring the creation into being
from any existents (mawjūdāt),
nor did He create it from prior
things. He created the first
principles according to His
desire, and then created the
universal natures from those
principles. The principles are
the origin of creation and the
beginning of what the Creator
called into being. The natures
and what results from the
variation of the natures are
derived from these principles.
The principles without
a doubt are three. The first and
most excellent of them is form;
the second is matter; and the
third is privation (‘adam) not in
time or place.[241] Matter is
potential, and form is actual.
Privation is the change of matter
into what is actual.
Consequently, the principles of
creation are a motion, which is
the becoming of form; a shape,
which is the form; and an object
of motion, which is matter. That
which occurs between these last
two is privation. The cause of
these principles is the First
Cause, which is the cause of
every effect. Hermes has spoken
well about the preceding when
he says: “They are only three:
the motion of a non-mover,
which is an effect, not a cause;
the motion of a mover, which is
an effect and a cause; and the
unmoving mover, which is a
cause, not an effect. All of the
qualities, quantities, numbers,
attributes, and things are from
the joining of matter to form.
The Creator (exalted and
glorified be He) is far above
these things, for He is their
Maker and their Creator. No
rational being can comprehend
the state of His exaltation, for
His exaltation is not in a place
and His existence is not in time.
His attributes cannot be
affirmed, His greatness cannot
be measured, and His power
cannot be compared. Exalted is
His might and peerless His
dominion. He executes all things
according to His will. Neither
motion nor rest apply to Him.
He regulates all things without
diminishment, and He calls them
into being without motion….He
made His creation in stages.
[First] He made the incorporeal
substance and the abode of
forms,[242] and He added to it
 the spirits which resemble them
forever and which never cease,
occurring before time, before
when, and before where. It
cannot be qualified by [176]
dimensions or quantity and is
not subject to translocation.
[Then] He created the fifth
nature in perpetuity not in time
and adorned it with the most
noble attributes and excellent
qualities.
This discourse of his and
others like it in other of his books
make it clear that the privation
which is one of the three principles
is strictly real non-existence
without any time or place. It is
perpetually prior to the existence of
the created. Our companion, the
Chief, in the Shifā’ and the Najāt,
made real, perpetual, unquantifiable
non-existence and temporal non-
existence within the genus of
duration and non-duration both
among the three principles
belonging to the natures. Each of
these paths is a way to the truth, for
it is evident that the generated
existent is a perpetual creation and
a temporal creation in two respects.
Insofar as it is a perpetual creation,
it enters into being after pure non-
being, and it is preceded by real,
atemporal non-existence; but
insofar as it is a generated existent
particularized to a particular time
and a particular boundary among
the boundaries of the extended
horizon and the temporal
dimension, it is preceded by
temporal, extended non-existence
prior to the time of its generation.
The Giver of the Craft favored the
first respect, making real non-
existence one of the three
fundaments which are the principles
of the natures. Our companion, the
Chief, favored the second respect,
so he included durational temporal
non-existence with it.
 If you ask: How is it possible
to make real non-existence a
creation of the true Maker (lauded
be He) and one of the fundaments
and principles of the natures, as
done by the Giver of the Craft,
since privation as such cannot be
qualified by any of this? I answer:
This is only possible by accident
and in a figurative sense in the
mind, as is the way of the Chief
with temporal non-existence.
However, the intellectual
association which makes accidental
qualification and dependence [upon
God] by extension possible is
different in the two paths.
According to the path of the Chief,
it is its [privation’s] correlation to
the prior form, the pending motion,
and the dispositional possibility
belonging to matter by association;
its correlation to the new generated
form through temporal priority; and
its correlation to the matter which is
the bearer of the potential to
receive and be acted upon, the
subject of dispositional possibility,
and the locus of the generated form,
insofar as it [privation] pertains to
it and is one of its states. According
to the path of the Giver of the Craft,
it is its [privation’s] correlation to
the new form in relation to matter,
insofar as it [privation] is the non-
being of its essence and the
negation of its occurrence; [177] its
[privation’s] being cut off from
consideration and obliterated in the
domain of perpetuity and concrete
reality by its [the form’s] new
existence, its subsequent
occurrence, and its renewed
generation; its [privation’s]
qualification in mental
consideration by its being prior to it
[the form] with respect to the
container of creation and the vessel
of occurrence, in terms of an
absolute, real, eternal priority, not a
quantifiable, flowing, temporal
priority in divisible time or the
indivisible now. Therefore, real
non-existence, with respect to these
aspects and particular
characteristics, is more specific
than absolute, simple non-existence,
which encompasses the non-
particular and the non-specialized,
in relation to the particular
properties of the subjects; and more
specific than absolute, specific non-
existence in mental consideration in
relation to a particular subject.
However, it is more general[243]
than being a nullification which
altogether swallows the substance
of the essence, a non-being which
absolutely consumes the substance
of the reality from pre-eternity to
post-eternity, and a perpetual real
non-existence belonging to the
essence of the subject which has it
as a consequence by occurrence in
the real world after pure non-
occurrence in perpetuity.
Therefore, real non-existence
has, with respect to these particular
characteristics, a share in the world
of existence, and, accordingly, it is
possible for it to be described by
dependence upon the true Cause by
reason of being-an-effect
(ma‘lūliyya) and being-created
(makhlūqiyya), and for it to be
related to that which is its non-
existence, its non-being, and its
negation by reason of being-a-
principle (‘unṣuriyya) and being-a-
cause (mabda’iyya). Remain
steadfast as you have been bidden,
and be not of them that wander
blindly.

Wamīḍ [5.4.17]
He states in the Najāt:
Whatever exists after not having
existed inevitably has a matter
which is the substratum in
which, from which, or with
which it exists. In natural
existents this is sensible and
visible. It inevitably has a
privation which precedes it,
because whatever does not have
a privation preceding it is pre-
eternal. And inevitably, it
simultaneously has a form
which occurs in the matter;
otherwise the matter would
remain as it was, and there
would be no generation.
Therefore, the
principles connected to the
generated natures are three:
form, matter, and privation. The
reason privation is considered a
principle is because it
inevitably belongs to the
generated insofar as it is
generated, while it is not
inevitable that the generated
belongs to it. It is a principle by
accident because the existent is
generated by its removal, not by
its existence.[244] Form’s share
of existence is more plentiful
than the share of matter because
it is the cause of giving
existence to it [matter]. Matter
is dependent upon it, for its
existence is through form. As
for privation, it is neither
essentially existent in an
absolute sense nor non-existent
in an absolute sense, for it is the
 absence [178] of the potentially
existing essence.
I say: What is intended by
“form” here is the intelligent
separate substance which gives
forms by the leave of its Lord. It is
the spirit of holiness or the
substantial material form insofar as
it is a particular form. In this
respect, it is one of the causes
which configure matter, not insofar
as it is the individual, new,
generated form subsisting in its
individual entity in matter. What is
intended by it is both the intelligent
separate form in its individuality
and the substantial material form in
its unqualified nature. He states in
the Ta‘līqāt, copying a statement by
our companion in instruction [Al-
Fārābī] in his annotations: “The
difference between matter and the
non-existent (ma‘dūm) is that matter
is non-existent accidentally and
existent essentially, while the non-
existent is non-existent essentially
and existent accidentally, since its
existence is in the mind in the sense
that it can be said to be conceived
in the mind.”

Wamīḍ [5.4.18]
In our view, which we
share with the concourse of the
People of Truth, individually one
prime matter is indeed one of the
three principles belonging to the
natures,[245] perpetually together
with the existent creature insofar as
it is perpetually created, due to
simultaneous creation in perpetuity
after perpetual real non-existence,
and preceding it by nature insofar
as it is one of its principles. But in
relation to that existent, insofar as it
is temporally created, it temporally
precedes it in the extension of
elapsing and renewal. According to
those who strike upon the earth of
illumination, it is eternally together
in existence with the other primary
originated things, while perpetually
preceding the existent creature in
existence insofar as it is perpetually
created, and temporally preceding it
insofar as it is temporally created.
It is impossible for it to exist in
perpetuity insofar as it is potential,
perpetually preceded by absolute
form, since its separation from form
is absolutely impossible in
perpetuity. Among the people are
those who permit this, which
complicates philosophy.
Our companion in
leadership says the following in
Chapter Two, Book Four, of the
Metaphysics of the Shifā’, on
potentiality and actuality:
In these chapters which we have
presented it is assumed that
potentiality is before actuality
without exception and that it
precedes it not in time alone.
This is something which the
generality among the ancients
inclined to believe. Some of
them [179] gave matter
existence before form, and had
the Agent clothe it with form
after that, either with respect to
a beginning through itself or
with respect to a cause which
caused it, as one of the
jurists[246] imagined with
 respect to that which does not
concern him, while not having
studied its theme. Thus he said
that something like the soul
unexpectedly occurred, and it
became occupied with the
management of matter and its
formation, but its management
was less than perfect and it did
not produce the best formation.
The Creator then perceived this
and perfected its formation.

Wamīḍ [5.4.19]
Since we have recited to
you many times that non-existence
in whatever container it may be
expresses the absence of thingness
in that container, not a thing which
is characterized by “absence” or a
thing to which the word “non-
existence” applies, therefore,
absolute non-existence (muṭlaq
al-‘adam) has neither an essence
nor a nature, and it cannot be
communicated except by its
expression as a concept obtained in
the mind. In other words, the
concept of absence, nullification,
non-being, and negation, which the
mind uses to express a nullified
nature, is termed “non-existence”
(‘adam). Then the mind considers
its relation to quiddities and
determinate essences distinct within
the boundaries of themselves, and
portions (ḥiṣaṣ) become composed
for it in relation to them which are
distinct in the mind, which
correspond to the distinction of
those essences and dispositions
(malakāt), and which correspond to
what is represented in the mind, not
insofar as they are non-existences
and non-beings. Therefore, non-
existences and non-beings are only
acquired through the acquisition of
what are non-existences and non-
beings belonging to them [the
quiddities], and their universal
propositions are only acquired in
the mind together with the
acquisition of the subjects. In this
way, it is possible to posit a
connection to creation and
dependence upon the Creator for
non-existences and non-beings as
well.
Furthermore, essential
possibility is the negation of the
two extremes of determination
(taqarrur) and non-determination
(ghayr taqarrur) with respect to
the stage of the essence itself as
such, despite its being determined
in actuality by the Maker. Essential
possibility, therefore, also has some
kind of dependence upon the Agent
of the essence and the Maker of the
quiddity, not essentially but
accidentally. In a number of ways, it
is established and clear that God
created both potentiality and
actuality, darkness and light. He
cleft apart non-existence and called
existence into being; He caused
existence to exist and caused non-
being not to exist. Blessed be God,
the best of creators!

Wamīḍ [5.4.20]
He has stated (exalted be
His grandeur) in the Book of divine
revelation: “Blessed be He in
whose hands is dominion. He has
[180] power over all things. He is
the One who created death and life,
that He may try you, which of you is
best in works.”[247] Perhaps what
is meant by these two is the life of
this transitory, beguiling world and
the perpetual, immortal life of the
world to come. This outer life is
death in comparison to that real life.
The creation of death is therefore
sound and according to reality
without the burden of inquiry.
Or what may be intended
by these two is this outer life and its
incidental cessation in the horizon
of time. Death’s antecedence to life
in [the above verse of] the Qur’ān
is because it is the outcome and
end.
If you ask: Did you not tell
us in the book Khusat al-Malakūt
that supervening non-existence is
analogous to pre-eternal non-
existence with respect to depending
upon the non-occurrence of the
complete cause of existence
altogether from pre-eternity to post-
eternity, and that the cessation of
life, which is death, is its
supervening non-existence
dependent upon the non-realization
of its complete cause from pre-
eternity to post-eternity? How then
is it possible for [physical] creation
(khalq) to be connected to it and
causation to apply to it?
I say: We have affirmed
there, among the principles which
illumine your vision, that
supervening non-existence only
derives from the particularization of
existence to a particular, definite
time, which it does not exceed or
surpass, and its lack of occurrence
in what is after that time is through
the non-realization of its complete
cause altogether from pre-eternity
to post-eternity. Therefore, the
creation of death and the causation
thereof is due to the
particularization of life to a certain
time and its restriction to a
particular boundary. In the same
manner, perpetual real non-
existence is related to the Agent
accidentally inasmuch as its
particular characteristic, in contrast
to absolute non-existence, pertains
to its removal from the domain of
perpetuity and its having as a
consequence existence originated
after it. Moreover, death belongs to
the privations of possessions,
which are more specialized than
absolute non-existence, with
respect to the restriction of the
disposition and the privation of the
possession. Causation applies to it
in this respect.
Or what is meant by
“death” is that which is before life;
in other words, the freedom of
prepared matter from life in its
earlier stages of development, like
the sperm, the clotted blood, and the
embryo, for instance. Consequently,
the creation and causation of death
before life may refer to matter and
its stages of development. Or death
is the death of the animal spirit and
the absence of bodily life by reason
of the extinguishing of the natural
heat and the desiccation of the
natural moisture. As for life, it is
the real, holy, everlasting life in the
changeless realm and the permanent
abode. The doctrine of the creation
of death is in accord with one of
these meanings. [181] Or it may be
said: Death is the state of the
incorporeal rational soul upon
severing its attachment to the body,
just as life is its state of attachment.
The question of the creation of these
two is settled in the same way.

Wamīḍ [5.4.21]
It is clear, therefore, that
although the Great Man, which is
the comprehensive system of the
universe viewed as one individual,
is changeless in essence and
possessed of actual existence by
virtue of the true Agent (exalted be
His majesty), it is perishable in
essence and destructible in quiddity
by virtue of itself in two ways. The
first of them is nullification in the
stage of its own essence as such
despite the realization of its actual
determination in the real world
through the emanation of the Agent
Maker. This corresponds to
essential creation, and it is
commensurate with the nature of
essential possibility. The second is
definite, real non-existence in the
domain of perpetuity and the heart
of concrete reality prior to the
effusion of the essence and the
emanation of existence through the
primary origination of the Maker
and His overflowing bounty. This
corresponds to perpetual creation,
and it is due to the insufficiency of
the nature of possibility to merit
eternal existence on account of the
necessity of its posteriority, due to
the characteristic of being-an-effect,
and its remoteness from the stage of
the essence of its true Maker, which
is itself His real, necessary, extra-
mental existence in every respect,
seated upon the throne of eternity.
Our companion in
leadership has said it well in the
Ta‘līqāt:
The Real is that whose
existence belongs to it through
itself. Therefore, the Creator is
the Real (ḥaqq), and all else
besides Him is non-existent
(bāṭil). In the same way, the
Necessary Being cannot be
demonstrated, for He can only
be known through Himself. As
He has stated: “God has
testified that there is no God but
Him.”
He also states:
Priority in place (taqaddum
fī’l-makān) occurs when you
posit a rank, like the rank of a
king, as a consequence of which
whoever is closer to him is
more prior. Priority in
excellence has to do with ends;
whoever is closer to them will
be more prior. Priority in time
pertains to the now you pick;
every time farther from it will
be more prior. The priority of
the Creator to the world is
priority in existence and in
relation to it. It is not that
existence is a third thing; rather
it is itself. You can only posit it
as a third thing in the mind.
[182]
 His meaning is clear with
regard to the fact that priority in
existence is eternal priority in the
objective world (al-khārij),
because Existence in the objective
world seated upon the throne of
eternity is identical to the stage of
the prior essence as such, as we
have explained already.
 The Sixth Qabas
On the continuity of time and
motion; setting up the course of the
demonstration with respect to the
continuity of the magnitude of time
according to the natural system in
two ways; establishing the finitude
of extended continuous quantity; and
invalidating a numerical infinity
with respect to successive temporal
creatures.

Wamḍa [6.1]
Know that there are two
ways to establish the continuity of
time. The first is the statement that
corporeal form is continuous in
itself and extended in itself. This is
made the starting point for
establishing that time is a
continuous, quantifiable entity. The
second is the assertion that time,
within the boundary of itself, is the
measure of a continuous unfixed
state. Then we progress from that to
the statement that the continuity of
the extended corporeal form is
through its own self.
In regard to the first way,
we say that body intelligible in
itself is sensible through its
accidents, including planes, rays,
colors, shapes, and other sensible
things. If the senses perceive those
accidents and convey them to the
intellecting substance, the mind
judges that there is an essentially
spatial existent which is their
subject. If it occupies space
essentially and is extended and
unfolding into the directions, then it
is designated “body.” That which
extends from it is what of itself
occupies space in one direction
different from what extends from it
in the other directions.[248]
Otherwise, it would not fill space
and extend into the directions
essentially. Insofar as it is not
essential, it is not accidental either,
for what is accidental is a species
of what is essential by natural
necessity. Consequently, there
cannot be an extended thing that
does not unfold into the directions
both essentially and accidentally.
Such a thing would clearly be
absurd. Thus, it is definitely
impossible for an essentially
extended, spatial substance to be
unextended [184] in the directions
at all and incapable of division in
the estimative faculty, for it has
been demonstrated that a corporeal
substance cannot have any
indivisible parts. It is evident, then,
that between the planes of the
extended body there is a solid
substance, continuous in itself and
extended in its substance, whose
substance extends in the directions
and whose essence unfolds in the
dimensions.[249] The explanation
for this is by means of the science
of metaphysics, not by means of
physics.

Wamḍa [6.2]
A certain man known as
Naẓẓām, who belongs to those who
meddle with what does not concern
them, posits that every body,
whether extended or unextended, is
actually divisible in essence into
two bodies, each of which is
likewise actually divisible, and so
on without any numerical end.
Consequently, each of the bodies
has numerically infinite
interpenetrating parts, all of which
are actually divisible bodies.[250]
Our companion in
leadership and others who are
learned in this profession
compelled him to accept the part
which is indivisible [i.e., the atom]
due to the possible divisions being
obtained actually in their entirety
(as a result of which another
division expected by the estimative
faculty would be impossible), and
to accept the implication of the
body being confined between
planes infinite in measure due to its
quantifiable parts being an infinite
number in actuality. It is my view
that his being compelled [to this
position] is completely unsound in
its reasoning. Has he not posited
that the divisions are in succession
(tarratub), not in one stage, and that
what is obtained in each stage is
actually divisible without end?
Therefore, every part of the infinite
successive parts is qualified by
actual divisibility. So where does
the indivisible part come from?
Further, the quantifiable parts are
acquired after the whole.
Consequently, the infinitude
pertaining to them depends upon a
continuous series of effects and in
the direction of their gradual
descent. This is not impossible,
because the infinitude in this case is
opposite to the direction of
succession, because it is in the
direction of gradual descent, while
succession is in the direction of
gradual ascent. Therefore, although
the quantifiable parts are infinite in
number, they are interpenetrating in
magnitude by way of gradual
decrease, not mutually separate and
discrete by way of gradual
decrease. The result is a whole
which is that finite, limited
magnitude itself. There is no
difficulty in this, and there is no
need to confine what is infinite
between two restricting boundaries,
because all of the planes and
boundaries consist of the starting
point, namely, of the whole which is
the object of division, not of any of
the stages of the divisions, nor of
the extremity opposite of the
starting point.[251] In sum, [185]
the planes and boundaries only limit
magnitudes, not the degrees of
numbers. It is possible to obtain one
finite, limited, external magnitude
from quantifiable, interpenetrating,
gradually diminishing parts, which
are infinite in number, not in
magnitude. Therefore, the planes of
one limited, finite magnitude are
confined to its limited surface
measurement and occur to the first
of the stages of its gradually
diminishing, interpenetrating sums,
which are infinite in number, not in
magnitude. How on earth is it
possible to confine what is infinite
in number between two numerically
restricting limits or to confine what
is infinite in surface measurement
between two quantitatively
restricted boundaries?!
Consequently, the only basis for
absolutely invalidating this delusion
is to require the occurrence of many
without one, which is something
clearly false. Let it be known.

Wamḍa [6.3]
The most erudite of them,
Shahrastānī, the author of al-Milal
wa’l-Niḥal, in his book named al-
Manāhij wa’l-Bayānāt, believed
that the extended body is not
composed of actual parts, but it is
subject to finite divisions.[252] His
error is evident through the
demonstration recited to you. It is
therefore clear that the extended
body, in the substance of its
essence, is subject to infinite
hypothetical division. I am not
saying “to no end,” rather I am
saying “not to an end.” That which
is possible to bring to actuality
from the divisions in its nature is
certainly their potential to accept an
actual finite number, but the degree
of finitude is not specified by
stopping at a final terminus which
they do not exceed.
Since this question is
according to this way, the same
applies to the continuous magnitude
(masāfa) of motion and time.
Consequently, the continuity of an
entity and its reception of unending,
ceaseless division corresponds to
all of the continuities belonging to
fixed quantities, an unfixed quantity,
and continuous terminal motions.
The continuity of time is settled in
this way. [253]

Wamīḍ [6.3.1]
Indeed, in the assertion of
infinitude and endlessness despite
the impossibility of an [actual]
numerical infinity, as with the
divisions of the body and
continuous quantity in general, and
as with the temporal things decreed
by God to occur [186] in the
extension of time following one
after another without any end in
time—in all of this there is a
difficult problem and complicated
dilemma according to the general
belief. It is that whatever is
maintained to have the possibility
of going from potentiality to
actuality with respect to the
divisions of the body—such that the
division which is possible in
mental consideration in summary is
not at all separated from it—can
either be described by (1) the
possibility of numerical infinity, if
only potentially, or (2) the
impossibility of this, which makes
it definitely necessary for it to be
numerically finite.
According to the first, the
possibility of the impossible is
necessitated. It is common sense
that whenever something’s
realization is impossible, its
possibility is also impossible.
Otherwise, the possibility of its
possibility would definitely require
the possibility of its realization.
According to the second,
what is maintained to have the
possibility of actuality is
necessarily confined to a definite
finite number. Consequently, it is
necessary for the division to stop at
that exact definite number and not to
exceed it. Without a doubt, the
possibility of the division must
conclude in that numerical terminus,
and it is not possible for the
terminus not to stop at a limit
corresponding to the possibility. Let
it be pondered.
This, then, is the account of
the problem according to its intent,
and no one has brought forward
with respect to it a solution worthy
of being mentioned or heeded. A
commentary upon the Ishārāt by
one of our contemporaries
embraces the assumption of two
contradictories [i.e., that something
can be both finite and infinite], but
this position is meaningless and a
waste of time. It is incumbent upon
us, therefore, to travel with you
upon the path of solving this aporia.
We say: In this fallacy
there is a mixing up and obscuring
going on with respect to the
particular determinate stage taking
the place of the unqualified
indeterminate nature and the
specific singular individual (fard)
taking the place of the general
universal individual.
Is it not evident to those
who possess a sound intellect and a
clear mind that if it is essentially
impossible for numerically infinite
divisions to go from potentiality to
actuality, then it is necessary for all
possible divisions in mental
consideration in general to be
judged according to the nature of
finitude in number absolutely and
without qualification, or by the
general individual of the nature of
numerical finitude according to the
most well-known of its two
technical meanings, as explained in
the Physics of the Shifā’. What I
mean by it is a nature among the
natures [187] in its particularity,
particularized by a certain
specification among the
specifications of the individuals not
in its particularity.
It is also an absolute
universal concept under the concept
of the unqualified nature not
conditioned by anything, but above
the specified, particular individual
in its particularity, and not by
participation between the many, but
by non-simultaneous alternation.
It is established as a
fundamental law that the necessity
of the unqualified nature not
conditioned by anything, or the
nature which is the general
individual in itself or due to another
thing, does not require the necessity
of the specified individual in its
particularity in itself or due to that
thing. This is the opposite of how it
is with respect to the necessity of
the individual in itself or due to
another thing, since it requires the
necessity of the nature in itself or
due to that thing. Indeed, it is
identical to it.
Since this is clear, we say:
If it is necessary with all the
temporal divisions or quantified
things with respect to their gradual
and successive occurrence without
any end in time, even though they
are qualified with the nature of
numerical finitude or with the
nature of its general individual, this
does not necessitate that any of the
stages of numerical finitudes
revealed in their particular
properties are needed by them at
all.
For every numerically
finite thing in its particularity within
a particular determinate boundary it
is possible for another numerically
finite thing to be realized apart from
it with a number greater than the
other belonging to the boundaries
which are the degrees of the
numbers beyond that boundary.
Division, therefore, does not stop at
any particular numerical boundary
at all, despite the conservation of
the nature of numerical finitude in
all of the degrees and boundaries,
and in these successive temporal
things occurring in the direction of
endless time. Let it be ascertained.

Wamḍa [6.4]
As for the second way,
[254] we say it is known and
observed that the existence of some
things is prior to others, and in like
manner, the non-existence of some
things is prior to others. The non-
existence of some things is also
prior to their existence by a
separate quantifiable priority. The
prior and the posterior with respect
to them have two separate,
unconnected boundaries, which an
unfixed extension passes by in the
estimative faculty.[255] This mode
of priority between existences, or
between non-existence and
existence, corresponds to the state
of things in the real world, and it is
not possible save for the fact that a
continuous, unfixed entity exists,
whose reality is to elapse and be
renewed. The hypothetical entities
of its quantifiable parts within the
boundaries of themselves, in their
particular characteristics not
conjoined in a single boundary, are
essentially identical to the prior and
the posterior, [188] to priority and
posteriority. But existences and
non-existences, insofar as they are
associated with them, are qualified
by priority, posteriority, and
simultaneity.
To express this another way,
the observation of the sensible
things around us necessarily gives
us certain judgment that in the actual
world prior things, posterior things,
and simultaneous things are
arranged in the utmost order, so that
one prior thing is more prior than
another prior thing, and one
simultaneous thing has a longer
duration than another simultaneous
thing.
This is not possible in the
mind, unless an existing continuous
quantity without a stable essence is
posited in the real world for the
sake of its essentially prior and
posterior parts, and for other
changeable things besides them,
with respect to particularization by
it through a definite corresponding
connection in existence, for if the
existences of mutually separate
things as such are considered, they,
with respect to themselves, neither
require nor preclude priority or
posteriority, simultaneity or non-
simultaneity, quantification or non-
quantification. This continuous
quantity is that which we call
“time” and “duration.” Let it be
recognized.

Wamḍa [6.5]
In this [second] way there
is a sound exposition by another
means. It is that the successive
changeable creatures are
particularized to their prior and
subsequent times, while the free
Agent, who is the Producer of the
essences, the Originator of the
realities, the Giver of forms, and
the Maker of existences, wise in
His being and willing through His
wisdom, is immensely exalted
above His handiwork, equal of
relation to what He has made,
immutable in His essence and His
attributes, and necessarily actual
and eternally necessary in all His
aspects. It is impossible, therefore,
for the unconstrained Ruler to give
preponderation to one of two things
which are equal in every respect by
His sheer will without a certain
determinant (murajjiḥ) through
which particularizing is required
and without a certain particularizer
through which giving
preponderance (tarjīḥ) is
necessitated. Otherwise, it would
be necessary for the dependent
connection (ta‘alluq)[256] of the
will, or its infinite dependent
connections in summative
consideration, to be given
preponderance not by a determinant
and to be singled out for one of two
equal boundaries (ṭarafayn)
without a particularizer. Giving
preponderation without a
determinant, therefore, would
necessitate preponderation without
a determinant with respect to the
dependent connections of the will.
This is something which is naturally
false and agreed to be impossible.
Therefore, the orderly succession of
creatures is only settled when there
are successive causes in existence
which prepare matter for the
successive changeable things [189]
and ready it to receive the creative
outpouring in stages through
successive dispositions
(isti‘dādāt). Hence, every prior
thing is a cause for disposing matter
to receive a subsequent thing, and it
is necessary without a doubt that the
prior should necessarily lead to the
subsequent.
But this is of no avail to
entities mutually separated in
existence.[257] Otherwise, it would
not be necessary for the existence of
any of them to be dependently
connected to the existence of any
other of them at all. It would not be
necessary for the prior to
necessarily lead to the subsequent,
and it would be impossible for the
prior to be a preparatory cause of
the subsequent. Therefore, the
renewal of the successive
dispositions (mu‘iddāt) is only
possible through the existence of
something which has successive
renewal of occurrence in itself, and
this is no other than motion.
It is clear then that the question
of temporal creation is only
established by continuous motion,
which is unceasingly renewed and
continuously conserved during the
time of the outpouring of created
existence. But for motion no
creation could occur in the horizon
of change. The necessity of the
priority of motion to the creation of
something in time is clear, as is the
necessity of motion being a
continuous entity. The question of
this type of creation is settled. Time
is nothing but the measure of a
motion which is the regulator of the
phases of the day and maintainer its
continuity, through which the other
motions and their continuity are
measured. The continuity of time is
established in this way, and by it the
continuity of the corporeal form is
also established due to the
necessary connection of time and
motion to magnitude.

Wamḍa [6.6]
There is a third way, in
addition to the two ways, through
which the continuity of the
corporeal form and the continuity of
time are established.[258] In sum,
the continuity of magnitudes are all
in the same station, whether they are
fixed or unfixed. If the mind is
illumined and discerning, is it not
evident that it is impossible for
extension to be obtained from non-
extension and magnitude from non-
magnitude? If mutually separated
substances, which are absolutely
unquantifiable and indivisible
within the boundaries of themselves
in a certain respect, are united
together, and in like manner the
unquantifiable, indivisible separate
nows, as the imaginations of a
group of those who meddle with
what does not concern them
believe, then the pure intellect,
considering them in their entirety,
whether they be finite or infinite in
summative consideration, must
judge that if a corporeal extension
and temporal magnitude is
obtainable from their unity, then
extension could be obtained from
non-extension and magnitude from
[190] non-magnitude. But this is
absurd and impossible.
It may be said that in the
science of demonstration this way
is the most certain of the
demonstrations. The path thereto is
through considering the substance of
the essence of the subject. We have
tread it more than once in the
Abwāb al-Rubūbiyyāt and once in
the Taqwīm al-Īmān, which is the
book of corrections and
emendations, for the purpose of
establishing that the world of
contingency has a self-subsistent,
essentially necessary Agent, for the
reality of the nature of possibility
(imkān) is the negation of the
necessity of the two extremes of the
essence, and its purport is the non-
being of the essence and its
nullification in the stage of itself as
such. The essence itself,
accordingly, belongs to the concept
of what is potential. It has been
determined by way of
demonstration that something which
is not necessary does not exist.
Were the contingent beings and
possible essences to exist not by an
essentially necessary agent, it
would be required of them, with
respect to all of them, whether finite
or infinite, in summative
consideration, for necessity to have
been obtained from non-necessity,
for realness to have sprung from
non-reality, and for actuality to have
originated from non-actuality. A
sound mind will not permit such a
thing. We have also tread it once in
the Taqwīm al-Īmān for the purpose
of establishing that
individualization, in the sense of
impossibility of predication upon
many, cannot be obtained by the
uniting together of universals or the
conjunction of unqualified natures
(unless there is a dependency of the
individualized in the stage of itself
in its own essence). Otherwise, it
would be necessary for the
repetition of the universal to be the
basis of particularity and the
multiplication of the unqualified to
be the basis of individuality.
Since it is evident that a
corporeal volume and a temporal
extension cannot be obtained from
the conjunction of indivisible parts
and a succession of indivisible
nows, it is clear that the corporeal
form is a continuous spatial
substance with a fixed extension in
its own essence, that time is a
continuous, extended, unfixed
quantity in its own reality, and that
motion is a continuous unfixed state
with the continuity of time, which is
its measure, and with the continuity
of the distance which corresponds
to it.

Wamḍa [6.7]
It is not possible for
quantity (or magnitude miqdār) to
occur to that which is not
continuous in its substance.[259]
Essential continuity, therefore,
makes it possible for something to
be the subject of quantity. Fixed
quantities occur to the substance of
the corporeal form [191] continuous
in itself. Motion is continuous with
respect to distance, and in accord
with its continuity through distance,
it is suitable for being quantified by
the continuity of time and measured
in quantity. Consequently, all
quantities ultimately depend upon
the continuity of essentially
extended, continuous substance.

Wamḍa [6.8]
Is it not established in the
science of demonstration that it is
inconceivable for inquiry into the
very essence of the subject of a
science and the constituent parts of
its essence, with respect to
affirmation and negation, to be one
of the objectives of the science in
which its demonstration is sought,
but it is strictly one of the questions
of another science which is higher
than it. Furthermore, inquiry into the
subjects of particular sciences and
the constituent parts of their
subjects as a whole strictly belongs
to the highest science, which is the
lord and master of the sciences in
their entirety. Moreover, inquiry
into indivisible parts, and matter
and form, is an inquiry into the
reality of body with respect to the
substance of its essence and the
substantialization of its reality, and
with respect to the mode of its
existence which particularizes it,
not an inquiry into body insofar as it
is the subject of physics. Also, the
denial of potential indivisible parts
belongs to an inquiry into
essentially extended, continuous,
spatial, corporeal substance and the
establishment of its simple
interrogative. Inquiry into the
simple interrogative is the negation
(lā-iy) of something, which is one
of the objectives of metaphysics.
Consequently, the question of the
indivisible part, with respect to
affirmation and negation, is a
question pertaining to the divine
science, just as inquiry into prime
matter and corporeal form is one of
the tasks of that science and its
questions, as we have set forth in
this book and in our book al-Īmādāt
wa’l-Tashrīqāt, which is the al-
Ṣaḥīfa al-Malakūtiyya.
The two masters of the
philosophers of Islām and our two
companions in the instruction of
philosophy and its leadership, Abū
Naṣr al-Fārābī and Abū ‘Alī Ibn
Sīnā, have explained this in their
books and their writings. The Chief
states, for instance, in his book al-
Ta‘līqāt:
The subject of physics consists
of all natural things, and its
relation to what is beneath it is
the relation of the universal
sciences to the particular
sciences. That subject is the
body insofar as it is moving or
stationary, and its object of
inquiry are the subsequent
accidents belonging to it insofar
as it is like this, not insofar as it
is a particular body.
Then he says:
As for examining the questions
“Is the body composed of
indivisible parts?” “Is it finite
or infinite?” “Is it necessary for
every body to have a locus, a
shape, [192] and a concrete
being or not?”—these are
related to the science of
metaphysics. They are among
the states of the body insofar as
it is existent, not insofar as it is
subject to change. This is an
inquiry into the mode of
existence which is peculiar to it,
so that it may be asked about
any existence peculiar to it: “Is
it a substance or an accident?”
And if it is a substance and it is
asked: “Is it finite or infinite?”,
not with respect to asking if its
actions and effects are finite or
infinite, this also pertains to the
science of metaphysics. As for
asking about the body, insofar as
it is moving: “Is it finite or
infinite?”, this is related to
physics. In like manner, if it is
asked: “Are its actions and
effects finite or infinite?”, this
pertains to physics.
In that same work, he says:
The discourse asking if the body
is composed of indivisible parts
[or not] is a discourse on the
mode of its existence. The same
applies to the discourse asking
if it is composed of matter and
form. These are not connected
to physics. As for what is
connected to physics, it is the
discourse which establishes its
existence with respect to its
motions, its potencies, and its
acts. The discourse concerning
finitude and infinitude has two
respects. The first of them
concerns magnitude and body as
such. The second concerns the
states of the body insofar as it is
moving or stationary. This is
connected to physics.
 In like manner, our
companion, the [Second] Teacher,
made similar statements in his
annotations using identical
terminology. As for what the Seal of
the Most Excellent Scholars said
concerning this in the Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt, when he claimed that the
refutation of the indivisible part and
the finitude of dimensions are
questions belonging to physics,
contrary to the discussion of matter
and form, which is among the
questions of First Philosophy, this
is most astonishing coming from
one of his caliber! He has boasted
in the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt about being
an imitator of our companion in
leadership. Why then did he not
follow what they set forth on this
theme and adhere to this judgment
upon which the consensus of former
philosophers agree? May God
illumine his resting place. What
occurred only occurred due to the
difference between the denial of the
indivisible part and the affirmation
of matter and form, as our
companion recognized. He set forth
the former in the Physics of the
Shifā’ and the Najāt and the latter
in the Metaphysics of these two
works. This does not constitute a
proof for him of what he has stated,
since he did not set it forth in the
Physics in such a way that it was
one of its objectives. [193]
Also, he intended to
explain there the denial of the
[indivisible] part by way of motion.
This method of exposition is taken
from physics. It is evident in his
misgiving that the difference of the
method of demonstration makes the
question pertain to two sciences,
just as the question of the revolution
of the heavens relates to both
astronomy and physics. Thus, we
have ascertained with respect to its
domain and its station that it is
similarly necessary to attribute it to
the difference of the qualifying
circumstantial mode of the subject.
Consequently, the question differs
with respect to the two sciences
through the difference of the subject
by reason of the difference of the
qualifying circumstantial mode. In
this book we have refuted the
indivisible part with sure
demonstrative expositions. Let them
be pondered.

Wamḍa [6.9]
As it is clear to you that
the corporeal form is a substance
which is continuous and extended in
itself, know that the dimensions of
this essentially extended substance
must, in accord with the substance
of its essence, extend in three
directions. But it is not required
with respect to its own quiddity as
such that the extensions of its
dimensions be characterized by
infinitude or by finitude, or by any
of the particular properties of
external magnitudes, which are
finitely specified. That which is one
of the essential constituents
(muqawwimāt) of its essence as
such is that its dimensions should
extend in the directions. But its
being measured in its extensions by
a certain measure either once or
infinite times is something outside
of the constitution of its reality. As
for the necessity of its dimensions
being finite, this is required in
[actual] existence in relation to
carrying out the demonstration of
the impossibility of infinity. As for
the particular characteristics of
external magnitudes, these are
commensurate with the particular
characteristics of the dispositions
of matter.
Consequently, the absolute
nature of dimensional extension into
the three directions is the stage of
the essence of substantial, natural
corporeality, and the specifications
of the particular characteristics of
external magnitudes are the
quantitative stage of accidental
mathematical corporeality. The
essentially extended, therefore, is
no other than the substantial natural
body, while the accidental
mathematical body is the stage
which specifies the extension of its
dimensions with respect to surface
area. Consequently, the
individuality of the mathematical
body is only altered with the
alteration of the stage of the surface
area. As for a form which changes
shape despite the conservation of
the surface measurement, the
individuality of the mathematical
corporeal entity is always
conserved, just as is the
individuality of the substantial
corporeal entity. Only the specific
measures of the geometrical faces
change, and the boundaries of the
dimensions by increase and
decrease in length [194] and
breadth, for example, not the
individuality of the extended entity
specified in external magnitude.
Change in the specifics of the units
of the dimensions is only
conceivable in the stage of
mathematical, quantitative
corporeality, not in the stage of the
reality of substantial extended
corporeality.[260]

Wamīḍ [6.9.1]
Since a part and a whole
are not possible in the nature of
absolute extension as long as its
measure is not specified,
quantifiable parts, which are the
parts into which the quantified
extended thing are analyzed, only
belong to the locus of the individual
entity, and pertain to the stage of
mathematical corporeality, just as
the predicated parts, which are
genera and differentiae, belong to
the locus of the substance of the
unqualified quiddity as such, and
the factual parts contrary in
existence, which are matters and
forms, belong to the locus of the
mode of existence, that is, the state
of the quiddity itself in one of the
two existences: the concrete or the
mental. Division, therefore, taken
absolutely, is of four kinds: (1)
discrete and separate in actuality in
the real world, (2) the particular
estimative, (3) the universal
hypothetical, and (4) that which is
by the variation of two constant
accidents in the essence of the
subject, as with black and white [in
a Dalmatian], whose only object is
the substantial, extended natural
body, but in the stage of
mathematical corporeality. That
which makes actual discontinuous
division possible is the disposition
(isti‘dād) of continuously
conserved, receptive matter; hence,
it is among the accidents of matter
in reality. That which makes
particular estimative division
possible is specified
quantitativeness itself; hence, it is
one of the accidents of
mathematical quantity. Although
universal hypothetical division is
associated with mathematical
quantity, nevertheless the basis of
correspondence and that which
makes the association possible is
absolute extension, which is a
condition of the essence of the
continuous substance itself within
the boundary of itself. All bodies
are identical with respect to
receiving the kinds of division and
with respect to the nature of
corporeality.[261] If it happens that
a certain body in its particularity,
like the sphere for instance, is such
that it requires particular
dimensions in existence, then a real
separative division is precluded.
This is not due to corporeality
itself, but is due to another
nature[262] which preserves its
secondary perfections. In like
manner, the unfixed quantity, time,
is also not subject to discontinuity
in the external world, since only
particular estimative division and
universal hypothetical division are
possible for it, not because it is a
quantity, but due to the particular
properties of its reality and due to
the necessity of the continuity of
motion, which is its perpetual,
continuous substrate on behalf of
the Soul, which is associated with
the management of the body which
bears it.
 Wamīḍ [6.9.2]
In accord with this,
“continuity,” in the terminology of
this science, has two meanings: (1)
a correlative continuity, which is
only intelligible between two
things, a contiguous and a
contiguous with it, and it applies to
quantity being united in limit with
another quantity, and to body being
such that it moves with the motion
of another body; (2) a real
continuity, in which something is
qualified by this with respect to
itself, not by its relation to another
thing. This second sense also has
two meanings: (a) the essential
continuity of something, namely, its
being in its own essence the
denotation of the predication
“continuous and extended in its
dimensions.” In accord with this,
the substance of the essence is
continuous and a continuity in two
respects. The continuous in this
respect is the form of the natural
body and its differentia.[263] (b)
The other [sense of real continuity]
is something being in the substance
of its essence such that it is
possible to analyze it into common
imaginary parts within common
boundaries. The continuous in this
sense is a differentia for quantity
and a concomitant of the substantial
continuous thing, which is the form
of the body with respect to
existence. There is not, in this case,
an extended thing that is essentially
a substantial and an accidental,
[264] but rather the essentially
extended is strictly the continuous
substance, which is the natural
corporeal form. It is not possible
for it, with respect to this stage, for
area (misāḥa) to be associated with
it. But if the extension of its
dimensions is specified, it is
possible for it to be measured so
and so many times or infinite times,
if it is estimated infinite in
extension. It may be said of it, with
respect to the stage of specification,
that it is a quantifiable body by
means of the mathematical quantity
which is the object of receiving
equivalence and difference.
Finitude is an accident which it
requires with respect to existence,
not with respect to estimation.
In like manner, if a plane is
considered in an absolute sense,
insofar as it is extended in two
dimensions only, it is the nature of
the plane. Measure is not specified
for it, area is not associated with it,
and it is not possible for division to
apply to it. But if it is considered
insofar as it is accidental to it [the
corporeal form], and the extension
of its two dimensions are specified,
it is measurable as a specific
quantity and division is possible for
it. However, in both of these
respects, it is outside of the reality
of body, an accident among its
accidents, and a limit belonging to
its extensions, which is contrary to
the extended in three directions.
Therefore, with respect to the
nature of three-dimensional
extension, it is a constituent of the
reality of body, while with respect
to the specification of dimensions,
it is one of the accidents of its
essence. These two respects also
apply to the line in relation to the
body. It is only subject to actual
division in a single respect with
respect to specification, not with
respect to the nature of extension in
one dimension without a
specification. In both [196] of these
respects, it is an accident of the
body and a limit of its plane.

Wamīḍ [6.9.3]
Perchance you perceive,
therefore, by the intuition of your
clear intellect and sound mind, that
just as it is impossible for an actual
existent to be composed essentially
from non-existent things, in like
manner, it is impossible for its
existent entity to be dissolved into
purely non-existent things.
Therefore, the quantitative parts
belonging to the existent entity
definitely have a mode of existence
in the real world. How is it
possible for an actual part of the
existent entity to be utterly non-
existent, and how is it possible for
it to be sheer nothingness? It may be
that certain subjects are posited to
the affirmatives of true external
propositions. If you heat part of a
continuous thing in the external
world and you cool another part of
it, for instance, it is true that this
part is hot and that part is cool in
actuality with respect to the external
world, and the truth of the
affirmative copula necessarily
requires the existence of the
subject. But it is also impossible
for them [the two hot and cool
parts] to be mutually separate in
existence and actually distinct in
existence from the whole, for how
can singular continuity be
intellected where there are mutually
separate, distinct existences? You
know already that existence is the
manifestation (sharḥ) of the
determined essence and the
signification of the actual entity, and
it is only particularized and
multiplied in relation to multiple
subjects. Hence, if certain distinct
existences are separate from each
other, this is certainly only due to
mutually separate and distinct
essences, each of which is a
singular continuous entity. A sound
mind is unable to conceive of a
single, essentially continuous entity
possessing multiple distinct
existences.
Consequently, it is clear
that the quantitative parts belonging
to an essentially continuous,
individual entity are certainly
existent with the same existence as
the continuous whole, because they
are not existent things with their
own causes. It happens that they
have a single existence in the real
world, which is the existence of that
single continuous entity, just as it is
the law for the unqualified
predicated natures, insofar as they
are parts of that continuous thing
which is a solitary existent with its
cause. Consequently, the existence
of quantifiable parts in the real
world is only between pure
potentiality and pure actuality. If
discontinuity occurs, separate,
distinct essences are observed, and
existence is necessarily multiplied.
[197]
In sum, existence is the
same as attributive existence, and it
is inconceivable for it to be
particularized and multiplied save
in relation to multiple subjects. So
wherever essences form a unity,
existence is one, and wherever they
are distinct from each other, it is
multiplied. Consequently, continuity
and discontinuity result in the
singleness of existence and its
multiplicity. Hence, the division of
the continuous is the multiplication
of the one, and the union of the
discontinuous is the making one of
the many. It is inconceivable for one
continuous form to remain with the
occurrence of discontinuity.
Division, therefore, in reality, is
nothing but the transformation of
one existence into multiple
existences.[265] It is demonstrated
by this that the one in continuity is
not disparate in reality, and it is not
continuous with what is
heterogeneous with it in nature. The
quantitative parts of one continuous
thing, therefore, are definitely one
in quiddity and equivalent in nature,
and they only exist subsequent to the
existence of the whole. For this
reason it may be said that they are
not parts according to reality, but
according to indulgence and
likeness, for they participate with
each other in name and definition,
and they coincide with each other
and the whole in quiddity. It may
also be said of the unqualified
predicated natures that they are
parts of the substance of the
quiddity by indulgence and
extension, not according to reality,
but by another way. This is one of
the most valuable of the
demonstrative principles which are
used to establish prime matter. Be
guided by it, and be not of those
who are heedless.
 Wamīḍ [6.9.4]
Have we not recited to you
that the conjunction of universals
does not result in the impossibility
of predication to many, for the
conjoined universals, whether finite
or infinite [in number], are like one
universal with respect to not
providing individuality. The entity
of something, its specification, its
oneness, its individualization, and
the particularization of its singular
existence are all the same thing. I
am not saying that the concept of
individualization is itself the
concept of existence in primary
essential predication. Rather, I am
saying that the source of
individualization is the source of
existence.[266] The
individualization of something, with
respect to the mode of its existence
which particularizes it, is separate
from the existences of other things
and distinct from them in
predication by reason of its
particular properties, concomitants,
and associated accidents, which are
the signs of individual oneness as
required by the substance of the
quiddity or by the disposition of the
matter. The cause of the
individuality of the mode of
existence is strictly its dependence
upon the real Existent
individualized by reason of Himself
and its relation to Him distinct from
other existences. The individuality
of things, therefore, is through their
essentially individualized
Originator [198], just as their
existence and their necessity is
through Him. The individualization
of something is the mode of its
existence which particularizes it as
it emanates from its Originator.
Thus, if it is one of the separate
lights, it is the substance of its
reality, corresponding to its
essential possibility, ready to
receive existence and
individualization through the
emanation of its Maker.
Consequently, its emanating Agent
by itself produces its quiddity and
its individuality, although it is such
that its generation is due to matter,
for it [matter] prepares it to receive
by virtue of the disposition
occurring in its matter.
If you inquire into the core
of the question, since the Great
Man, which is the entire system of
the world of possibility, is, in its
individuality, the most perfect of
possible systems, and it is
impossible for another system to be
superior to it or in the same rank in
terms of perfection, the Providence
of the Maker, the All-Bountiful
(exalted be His name), which is the
Universal Nature which directs and
preserves the system of the whole
—since He (lauded be He), the All-
Bountiful, the Almighty, is perfect
in His glory and His majesty, His
grace and His mercy, and beyond
perfection—necessitates that He
should freely choose it and will it,
produce it and emanate it, through
His active, emanating Essence and
His perfect, consummate wisdom.
The entire system, therefore, occurs
through Him, not through the
intermediary of a certain thing and
not by the inclusion of something
outside of Himself apart from the
essence of God, for outside of Him
there is nothing which is [not]
dependent upon the real Originator.
He is in His own essence its
Originator, its Fashioner, its
Emanator, and its Agent.
Consequently, the entire solitary
system in its oneness and its entity
is dependent upon the real One,
who is individualized by virtue of
Himself. As for the specified thing
which emanates from Him, it is
without a doubt an essentially
individual existent, and the mode of
its existence emanating from Him
(lauded be He) is the reality of its
individualization and the principle
of its individuality.[267] As for
each part of the parts of the system
of the whole, whether immaterial or
material, it is only individualized
by emanating from its Maker as a
part of the individually singular,
comprehensive system, since a part
of an individual thing is
inconceivable separated from its
other parts in existence, insofar as it
is its particular distinct part, save
as an individual. Providence
intends the system and the parts,
insofar as they are its parts, with
one primary intention.
Therefore, if the mind
considers things spread out and
separated from each other and
separated from the First Principle,
it is correct that some are dependent
on others, as a result of which it
may be stated in clear terms: This is
from that, and because of that, with
respect to a beginning without an
intermediary, even though
dependency in the vertical series
ultimately ends in Him (exalted be
He) by demonstrative necessity. But
if all of the things are considered
with respect to the whole solitary,
harmonious system, there is only
one existent—one in system,
multiple in composition, dependent
with all of its parts in the horizontal
series upon the emanating Maker
(lauded be He) [199] all at once,
and individualized by Him all at
once. For He is the Agent and the
Goal in an absolute sense. He is
real Existence and self-subsisting
Individualization. For every
existent besides Him, He is the
correspondent (muṭābiq) of the
abstraction (intizā‘) of existence
from it; and for every
individualized thing besides Him,
He is the correspondent of the
abstraction of individualization
from it.[268] There is no existence
and no individualization, no power
and no might, save in God, the
Exalted, the Great. This is a noble
principle, whose rule is the mother
of all demonstrative principles.

Wamīḍ [6.9.5]
Since it is established that
continuity and discontinuity are the
singleness of existence and its
multiplicity, the multiplying of
existence is no other than the
multiplying of existent individuals,
and its singleness is the singleness
of an individual thing. It is
established, therefore, that
continuous oneness without a doubt
necessarily accompanies individual
numerical oneness, and that
discontinuous multiplicity
necessarily accompanies individual
multiplicity. Therefore, the division
of the continuous, without
exception, is the transformation of
individual oneness into individual
multiplicity. The quantitative parts
are posterior to the whole in
existence. It is impossible for the
continuous form in its individuality
to remain together with the
occurrence of discontinuity,
regardless of whether it be in the
real world or in the mind. It is
impossible, therefore, for any two
bodies to be a part of one
continuous body, except
hypothetically, not actually.
A tree, for example, is a
single body by nature, one in
species and one in individuality, but
not quantitatively one. Fire or
water, for example, are part of one
tree, but not part of one corporeality
and one continuous, quantifiable
form.[269] Be on guard, then,
against taking what is accidental for
what is essential. This is also one
of the principles for establishing
prime matter.
 Wamīḍ [6.9.6]
Know that individual
oneness, that is to say, numerical
oneness absolutely, is distinguished
from among the kinds of oneness by
the fact that, by its nature, it is
impossible for it to be removed
from its subject,[270] so individual
contrary multiplicity is a
consequence of the subject itself.
Indeed, its removal necessarily
accompanies the removal of its
subject. In short, it is impossible for
individual oneness and individual
multiplicity, which is its contrary, to
arrive in succession upon a single
particular subject. [200] If an
individual oneness or an individual
multiplicity is nullified, the
substance of the essence of its
subject is nullified with its
nullification. If it is produced, the
substance of the essence of the
subject is produced with it. The
predication of successive arrival
upon a particular subject is the
purpose of the other kinds of
oneness and multiplicity. Has it not
been demonstrated that individual
oneness is the same as the mode of
existence or its concomitant.
Through succession it is impossible
for the mode of existence of
something to be nullified while its
essence remains. The succession of
dissimilar existences upon a
particular solitary essence,
therefore, is utterly inconceivable,
either with motion or without
motion. Furthermore, is not the
concept of individual oneness
indivisibility into particulars, just
as the concept of continuous
oneness is actual indivisibility into
quantitative parts? If its removal
from the essence of the subject
were possible, despite the
continuous duration of the essence,
through the subsequent occurrence
of its contrary individual
multiplicity, it would be possible
for the particular to become a
universal and the individual an
unqualified nature. This is absurd
and groundless, and beyond the
circle of conception. This is the last
of the principles upon which the
proof of prime matter is based. It is
a firm principle which the judgment
of no one among the family of
intellect and the people of truth
denies.

Wamīḍ [6.9.7]
Indeed, he who abides in
the clime of natural intelligence
does not distinguish here with
respect to impossibility between
subsequent succession in the second
creation (al-fiṭra al-thāniyya) and
initial alternation from the
beginning of the first creation (al-
fiṭra al-ūlā).[271] The two
explanations already recited to you
in two ways support the exposition
concerning the two cases. Truly,
something being in the substance of
itself such that it is not precluded
from having at the beginning of the
first creation this existence or these
two existences—the particular
reality or the universal nature, the
individual entity or the quiddity of
the unqualified nature—itself bears
witness to the absurdity and
incorrectness of the possibility of
their arrival upon it in succession
from a distance in the second
creation. Is it not seemly to ponder
that if it is right for a certain
concept to be at the beginning of the
first creation, either according to
the characteristic of the possibility
of the multiplicity of individuals or
according to the characteristic of
the impossibility of predication to
many, it is conceivable, in this case,
for the concept to have a third state,
which is the common nature shared
between the two things? That
common nature would only belong
to it with respect to the essence, not
with respect to any of the two
particularities. Can one say this is
permissible with respect to an
accident of the constitution of the
human creation? [No!] Consider
also, in this case, it would be
necessary for each of the two things
in its particularity to belong to it,
not by the essence itself, but by
[201] a requisite coming to it from
outside. Consequently, the
particular would be a particular not
by the essence but by a cause, the
individual would be an individual
not by the essence but by a cause,
the universal would be a universal
not by the essence but by a cause,
and the unqualified nature would be
an unqualified nature not by the
essence but by a cause. Methinks,
he who permits such a thing is
lacking in common sense.
This is a principle which
makes the path clear for
establishing prime matter, against
the assumption of the doctrine of the
small hard bodies of Democritus,
and solves the doubt by
distinguishing between supervening
discontinuity in the second creation
and innate discontinuity in the first
creation, by possibility and
impossibility, according to that
hypothesis. Let it be understood.
 Wamīḍ [6.9.8]
Perhaps you will say that
there is a doubt through which this
question has become difficult to the
fastidious and escaping from it
impossible for those who are
pedantic. It is that the parts of one
continuous thing are existent in the
external world, as is evident, with
the self-same existence as that
continuous thing, but not altogether
non-existent in the real world, not
separated from each other in
existence, or distinct from the
whole, and some are not derived
from others in the mode of external
existence. Therefore, the possibility
of predicating some of the
quantitative parts to others and to
the whole is implied, as a result of
which it would be true to say: “This
cubit is half of it, and this half is
that other half,” for the basis of this
is oneness (ittiḥād) in existence,
and there is no reality to the
predication except through the
oneness of the two sides in
existence and their dissimilarity in
the mind. Yet this is something
which is clearly absurd and
manifestly false.
It may be answered to you:
The way to untie the knot in this
aporia is that the meaning of the
duality posited as the basis of
predication is the dissimilarity of
its two sides in the mind and their
oneness in the container of
predication, in the sense that they
share in that identical mode of
existence independently. Their
mental duality pertains to one of the
stages of the thing itself considered
with respect to its relation to
existence in the container of
predication, in other words, the
external world in external
propositions, and with respect to
another aspect among the aspects of
the mind besides the aspect of
duality in mental propositions, and
the absolute thing itself in real
propositions, in the sense that what
is realized in the aspect of the mind
by the qualification of “duality” and
“distinction” is realized in the
container of predication by means
of mixture and the condition of
oneness. The question, therefore,
does not return to either pure
oneness or pure duality, so the basis
of the reality of predication is
discredited. [202]
Consequently, predication
is only possible when the two, in
the consideration of the mind, have
been mixed and united with respect
to existence in the container of
predication, such that that mode of
existence itself belongs to each of
these two by itself and
independently, either essentially
and in reality in relation to both
together, which is essential
predication, or in relation to one of
them alone essentially and in
relation to the other by a mental
figure of speech, which is
accidental predication, such that it
is possible for the intellect to
maintain that the existent in the
container of predication is two with
respect to the thing itself
independently, even though the
mode of their existence in the
container of predication is one.
Consequently, this does not
necessitate the realization of these
two in the container of predication
in the condition of duality and the
form of distinct existence, since the
basis of multiplicity and duality,
and the object of distinction and
separation in any container is only
the duality of the mode of existence
and the multiplicity of the
individual occurring in that
container.
Since this is established,
we say that it is impossible for that
which is existent with the very
existence of the solitary continuous
thing, insofar as part of that existent
is simple and purely one, and part
of the existent is one in essence and
entity, to be separate from it in
occurrence and distinct from it in
existence, or to be purely non-
existent, not because that existence
itself is also related to it
independently, either essentially or
accidentally, just as it is essentially
related to that continuous thing
independently. Thus, it cannot be
tested by the criterion of
predication. It cannot be predicated
to it at all, either essentially or
accidentally, since the existent is
not, by itself, two with respect to
the thing itself, and the mode of the
existence of these two in the
container of predication is one;
otherwise, it would be possible to
maintain two existents existing
independently within the boundaries
of themselves happening to be one
with respect to the mode of
existence, either essentially or
accidentally. Nay, the truth is that
the existent within the boundary of
itself is one. Then the mind analyzes
it into parts which cannot be
subsequent to it in existence nor
separated from it with respect to it.
This is our path and the
path of the concourse of
philosophers who are firmly
grounded in knowledge, and there is
no way around it. It is the compass
for the judgment of the intellect in
the circle of predication. As for
those who imitate others, they
wander aimlessly in a trackless
desert and have gone astray in a
desolate wilderness. The path upon
which they tread is the path of weak
intellects. They cleave tenaciously
in the quicksand of doubt to the
weed of specialization (takhṣīṣ),
and they say, in accord with the
doctrine of the grammarians, that
definitions specialize the predicate
with oneness [203] in existence,
despite lack of distinction in usage.
Among them is he who strays from
the path, allows predication of the
quantitative part, and says, for
example, that if half a cubit is taken
with respect to the quantitative
nature non-conditioned by anything,
it is predicable to all of it. He does
not perceive that the quantitative
nature non-conditioned by anything
is one of the predicated parts from
which the reality is constituted with
respect to the root of the substance
of the quiddity, and it belongs to the
locus of the nature of the
unqualified reality, while the
quantitative parts with respect to
quantity and continuity are that into
which the continuous individual is
analyzed, and they belong to the
locus of the individuality of the
extensional nature. The former is
one with the unqualified reality
which is constituted of it, while the
latter are distinct from the
individual entity analyzed into them.
Let it be pondered.

Wamīḍ [6.9.9]
The prime matter of the
world of generation and corruption
is individually one in its essence
with an indeterminate, individual
oneness, and its individualizations
are accidental via the individual
forms which arrive successively
upon it[272] and are determinate
(muḥaṣṣala) in relation to the
indeterminacy of its essential
individual oneness. The formative
agent (muqawwim) of its individual
solitary essence, consisting of the
essentially extended corporeal
form, is the natural form which is
the measure of its extension in the
area between the center of the earth
and the concave surface of the
sphere of the moon, unqualified in
relation to the particular
characteristics of the stages of
continuities and discontinuities after
the conservation of that area
measure itself with respect to all
the evolutionary stages of continuity
and discontinuity. The same applies
to the prime matter of every body in
its particularity. The formative
agent of the particularity of its
essence is the particular surface
measure belonging to the substantial
form extended in itself belonging to
that body in its particularity, not
conditioned by any of the particular
characteristics of the continuities
and the discontinuities. All of these
continuous and discontinuous
particular characteristics,
conditioned by the conservation of
the area measure, are determinate in
relation to the oneness of the
essence of that individual prime
matter and negated due to its
indeterminacy.
It is not like this for the
corporeal form [= the substantial
form], for the continuous, specified
surface measure in its very
specified continuity is the basis for
the individualization of the
essentially extended corporeal form
and the basis of the individuality of
its individuation in its particularity,
as you know.
It is clear, therefore, that
the division (infiṣāl) of the
continuous, individually one,
corporeal form into two individual
continuous forms does not require
the transformation of its
individually one prime matter
within the boundary [204] of itself
into two individual prime matters
multiple in individual entity, as is
the case with form. Therefore, the
division of the individual form and
its separation into two distinct
forms commensurate with
essentially individual entity is not a
cause for requiring the division and
partitioning of individual matter,
nor its transformation into two
individual matters distinct in
individual identity, except in an
accidental manner, not essentially.
The doubt obliging prime matter to
have another matter is therefore
removed, since it is clear that the
formative agent for the individuality
of individually one prime matter is
strictly the stage of the surface area
belonging to the corporeal form, not
any of the particular characteristics
of continuity and discontinuity
occurring in the surface magnitude
which necessarily accompany
individual oneness and multiplicity.
This is the meaning of
what you hear them say, namely, that
the corporeal form extended in
itself, with respect to its own nature
non-conditioned by anything, is the
formative agent of the substance of
individual prime matter itself,
insofar as it is individual prime
matter, and it is the partner of the
cause of its individuation and its
individualized, indeterminate
essence maintained by the
succession of individual forms upon
it. It precedes it [matter] essentially,
and in accord with the particularity
of its individual, quantified,
measured entity, it inheres in it and
is constituted by it. Consequently,
the indeterminacy of the oneness of
individual prime matter in relation
to corporeal form is only in relation
to the continuities and
discontinuities, not in relation to the
stages of surface magnitudes. Thus
the prime matter of a body whose
surface measure is two cubits by
two cubits, for example, cannot
receive a corporeal form whose
measure of extension in area is
three cubits by a cubit and a half.
For this reason, the
question of expansion and
contraction is not in accord with
what the masses conceive, but
according to another way, as we
have explained in another place.
Moreover, individual prime matter
has an indeterminacy, within the
boundary of its indeterminate
oneness, with respect to natural
species forms as well, however, in
relation to their particular
characteristics which arrive
successively upon it and are subject
to generation, not in relation to that
whose existence is above the
horizon of transformation and
change, and in which the attributes
of generation and corruption, time
and motion, do not occur.

Wamḍa [6.10]
Have you heard that
motion has two senses? The first is
an individual simple state, which is
[205] the moving object being
intermediate between the beginning
and the end—being intermediate in
an individual, flowing way,
constant in its individual essence—
inasmuch as the motion remains
unfixed in relation to the boundaries
which the motion is in. It is certain,
then, that whichever “now” is
posited in the time of the motion,
the arrival (muwāfāt) of a certain
boundary (ḥadd) belonging to the
moving object will be in it [that
now] which does not belong to it
before that now or after it.
Therefore, that boundary cannot
belong to it in two nows, just as it
is with each of the two boundaries
of the two extremes of the beginning
and the end. This simple state, due
to its own flowing essence, which
is unfixed with respect to its
inseparable relation to the
boundaries of distance by arrival, is
called medial motion. It is not, in
itself, either one of the
instantaneously occurring existents
or one of the gradually occurring
existents, but rather it is a temporal
existent whose existence requires a
particular time in which it exists,
not by way of correspondence to its
extension, but such that it is existent
in its whole entity in every part of
its parts and in every boundary of
its boundaries, contrary to how it is
with gradually occurring existents.
It is not correct to say of a
postulated now [in medial motion]
that it is the now of the beginning of
existence and the beginning of
actualization, in contrast to the case
of instantaneous existents.
One cannot conceive of
motion in this sense corresponding
to a certain continuous distance, nor
to a certain time, nor to a certain
extended entity at all. It only
corresponds in essence, with an
ever-flowing correspondence, to an
indivisible boundary among the
boundaries of distance and to an
indivisible now among the nows of
time.
The second [sense of
motion] is a continuous state which
corresponds to the continuous
distance between its two extremes
of the beginning and the end. It is
called terminal motion.[273] It is
gradually occurring in existence and
unfixed in its parts. The container of
its entity and the vessel of its
occurrence is time. Its hypothetical
indivisible boundaries are beings
postulated in the middle coinciding
with the boundaries postulated in
the distance and the nows
postulated in time.
Motion in the first sense is
removed from motion in this sense
and does not subsist in it, but rather
it marks it and subsists in its
subject. The destruction of its mark
(rāsimiyya) is the continuation of
its simple, individual, flowing
essence and the impermanence of
its relation to the hypothetical
boundaries in the distance. [206]

Wamḍa [6.11]
Just as motion is two
things which differ conceptually
and in essence, in like manner, there
are two different things pertaining
to time which correspond to these
two. One of them is the flowing
now, which is the measure of
medial motion, which corresponds
to it [the flowing now] and is not
separate from it as long as it is
existent. The other is continuous,
extended time, which is the measure
of terminal motion and that in which
it [motion] exists and to which it
corresponds. Just as medial flowing
motion is apart from the categories
of terminal motion, in like manner,
the flowing now is unlike the now
which is the divider of time and the
common separator of its past and
future parts. It does not subsist in it,
but rather it marks it and subsists in
the body of the outermost sphere,
which is the subject of the circular
terminal motion, which is the
substrate of time, and recurring
medial motion, which is
inseparable from the flowing now.
Both recurring and linear medial
motions are measured by the
flowing now, just as all circular and
non-circular terminal motions are
measured by time. The flowing now
and medial motion are markers for
time and terminal motion in the
same way that the efficient point is
for the line, as when the tip of a
cone is presumed to pass along a
plane. The imaginary nows which
are the dividers of times and of
beings in relation to the boundaries
of distance, which are the imaginary
units of terminal motion,
correspond to the points which are
the actual dividers of lines and to
the points hypothesized in a
continuous line by estimation. The
dividing now (or: bounding now) is
no other than the imaginary now
with respect to time. It is only a
connector. As for the point, some
are imaginary connective points and
others are existent divisive points,
as with the units of terminal motion
and its dividers.

Wamḍa [6.12]
Do not forget what we
have verified in al-Ufuq al-Mubīn,
that the nature of the motion of the
outermost sphere, which is the
substratum of time, in its
particularity, not the nature of any
motion at all, is part of the cause of
time, and it precedes it essentially,
yet the individualization of any
motion, whether it be the substratum
of time or other than that, is
conditioned by time. There is no
vicious circle in this reasoning in
the same way that it was explained
to you earlier regarding prime
matter and form, namely, that form,
insofar as it is a certain form, and
insofar as it is the nature of form, is
part of the cause of individual
prime matter. But individualized
prime matter is also a cause [207]
of the individualization of form in a
certain respect, that is to say, a
cause which receives the individual
form insofar as it is an individual
form.
Time is not one of the
individualizing aspects, i.e.,
individualizing causes, of things,
except for motion, because motion,
in the nature of its existent essence,
does not exist in separation from
speed and slowness, and these two
are not separated from time, rather
from its specification, since the
specification of specified speed in
its particularity only pertains to a
particular time. As for the other
temporally individualized things,
time in relation to them is the
container of individualization and
existence, but not one of their
necessary causes, except in an
accidental way. With respect to the
consideration of what is accidental,
it may be said that things are
dependent on their times.
 This is what our
companion, the Chief, meant in
Chapter Thirteen, Book Two, of the
Physics of the Shifā’, where he
said: “Time is not the cause of
anything, but if something is existent
or non-existent with the duration of
time, and an external cause is not
observed for it, the people have
imputed this to time, since they do
not find or they are unaware of
anything else associated with it
other than time.”

Wamīḍ [6.12.1]
Do not let yourself be
disturbed by what the doubters utter
regarding difficult knots in this
theme, that being in the middle is
applicable to all of the
hypothesized medial beings
commensurate with the possible,
specified boundaries hypothesized
in individual continuous distance.
Hence, occurrence in the middle is
a universal thing, not one thing by
individualization, despite the
continuous distance being a single
individual entity. By this means,
they voice their doubt concerning a
difficult knot with respect to the
predication of some particulars to
others, like this speaking in relation
to this man, and this living, this
writing, and this white, for
example. If this is admissible, it
would be necessary for this
speaking, for example, to have an
indeterminate oneness in relation to
these particulars to which it is
predicated, and this would require
the particular to be a universal and
the individual an unqualified nature.
Know then that the
criterion for a concept being a
universal and an unqualified nature
is its having within the boundary of
itself an indeterminate oneness in
relation to more than one entity. Its
indeterminate oneness, therefore,
does not preclude it from having
potential determinations
(taḥaṣṣulāt), each of which is
superior and more perfect than the
determinateness of its solitary
indeterminate nature within the
boundary of the oneness of the
substance of its indeterminate
essence. This is what is meant by
[208] a concept being a universal
unqualified nature predicable to
many.
The question of individual
medial motion in relation to these
medial beings is not according to
this path [i.e., that of the relation of
a universal nature to many]. It is
evident that the basis of the
individual determinateness
belonging to the substance of
medial motion itself and to all
medial beings is the oneness of the
subject and time and what the
motion is in, and the specification
of the beginning and the end. All of
this is solely for the sake of
individualization. Consequently, if
this individual moving object is in
the middle in this individual time in
this continuous individual distance
between its two individual
extremes, which are the beginning
and the end, it will not be increased
at all in determinateness and
individualization after that by any
aspect of the beings and the
specified, hypothesized, medial
boundaries pertaining to that
motion. Rather, certain gradually
changing, relational accidents are
attached to the individual
determinate entity which augment
the determinateness of its individual
oneness in accordance with the
arrival of particular hypothesized
boundaries in that individual
continuous distance. Therefore,
individual determinateness is not
multiplied and increased for the
being in the middle, except by the
multiplication of the distance, the
severance of its continuity, and the
actual occurrence of a specified
beginning and end apart from these
first two.
Through this method, the
path is clear to you regarding the
predication of the particular to
solitary particulars in the mode of
existence. It is clear also that the
occurrence of certain individual
determinations related to the nature
of one concept is not the same as its
nature multiplied with respect to
those multiple determinations
related to its solitary nature. Rather
the converse is true, for there is an
individual determinateness which is
one with respect to itself but
multiple with respect to multiple
natures to which it is related.
Therefore, the question regarding
the particular predicated to
particulars differing in concept not
in determinateness is contrary to the
mode of indeterminate oneness,
which is the criterion for a concept
being a universal unqualified nature
predicable to many, in a number of
respects.
The first is that the nature,
in the latter case, is one with
respect to the essence itself and
multiple with respect to manifold
determinatenesses related to it. In
the former case, the determinateness
is one with respect to the essence
itself and multiple with respect to
multiple natures to which it is
related.
The second is that the
many determinate things, in the
latter case, are under one nature
which is predicable to them insofar
as they are [209] determinate. In the
former case, the subjects and the
concept predicated to them are all
in the same stage of determinateness
and particularization. Hence, it is
certain that the determinateness is
augmentable in the latter case, but it
is not like this in the former case.
The third is that the basis
of determinateness for each one of
the many, in the latter case, is
outside of the constitution of what is
the basis of determinateness for the
other units. The situation is not like
this in the former case.
The fourth is that the
subject and the predicate require
postulation and predication in the
latter case, with respect to
determinateness and
indeterminateness But in the former
case, it is not according to this path.
One is astonished at our
companion in leadership. He has
deduced this principle and tread
upon its path in the Physics of the
Shifā’, untying thereby the knot of
doubt in the subject of medial
motion. But why did he not tread
upon it in the subject of
predication? Consequently, he
denied the predication of the
particular without reservation in the
Categories of the Shifā’.[274] Let it
be recognized.

Wamīḍ [6.12.2]
Are you not convinced,
therefore, that the difference
between medial motion and
terminal motion with respect to
unfixed continuity, and likewise
between the flowing now and
extended time, is that unfixed
continuity by way of elapsing and
renewal in medial motion and the
flowing now strictly refers to a
concomitant of the simple, existent,
individual thing, in other words, its
unfixed relation to the hypothetical
boundaries by arrival. In terminal
motion and extended time, it refers
to the continuous, extended, existent
entity itself. Terminal motion and
extended time are only marked by
the essence of the simple existent
thing itself by means of the
constancy of its essence and the
non-fixity of its relation. In other
words, their entities are only
determinate purely through these
two attributes belonging to the
simple thing which marks them, i.e.,
medial motion and the flowing now,
no other. Therefore, if it is judged
that the two markers are two
existents in the real world
according to these two attributes, it
is certainly necessary for you to
maintain that the two continuous,
marked entities, i.e., the two things
determinate through the mode of
their existence according to these
two attributes, are definitely also
existents in the real world, if you,
through the soundness of your
intellect, are free of the ailment of
imperfection and the plague of
distorted logic and belong to the
people of truth and the men of
wisdom.
By a second demonstrative
way, has not your insight
ascertained more than once that
[210] the removal of an actual thing
from the domain of perpetuity is
impossible? Otherwise, extension
would be required in perpetuity.
[275] Also, an existent in a
particular time cannot be removed
in perpetuity from the time of its
existence; otherwise, the two
contradictories would be combined.
Nor can it be removed from another
time other than the time of its
existence, because it is not existent
in it so that it could be removed
from it. Rather, only the duration of
the existence of the temporal thing
in time ceases and is cut off, as a
result of which one who is not
trained in philosophy might think
that non-existence has supervened
upon its actual existence during its
time. It is correct that its existence
does not occur in the subsequent
time at all, but not that the existence
obtained in the prior time has been
nullified. In this way, the truth of the
question of termination and
commencement is in accord with
what inquiry has established upon
its seat.
As this is clear, we say:
Insofar as the being in the middle
and the flowing now occur in the
real world in every part of the
hypothetical parts during the time of
motion, and in every boundary of its
boundaries, its occurrence in that
part and in that boundary as such
definitely does not cease in the vast
arena which is container of
perpetuity, although it is
necessitated in the narrow strait of
the horizon of time. It is evident
then that between the occurrences in
those parts and in those boundaries,
insofar as they are occurrences in
them, there is a continuity in
realization with respect to
occurrence in the spacious
container of perpetuity,[276] even
though some of them are elapsing
and others are being renewed with
respect to their occurrence in the
narrow strait of the horizon of time.
Furthermore, the intersection (qaṭ‘)
of any part which is postulated in a
distance is never removed in
actuality from the particular time it
is in. In like manner, the arrival
(muwāfāt) of any boundary which
is abstracted from it [the distance]
is not cancelled in actuality, insofar
as it is actual, in its particular now
at all. These intersections and these
arrivals are in the container of the
real world, and without a doubt real
continuity is required in the
container of the real world between
the hypothetical intersections
belonging to the hypothetical parts
in the distance. The same is true by
natural necessity between the
hypothetical arrivals in relation to
the postulated boundaries, although
that continuity, in terms of
conjunction (ijtimā‘), is not in any
of the boundaries belonging to the
horizon of the extension of time. Let
it be known.
 By a third demonstrative
way, is it not so that if the
correspondence of medial motion
and the flowing now to any of the
quantities occurring between the
hypothetical boundaries is
completely unreasonable, for it is
the moving object with respect to
this, it will always be in every now
of the hypothetical nows in the time
of motion in correspondence with
[211] a boundary of those
boundaries? Therefore, it is
certainly not possible for the
moving object in medial motion and
the flowing now to have the arrival
of a certain quantity between two
boundaries of those hypothetical
boundaries. Rather it only has, from
that respect, in every now in its
particularity, the arrival of a
particular indivisible boundary,
which is utterly unquantifiable. For
this reason, if it has nothing else in
existence except medial motion and
the flowing now, it is inconceivable
for it, with respect to existence in
the external world, to have anything
but the arrival of boundaries
without the arrival of any
continuous quantities between them,
as a result of which it would
certainly be necessary for it to leap,
as long as it is moving, an infinite
number of leaps in accordance with
the hypothetical quantities between
those infinite boundaries, so that the
arrival of those boundaries would
be possible for it. Thus it would
leap over all the quantities in their
entirety, and all of the boundaries in
their entirety would be encountered.
This is the real supreme leap. But
there is nothing more offensive and
atrocious than the common lesser
leap which some of the riffraff
among the meddlers took upon
themselves to allow and burdened
themselves with its perpetration.
[277]
It has now been
demonstrated in these clear ways
that the moving object must traverse
continuous, existent distance, and it
obtains its arrivals in the external
world by means of a real
continuous terminal motion
corresponding to that continuous
distance which the motion is in and
to the extended time by which it is
quantified and measured. It [the
motion] exists in it [time] with
respect to its quantifiable
continuous entity by means of
correspondence to it. Therefore, the
existence of extended time is
necessary as the container of its
[motion’s] existence and the vessel
of its occurrence in the real world
in the domain of perpetuity. It is
clear from this that the domain of
perpetuity is the container of the
existence of extended time. Let it be
pondered.

Wamīḍ [6.12.3]
Do not reckon any among
the chiefs of the philosophers, their
teachers, and their erudite pupils to
be a denier of the existence of
extended time in its continuous
essence, from its pre-eternity until
its post eternity, in the core (kabd)
of the objective world and the
center (ḥāqq) of concrete reality in
the middle (matn) of the container
of its existence which is perpetuity,
nor of the existence of all
continuous terminal motions in the
vessel of the real world in the
container of their existence, which
is extended continuous time existent
in perpetuity. Only a small group
[212] of imitators, whose limited
perceptions have caused them to
wander in the dark wastes of
accumulated perplexity, have
strayed from the straight path.
Methinks a few short words and
phrases by his student in the Taḥṣīl
have suffered them to restrict
existence in the external world to
the flowing now and medial motion.
In al-Ufuq al-Mubīn and al-Ṣirāṭ
al-Mustaqīm, we have thoroughly
investigated this question, leaving
neither room for any doubt nor a
seat for idle fancy, and there is no
need for us to repeat our discourse
on that again. We suffice ourselves
here to relating a small part of the
discourse of the Chief.
In solution of the doubts
posed regarding time, he states in
Chapter Thirteen, Book Two, of the
Physics of the Shifā’:
As for time and what is said
about its destruction and that it
has no existence, this is based
upon the fact that it has no
existence in the now. There is a
difference between saying “It
has no existence absolutely” and
saying “It has no actual
existence in a now.” We admit
and affirm that actual existence
(wujūd al-muḥaṣṣal) does not
belong to time in this mode,
except in the soul and in
estimation. As for absolute
existence, which is contrary to
absolute non-existence, this
holds true of it, for if it does not
hold true of it, its negation will
be true. It would then be true for
us to say that between the two
ends of a distance there is no
possible magnitude belonging to
a motion with a determined
speed capable of traversing it.
But if this negation is false, and
the motion with that determined
speed has a magnitude by which
it is able to traverse this
distance, and it is possible for it
to traverse other distances by
being slower or faster, as we
have already explained, then the
affirmation which is contrary to
it is true, which is that the
magnitude for this possibility
exists. Now an affirmation
signifies the existence of
something absolutely, although it
does not signify its existence as
actualized in a now or in a
certain respect. This existence
does not belong to it by reason
of estimation, for even if it is
not estimated, this mode of
existence and this mode of truth
are obtained.
Nevertheless, it is
necessary to know that among
existing things there are those
whose existence is realized and
actual, and among them there
are those whose existence is
weaker. Time seems to be
weaker than motion in
existence. It is akin to things
which exist in relation to other
things, even though time as such
is not an object of relation,
rather relation may require it.
Inasmuch as the distance is
existent and the boundaries
[213] of distance are existent,
then that thing which by its
nature is upon it and
corresponds to it, or traverses
it, or measures its traversal, has
a mode of existence, so that if it
is said that it definitely has no
existence, this is false. But if it
is desired to make an existence
for time, not according to this
way, but through actualization
(taḥṣīl), it will only be in
estimation. Therefore, the
premise used, namely, that time
has no positive existence,
meaning no existence in a
solitary now, is admissible. We
do not say it is impossible for it
to have existence, but not in a
now. Rather, its existence is by
means of continuous generation,
such that between any two nows
which you postulate, the thing
which is time is between them,
though it is definitely not in any
solitary now.
In brief, their question
that if time exists, it either exists
in a now or in another time; or
their question about when it
exists—all of this is
unnecessary to become
preoccupied with, for time
exists neither in a now nor in
another time, and it has no
when. Rather, it exists
absolutely. It is time itself, so
how can it exist in another time?
Therefore, their statement that
time is either non-existent, or its
existence is in a now, or its
existence persists in a particular
time, is not plausible. Indeed,
the opposite of our statement “it
does not exist” is not “it exists
in a now” or “it exists persisting
in a particular time”; rather, [the
opposite is] time exists, but not
in either of the two modes of
existence [i.e., the mental or the
concrete], for it is neither in a
now nor does it persist during a
particular time. This is no
different than someone saying
either “place is existent in
another place,” or “in a
boundary of a place,” or “it is
non-existent.” This is because it
is not necessary for it either to
exist in another place, or in a
boundary of a place, or to be
 non-existent; rather there are (1)
things which do not exist at all
in a place and (2) those which
do not exist at all in time or the
now. Place itself belongs to the
first category, and time itself
belongs to the second category.
You will henceforth be
informed.
He states in Chapter Two,
Book Four, of the Categories of the
Shifā’, on the division of quantity
into that whose parts have a
position and into that which does
not have a position:
It might be said that a moving
body has no position. But if the
speaker means by this that it has
no position, the position which
belongs to the category, it may
be that he presumes that to be
true, but it is not so. There is a
difference between it not having
a position and it not having a
fixed position, just as there is a
difference between [214] it not
having a place and it not having
a fixed place. Just as motion,
strictly speaking, does not
remove body from having a
place, although it does remove
it from having a fixed place, in
like manner, the state of motion
in relation to position does not
 remove the body from having a
position, although it does
remove it from having a fixed
position.
Just as this passage makes
it clear that the existence of
continuous motion pertains to
existence in the extension of time,
not by means of fixity, it also makes
it clear that the moving object
during the time of motion has an
unfixed temporal instance,
belonging to the category to which
motion belongs, corresponding to
extended time and continuous
motion. The explanation for this can
be found in al-Ufuq al-Mubīn.
 Wamīḍ [6.12.4]
Methinks you are now
ready to maintain that the whole of
time and motion is unfixed in
essence and existence with respect
to the realm of temporal extension,
which is the horizon of the
existence of changing things as
such, while it is fixed in essence
and existence with respect to
occurrence in the container of
changeless existences created after
real non-existence, which is
perpetuity.
If you remain unclear in
your understanding of this subject,
after what you have already learned
and stored away, consider the
question of the extension of
continuous body, for it is accounted
as fixed in essence and existence
insofar as its parts are joined
together with respect to occurrence
in the container of the changeless,
as a result of which they exist
together in the domain of perpetuity.
The same applies with respect to
occurrence in the horizon of time,
as a result of which they occur
together in a single now and in a
single time. Therefore, it is
possible to postulate the occurrence
of the body as such in time,[278]
even if they [the parts] are not
joined together in terms of the
relation of their existence to the
extension of the spatial container,
because it is possible for them to be
united in a solitary boundary of the
boundaries of place. If the parts of
the spatial body could be conscious
of themselves and perceptive of
their places, they would consider
their places to be unfixed in essence
due to their being non-conjoined
with respect to occurrence in the
realm of spatial extension, which is
the container of all spatial things,
due to the fact that the parts of place
(or space makān) are not joined
together in realization in a solitary
boundary, even though they are
fixed in essence and occurrence
with respect to existence in the
domain of perpetuity and true [215]
actual reality, and with respect to
occurrence in the realm of the
extension of time, which is the
horizon of the existence of all
temporal things, by hypothesis and
postulation. I mean, if the
occurrence of a fixed, immutable
spatial extension in time is
postulated to be correct, there
would be no deviation in that due to
the difference of the conditions and
the attributes by the difference of
the worlds and the realms. Thus, the
non-fixity of the essence is due to
the negation of spatial simultaneity,
and the fixity of the essence is due
to the affirmation of actual
perpetual, unquantifiable
simultaneity and temporal
simultaneity incorporated in the
genus of quantification non-
quantification by hypothesis and
postulation. In other words, if the
existence of the substance of the
body itself as such is possible in
time, and if the question of place
and spatial things is according to
this path, then in the same manner
the unfixed temporal things in the
extension of the horizon of time
occur in a fixed mode in the domain
of the container of changeless
existence which is perpetuity, and
there is no deviation. The form of
the proposition has varied with
respect to the difference of the two
realms. Therefore, non-fixity of
essence and existence are due to the
negation of temporal, quantifiable
simultaneity, and fixity of essence in
existence is due to the affirmation
of unquantifiable, perpetual
simultaneity. Let it be considered
carefully.

Wamīḍ [6.12.5]
 Perchance it is clear to you
that just as the flowing now and
medial motion necessitate the
existence of extended time and
continuous motion in the real world,
in the same manner—insofar as they
have in the real world constant
realization of the flowing essence
and difference of unfixed relation to
the possible hypothetical
boundaries—they necessitate the
impression of a continuous state and
the extended magnitude of motion
and time in the tablets of minds,
such as in retentive faculties and
impressible souls. That which is
impressed from each of these two in
the mind is the fixed essence due to
persistence (baqā’) in the tablet of
the mind. As for the incidence
(ḥudūth) of the impression in it, it
occurs gradually during the sum of
the time the fixed essence is existent
in the real world to which that
mental impression corresponds.
Therefore, the hypothetical parts in
the extended impression succeed
each other in the impression in the
manner in which hypothetical parts
succeed each other in a straight line
impressed in the tablet of the
common sense by a falling drop, or
in a revolving circle impressed in it
by a rotating flame. Thus they occur
in it as a simultaneous whole due to
persisting after incidence in
contrast to the manner of occurrence
in the real world. Nothing of that
impression is impressed in any now
which is assumed, [216] since
every part of it is a quantifiable
entity or a continuous state, in short,
a time or a motion, so how can it
correspond to the now? It is only
possible for the divider of that
extended impression, which is also
a now, or for one of the boundaries
of continuous motion, to correspond
to the now.

Wamīḍ [6.12.6]
 The non-conjunction (or:
non-simultaneity ‘adam ijtimā‘) of
the parts pertains to incidence
(ḥudūth) only without applying to
persistence (baqā’) also. This does
not require of something,
accordingly, that it be said of it that
it is unfixed in essence. Are not
fixed magnitudes, like mathematical
corporeality in quantitative
motions, as with growth, i.e., real
expansion (takhalkhul),[279]
increased gradually during
incidence? This does not discredit
their being fixed in essence as an
aggregate (mujtama‘a) of parts in
existence due to their being the
stages of accretions united together
by virtue of persistence. Therefore,
it is not correct for the impression
of extended time and continuous
motion in the tablet of the mind,
insofar as it is gradual in incidence,
despite its being fixed persistently
in the mind, to be considered among
those things which are definitely not
fixed in essence, for its hypothetical
parts are successive with respect to
the incidence of the impression in
the retentive imagination, which is
the mode of their existence in the
mind. But once they are impressed,
then they remain existing there
simultaneously due to persistence,
as with the stages of fixed
accretions in quantitative motion.
Therefore, the only basis for
extended time and continuous
motion being unfixed in essence,
with respect to the essence itself,
and for the flowing now and medial
motion being unfixed in occurrence,
not with respect to the essence
itself, but with respect to their
unfixed concomitant relation to the
hypothetical boundaries, is concrete
existence in the real world by way
of non-fixity, due to incidence and
persistence in the horizon of
elapsing and renewal, no other. Let
it be ascertained.
 Wamīḍ [6.12.7]
Methinks it is therefore
known by existential necessity that
the state of the moving object in
sense experience is surely identical
to the continuous unfixed state
called “terminal motion” and an
unfixed quantity called “extended
time.” However, medial motion and
the flowing now are only verified
through investigation by inquiry and
demonstration. For they only mark
continuous motion and extended
time insofar as they [i.e. medial
motion and the flowing now] are
existent in the real world, constant
in essence and unfixed in their
relation [217] to the hypothetical
boundaries of distance, not insofar
as they are apprehended in this
respect, as might occur to some
estimative faculties. This is like the
impression (rasm) of a falling drop
and a rapidly circling point as a
straight extension and a circular
line in the common sense. Is it not
clearly observed that when it is
impressed in the tablet of the
[common] sense, it is a straight line
and a circular line? But the marker
of these two is a falling drop and a
circling point with respect to
existence in the real world,
notwithstanding the exchange of
places, wheres, paths, and positions
during continuous gradual
progression. Therefore, only
continuous motion and extended
time are apprehended while they
are impressed in the retentive
imagination, yet the marker is two
simple things which exist in the real
world. This question has now been
thoroughly examined.

Wamīḍ [6.12.8]
Surely you are aware
through what has been clarified and
explained to you that just as each of
these two markers is the cause of
the impression of something
continuous and extended in the
baser faculties of the imagination,
in like manner, they are the cause of
impression in the tablets of the
souls of the spheres as well.
Consequently, extended time in the
whole of its continuous extension is
impressed in them in actuality,[280]
as well as the motion which
regulates the day, which is its
substrate, in the whole of its
continuous, non-discrete state due
to the existence of their two
markers in the real world. This
theme is clear.
 Wamīḍ [6.12.9]
Are you not now at the
appointed time in the composition
of the demonstration of the creation
of the world in its well-ordered
system called the “Great Man”? Is
it not evident to everyone who has a
share of the provision of learning
and a portion of intellectual
discernment that the true Creator
(exalted be His sovereignty) is
apart from the two worlds of time
and space? He is eternally prior in
existence to the specified part
occurring in extended time, like this
day, for instance. In like manner, He
is eternally prior in existence to its
substrate which corresponds to it,
like this rotating motion which
continuously regulates the day. It
has been demonstrated to you that
the parts of one continuous thing are
existent all together with the same
individual existence which is itself
the existence of the whole of that
one continuous thing. [218]
It is therefore unavoidably
clear by logical necessity that that
individual existence—which is the
existence of the whole of extended
time and the existence of its parts,
and similarly the individual
existence which is the existence of
the whole of continuous motion,
which is the substrate of time, and
the existence of its parts—is
posterior in existence in perpetuity,
with a real, perpetual, separate
posteriority, to the existence of the
true Creator (glorified be He) in
eternity, Who is prior to it with an
absolute, isolated, real, and eternal
priority. In the composition of the
demonstration, it is equal whether
you take this in relation to the
extension of extended continuous
time and the continuity of
continuous terminal motion
belonging to the substance of an
entity in the domain of the real
world, or with respect to the tablet
of the mind of the soul of the
sphere, or you consider it in
relation to the extension of the
flowing now and the continuity of
medial motion with respect to their
quantifiable, continuous, unfixed,
concomitant relation to the
hypothetical boundaries.
It is therefore established
that the circular motion which is the
substrate of time—which is the
most prior and most evident of the
motions and none other than the
motion of the outermost sphere
which confines the directions—is
created in essence and preceded in
existence by real non-existence in
perpetuity. The same applies to its
measure, time, which inheres in it.
It follows from this that there is a
subject for that motion, and it is the
supreme body which confines the
directions, which is also created
and existent in perpetuity following
perpetual real non-existence.
Otherwise, it would be necessary
for it to be existent first in the real
world devoid of both motion and
rest, since rest is also impossible
without time, and then clothed in
motion later upon the creation of
motion. But this is absurd and
groundless. The rules and
principles of philosophy render this
impossible.
Inasmuch as the creation of
the body confining the directions is
established, and the creation of its
continuous circular motion, which
is itself the substrate of time, the
affirmation of the creation of the
other bodies and motions in their
entirety is certainly established as
well, for the circular motion, which
is faster and more evident than any
particular motion, is not dependent
in existence upon the other motions,
but they are dependent upon it.
Hence, without a doubt it
necessarily precedes the other
motions, so that their existence is
possible. The subject of this motion
is similarly related to [219] the
subjects of the other motions. If a
circular motion did not belong to
the body which confines the
directions, no directions would
apply to the linear extensions and it
would be impossible for natural
linear motions to occur in them.
Compelled motion would be
impossible as well, since the
compelled is the opposite of the
natural. Thus, where there is no
natural [motion], there is no
compelled [motion] either.
Therefore, the motion of a
particular body by itself, as long as
the directions are not confined and
the measure of the motions does not
occur, in short, as long as the world
of bodies is not constituted, is
impossible, even if there is no
evidence of the impossibility. The
impossibility of most absurdities is
not self-evident, for this only
becomes clear through inquiry and
demonstration. The estimative
faculty does not deny that there is a
time which is delimited along with
linear extension and linear motion,
even if a circular body and a
circular motion are not in existence.
However, contemplating something
which is possible in existence is not
the same as contemplating
something which the estimative
faculty considers to be possible in
existence, even when its existence
in itself is impossible. Our
companion in leadership has
affirmed this also in the Shifā’ in
imitation of the Giver of the Craft in
the First Discipline.

Wamīḍ [6.12.10]
Is not the body of the
outermost sphere and the girdle of
the regulator of the day in relation
to the body of the Great Man, which
is the entire universe in its
individual harmonious system, in
the station of the crown of the head
and the pia mater in relation to the
body of the Lesser World, which is
the material temple of the species of
man? This is what the Giver of the
Craft, Aristotle, has stated. And is
not the sun and its universal sphere,
with the particular spheres it
contains, in the station of the heart
and its cavity, the chest and its
bones? Consequently, if the creation
of the head, the brain, the chest, and
the heart is established, the creation
of the other organs and the whole
body is definitely established as
well. Let it be pondered.
 Wamīḍ [6.12.11]
Is it not clear to you from what
has preceded that in parallel with
each mode of priority and
posteriority there is a mode of
simultaneity, and that causal priority
is connected to posteriority in
being-an-effect?[281] The question
is difficult with respect to the
simultaneity which is parallel to
them, because it is not possible for
one effect, insofar as it is one, to
have two complete causes, either by
way of conjunction (ijtimā‘) or by
way of succession and alternation.
The same applies to subsequent
succession and initial alternation,
as was demonstrated in the book al-
Taqdīsāt and other books. Causal
simultaneity, therefore, [in this
sense] is not possible, [220]
because it is not possible for two
simultaneously causal things to be
in the same stage with respect to the
same thing which is posterior to
them in being-an-effect.
Furthermore, it is not possible
for a solitary complete cause,
insofar as it is one, to have two
effects, since it is not in the nature
of the many to emanate
simultaneously from a single
complete cause through all the
circumstantial modes. We will
recite the proof of this to you, if
God, the Almighty, the All-
Knowing, wills it. Consequently,
simultaneity in being-an-effect is
also not possible, because it is not
possible for two things
simultaneous in being-an-effect to
be in the same stage posterior to a
single thing which precedes them as
their cause. Therefore, the way by
which this simultaneity is made
possible is to consider two
simultaneous aspects in one stage,
insofar as they are such, as two
causes in that stage connected to
two effects in another stage. These
two aspects are thus simultaneous
in causality in relation to the two
things simultaneous in being-an-
effect. Inseparability (talāzum)
between two things, insofar as they
are two effects in one stage, is
established thereby.
Let it be known that when
the First Emanated (al-ṣādir al-
awwal), which is said to be the
primary foundation consisting of the
world of Command, emanated from
the Creator, who is the real One in
every respect (exalted be His
sovereignty), there was in the First
Emanated a conjunction of certain
interdependent circumstantial
modes[282]: essential possibility,
necessity through another, quiddity,
existence, intellection of the
substance of [its own] essence, and
intellection of the essence of the
principle of effusion, the Creator,
the Real (glorified be He). On
account of these circumstantial
modes, multiple aspects are
obtained in the essence of the
Originator, the real One (exalted be
His remembrance). If these aspects
are made qualifying circumstantial
modes, the complete agent is one in
essence and multiple in qualifying
aspects which augment the essence
of the subject. Consequently, He
(exalted be His sovereignty) is the
Agent and the Originator of the
quiddity of the First Intelligence,
which is essentially possible;[283]
He is the Maker of the existence of
the First Intelligence, which is the
necessary through another; and He
is the Emanator of the substance of
the essence of the First Intelligence,
which is the contemplator of the
substance of its essence and the
contemplator of the essence of its
Agent. In this way the dependency
of many simultaneously upon the
real One (glorified be He) is made
possible, due to multiple
interdependent circumstantial
modes in a single stage.
Consequently, simultaneity in being-
an-effect in a single stage belongs
to the substance of the second
intellect, the body of the supreme
sphere, and the substance of first
soul connected to the body of that
sphere, in relation to the true agent.
And simultaneity in causality in a
single stage belongs to the one agent
[221] by virtue of multiple
qualifying aspects in relation to
those substances dependent upon it
in a single stage. Without any doubt,
inseparability (talāzum) between
these effects in this respect is
certainly confirmed. This is the path
of the way of the intellect and the
road which is course of wisdom,
upon which the ranks of the intuitive
philosophers and the discursive
philosophers tread.
Since this is settled, it is
evident that if the creation of the
body of the outermost sphere,
indeed, the creation of the entire
world of [the physical] creation
(‘alām al-khalq), is established,
then the creation of that which is
with it in the stage of being-an-
effect from the world of Command
is established. Indeed, the creation
of the world of Command (‘alām
al-amr) is also established, with its
natures and its essences, and the
congregations of its substances and
its lights in their entirety, due to the
impossibility of the categorization
of the simple originated things and
the purely separate things, which
are sanctified from attachment to the
dispositions of prime matter and the
impediments of the world of
corporeal nature, by both creation
and eternity.

Wamīḍ [6.12.12]
In short, the purely
perpetual things among the
changeless realities are exalted in
every respect above occurrence in
the extension of the world of
time[284]—especially the
substantial simples among the
mutually embracing, active, primary
originated things in the order of the
chain of beginning, and especially
the realities of the divine Command
among the intelligible substances
and the sanctified separate realities
in the bosom of the world of
Command—due to their entities
being contained together in mutual
embrace in the world of primary
origination and their existences
being free from subjection to
dispositional possibility. Without a
doubt the only prerequisite for their
being made in perpetuity by the
agent Creator and their actual
emanation via the fashioning of the
omniscient Emanating Being is the
characteristic of essential
possibility, no other. Nothing
impedes them from receiving the
outpouring [of creation] and
entering into the world of
actualization except lack of
essential possibility and lack of
worthiness for fashioning. It is
inconceivable, therefore, for some
of the primary originated things, in
other words, the essences which are
not dependent for existence upon
dispositional possibility, to be
actually included in primary
origination before others or for any
of them to be obstructed from being
originated by the true Maker in
perpetuity for an eternal duration,
for by reason of the capacity of the
nature of essential possibility, they
merit this.
Since the demonstration
decrees with the decree of the clear
intellect that some of the things
which admit of [222] having the
nature of essential possibility alone
—like the substance of the body of
the supreme sphere which confines
the directions, its continuous
circular motion, its measure which
is time, the first soul connected to
it, and the second intellect which is
with it in the stage of being made,
for instance—are created in
essence in perpetuity through the
creation of their perpetual existence
following real non-existence, not in
time or in place, it is undoubtedly
clear that the nature of essential
possibility only has the capacity to
receive existence in perpetuity after
real non-existence. It is evident
from this, therefore, that whatever
has the characteristic of essential
possibility is definitely called into
existence after real non-existence.
The proof of the creation
of the macrocosm, called the Great
Man, is therefore evident by way of
deductive demonstration (burhān
limmī)[285] by this path also.
Praise be to God who has guided us
to this! We would not have been
guided had God not guided us.
Praise be to God, the Lord of all the
worlds! May God bless our Master
and our Prophet, Muḥammad, and
his family, the pure ones.

Wamīḍ [6.12.13]
It is very astonishing, and it
happens very rarely, that the two
leaders of the Greek philosophers,
the divine Plato and the teacher
Aristotle, both departed from one of
the logical principles of philosophy
and deviated, in two fundamental
areas of metaphysics, from the
straight path. As for the principle
from whose remembrance and
observance they turned aside, it is
that the parts of one existent,
continuous, extended thing are
neither purely non-existents nor are
they existents distinct from each
other in existence. Rather, they are
existent with a single individual
existence which is itself the
existence of the individually one,
continuous whole. Plato neglected
to consider this principle with
respect to the fixed, continuous,
extended thing, and he supposed its
persistence (baqā’) to be through
the two forms of continuity and
discontinuity in its individual
existence. Thus he deviated from
the road of truth and obliged
himself to deny the existence of
prime matter.[286] Aristotle failed
to awaken his judgment on the
unfixed, continuous, extended thing,
as a consequence of which he
deviated from the path and strayed
into the wilderness of dividing the
world with respect to the generated
and the primary originated into
creation and eternity respectively.
He held, moreover, that the parts of
time, like yesterday, today, and
tomorrow, for instance, are
posterior in existence to the true
Maker (glorified be He) [223] with
a real, perpetual, separate
posteriority, but he did not hold this
with respect to the whole of
extended time itself. He only
allowed its essential posteriority to
Him in the intelligible order, not a
separate posteriority in existence.
In short, this principle is a
fundamental constituent of the
demonstration for the existence of
prime matter and the creation of the
world. It was overlooked by the
two leaders of philosophy, obliging
one of them to deny prime matter
and compelling the other [to
advocate] the eternity of the world.
Let it be known.

Wamīḍ [6.12.14]
Let us now tread upon the
path of inquiry by another way. Is
not that which has been established
upon its seat settled for you,
namely, that among possible things
is (1) that whose basis of suitability
for receiving the outpouring [of
creation] is the characteristic of its
essential possibility, and (2) that
whose basis of worth for the
emanation is no other than
dispositional possibility. That
which is subject to dispositional
possibility is not receptive of
entification for pre-eternity of
existence in perpetuity; rather it is
necessary for it, with respect to the
root of its essence, to be such that it
does not enter into existence at all
except after privation. Therefore, if
it enters into existence, three things
apply to it in mental consideration:
(1) a prior privation, (2) a
subsequent existence, and (3) a
concomitant attribute belonging to
this existence, which is its only
being actual after privation. The
generated existence (al-wujūd al-
ḥādith) is through the fashioning
(ṣun‘) of the Agent. The prior
privation is due to the lack of
coming together of the
preconditions of the fashioning and
the absence of any of the conditions
anticipated for being made. The
attribute of this existence, which is
its being definitely after the
privation, belongs to the very
reality of this existent and the root
of its essence, since the nature of its
substance does not have the
capacity to merit entering into
existence except after privation and
through the fashioning of its agent in
this regard. Nay, within the
boundary of itself, it is subject to
dispositional possibility. The
disposition is contained within it,
not the actual occurrence of that for
which the disposition exists, but
certainly the potential for it.
It is consequently evident
that what is subject to dispositional
possibility is its actual existence
through the definite nullification of
its non-existence contrary to its
existence in the domain of the real
world. It is certainly not possible,
then, for it to have a pre-eternal
existence in perpetuity by necessity.
In short, it is clear to the mind that
if an existent created in essence
through dispositional possibility
enters into existence, its non-
existence contrary to its existence is
nullified. Thus [224] its entrance
into being is through the negation of
its non-being in actuality. There is
no doubt, however, that its prior
temporal non-existence is not
negated by its existence posterior to
it in time due to the necessary lack
of opposition between these two. It
is consequently established that
existents are created in essence
(ḥādith al-dhāt) in the real world
and have a beginning of existence
after real non-existence in
perpetuity. Perpetual creation is
certainly established as well.

Wamīḍ [6.12.15]
Do you remember from
that which we have set forth to you
several times that the distinction
between the generated and the
primary originated pertains to the
opinion of those who divide these
into two. It is that the existence of
the generated is after its non-
existence contrary to its existence in
the real world. Thus its non-being
in the real world cannot be
combined whatsoever with its being
in the real world. Instead, its being
in the real world is only possible
through the negation of its non-
being, and its existence is only
possible through the nullification of
its non-existence, since non-
existence and existence in the real
world are definitely contradictory
to each other. This is in contrast to
how it is with the primary
originated, [according to Ibn Sīnā,]
since its existence in the real world
by the agency of its Originator is
after its absolute non-existence with
respect to the substance of itself as
such, since it is an actual existence
in the real world through the
requirement of the efficient cause.
Thus it is an actual existence after
absolute non-existence with an
essential posteriority in the
intelligible order, not that it
generated after non-being contrary
to being with a real, separate
posteriority in the real world.
Consequently, [they say] the
primary originated is pre-eternal
(azalī) and the generated is
certainly temporal (ḥādith).
They say that privation,
namely non-being, in the real world
is one of the accidental principles
for the generation of the generated
in the real world.
The Giver of the Craft and
its teacher states “The privation
which is one of the three
fundamentals that are the principles
of generation is a privation which is
not in time and not in place.”[287]
Our companion says in the
Physics of the Najāt: “It is certain
that whatever is after it was not is
through a privation which preceded
it, because that which privation
does not precede is pre-eternal
(azalī).” Then he says: “Privation
being a principle is due to the fact
that it unavoidably belongs to the
generated insofar as it is generated.
But it has a way out from the
generated, because it is a principle
accidentally. This is because the
generated exists through its
removal, not through its existence.”
[225]
And he states in the Shifā’
in Chapter Two, Book One, of the
Physics:
It may be said that something is
from (‘an) prime matter and
from privation, but it may not be
said that it is from form.[288]
For it may be said that a bed is
from prime matter, that is to say,
from the wood, and it may be
said it is from a non-bed. In
many situations it is possible to
say it is from prime matter, and
in many of them it is not
possible, but it is always
possible to say it is from a
privation. It may not be said that
a writer is from the man, but it
may be said that the man is a
writer. It may be said, however,
that a man is from the embryo,
and it may be said a bed is from
wood. The cause pertains to
this. As for the embryo, because
it puts off the form of the
embryo, the term “from,” in this
case, points to the meaning of
“after,” as with their saying: It
is from privation [meaning
“after privation”]. It may
likewise be said a man is from
 non-man, in other words, after
non-man.
You have ascertained more
than once that it cannot be said of
the temporal non-existence
temporally preceding the existence
of the generated thing that by its
removal the existence of the
generated thing will exist, for it is
definitely not removed within its
own boundary and from its
particular time. Otherwise, the two
contradictories would coexist. But
it can never be realized within the
boundary of existence and its time,
as a result of which it would need
to be removed from it. Temporal
non-existence in a prior time,
therefore, is not contradictory to the
existence of the generated thing
created in a later time. Hence, it is
not possible to say: Through the
removal of this non-existence
existence exists, except with
respect to perpetual real non-
existence alone, with which
creation in perpetuity corresponds.
It is therefore evident that the
existence subject to dispositional
possibility, whose being cannot
exist except through the removal of
its non-being in the real world,
certainly requires that it be created
in perpetuity. Let it be pondered.
 Wamīḍ [6.12.16]
Have we not already recited to
you in what has preceded that
temporal creation—which is the
existence of something being
preceded by its continuous,
extended non-existence before the
time of existence at the moment of
creation—only refers to the
particularization of existence to a
definite time cut off from the
direction of the beginning at a
particular now, which is the border
of that time, or by a particular
indivisible boundary among the
boundaries of time, which are the
nows. Temporal non-existence in a
prior time is not contrary to
existence created in a time or a now
following afterwards due to the
difference of the two distinct
boundaries. Consequently, that non-
existence which is not contradictory
to this existence, insofar as it is that
non-existence, does not preclude
[226] this existence created in time
from being preceded in perpetuity
by a perpetual, atemporal real non-
existence or from not being
preceded by it. It also does not
require any of this.
It is manifestly known that
dispositional possibility as such is
a necessary accompaniment of
motion and time. Its only requisite
is the actual non-occurrence of that
for which the disposition exists
during the time of the occurrence of
the disposition. The precedence of
the potential to the actual,
accordingly, is a quantifiable
precedence in time. However, this
alone does not render it impossible
that the disposition, the matter that
bears it, and that for which the
disposition exists, all may exist
together in perpetuity with a
perpetual simultaneity. The priority
of matter and its disposition to that
for which it is disposed, with
respect to occurrence in perpetuity,
is a natural priority [like the
priority of the number two over
three, for example], not a perpetual
real priority [like that of a cause
over its effect, for example].
Hence, dispositional
possibility as such, in relation to the
existence of that for which it is a
disposition, is neither contrary to its
perpetual creation nor does it
require it. Therefore, we say: but
for the fact that the nature of
essential possibility itself precludes
pre-eternal existence in perpetuity,
nothing would remain to that for
which the disposition exists except
essential creation, by virtue of the
nature of possibility, and temporal
creation, due to dispositional
possibility, and no more than these
two. In that case, the thing generated
via dispositional possibility would
combine within itself temporal
creation and perpetual pre-eternity.
[289] No one, however, will rush
into permitting this, except one who
has forsaken his rational nature and
rejected his common sense.

Wamīḍ [6.12.17]
The composition of the
course of the demonstration of the
creation of the universal system in
its comprehensive, harmonious
being—which is the totality of the
perfectly-ordered, harmonious
Great World, characterized as the
“Great Man,” in its individual
oneness—is now completed by
means of reasoning from the causes
(limm) in this way also.[290] For it
is clear that perpetual creation is
solidly established for the temporal
creatures whose generation is
preceded by dispositional
possibility. The foundation of this
affirmation and the basis of the
necessity of real non-existence
preceding their existence in
perpetuity is the nature of essential
possibility, which has no capacity
to receive pre-eternity.
Consequently, the decree of
perpetual creation applies to
whatever falls under the nature of
possibility, due to the sway of real
non-existence perpetually preceding
it in perpetuity. In like manner, the
decree of essential creation is
applicable to it also, due to [227]
the sway of [absolute] non-
existence preceding it essentially in
the stage of the essence, as is
evident.
By the leave of God, we
have fully investigated the doctrine
by means of this way, and there is
no stage above it in the book al-
Īmāḍāt wa’l-Tashrīqāt. It is
therefore clear to everyone who
reflects, who seeks the illumination
of his insight, that there are five
ways[291] which support the
demonstration by means of
reasoning from the causes. The
preparation is now completed for
raising the manifest proof. The path
to this exalted theme until our time
has been according to the practice
of speculative science. But my Lord
(exalted be His remembrance)
confides extraordinary things to me.
Therefore, all of it is through a holy
and heavenly power, not by a human
reflective nature.

Wamīḍ [6.12.18]
Do not imagine that if
temporal non-existence as such was
not a non-existence in the real
world, the statement “Zayd is a non-
existent” in a particular time would
be true. He is not a non-existent in
the real world. Thus the qualified
(muqayyad) being true is required
with the negation of the absolute
(mutlaq). It is therefore clear to one
who reflects that the non-existence
of something in the real world is not
absolute in relation to its non-
existence in a particular time or in
all times, as we have already
explained [because it is a non-
existence qualified by time]. Is this
any different than saying: “Zayd is a
non-existent in himself” in relation
to “Zayd is a non-existent”; and
“Zayd is a non-existent in the real
world” in relation to “Zayd is a
non-existent in thought”? Let is be
perceived.

Wamīḍ [6.12.19]
Let us turn now to
explaining the finitude of extended
time with respect to the measure of
its extension, continuous motion
with respect to the magnitude of its
continuity, and discontinuous
quantity with respect to the degrees
of its numbers.[292] Have you not
heard that the people of truth among
the learned make the impossibility
of an actual infinity in the extension
of magnitude and in a series of
numbers conditional upon
conjunction (ijtimā‘) in the mode of
existence and succession (tarattub)
in the direction of infinity?[293] If
these two conditions are met, the
judgment of impossibility follows
in the course of the demonstration,
whether this be with respect to the
real world or in the mind, or
whether it is with respect to the
container of perpetuity or in the
horizon of time.
Have we not explained to
you that the existence of actual
extended time in the entirety of its
extension is in perpetuity? The
same applies to the existence of
actual continuous motion in its
complete continuity, and to the
existence of the units which succeed
one another [228] in time in the
entirety of their numbers. You are
aware also of the occurrence of all
of this with an impressed existence
in the tablets of the celestial minds
in actuality.
Understand, then, with the
faculty of discernment, that the
demonstrations raised to prove the
impossibility of an actual infinity,
whenever the two conditions are
met, support the judgment with
respect to the mode of concrete
fixed existence, changeless in
actuality, in the domain of
perpetuity and the mode of fixed
occurrence, by way of actual
impression, in the tablet of the
celestial mind. In short, the
demonstration by circumstantial
modes, the demonstration by the
intermediate and the extreme, the
demonstration by coincidence, the
demonstration by succession, and
the most sound, succinct
demonstration of the impossibility
of an actual infinity—with respect
to continuous, fixed, existent
quantity and with respect to
discontinuous quantity and its
subject belonging to conjoined,
successive existents, whether by
position, by nature, or by intellect,
or sequence of cause and effect,
with respect to priority and
posteriority by nature, or priority
and posteriority by quiddity, or
causal priority and posteriority in
being-an-effect—are certainly
applicable to the judgment about
extended time, continuous motion,
and conjoined stages in perpetuity
by the impossibility of infinity.
Consequently, it is impossible for
the measure of the extension of time
and the continuity of motion to
extend infinitely in the direction of
pre-eternity, or for the number of
creatures preceding each other to go
on indefinitely without a beginning.
[294] Let it be pondered.

Wamīḍ [6.12.20]
As for the demonstration
by circumstantial modes, it is that if
there are certain existent
circumstantial modes or numbers
ordered by nature, by quiddity, or
by causality; or certain existent
motions or times ordered by
boundaries and stages; or certain
existent distances or points ordered
by position, the pure intellect
judges that if what is between any
circumstantial mode [and another]
and between any unit [and another],
and what is between any boundary,
or between any now and another
now, and what is between any point
and another point, has no end, it
would be necessary to confine an
infinity between two restricting
limits of the sequence, and this is
something which is naturally
impossible. Consequently, if it is
between each one of these
sequential things, whichever of
them it may be, according to
exhaustive inclusion, it is only
possible for a finite quantity to
occur, since the whole is certainly
also a finite quantity. [229] It
should not be imagined that this is a
judgment about the summative
whole based upon what each one of
its units is judged by, for it may be
false, as when it is said: “Each one
of the parts of this quantity is less
than a cubit, so it also is less than a
cubit.” It may be that it is a cubit or
more. The judgment, in this case,
treats each of the sequential parts,
but it is false with respect to the
whole. Therefore, it is necessary to
understand that a summative
judgment about sequential things,
according to general exhaustion, is
such that it necessarily treats the
whole, as when it is said: “What is
between this point is the divider,
and whichever point exists or is
hypothesized in this magnitude is
less than a cubit, so this quantity is
less than a cubit.” If this judgment is
true, according to exhaustive
inclusion, then the quantity in its
entirety is less than a cubit. In the
same way, whenever it is correct,
according to exhaustive inclusion,
that from the starting point of a
certain series until whatever the
sequence reaches is less than forty
[cubits], then it is definitely correct
that the whole series is less than
forty [cubits]. Therefore, if it is
correct, according to exhaustive
inclusion, that from the beginning of
the series until whatever existence
reaches and to which the sequence
is confined is finite, then it is
correct by natural necessity that the
entire series is finite.
The general rule is that
exhaustive judgment includes each
and every one. If it is unreservedly
correct for all of the mensurations
of existence for each of the units,
whether in isolation from each other
or considered collectively, then it is
certainly applicable to the entire
sum as well. But if the condition of
isolation is specialized to each and
every part, the judgment of the
whole is unlike the judgment of the
units.
In regard to the
demonstration by the intermediate
and the extreme, we say in support
of its composition: Every effect or
boundary has within the boundary
of itself the characteristic of
intermediacy due to the fact that
apart from itself there is certainly
either a cause or another boundary,
which in relation to it is like the
extreme in relation to the
intermediate. I am not saying it has
this insofar as it is an effect
correlated to a cause, since the
situation in this regard is equality
with respect to both the cause and
the effect. Rather, I am saying that it
has this characteristic due to its
own caused essence, needy and
impoverished within the boundary
of its substance, in contrast to how
it is with the essence of the cause
itself. For if certain causes
belonging to certain effects increase
in sequence infinitely, or if certain
boundaries separated from each
other in existence in a series
increase without end, being-an-
effect and being-intermediate will
include all the units in the series in
their entirety, because each of them
is an effect of what is above it and
an intermediate in relation to it,
even if it is [230] a cause to what is
below it and an extreme in relation
to it. Consequently, they are one and
all considered to be units in
summative consideration due to the
fact that intermediacy definitely
embraces all of them. There is
nothing left but an infinite series of
intermediate things. Thus, as long as
an extreme which is not an
intermediary and a cause which is
not an effect is not determined (lam
yataqarrar), in which the
intermediate things and the effects
terminate, an alternative to the
necessity of the realization of
intermediacy without an end will
not be possible.[295]
In sum, as long as, in the
series of effects and causes, the
intermediary, like all that is above
the final effect, has the quality of the
extreme which is the beginning of
the series and is like the final effect
in the quality of intermediacy with
respect to the substance of the
caused essence, it is inconceivable
for there to be occurrence at all
except through an extreme which is
not an intermediary in its own
essence, sanctified from need,
being-an-effect, and intermediacy.
As for the demonstration
by correlation, we say: If a series
consisting of a certain effect and its
causes, or a certain preceded thing
and what precedes it, is increased
in sequence infinitely, there would
be in the final effect and the final
preceded thing a state of being-an-
effect by itself without any causality
and a state of being preceded by
itself without any priority, and in
each of the things above it [i.e., the
originally posited effect], there
would be both a causality and an
effectness, a priority and a
posteriority together. Consequently,
the effected things would be more
than the causal things by one, and
the preceded things would be more
than the prior things by one. But
natural reason says that one cause
corresponds to only one effect, and
one prior thing corresponds to only
one preceded thing [in a series].
Therefore, it is implied that a
certain effectness is in the series
which does not correspond to a
certain causality, and a certain
posteriority which does not
correspond to a certain priority at
all, since one of the two
correlatives is increased in number
over the other. But this is absurd
and impossible by natural necessity.
In regard to the
demonstration by succession, know
that it is necessary, without a doubt,
for every series of sequential
causes and effects to be such that if
one of the units is posited to be
absent, whatever is after that one
unit in the series must be absent as
well. Consequently, every actually
existent series, which a state of
sequential effectness encompasses,
must have a cause which is the first
cause, but for which all of the
subsequent stages, which are its
effects and the effects of its effects
until the end [231] of the sequence
and the end of the chain, would be
annihilated.[296] Otherwise, the
state of sequential effectness would
not encompass all the units of the
series. Were we to hypothesize a
series which does not ascend to a
certain cause which has no cause,
there would be, in this case, no first
cause, and without it the entire
series would be annihilated. This is
incompatible with the state of
being-an-effect that encompasses
the entire series. In short, the state
of being-an-effect sequentially
encompassing all of the units of the
series, such that none of them are
separated from it at all, despite the
postulation that there is not a single
cause for all of them without which
the entire series would be
annihilated, is a succession.
Therefore, one of the characteristics
of the state of being-an-effect
encompassing all the sequential
things is the necessity of a single
cause but for which none of the
units in the ordered series would
exist at all. This judgment is not
dependent upon the finitude of the
series or its infinity, and there is no
difference for it in the two forms at
all.[297] Let it be pondered.
As for the most sound and
succinct demonstration, it is that if
what belongs to any of the units
which succeed each other actually
toward infinity, unless it is like the
final one [i.e., the first cause], is
that it is not determined as long as
another unit before it is not
determined, then it is true of the
infinite units in their entirety that
they do not enter into determination
as long as another thing apart from
them is not determined before them.
Therefore, the natural disposition of
the clear intellect comprehends and
the judgment of the intelligent nature
decrees: How is something
determined in that series so that
another thing can be determined
after it?

Wamīḍ [6.12.21]
As for the method of
coincidence (taṭbīq),[298] its use
cannot be relied upon and there is
no support for its demonstration.
Indeed, it contains a misleading
deception. For infinities in one
direction may be different from
another direction, which is the side
of finiteness, not from the direction
which is the side of infinity, just as
the series of hundreds are without
end and the series of thousands
continue indefinitely. It is not
possible to move infinity in its
universalness from the direction of
infinity or to extract it in its
universalness from its degree, its
locus, and its station, or from the
degrees which belong to all of its
units in that direction. Therefore, if
the extreme of one of two infinite
series, different by more or less in
the direction of finiteness, is
hypothetically made to coincide
with the extreme of the other series,
[232] the increase belonging to the
locus of the extreme and its degree
will be transferred to the locus of
the intermediary and its degree, and
it will continue to be transferred to
and repeated in the intermediaries
as long as coincidence is
hypothetically applied. But a
substitution will never almost
culminate in a particular boundary
or a particular degree, nor will it
reach the farthest boundary and the
final degree. Whenever the
application of the estimative faculty
is interrupted and the work of
coincidence is cut off, difference
occurs by competition for that
boundary and that degree, and the
increased amount is established in
the seat of that stage. In short, the
difference never leads to the side of
infinity, but rather it always leads to
the side of finiteness, be it in the
boundary of the extreme or in any of
the boundaries of the
intermediaries. Let it be considered
carefully and not fumbled.

Wamīḍ [6.12.22]
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars states in the
Naqd al-Muḥaṣṣal:
The proof upon which the
majority of the Mutakallimūn
depend on the question of
creation requires proving the
impossibility of the existence of
creatures having no beginning in
the direction of the past. We
will recount first what is said
for and against this, and then we
will give our own opinion. The
ancient philosophers advocated
the necessity of the finitude of
past creatures. Since each one
of them is created, the totality is
also created. It was objected to
this that a judgment about the
whole may be contrary to a
judgment about the units. Then
they said: More and less apply
to past creatures; therefore, they
are finite and occur as objects
of God’s knowledge and of His
power.[299] [It was objected
that] the first is more than the
second, even though these two
are infinite.
Then the scholars among
them said: If the past creatures
are taken at one time beginning
from the present, for instance,
and going toward the past, and
at another time beginning before
this time from a year ago and
going toward the past, and if
one of these two [series] is
made to coincide with the other
in the imagination so that the
two beginnings are made one
and they are going toward the
past in correspondence,
equivalence between these two
is impossible. Otherwise, the
existence of the creatures
occurring in the time which is
between the present [and their
non-existence] and between the
previous year and their non-
existence would be the same.
But it is impossible for the
[series] beginning from the
previous year to be greater than
the [series] beginning from the
present, because that which is
less than two equivalent things
cannot be greater than either one
of them. Therefore, it is
necessary for the [series]
beginning from the previous
year in the direction of the past
to be less than the [series]
beginning from the present in
that direction. But this is only
possible through its finiteness
before the finiteness [233] of
the [series] beginning from the
present. The lesser is finite, and
what is more than it by a finite
amount is finite, so they are both
finite.
The opponent objected that
such a coincidence (taṭbīq) [of
two different series] only
occurs in the mind, and this is
conditioned by the impression
of the two corresponding things
in it, but an infinity cannot be
impressed in the mind. It is
evident that these two do not
occur in existence together, let
alone imagining their
coincidence in existence. This
proof, therefore, depends upon
the occurrence of what cannot
occur either in the mind or in
existence. Furthermore, increase
and decrease can only be
hypothesized with respect to the
finite extreme, not with respect
to the extreme whose finiteness
is disputed and which cannot be
caused.
This is the gist of their
argument on this subject. I say
that every created thing can be
described by being prior to
what is after it and by being
subsequent to what is before it.
These two considerations are
different from each other, for if
we consider the past creatures
beginning from the present at
one time such that each one of
them is prior, and at another
time such that each is posterior,
the prior things and the
posterior things are dissimilar
in aspect while coincident with
each other in existence, and this
coincidence does not need to be
imaginary. Nevertheless, the
prior things must be greater than
the subsequent things [by one] in
the direction which is under
dispute. Consequently,
subsequent things are finite in
the past due to the necessity of
their termination before the
termination of prior things, and
since the prior things are greater
than them by a finite quantity,
they are finite also.
Methinks through that
which we have acquainted you
with, you now apprehend the
colocynth of truth and will increase
in insight with respect to it
henceforth, if God, the Almighty, the
All-Knowing, wills it.

Wamīḍ [6.12.23]
It is only within the power
of the intellect to demonstrate the
impossibility of infinity in the
series of ascent toward the causes,
not in the series of descent toward
the effects by way of emanation.
[300] The crux of the decisive
doctrine is that in the series of
ascent, upon assuming infinity, a
cause does not exist which the mind
can appoint with certainty as being
determined first, by which the entire
sequential series enters into
determination. This, indeed, is the
criterion for judging absurdity. The
matter with respect to the
descending series is the opposite of
this. [234]
If you say: How do you
maintain that all of the
demonstrations are on this path,
while it is evident from the two
demonstrations of the circumstantial
modes and correlation that their
judgment renders applicability [of
infinity] to the two series of ascent
and descent equally impossible
without a difference? I say to you:
Are you not convinced that the
criterion for judging something
impossible, with respect to any
demonstration raised, is the
combination of the two conditions
of succession (tarattub) and
conjunction (ijtimā‘) in actual
existence in the direction of
infinity? The standard of
distinction, therefore, will become
clear through careful reflection. Are
not causes and effects which are
conjoined in existence only in
succession in the intelligible order
due to the essence itself as such, not
with respect to occurrence in the
external world, since they are
purely simultaneous in the real
world?
Therefore, we say: In the
case of ascent, the successive
causes ascending gradually toward
infinity are certainly conjoined in
occurrence in their entirety in the
stage of the essence of the final
effect, as a result of which
succession and conjunction in
existence are both together in the
direction of infinity. As for the case
of descent, the successive effects
are not realized in the stage of the
essence of the cause. Is it not
impossible for the effect to have
existence in the stage of the essence
of the cause, in contrast to how it is
for the cause? For it [the cause]
definitely exists necessarily in the
stage of the essence of the effect.
However, none of the effects are
realized in the stage of the essence
of any of the causes, let alone that
infinite effects should be realized in
the stage of the essence of the
cause. Consequently, with respect
to the infinite successive effects,
there is infinity in one direction,
which is the direction of falling and
descent, while succession and
conjunction in actual existence are
in the other direction, opposite of
that direction, which is the direction
of rising and ascent. Let it be
pondered. There are various
aspects of difference. We have
presented them in the book of
corrections and emendations, which
is the book Taqwīm al-Īmān.

Wamīḍ [6.12.24]
Those who meddle with
what does not concern them among
the generality of the Mutakallimūn
and among the followers of the
philosophers believe that the
finiteness of the magnitude of the
continuity of motion and the
extension of time and the finiteness
of the number of temporal creatures
succeeding each other in the
direction of the past lies in the
power of affirming creation
(ḥudūth) and denying pre-eternity
(azaliyya). They do not realize,
however, that no aspect of
finiteness and infinity pertaining to
continuous or discontinuous
quantity has [235] a connection to
any aspect of pre-eternity non-pre-
eternity in perpetuity[301] with
respect to the permanence of
existence or the priority of real non-
existence, which is not under the
genus of quantification non-
quantification. Are not the
extensions of the spatial dimensions
finite in magnitude? But this does
not require them, in this regard, to
either preclude or require, with
respect to existence in perpetuity,
being created or pre-eternal. The
same applies to the continuities of
linear and circular motions, the
quantities of continuous, temporal
extensions, and the stages of the
numbers of discontinuous
quantities. In short, finiteness and
infinity with respect to quantity is
something apart from eternity and
non-eternity with respect to
existence, for they have two
meanings in the mind, each of which
is different from the other in
concept, without requiring it in
reality. The intrusion of these
conjectures and imaginations is one
of the consequences of a lack of
distinction between perpetual real
non-existence and quantifiable
temporal non-existence, and
thinking that if time is non-existent
first, then enters into existence later,
its non-existence must occur in an
imaginary extended, temporal
dimension going in the direction of
the beginning without any end,
while the termination of its duration
is in the direction of the end with
the now which is the beginning of
its entrance into existence. And if it
is finite in magnitude, the finiteness
of its magnitude is at the instant of
the termination of its prior
continuous non-existence. Such are
among the erroneous suppositions
and unsound conjectures [of these
thinkers]. Be not of the foolish, the
deceived.

Wamīḍ [6.12.25]
Do not think that time is a
magnitude which is straight in
extension, as are linear, non-curved
dimensions and external, straight
distances, so that you consider the
only difference between the
magnitudes of straight lines and
planes and the magnitude of time to
be through fixity and non-fixity, and
that fixed quantities like straight
lines and planes and the unfixed
quantity which is time share in
absolute straightness. Indeed, it is
incumbent upon you to reflect more
deeply than the ordinary view.
Know that just as the substrate of
time is a circular motion and the
bearer of its substrate is a circular
body, in the same way, it also is a
non-linear extension, for its reality
is to be the measure of a circular
motion. It is a continuous quantity
lacking position which corresponds
to a circular motion. It is its
measure, which inheres within it,
and through it both circular and
straight motions are measured [236]
in a general absolute way. It
corresponds also to the supreme
circular circumference, which is the
girdle of that motion and the girdle
of supreme sphere which is moved
by it. Indeed, it is the girdle of the
corporeal world in its entirety. It is
not that the outermost sphere which
confines the directions was
originated without any motion and
then it moved afterwards. Nay,
rather it was extracted from the
void of absolute non-being and
abyss of real non-existence and was
brought into the vast space of
perpetual existence moving with a
continuous, circular motion not
separated from its entity and its
continuity. This motion does not
have, with respect to existence, a
specified boundary which
corresponds to the beginning of the
distance and the extremity of the
extension. But if an actual starting
point in the girdle is specified for
the motion by the estimative faculty,
as an abstracted hypothetical
concept, one complete revolution is
obtained thereby upon returning to
it. Other complete revolutions are
inferred after that, and each
hypothesized revolution of the
revolutions of the continuous
motion corresponds to that girdle
which is the circle which regulates
the day. In the same way, the
wondrous Creator (glorified be He)
originated and created time, which
is the measure inhering in that
motion. He extracted it from the
void of absolute non-being and the
abyss of real non-existence and
brought it forth into the vast space
of the actualization of perpetual
pure being as a continuous
extension not severed from the
continuity [of motion] and the
magnitude [of the sphere]. It is the
number of unceasing, continuous
circular motion and its measure. In
itself it is individually one
continuous quantity, circular in
quantitative form and finite in
magnitude, not severed from
continuity by discontinuity except in
estimation. If the estimative faculty
determines a hypothetical now in it
corresponding to the starting point
hypothesized in the circular motion
which is its substrate,
commensurate with the assumed
point in the regulator of the day, one
positionless revolution is
completed for time whenever one
complete revolution is completed
for the regulator of the day.
The hours, therefore, are
the parts of one temporal rotation,
while the months and years are
multiple temporal rotations. The
degrees of the circle which
regulates the day, with respect to
the quantitative composition of its
own continuous, circular, fixed self,
are the parts of the circle of the
sphere, and with respect to the
quantitative composition of its
continuous, circular, unfixed
motion, they are the parts of the
temporal rotations.
 It is evident to you, then,
that just as there is no actual point
in the encompassing circle nor in
the plane of the sphere, [237]
notwithstanding that both of them
are a finite magnitude with respect
to distance, in the same manner,
there is no real divider belonging to
the continuous circular motion of
the sphere, and no actual now
belonging to continuous extended
time, despite the extension of each
of them being actually finite in
quantity and magnitude. Disjunction
and discontinuity does not occur to
their continuity except in the faculty
of estimation. This is a principle
which is required by demonstrative
principles and rational laws. Your
insight and certainty will increase
through this with respect to what
will be recited to you at the
beginning of the argument, if God,
the All-Knowing, the Wise, wills it.
 The Seventh Qabas
A series of abridged arguments,
unsound dialectical arguments, and
criticism
of certain syllogisms and
controversial sophistical doubts,
according to the two extremes of the
two groups.

Wamḍa [7.1][302]
Do you remember from
what you have learned and stored
away that among the principles and
rules is that [subsequent]
supervening non-existence is
impossible with respect to the
essence of time, and similarly prior
non-existence followed by
existence?[303] Only complete,
pre-eternal and post-eternal non-
existence is possible for the
essence of time, without either of
the two [temporal] non-existences
on the two sides of existence. This
is something upon which the
preeminent philosophers, the wise,
and the learned agree. The doubt,
therefore, that it is necessary for
time to be necessarily existent is
removed. The essentially necessary
is that which requires in itself and
by reason of itself the nature of
existence, whereas the nature of
non-existence is impossible for it in
itself and through itself. The
necessity of the [universal] nature
does not require the necessity of its
individuals in the way its
impossibility requires the
impossibility of its individuals.
Indeed, some of the individuals and
portions in their particularity may
be impossible despite the necessity
of the nature itself, for existence
after non-existence, or existence
occurring to the quiddity, or
existence necessitated through
another may be impossible for them
due to the particularities
(khuṣūṣiyyāt) of the conditions or
the qualifications. The essentially
possible is that for which neither
the nature of existence nor the
nature of non-existence is either
required or impossible with respect
to its own essence. The possibility
of the [universal] nature is not
contrary to the impossibility of
some of its individuals or portions
in their particularity due to the
particularities of the conditions or
the qualifications. Consequently, it
is impossible for any essentially
possible thing to have an existence
which is identical to its quiddity or
which belongs to the essential
constituents (jawhariyyāt) of its
quiddity, an existence which
absolute non-existence does not
essentially precede with respect to
the substance of the quiddity, and an
existence which real non-existence
does not perpetually precede, as
[240] has been demonstrated to you.
And it is impossible for a substance
as such to have an existence which
subsists in a subject, for an accident
as such to have an existence which
subsists in itself, for motion and
time to have a fixed existence, and
for time to have a prior [temporal]
non-existence followed by
existence and an essentially
subsequent, supervening non-
existence after existence.

Wamḍa [7.2]
Do you recall what I set
forth in al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm and
in al-Ufuq al-Mubīn, that although
essential necessity is not required
in this case [of time], nevertheless
there is no escape from requiring its
permanent possibility independent
of an efficient cause belonging to its
essence permanently and continuing
for its entity in existence? If
[subsequent] supervening non-
existence is impossible with
respect to the essence of time itself,
and it is clear that the impossibility
of one of the two contradictory
extremes, with respect to the
substance of the essence, is subject
to the necessity of the other extreme
with respect to it, in terms of the
essence itself, then does it not
follow that the existence contrary to
supervening non-existence, which is
supervening existence, or
continuous existence, or whatever
you desire to call it, is necessary
for time itself with respect to the
substance of its essence? It is
therefore certainly independent,
with respect to the continuance of
its existence, from an efficient
cause of its continuance.[304]
This is a dilemma among
the dilemmas posed by doubt and a
knot which only complicates them.
The path for solving this dilemma
and removing the doubt is for us to
say: How can the mode of existence
be necessary for the essence of
time, while it is possible for it to be
excluded from it with respect to its
essence, as implied in the exclusion
of absolute existence from it
through the universal, even though
this is not possible for it after the
occurrence of existence to it, as
inferred in this circumstantial
mode? Therefore, necessity,
assuming it is acquired from
another, definitely does not imply
necessity with respect to the
essence itself. None of the modes of
existence is suitable as a
contradictory to supervening non-
existence nor to any of the
particular non-existences at all.
Rather, the contradictory of
supervening non-existence is its
negation (raf‘). The qualified
(muqayyad) may be negated by the
negation of its qualified essence,
and it may be negated by the
negation of its condition (qayd).
Thus, the negation of supervening
non-existence is not incompatible
with its being realized by existence,
or by a negation which is not
supervening. The impossible is only
non-existence supervening upon the
qualifying qualification, not upon
the correlation; in other words, the
negation of existence by way of
qualification (taqyīd), that is to say,
the negation qualified by
supervening, not the negation of the
object related to supervening
existence, such as is the negation of
the qualified. What is easiest for
you is to be content with the truth of
its contradictory by the negation of
the supervening, [241] for it is
realized by the negation of a non-
supervening.
In short, the only thing
required by the impossibility of
supervening non-existence is the
necessity of its negation with
respect to the essence without
qualification, regardless of whether
it be by the negation of the non-
existence accompanying existence
or by the negation of its supervening
realized by negation altogether after
the occurrence of existence.
Therefore, each of the two
particularities are in the station of
pure possibility with respect to the
essence of time itself, and each of
them certainly needs a necessitating
cause. The same applies to the
doctrine on the impossibility of
prior non-existence followed by
existence and the necessity of its
contradictory, which is its negation,
whether this be by the negation of
non-existence accompanying the
occurrence of existence or by a
negation which follows it.
Therefore, it is realized by the
absence of existence altogether in
pre-eternity and post-eternity, as a
result of which nothing of the two
particularities occurs except
through a necessitating cause. Let it
be recognized.
 Wamḍa [7.3]
The path of the doctrine
concerning existence-after-non-
existence is in accord with this
way, whichever kind of posteriority
it may be, with respect to the
essence of the essentially necessary
Self-Subsisting Being (exalted be
His sovereignty). It [existence-
after-non-existence] is impossible,
in this case, with the impossibility
of all the modes of non-existence.
Hence, its contradictory is
necessary, which is the negation of
existence-after-non-existence. It is
realized by real eternal existence,
which is prior to all existences, and
it [real eternal existence] is not
after a non-existence in any respect
at all.

Wamīḍ [7.3.1]
With respect to the tying of
the knot of difficulty here, we have
another difficult path, from which
there is no escape except through
what God (lauded be He) has
bestowed upon us through His
boundless grace and His plentiful
bounty. It is that it is required by the
impossibility of non-existence
supervening upon time with respect
to its very essence either that time
should be the First Emanated or that
it should be a permanent possibility
with the absence of its complete
cause. Both of these options are
manifestly false, and this falseness
is agreed upon.
This is because either the
essentially necessary Self-
Subsisting Being (exalted be His
remembrance) would be its
complete agent and its complete
cause, as a result of which the first
thing [i.e. the First Emanated] is
implied, or another thing apart from
the essentially necessary Being
would be such that its [time’s]
complete cause is completed by it,
as a result of which its complete
cause would certainly be an
essentially possible thing, but
among possibles supervening non-
existence is essentially impossible
only for time. Hence, for every
essentially possible thing besides
time, its supervening non-existence
[242] is impossible through another
through the existence of its cause.
Thus, if the supervening non-
existence of the complete cause of
time is essentially possible and
impossible through another, and the
supervening non-existence of time
is essentially impossible, then
without a doubt the permanent
possibility of time is required with
the absence of its complete cause
after its [the cause’s] existence.
This is absurd and baseless,
because just as the occurrence of
the impossible is impossible, in
like manner, the possibility of its
occurrence is definitely impossible.
Similar to this applies to prior non-
existence followed by existence
also, for this non-existence is also
essentially impossible with respect
to the reality of time apart from its
complete cause, as a result of which
the impossibility of the non-
existence of time together with the
possibility of the non-existence of
its complete cause in the real world
would be implied. And that is
subject to the possibility of the
existence of time together with the
non-inclusion of its complete cause
after that in existence. But the
possibility of the impossible is
impossible.
I have mentioned this
difficulty in some talks and in
letters to those who merit being
addressed among our learned
offspring and our discerning
companions, and I have not seen in
these perplexed ones the power to
discover a way of escaping this
dilemma by accepted principles and
rules. Therefore, let it be known
that the way to be free of it is
through two ways:
The first is that in it there
is a confusion of flowing temporal
non-existence with perpetual real
non-existence, for what is
essentially impossible for time is
only the temporal supervening of
temporal non-existence or the
temporal priority of temporal non-
existence to its existence,[305] for
that would imply the hypothetical
existence of time upon assuming its
non-existence, and that is assuming
two contradictories. The basis of
this impossibility, then, is a
particular property of the essence of
time. However, either real non-
existence perpetually supervenes
upon its [time’s] existence in
perpetuity or real non-existence
perpetually precedes its existence
in perpetuity. Therefore, it [real
non-existence] is not essentially
impossible with respect to its
essence, but rather this is only
impossible through another. As for
supervening non-existence, the
necessity of the permanence of its
existence in perpetuity is due to the
affirmation of its efficient cause and
the permanence of its emanation,
but the necessity of that is an
impossible thing, for it is extension
in perpetuity, as has become clear
in his misgivings. This
impossibility through another is not
specialized to time, for it is general
to all possibilities in their entirety.
As for prior non-existence, it is
based upon what the deniers of the
creation of absolutely immutable
perpetual things outside of the
world of dispositional possibility
claim, due to the criterion of
suitability for receiving the
emanation in this case being [243]
the nature of essential possibility,
no other. The falsity of what they
claim will be explained to you
shortly. This impossibility through
another is also not singled out to the
reality of time,[306] for it is a mode
belonging to whatever is not subject
to dispositional possibility among
essential possibilities absolutely
and universally.
The second is that in it
there is a fallacy with respect to
lack of distinction between
essential possibility and possibility
in relation to another, and similarly
between necessity with respect to
the essence and necessity with
respect to relation to another, and
similarly between essential
impossibility and impossibility in
relation to another. The essentially
possible is that whose existence
and non-existence is possible with
respect to itself, not in relation to
what is other than it. This does not
preclude that its existence and its
non-existence may be necessary or
impossible in relation to what is
other than it. Therefore, we say: If
supervening non-existence or prior
non-existence is impossible with
respect to the essence of time,
while the necessity of its existence
and its continuance is due to the
complete efficient cause by reason
of its being possibly existent and
continuous in its own essence, then
this only requires that supervening
non-existence or prior non-
existence are impossible with
respect to its complete cause, not
with respect to its [the cause’s]
essence, but rather with respect to
its relation to the essence of its
effect, which is time. Consequently,
the possibility of supervening or
prior non-existence with respect to
the essence of the essentially
possible cause does not preclude
that this is impossible for the cause
in relation to the essence of the
effect, not in relation to its [the
cause’s] own essence, whether
essentially, through another, or in
relation to another. For each of the
necessary, the possible, and the
impossible, there is a clear,
evident, and ample distinction. We
have presented a proper exposition
on this in al-Ufuq al-Mubīn. Be not
neglectful of it.

Wamīḍ [7.3.2]
The doubt that presses is
that if the supervening or the prior
non-existence which is impossible
with respect to the essence of time
is strictly that which temporally
supervenes or is quantifiably prior
in time, then time and those things
which are free of time in the worlds
of primary origination and
Command share in this
impossibility. Why should they
restrict this to the quiddity of time
in its particularity only? Know that
this is indeed impossible with
respect to the things in the worlds
of primary origination and
Command with respect to the
common nature shared between all
of them, which is separation from
the two worlds of time and place,
but not with respect to the particular
nature [244] of any of their
quiddities. The case is the opposite
of this for time, since in the
particularity of its essence and the
particularity of its quiddity, it
requires this impossibility, due to
its being a requisite of the existence
of time, upon assuming its non-
existence. The case is not like this
for any other quiddities except for
the quiddity of time. Therefore, the
particular natures of the other
quiddities in their entirety are not
subject to this impossibility. Let it
be recognized.

Wamīḍ [7.3.3]
Among the worthless
dialectical arguments for
establishing the creation of the
world is that it is said: according to
the position of those who believe in
its eternity, it is impossible for non-
existence to essentially precede the
existence of time with respect to the
quiddity of time itself, but this is not
impossible for its complete cause
due to its being unnecessary
essentially. The subject liable to
this impossibility, among all
possible things, is nothing but the
quiddity of time. This implies the
possibility, therefore, that the cause
of time is not included in actual
existence, while time is actually
existent. We have torn away the veil
of falsehood from this worthless
argument in two ways: (1) The
abstraction of the non-impossible,
which is the possibility of real non-
existence preceding it in perpetuity.
(2) It is prevented by the originating
cause from what is essentially
impossible for it, which is
temporally prior, quantifiable non-
existence. The difference is
between the possibility of prior
non-existence with respect to the
essence of the cause as such and its
possibility with respect to it [the
cause] with respect to its relation to
the essence of the effect, which is
time. The former is affirmed, while
the latter is denied.

Wamīḍ [7.3.4]
 The argument for the
creation of time based upon the
quantitative finiteness of its
magnitude in the direction of the
past is widespread among the
ordinary minds of the masses, as
well as the affirmation of the
temporal creation of the world by
denying a numerical infinity of
temporal creatures preceding and
succeeding each other in existence
in the past. They also extend
temporal creation to the unqualified
natures, whose individuals succeed
each other without end in the
direction of the beginning, due to
the creation of every individual in
time with universal inclusion. We
have apprised you more than once
that there is no path for any of these
delusions leading to the road of
those who perform rational
investigation.
Linear and circular
magnitudes have no connection to
pre-eternity or non-pre-eternity in
existence and occurrence [245]
with respect to finiteness or infinity
in magnitude and surface area. Just
as the circle which is the regulator
of the day, for instance, is a finite
magnitude, which does not preclude
its precedence or non-precedence
by real non-existence in perpetuity,
the same applies to its recurrent
continuous motion. The conclusive
demonstrations which maintain
infinity to be invalid only have
sway with the combination of the
two conditions of succession
(tarratub) and conjunction (ijtimā‘)
in existence in the direction of
infinity. The nature having
successive individuals is conserved
in quiddity in the extension of time
through the succession of its
individuals without cessation, as
we have explained to you already.

Wamīḍ [7.3.5]
Among the sophistical
arguments raised is the following: It
is evident that the causation
(ta’thīr) of the Agent with respect
to the world of possibility and each
of its parts is either in the state of
its [the world’s] determination and
its existence, which is impossible,
because this is giving existence to
the existent and actualizing the
actual, or it is in the state of its non-
existence, which is what is sought.
Consequently, the world with all of
its parts is preceded by real non-
existence, and the action with
respect to giving it existence is in
the state of its prior non-existence.
[307]
 The solution of this is to
say: The action upon the world is
the state of its existence, albeit,
insofar as it is it, not as conditioned
by its existence. What is impossible
is actualizing the actual and giving
existence to the existent conditioned
by its occurrence and its existence
while not in the state of its
occurrence and its existence. There
is a clear distinction between taking
the action in the state of its
occurrence with respect to itself
and taking it not with respect to
itself, but rather as conditioned by
its occurrence. It is not impossible
for the cause to exert its effect in the
state of the occurrence of the effect.
Indeed, the cause is together with
its effect in this way. It effects it
insofar as it is it, not insofar as it is
obtained or not obtained, but
whenever it is obtained. In short,
the action of the cause is only in the
state of occurrence obtained through
that action. This is an actualizing
belonging to the actualized by that
actualizing. There is no
impossibility in this.
To express this another
way: If what is meant by “the state
of occurrence” is the simultaneity of
the effect and the cause in the real
world by association in the
realization with respect to the
essence of the effect, this means that
the action is in the state of
occurrence through that action. But
if simultaneity in the mind is meant
with respect to essential necessary
association in the stage of the
essence of the cause, it may be said
that the action is neither in the state
of occurrence nor in the state of
non-occurrence, because the action
pertains to [246] the essence itself
as such, not insofar as it occurs or
does not occur. The occurrence of
the essence of the cause as such has
an intelligible stage in which no
occurrence of the essence of the
effect is intellected, but rather only
the substance of the essence of the
effect as such is intellected, not
insofar as it is occurring or not
occurring. There is no essential
necessary connection between the
essence of the effect and the
essence of the cause with respect to
the stage of the essence of the cause
itself, but rather only with respect
to the stage of the essence of the
effect itself. Therefore, the essence
of the effect, whether occurring or
not occurring, is posterior to the
stage of the cause, whether
occurring or not occurring, and
between it and the essence of the
cause there is an essential
necessary connection with respect
to occurrence in the real world,
belonging to the essence of the
effect itself, not the stage of the
essence of the cause.
Those who meddle with
what does not concern them have
turned away from the broad path of
truth and are preoccupied with
another path, which is rough and
remote. It is that the cause acts in
the state of the creation of the effect,
not in the state of its existence and
not in the state of its non-existence.
Therefore, the state of creation
(ḥudūth) is apart from both the state
of existence and the state of non-
existence.[308] Indeed, one of them
has struck a melody upon the
mandolin of feeblemindedness and
stated:
Based upon the permissibility of
the succession of nows, the
association of cause and effect
is not required with respect to
occurrence. It is like the sound
which exists in the second now,
although it emanates from its
speaker in the now which
precedes it.[309] Hence, the
action is prior to the effect by
one now and occurs in the now
before it in relation to what
 occurs after it, regardless of
whether the effect exists in that
now through another action (as
in the case of persistence, which
depends upon the cause
effecting it) or does not exist in
it (as in the case of creation
through the existentiating cause).
The effect in the now of the
action is non-existent, and in the
now wherein it becomes
existent it is not associated with
non-existence.
I swear by the life of the
Beloved, time is too precious to
spend it occupied with invalidating
these imaginings and delusions. Let
us turn now to that which the
spiders of the imaginations of the
philosophers have spun, who are
floundering in controversy by
reason of their philosophizing on
this question.

Wamīḍ [7.3.6]
Have you not heard them
say in arguing for the eternity of
time that if time were created and
not pre-eternal in existence, it
would be non-existent prior to its
existence with a separate priority,
and because of it the prior could not
be joined with the posterior [247]
in the real world, although the
essential subject of this priority is
the parts of time, some parts in
relation to others. That which is
beyond time cannot be qualified by
it [this priority] except accidentally,
due to the association of the parts of
time. Consequently, the existence of
time is required upon assuming its
non-existence.
There is no doubt that in
this discourse of theirs they are
debating with a people who belong
to the hosts of error, and they are
unable with their feeble minds to
attain another course for absolute,
unquantifiable, separate priority.
They do not present it by
establishing its demonstrability and
confidence in its soundness. How
could it be, when it has been made
clear to you repeatedly that they are
those who agree in naming the
relation of the changeless to the
changing and to the changeless, with
respect to priority and simultaneity,
“perpetuity and eternity,” and they
explain that just as the existence of
time does not have a “when” and its
existence is not in another time, in
the same way, it is not possible for
its non-existence to have a when or
be in another time. And they hold
that separate priority has a
quantifiable temporal extensionality
whose subject is no other than the
parts of time, as well as an
absolutely unquantifiable state,
which is eternal priority, such as
belongs to the Maker, the First
(glorified be He), in relation to this
day and this temporal phenomenon,
for example. Why, then, do they
contradict themselves and set out
into the land of conviction with
what is contrary to their doctrine?
In sum, the estimation of extension
upon assuming the non-existence of
time, and the qualification of the
Holy Creator by a quantifiable,
extensional priority or a flowing
temporal simultaneity, is something
which no possessor of learning
considers correct and no possessor
of insight advocates at all, neither
in pre-Islamic philosophy nor in the
Islam of wisdom. But only those
who meddle with what does not
concern them, by reason of their
idle conjectures, take this as their
mount, thus going astray in the
wilderness of impotence, the abyss
of error, and the desert of deviation.

Wamīḍ [7.3.7]
Among the strongest of
their arguments is what they say: Is
it not evident that the complete
cause of the system of the whole,
called “the Great Man” and
characterized as “the macrocosm,”
by primary intention, is solely the
essentially necessary Self-
Subsisting Being (exalted be His
remembrance) through His own
essence, for there is nothing outside
of it except Him, and whatever is
other than His own essence is
necessarily contained within it. And
since it is inconceivable that it
should have any matter, it is
originated absolutely. In like
manner, the complete cause of the
most excellent of its parts, which is
the noblest of the possibilities and
the most sanctified [248] of the
divine things in the chain of
beginning, by existentiation and
primary origination, is solely the
essence of the real Emanator
himself (exalted be His glory). It is
not reasonable that it [i.e., the
noblest of the possibilities] should
have any matter, nor that its
existence should have a particular
cause among causes other than the
stage of the essence of its emanating
Agent (exalted be His sovereignty).
Therefore, it is the First Emanated,
the most perfect of the primary
originated things, and the most
worthy of the act of primary
origination. It is the first of the
intelligible substances sanctified
from attachment to matter and from
the worlds of dispositional
possibility. The sole basis,
therefore, for the outpouring of the
system of the world and the
emanation of the First Emanated—
which among the parts of this most
perfect system is the most excellent
of primary originated things and the
most perfect of intelligible
substances—from the agent
Originator, the Mighty, the
Knowing, is the nature of essential
possibility alone. The agent
Originator, the true Creator, whose
outpouring is necessary and whose
emanation is perfect, is a giver
through His generosity and an
efficient cause through His mercy.
How, then, is it possible for the
effect to be posterior to the
complete cause and the emanation
posterior to the act of emanation?
[310] Therefore, there is no escape
from advocating the pre-eternity of
the world, due to the pre-eternal
emanation of the Emanator, His
bounty and His mercy, or going out
from the clime of truth by denying
demonstrative principles.
We say: There is no doubt
in the truth of the premises of this
syllogism. However, they are of no
avail in necessitating the
conclusion; rather they are
incapable of serving that purpose
due to the carelessness of the
inquiry and the sloppiness of the
investigation. The conclusion is
only valid if it can be established
that pre-eternal emanation is
applicable to the nature of essential
possibility. But how can they
establish this? Without establishing
it, it is like scratching a mountain
with fingernails or pulling thorn
bushes with bare hands. How can
they accomplish this? We have
established through properly
constructed, clear demonstrations
that the substance of the essentially
possible only has the potential and
capability, due to the characteristic
of essential possibility, for actual
determination after pure
nullification in the center of the
objective world and existence
preceded by real non-existence in
the domain of perpetuity. The only
impossible posteriority to the
complete cause is quantifiable,
measurable, flowing posteriority,
while real unquantifiable
posteriority is unreservedly not
impossible. Indeed, if it is from the
side of the complete Agent, by His
delay in fashioning and His holding
back from emanating, despite the
readiness of the dispositions and
the coming together of all the
conditions, not if it is from the
substance of the essence of the
effect, the necessity of posteriority
and the impossibility of
simultaneity is due to the essence of
the effect itself, in accord with the
characteristic of its essential
possibility, and pre-eternal
emanation and eternal existence
[249] not preceded by real non-
existence is essentially impossible
for its reality, outside of the circle
of its possibility, and incompatible
with inclusion in its potential.
 Is not the conclusive
demonstration of the posteriority of
the effect to its complete cause by
impossibility, namely, that the
possibility of posteriority
necessitates either disregarding the
assumption of the completeness of
the cause or the occurrence of
actual or potential preponderation
without a preponderator which
requires it? Consequently, real
posteriority, with respect to the
impossibility of the emanation
previously, pertains to the nature of
the substance of the effect and the
deficiency of its reality. The
demonstration does not rule this out,
and the completeness of the
Necessary Agent does not preclude
it. Indeed, the power of a clear
intellect requires it, and the clarity
of a sound mind obliges it.
In short, the rule of cause
and effect is that if the complete
cause and its effect, the complete
agent and its patient, are together in
time, it is certainly necessary for a
particular time or a now to unite
them in existence. However, if the
effect in the substance of its essence
has the complete potential to
receive the emanation absolutely
and without qualification, its
posteriority to its complete agent
would be impossible absolutely and
without qualification. But if in the
nature of its substance it is such that
its essence does not preclude real
posteriority, insofar as its nature is
incapable of receiving pre-eternal
determination (taqarrur),[311] and
existence after real non-existence is
not impossible for the substance of
its essence, then it is necessary for
it to be posterior to its complete
agent with a real perpetual, non-
flowing, unquantifiable,
immeasurable posteriority. In this
case it is not a contradiction [to the
demonstration] at all. Let it be
pondered.
 Wamīḍ [7.3.8]
Do you not accept through
what you have ascertained with a
compounded intellect that the effect
is definitely posterior in occurrence
to the stage of the essence of the
cause, even though it is together
with it in occurrence in the external
world. The completeness of the
cause is not discredited by this,
because occurrence [of the effect]
in the stage of the essence of the
cause is something which is not
within the compass of possibility to
achieve nor can the nature of being-
an-effect sustain it. Indeed, this is
essentially impossible for the
substance of the essence of the
effect. The same applies to real
posteriority, since that which is
innate in the substance of the
essence of the effect and essential
for the necessitation of its quiddity,
as is evident, is that essential
possibility is the criterion by which
dependency upon the efficient cause
is possible.
If you say: If that is
correct, then the complete cause of
the First Emanated is the essence
[250] of its Agent Maker along with
the nature of its essential
possibility; therefore, a simple
complete cause is not possible in
existence. I say: Not at all!
Possibility is one of the stages of
the essence of the effect free from it
in mental consideration, when
considering its [the effect’s]
dependency upon its cause, for it
[possibility] is one of the
consequences of the substance of
the dependent effect, as with the
essential constituents of the
quiddity, and one of the aspects of
its essence which makes it possible
to infer the characteristic of being-
an-effect and completes the
principle of needing a cause. It,
therefore, belongs to the locus of
the dependent effect, not to the
locus of the cause needed by it, for
it is one of the beings of reason
(i‘tibārāt) on the side of the effect,
not one of the beings of reason on
the side of the cause. In short, the
emanation of the complete Agent is
in conformity with the worthiness
(istiḥqāq) of the possibility of the
made thing and in accordance with
the compass of the potentiality of its
nature to receive the emanation,
although there is no subjection here
to dispositional possibility and
absolutely no holding back of any
emanation at all.[312]
If it is asked, for example:
Why did the complete, originating
Efficient Cause not originate the
soul free in its actions from
attachment to matter, like the
intellect, or why did He not create
the horse able to apprehend the
unqualified natures, disposed for
the universal laws, and coming to
the world of holiness by seeking
perfection, like man, or why did He
not make the effect exist essentially
in the stage of the essence of the
cause, or why did He not make the
possible quiddity existent with
respect to the stage of its essence or
make it such that its quiddity is
itself its existence, or why did He
not make five evenly divisible like
six—all of these are esteemed
useless prattle, weak questions, and
simpleminded, profitless inquiry. In
like manner, if it is asked: Why did
the emanating Creator not give
existence to the world of possibility
in pre-eternity not preceded by real
non-existence, this also belongs to
the category of these foolish
utterances in the opinion of one who
understands the nature of essential
possibility and its requirements, of
which you have been informed in
the previous pages.
Furthermore, have we not
apprised you by means of deductive
demonstration that essential priority
necessarily accompanies eternal
separate priority, and essential
posteriority, accordingly,
necessarily accompanies perpetual
separate posteriority. It may
therefore be summed up that the
impossible with respect to
posteriority to the complete cause is
strictly quantifiable, extensional
non-simultaneity without
qualification, while real,
unquantifiable non-simultaneity, if
eternal simultaneity is not
impossible, refers to the worthiness
of the substance of the essence of
the effect, not without qualification.
Hence, the judgment of eternal
simultaneity [251] between the
essentially necessary complete
Cause and its essentially possible
effect with respect to eternal
existence in the real world, insofar
as it is essentially impossible due
to the nature of essential possibility
and the reality of essential
necessity, is the same as the
judgment of essential simultaneity
between the absolute complete
cause and its effect with respect to
the stage of the essence, insofar as
it is impossible due to the nature of
causality and being-an-effect. Let it
be considered carefully.
 Wamīḍ [7.3.9]
It is circulating upon the
tongues and spreading from ear to
ear, in report of that which we
invalidated among their proofs,
namely: either all that unavoidably
exists in the world of possibility
occurs in pre-eternity, so that part
of the world is certainly pre-eternal
in existence due to the impossibility
of the effect being posterior to the
complete cause, or it does not.
Without a doubt, it is definitely
necessary for something anticipated
in the possibility of the existence of
the world and for which the
completeness of the efficient cause
is inferred to proceed from
potentiality into actuality together
with the proceeding of the world
from potentiality into actuality.
Then the eye is turned toward that
anticipated thing coming into
actuality, and the inquiry is driven
to the point where the successive
anticipated things (muntaẓirāt)
coming into actuality form a
continuous chain together without
end in the direction of the
beginning. This is impossible [i.e.,
an infinite chain and a beginning] by
the force of demonstration in the
opinion of all of the learned. Thus
there is no escape from maintaining
the pre-eternity of the world due to
its eternal existence via its
complete, essentially eternal Agent.
We say: Methinks through
what you have pondered, you are
certain that the way to invalidate
this position is to choose the first
part of the two parts of the answer.
Whatever unavoidably belongs to
the existence of the First Emanated,
which is the most excellent of the
parts of the system of existence in
the chain of beginning, certainly
occurs actually in pre-eternity,
since its complete agent is the
essence of the agent Creator himself
in His real oneness and His
absolute simplicity, and it is only
posterior to Him with a real,
unquantifiable, non-flowing
perpetual posteriority, since eternal
simultaneity is essentially
impossible for it. What is necessary
in the doctrine of causality and
being-an-effect is for the effect to
be together with its complete cause
in existence with a simultaneity
which the substance of the essence
of the effect sustains, not a
simultaneity which the substance of
the essence of the effect precludes
with respect to its very quiddity, but
one which the essence of the cause
itself precludes with respect to
what the particularity of its reality
requires, as you have been informed
several times. [252]

Wamīḍ [7.3.10]
Among the things they [the
philosophers] argue by way of
dialectic against one who belongs
to a group of those who meddle
with what does not concern them,
who believes that the creation of the
world is singled out to the
particular time of its creation due to
the creation being most suited to
that particular time, even though it
was possible before that time, is
what he [Ibn Sīnā] set forth in the
Ishārāt.
His argument, as
summarized by the author of the
Muḥākamāt, is that they prove the
eternity of the action of God in two
respects:
The first is with respect to the
Agent, and his argument is that
the Necessary by reason of
himself is necessary in all of
His primary attributes, and
whatever needs His action
occurs through His essence.
Since it is established that the
effect is not posterior [in time]
to its complete cause, the
eternity of the action is
necessary, and their
qualification by “primary” is for
the sake of the removal of
relational attributes. The second
is with respect to the action, and
his argument is that it is not
possible for God’s action to be
non-existent and then to exist,
since real non-existence has no
distinguishable characteristic in
it so that the restraint of the
Agent from the act of giving
existence would be more
suitable in some states than the
act of giving existence in others,
or so that the non-emanation of
the effect from the Agent in
some states would be more
suitable than its emanation in
others, for if its emanation is
necessary, it would be in all the
states, or its non-emanation
would be in all the states.
Therefore, it is necessary for the
action either to be eternal or for
it to be entirely non-existent.
This, in truth, is the answer to
the one who said: “It was only
created in a particular time,
because it was most suited to its
existence, or it was possible in
it.” The qualification of non-
existence by “real” is a signal
 for the temporal non-existence
of a created thing preceded by
matter.
We say that this is an
established conclusion according to
the postulations of these peoples.
But according to the path of truth,
the watchtower of the intellect, and
the road of demonstration, it is
manifestly false. Is it not accepted
by the balance of the compounded
intellect that there is no newness
(tajaddud) on the side of the true
Efficient Cause at all, that
occurrence after non-occurrence
applies strictly to the substance of
the essence of the effect, and that
there is no distinguishable
characteristic in real non-existence
because a succession of boundaries
is inconceivable in it, and neither
extension nor non-extension,
quantification nor non-
quantification, is thinkable in it, due
to its complete removal from the
genus of extension non-extension.
Therefore, the possibility of the
creation of the world before it was
created is incomprehensible,
because there is no “before”
belonging to it within the compass
of the circle of possibility, since
nothing is conceivable prior to its
existence except eternal existence.
It is clear to you that eternal
existence is essentially impossible
for possible things [253] due to the
nature of possibility and the nature
of being-an-effect. The active
Creator (magnified be His glory),
through His power, His will, His
knowledge, and His wisdom, has
poured the bucket of grace and
bounty upon the world of
possibility to the degree the
capacity of the worthiness of its
quiddity and the potentiality of the
nature of its possibility is capable
of receiving. God (glorified be He)
knew through His knowledge of
himself the system of the good
through His action. He knew all of
the worlds of possibility and its
regions in its comprehensive,
harmonious order. Then He said to
it “Be!”, and it was.
If it is asked: Why didn’t
He pour forth existence upon His
effect not preceded by real non-
existence? The answer is that its
nature could not sustain it and its
substance was not capable of it.
This is due to the deficiency of the
substance of the effect, not due to
the restraint and holding back of the
Agent, just as He does not pour
forth existence upon it free from the
quiddity due to the deficiency of its
essence and the inadequacy of its
nature. If it is asked: Why didn’t He
originate it before He originated it?
The answer is because there is no
“before” for it except eternal pre-
eternity, which is impossible for it
with respect to the nature of its
essence and the reality of its
quiddity.[313]

Wamīḍ [7.3.11]
Their dialectical proof
based on the necessity of the
suspension of attributes (ta‘ṭīl)
[upon assuming creation] is in
accord with this way, where they
say that advocating the pre-eternity
of the true Creator (lauded be He)
and the creation (ḥudūth) of His
made things in their entirety is
nothing but the suspension of the
Bounteous, the Real, from His
bounty during the non-existence of
the made things altogether, which is
absurd and impossible. This is
because His absolute munificence
and sheer bounty are essential with
respect to the stage of the Essence,
not something in addition to His
essence at all. The Necessary by
virtue of himself must be necessary
in all His aspects, and it is not
possible for Him to be described
later by what He does not have first
in the stage of His essence. Let it be
pondered: What can impair the sun
from continuing to shed its rays and
casting the particles of its light?
What, then, do you think about the
Sun of the world of the Intellect,
which is the Light of lights, infinite
in its luminosity, its glory, and its
perfection, for it is the Emanator of
light, subsistent equally from pre-
eternity to post-eternity? It is clear
that what perpetually emanates from
Him is existence. It is
inconceivable for His excellence,
His generosity, His agency, and His
bounty to be suspended for a
duration which has no beginning
and then to produce the act of giving
existence and emanation.[314]
This proof is also
dialectical in form, the subject of
principles founded on the postulates
of those who meddle with what
does not concern them, not
demonstrative, based on rational
principles and speculative laws. It
is clear to those who discern with
the compounded intellect that
suspension of attributes is only
necessary [254] if two successive
indivisible boundaries are imagined
in real non-existence before the
existence of the world, or two
indivisible boundaries and a
quantitative intermediary, or one
indivisible boundary which is the
divider of an imaginary quantifiable
extension, as the now is for time. In
this case, holding back from causing
the effect and producing the
emanation would be within a
boundary separated from the
boundary of primary origination and
emanation, and the liberal Efficient
Cause would be suspended from
[the act of] His liberality and His
mercy and held back from His
fashioning and His emanation.
You are assured that this is
nothing but a baseless imagination
which the dejected have conceived
and an idle fancy which the
wrongdoers have contrived. There
is only a pure, perpetual real non-
existence, outside of the estimation
of boundaries and extensions,
before the real existence belonging
to the system of the world in the
domain of perpetuity through the
absolute bounty of the true
Generous One and the outpouring of
the All-Bountiful, such that real,
unadulterated existence occurs in
the locus of real non-existence in
place of it, not in a boundary
separate in existence or in the
estimative faculty from the
boundary of non-existence. It is not
possible for the true Creator to
become attired later with something
He was not adorned with first in the
stage of His essence, nor for any of
the modes of His essence or any of
the aspects which are anticipated in
the fashioning and the emanation to
occur [like an accident] to His
essence. Indeed, the objects of
primary origination are only not
eternal in existence because of the
capacity of their essences and the
possibility of their quiddities, since
they are realities which are unable
to sustain eternity in their
determination and essences which
are incapable of receiving pre-
eternity of existence in perpetuity. It
is certain, therefore, that the new
(mutajaddid) is only the essence of
the effect itself, not a particular
thing on the side of the agent which
it requires for its agency.
Consequently, there is no place for
the estimation of suspension of
attributes, and there is no barrier to
the predetermination of all the
possibilities by the two creations:
the essential and the perpetual.
[315]
Let it be considered. How
can it impair the sun if there is no
clay earth to shine with its light or
no clay walls to reflect its
splendor? What then should you
think of the true King, the absolutely
Independent One, the Agent of the
sun and the moon, the Maker of light
and darkness, since He alone
possesses pre-existence and pre-
eternity and is solitary in firstness
and eternity? In short, the only ones
who advocate the suspending of
attributes are those who hold to the
misguided doctrine that prior to the
existence of the world there was an
extended non-existence and an
imaginary boundary in which
fashioning and giving existence
were possible [but did not take
place], and in which primary
origination and emanation were
possible, apart from creation in
perpetuity and without pre-eternity
in eternity, as [255] the
simpleminded common people
believe among those who succumb
to their idle fancies.
As for the preeminent
minds and firmly grounded
philosophers, their station in
knowledge is that of the utmost of
the stations of the knowers. For this
reason, he [Ibn Sīnā] stated in the
Metaphysics of the Shifā’ and the
Najāt: “Those who would suspend
God from His generosity…” He is
alluding to a group of the Mu‘tazila
and Asha‘riyya among those who
meddle with what does not concern
them. I say: On the opposite side of
these meddlers who would suspend
God from His generosity are those
travelers into the land of polytheism
among the philosophers who would
make God’s primary originated
things partners with Him in eternity.
The intermediate group of intuitive
philosophers versed in prophetic
and demonstrative wisdom are the
companions of the blessed Olive
Tree which belongs neither to the
East nor to the West.

Wamīḍ [7.3.12]
 Know that the exaltation of
the Creator, the Originator with
respect to primary origination, and
the grandeur of the Maker, the
Fashioner with respect to
fashioning, is that He in himself is
such that He originates and
fashions, emanates and creates, not
because the things are His creation
and the existents are His
handiwork. His nature with respect
to knowing is also like this. Thus,
His exaltation and His grandeur
with respect to knowledge is that
He in himself knows all things with
the same knowledge by which He
knows himself. All things emanate
from Him unveiled and known, not
because the things are objects of
knowledge to Him. Consequently,
His exaltation and His grandeur are
by reason of His own essence with
respect to all of His modes and His
attributes, not by reason of His
concomitants, His traces, and the
objects of His making and His
fashioning.

Wamīḍ [7.3.13]
In the Shifā’, the Najāt,
and other of his books, he [Ibn
Sīnā] took the path of the
dialecticians and became engaged
in dialectic. We will now set forth
the discourse in the Shifā’ on this
subject. He says in Chapter One,
Book Nine, of the Metaphysics of
the Shifā’:
The clear and unsullied intellect
testifies that if the One Essence
is in all His respects as He was,
and nothing was given existence
from Him before, and He is now
like that, then at this time as
well nothing can be given
existence from Him. Hence, if
something should now come
into existence from Him, then an
intention and will, or a nature,
or a power and capability, or
something like this will have
been produced in the Essence
which didn’t exist before….
The first creature, then,
according to this doctrine, is in
His essence, but this is absurd.
How is it possible for
something to be created in His
essence and from the One who
creates, when it is clear that the
Necessarily Existent [256] by
virtue of himself is one? It is
therefore seen that this is not a
creature from Him, and it is not
the relation sought, for we are
seeking the necessitating
relation for bringing the first
possible thing into actuality. Is it
from another necessarily
existent being? But it is said that
the Necessarily Existent [by
virtue of himself] is one.
Moreover, if it were from
another, then it would be the
First Cause, and the argument
would be asserted concerning it.
Furthermore, how is it possible
for a time of refraining [to act]
and a time of commencing [to
act] to be distinguished in non-
existence? By what does this
time differ from that time?…
Then he said:
Nay, rather we say: Either the
object willed is the act of
calling into existence itself or
there is another object intended
after it. If the object willed is
the act of calling into existence
itself via His essence, then why
didn’t it exist before? Would
you say He deemed it more
appropriate now, or its time has
occurred, or He is powerful to
do it now?…Furthermore, in
what sense is the First prior to
His created actions? Is it by His
essence [like the priority of one
to two] or in time?[316]…
Consequently, if it [creation] is
not preceded by something
which is past in relation to the
first moment of the occurrence
of creation, then it is created
together with its creation. But
how could what belongs to the
first instant of creation not be
preceded by something,
according to them, so that He
was but He did not create, and
then He was and He created?
Neither can “He was but did not
create” be asserted with “He
was and He created” nor can
“His being before creation” be
asserted with “His being
together with creation,”…for
the existence of His essence
[continues] to occur after
creation, while the non-
existence of the creation is
described by the words “it was
and is not now.”
Underlying our words
“He was” is a logical
notion[317] apart from the
logical notion of the two
things….This notion has been
posited to the Creator as an
extension without a beginning
and allowed Him to create
within it beforehand any
creation which can be imagined
within it. If it is like this, then
this priority is quantitative and
measurable, and this is what we
call “time,” since its
mensuration is not the
mensuration of what has
position and fixity, but is
through renewal.
If you wish, ponder our
words in the Physics, since we
have explained that what the
notion of “was and will be”
indicate is accidental to an
unfixed state, and the unfixed
state is motion. If you are
certain, then you know that the
First only precedes creation,
according to them, not
absolutely, but in a time which
has a motion and bodies or a
body along with it.
These people who
would suspend God from the act
of His bounty must admit either
that God was able before He
created the creation to create a
body having motions
corresponding to the instants
and times leading up to the
instant of the creation of the
world, or that it persisted with
the creation of the world and
had various determinate times
and instants up until the instant
of the creation of the world, or
the Creator didn’t commence the
creation except at the moment of
beginning. [257]
The second option
requires the transferal of the
Creator from a state of
powerlessness to a state of
power, or the transferal of
created things from
impossibility to possibility
without a cause. Regarding the
first option, which they divide
into two parts, it may be said
that either it must have been
possible for the Creator to
create another body different
from that body leading up to the
creation of the world with a
different duration and more
motions, or it was not possible.
It is absurd that it should not be
possible, as we have explained.
Therefore, if it is possible, then
either its creation along with the
creation of that first body which
we mentioned before this body
is possible, or it is only
possible before it. If it is
possible along with it, this is
absurd, because it is impossible
for two creations to begin
equivalent in the speed of their
motion and occurring such that
they both lead up to the creation
of the world, while the duration
of one of them is longer than the
other. If it is not possible along
with it, but its possibility is
distinct from it, and prior to it
or posterior to it, then the
possibility of the creation of
something would be determined
in the state of non-existence by
another attribute, and not its
possibility. This is in one state
apart from another state, and it
occurs prior and posterior, and
it would continue without end.
The truth of what we have set
forth concerning the existence of
a motion which has no
beginning in time is evident. Its
only beginning is with respect to
 the Creator, and it is the
celestial motions.
He has mentioned this theme in
the Najāt as well with the same
statements which were used in the
Shifā’. He says: “It is a dialectical
exposition, which if investigated
will lead to demonstration.” We
say: Investigating it in such wise
that it departs from dialectic and
leads to demonstration is something
which is not within the compass of
the power of possibility to
accomplish. Do not the
demonstrations which have been
carried out and the consensus of the
wise concur that the Agent Maker
(glorified be He) precedes this
temporally generated creature in
existence, for example, with an
absolutely separate, eternal,
extensionless priority in the real
world, not a quantifiable,
quantitative, extended priority with
a particular time and instants in the
horizon of changing and elapsing?
We have demonstrated in the
preceding sections by way of
deductive reasoning and the
compounded intellect through a
number of methods that His priority
in relation to the Great World
(‘ālam al-akbar) in its
comprehensive system is identical
to His priority in relation to all of
the generated, temporal creatures,
with an absolute, eternal,
unquantifiable priority, and that the
world in its comprehensive
harmonious system is preceded in
actuality by its definite real non-
existence in perpetuity and by the
existence of its self-subsistent
Maker in eternity. It is impossible
and absurd to postulate another
thing existing before the possible
created world, intermediate [258]
in existence between it and the
Creator. How is it conceivable for
one who possesses a share of innate
intelligence [i.e., Ibn Sīnā] to say
that it is possible for time to be
called into existence before time
and for place to be called into
existence before place, in short, for
the existentiation of extension
before extension and the
existentiation of the world before
the world? The creation of another
body before the body which
encompasses the directions, another
motion before its motion, and
another flowing extension before
the time which is the measure of its
motion, are among essential
impossibilities. This impossibility
is not due to its being something
impossible by reason of the [lack
of] power of the perfect, self-
subsisting Necessary Being, but
rather it is only due to the fact that
in itself it is something unattainable
and impossible. Essential
impossibility does not have the
power to merit a conceivable
essence which is able to receive the
act of creation nor a way to become
dependent upon divine power.
Deficiency and incapacity pertain to
the notion of the impossible, since it
has no essence with which divine
power can become associated,
neither in the estimation nor in
conception, nor through the absolute
power of the All-Powerful, the
Real (magnified be His glory).
Therefore, the creation of the world
after its real non-existence in
perpetuity does not involve the
transferal of the Creator from
powerlessness to power, nor does it
involve a change in His essence or
in any of the attributes and the
modes of His essence, nor does it
pertain to the transferal of the world
from impossibility to possibility,
from not being an object of power
to being an object of power. Nay, it
is only due to the perpetual
deficiency of the substance of the
possible, caused essence and by
reason of the incapacity of the
nature of the essentially possible to
receive eternity and the
impossibility of the pre-eternity of
the determination in perpetuity with
respect to the quiddities of the
possible things themselves and the
realities of the effects, and the
impossibility altogether of
estimating an extension or non-
extension, flow or non-flow,
instants or boundaries, in positive,
perpetual, real non-existence.[318]

Wamīḍ [7.3.14]
His student [Bahmanyār]
states in the Physics of the Taḥṣīl:
You know that it is not possible
for the body restricting the
directions to be multiple in
itself, for if a single thing were
multiple in itself, the existence
of one of it would not be
possible. You know also that
this body is not divisible nor
liable to dissection, so that it
could become multiple through
partition. And you know that it
is necessary for every body
which is multiple to be
preceded by a body which
moves in a circle, so that it is
multiple by reason of that
motion. If this is the case, then it
is not possible for multiple
bodies which encompass the
directions to exist, nor should
multiple intermediates exist.
Hence, it is not possible [259]
for multiple worlds to exist. We
have explained that there is
nothing outside of the
[outermost] sphere, neither
void, nor body, nor plenum. It is
clear that there is no prime
matter which is not enformed by
form. Therefore, the form of the
world is particular to a single
matter through which all the
things confined within a single
world cohere together. The
existence of many worlds is not
 in the realm of possibility.
Our companion states in
Chapter Thirteen, Book Two, of the
Physics of the Shifā’:
If someone should say: What if
the motion [of the outermost
sphere] did not exist? Would
time then not exist, so that other
motions besides it would be
without any priority or
posteriority? Or what we
already mentioned in the doubts
might be said, namely, that the
body in order to be in motion
does not need the motion of
another body; so it is possible
for it to be moving but not
possible for it not to have a
time? The answer to this will
become clear to you. If there
were no circular motion
belonging to a spherical body,
then directions could not be
posited for rectilinear motion;
hence there would be neither
natural nor compulsory
rectilinear motions. Thus it is
possible that the motion of one
body alone without [that of]
other bodies is impossible,
although the impossibility is not
evident. Not every impossible
thing which one assumes can be
shown to be evidently
impossible, for a great number
of impossible things are not
evident and their impossibility
only becomes clear through
exposition and demonstration. If
we rely upon the estimative
faculty, and if we mentally
remove the circular motion and
assert a finite rectilinear motion
in the mind, it would be
possible to assert a limited time
which the estimation could not
deny. However, this is not what
we are considering, but only
that which holds true with
respect to existence. The
existence of time, therefore, is
 dependent upon one motion,
which it measures, and it also
measures the other motions
which cannot exist, except in the
mind, apart from the motion of
the body by whose motion time
is generated.
I say: This is something
which he has reiterated in many
places in the Shifā’, the Ta‘līqāt,
and other of his books and letters,
namely that the arguments raised for
the pre-eternity of the world are not
in the form of demonstrative
expositions; rather they are
dialectical arguments against the
postulations of the Mu‘tazila and
those who share their position,
which is based upon the possibility
of the existence of motions before
the creation of the world. In short, it
is based upon the possibility of
another creation prior to whichever
creation is postulated and assumed
to be the beginning of creation. This
would require the non-existence of
the world prior to its existence to
not be [260] an absolute, real non-
existence not in time and space;
rather it would be a quantitative,
measurable, extended non-existence
without a beginning. This is one of
their suppositions and their
assumptions resulting from their
inability to remove the extension of
time from the estimative faculty, just
as they are unable to remove the
spatial extension from it, for they
estimate, upon assuming the non-
existence of the world, an infinite,
imaginary, temporal extension and
an infinite, imaginary spatial
domain as well. A sound and clear
intellect, however, decrees that both
of these are impossibilities which
the imagination has contrived and
the estimation has conceived.

Wamīḍ [7.3.15]
The rabble among the
meddlers do not content themselves
with making the real non-existence
before the world an extended
quantity without a beginning, but
they exceed this falsehood by
asserting that the hallowed Lord has
the properties of temporal things,
such as magnitude, quantity, limits,
and times. They say: The true
Creator (lauded be He) is
continuous in His extended
existence together with the
extension of the non-existence of the
world without a beginning, and the
determinant (or preponderator
murajjiḥ) for the existence of the
world within a particular boundary
is His particularizing will, without
another determinant and
particularizer besides the will.
[319] It is possible for Him to
create before any creation
postulated within a particular
boundary of the boundaries of that
extension another creation within a
boundary prior to it, without any
beginning. They do not understand
that it is utterly inconceivable for
time to have a “when,” neither with
respect to its existence nor with
respect to its non-existence. Just as
it is not possible for time to exist in
another time, in like manner, it is
impossible for it to be non-existent
in another time. They do not realize
that if it were as they conjecture,
that non-existence itself would be
an unfixed extension in which
equivalence and difference,
elapsing and renewal, and
successive priorities and
posteriorities occur, although
separate from matter and not
subsisting in a locus or a subject.
Time itself is also an unfixed
quantity in which equivalence and
difference, priorities and
posteriorities occur, except that they
subsist in the motion which subsists
in the moving body which is its
substrate. Therefore, the individuals
of a certain determinate species
nature would differ in
incorporeality and materiality,
which is patently false to those
possessed of insight and sufficient
learning. Is it not so that just as a
certain nature does not differ in
accidentality and substantiality, in
the same way, it definitely does not
differ in inherence and non-
inherence, in dependency on prime
matter and in independence from it?
Moreover, [261] if it is possible for
a certain determinate nature to be
completely actualized in
individualization without
attachment to matter, then how
could it happen to it to become
attached in its actualization and its
individualization to matter and its
conditions?
By this the invalidity of the
void and a created fixed dimension
subsisting in itself free of matter is
evident as well, since there is no
distinction between it and the
substantial corporeal form, except
by abstraction from prime matter
and subsisting in it. A number of the
Stoics in the age of the Greeks
believed in this. Calling the
temporal extension “perpetuity”
insofar as it is incorporeal with
respect to itself, and calling it
“time” when attached to matter with
respect to the changeable things
which occur within it, is
invalidated as well. This is the
opinion of a group of agitators who
have muddled philosophy. Indeed, a
group of recent thinkers has
ascribed these two doctrines to the
Leader of Philosophy, the divine
Plato. This is nothing more than a
falsehood and a fabrication.
If both non-existence and
existence are regarded as being
unintelligible in relation to flowing
extension and duration in time, is it
not reasonable for intelligible
substances and divine existents to
be free in essence and existence
from flowing, quantifiable,
temporal duration? What then
should we think about the
Originator of the worlds of
Command and [the physical]
creation, the Self-Subsistent of
eternity and perpetuity, and the
Fashioner of time and space?
Do not forget what we
apprised you of previously, that
giving preponderation without a
determinant is the requisite of
preponderation without a
determinant with respect to the
levels of the will and its dependent
connections. Be not of those who
entangle themselves in the perils of
delusions.

Wamīḍ [7.3.16]
He [Ibn Sīnā] states in the
Ta‘līqāt in opposition to them:[320]
If we suppose a beginning for
the creation of the world in the
manner the Mu‘tazila hold, an
impossibility necessarily
follows, for they hypothesize
something before this event. In
that thing which they
hypothesize, they assume the
possibility of different
motions. But the different
motions can only be true with
the possibility of measuring
them, and the possibility of
measuring them must coincide
with the existence of time.
Consequently, the postulation
of the possibility of the
existence of different motions
[in that thing before creation]
presupposes the existence of
time. Hence, another time
would exist before time.
If time did not exist, it would
not be possible to assume the
existence of different motions.
But the assumption of the
existence [262] of different
motions is possible. Therefore,
the antecedent is false.
If time is existent, then bodies
are existent.
If it is possible to assume
different motions, the existence
of time is necessitated together
with the possibility of this
assumption. And with the
existence of time, the existence
of motion is necessitated, and
with the existence of motion,
the existence of bodies.
Consequently, bodies are
certainly [assumed] existent
with this assumption. There is,
accordingly, no escape from
the mode of time. Priority and
posteriority in motions require
the existence of time.
His words “in one state apart
from another state” and “it
befalls before or after” signify
time.
Motion does not enter into the
substance of the sphere, for
motion is a state supervening
upon it after the realization of
its substance, and motion does
not lead it to corruption as it
leads the things which are
[themselves] in motion, which
are generated, corruptible
things. They are in [a state of]
motion and change from the
beginning of their existence till
their end, and motion produces
an affect on them. For this
reason, it is said that the
sphere is not in motion but
with motion, and with time, not
in time.
The past thing in itself is time,
while the past in time is
motion and that which is in
motion and with it, namely,
what is flowing and
changeable.
Time is the number of motion
with respect to the prior and
the posterior, in other words, a
priority and posteriority in
distance occurs through a
flowing, varying motion.
When motion is assumed to
occur, the thing which
precedes it is not absolutely
nothing. This is because it is
not denied that it is within the
power of God (exalted be He)
to bring motions into existence
in that non-existence which
they advocate. Therefore, if
we postulate the existence of
twenty motions terminating
with the beginning of the first
[thing], and the existence of ten
motions terminating also with
the beginning of the first
[thing], it would not be
possible to say that the
correspondent of two motions
belonging to that non-existence
is the same. Rather, it is
necessary for the
correspondent of the twenty
motions to differ from the
correspondent of the ten
motions. There is no
distinction in absolute
nothingness, and there is no
distinction between these two
except for a quantitative,
flowing difference, which is
time. Consequently, a time will
have preceded the generated
motion, [263] for time is the
measure of motion, and another
motion will have preceded that
motion. Furthermore, there is
inevitably a moving object
together with the existence of
motion. And we have denied
that it can be a separate thing
which has no attachment to
matter. Hence, it is necessary
for the moving object to be a
body or corporeal. If it is
denied that it is within the
power of God to bring motions
into existence before the
beginning of the first motion
which is assumed to be
created, this is a strange
proposition. The assumption of
motions in that non-existence
is equivalent to the assumption
of the void, insofar as it is
absolutely nothing. It is
astonishing that these people
maintain the Fashioner when
they say that bodies are not
separated from phenomena,
like motion or rest, and
whatever is not separated from
phenomena is created. The
major premise needs
emendation, but they say that it
is an axiom. This exposition,
in its feeblemindedness,
obliges them to make the
Fashioner created, because,
according to them, He is not
devoid of created desires (or
wills) and created aversions,
except that they say the will of
God and His aversion are
accidents which are not in a
subject. This, as you see, is
foolish. Or they say that His
will is created, even though
impossible consequences are
required by the creation of His
will. Among them is that it
would need a cause other than
the essence of the Creator, who
is exalted above intending
(qaṣd) or desiring (ṭalab)
 something altogether.
Furthermore, it would imply a
change in the essence of the
First, and it would require
every created [will] to be
preceded by another created
[will] in an infinite regress.
I say: That which he has
explained in the course of his
discourse is that the object sought is
the creation of the world, that is to
say, its existence after its non-
existence in the objective world
and the core of concrete reality. It is
a dialectical argument based upon
their fallacious premises, which
consist of that non-existence being a
measurable, quantitative, extended
non-existence without any beginning
and the existentiation of one or
several motions in that extended
non-existence being essentially
possible and capable of enactment
by the power of God, since it is not
possible to deny this with the
premise of an imaginary extension
in that non-existence. This is what
he intended by saying “This is a
strange proposition.”
Although his aim is to
invalidate these fallacious premises
and baseless propositions, it is a
rational exposition and a
demonstrative explanation which
does not require thereby the
negation of the creation of the
world, in other words, its existence
via the fashioning of the Creator
after its definite, real non-existence
in the domain of perpetuity, the core
of the objective world, and center
of [264] concrete reality, as is
evident to you through
demonstrative expositions and sure
proofs.
Perhaps this decisive
proposition is what he intended in
the book al-Mabda’ wa’l-Ma‘ād,
where he said: “It follows from the
premise of these deniers [of God’s
attributes][321] that God would be
prior to time and motion in another
time.” Then he says: “Let us give
now a dialectical argument, which
if investigated carefully will enable
it to be turned into a demonstration,
such that the deniers will be forced
to admit one moment before another
without end and an infinitely
extended time in the past. These
deniers who have suspended God
from His generosity must either
admit that God is powerful before
He created the creation…” Similar
words are in the Shifā’, and
likewise in the Najāt in exposition
of the chapter connected to this
theme: “The opponents are obliged
to posit a time before time without
end and an infinitely extended time.
This is a dialectical exposition,
which if investigated carefully will
lead to demonstration.” Let it be
considered carefully and not
fumbled.

Wamīḍ [7.3.17]
Among the ways of
argumentation for the eternity of the
world is what he set forth in
Chapter Eleven, Book Three, of the
Physics of the Shifā’, where he
states:
Let us consider: Is it possible
for motion to begin at a certain
moment of time which has no
“before,” or for motion to be a
primary origination while every
boundary of time has a “before”
and the essence of the Creator is
before each thing? We say that
every non-existent thing prior to
its existence is possibly
existent. Consequently, the
possibility of its existence is
existent before its existence. If it
is not an existent which is
possibly existent, it is a non-
existent which is possibly
existent. If it is not possibly
existent, then it is impossible of
existence. Therefore, the
possibility of existence is
existent before existence, and
the possibility of existent
existence is without a doubt an
actual thing which is not the
same as non-existence.[322]
How many are the non-existents
impossible of existence?
Therefore, it [i.e., the possibly
existent] is either a substance
subsisting in itself or something
which is existent in another
thing. If it is something
subsistent in itself, not in a
locus and not in a subject,
insofar as it is such, it is not
correlated; but insofar as it is
possibly existent, it is
correlated to something and
intelligible by analogy.
From this the existence
of a matter which bears the
possibility of the existence of
the creature before its creation
is inferred, as well as the
existence of a motion which
renders it remote from or near
to the Efficient Cause, which
pours forth the essence and
bestows existence. [265] The
generation of each thing is from
the matter which bears the
possibility of that thing, and the
continuous motion is the
 actualizer of the successive
dispositions, which differ in
power and weakness, nearness
and remoteness. Eternal being
[namely, matter] is only
preceded in existence by the
essence of the Efficient Cause.
A similar discourse is found in
Book Four of the Metaphysics of
the Shifā’ in the chapter on
potentiality and actuality,
concerning establishing the priority
of the matter which bears the
potentiality of the existence of
something within it.[323]
We say: Let it be known to you
that this is a fallacy of homonymy
(ishtirāk al-ism), for the term
“possibility” (imkān) in the
terminology of this profession
refers to (1) the possibility of the
essence, whose reality is the simple
negation of the two extremes of
determination (taqarrur) and non-
determination with respect to the
stage of the essence itself, when the
essence is determined in the real
world via the Efficient Cause,
which is called “essential
possibility,” and to (2) the
possibility of the disposition,
whose reality is the potentiality of
matter and its preparedness in
relation to the occurrence of the
thing for which the preparedness
and the potentiality exists, which
subsists in the matter which bears it
when it exists, which is called
“dispositional possibility.”
“Possibility,” therefore, is a term
which applies equally to two
notions. The first only describes the
very essence of the thing when it is
determined and exists, not in the
state of non-existence. Hence, the
meaning of the possibility of the
non-existent is that whenever it
exists, the notion of “possibility” is
abstracted from the substance of its
essence. The second only describes
its bearer and its subject, the
substance of the essence of the
matter, in relation to that which is
not actually in existence, and when
it [the thing] exists, it subsists in it
and its disposition for it [the thing]
definitely disappears from it [the
matter]. Possibility in this second
sense is only admissible for
temporally generated material
things. Therefore, the necessity of
creation being preceded by matter
with a separate priority is only true
for a temporal creature insofar as it
is a temporal creature dependent
upon generation, not for a creature
in perpetuity insofar as it is a
perpetual creature dependent upon
fashioning.[324] The error, then,
arises from the sharing of the term.
A detailed treatment on this is found
in my books al-Īmādāt wa’l-
Tashrīqāt and in al-Mu‘allaqāt
‘alā Ilāhiyyāt al-Shifā’.
It is most aptly stated in the
Najāt, where he says:
Whatever has a temporal
beginning, not a primary
originated beginning, for the
time of its existence is preceded
by a time and a matter before its
existence. In short, the notion of
non-existence (‘adam) is
different from the notion of
potentiality (quwwa), and the
possibility of the possible thing
within the boundary of itself is
apart from the potentiality of
[266] the receptive, bearing
matter and its preparedness in
relation to that which is going to
exist in it subsequently. That
which necessitates the priority
of the existence of matter to the
creation of the thing after its
non-existence is the second
meaning, not the first.
He states in the Ta‘līqāt:
The existents, with the
exception of the Necessarily
Existent whose existence is
through Himself, are possibly
existent. However, among the
existents is that whose
possibility of existence is in
another, and similarly its
potential existence precedes
its actual existence, so it is
possibly existent in an absolute
sense and generated. And
among them is that whose
possibility of existence is in
itself, and it is that whose
possibility of existence is
simultaneous with it and
whose potential existence does
not precede its actual
existence. These are the
intelligences and the other
primary originated things. It
may only be said that they are
possibly existent in the sense
that their existence is not
dependent upon themselves but
upon the Giver of their
existence. Therefore, they are
existent in relation to Him, but
with respect to themselves they
are non-existent.[325]
Non-existence (‘adam) may be
stated in two ways: (1) A non-
existence which has a mode of
existence; it is that which
exists potentially, which may
be made actual. (2) A non-
existence which positively has
 no form.
Everything which exists whose
existence has a cause is
possibly existent. And the
possibly existent is that which
is possible to exist or not to
exist. As for its existence after
its non-existence, this is
necessary, since its existence
is only possible after its non-
existence.
Let it be known that
dispositional possibility, which
requires matter before creation, is a
thing which varies in strength and
weakness. But none of the kinds of
analogical gradation (tashkīk)
apply to essential possibility, and
dependency upon matter is not
required of it at all. The Most
Excellent of Scholars in the Naqd
al-Muḥaṣṣal and in the Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt has expended considerable
effort to attain the highest level on
this subject.

Wamīḍ [7.3.18]
He [Ibn Sīnā] has stated in
the Ta‘līqāt that the absolutely non-
existent does not have the
potentiality within it by which to
receive existence from the Giver of
Existence, and therefore it certainly
does not exist. The possible is not
like this, for it has a potentiality
within it, and therefore it exists.
Were it not for this potentiality, it
could not exist. The mind
recognizes instinctively that what is
not existent, neither it nor its matter
[being existent], cannot receive the
emanation of the Agent, since it is
not possible for the absolutely non-
existent to receive the emanation [of
existence]. How then is [267] the
creation of possible things in their
entirety in perpetuity realizable
without an eternal matter, so long as
they are absolutely non-existent?
What is it that is receptive of the act
of making and dependent upon the
action in absolute non-existence? If
you conjectured this, then recall
what we established for you,
namely, that the effect only receives
the emanation of existence from the
Giver of Existence when it is
existent through Him,[326] not
when it is non-existent, regardless
of whether it is created or pre-
eternal. Consequently, the perpetual
creations in their entirety—their
temporal aspects particularized in
existence to certain times or
determined in the extension of time
from its pre-eternity to its post
eternity, and their changeless
perpetual aspects wholly outside of
the extension of time and outside of
the genera of temporal eternity and
temporal creation—have, due to
essential possibility, the potentiality
to receive the action and the
capability of accepting the
emanation in the state of
determination and at the moment of
existence, but not when they are
absolutely non-existent in
perpetuity.[327] As for the
generated, temporal creations, they
have, when they are not yet
included in generation, with respect
to the priority of the other notion,
which is dispositional possibility,
the potentiality for the emanation
before the actual emanation due to
the state of the matter which bears
their dispositional possibility
moving through dispositional
qualities.[328] The priority of the
potential to receive, with respect to
possibility in the dispositional
sense, is only required by creatures
in time and with respect to the
temporal priority of matter
disposed for a temporal creature.
Absolute non-existence, therefore,
without the existence of a disposed
matter, is only contrary to
generation, but it is not contrary to
primary origination and fashioning.
If you should ask how it is
possible in definite, absolute, real
non-existence for something to be
singled out and distinguished to
necessitate emanation, I would say:
the manifestation (ẓuhūr) of the
complete Agent and His presence
(ḥuḍūr) insofar as He is a complete
agent (I do not mean by that the
consideration of this circumstantial
mode; rather I mean His
manifestation through the
circumstantial mode itself, through
which the essence of the made thing
itself is created and from which it
derives.) is most certainly itself the
presence of the essence of the made
thing itself and its manifestation.
But He is stronger with respect to
necessitating the manifestation of
the made thing and causing its
unveiling than the presence of the
substance of the essence of the
made thing itself, let alone the
presence of its shadowy form.
Since it is evident that the
active Creator (exalted be His
sovereignty) is in His own essence
the complete agent of the system of
the good in the whole of its
existence, He is by virtue of His
own essence such that the totality of
the good overflows from Him and
issues from Him, [268] and the
universal system owes its existence
to Him from pre-eternity till
everlasting, and from the beginning
until the end. Inasmuch as He knows
His own essence with the most
perfect and most sufficient
knowledge, through His very
contemplation of himself He
intellects the system of the good in
all possible worlds from the
beginning of the substantialization
until its end, and from the
commencement of existence until its
utmost limit. He is in His own
essence and by virtue of His own
reality abounding in might, and He
encompasses and knows all things.
Both before their existence and
during their existence all things are
equal in relation to His perfect
knowledge, for He does not acquire
a new knowledge and a fresh
cognition through their existence.
Indeed, the basis of the
manifestation of all else besides
Him is the manifestation of himself
to himself. The same applies to all
of the objects of vision in relation
to His vision, and all of the objects
of hearing in relation to His
hearing, since both His vision and
His hearing are the same as His
essence and His reality, not
something apart from His reality
augmenting the state of His essence.
Therefore, He knows through His
own essence the design of the form
of the good, the bestowal of the
emanation, the perfection of His
handiwork, the fullness of His
mercy in all the worlds of
existence, the manner of the
provision of wisdom in the order of
the system of existence, and the
most excellent sciences and their
principles. Without a doubt, the
entire system of existence is
particularized in its universal,
harmonious particularity and its all-
inclusive, ordered individuality by
emanating from His mercy and
issuing from His essential wisdom,
and the parts of the system in their
particularities, inasmuch as they
themselves are parts of the
individual, particularized system,
by necessity emanate from Him. It
follows, therefore, that He
originates the entire system and
brings it into existence through His
grace and His mercy, and He raises
it up and causes it to proceed from
Him from the beginning until the
end through His generosity and His
wisdom. The cord of idle fancy has
been severed, and the root of those
who obfuscate knowledge[329] has
been pulled out. Praise be to God,
the Lord of the worlds.
 Wamīḍ [7.3.19]
He [Ibn Sīnā] states in the
book al-Mabda’ wa’l-Ma‘ād,
taking the path of dialectic:
How can time be created so that
it is possible for motion to be
created? Every now is after a
before and before an after.
Hence, it is a common boundary
between two things, both of
which it continuously requires.
Among the things which this
clarifies is that it may be
explained that the existence of
the now is the existence of the
boundary, and not something
 intelligible in itself. The same
applies to all of the limits of
magnitudes. But the now does
not correspond to the point,
since the point may be divided,
and it may be a common
boundary. [269]
We have quoted this in the
book Khulsat al-Malakūt, and we
have established that the creation of
time in existence and the finitude of
its continuous extension with
respect to its quantitative magnitude
is something which does not require
the now to be a divider like the
separating point which is the
divider of a straight, fixed,
continuously intersected extension,
for the now is strictly a connector,
like the connective point assumed in
the circumference of a circle of
finite magnitude with respect to
area. We have recounted it to you in
what has preceded, and we will
elaborate upon the doctrine
concerning it again, if God, the
Almighty, the All-Knowing, wills.

Wamīḍ [7.3.20]
He [Ibn Sīnā] states in his
epistle treating this subject with
respect to invalidating that the
existence of the world had a
temporal beginning:
This is an epistle which I have
written…concerning the
arguments of those who assert
that the past has a temporal
beginning and an explanation of
their analysis into syllogisms by
their form and the matter of their
premises together. The millstone
of what is said in its chapters,
whose number is eleven, turns
upon the fact that the premises
which they have used in their
syllogisms are all common
beliefs, which are neither
primary principles nor sound. It
is clear that the impossibility of
infinity is conditioned by the
possession of the two attributes
of succession (tarattub) and
conjunction (ijtimā‘) in
existence, and that a true
proposition for each and every
member [in a series] may be
false for the whole. Otherwise
the whole would be a part,
since each one is a part.
Therefore, if all of the units are
created in time, it is not
necessary for the whole to be
created in time. It is also clear
that increase and decrease do
not apply to what is infinite in
the direction in which it is
infinite, not in the direction in
which it is finite. The
revolutions [of the sphere]
which are in the direction of the
past from the time of the Flood
are less than those which are
from our time, yet despite this
they are infinite in the direction
of the past. And it is clear that
the dependence of the existence
of a temporal creature upon the
termination of what is infinite,
such as the motions existing in
elapsed times in the direction of
the past which are not
simultaneous in existence, is
something which does not imply
an absurdity.[330] Perchance
 through what we have instructed
you and recited to you, you are
not in doubt about what we have
affirmed with true and decisive
propositions.
In Chapter Eleven, Book
Three, of the Physics of the Shifā’
he takes the same path as in the
epistle [on eternity], and he asserts
that time and motion are existents
by means of continuity in the past
and in the future, and that [270] the
infinity of the number of revolutions
[of the sphere] and the former
returns in the direction of the past,
only refer to non-ceasing infinity, as
in the direction of the future, but not
to an actual numerical infinity.[331]
At the end of this chapter,
he says:
These people have necessitated
what I am saying, for they
certainly admit that before the
first motion there were a
number of finite motions which
the Creator brought into being,
and each one of them has a state
of persistence and non-
persistence posited to arrive
constantly upon it without
interruption. If their number is
ten, for example, then it must
either (1) be possible, in their
view—together with the
possibility of the existentiation
of the first of them until the
existentiation of the motion
existing now—for twenty
motions to exist according to the
mentioned constant succession,
such that the persistence of each
one of them and its non-
persistence correspond to what
we posited for these ten—or (2)
that is not possible according to
them. It they admit this, it is not
impossible for those ten to exist
in bodies and these twenty in
other bodies. Thus these twenty
will have existed in the period
of these ten, while the state of
each one in persistence and non-
persistence is like the state of
the other. But this is impossible.
If they don’t admit this, it is
necessary for a number to be in
the state of non-existence due to
the possibility of the occurrence
of motions and their
existentiation in succession.
This certainly requires that it
should be something which is
infinite, since there is no state
which is the first possible state.
Therefore, actual existents,
according to their method, have
no limit in the past. Yet they
deny this. Other things are
required, such as what we
forced [them to admit] with
respect to time, namely that
there are constantly arriving
changes. Otherwise, one
existence would not follow after
another existence, whether the
subject for them is an existent,
since there is no change except
in a subject, or the subject is the
essence of the real One,
according to them, since there is
nothing other than Him. But this
is heresy. Exalted and glorified
is He above what the heretics
say.
We say: Yes, he has forced
them by what he has adduced
against them, and there is no refuge
or escape for them from it at all. We
have informed you, by the grace of
God (glorified be He), that the
partisans of reason and the people
of truth are in a spacious realm
above all of this. Real non-
existence is sanctified from the
estimation of extension and
limitation. A motion before the first
motion, a body before the first
body, and, in short, a creation
before the first creation, is
something which, within the
boundary of itself, is essentially
impossible and completely
unfeasible. However, we say: Just
as heresy with regard to the
attributes of God (exalted be His
remembrance) is compelled upon
those who burden themselves with
the notion of an extended non-
existence before God called the
beginning of the world into
existence, [271] in like manner, that
which those who esteem themselves
to be philosophers hold concerning
the pre-eternity of the primary
originated things in existence is a
kind of religious blasphemy and
taking partners with God.
Immeasurably exalted is He above
what the oppressors impute.
 Wamīḍ [7.3.21]
Perchance you have heard
the argument for the pre-eternity of
the world based on eternal
existence (wujūd sarmadī) in
perpetuity propounded by some of
the followers of the philosophers
who have not placed a true step
upon the path of learning. Their
argument is that the pre-eternity of
the possible requires the possibility
of pre-eternity, and essential
possibility in primary originated
things makes possible the emanation
from the Emanator, the pouring forth
of grace by His bounty, and the
bestowal of liberality through His
mercy. This is clearly false, for we
have explained previously that the
characteristic of essential
possibility is the possibility of both
the nature of unqualified existence
and the nature of unqualified non-
existence.[332] And this is not
incompatible with the impossibility
of certain particular characteristics
of existences or non-existences with
respect to the essence by reason of
particularity. Consequently, the pre-
eternity of the possibility of the
nature of unqualified existence does
not require the possibility of eternal
pre-eternal existence (wujūd azalī
sarmadī). Let is be recognized.

Wamīḍ [7.3.22]
The author of al-Milal
wa’l-Niḥal [Shahrastānī] states in
exposition of Proclus:
An example of this is the
account of the arguments of
Proclus for the eternity of the
world. The doctrine of the
eternity of the world and the
pre-eternity of motions, after
establishing the Fashioner and
the doctrine of the First Cause,
only appeared following
Aristotle, because he clearly
differed from the ancient
philosophers [on this question],
and he devised this theory based
on syllogisms which he
considered to be a proof and a
demonstration. Several of his
students followed in his
footsteps and elaborated upon
his doctrine, such as Alexander
of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and
Porphyry. Proclus, who is
aligned with Plato,[333] wrote
a book on this subject in which
he presented these arguments.
However, the ancient
philosophers only stated about it
what we have already reported.
The first argument: He
said: The Creator is generous in
himself, and the cause of the
existence of the world is His
generosity. His generosity is
eternal and unceasing. It follows
then that the existence of the
world is eternal and unceasing.
He said: It is not possible for
Him to be at one time generous
and at another time not
generous, for this would
necessitate a change in His
essence, and He is unceasingly
generous by virtue of himself.
[272] He said: There is no
obstacle hindering the
emanation of His generosity,
since were there an obstacle, it
would not be from himself but
from another. The Necessarily
Existent by virtue of himself has
neither an inducing factor for
anything nor a preventive factor
for anything.
The second: He said:
The Creator must always be
either an actual creator or a
potential creator. In other
words, He is able to act or not
to act. If He is the first, the
effect will always be created,
and if He is the second, that
which is potential cannot
become actual except by a
mover, and what moves
something from potentiality to
actuality is not the essence of
the thing. It is necessary then for
it to have a mover from the
outside which acts upon it. This
contradicts His being an
absolute creator, who is subject
to neither influence nor change.
The third: He said:
Every cause for which
movement and change are
impossible can only be a cause
with respect to its essence, not
with respect to transferal from
inaction to action. The effect of
every cause with respect to its
essence is with respect to its
essence. If it never ceases, its
effect never ceases.
The fourth: Time
cannot be existent without the
sphere, nor can the sphere be
existent without time, because
time is the counter of the
motions of the sphere.
Therefore, it is not possible to
say “when” and “before” and
“after” except when there is
time. “When” and “before” are
everlasting, and, therefore, so
are time, the motions of the
sphere, and the sphere
everlasting.
 The fifth: He said: The
world is the best system, the
most perfect constitution, and its
Fashioner is generous and good.
Excellence and goodness cannot
be canceled except by evil. Its
Fashioner is not evil. Therefore,
He is unable to cancel it, and it
is never canceled. That which is
never canceled is eternal.
The sixth: Since the
generated is only corrupted by
something extraneous which
occurs to it, and nothing other
than the world is outside of it
which is possible to occur so it
can be corrupted, it is
established that it [the world] is
not corruptible. What corruption
cannot touch, generation and
creation cannot touch. But every
generated thing is corruptible.
The seventh: He said:
Things which are in their natural
place are neither changeable,
generable, nor corruptible. They
are only changeable, generable,
and corruptible when they are in
alien places and they are
interattracted to their places,
like the fire in our bodies which
attempts to become disengaged
and return to its center. When
the association is broken, it is
corrupted. [273] Generation and
corruption, however, only affect
composites, not the simples
which are the elements in their
[natural] places. They are in one
state, and what is in one state is
eternal.
The eighth: He said:
The intellect, the soul, and the
spheres move in a circle. The
natures move either from the
middle or toward the middle in
a linear way. Since it is like
this, the mutual alienation
among the elements is only due
to the incompatibility of their
motions. Circular motion,
however, has no contrary;
therefore, corruption cannot
occur to it.[334]
The ninth: He said: The
universals of the elements only
move in a circle, even though
the particulars move linearly.
Therefore, the sphere and the
universals of the elements do
not suffer corruption. Since it is
not possible for the world to be
corrupted, it is not possible for
it to be generated.
Among those who side
with Proclus is one who
defended him for mentioning
these arguments. He said that he
was speaking to the people in
two ways. One of them was
spiritual and simple; the second
was material and composite.
The people of his time were
speaking to him in a material
way, and they prevailed upon
him to relate these arguments
because of their opposition to
him. Thus he departed from the
way of wisdom and philosophy
in this regard. Later he wrote a
book on this subject, and
someone who didn’t understand
him studied it. He understood
only the outer meaning of his
words, not their inner meaning.
 We say: The way to solve
these difficulties and dispel these
doubts is that which we have taught
you by the leave of God (glorified
be He). As for the first three of
them, you are cognizant that the non-
existence of the world before its
existence is because of the
substance of its essence, due to the
deficiency of the nature of
possibility and the inadequacy of
the quiddity to receive the
emanation [of existence] pre-
eternally and eternally, not due to a
certain mode awaited in the
Efficient Cause. As for the fourth
doubt, the difference between
temporal priority and eternal real
priority is clear to you. The latter is
outside of the category of “when”
and outside of the realm of time and
motion. As for the last five doubts,
it is not possible for that which is
incorruptible to be subject to
generation, for this consists of
creation in time and composition
from matter. But it is not impossible
for it to be primary originated in
perpetuity after real non-existence
with an unquantifiable posteriority.
Be not of those who are
uninformed. [274]

Wamīḍ [7.3.23]
 In al-Milal wa’l-Niḥal in
exposition of the teacher of the
Greek Peripatetics, Aristotle, after
presenting certain points from his
discourse in the Metaphysics
containing sixteen exalted and
heavenly questions, he recorded
him with these words:
One of the materialists
(dahriyya)[335] asked
Aristotle: If the Creator is
eternal and nothing was with
Him, and then He created the
world, why did He create it? He
said to him: “Why” is not
admissible to ask of Him,
because “why” requires a
cause, and the cause is
predicated in such a way that it
is a cause from a causer above
Him, although there is no cause
above Him. He is not a
composite, so it is impossible
for His essence to consist of
several causes. Consequently,
“why” is negated from Him. He
only produces what He
produces because He is
generous (jawād).
Then it was stated: He
must be an eternal agent since
His generosity is eternal. He
replied: The meaning of “being
eternal” (lam yazal) is not to
have a beginning, but “to
produce” (fa‘ala) requires a
beginning. The conjunction of
what has no beginning with
what possesses a beginning is
impossible and contradictory in
word and in essence.
Then he was asked: Will
this world end? He replied:
Yes. It was stated: If it comes to
an end, then His generosity will
come to an end. He replied: He
will cause it to end so that He
can give it a form which is not
subject to corruption, since this
form is subject to corruption.
This is the end of his
 account. He ascribes this
section to Socrates, who spoke
it to Hippocrates. It is a typical
discourse of the ancients.
I say: If this ascription is
correct, and this discourse does
come down from Aristotle, it is
clear, as our companion in
instruction maintains in his book al-
Jam‘ bayna al-Ra’yayn, that
Aristotle believed in the creation of
the world, and that he does not
differ from his master, the divine
Plato, on this question. In short, the
words and saying of Aristotle on
this subject are very contradictory
and conflicting. Methinks he is
bewildered in his deliberation and
confused in his thinking by reason
of the difficulties of this recondite
theme. May God, the glorified,
inform us.

Wamīḍ [7.3.24]
One of the things he
declares openly and proclaims
loudly is that Aristotle, the Teacher,
believed that the proposition of the
pre-eternity of world or its creation
is subject to doubt and that there is
no path to attain certainty on it by
means of demonstration, which he
stated in the First Discipline in the
explanation of the distinction [275]
between a dialectical proof and a
dialectical problem, that is to say,
between a dialectical premise and a
dialectical question. Our
companion reported it in the Shifā’
in Chapter Eight, Book One, of the
Topics, where he said:
This is a chapter on widely
recognized dialectical premises
and dialectical problems. We
are obliged to define a
dialectical premise as a part of
a dialectical syllogism, and a
dialectical problem as one of
two contradictory positions to
which a dialectical syllogism
leads. For the one who answers,
it is a support and a
preservation, while for the
questioner, it is the opposite of
this. Thus it is necessary for him
to understand this convention of
the First Discipline, not as it is
thought, that these two refer to
one thing which is actually or
potentially a part of a
dialectical syllogism. This is
not conformable to the purpose
and object of this convention.
Nay, according to what we say,
it is not possible for a premise
to be dialectical unless it is
widely recognized or
sanctioned. Therefore, a
dialectical premise is a
generally accepted or
sanctioned premise. As for the
dialectical problem, it is also
not proper for it to be anything.
Not every problem is
dialectical, but dialectical
problems are those whose
acceptance is not agreed upon,
but which are controversial,
disputed, and subject to doubt.
The dialectical problem,
therefore, is something into
which inquiry is made and in
which the two contradictory
sides of the question are
compared.
 He goes into this in great
detail. Then he says:
As for what follows this in the
First Discipline,[336] it is
understood in two respects. The
less likely of them is that he is
saying: As for that which is
more entitled to be a dialectical
question, in other words, to be a
premise inferred by the
question, it is that to which
seeking approval pertains for a
notion which benefits it with
respect to establishing the
conclusion through what is
favored or eschewed, or a
conclusion of belief through
what is regarded to be true and
for which knowledge is sought.
The second aspect, which is the
more likely of them, is that he is
asserting the doctrine with
respect to the dialectical
premise, and taking it as such by
itself, not with respect to a
particular questioner and
answerer. Then he is
subordinating it to the
dialectical conclusion. It is as
though he is saying: As for the
dialectical conclusion, it is a
practical proposition or a
proposition of belief. Either
something is correlated to it by
virtue of itself or it is correlated
to it so that it is specified in the
knowledge of another thing. It is
certainly something which is not
manifestly recognized, for it is
proper for it to be doubted with
respect to it, because he did not
regard it to belong to the
masses, for example, that there
are three syllogistic difficulties,
or he did not regard it to belong
to the philosophers, for
example, the question: Are the
heavenly bodies even or odd? It
may be that [276] the dialectical
correlates to a kind of them by
generally accepted premises,
that it is more suitable by them
that they are even or odd. Or the
philosophers have a different
view than what the general
public have, or there is variance
about it between two factions of
each group. In general, that
which occurs with respect to it
is a doubt, and it is the object of
doubt, either in order to oppose
the proofs for it and reverse
them, or to cancel all the proofs
on both sides, or they are
remote from the accepted thing,
like the state of the world: Is it
pre-eternal or not? Even more,
that something whose proof is
improbable is not a dialectical
question. It is that for which
there is no syllogism with
generally accepted premises,
and for which a syllogism based
on primary principles is absurd.
For example, is the angle of half
a circle a right angle? Know
that many of the opinions of the
philosophers are not shared by
the masses, nor is there a path to
them with the generally
accepted [premise]. However,
there is a path leading to them
by demonstration, and most of
the opinions are contrary to it.
There is no path of the people
 that leads to them through
primary principles, though a
syllogism with a generally
accepted [premise] may burden
itself with them, as for example,
the question are the heavenly
bodies even or odd? Is Saturn
ill-fated or fortune bringing?
It is clear here that the
First Teacher is claiming that the
question of the pre-eternity of the
world or its creation is subject to
doubt no matter which position is
taken and that there is no proof for
either side except by dialectic. Our
companion in leadership has
imitated him and followed in his
footsteps in the Shifā’ and in his
other books. Regarding the words
of our companion in instruction in
al-Jam‘ bayna al-Ra’yayn, that
what he [Aristotle] set forth in the
First Discipline is only being used
as an example, and that what he
believes in is the creation of the
world, we have recited to you what
pertains to this in the beginning of
the book.[337] In short, completing
the demonstration of the creation of
the world by means of the
compounded intellect is one of the
things my Lord has favored me with
through His abounding grace. Praise
be to God, the Lord of the worlds.
 Wamīḍ [7.3.25]
Are you aware that our
companion in leadership has
recorded at the end of the
sophistical art, one of the [logical]
arts in the Shifā’, an account from
the Giver of the Craft, Aristotle, in
which he said:
We have not acquired the craft
of the sophistical art from those
who preceded us among our
leaders and our masters; rather
we have inherited from them
rhetorical, practical, dialectical
and demonstrative things. As for
the form of the syllogism and the
form of each and every
syllogism, according to the
method [277] which the logician
determines—a matter from
which we turned away and were
repelled from its acquisition for
a long time until we discovered
it—if a shortcoming occurs in
this one art, let the one who
notices it after examination
excuse me, accept the gift,
insofar as we have given it
correctly, and know that the
acquisition of this principle and
the discovery of the rule of this
craft is more splendid in
position and more eminent in
 rank than the edifice built upon
it, especially if the discoverer,
despite the fact that he is an
inventor, originator, and master
of the perfection of the craft and
its rules, does not leave it
except for things which are
insignificant.
Then he says:
This is what the First Teacher
imparts. For my part, I say to the
concourse of students and
thinkers about the sciences,
ponder what this great
philosopher has stated. Then
consider: Has anyone who has
reproached him for a
shortcoming since that time
attained this goal during this
period of close to 1330 years,
and spoken truthfully such that
he has confessed to his own
shortcoming, since he is remiss
in the same way? Has anyone
come after him who has
surpassed him in this art?
Certainly not! Nay, what he
produced is complete and
perfect. The share stops at him
and prohibits extending beyond
him to another. With the lack of
clarity of our philosophical
speculation during the days of
our endeavor to acquire
knowledge, our complete
devotion to it, and our
employment of an intelligent
mind devoted to what is
necessary, we contemplated,
investigated, and studied, but
we did not find a way out for
the sophistry other than what he
mentioned. If there is anything,
the details belong to some
sentences which we borrowed
from him, which we hope to
increase as a proof for it in
what follows when we hope to
be free for what is most
necessary. In the book which his
teacher produced and named the
Book of the Sophists, he turned
aside from the necessary and
fell short in it from competence
[to meet the task]. As for his
deviation, he confused logic
with the natural and the divine.
This was due to a weakness of
distinction which was in it
before the appearance of this
great philosopher. As for his
falling short, he did not
understand any aspect of the
fallacy except the common term.
It is more proper for us to speak
the truth and say that if the sum
of the knowledge of that man is
what came to us from him, his
 provisions were paltry and
philosophy did not become
mature in his time with a
maturity which could be reaped.
Whoever burdens himself with
bigotry and does not possess
any of his knowledge except for
what was passed down to us,
this is either because of
jealousy of this man or due to a
common saying which holds the
more prior in time to be
superior in the craft in rank. The
truth is the opposite of this.
[278]
I say: If this companion
were in our time, and he were to
take from careful reflection a
crystalline humor, from the desire
of truth an eyeball, from the
yearning for illumination a pupil,
and from the nature of equity a
reflection, he would perceive with
the eye of certainty that just as not
even a fraction of the categories of
the arts of the wisdom of balance
(al-mīzān) [i.e., logic] had become
mature until the time of the Giver of
the Craft, Aristotle, with a maturity
which could be reaped, in like
manner, a significant portion of the
foundational principles of
metaphysics, especially in the area
of divine questions, was immature
and unripe, and did not become
mature until our time with a
maturity which could be reaped.
Notwithstanding this, we do not
deny the truth of our predecessors
and the precedence of the early
philosophers in determining the
laws and setting forth the rules.
May God recompense them from us
and from the concourse of the
people of knowledge with a goodly
reward, for they indeed established
the foundations and pointed out the
path. “But God guides whom He
wills to the straight path.”
 The Eighth Qabas
Inquiry into the power of God and
His will after completing what
remains in the care of
the intellect, through the use of
decisive utterance, to solve
some of the difficulties and
dilemmas caused by doubt
and the confusions arising from idle
fancies.

Wamḍa [8.1]
Have you not heard from
among the ranks of logical rules and
philosophical principles that the
nature of the concomitance (luzūm)
of one thing to another thing may be
principal with respect to the
particular characteristics of the two
sides with respect to the substances
of their essences, as with the
concomitance of evenness to four. I
mean by this the four being even, in
other words, divisible into two
equal parts. And this concomitance
may not be principal with respect to
the very substances of the two
sides, but rather it may be
subordinate to another intermediate
concomitance and with respect to
the mediacy of another
concomitance which is principal, as
with the concomitance of the
concomitance of the evenness of the
four to it. This does not belong to
the essence of four itself with
respect to its substance, but only
derives from the impossibility of its
separation from evenness. The
impossibility of its separation from
the concomitance of evenness is
implied by this also, so that if the
retention of the concomitance of
evenness is possible for it along
with the possibility of its separation
from the concomitance of the
concomitance, the substance of its
essence would be free from the
requirement of the concomitance of
the concomitance. The same would
apply to the concomitance of the
concomitance of the concomitance,
and to the concomitance of the
concomitance of the concomitance
of the concomitance, and so on to
infinity. The discourse concerning it
is completely poured into this mold.
Consequently, the totality of the
concomitances, with the exception
of the first concomitance, are
subordinate concomitances, not
principal concomitances. [280]

Wamḍa [8.2]
Principal concomitance
between the fundamental object of
concomitance and its primary,
principal concomitant is required
by the concomitance between the
two contradictories of these two
upon conversion. As for
subordinate concomitance in
relation to the subordinate
concomitant in a posterior stage, it
may not require the realization of
concomitance between the two
contradictories upon conversion.
This is because the contradictory of
the concomitant depends upon the
nullification of the source of the
principal concomitance between the
two entities, as it is clear that the
necessity of the conversion of the
concomitance between the two
contradictories is only upon
assuming that concomitance remains
between the two entities, so that it
is correct to say that the non-
existence of the concomitant is
definitely required by the non-
existence of the object of
concomitance, not upon assuming
the absence of concomitance
between them. Since, according to
this assumption, the non-existences
of these two would not be the non-
existence of the concomitant and the
non-existence of the object of
concomitance, these two are not
concomitant at all. Therefore, the
concomitance of four and the
concomitance of evenness which
belongs to it, for example, do not
require concomitance between the
two contradictories of these two,
just as the concomitance of four and
evenness do require it. Does not the
contradictory of the subordinate
concomitant, which is the non-
concomitance of evenness to four,
negate the principle of principal
concomitance between four and
evenness? Without a doubt the
negation (irtifā‘) of concomitance
between four and that concomitance
is required as well, for it is
subordinate with respect to the
primary, principal concomitance. If
the primary is nullified, the
subordinate is also certainly
nullified. Consequently, the
contradictory of the concomitant is
not retained as a contradictory of
the concomitant, and the
contradictory of the object of
concomitance is not retained as a
contradictory of the object of
concomitance, so that concomitance
is not required between them at all.
It is therefore clear that the non-
existence of the concomitance of
evenness to four does not require
the non-existence of four, in contrast
to how it is for the non-existence of
evenness, since it definitely
requires the non-existence of four.
 Wamḍa [8.3]
If this question is
considered carefully and
investigated, it is evident that the
object of the concomitance of
evenness, for example, which is the
principal concomitant, is the very
essence of four. As for the object of
concomitance of its concomitance
to it, which is the subordinate
concomitant, it is not four itself in
reality, but it is its being-an-object-
of-concomitance (malzūmiyyati-hā)
for evenness. Therefore, the non-
existence of the concomitant which
is the concomitance of evenness to
four only requires the non-existence
of that being-an-object-of-
concomitance which [281] is the
object of concomitance belonging to
it in reality, not four itself, which is
the object of the concomitance of
evenness in reality, only belonging
to the concomitance of evenness
accidentally. According to this, the
non-existence of every concomitant
requires the non-existence of that
which is its essential object of
concomitance, but it is not possible
for the primary object of
concomitance to be the essential
object of concomitance of the
subordinate concomitant. Let it be
recognized.

Wamīḍ [8.3.1]
Is this theme difficult for
you to comprehend because the
deceivers test you and mislead you
by it, saying that anything whose
entrance into existence does not
require the negation (raf‘) of a
certain real thing is certainly
permanently existent with a
perpetual continuity? For if it were
possible for it to have a real non-
existence in the domain of
perpetuity and the heart of the real
world, its entrance into existence
would undoubtedly require the
nullification of that non-existence
and its definite removal from the
domain of perpetuity and the real
world. Otherwise, the two
contradictories would be
simultaneous in the core of concrete
existence, and the assumption
would be violated.[338] However,
the entrance into existence of every
possible essence does not require a
certain actual negation at all, since
were this required, this requiring
(istilzām) would be required also,
as a consequence of which its
entrance into existence would be an
object of concomitance, and the
requiring of the negation of a
certain thing from the real world
would be a concomitant. It is
established in its seat in the science
which is the balance for
philosophical speculation, the
criterion for demonstration, and the
measure for all the sciences that
concomitance (mulāzama) between
two entities is necessarily retained
between the two contradictories
upon conversion. This implies that
the non-existence of its requiring
the negation of a certain thing from
the real world is required by the
non-existence of its entrance into
existence in pre-eternity and post
eternity. And it has been established
by argument (tamhīd) and settled by
convention (waḍ‘) that the non-
existence of its requiring the
negation of a certain real thing is
required by its perpetual existence
in pre-eternity and post-eternity. So
this is absurd and baseless. For it is
evident that whatever is possible of
essence is actually realized in
existence in perpetuity perpetually
and pre-eternally, not after a
perpetual real non-existence which
is negated from perpetuity by
existence.
The eternity (qidam) of the
Great World with all of its parts is
therefore implied in perpetuity with
an eternal perpetuity. Yet the
consensus of the learned, one and
all, has held to the opposite of this.
This is a difficult calamity among
the intractable problems which
have incapacitated great minds and
rendered philosophical speculation
barren until our time. Methinks at
this moment you discern, through
what we have caused you to see,
that the problem [282] here is
solved and the calamity is removed.
It is evident that the non-existence
of the subordinate concomitant,
which is the requiring of a certain
actual negation from the real world,
does not require the non-existence
of the principal object of
concomitance, which is entrance
into the world of existence, since it
is dependent upon the nullification
of the source of the principal
concomitance. Rather it follows that
it requires the non-existence of that
which is the essential object of
concomitance of that requiring in
reality. It is nothing but the being-
an-object-of-concomitance of the
principal object of concomitance of
that negation, not the principal
object of concomitance itself,
which is entrance into the world of
existence in its own substance. This
is the apex of the degrees of inquiry
and the station of the abode of truth.
Be not of those who wander
blindly.

Wamīḍ [8.3.2]
It may come to the
estimative faculty sometimes in the
path of solving a problem (1) that
what inquiry has established and
argument has settled is that the non-
existence of the requiring of a
certain negation from the real world
from the beginning of the thing
perpetually necessitates existence.
This means that if there is no
requirement for a certain actual
negation, it is necessary for
existence to be obtained perpetually
from pre-eternity to everlasting.
The premise established in its seat
is that the non-existence of the
concomitant whose concomitance is
assumed, upon assuming the actual
realization of the requiring, is
required by the non-existence of the
object of concomitance whose
being an object of concomitance is
assumed.[339] Consequently, what
a difference between what the
argument established and what the
sophistical dilemma compelled,
[340] building upon what is
established in its seat. And
sometimes [it may come to it] (2)
that the non-existence of requiring a
certain actual negation for the
entrance into existence of what is
possible of essence is impossible,
as a result of which it is
permissible for it, upon assuming
its realization, to necessitate the
non-existence of that possible thing,
even though this requiring is also an
impossibility, since it is allowable
by the intellect that a certain
impossibility may necessitate
another impossibility. Nothing of
these two returns to a profitable
advantage.
As for the first, the path of
the rule established in its seat is that
if a requiring between two things is
assumed, the non-existence of that
whose being-a-concomitant is
assumed is certainly required by the
non-existence that whose being-an-
object-of-concomitance is assumed,
regardless of whether it pertains to
that non-existence from the
beginning of the thing or following
realization. The path of the
sophistical dilemma is that if it is
correct for there to be a certain
requiring (istilzām) between the
entrance into existence of what is
possible of essence and a certain
actual negation, [283] this requiring
is also a concomitant for the object
of concomitance. Consequently, the
non-existence of this requiring
would certainly be the non-
existence of that whose being-a-
concomitant is assumed, regardless
of whether it is the non-existence of
this requiring altogether or its non-
existence after realization. And it
would certainly be required by the
non-existence of the entrance into
existence of that possible essence.
Yet the argument has established
that the non-existence of this
requiring is required by the
existence of something perpetually.
This is absurd.
As for the second,
allowing one impossible to require
another impossible is a positively
baseless objection. It is nothing but
the path of those who say “We do
not concede…” and “Why is it
not…” Among the generally
accepted principles is that requiring
between two impossibles is only
possible if a mutual incompatibility
does not exist between them in
mental consideration. Furthermore,
we have ascertained in al-Ufuq al-
Mubīn that complete lack of
incompatibility does not necessitate
maintaining requiring, but rather it
is absolutely unavoidable for
requiring to have an essential
intelligible connection, which is the
basis for realizing concomitance
between two concepts. A
distinction between the impossible
and the possible is not reasonable
with respect to requiring by an
intelligible connection and its [the
requiring’s] non-existence by its
[the connection’s] non-existence.
Just as the actual realization of
requiring is only through the actual
realization of a natural connection,
in the same way, potential requiring
(al-istilzām bi’l-imkān) is only
through the realization of a potential
natural connection.
In sum, the connection of
concomitance between two things is
due to the causality of one of them
to the other or due to their being-an-
effect simultaneously to a single
cause. Therefore, if something
which is not an essential
impossibility is an object of
concomitance for a concomitant,
and if it is a cause of it, its
existence is definitely required for
its very existence and its non-
existence is definitely required for
its very non-existence. If it is an
effect of it, its existence definitely
needs its existence in its
particularity, and its non-existence
definitely needs its non-existence in
its particularity, no other. The same
applies if it is an effect of its cause.
Consequently, if an essentially
possible thing were to require that
requiring, it would be necessary for
the non-existence of that requiring
to require the non-existence of that
possible thing in its particularity,
not its existence and its non-
existence necessarily together. Yes,
this is conceivable for that which is
an object of concomitance among
essentially impossible things,
because the essentially impossible
in the nature of its notion requires
its non-existence to be included
with its existence. Moreover, the
impossibility of the non-existence
of that requiring only pertains to the
object of concomitance itself, but it
is not essentially impossible in
itself. Be not of those who wander
astray. [284]

Wamḍa [8.4]
According to the people of
truth among the companions of the
Craft, there is a clear distinction in
a number of respects between
absence (intifā’) and limit (intihā’)
in magnitude. The first is that the
absence of magnitude is the
negation of its essence and the
nullification of its being, while its
limit is the termination of its
continuity and the end of its
extension.
The second is that the
relation of absence to the center
(waṣaṭ) and the side (ṭaraf) is the
same, since it is the absolute
nullification of the existence of
magnitude. As for the limit, it is the
nullification of the essence of the
magnitude at one side of its sides
and the termination of its extension
at one boundary of its boundaries.
The third is that the
absolute nullification of the
extension of an existent magnitude
at a particular boundary (ḥadd) is a
negation which belongs to it
regardless of whether that boundary
is an end for its extension, a
correspondent of the direction of its
extension, and a course (samt) for
its unfolding, or not. This is in
contrast to how it is with the limit,
for it is the absence of the extension
of an existent magnitude at a
boundary occurring in the direction
of its unfolding and corresponding
to the course of its extension, such
that it is possible for the intellect,
with the assistance of the estimative
faculty, to conceive of another
extension contiguous with it which
that boundary joins together.
Whenever it is not this way, there is
neither a boundary nor a limit but
rather an absence only. A circle
around a pole in the plane of a
sphere is absent at the point of the
pole but existent in its entirety
outside of it. It is incorrect to say
that the pole is its boundary or that
it ends at the pole. In like manner,
the extension of the plane of a cone
is absent at the point of the top but
existent in its entirety beyond it, and
it is not true that it ends at it, and
that it [the point] is its essential
boundary. The two extensions of the
plane of a triangle, also, are absent
at any of the points of its angles,
and this does not require its [a
point’s] being a boundary for the
plane of the triangle and the plane
of the triangle ending essentially at
a point.[341] The body of a cone is
similarly absent at the point of the
top. The convex body, also, is
absent at a line at which the two
planes encompassing it end. It is
only possible to think of the body of
the cone ending at the point and the
convex body ending at the line
accidentally [not essentially]. It is
therefore correct that the cone and
the convex body only end
essentially with respect to
corporeality in the plane. However,
the vertical extension of the plane
of the cone ends, in one of two
directions, at the point of the top,
and in the other direction, at a
certain point in [285] the
circumference of the base. As for
its horizontal extension, it is infinite
in position (waḍ‘), and it is absent
at the point of the top and does not
end in it. The plane of a convex
body ends solely at a line, and the
plane of a triangle also ends at a
line in reality, and then the line ends
at one of the points of its angles. Let
it be known.

Wamḍa [8.5]
 The boundaries (aṭrāf) are
the limits (nihāyāt) of magnitudes
in existence with respect to position
(waḍ‘), not with respect to
quantitativeness. Consequently, that
which is infinite in terms of
position has no boundary, even
though it is a finite magnitude in
surface area, such as the
circumference of a circle and the
circumference of a sphere. The
point, then, does not require the
nature of the line as such, nor with
respect to existence absolutely, but
the question may fall short with
respect to existence, since the line
is infinite in terms of position. The
same applies to the line in relation
to the plane. As for the plane, it
definitely requires the body for
existence, but not insofar as it is a
body, but insofar as it is finite. Let
it be known.

Wamḍa [8.6]
According to the people of
truth among the companions of the
Craft, the plane, the line, and the
point are existents which are
dissimilar to that for which they are
the limits. Among the imitators is
one who makes them accidents
inhering in the body existent with its
very existence, not through
existences which are separate and
distinct from the existence of the
body, which correspond to the
inhering parts. He does not realize
that it is impossible for the accident
and the substance to be united
together in existence. Is not the
existence of the substance the
existence of something in itself,
while the existence of the accident
is its existence in its subject? These
are two distinct modes of existence.
Furthermore, the subject belongs to
the causes. The cause is different
from the effect in essence and
existence, and it definitely precedes
it essentially. Moreover, it may
happen that two planes, or two
lines, or two points, interpenetrate
in such a way that they are one in
position but not existence, but it is
not possible for two bodies to
interpenetrate at all. Consequently,
any two bodies are distinct both in
position and in existence.
Regarding what is said
about the plane being the exterior of
the body itself, it is clear that the
body in the external world is not
two things: one of them its exterior,
and one of them its interior. Rather
both of them are a single existent in
the external world. Although the
mind [286] may distinguish its
external from its internal, this
imagination does not depend upon
rational investigation. What is true
is that the body is not two things in
the external world, but the existent
in the external world is two things.
One of them is the body and the
other is a magnitude inhering in it
which possesses two dimensions. It
may be said of it, by another
consideration, that it is the exterior
of the body, as our companion
stated in the Ta‘līqāt: “The plane
may be considered a limit, and it
may be considered a magnitude, but
it is not magnitude in the direction
by which it is a limit. The relation
of this notion, namely, that it is
possible to assume two dimensions
in it, to quantitativeness in it, is the
relation of the differentia to the
genus.” In sum, the idea of inhering
accidents existent with the selfsame
existence as the subject is an absurd
argument.
It might be claimed that
among the statements of our
companion in the Shifā’ on the
incorporeality of the soul, there is
an explanation of this, but this
ascription is certainly incorrect.
The purport of the argument of our
companion in the Physics of the
Shifā’, in the chapter on the soul’s
incorporeality in the Psychology, is
that he does not distinguish between
the body and its particular boundary
with respect to position, not that he
does not differentiate between them
with respect to existence. We have
quoted his words on this in al-Ṣirāṭ
al-Mustaqīm.

Wamḍa [8.7]
“Line” and “plane” in the
terminology of the Craft apply
equivocally to [two different
notions]: a notion in which limit
(nihāya) is not inferred, as when a
“line” is spoken of and nothing but
length is signified thereby while
disregarding width and depth, not
conditioned by being free from their
conjunction, but such that it is a
length in which nothing but the
reality of length is considered, in
other words, a single extension
which is not contrary to the
conjunction of width and depth, or
not the conjunction of these two to it
in existence. In the same way, a
“plane” may be spoken of in
relation to length and width alone,
i.e., two extensions, while
disregarding the other extension.
Each of these two, in this respect, is
an existent, tangible magnitude.
This is a subject for the science of
geometry. And they apply to a
notion in which limit is inferred, as
when a “line” and a “plane” are
spoken of in the sense which has
been discussed, but conditioned by
their substrate not having an
extension apart from them, but
rather the unfolding of the extension
is terminated with them. In this
regard, the concept of “boundary”
and “limit” is predicable to them.
Neither of these two becomes a
limit and a boundary except with
respect to this negative notion.
In like manner, “now” and
“point” apply equivocally to two
notions. One of them is the
principle of [287] quantity, and the
other is that notion conditioned by
nothing of the extension persisting
apart from it. Limit only applies to
the last notion.
This is the path of the
author of al-Talwīḥāt in his
discourse where he says: “Limits
are privative because they are
something having a quantity from
which another thing does not persist
apart.” Then he states:
If it is said: Do you not maintain
that the plane is tangible, so that
it is an existent? It may be
answered: “Line” may signify
nothing but length, just as
 “plane” may signify no more
than width and length together,
and these two pertain to
quantity, so it is by
participation. Otherwise,
privative limits, with respect to
their privation, cannot be
sensed. Quantities which do not
have the condition of another
thing not persisting apart from
them cannot become a limit.
Thus, negation in their concept
is unavoidable.
From this it is pervasive
among the moderns and circulating
upon their tongues that the author of
al-Talwīḥāt, contrary to the
philosophers, believed that the
plane, the line, and the point are
privative things. This
misconception is either due to a
fabrication ascribed to him or due
to a poor understanding of his
intention.

Wamḍa [8.8]
The Leader of the
Doubters in the Muḥaṣṣal negates
existence from the boundaries
(aṭrāf) absolutely. But in his
commentary upon the Ishārāt his
argument is confused, so that
sometimes he makes the limit
(nihāya) the assumed object of
relation (muḍāf), and at others he
makes it a relation (iḍāfa)
occurring to all of the boundaries in
relation to what has the boundary,
as a result of which it belongs to the
true object of relation.
He says: “If the plane, for
example, is related to the body, a
relation occurs to it which is the
limit, and although it is posterior to
the plane in realization due to the
plane’s being a subject for it,
nevertheless its affirmation to the
body is the cause of the affirmation
of the plane to it, like the middle
term in a deductive demonstration
when it is an effect of the major
term and the cause of its affirmation
of the minor term.” Then he says:
“This is why the Master maintained
that the concomitance of the plane
to the body is through the mediacy
of limitation.”
I say: All of this is error
upon error. How can the relation of
the accident to its subject be prior
to the occurrence of that accident to
its subject? That relation is only
comprehensible after the
occurrence. The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars has confirmed
this in the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt and in
the Naqd al-Muḥaṣṣal, [288] by
saying that the plane, for instance, is
not solely the cessation (fanā’) of
the body and the termination of its
extension, for cessation cannot be
tangibly indicated whereas the
plane can be so indicated. Indeed,
critical inquiry determines that
there are three things: (1) The first
is the quiddity of the plane, which
is continuous magnitude possessed
of two dimensions. (2) The second
is a cessation belonging to the body
and a non-being in the sense of its
coming to an end and its termination
in a specific direction at that plane,
not absolute non-existence, which
refers to the absence of the essence
of the body and the negation of its
existence. (3) The third is a relation
to the body which is accidental to
its cessation at the plane, and with
respect to this it may be called a
“limit” belonging to a body having
a limit. The affirmation of the first
to the body is only inferred through
the affirmation of the second to it,
since it is concurrent with and
necessitates the first. As for the
third, if its accidental relation to the
first is considered, the sum is a
plane related to what possesses the
plane. If its accidental relation to
the second is considered, it is a
limit related to what possesses the
limit. The limit, therefore, is not
accidental to the plane in relation to
the body, but rather termination
occurs to the extension of the body
first, then the plane requires that
termination second, then relation
occurs to these two in two respects.
The same applies to the line and the
point.
The now is also in accord
with this path, for three things also
pertain to it: (1) something which is
indivisible in terms of extension,
which is the now; (2) a cessation
belonging to the extension of time at
it; (3) and a relation which is
accidental to both of them, with
respect to which that cessation may
be called a “limit” related to that
which possesses a limit, which is
time, and that now may be called a
“now” related to that which
possesses the now, which is time.
The now, accordingly, may be
called “the limit of time,” in the
sense that it is concurrent with that
which is its limit, in other words,
the cessation at the now, by virtue
of accidental relation. Let it be
recognized.

Wamīḍ [8.8.1]
As you know, the point
only subsists in the line, insofar as
the specification (ta‘ayyun) of the
extension of the line is in its
direction, without the specification
of its extension in another direction
opposite of that direction being
considered at all, with respect to its
being a substratum for the point and
the point’s accidental relation to it,
either as an infinitude or any of the
specified finitudes. Indeed, the
specification of its extension in
another direction is only the basis
for the subsistence of another point
in it in that direction. The same
applies to the plane in relation to
the extension of the body which is
its substrate. We have informed you
that the substrate of the point at the
top of the cone, which ends in it
essentially, is one of the two
extensions of its plane, namely, its
vertical extension, insofar as that
extension is specified in the
direction of the top and [289] its
extension in the direction of the
base is not considered, since
consideration of the length of the
extension or its shortness in the
direction of the base is
inconsequential with respect to
ending at the point in the direction
of the top, as is undoubtedly
evident.
It is known with certainty,
as has become clear to you in what
has preceded, that division in its
kinds is only possible actually
when the continuous extended thing
is specified with respect to the
continuity of its extension, not with
respect to the nature of extension
without a specification, since a part
and a whole are inconceivable in
the nature of extension as long as
specification does not occur to it
[that nature] by necessity. It is clear
then that dividing the cone
vertically into two segments, one of
them the segment of the top and the
other the segment of the base, does
not necessitate the annihilation of
the point of the top, nor of the plane
of the base, nor of the
circumference of its circle. For the
substrate of any of them does not
cease to be insofar as it is its
substrate, but rather their substrate
only ceases to be insofar as it is
devoid of consideration in the
respect of being a substrate. Similar
to this is the doctrine of the negation
(intifā’) of the individual
continuous form in its particular
individuality in the two forms of
continuity and discontinuity
together, as is the path of the
deniers. Is it not clear that the
substrate of the point of the top, for
example, is this vertical extension
insofar as it is delimited and
specified in the direction of the top
in its particularity. Just as it is
existent through the very existence
of the individual, definite, specific
form in the two directions before
discontinuity (infiṣāl), in like
manner, it is existent through the
very existence of the individual,
definite, specific form arising after
discontinuity also. Consequently,
that which is its [the point’s]
essential substrate does not cease to
be with discontinuity, but rather it is
existent in the two forms of
continuity and discontinuity through
the very existence of each of the
two definite forms, whose extension
is specified in both the directions of
vanishing and occurring. It is clear
then, although many regard this as
dubious and find it difficult to
accept, that the body of the cone in
its entire individuality is the
substrate of the point of the top, not
just that part of its body which is
adjacent to it, for extended
magnitude is subject to infinite
division. Therefore, whatever part
of the body is assumed to be
adjacent to it, that which is less than
it in magnitude and nearer to it
adjoins it. And since it is its
substrate in the totality of its
individuality, it follows, according
to the doctrine of the Platonists, that
the segment of the base cut off and
divided from the segment of the top
by intersection is a portion of the
substrate of the point of the top and
a part of it in actuality. This is
contrary to the intuitive
understanding of the rational nature,
for according to the doctrine of the
Aristotelians, its [the point’s]
annihilation is through its [the
cone’s] annihilation through
division. However, the intuitive
understanding testifies to its [the
point’s] persistence despite its [the
cone’s] negation upon division. The
position of one of the imitators,
[342] who holds that the majority of
the Peripatetics claim [290] the
self-evidentness of the negation of
the body of the cone, has been
cancelled. Such being the case, the
negation of the points would follow
from this. Remain steadfast, as you
have been admonished, and be not
of those who wander blindly.

Wamīḍ [8.8.2]
This lashing (qidda)[343]
corresponds to a muddy proposition
which is knit from the way of doubt.
It is known and established that
division by the difference of the
accident does not require
discontinuity (infiṣāl) in the
external world, except with respect
to those fixed accidents and
relations and relative states.[344] If
half of an individual continuous
body becomes black or hot, for
example, the substrate of that
blackness and that heat in the
external world is that continuous
body in its individual entirety, for it
is an existent distinct from the other
existents. If we cut a small segment
from the other half, from what
adjoins the boundary, this body will
cease to be in its individual
continuous form, and through the
discontinuity another individual
continuous form will appear. It
follows, then, that that accident will
cease to be also. Otherwise, the
persistence of what inheres would
be implied despite the absence of
the substrate. However, its ceasing
to be is contrary to the sure
evidence of its persistence. It is
solved by means of inquiry, and it
may be said that the substratum of
that accident in the external world
is this continuous body itself;
however, with respect to the
individual, specific magnitude of
half of it, not with respect to the
whole of its extension. Therefore,
the aspect of being a substratum in
the external world returns in reality
to that half in its particularity,
which is existent before
discontinuity through the very
existence of this individual
continuous body, which vanishes
(zā’il) through discontinuity and
after discontinuity through the very
existence of the individual
continuous body arising (ḥādith)
with the occurrence of
discontinuity. Its existence in the
external world, then, through the
very existence of an individual,
continuous, extended body in the
two forms of continuity and
discontinuity suffices for realizing
the aspect of being a substratum
externally. Let it be known.

Wamīḍ [8.8.3]
Inquiry into the question of
the angle is also according to this
path. The two-dimensional angle is
a plane which is absent where two
sides adjoin; in other words, the
point at the top of the angle is not a
limit for it. The three-dimensional
angle, like the three-dimensional
top of the cone, for example, is a
body which is absent at the point of
the top and not a limit for it, as has
been recited to you.
 It may be doubted and said
that the plane is an extended
magnitude in two dimensions, for it
is subject to division in the two
dimensions of length and width. But
the two dimensional angle only
accepts division in this horizontal
extension, [291] which is the
dimension of what is between the
two sides without the vertical
extension, which is the dimension
of what is between the top and the
base, since the difference of the
side in length and shortness does
not produce a difference in the
measure of the angle at all. It is not
correct, therefore, that the two-
dimensional angle is a plane, as is
the doctrine of the mathematicians,
nor that it is a state inhering in the
plane, as is the position of the
intuitive philosophers. For the
proposition (ḥukm) of qualities
particularized by quantities is the
proposition of their substrate with
respect to receiving division in the
dimensions, albeit accidentally, not
essentially. In like manner, it is
impossible for the three-
dimensional angle to be a body,
because the body accepts division
in all three dimensions, while the
three-dimensional angle only
accepts it in two dimensions.
 The decisive criterion of
the inquiry and the crux of the
investigation for solving this doubt
is that is may be said, in the context
with which you are cognizant, that
the reality of the two-dimensional
angle is one of the two extensions
of the plane enclosed by the two
sides which meet exactly at a point
which limits them, and its
horizontal extension is what is
between the two sides. Its other
vertical extension, which is
between the top and the base,
requires the determining point to be
in the direction of the top, while
indeterminacy is in the direction of
the base. As long as the extension is
determined, the possibility of
receiving actual division is
necessary for it, and whenever it is
taken as undetermined and not
specified, receiving actual division
is not possible for it. This is a firm
principle pertaining to all
magnitudes. The path of the doctrine
on the three-dimensional angle
corresponds with this exposition.
If you say: According to
this, it is not necessary for the angle
to be a fourth kind of magnitude in
addition to the three kinds. I say:
Certainly not! For two-dimensional
[magnitude] is the quantity of the
plane in some of its respects, while
three-dimensional [magnitude] is
the quantity of the body in some of
its respects. Consequently, the angle
is not another quantity in addition to
the three kinds of quantities. Let it
be recognized.
Our companion in
leadership states in Chapter Two,
Book Six, of the Categories of the
Shifā’:
As for the angle, it has been
thought to be a continuous
quantity besides the plane and
the body. Hence, it is necessary
to examine this question. We say
that it may happen that a
magnitude, whether it be a body
or a plane, is contained between
certain boundaries which meet
at one point, in which case it is
an angle. As for the difference
between the angle and
[geometrical] figures (ashkāl),
it is that the angle is only an
angle insofar as the magnitude is
considered restricted between
two limits or the limits meet
another limit. Let us now
specialize the discourse to the
two-dimensional [magnitude].
[292] We say that it is evident
that something two-dimensional
which two adjoining limits
contain may either be contained
together with a third or a fourth
[limit], or not so contained. If a
third [limit] does not contain
together with them, it is evident
that its two adjoining limits will
either meet at another limit
common to them or they will not
meet, regardless of whether they
meet when they are extended or
they do not meet, but they
proceed in the estimation
towards infinity. If they meet,
this is like the state of two lines
containing a segment of a circle,
or a crescent shape, or an oval
shape, and so forth. The plane
which is not bound by a third
limit but which is only bound by
two limits which meet on only
one side, insofar as it is like
that, or its state is like that, is an
angle. But that which is bound
by another limit besides these
two so that it is contained by it,
or its two limits meet it so that it
is contained by it, insofar as it
is like that, or its state is like
that, is a [geometrical] figure.
[345]
Then he says:
Just as when the geometricians
say “figure,” they have in mind
something possessing a shape,
 in like manner, when they say
“angle,” they have in mind a
magnitude having an angle. For
this reason, the angle is not
bisected and equal, greater and
lesser….It is not befitting to pay
heed to what one of those who
meddle with what does not
concern them said, that the angle
is another genus of quantity
between the line and the plane.
He also states in Chapter
Four, Book Three, of the
Metaphysics of the Shifā’:
As for the angle, it has been
thought to be a continuous
quantity besides the plane and
the body. Hence, it is necessary
to examine this question. We say
that it may happen that a
magnitude, whether it be a body
or a plane, is contained between
certain boundaries which meet
at one point. Consequently,
insofar as it is between these
boundaries, it is something
having an angle, without us
considering the state of its
boundaries in another direction.
Methinks it is a magnitude
greater than the dimension
which ends at a point. So if you
wish to call this magnitude itself
as such an “angle,” and if you
wish to call the quality which
belongs to it as such an “angle,”
the former is like quadrangle
and the latter is like
quadrangular. If you apply the
name to the former, I say: An
equal angle is less and more
(or: minus and plus) to itself,
because its substance is a
magnitude. If the second notion
is applied to it, I say: This
belongs to it because of the
magnitude which it is in, as is
the case with quadrangular.
[293]

Wamīḍ [8.8.4]
 Among the dilemmas of
this abstruse subject is that if the
following proposition is
established by the force of valid
demonstrations—namely, that time
existent in its continuous extension
in perpetuity is a creature of
existence after non-existence in the
external world and a finite
magnitude in its essential
continuous quantity—then it follows
that it will have an actually existent
boundary (ṭaraf) at which its finite
magnitude extending toward the
side of the past and the direction of
the beginning ends, which boundary
is an indivisible now. I am not
speaking of the flowing now, which
is outside of time and does not
subsist in it, but which marks it;
rather I am speaking of the now
which is one of the limits and
boundaries subsisting in the
extension of continuous time, whose
continuity is interrupted by it. You
say the dividing point, which may
be connective or which may be
divisive. But it is only true of the
dividing now (ān ṭaraf) that it is an
imaginary connector between two
past and future times, not an actual
existent which divides and
separates continuous time in the
real world.
 We say: Since we have
recited to your ears and imparted to
your mind some of the principles
and rules, haply you discern the
nature of the situation and are
conversant with the solution to this
difficult problem in a number of
ways.
The first is that you know
that an actually existent boundary
does not require the nature of finite
extension insofar as it is finite in
magnitude, but rather it only
requires it with respect to finiteness
in position (waḍ‘).[346] Therefore,
if a continuous, extended thing is
finite in magnitude, not finite in
position, or not subject to position,
an actual boundary cannot occur to
it except in estimation when
hypothetically intersecting the
continuity in the estimative faculty.
Therefore, the actually existent
boundaries belonging to magnitudes
are positional limits, not
quantitative limits. Consequently,
time, because it is a continuous
quantity not having a position,
cannot possibly have an actual
boundary in existence, even though
it is finite in magnitude. Rather,
only a hypothetical, imaginary
boundary applies to it in the
estimative faculty, since what
applies to its continuity is a
discontinuity and disjunction by
supposition and estimation.
The second is that time is
the measure of continuous circular
motion subsisting in the regulator of
the day, as you are aware. It is clear
that the boundary of extended time
must correspond to the boundary of
the continuous motion which
corresponds to the boundary of
continuous distance. Consequently,
the starting point of time coincides
with the starting point of motion,
and the starting point [294] of
motion coincides with the starting
point of distance. But the regulator
of the day does not have an actually
existent, [starting] boundary,
despite its being a continuous
magnitude of finite quantity, nor
does its continuous circular motion
have an actual [starting] boundary,
except when an imaginary point in
the regulator of the day is
hypothetically made a starting point
for its circular motion.
Consequently, just as the bearer of
the substrate of time, i.e., the sphere
containing the directions, and the
circle of the regulator of the day,
does not have an actual, definite
boundary, and just as the substrate
of time, i.e., the circular motion of
the regulator of the day, does not
have an actually existent,
indivisible boundary, in like
manner, continuous extended time,
which corresponds to these things,
cannot have an actually existent
boundary, except hypothetically in
the estimation.[347]
The third is that creation
(ḥudūth) does not require a
particular indivisible now at the
beginning, unless the created thing
is a gradual (tadrījī) creation, in
which case it needs a particular
now in the estimative faculty which
is the end of the time of rest and the
beginning of the time of motion, or
unless it is an instantaneous (duf‘ī)
creation, so that a now which is the
first of the nows of the existence of
the creature is particularized for it.
But if the temporally occurring
creature is neither gradual nor
instantaneous but occurs in its
entirety in time itself, in every parts
of its parts, and in every limit of its
limits, as long as it is in between
the two limits of the two extremes,
or [if it is] a perpetual creation, not
occurring in a particular time or
now at all, but it is altogether
outside of the two domains of time
and space, then it is
incomprehensible for there to be a
now for creation in the external
world which is the boundary of
time, as is definitely clear.
Therefore, since time is a created
thing occurring after non-existence
in the true objective world, whose
existence occurs through the
fashioning of the Maker in the
domain of perpetuity, not in a
particular time or now, then how is
a bounding now and a temporal
starting point conceivable with
respect to its creation in perpetuity?
Let it be pondered.
The fourth is that the
termination of time and its ending in
the direction of the beginning only
requires the existence of the now if
it is preceded at its boundary by
non-existence such that it is
possible to conceive it as an
extension apart from it [time] which
that bounding limit adjoins, so that
the intellect posits the now as a
connection between them with the
aid of the estimation. Hence, it
comes to the estimative faculty that
it has posited a termination at
something in the middle which it
conceives from the extension, as is
the way of the limit (intihā’).
Therefore, a boundary occurs [295]
for the existent from the extension,
interposing between it and non-
existence. But if existence occurs to
time after absolute non-existence in
the objective world, and existence
is after real non-existence in
perpetuity, such that it is created in
its entirety after non-existence, as is
the way of absence (intifā’), as you
know, and its absence is such that
an extension cannot be conceived
apart from it at all, as pertains to
time, nor non-extension, as pertains
to the now, but rather a sheer, real
non-existence belongs to the
extension of time, not a non-
existence qualified by being
extended and non-extended, then the
absence will not be, in this case, in
the mode of extension so as to
require ending at the now.
Consequently, just as the circle
around the pole in the plane of a
sphere is absent at the point of the
pole and existent in its entirety after
it, in like manner, time is absent in
pre-eternity, in the sense that it is
utterly non-existent in the objective
world, then its Fashioner caused it
to come forth from real non-
existence into existence in
perpetuity in the fullness of its
quantitative extension without
having a first now in which its
magnitude terminates and from
which its existence commences.
 It is clear then that the now
has no path to existence in the real
world whatsoever. But by means of
the estimation its realization may be
presumed as long as the estimative
faculty analyzes the extension of
time into hypothetical parts which it
abstracts from time. The continuity
of time in the real world is not
interrupted by this at all, nor in the
estimative faculty with respect to
the essence of time itself, but only
with respect to its relation to
continuous, terminal linear motions
that occur in it.
Therefore, that which is
most befitting to affirm about the
now which is the boundary of time
is that the relation of this now to
time is the relation of the
hypothetical point to the finite
circular line with respect to
magnitude not position. Obtain
wisdom through the substance of
your intellect and sanctify it from
the limitations of your imagination.
Take heed lest you circle around its
sanctuary with a bent mind or a
broken intelligence.

Wamīḍ [8.8.5]
In short, there is no
alternative to the actual existence of
the bounding now (ān ṭaraf)
according to the premises of those
who meddle with what does not
concern them, who hold (1) that
extended non-existence without a
beginning is the container of time,
(2) that the existence of time
intersects the extension of that non-
existence at the beginning of the
world, (3) that the magnitude of
time is a linear extension ending in
that non-existence with its
boundary, which is the limit of the
extension of non-existence and the
beginning of the extension of time,
[348] and (4) that it is possible for
time, with respect to the substance
[296] of its essence and the nature
of the order of existence, to become
greater in magnitude and longer in
extension than what it was when it
was created. They have other
erroneous, absurd conjectures and
feeble, invalid suppositions besides
these.
It is evident through
demonstrative necessity, indeed,
through rational investigation, that if
that non-existence which they have
made the container of time were as
they imagine it to be, it would itself
be time. The creation of time,
according to their portrayal and
their conception, would depend
upon its eternity in existence, and
the finiteness of the magnitude of
time would depend upon its infinity
in quantity.
Consequently, there is no
possibility for the actual existence
of the now, according to the path of
truth and the road of the intellect, in
conceptualizing the question of
creation and the finiteness of the
extension of time, because what is
correct is the priority of real non-
existence to the existence of the
world without another possibility
intermediate between the eternal
Maker and the created domain, due
to the incomprehensibility of
extension and non-extension there
altogether. Time’s being a quantity
without position is due to its being
unfixed in its essence in the world
of extension and non-extension,
except in imaginal existence.[349]
Its being non-linear in extension in
the substance of its essence is due
to its being the measure of the
rotational motion of the body of the
sphere, which draws the object
moved from real non-existence to
real existence in perpetuity. It is not
that it exists without being clothed
in motion, then it moves later. A
point is not specified with the
commencement of motion at all,
neither in the moving body, nor in
the plane which is its boundary, nor
in the circumference of the circle
postulated in it, which is its girdle.
For exchange of position occurs to
all the parts and the points in
relation to each other or to outside
things in perpetuity simultaneously.
A temporal beginning or now is
incomprehensible for creation in
perpetuity. Time, in the entirety of
its continuous, circular magnitude,
belongs to [the category of]
existence after real non-existence in
perpetuity, not in a time or in a now.
It is not possible for it, with respect
to itself, to be existent in perpetuity
prior to what comes into existence,
since there is nothing prior to it
except eternity, which it is
incapable of receiving due to the
nature of essential possibility. It is
also not possible for it, with respect
to itself, to be greater in magnitude
or longer in extension than the
magnitude and extension which it
has. Be not of those who are
uninformed. [297]

Wamīḍ [8.8.6]
Perchance you will ask:
What is the state of the outermost
sphere, with respect to its essence,
that does not preclude its increase
in magnitude over what it is, and
this [increase in magnitude] does
not necessitate a quantification in
the non-existence assumed beyond
its plane which confines the
directions and the fixed dimensions,
while this is not possible for time
with respect to its essence? If it
were possible, it would be
necessary for the real non-existence
assumed to precede it to be a
quantitative magnitude.
Furthermore, the nature of quantity
does not preclude increase and
decrease, but nothing of the degrees
of these two is assumed. What then
is the state of the quantity called
time, in the particularity of its
essence, which is contrary to this?
It may be answered: This
question has been investigated in
al-Ufuq al-Mubīn, and a proper
exposition of the difference
between unfixed quantity lacking
position and fixed magnitudes
having position is presented there in
detail. Only the non-existence
which is equal in relation to side
and center, beginning and end, is
comprehensible in relation to the
unfixed quantity of continuous
cyclic time subsisting in the motion
of the continuous outermost sphere.
It is the complete absence of its
essence, not the other non-existence
which is the limit of the extension
of magnitude and the termination of
its extension at a particular
boundary without the absence of its
substance and the negation of its
existence in the real world. As for
the bearer of the substrate of time,
which is the outermost sphere, two
non-existences are conceivable in
relation to it. That which is a
concomitant of the quiddity of
magnitude and the nature of
continuous quantity is solely the
possibility of receiving equality and
difference, not the possibility of
increasing the amount obtained in
the first creation. Therefore, a
segment of the extension of time is
shorter in magnitude than the
extension of the whole of time, and
one particular time, for instance, is
equal to or different from another
particular time. The same applies to
one particular dimension in relation
to another. It is impossible for the
essence of time to be created in the
first creation longer in duration and
greater in magnitude than what it is
created now. But this is not
impossible with respect to the
outermost sphere with respect to its
own essence and the nature of its
magnitude. Rather, this is only
impossible essentially with respect
to the nature of the system of the
whole and the universal managing
nature which holds together the
system of the whole, which is the
primal Providence. Furthermore,
the assumption of time being greater
in magnitude and longer in
extension in the direction of the
beginning than what it was created
is the same as the assumption of the
substance of its essence being
existent before the existence of its
essence, [298] which is essentially
impossible. The question of the
outermost sphere is not according to
this path. Its being greater in
magnitude at the beginning of
creation than what it is created does
not require its being existent before
its existence, let alone that the
assumption of one of the two things
is the same as the assumption of the
other. Furthermore, there is nothing
beyond the outermost sphere
between which an imaginary space
and a hypothetical non-existence
qualified by extension could be
interposed, as a result of which it
would follow that there is a
dimension and an actual void
subsisting purely not in any matter.
Thus its extension would
undoubtedly increase and exceed
the extension of an imaginary
segment of it, and two of its
hypothetical parts would be
different or equal. Indeed, it is only
possible for the outermost body,
with respect to itself, to have a
greater magnitude, although this is
impossible due to the absence of a
dimension and a direction beyond it
in which its body could extend and
unfold.
As for time and the
universe in its totality, the real
Fashioner is existent before it. So if
a non-existence with a supposed
extension and an extension
hypothesized as flowing and
continuous were to be interposed
between the universe and its
Fashioner, it would be correct for
something created and given
existence before the world and after
the Fashioner to occur in it and
correspond to a hypothetical part of
it, whether it be a time, or a motion,
or something else. It would
therefore certainly be longer in
extension than a hypothetical part of
it and two hypothesized segments of
it, not separated either from
equality in extension or from
difference. It would then be, by
definite necessity, an actual
quantifiable magnitude free from a
substrate in which it subsists. This
would be like interposing a void
and a space not occupied by a
corporeal extension between two
bodies. Thus there would
necessarily be a dimension between
them, and a starting point requires
that that void and dimension should
themselves be an actually existent,
quantifiable extension whose
essence and existence do not subsist
in a subject and a substrate, since it
would undoubtedly be greater and
longer in extension, and more
intense in the extension with respect
to going out, than its hypothesized
part.
The principle distinction
between time and the sphere is now
concluded in this regard, and it is
clear that the impossibility of time
being created with a greater
magnitude than what was created
for it in the first creation is an
essential impossibility with respect
to the substance of its essence due
to the properties of its own reality,
just as the impossibility of
supervening non-existence belongs
to its own essence due to the
properties of the substance of its
quiddity.
On the other hand, we say
that magnitude being in the
boundary of the substance of its
essence such that it is possible,
[299] in relation to its own species
reality, to be created greater in
magnitude than what was created
for it in the first creation, only
pertains to linear and straight
magnitudes. As for round
magnitudes of varying convexity,
this is essentially impossible for
them by virtue of their own species
quiddity. Is it not a principle
established in its seat that linearity
and circularity, and similarly the
ranks of circular shapes varying in
convexity, are all species
differentia, not the accidents of
varieties. Therefore, the straight or
the circular, and the circular shapes
of varying convexity, are no other
than distinct, dissimilar species,
which are different in quiddity.

Wamīḍ [8.8.7]
Among the difficult, doubt-
provoking problems which might be
asked is that the non-existence of
the world in perpetuity prior to its
existence is either necessary with
respect to the essence of the world
(in which case how could it be
dispelled and negated so that the
world could exist after it?), or it is
essentially impossible (so that the
world would be eternally and pre-
eternally necessary), or it is
essentially possible (from which it
follows that it must have a cause,
but the cause of non-existence is
nothing but the non-existence of the
cause of existence). It is clear that
the cause of the existence of the
world is the true, self-subsisting
Creator, whose existence is
essentially necessary, and no other.
The way, then, to solve this
dilemma is through what we have
instructed you already, namely, that
the essentially impossible with
respect to the world is pre-eternal,
eternal existence. And there is no
doubt that what is necessary for the
essence of the world is the
contradictory of that existence,
which is its negation (raf‘) [300]
and the negation of pre-eternal
existence, either by the negation of
absolute existence, which is
absolute non-existence from pre-
eternity to post-eternity, or by the
negation of pre-eternity, so that it
can be realized by existence after
real non-existence. Therefore, that
which is required with respect to
the essence of the world itself is
absolute real non-existence,
whether it be a sheer annihilation
from pre-eternity to post-eternity or
a perpetual real non-existence
dispelled by perpetual real
existence after it. Particular to each
of these two particularities is that it
is certainly particularized by an
external cause. Consequently, the
non-existence of the world in
perpetuity before its perpetual
existence, insofar as it is its real
non-existence in the real world, in
other words, insofar as it is the
negation of its pre-eternity and its
eternity, is essential to the world
and natural to it in accord with the
nature of essential possibility, and it
is not dependent upon a cause at all,
but insofar as it is dispelled by
perpetual existence after it, it is
dependent [accidentally] upon the
Creator of the essence and the
Maker of existence. There is no
contradiction, since the cause
(mustanad), in reality, in this case,
is the dispelling of non-existence,
not itself. The Maker of essence and
existence in perpetuity is himself
the cause of the dispelling of
perpetual real non-existence. We
have recited to you a number of
times that non-existence is the non-
being of something and its absence,
not some “thing” which is
characterized by “absence,” and
that the existence (wujūd) of a
creature in perpetuity is through the
negation of its non-existence (lā-
wujūd), since two distinct
boundaries for existence and non-
existence is incomprehensible in
perpetuity, in contrast to how it is
for [creatures in] time. The
appointed time of truth is fulfilled
and the wall of doubt has collapsed
by the leave of God, glorified be
He.

Wamīḍ [8.8.8]
Another difficult problem
with respect to temporal creation is
that [the cause of ] the
particularization (ikhtiṣāṣ) of the
beginning of the existence of a
generated thing, within the boundary
of its creation in the extension of
time, must inevitably be a part of its
complete cause for the sake of
going from potentiality to actuality
within that boundary in its
particularity. Otherwise, a
quantitative flowing posteriority
would be required by the complete
cause existing before that boundary.
Therefore, we turn our attention to
that part occurring in the boundary
in relation to its complete cause
also. We transfer the inquiry to the
moment which necessitates certain
successive things, which are
conjoined in terms of creation
within that boundary, to be drawn
forth into actuality together
necessarily with the creation of the
creature within that boundary itself.
We say: If those things created
together are successive, conjoined
existences, an impossible series is
required essentially in that moment
itself. If they are certain successive
privations [301] created in that
moment in its particularity which
belong to certain successive
existences occurring together before
that moment, that series is required
at the moment of the occurrence of
those existences. If they are
interjoined, an impossible series is
required also, either with the
existence of the creature or before
it. A successive series, therefore,
serves no purpose whatsoever with
respect to the preparatory
conditions and states needed for the
creation of something, as is
definitely clear. This is the road of
fastening the difficulty in the knot of
this doubt.
As for the path for untying
the knot, it is that it may be said:
But for the circular motion of the
sphere and the prime matter of the
world of generation and corruption,
which is one in its individual,
indeterminate being and the bearer
for the nature of dispositional
possibility and the moving object
with respect to dispositional
natures, the question of temporal
creation could not be settled and an
impossible series would
necessarily follow. Therefore, the
grindstone of temporal creation
turns upon continuous circular
motion and disposed and receptive
prime matter. The order and
succession of the temporal
creatures and their particularization
to certain times and nows is only
possible because of the motions of
the heavenly bodies in their
revolutions and the motion of the
prime matter of the world of the
elements with respect to
dispositions and dispositional
natures. The infinite with respect to
the preparatory and completing
conditions is only the non-ceasing
infinity, not the numerical infinity.
Temporal privations are not non-
existences in reality, for the object
of temporal privation is no other
than the disappearance of a certain
temporal limited in existence and
its absence from another temporal
limited in existence. Priorities and
posteriorities, elapsing and
renewal, depend upon the horizon
of elapsing and renewal, which is
time, and culminate in the very
entities of its parts, as has been
explained to you several times in
what has preceded. In short, but for
the fact that among the causes is that
whose quiddity is renewal and
occurrence, so that it temporally
elapses and is renewed in itself,
existence in the world of temporal
extension would be absolutely
impossible for any temporal
creature, as would a temporal
privation supervening after
existence. That thing which elapses
and is renewed in itself in time is
no other than the motion which, by
virtue of itself, is passing away and
overtaking. Therefore, just as
existents which are possible in
quiddity certainly lead to a
necessary existent by virtue of
itself, and existents subject to being
acted upon lead to an existent which
is a recipient of action whose
receptivity is by virtue of itself
[i.e., matter], in like manner,
progressing, changing things lead to
something which changes whose
change is by virtue of its own
essence, and this is motion. [302]
Such causes as these are causes
accidentally, for they do not give
existence, but rather they provide
particularization for the creation of
existence within a certain boundary
in its particularity among the
boundaries of the extension of time.
Let is be known.

Wamīḍ [8.8.9]
You may ask: How is the
dependence of a weak, changing,
unfixed existent [i.e., motion] upon
what is essentially changeless, real,
and fixed possible, so that its being
a mediary for the dependence of the
changeable things in the world of
generation and corruption upon the
essentially necessary, true Creator
in all respects is possible? It may
be answered: Is it not evident
through what has been explained in
the preceding many times that
motion—and indeed, progressing,
changing things in general—has two
aspects: (1) its aspect in relation to
the world of perpetuity, by which it
is continuous, fixed, and
changeless, and (2) its aspect in
relation to the world of flow and
quantification, slipping away and
overtaking, by which it is changing,
progressing, variable, and unfixed.
Consequently, with respect to the
aspect of continuity and
changelessness in the domain of
perpetuity, it is dependent upon the
essentially necessary, real,
Changeless Being (exalted be His
sovereignty), while with respect to
flow and change, elapsing and
renewal, in the extension of time, it
is a mediary for the dependence of
temporal creatures, subject to their
boundaries and their times, upon
Him (glorified be He), and it makes
them conditional on those
boundaries and times due to
preparing receptive, bearing matter
for their dispositional possibilities.
Thus every prior motion, with
respect to the dispositions, is a
preparatory cause for the existence
of the subsequent motion.
As for time, its role in the
order of the physical creation with
respect to the creatures related to it
by in-ness is not preparatory and
causal. Thus it is not possible for a
part of it to be preparatory and
causal in relation to another part.
Rather, the nature of its hypothetical
parts, which are successive in
occurrence and contrary to each
other in coexistence, only pertains
to its relation to the temporal
worlds and their boundaries, just as
places in the nature of their entities
are contrary to each other in
coexistence with respect to relation
to the boundaries of the spatial
worlds. For this reason, priority
and posteriority in the former are
temporal, and in the latter they are
spatial, not by nature through the
connection of cause and effect, as
the Master of Illumination believed
in his al-Muṭāraḥāt and al-
Talwīḥāt, and to which a group of
his imitators adhered. [303]

Wamīḍ [8.8.10]
What we have recited to
you is the true position in summary
of the intent of the discourse of our
companions and the ascertainment
of its meaning, when they say: The
continuous circular motion of the
sphere possesses the two aspects of
constancy (thabāt) and renewal
(tajaddud), for it is constant in
renewal and renewed in constancy.
Consequently, by reason of these
two aspects, it [motion] is suitable
for intermediacy between the two
extremes of the eternal and the
created. With respect to constancy,
it proceeds from the eternal
changeless Essence, and with
respect to renewal, it becomes the
basis (mustanad) of the changing
temporal creatures and an
intermediary for their emanation
from the Changeless Eternal Being,
who is exalted above the worlds of
time and space. This [emanation]
does not become particularized by
the medial motion, as these
imitators believe, since the path of
the terminal and medial motions
with respect to the property of
quantifiable continuity, which is
unfixed in relation to the world of
change and fixed in relation to the
world of changelessness, is the
same. However, in terminal motion,
it pertains to the analyzable parts
and portions it has within the
boundary of its being continuous
with them; and in medial motion, it
pertains to that which encompasses
its occurrence and necessitates its
nature due to various unfixed
relations to various boundaries
which the motion is in, since it is by
the nature of its reality a permanent,
unchanging individual essence
which flows in its quantifiable,
continuous relation.
What their leader, Ghazālī,
proposed in his Tahāfut in
opposition to philosophy—that:
“The question about its cause
returns to them with respect to the
aspect of renewal, since every
renewed thing certainly has a
renewed cause for its renewal. The
same applies to the question about
the cause of its supervening non-
existence, for it is also renewed”—
is voided and clearly invalid, since
you are cognizant that elapsing and
renewal, occurrence and passing
away in relation to the world of
change is a requisite of the quiddity
of motion and time.[350] Therefore,
the question about the cause in this
case is utter nonsense, because
what is essential does not depend
upon otherness. The question then
returns to why this entity is this
entity? Let it be considered
carefully. [304]

Wamīḍ [8.8.11]
Among the difficult,
recondite problems, according to
the philosophers, is what the Seal
of the Most Excellent Scholars has
mentioned in the “Fuṣūl” ascribed
to him. He says:
It is compelled: The Necessary,
according to the philosophers,
is necessary by virtue of
himself, and the effect of every
necessary thing cannot be
separated from it. Hence, they
are compelled to admit that if
something in the world becomes
non-existent, the Necessary
should become non-existent on
account of the non-existence of
that thing, either due to the non-
existence of its condition or the
 condition of its cause, or due to
the non-existence of a part of its
cause. The argument concerning
the cause’s non-existence is like
the argument concerning it, so
that it terminates in the
Necessary, for [contingent]
existents in their entirety lead
through a series of dependency
to the Necessary. So it follows
that the non-existence of
something should lead to the
Necessary by reason of
Himself. There is no escape for
them from this compulsion.
He took it upon himself in
one of his treatises to become free
from this narrow strait by saying:
The preparation (i‘dād) of one
of two mutually opposite things
removes the preparation of the
other. Since the prior is a
preparatory condition for the
subsequent, that preparation
removes the preparation of the
existence of the prior, so that
when the preparation of the
existence of the subsequent is
completed, the preparation of
the existence of the prior
disappears entirely.
Consequently, the prior ceases
to exist and the subsequent is
generated. This is not a vicious
circle, because the preparation
of the subsequent is an effect of
the existence of the prior, and it
[the preparation of the
subsequent] is the remover of
the preparation of the existence
of the prior. It is therefore an
accidental cause of the
subsequent non-existence of the
prior. That non-existence is a
condition for the existence of
the subsequent, not for the
preparation of its existence, so
there is no vicious circle, and
consequently the emanation of
creatures from the pre-eternal
Cause is achieved. One event
 (ḥādith) is posterior to another
event due to their mutual
opposition, and every event is
an accidental cause of its [own]
extinction and an essential cause
of the existence of another after
it.
I say: This argument,
despite its weakness, is the most
worthy of what we have received
from the efforts of reputed clever
minds. There is no refuge
whatsoever from this difficulty for
anyone among the people of truth
and for any of the meddlers. It is
that the caused event definitely
ceases to exist with the cessation of
its complete cause. No one among
the circle of the learned advocates
the persistence of the effect with the
cessation of its complete cause. As
for the fact that every event in the
chain of preparation and
preparedness is an accidental cause
of its extinction and an essential
cause of the existence of another
after it, as he has established, we
grant that it is like this. But the
argument concerns the essential
cause, since it is necessarily
unavoidable, [305] and not what is
accidental in existence. If not, what
is in existence is definitely what is
essential, and all things in the
successive chain of existence
terminate in the essentially
necessary Self-Subsisting Being
(exalted be His remembrance). It
would therefore follow that the non-
existence of something decreed not
to exist would lead to the cessation
of the starting point of the chain and
its Creator. Immeasurably exalted is
He above that!
It is incumbent upon us to
severe the vein of the doubt and cut
out the root of the difficulty. We
say: That which we have already
established for you contains a way
out from this narrow strait for those
who ponder, namely, that generation
(ḥudūth) and corruption (zuwāl) in
the world of time’s extension is
only possible by leading back to a
renewable and elapsing nature, the
nature of whose substance is a
changeless continuity of renewal
and elapsing and a continuous flow
of generation and corruption
without depending in passing and
elapsing upon a cause external to
itself.
However, we will begin
now with a new explanation by
another path. Know that this
question is only difficult to
comprehend for one who, by reason
of his unsound conceptions,
believes that the non-existence
supervening upon a generable-
corruptible thing in time is [itself] a
new event (ḥādith mutajaddad) in
the real world; that the supervening
of non-existence consists of the
renewal of nullification after the
determination (taqarrur); that the
ceasing-to-be of a temporal thing is
only through the negation of its
existence obtained during the time
of its occurrence from the
necessitating Agent, from the
container of realization and the time
of occurrence; that non-existence is
the act of the Agent and the Agent
the producer of annihilation and
absence; that the non-existence of
the occurrence of something in a
particular time is only realizable in
that time and with its realization not
before it; and that the absence of an
impediment prior to the effect
essentially, with respect to priority
by nature, is due to its being a part
of the effect’s complete cause. Not
one of these delusions has a share
in the world of the intellect nor in
the clime of wisdom from the
Creator. These are the
claims of certain groups among the
meddlers and would-be
philosophers. But one who has
discernment with regard to this
question knows that whatever is
generated and renewed, and action
and reaction are accepted for it, is
without a doubt a certain
“something,” whereas non-
existence is not a certain
“something” characterized by “non-
being” and “absence.” Rather it is a
pure negation, an utter non-being,
which cannot be known save by its
term. Nothing is intended by its
notion except that it is nothing at all
in existence. The supervening of
non-existence upon a temporal
creature is the pure negation of its
existence in the subsequent time,
[306] provided that the condition of
negated existence is in the
subsequent time, not the condition
of negation applicable to it, since
by maintaining this its affirmation
(ṣidq) is not renewed in this time,
but rather it is realized in both the
time of the existence of the
generated thing and in pre-eternity
and everlasting. Therefore, the
generable-corruptible thing does
not have existence in the time of
corruption, such that the removal of
existence and the renewal of non-
existence is possible in it, but rather
[its] existence in the time of
corruption is negated from pre-
eternity to everlasting. In sum, the
possible essence without the Maker
emanating it is nullified and negated
in both the domain of perpetuity and
in pre-eternity and everlasting. But
when the Maker produces it in the
domain of perpetuity, not in a time
and moment at all, or [produces it]
in a particular time or a particular
moment, the decree of its real non-
existence in perpetuity is canceled
and the decree of its perpetual
existence is realized instead, or the
duration of its non-existence in the
extension of time is terminated by
its generated existence in the time
after it.
So the emanating existence
continues as long as the emanation
with respect to its relation to times
is continuous. Whenever the
emanating Maker holds back from
making and pouring forth, in terms
of His relation to boundaries and
times, due to the non-occurrence of
dispositions and actualizers, the
outflow of the determination is
interrupted, the continuity of
existence is cut off, the ship of
primal non-being, which is the
capital of the nature of essential
possibility, is firmly moored by its
anchor, and the millstone of
complete nullification and real non-
existence, which is the opponent of
the possible quiddity, stops
uprightly on its axis. In this way, the
outflow of existence comes to an
end and duration into the future is
cut off. But it is not that the
existence which has emanated and
occurred in past time is removed
from the heart of the domain of
perpetuity and from the realm of the
land of time. Is it not clear that its
exclusion from its own time
depends upon the coexistence of the
two contradictories, and its
exclusion from the time afterwards
is incomprehensible, since it is not
realized in it at all? It is therefore
settled and explained that the reality
of ceasing-to-be (zuwāl) is the
termination of the continuity of the
emanation, due to the lack of a
preserving relation. This is
expressed in the wise Qur’ān and
the bountiful Revelation sometimes
by the term “preservation” (ḥifẓ), as
in “their preservation does not
fatigue Him,”[351] and sometimes
by the term “sustaining” (imsāk), as
in “He sustains the heavens and the
earth lest they should cease to
exist.”[352] There is no non-
existence unless it is pre-eternal
(azalī).[353] The actual meaning of
the supervening of non-existence
upon a temporal creature is the
particularization of its existence to
a particular time confined in the
direction of the end by a particular
boundary, just as it is similarly
confined in the direction of the
beginning. This existence confined
by the two boundaries of a
beginning and an end is neither
removed from perpetuity nor from
that time confined by two
boundaries. [307] Its qualification
by “past” refers to its relation to
temporal things existing in the
extension of time after it. The
particularization of the existence
limited in the two directions by the
particularity of the two boundaries
of the two sides issues from the
Agent in accord with the
particularity of the preparedness of
the receptive matter for the sake of
its essentially material generation,
and that existence is subject to
origination (ḥudūth) and
persistence (baqā’) through
dispositional possibility. For this
reason, to the extent that the
substance separate from matter is in
its essence, not in its action, in
other words, the human rational
soul, it does not perish with the
perishing of the constitution nor
become annihilated with the
annihilation of the body.
 It is therefore clear that the
non-existence subsequent to the
generable-corruptible creature is
pre-eternal, whose cause is solely
the non-existence of the realization
of the complete cause of the
occurrence of existence in the time
subsequent to the beginning of the
thing in pre-eternity and everlasting,
just as the prior non-existence
before the occurrence of the
existence generated at the starting
time is also like that. It is not that it
is a renewed [non-existence] which
is dependent upon the absence of a
certain part of the complete cause
of the existence occurring in the
time of generation. Hence, the
complete cause of that existence
and the negation of an existence
which has entered into realization
are never absent. It is only
admissible that the complete cause
of a particular assumed
determination and a particular
supposed existence has no role in
the realization of the beginning of
the thing from pre-eternity to
everlasting. The pre-eternal
privations, whether prior or
subsequent, on the two borders of
generated existence in a particular
time are a continuous, unceasing
sequence with respect to causality
and being-an-effect, such that they
are similar in mental consideration
and distinct with respect to their
relation to states (malakāt), not to a
final end at which the thing stops.
Let it be ascertained.

Wamīḍ [8.8.12]
It is evident to you that the
non-existence of the effect is
dependent essentially only upon the
non-existence of the complete
cause, i.e., upon the non-agency of
the complete agent and the lack of
its actually producing it, just as its
determination and its existence
depend solely upon its actual act of
causation. It is clear through
demonstration that one particular
thing derives existence and non-
existence only from another
particular thing,[354] and it only
issues forth in its particularity from
another thing which pertains to it
with respect to the two boundaries.
As for the non-existence of one of
the parts [of the composite effect] in
particular, or not in particular, and
the non-existence of one of the
[subsidiary] causes with respect to
it, or not with respect to it, contrary
to the conceptions of the masses and
their suppositions, these are
associates [308] of the essential
object of dependence and its
concomitants, not interior states
inferred within it. As for what one
group conjectured, that removal of
the part is the same as the removal
of the composite, it is also not in
accord with established principles.
Are not part and whole as such
necessarily dissimilar? Non-
existence is certainly apportioned
and multiplied by the multiplicity of
the subjects, just as it is with
existence. Therefore, if the whole is
considered with respect to
emanational dependence, the part is
found in the locus of the dependent
and the emanated, not in the locus of
the object of dependence and the
emanator. It is incomprehensible for
the whole to have a new emanation
in addition to the emanation of all
the parts or a new action upon it in
addition to the action upon them.
The part only pertains to the locus
of the object of dependence and the
emanator with respect to
constitutional and compositional
dependence.[355] Hence, it is
certainly outside of the constitution
of the Maker of the determination
and the Agent of the essence, and
outside of the completers (or:
complements mutammimāt) of the
act of making and the conditions of
the emanation.
If this thing were
according to what they have
imagined, it would be necessary for
the part, insofar as it is a particular
part, to be included both in the
emanating cause and in the
emanated effect, insofar as they are
both as such. And the non-existence
of the part, insofar as it is a
particular non-existence, would be
a complete cause of the non-
existence of the cause and of the
non-existence of the effect
simultaneously in a single stage, or
it itself would be both the non-
existence of the cause and the non-
existence of the effect. It follows
from this that it itself would be a
cause and an effect by virtue of
itself, since the non-existence of the
cause is definitely the cause of the
non-existence of the effect.
However, the non-existence of the
condition is not such that the non-
existence of the conditioned is
essentially dependent upon it, but
rather it is an accidental cause of it
[i.e., its non-existence], since it is
an associate of the non-existence of
its complete cause, which is the
essential cause of its non-existence.
In like manner, the non-existence of
the effect is not dependent upon the
existence of the opposite, for the
effect may be absent despite the
absence of an impediment due to the
non-existence of the realization of
the complete cause. Therefore, the
non-existence of one of two
mutually opposite things does not
depend upon the existence of the
other, since one of them may cease
to exist with the non-existence of
the other also due to the absence of
the complete necessitating cause.
Likewise, that which the inquiry
confirms and the investigation
brings out is that the absence of an
impediment is one of the
concomitants of the existence of the
effect and one of the associates of
its necessitating cause. But it is not
that it is needed for it essentially or
precedes it by nature, except by
accident with respect to
accompanying a certain disposition
of the matter, which is essentially
prior.
In sum, let the utmost effort
be made to persevere steadfastly
with these recondite themes, and let
us guard ourselves [309] against
confusing what is accidental with
what is essential. Know that the
hidden meanings of these subtleties
and the truths of these mysteries
require an intellect more spacious
and refined than the intellects of
ordinary men, a mind more lofty
and mature than the minds of the
masses, and a deliberation deeper
and more profound than the
deliberations of the purveyors of
idle fancy. As God has amply
bestowed upon us his manifold and
hidden bounties, the appointed time
for establishing the truth is
completed, the path for removing
the doubts and delusions has been
made plain, and the speculative
faculty has reached its highest
station through the perfection of the
acquired intellect. Let us turn now
to investigating the doctrine of real,
active, necessary power and
essential, emanating, self-subsistent
will by means of ample
philosophical speculation and
mature inquiry.

Wamḍa [8.9]
Have you not heard that a
group of those who obey their
delusions think that “power” (or:
omnipotence qudra) has [only] two
meanings: the possibility of acting
and desisting, and the agent being in
its essence such that if it wills, it
acts; and if it doesn’t will, it
doesn’t act, and they say that those
among the philosophers who
believe in the eternity of the world
only bear witness to the Agent
Creator (exalted be His
sovereignty) with respect to the first
meaning, not the second meaning.
[356] They do not realize that the
two meanings are inseparable in
concept and in reality, and that
whoever affirms the second
meaning must certainly affirm the
first meaning as well. Is it not so
that if the agent with respect to its
own self is such that if it wills, it
acts, and if it doesn’t will, it
doesn’t act; then without a doubt,
with respect to itself, while
disregarding willing or non-willing,
it is possible for it to act or desist,
even if action is required of it when
will is required, and desisting when
non-willing is required? Therefore,
the continuance of the action and its
necessity are through the
continuance of the will and its
necessity. This is not contrary to the
possibility of desisting when non-
willing is assumed. Similarly, the
continuance of desisting and its
necessity through non-willing is not
contrary to the possibility of action
upon assuming a will. It is
manifestly clear that those who
believe in the eternity of the world
among the philosophers, or those
who pretend to be philosophers,
only necessitate the continuance of
the Agent Creator’s action due to
the necessity of the continuance of
the will, since they say that He is
perfect and beyond perfection.
Consequently, it is necessary, by
reason of His perfect, bountiful
Essence and His perfect knowledge
of the system of the good, for Him
to continuously will to overflow
with the good.[357] But this does
not preclude the possibility of
desisting upon assuming the
absence of will. The truth of the
conditional proposition does not
require the truth of any of the
categorical statements [310] on the
two sides.
Therefore, there is only a
conflict between the two contending
parties here with regard to the
eternity of the world and its
creation, but not with regard to the
attribute of will and choice
belonging to the Agent Creator
(glorified be He). Moreover, it is
not possible for one whose agency
comes from knowledge and will to
be qualified by being bound and
compelled, according to those who
have a share of rational insight. But
the possibility of acting and
desisting with respect to an
essence, and its being in itself such
that if it desires, it acts, and if it
doesn’t desire, it doesn’t act, are
nothing but two statements of the
philosophers for explaining power
and choice. Therefore, to call one
of them a position for choice and
the other a position for compulsion
is outside of the realm of truth and
renouncing the attribute of fairness.
Let it be known.

Wamḍa [8.10]
The most erudite of the
doubters says in his commentary
upon the Ishārāt:
It is certain that the difference
here between the philosophers
and the Mutakallimūn is verbal,
because the Mutakallimūn allow
that the world, upon assuming
its pre-eternity, is the effect of a
pre-eternal cause. However,
they deny the doctrine of cause
and effect, not by this evidence,
[358] but by that which proves
that the cause of the existence of
the world must be powerful. As
for the philosophers, they agree
that it is impossible for the pre-
eternal to be an act of a free
agent. Consequently, agreement
is obtained on the fact that
something being pre-eternal
 precludes its need of one who is
powerful and has free will, but
does not preclude its need of a
necessitating cause. If the matter
is like this, it appears that there
is no controversy on this
question.
The Seal of the Most
Excellent of Scholars responds to
this commentary:
I say: This is a reconciliation
without the mutual consent of
the two opposing parties,
because the Mutakallimūn one
and all preface their books with
the argument of the necessity of
the world being [temporally]
created without paying attention
to [the question of] its Agent,
not to mention whether its Agent
has free will or not. Then they
mention, after affirming its
creation, that it needs a Creator,
and that its Creator must be free
to choose, because were He
constrained, the world would be
eternal, which is false due to
what they mentioned first. Thus,
it appears that they have not
based the creation of the world
upon the doctrine of choice but
rather based choice upon
creation. As for the doctrine
negating cause and effect, it is
not agreed upon by them,
because those who affirm states
among the Mu‘tazila say this
[i.e., cause and effect] is
obvious. [311] Furthermore, the
companions of this learned man,
I mean the Ash‘ariya,
acknowledge together with the
First Principle eight eternals,
which they call the attributes of
the First Principle. Therefore,
they either make the Necessary
by virtue of himself the ninth, or
they make them effects of a
necessary Essence which is
their cause. This is something
they guard themselves against
speaking clearly about. But
there is no escape for them from
this conclusion. It is evident that
they do not agree upon the
doctrine of the denial of cause
and effect, but they are agreed
upon the doctrine of creation.
As for the
philosophers, they do not
believe that it is impossible for
something pre-eternal to be an
act of a free agent, but rather
they believe that a pre-eternal
act can only proceed from a
pre-eternal agent that is perfect
in agency, and that it is
impossible for the act of a pre-
eternal agent perfect in agency
to not be pre-eternal. Since the
world, according to them, is a
pre-eternal act, they make it
dependent upon a pre-eternal
agent perfect in agency. This is
from their natural sciences.
Furthermore, since the First
Principle, according to them, is
pre-eternal and perfect in
agency, they hold that the world,
which is His act, is pre-eternal.
This is from their metaphysics.
But they do not believe also that
He is not powerful and free to
choose, for they maintain that
His power and His free will do
 not necessitate any multiplicity
in His essence, and that His
agency is neither like the agency
found in animals with free
choice nor like the agency found
in compelled things among the
possessors of corporeal natures.

Wamḍa [8.11]
I am astonished by the
Leader of the Doubters, how he
returned to the truth in al-Mabāḥith
al-Mashriqiyya (The Eastern
Subjects), while he forsook it in al-
Ladad (The Fierce Dispute). Yet he
yielded to reason, submitted to the
people of truth, and acknowledged
that the difference between one who
is powerful and has choice and a
constrained agent is not according
to the path he was taking refuge
upon in his other books.
He states:
If the will of God is perpetual in
existence, that will does not
have an intention (qaṣd) for
calling things into existence,
because it is impossible for an
intention for something to
persist after the occurrence of
that thing. It is established then
that the will of God does not
consist of intention. Rather, the
truth about the meaning of His
being willing is that He
contemplates himself and
contemplates the system of the
good existing in the universe.
How could it be otherwise,
since that system [312] is
certainly a superabundant
creature, and it is a good which
is not incompatible with the
essence of the First Principle.
Thus the knowledge of the
[First] Principle is through its
[the creature’s] overflowing
from Him, and it is not
incompatible with His essence.
It is His will (irāda) for that
and His consent (riḍā). We
assert, then, our proposition that
the difference between willing
and not willing, regardless of
whether it be with respect to us
or with respect to God, is what
we have mentioned, for as long
as our will has an equal relation
to the existence of the object
willed and its non-existence, it
is not suitable for the
preponderation of one of these
two extremes over the other. But
if its relation results in the
existence of the object willed, it
is preponderant over its non-
existence. It is established that
preponderation only occurs by
coming to the boundary of
necessity, through which the
occurrence is required, since
the decisive will is only
realized by God, and it then
becomes the necessitator of the
act. Therefore, what is said
about the difference between the
compelled and the free to
choose—that it is possible for
the free to choose to act and not
to act, while it is not possible
for the compelled not to act—is
an invalid argument. For we
have explained that when the
will has an equal relation, it is
not decisive, and the occurrence
of the object willed is
impossible, but when one of its
two extremes preponderates
over the other, it becomes the
necessitator of the act. No
distinction remains between it
and the other necessitated things
in this respect. Rather, the
distinction is what we have
mentioned, namely, that the
willer is that which knows the
procession of the act which is
not incompatible with him,
while the non-willer is that
which does not know what
proceeds from it, like the
natural faculties. Even if
awareness is attained, action is
not compatible with it, but is
instead incompatible, as with
what is forced to act, since the
action is not willed. Among the
things which proves that it is not
a condition for the Essence to
be willing and powerful is the
possibility that He not act. If
God knows that He will
produce a certain act at a
certain time, but if that act were
not to occur, then God’s
knowledge would not
correspond with the object
known, and His knowledge
would be ignorance, which is
 impossible. That which leads to
impossibility is itself
impossible; therefore the non-
existence of the occurrence of
that action is impossible.
Rather, its occurrence is
necessary because of the
impossibility of its going
outside of the two contradictory
extremes, inasmuch as God
wills it and is powerful over it.
We know that the possibility of
non-being is not a condition for
the action being decreed or
willed.
After this chapter in
another chapter on His power, he
states:

The powerful is one who if he

desires to act, he acts, and if he
desires not to act, he doesn’t
act. It is necessary to know that
it is not a condition for the truth
of this conditional proposition
for the categorical statement to
be true—in other words, for it
to be true that he desires not to
act, and he doesn’t act—for
[313] the agent is only an actual
agent during the procession of
the action from him. In that state
it is impossible for desiring not
to act and not acting to apply to
him. Therefore we know that the
correctness of describing the
agent by agency is not because
of the truth of this categorical
statement, but because of the
truth of that conditional
statement. Otherwise, it would
be true of Him (exalted be He)
that were He to desire not to
act, He wouldn’t act, although it
is not true of Him that He wills
not to act, since we have
explained that the will to act is
one of the concomitants of His
essence.
If it is said: We do not
consider, with respect to the
Agent being an agent, His will
not to act, so what you have
mentioned in not necessary for
us, but rather we consider His
being such that a will not to act
is possible for Him, for the
Agent is the state of His being
an agent. Although it is not true
that He desires not to act, it is
true that in His nature is the
power not to act. We only
consider this condition so that
He may be distinguished from
compelled causes.
We say: We have explained
that the modes are that by which
the Agent becomes an actual
 complete agent. It is impossible
for Him to make the action not
dependent upon Him. Therefore,
whenever the Agent combines
the modes by which He causes
the act, it is not true of Him that
it is in His nature not to act, but
rather this is false. As for the
distinction between the
powerful and the compelled, we
have set it forth in the preceding
chapter.
His argument in his words
is ended, and he has reached a high
station in this inquiry.

Wamḍa [8.12]
 The nature of essential
possibility is the complete cause of
needing an essential efficient cause.
This is because the necessity of the
actualization (fi‘liyya) is due to a
particular essence through the
substance of the essence itself, or
its impossibility is a complete
cause for absolute independence
from a cause, particularly an
efficient cause. The negation of
anything that is a complete cause for
something is definitely a complete
cause for that thing’s negation.
Therefore, the non-necessity of the
two extremes of actualization and
non-actualization belonging to the
essence with respect to itself is
certainly the complete cause of
needing an emanational cause for
the actualization of either of the two
extremes. The nature of essential
possibility, then, is the complete
cause of needing an emanational
efficient cause for the possible
essence. But creation (ḥudūth) has
no share at all of inclusion as a part
or a condition, as certain of the
meddlers believed.[359] [314]

Wamḍa [8.13]
It is therefore clear that as
long as something is not necessary,
it is not substantialized, and as long
as it is not necessary, it is not given
existence.[360] That which has the
possibility of the two extremes in
the substance of its essence and the
root of its quiddity requires
necessity from a cause before one
of the two extremes can be
specified for it by actualization, as
is agreed upon by the people of
truth. Unreachable priority
(awlawiyya) as the principle of
necessity, as many of the common
meddlers believed, is useless for
severing the relation of possibility
and not productive of actual
existence at all. Rather, it is
necessary for the obverse to be
necessitated through its complete
efficient cause, and by relation to it
totally. Its complete efficient cause
is not in it, but only in relation to it.
Is it not so that if the
principle of necessity is fulfilled,
the relation of possibility is severed
and actualization is determinately
distinguished from non-
actualization? The necessity from
the cause, therefore, has cut out the
root of the task completely for one
who asks about the cause of
preponderation. The necessity of
the necessity, and the necessity of
the necessity of the necessity have
proceeded from necessity
continuously as far back as mental
consideration allows.
As for non-necessary priority,
according to what the meddlers and
the conjecturers of suppositions
believe, because it does not
definitely reach the station of
completion nor an appointed time
for departing from the circle of
possible relation, determination and
non-determination, emanation and
non-emanation are both possible
together with it, for it is itself
obtained with each of the two
assumptions, as a result of which it
is continuously preserved in the two
forms and continuously shared
between the two things. Thus it
certainly still has an equal relation
to the two extremes [of
determination and non-
determination]. The question of the
cause of preponderation, therefore,
returns anew. The thing (amr) needs
from the start either (1) another
thing, by whose occurrence the
extreme of determination is
definitely distinguished from the
extreme of non-determination, and
by which emanation is exactly
differentiated from non-emanation,
so that the assumption of the
occurrence of the complete cause is
pierced first. The inquiry is boosted
here by investigation. Or it needs
(2) another new priority
(awlawiyya) apart from that old
priority. But since it [the new
priority] is also a non-necessary
one, it does not have the capacity to
be that which singles out one of the
two extremes of the relation of
possibility, but rather it is necessary
for the thing to continue leading
back to other priorities infinitely. If
this infinite series of priorities is
considered in its entirety in
summative consideration, it is like
the first priority with respect to lack
of independence [315] and
usefulness, because of the relation
of possibility, despite all this, still
standing up upon its axis.
In sum, the distinction
between necessary things in the
form of necessary priority and prior
things in the form of non-necessary
priority is that all necessary things
issue from the spring of primal
necessity, which is the principle for
the occurrence of the relation of
necessity emerging from the
compass of the circle of the
possibility of the two extremes. All
of them [i.e., the necessary things]
are necessary consequents in mental
consideration. Infinity for them is
both non-ceasing and non-
numerable. The relation of
possibility in every stage is severed
in the real world by the necessity of
the prior thing (matbū‘), which is
the root object of necessity. It is
necessary for the issuing of the
priority of the priority in non-
necessary priorities to precede the
issuing of the priority from another
spring apart from the spring of the
priority due to its being one of the
prior determinants in a higher stage
with respect to the thing itself.
Infinity for them is actually
numerable and not non-ceasing in
mental postulation, due to the total
dependence of the occurrence of the
effect upon them, and the
dependence of the occurrence of
every priority upon the priority of
that priority. The secret with
respect to this is that the relation of
possibility, which is the reason for
dependency upon a cause, the
source of nullification and non-
being, and the basis for needing an
agent, is not severed in any of the
stages at all, but indeed remains
standing upon its axis in every
stage. The truth is now established
upon the throne of demonstration for
this question by the leave of God,
glorified be He. Praise be to God,
the lord of all the worlds.
 Wamīḍ [8.13.1]
Since the path of the
question has become clear, it is
evident that the relation of the
complete efficient cause to its made
effect is definitely through
necessity. If the Powerful, the
Unconstrained in His own essence
is the complete agent of the object
He has willed, His power and His
will in relation to His effect are
necessarily by power and choice
according to the necessary relation.
Therefore, since there is no doubt
that the Agent Maker (exalted be
His sovereignty), in His own real,
unique essence, is the complete
agent of the universe in its
comprehensive, harmonious system,
there is behind the whole world of
possibility necessarily only the
essentially Necessary by reason of
himself. In like manner, the
complete efficient cause of the
substance of the essence of the First
Emanated, which is the first of the
parts of the system of the whole, is
God (glorified be He) by the agency
of His own essence alone. Then
[He emanates] the other existents of
the system, in accord with their
ranks and their stations, until the
utter end of existence in succession
[316] descending from His
presence with respect to both the
vertical and horizontal order. It is
certain, then, that His power, His
agency, His choice, and His will in
relation to all things and in relation
to each thing in particular are in a
perfect, complete, necessary mode.
Moreover, is it not firmly
established by certain
demonstration by means of the
compounded intellect that the
Necessary by virtue of himself is
definitely necessary in all of His
modes, whereas a possible [or:
potential] mode is not possible for
His real, necessary Essence in any
respect whatsoever? Indeed,
whatever is an absolute perfection
belonging to existence as such is
necessarily affirmed to His essence
with respect to that stage.
Consequently, it is necessarily
impossible for the choice to
emanate the good and the willing of
it to not be among the things which
are requisite of His essence
(glorified be He) by virtue of His
essence. Furthermore, if the relation
of the emanation of the good by
means of will and choice to His
essence were by possibility, not
necessity, it would be necessary for
His will and His choice to emanate
the good of the system of the whole
to be another cause apart from His
essence, on account of which the
relation to Him of the will and
choice to emanate would proceed
from potentiality to actuality and
from possibility to necessity. This,
notwithstanding its absurdity and its
impossibility in itself, cannot be
conceived at all, because anything
external to His essence and also
outside of the sum of His creation is
necessarily nonsensical.
It is plain therefore that the
only way for the emanation [of
creation] to take place is that God
knows, through His own real,
causal essence, the manner (wajh)
of the good in the system of the
world, then He wills it and chooses
it by His grace and His mercy, and
then He produces it and emanates it
by real, necessary will and perfect,
necessary power. His agency by
virtue of necessary power does not
require departing from the path of
choice and entering into the arena of
compulsion. How could this be
when action in this case is preceded
by perfect knowledge and proceeds
from free will? The action of a
compelled agent cannot be from
knowledge and its effect cannot be
from will. Necessity by choice,
then, is not incompatible with
choice, but rather it requires it and
confirms it. It is apparent from this
that the deniers of the truth among
the meddlers are only those who
permit emanation from the complete
cause by non-necessary priority.
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars states in the
Sharḥ al-Ishārāt:
The Mutakallimūn are those
who believe in the [temporal]
creation (ḥudūth) of the world.
They are divided into three
groups. One group recognize the
particularization (takhaṣṣuṣ) of
that moment by creation [317]
but consider the existence which
is the cause of that
particularization not to be the
Agent. These are the majority of
the ancient Mu‘tazila among the
Mutakallimūn and those who
followed in their course. They
only advocate its
particularization by priority
(awlawiyya), not necessity, and
they make the cause of
particularization an affair which
reverts back to the world.
Another group maintain its
particularization to that moment
by necessity, and they make the
creation of the world at any
other time impossible, because
there is no moment before that
moment. This is the position of
Abu’l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, known
as al-Ka‘bī, and those who
follow him. Another group do
not recognize particularization
for fear of weakness of
causation. Instead, they believe
that the existence of the world is
not dependent upon a moment
nor any other thing other than the
Agent (and He is not asked
about what He does), or they
recognize particularization but
deny the necessity of its
dependency upon a cause other
than the Agent, for they maintain
that the Agent is free to choose
one possibility (maqdūriyya)
over another without need of a
particularizing agent. They
exemplify this by a thirsty
person who comes upon two
vessels of water which are
equal in every respect. He will
certainly choose one of them.
[361] They have other well-
known examples besides this
one. They are the companions of
Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, those
who follow him, and others
among the recent Mutakallimūn.
 Wamīḍ [8.13.2]
That which makes being-
an-object-of-agency (maqdūriyya)
possible, and the basis of the
admissibility of occurrence through
connection to the heavenly,
necessary power, is the nature of
essential possibility. Every
essentially possible thing is [a link]
in a chain of dependence leading
back to the essentially necessary,
self-subsistent Creator (exalted be
His sovereignty), and it and
everything whose existence is
dependent upon it among the
possible things in the vertical series
is dependent upon Him (glorified
be He). God is the Creator of each
thing, and He is powerful over each
thing, since each thing which is
possible of existence, with all of its
causes and its principles, is
dependent upon His power, His
will, His emanation, and His
agency. His perfect necessary
power has the capability [to
realize] everything in the world of
possibility. He is the Creator,
absolutely, of whatever has a cause,
with the totality of its causes and its
principles, since nothing which
needs Him within the chain of
possible dependency can escape
from His knowledge, His will, His
handiwork, and His power
(magnified be His grandeur).
It is therefore clear and
evident that a connection of real,
necessary power to essential
impossibilities, [318] in the respect
assumed, does not exist as an object
of agency, since it has no reality and
no thingness in any respect at all,
nor from the respect of deficiency
of power and its weakness. This is
the implicit meaning of what you
have heard them say: “Possibility is
what makes being-an-object-of-
agency possible, not what makes
being-an-agent possible.” The
impossible is not an object of
agency with respect to itself as
nullified, nor is it a cause of
weakness in relation to real power.
Between the two statements, in
other words, between the two
concepts expressed in the two
statements, is an evident distinction
and a clear difference. We do not
intend by saying this to affirm a
correlative agency without a
correlative object of agency. How
could any rational person maintain
that? Rather we intend to affirm the
real power which is the cause of
correlational agency whenever
something which is an object of
agency is admissible in terms of its
conceptual reality, as is the case
with the causality of a cause prior
to the essence of the effect and prior
to correlational causality and being-
an-effect.

Wamīḍ [8.13.3]
Perhaps you will say: If
the divine power is necessary, the
non-emanation of the possible
world through that power is
essentially impossible. It then
follows that its emanation is
essentially necessary, but this
contradicts the essential possibility
of its existence.[362]
It may be answered that the
emanation of something is its
determination and its existence
through another. But this is another
meaning apart from its
determination and its existence in
itself essentially and in mental
consideration only. For its
determination and its existence in
itself are not correlated, while from
another besides it they are
correlated and intelligible in
relation to what is other than it,
because it is possible for us to
understand the former despite our
unawareness of the latter, and
because we judge that it has
proceeded from another, and the
predicate is not the subject.
Therefore, the possibility of the
existence of the world with respect
to its essence does not contradict
the necessity of its emanation from
God (glorified be He) and the
necessity of His willing it by reason
of His being perfect in agency and
desirous of issuing the good
essentially. The world proceeds
from His own knowledge and His
will, dependent upon His
necessarily existent, real, solitary
essence alone, and essential
knowledge, power, will, agency,
and effusion. Let is be pondered.
[319]
 Wamīḍ [8.13.4]
If you say: Is it not clearly
established that the true necessary
Reality is immeasurably exalted
and sanctified above multiplicity
before the essence, multiplicity
with the essence, and multiplicity
after the essence. It is not possible
for the One Essence to become
multiple in one circumstantial mode
after another, or in one aspect after
another, or in any of the modes of
the Essence at all. In the station of
His real, solitary essence, He is
sanctified from every mode which
necessitates all the perfect,
glorious, holy names, since the
perfect circumstantial modes in
their entirety return to the
circumstantial mode of essential
necessity, to which nothing
whatsoever can be added.
Therefore, the station of His
solitary essence is identical to
knowledge, will, life, and all the
modes of might and glory and all
the attributes of splendor and
beauty. If, then, the emanation of the
system of existence from Him is
necessary in its essence by reason
of His knowledge and His will,
then it is certainly necessary by
reason of the station of His very
essence (glorified be He). How,
then, is the possibility of emanation
and non-emanation inferred in the
definition of power admissible with
respect to the very essence of the
All-Powerful?
I say: First, let it be known
to you that the possibility of
emanation and non-emanation
inferred in the definition of the
reality of power in relation to the
essence of the one who is powerful,
is either with respect to (1) a mode
of potentiality in the essence of the
powerful, as with the power of
man, for example, over the objects
of his power, for this is through the
deficiency of the substance of the
essence, and his being within the
boundary of himself potential in
relation to his attributes and his
perfections, or (2) with respect to
the disposition of essential
possibility in the object of agency,
as in the power of the true Powerful
One over all the objects of agency,
for this is due to His sanctity from
the characteristics of deficiency and
the attributes of possibility in all
respects. Therefore, it is possible
for the object of agency, which is
possible in essence by reason of
essential possibility, to proceed or
not to proceed from its essentially
powerful Maker, even though it
proceeds necessarily from Him
with respect to His knowledge and
His will in the station of His
essence, since this is the most
perfect of the modes of power and
of its stages.[363]
Secondly, unrestrained
power is confirmed by the essential
necessity of will and knowledge. If
the All-Powerful acts with
knowledge and will, He certainly
acts with unrestrained power,
especially if His own essence is
identical to knowledge and will.
The possibility of emanation and
non-emanation inferred in the
definition of power remains due to
its relation to the consideration of
the object of agency being good in
the system of existence or not, since
[320] that consideration is certainly
something in addition to the
substance of the essence of the
object of agency.
Therefore, the Agent, who
is powerful by necessity in the stage
of His essence, is such that
whenever a possible thing is
receptive to His power among the
things which are worthy of the
system of the good in the succession
of existence, whether vertically or
horizontally, He causes it to enter
[into existence] through His will,
and He produces it through His
knowledge and His purpose,
according to the mode of necessity,
with respect to that consideration
(i‘tibār) which is added to the
consideration which is the root of
the essence of the possible object of
agency and the substance of its
quiddity. And whenever it itself is
not something whose existence and
determination are good for the
system of existence, He holds back
from fashioning it and emanating it,
and He does not cause it to enter
[into existence] through His will
and His purpose. This is what I
maintain after inquiry into this
subject. Perchance it is the
colocynth of truth and the secret of
wisdom at the heart of this subject.
God (glorified be He) is the
benefactor of virtue and excellence.

Wamīḍ [8.13.5]
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars (may God’s
good pleasure rest upon him) did
well and hit the target in explaining
the subject of knowledge, when he
stated in the eleventh question:
“Multiplicity of power and
knowledge only occur in possible
existents. Thus minds compare the
First Principle to themselves, and
they ascribe to Him knowledge and
power. But His sanctification
(tanzīh) requires us to say: ‘Exalted
be thy Lord, the Lord of might,
above what they ascribe to Him!’”
Then he says in the twelfth
question explaining the doctrine of
the philosophers on the will of
God: “It is knowledge of the system
of the whole according to the most
excellent manner. If power and
knowledge are a single thing, which
is required for the existence of
possible things in the most perfect
system, then power, knowledge, and
will are a single thing in essence,
which are differentiated by the
mentioned mental
considerations.”[364]
Then in the nineteenth
question on determinism and free
will, he states:
There is no doubt that with the
occurrence of the causes, the
effect is necessary, and with
their cessation, it is impossible.
Therefore, he who looks to the
first causes and perceives that
they are neither by the power of
the Agent nor by His will
maintains determinism. This is
absolutely incorrect, because
the direct cause of the effect
(fi‘l) [in the case of first causes]
is His power and His will. As
for he who looks to the
immediate cause [of temporal
things] and maintains free will
(ikhtiyār), this is also
absolutely incorrect, because
the effect [in this case] does not
occur by causes all of which are
objects of His power and His
will. The truth is what one of
them said: There is neither
determinism nor delegation of
power, but something between
two things. As for the truth
about God, if it is maintained
[321] that power and will are
 two different things for Him,
there would follow what is
required here without the
possibility of an imperfection.
However, the emanation of His
acts (exalted be He) from Him
is not dependent upon a
multiplicity. Rather, He is the
cause of the existence of the
many. So neither free will nor
compulsion are conceivable in
this case.
He intends similar to what
we understand by free will and
compulsion with respect to the
existents which are around us.
 Wamīḍ [8.13.6]
It may thus be summarized
that if the agency of the Agent with
respect to His act is due to His
knowledge of that act being more
excellent and more perfect in the
system of existence than its
opposite, and knowledge of that is
the same as the essence of the
Agent, and the act being more
complete, more perfect, more
worthy, and more noble in the
system of the good than its opposite
is something in addition to the
particularity of its essence in
[mental] consideration, then
certainly the emanation of that act,
not its opposite, from the essence of
the Agent is necessary with respect
to the essence of the Agent.
Nonetheless, His power in relation
to the two extremes is equal, since
the necessity of emanation from
Him is due to the fact that He
requires that, not its opposite, due
to its being more perfect and more
excellent in the system of the good
than its opposite. This emanation
from Him is not because the
essence of the Agent is only
powerful over it in its particularity,
not its opposite. For if its opposite
were more perfect and more
excellent, it would be specified to
proceed from the essence of the
Agent, and His agency over it
would be due to His essence, and
His knowledge of that is the same
as His essence.
Since it is firmly established
that the Sustainer of the whole only
produces the whole through a
knowledge which is itself His
knowing essence, which is the most
perfect knowledge of every object
of knowledge, whether intelligible
or sensible, He (glorified be He) is
therefore definitely an agent by will
and choice in the most perfect and
comprehensive manner. He knows
His essence, and He is in His own
reality the wellspring of every
determination and existence, of
every perfect determination and
perfect existence. His real essence
is pure actuality in every respect,
and His essence in itself is the
emanator of the good, the agent of
the most perfect system without
qualification. Since He knows
through His own essence the nature
of the system of the good in the
whole, the emanation of existents
from Him depends on His essence
and the intelligibility of His
essence, according to the perfect
intelligible system present with
Him through the intelligibility of
His essence. It is not that it
proceeds from Him like light
proceeds from a lamp and heat from
fire. Immeasurably exalted is His
glory above that! Nay, rather it is
that He knows the nature of the
system of the good in existence, and
it necessarily emanates from Him.
And He knows that this state of
knowing requires existence to
emanate from Him according to a
succession which he cognizes [322]
as the best and the most excellent
order. The emanation of good and
excellence from Him is not
incompatible with His bountiful
essence; indeed, it is worthy of the
effusion of His active mercy and the
outpouring of His all-encompassing
grace, since it is a goodly
consequent of His essence and a
concomitant of His perfect bounty,
which is His own essence.
Therefore, His effects are willed by
Him and their order proceeds from
Him according to His good
pleasure. But it is not that He knows
them and then He wills them.
Rather, His very knowledge of their
comprehensive, perfect order is His
willing of them and His choosing of
them. His real beneficent essence,
by reason of its overflowing
goodness and its pure, efficient
actuality, is that which moves Him
to choose it.
Consequently, just as it is
evident that both thinker and object
of thought are the same in Him, in
like manner, it is abundantly clear
that His being a willer and His
being a knower are the same thing,
and that His will is identical to His
knowledge of the system of the most
complete and perfect good. He
himself is His own motivating
factor (dā‘ī) which motivates Him
to choose to act and to emanate. It is
nothing but His own necessitating
essence as such. Existence belongs
to these names and all the perfect
names predicated to the possible
essence by reason of multiple
aspects and diverse circumstantial
modes.

Wamīḍ [8.13.7]
Our way when we intend
to do something is to conceive it;
then we form a mental, imaginal, or
scientific cognition by which we
judge whether it is helpful,
beneficial, or worthy—in short, a
particular goodness in relation to
the substance of our essence, or in
relation to one of our faculties. A
desire for it proceeds from this. If
the desire becomes strong and
consensus confirms it, the
appetitive faculty is stimulated and
a new will, or consensus, issues
from it. Then we activate the motive
faculty, which is in the muscles, and
the nerves and sensory organs are
set in motion. Then the external
organs move to accomplish it. The
attribute in us which is the
perception of the act and the
perception of the aspect of good in
it is different from the attribute
which is the means to accomplish it,
which is a desire and its confirming
stage, which is consensus and will,
since our acts are only through
sensory instruments which only
move through a desire. That by
which we consent to act is our
perception of the good returning to
us in it.
As for the Self-Subsisting,
the Real (glorified be He), since
His being is far exalted above His
act occurring through an instrument
and above conceiving a particular
goodness for Him which He does
not possess in the station of His
essence by virtue of His essence,
since it is incomprehensible for
Him to be seeking perfection [323]
and to embellish, motivate, or
beautify himself with a particular
attribute which is additional to the
stage of His essence, then it is
certainly not possible for Him to
have an appetitive desire for
anything at all. Therefore, that by
which He consents to the objects of
His power and His effects is His
very knowledge of them, and
because they are good in
themselves, not because they have a
particular goodness which returns
to Him. Immeasurably exalted is He
from that! This knowledge is the
same as His real, actual essence in
every respect, and it is the same as
His will and His choice. Therefore,
He wills in the stage of His own
essence, and by a knowledge which
is identical to the stage of His
essence, not by an intention and
will accidental to His essence. A
single notion for Him is His
essence and His knowledge of His
essence. It is the perception of
made things and knowledge of the
design of the good in them. This is
the path to making (ja‘l), fashioning
(ṣun‘), primary origination (ibdā‘),
and emanation (ifāḍa). Hence, just
as in us the impulse of the
appetitive faculty derives from our
very conception of something and
our belief that it is advantageous or
proper in relation to us, without
another will apart from that very
belief in between the conception
and conviction and the impulse of
the desire, [in like manner,] in the
necessary knowledge and the divine
station, making and emanation
derive from His knowledge of the
thing, which is good in itself and
worthy of the system of existence,
without a desire, purpose, intention,
or impulse arising in between them.
Consequently, there is not another
will in addition to that knowledge
which is identical to the stage of the
essence. He (glorified be He) by
His own essence knows the good
things and consents to them, then He
produces them and creates them,
fashions them and emanates them
out of bounty and favor, goodness
and beneficence. He does not do
this in the sense that He seeks them,
plans them, intends them, and
desires them, for His will and His
choice are far superior to and
transcend the free will which
belongs to those who choose among
His creatures and His servants, how
much more the necessitation which
belongs to the natures which are
compelled in their actions among
His handiworks, which in their
essences, their natures, their
dispositions, and their tempers are
subservient to the command of God,
lauded be He.

Wamīḍ [8.13.8]
Are you not, by your
esteemed rational nature, convinced
that a soundly constructed
demonstration affirms that whatever
is an absolute perfection belonging
to an existent as such is among its
real attributes? Therefore, it is
necessary, according to the doctrine
of the clear intellect, for it to be
affirmed of the essentially
necessary Self-Subsistent Being
(exalted be His remembrance) with
respect to His real, self-subsisting
essence in the stage of His essence,
including will and choice, just as
with the other attributes [324] and
perfections. It is consequently
necessary for the attributes of will
and choice to also be identical to
His real necessary essence in all
respects, just as with the other
attributes of perfection without any
distinction.. Furthermore, do not all
the realities, insofar as they have
attributes and characteristics, have
divine duties and supererogatory
acts, namely, primary entelechies
and secondary entelechies created
by God, which depend upon His
fashioning, His generosity, His
bounty, and His outpouring? For it
is God who gives knowledge to the
learned, power to the powerful,
will to those endowed with it, and
choice to those who choose, and it
is self evident that He cannot
bestow a perfection if He himself is
deficient in it. Whoever burdens
himself with denying this has
withdrawn from common sense and
departed from a rational and
discerning nature. And it is clear
that if a perfection is not identical
to the stage of His essence, He is
certainly deficient in it. It is
therefore necessary for will and
choice to be identical to the stage of
His solitary, real essence (glorified
be He), and the same applies to
knowledge, power, and the other
modes which adorn reality and the
perfections of existence. In the
Noble Qur’ān and the Divine
Revelation, the following words
allude to this theme: “Over every
possessor of knowledge He is the
all-knowing,”[365] for it is
necessary for the All-Knowing by
virtue of His essence to not be one
whose knowledge is added to His
essence; rather He is above every
possessor of knowledge in a
general and exhaustive way. It is
clear that the only basis of this is
the circumstantial mode of
perfection taken absolutely, not the
particularity of the circumstantial
mode of knowledge. Let it be
known.

Wamīḍ [8.13.9]
There remains a difficult
and recondite doubt. It is that it is
not possible for the will of God to
be identical to His knowledge,
because He knows each thing, but
He does not will evil, injustice,
unbelief, nor any of the
reprehensible sins and vices. If His
knowledge is connected to each
thing essentially, the same cannot be
true of His will. It is therefore
certain that His will is another thing
apart from His knowledge. Since
His knowledge is the same as His
solitary, real essence (exalted be
His sovereignty), then His will is
something else apart from His pure
reality and added to His essence.
Consequently, willing is not one of
the modes of His essence and not
one of the names of His attributes;
otherwise, it would be the same as
His essence.
Our senior master, the
chief of the moderns, Abū Ja‘far
Muḥammad Ibn [325] Ya‘qūb al-
Kulaynī (may God’s good pleasure
rest upon him) has established this
doubt in his compilation al-Kāfī
and made it a proof, and argued for
the position that the will of the
necessarily Self-subsistent is added
to His essence, not the same as His
essence, and not an attribute of His
essence.
It is certain that it may be
said to remove the doubt, according
to what we ascertained in al-
Rawāshiḥ al-Samāwiyya, that it is
impossible for the emanation of the
good to be incompatible with the
essence of the true Generous One
and the absolutely All-Possessing.
Nay, His freely choosing it [the
emanation of the good] is definitely
a concomitant of His essence.
Therefore, whatever He knows to
be good for the system of existence
He fashions and emanates, and it is
not incompatible with His essence
nor unpleasing to His essence. The
emanation of the good being
pleasing (murḍī) to His essence is
the meaning of His will which is
one of the attributes of His essence
and which is the same as His
essence. The stage of His own
essence, then, is a complete
knowledge of each thing, a real
will, and a real choosing of the
whole which is good. He, in His
own essence, requires the name
“the knower of each thing” and the
name “the unrestrained willer of
every good thing” without any
deliberation, resolution,
premeditation, or design. He neither
chooses nor emanates anything
which is not absolutely good or
whose good does not prevail over
its evil, nor does He cause it to
enter into the arena of fashioning
and generation, existentiation and
emanation, at all. He only wills the
small number of necessary evils
belonging to the manifold good
things insofar as they are
inseparable from those good things,
not insofar as they are evils. This is
why an insignificant number of
evils, which are the concomitants of
great blessings and manifold goods,
are contained in the
predetermination (qaḍā’) of God,
not essentially but accidentally. We
have explained this decisively in
our book al-Īqāẓāt. The real, divine
will not being connected to evils
essentially, therefore, is not
contradictory to the will of the good
being identical to that knowledge
which is itself the stage of His real,
solitary essence. A parallel of the
willing of the good in relation to the
attribute of knowledge is the
attributes of hearing and vision. Are
not hearing and vision among the
attributes of His essence which are
identical to His real, necessary
being, which is itself a complete
knowledge encompassing all
things? His hearing, then, is the
hearing of everything which can be
heard, not of all things; and His
vision is the seeing of every
seeable thing, not of all things. The
same applies to His real will. His
essence is knowledge of every
possible thing, but will of every
possible good thing. It is hearing in
relation to every hearable thing,
vision in relation to every seeable
thing, and power in relation to
everything which is an object of
power. The evils which take place
in the system of existence,
regardless of [326] whether they be
in this primary abode or in the
abode hereafter, are neither willed
essentially nor required essentially,
but rather, they are willed and
required accidentally. They are thus
contained in the predetermination
(qaḍā’), not essentially, but
accidentally, insofar as they are
concomitants of the great necessary
goods which proceed from the true
Wise One and the absolutely Good
Being, although they do occur in
fate (qadar) essentially.[366] We
will elaborate upon this in the Tenth
Qabas, with the permission of God,
the Almighty, the All-Knowing, so
that you will become informed and
assured, and not wander astray.
May God confirm you in accord
with His enduring manifest words
and His pure and perfect religion.

Wamīd [8.13.10]
If you say: What’s the
matter with you? According to what
the two Abū Ja‘fars, Abū Ja‘far al-
Kulaynī, the Chief of the
Transmitters, in his compendium al-
Kāfī, and Abū Ja‘far al-Ṣadūq Ibn
Bābawaih al-Qumī, in the Kitāb al-
Tawḥīd and in the book ‘Uyūn
Akhbār al-Riḍā, recount from our
pure masters and our infallible
Imāms, the keepers of the secrets of
Revelation and the custodians of the
laws of religion (God’s blessings
and salutations be upon them), will
(irāda) and purpose (mashiyya) are
created, and they are attributes of
His action, not attributes of His
essence.
I say: My path in this
regard is that “will” may express
and mean the verbal noun with
fatḥa, as in producing and giving
existence, or it may express and
mean the verbal noun with kasra, as
in the effect itself and the new
creature. Just as His knowledge of
things has stages, the last of which
is the existence of existents and
their emanation from Him, manifest
and unconcealed—in the sense that
their existence and their emanation
from Him unveiled in His presence
and not lost or hidden from Him is
itself their being-an-object-of-
knowledge to Him, not the state of
His knowing them, as we
investigated in the book al-
Taqdīsāt, since His state of
knowing them does not proceed
from their existence, but rather they
on account of His knowledge of His
own essence are in the most perfect
state of existence and the most
excellent of modes—in like manner,
His will (exalted be His
sovereignty) has stages, the last of
which is itself the essences of
existents and their actually
determined entities. They are only
the same as the will in the sense of
being objects willed by Him, not in
the sense that His state of willing is
them. Moreover, the state of being
an object of will, also, is in the
sense of its actual emanation from
Him as an object of consent, not in
the sense of its being an object of
consent in Him. For that which
causes the actualization of the
consent (riḍā) and the
commencement of the
particularization is His very
essence (glorified be He) due to
[327] His generosity, His mercy,
His providence, and His goodness.
This is more worthy with respect to
choice than having the consent issue
from another thing which is added
to the essence of the Agent, and than
the agency of the Agent not being by
its own essence but by something
else attached to the substance of His
essence.
His made things (or:
effects maj‘ūlāt), therefore, are an
object of consent before the
emanation and with the emanation
in the same way. His consent is not
renewed with their actual
emanation from Him, but rather the
new creature and the actual
existence of things from Him is
consented to, not another thing in
the essence of the Agent or in one of
the modes of His essence at all. In
short, the question of will
corresponds to the question of
knowledge. For the state of being an
object of knowledge, which is itself
the essences of the determined
existents and their entities, only
refers to the existence of things and
their actual determination, unveiled,
which is not their state of being
actually unveiled, since their state
of being actually unveiled acquired
before the determination and with
the determination are the same,
because that by which unveiling
occurs is the very essence of the
complete Agent, the All-Knowing,
the Wise. The state of unveiling,
then, is superior to the case when
that by which the unveiling occurs
is the existence of the substance of
the actual object of knowledge
itself, or due to the occurrence of its
shadowy form. It is clear then that it
is possible for one thing itself to
have unlimited shadowy forms
corresponding to multiple minds or
corresponding to multiple times.
But it is not possible except through
the dependence of the substance of
the solitary effect itself upon the
very essence of its complete,
solitary Agent itself. There is no
doubt then that the unveiling of the
complete Agent is more worthy and
superior with respect to bestowing
the specification of its shadow,
which is the substance of His effect
itself issuing from His very
essence, than the unveiling of the
shadowy form.
It is now clear that the will
which is identical to the entities of
the created things is only their
determination and their actual
existence as objects of will and
consent. In this sense it [will] is not
an attribute of the Creator which is
renewed in Him later. Rather, it is
one of the attributes of the entities
of generated and new creatures.
This is what was meant by the
words of the Lights of the world of
intellect and wisdom and the Moons
of the heaven of holiness and
sanctity and by their traditions.
(May the blessings of God, His
greetings, and His salutations rest
upon their souls and their bodies.)
Let it be known.

Wamīḍ [8.13.11]
It befits us to provide
commentary here upon some of the
passages [from the authoritative
traditions] that this may serve as a
standard, criterion, [328] and
measure by which to judge it, lead
to it, and set out upon the path in
this subject.
We say: From Abū Ja‘far
al-Kulaynī (may God be pleased
with him) in his compendium al-
Kāfī and in the Kitāb al-Tawḥīd,
with respect to the will being one of
the attributes of action, among his
tripartite propositions in the Ṣaḥīḥ,
it is related on the authority of
Ṣafwān Ibn Yaḥyā that he said:
I said to Abu’l-Ḥasan: “Teach
us about the will belonging to
God and belonging to creation.”
He replied: “The will belonging
to creation is the mind and what
it manifests for them after that
pertaining to action. As for the
will of God, His will is His act
of creating (iḥdāth) and nothing
else, for He does not deliberate,
intend, or premeditate. These
attributes are negated from Him,
for they are the attributes of
creation. The will of God is His
 action and nothing else. He says
to it ‘Be!’ and it comes into
existence without a word or
intonation from the tongue, and
with neither intention nor
premeditation. There is no
explanation for this, just as there
is no explanation for Him.
I say: The “mind” is the
conception of the act, and “what it
manifests for them after that” is the
belief in benefit in it, whether
intellectual, imaginal, or mental;
then desire springs from that; and
then the strengthening of the desire
and its intensification, until it
reaches the right amount, so that it
becomes a consensus. These are the
causes of free acts in us. But God is
sanctified from all of this. Free
action in us depends upon
deliberation, resolve,
premeditation, desire, consensus,
and intention. These are
intermediate between our essence
and our act. But free action in the
transcendent Necessary Being
depends upon His solitary essence
and His knowledge of the system of
the good with respect to the objects
of His agency by virtue of His
knowledge of himself, without it
being intermediate between His
necessary essence in any respect
and His free actions. Neither
attributes nor states occur to His
essence, since no states occur to
His essence at all. His solitary,
peerless, self-subsisting essence
itself is purpose (irāda), insofar He
purposes among His effects and His
handiwork the good things of the
system of existence. His prior
knowledge itself is choice
(ikhtiyār) and will (mashiyya) of
His free actions. There is neither
purpose nor will, in this case, apart
from the Essence itself, save for the
very being of the created act itself,
and its production and its
existentiation. There is no
explanation for His will and His
purpose, just as there is no
explanation for Him.
Through him, on this
theme, it is also related on the
authority Hishām Ibn al-Ḥakam in
the tradition about the unbeliever
who asked Abū ‘Abdu’llāh (peace
be upon him): “Does He possess
good pleasure and anger?” Abū
‘Abdu’llāh replied: [329]
Yes, but not in the way they
exist in His creatures. This is
because good pleasure is a state
which you enter upon, and you
carry it from one state to
another. For the creature is
 made hollow (ajwaf) and
composite and the things within
it have an entrance [and an exit].
Our Creator, however, has no
entrance for the things within
Him, because He is one, single
in essence and single in
attributes. Therefore, His good
pleasure is His reward and His
anger is His punishment without
anything occurring to Him, lest
He would need it and carry it
from one state to another, which
is an attribute of weak and
needy creatures.
Al-Ṣadūq (may God’s
good pleasure rest upon him) has
recounted it as well in the Kitāb al-
Tawḥīd, as follows: “Good
pleasure and wrath pertain to Him,
but our Creator has no entrance for
the things within Him, because He
is one, one in essence and one in
attributes.”
I say: The created is only
hollow because every possible
entity is a composite pair, twofold
in reality from genus and
differentia, from quiddity and
existence, from possibility via the
essence and necessity via
dependence upon the agent cause,
from what is potential due to the
nature of essential possibility and
from what is actual due to the
necessity arriving from the
necessity of the agent. Every
possible entity, therefore, is
certainly hollow in essence. All
possible entities whose existence is
dependent upon prime matter have
another hollowness (ajwafiyya) as
well with respect to that whose
perfections are potential in the
second creation due to dispositional
potential. Therefore, that whose
essence has no interior (jawf) in
any respect at all can only be God,
the One, the Incomparable, the
Real, the Eternal. The meaning of
“eternal” (ṣamad) is that which has
no interior and no entrance in any
concept, thing, circumstantial mode,
or aspect pertaining to His real,
solitary essence. His perfect,
necessary existence is beyond
perfection in every respect.
This very position is attested
to by Hishām Ibn al-Ḥakam in the
tradition about the unbeliever who
asked questions from Abū
‘Abdu’llāh (peace be upon him).
He said to him: “Are you saying
that He is hearing and seeing?” He
replied:
He is hearing and seeing. He
hears without ears and sees
without eyes. Nay, He hears by
virtue of himself, and He sees
by virtue of himself. By saying
that He is hearing by virtue of
himself, I do not mean that He is
one thing and the self is another
thing. However, my purpose is
to express myself, since I was
asked, and I instruct you, since
you asked. Therefore, I say: All
of Him hears; it is not that His
whole has a part, because the
whole for us has a part. [330]
However, my purpose is to
instruct you and express myself.
I have no recourse in all of this
but to return to saying that He is
hearing, seeing, knowing, and
 informed without any distinction
in His essence or in His
attributes.
From the al-Kāfī also,
with respect to the creation of the
names, it is attested by ‘Abdu’l-
A‘lā from Abū ‘Abdu’llāh that he
said:
The name of God is not God.
Everything to which a name is
applied is created with the
exception of God. That which
the tongues express (‘abarat-
hu) and the hands fabricate is
created, and God is one of its
goals, but that which makes the
goal is other than the goal. For
the goal (or end ghāya) is
qualified, and every qualified
thing is created. The Fashioner
of all things cannot be qualified
by a limit. He is not an object to
which a name can be applied;
otherwise His being could be
known through the fashioning of
someone besides Him. He is not
a goal which can be reached,
and he who understands this
precept will never be debased.
He is pure unity. Be mindful of
Him, believe in Him, and try to
understand Him, by the leave of
God. He who claims that he
knows God through a veil, or a
form, or a likeness is an
unbeliever, because His veil,
His likeness, and His form are
not Him. He, verily, is one, and
He is the object of those who
profess His unity. How then can
anyone who claims to know
Him through other than Him be a
professor of His unity? Only he
has known God who has known
Him by God, and whoever has
not known Him by Him does not
know Him, but only knows what
is other than Him. There is
nothing between the Creator and
the created. God is the creator
of all things not from another
 thing. God may be named by His
names, but He is other than His
names, and the names are other
than Him.
I say: ‘Abarat-hu is either
pronounced without tashdīd. For
example, those who interpret
dreams elucidate them when they
explain them and interpret them, and
the dream is illuminated through
what they interpret. It is said: Such
a person is an interpreter of dreams
(‘ābir al-ru’yā) and an interpreter
for dreams (‘ābir lil-ru’yā) [with
Lām]. In the Noble Revelation it is
said: “If you are able to interpret
dreams (lil-ru’yā
ta‘burūna).”[367] The masters of
linguistics call this Lām the “Lām of
clarification,” because it clarifies
the genitive construction. An
interpreter is also someone who
examines something and ponders
upon it. And someone who makes
inferences (mu‘tabir) alludes to
one thing by another thing. Or it is
pronounced with tashdīd by elision
and conjunction, that is to say
‘abarrat ‘an-hu (“[the tongues]
express it”). “The hands fabricate”
can just as well refer to the hands of
the body or the hands of minds and
thoughts, regardless of whether the
thoughts be those of the base
faculties or those of the exalted
intelligences. “God is one of its
goals” refers to the fact that He
(glorified be He) is the goal of
whoever posits a goal for Him and
makes Him the possessor of that
goal. The words “that which makes
the goal is other than the goal” point
to the falsity of the delusion of those
who would give Him a goal and to
the absurdity of their claim. “A
named limit” is either in construct
with “named” or in qualification of
it. [The verb] “is not” pertains to
that limited named or [331] that
named limit.[368] “Otherwise His
being could be known” is in the
passive voice, and it refers either to
the named or to the limit. “Through
the fabrication of someone besides
Him” is in relation to the agent. The
referent of “besides Him” is also
either the named or the limit. “Not a
goal which can be reached” is in
the passive voice or in the active
voice.
The meaning in sum is that He
who makes the goal is other than the
goal, for the goal posited to belong
to Him is certainly a qualified thing
(mawṣūf) that is known, limited,
comprehended, and essentially
conjectured. Every qualified thing,
whether conjectured or reasoned, is
without a doubt fashioned. The
Fashioner of all things definitely
cannot be qualified by a limit, since
that limit is certainly fashioned and
an effect. It is not existent by virtue
of itself, as a result of which His
being could be known through the
fashioning of someone besides Him.
Minds and thoughts can only reach a
goal that is not the stage of His
might and His glory, and which is
beneath that which befits Him and
is worthy of His sanctity and His
perfection (magnified be His glory
and exalted be His sovereignty).
[The statement] “he who
understands this precept (ḥukm)
will never be debased” is referring
to the precept by association, which
is a maxim concerning knowledge
and also the source of “the maxims
among us by decree,” in other
words, by predetermination. He
calls it “fundamental” (jawharī) in
the authentic traditions. That maxim
is the recognition of the most
excellent of things through the most
excellent of sciences. It is alluded
to in the noble Qur’ān with the
words: “Lord, bestow upon me a
precept.”[369] One of the
commentators states: “This means a
perfection (kamāl) in knowledge
and action by which he [Abraham]
would be prepared for the
viceregency of God and the
leadership of mankind.”
Ar‘awhu is either connected to
ri‘āya in the sense of
“remembrance;” in other words,
“Remember Him and be mindful of
Him.” Or it is connected to it in the
sense of “faithfulness.” This is a
well-known word. It is not
connected to it in the sense of
inclining toward Him or the sense
of guarding, befriending, and
defending His rights.
As for the words “Only he has
known God who has known Him by
God,” whoever knows God
(glorified be He) in all of His
perfect aspects by His real, unitary
essence, not by another conception
and another mode apart from the
stage of His own essence, has
indeed known God by God. But
whoever knows Him with respect
to attributes and perfections by
varying conceptions and manifold
modes and aspects in addition to the
mode of His real, unitary essence
has not known Him. Rather, he has
known conjectured, fabricated
things apart from His essence. To
put it another way, “Only he has
known God (exalted and glorified
be He) who has known Him not by
calling upon His creation for a
witness but by contemplating the
nature of existence as such, since
nothing corresponds to Him except
His own essence (glorified be He).
[332]

Wamīḍ [8.13.12]
The imaginations of a
number of the meddlers, such as
some of the Mu‘tazila, and a
number of those who aspire to be
philosophers, like Abu’l-Barakāt
al-Baghdādī and those who follow
in his footsteps, hold to the
assertion that God (glorified be He)
has a new will, which is one of His
attributes and a mode of His
essence, which is renewed with the
creation of every new creature
among His effects. By it the
creation of the creature is specified
and the boundary of choice is
particularized. This conjecture and
supposition of theirs is nothing but a
deviation from the path of actuality
and an abandonment of the
knowledge of the Lord.
How is it possible for the
real Necessary Being to be
potential in any respect with respect
to a certain primary attribute, but
then it belongs to Him actually
later? Were this allowable, He
would necessarily require a cause
to move Him from potentiality into
actuality. Immeasurably exalted is
He above that!
Furthermore, is it not
established by demonstrative
principles that He knows in the
stage of His essence the system of
the good with respect to what is
outside of himself in the most
perfect manner? It does not befit the
generosity of the Most Generous
and the wisdom of the All-Wise that
He should know what is best and
good in itself in the mode of its
goodness and its perfection in itself,
without it being incompatible with
His essence, while He does not
consent to it.
Therefore, newness only
pertains to the essences of the made
things, the objects of knowledge,
and the willed things, not to
something in the essence of the
Maker, the Knower, and the Willer,
or to a certain mode of His essence.
He (exalted be His remembrance)
in the stage of His essence consents
to the system of the good as an
intelligible through the
intelligibility of His essence
without wishing for it. Then He
produces the most perfect system as
an object of knowledge, in accord
with what the nature of possibility
is able receive and sustain, through
generosity, mercy, grace, and
beneficence, not through resolution,
desire, premeditation, and
deliberation. Consequently, the only
motivating factor of His action is
His knowledge of the most perfect
system, and it is identical to His
solitary essence (exalted be His
sovereignty), and His will, His
purpose, His providence, and His
wisdom all return to it [His
knowledge]. God alone, therefore,
by reason of His own solitary
essence, is the agent of the system
of the whole, which is the Great
Man, and [He is] its first and last
goal, in other words, the goal of
goals, which is the goal of every
goal. This is the way of the path of
truth and the road of those
philosophers who are firmly
grounded in wisdom.
As for the meddlers and
would-be philosophers, they
wander astray in every desert and
seek blindly in every valley. He
says [333] in the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt:
The Mutakallimūn stand in need
of affirming something
belonging to the free Agent by
reason of which the boundary
which He chooses is
particularized. So they maintain
that He has a will which is
connected to that boundary. This
will is renewed according to
some of the Mu‘tazila, and it is
eternal according to the
Ash‘ariya. And it is added to
His knowledge according to al-
Ka‘bī. The Master refers to the
falsity of a renewed will, then
he states: “Know that those
Mu‘tazila who do not advocate
a renewed will do not
understand by renewal anything
other than action, despite their
doctrine either (1) of certain
moments being more suitable
 for the emanation or (2) of the
impossibility of the emanation
occurring in any moment but that
moment.” When the Master
finished invalidating the
doctrine of the renewal of
something and the doctrine that
nothing is renewed, he pointed
out that these two doctrines also
advocate renewal.

Wamīḍ [8.13.13]
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars states in the
Sharḥ Risāla Mas’ala al-‘Ilm:
The twentieth question is about
His providence, His
benevolence, and His guidance.
His providence is His
knowledge of the system of the
whole as it is. In a system of
certain things every part is a
subsidiary system belonging to
that system and contained within
it. His benevolence is His
perpetual administration
(taṣarruf) of all the essences
and attributes through universal
and particular acts without other
than Him perceiving this. His
guidance is His giving of
perception to every possessor
of perception of what is most
worthy for him to seek, not of
what is not worthy for him.
The twenty-first
question concerns the attribute
of His wisdom and His
generosity. His wisdom is His
giving of existence to the
existents in the most excellent
and perfect manner and the
propitious driving of what is
deficient from them from their
beginning until their completion.
His generosity is the emanation
of the good from Him without
any stinginess, restraint, or
holding back upon whatever is
able to receive it to the extent it
can receive it. The advocates of
disparate attributes disagree
over which attributes are more
prior than others. Some of them
say that knowledge is the most
prior, because power is solely
dependent upon knowing the
possibility of something’s
occurrence. Others says that
power is the most prior,
because as long as the object of
knowledge does not proceed
from Him, it is not possible for
knowledge to be connected to it.
Another group say that
generosity is the most prior,
because if the attributes are
unlike the essence, then they
 [also] proceed from Him, and
His causing them to proceed is
generosity. All of these
possibilities are a delusion.

Wamīḍ [8.13.14]
Our companion in
leadership [Ibn Sīnā] has attained
the highest station of inquiry into the
doctrine of knowledge, will, power,
[334] providence, generosity, and
wisdom in his books and his
treatises, and he has inquired into
the implications of the argument that
God is the agent and goal of the
system of existence and of the
existence of every existent. He does
not deny successive ends and
intermediate goals, but he affirms
that the final goal, which is the goal
of goals and their end, is no other
than the solitary, self-subsisting,
necessary Essence.
He states in the Ta‘līqāt:
His providence is that He
causes each thing to exist in the
best way possible for it in the
order of things.
In explanation of His will: All
of these existents proceed from
His essence and are required
by His essence. Therefore,
they are not incompatible with
Him, for He indeed loves His
essence. All of these things are
willed by reason of His
essence. Thus, their being an
object of His will is not due to
an objective other than His
essence, bur rather it is
because of His essence
because they are necessitated
by His essence. He does not
will these existents because of
them, but because of His
essence and because His
essence necessitates them. For
example, if you love
something, whatever proceeds
from it is also loved by you
because of that thing. We only
 will something because of a
desire or a passion, not
because of the essence of the
thing willed. If the desire, the
passion, or other than these
two among things [belongs to]
something conscious of itself,
and the source of actions from
it is itself, then it is a willer of
those things by virtue of itself,
because they proceed from its
essence. Will can only belong
to something that is conscious
of itself.
Then he says:
We have explained that the
Necessary Being is perfect; nay,
He transcends perfection.
Therefore, it is not possible for
His action to be for the sake of
an objective [other than
himself], and it is also not
possible for Him to perceive
something as beneficial to Him
so that He would desire it and
then acquire it. Consequently,
His will is due to knowledge,
because He knows that that thing
in itself is good and excellent,
and its existence requires it to
be in such a manner so that it is
a first-rate existence and the
generation of that thing is better
than its non-generation. He has
no need after this knowledge of
another will in order for the
thing to become existent. Nay,
rather His very knowledge of
the system of possible things in
their perfect order is the
necessitating cause of the
existence of those things in their
present order and perfect
arrangement. In short, the
objects of His knowledge are
concomitants of His essence. He
does not know them and then
consent to them. Rather, since
their emanation is necessitated
by His essence, their very
emanation from Him is identical
to His consent of them. Since
their emanation from Him is not
incompatible with His essence,
but is agreeable to the essence
of the Agent, [335] whatever
exists is not incompatible.
Furthermore, the Agent knows
that He is its agent, and it is an
object of His will, because it is
agreeable to Him. We say:
These objects of knowledge
which proceed from the
necessity of the essence of the
Necessary Being, which is itself
the object of His love, are
simultaneous with His
knowledge, for He is their agent
and their cause. Whatever
proceeds from another thing
according to this attribute, and it
is not incompatible with it, is an
object of its will. Therefore, the
Agent and every act which
proceeds from the Agent are
compatible, and consequently
all things are willed by the
Necessary Being. This object of
will is an object of will free of
being an objective, because the
objective of His consent to the
emanation of those things is the
necessity of His essence, which
is the object of His love.
Therefore, His consent to the
emanation of things is because
of His essence and the goal of
His action is himself.
An analogy for this is if
you love something because of a
man, then that man is loved in
reality. In like manner, the
absolute object of love is His
essence. The likeness of the
will in us is that we will
something and we desire it
because we are in need of it.
The Necessary Being wills in
the manner which we have set
forth, but He does not desire it,
because He is independent of it.
An objective (gharaḍ) cannot
exist without a desire (shawq),
since it is said: “Why does he
seek this?” and it is answered:
“Because he desires it.” So
where there is no desire, there
is no objective. The objective
here is not in acquiring the
object intended, nor is the
objective in that which follows
its acquisition, since acquiring
the thing is an objective and the
benefit which follows that
acquisition is also an objective.
The goal may be the action
itself, or it may be the benefit
subsequent to the action. For
example, walking may be the
goal, or exercising oneself may
be the goal. In like manner,
building may be the goal, or
taking shelter by it may be the
goal. If a man recognizes the
perfection which is the reality
of the Necessary Being, then he
arranges the things which
follow him after His likeness so
that those things are in the
utmost order, the objective in
reality is the Being necessarily
existent by reason of himself,
who is the perfection.
Therefore, if the Being
necessarily existent by reason of
himself is the agent, He is also
the goal and the objective.
Similarly, if we recognize, for
example, perfection in the
building of a house, then we
arrange the things of that
building in accord with the
necessity of that perfection, the
objective is that perfection. If
that perfection is the agent, the
agent and the objective are the
same.
An example of this will
in us is that if we conceive of
something, and we recognize
that it is beneficial or right, this
belief and conception motivates
the appetitive faculty as long as
there is not [another]
determinant and there is no
impediment. [336]
Consequently, between the
mentioned conception and belief
and the movement of the
appetitive faculty there is not
another will, except for this
belief itself. The same applies
to the will of the Necessary
Being. The very intelligibility of
things to Him, in the manner
which we have indicated, is the
cause of the existence of those
things, for He does not need to
desire what He intellects nor to
pursue its acquisition. We, on
the other hand, need the
appetitive faculty, and to will
we need a desire, so that we
may pursue through sensory
instruments that which is
agreeable to us. The action of
our sensory instruments follows
a desire which precedes it. But
where there is no need of this
desire and the use of sensory
instruments, there is only
absolute knowledge of the
system of existents and His
knowledge of the most excellent
ways (wujūh), with which it is
necessary for the existents to be
in accord, and His knowledge
of the best of systems. This is
His providence itself. For if we
were to arrange an existent
thing, we would contemplate
first the most excellent system,
then we would arrange the
existents which we purpose to
call into being in accord with
that most excellent system and
through its necessity. But if the
system and the perfection are
identical to the agent, and the
existents proceed from its
necessity, providence is
obtained in this case, and it is
identical to the will, and the
will is identical to His
knowledge. The reason for this
is that the agent and the goal are
the same thing. Providence is
that the Being necessarily
existent by virtue of himself
understands how man’s organs
must be and how the motion of
the heavens must be in order for
them to be perfect. The system
of the good for these two is
existent without another desire,
wish, or objective following
this knowledge other than His
knowledge, as we have
explained, through the
correspondence of what He
knows to His essence, which is
 the object of His love.
Therefore, in sum, having an
objective with respect the lower
—i.e., were He to create the
creation in pursuit of an
objective, in other words, if the
objective should be the creation
or the perfections existing in
creation, namely, that which is
subsequent to the creation—is
to pursue a perfection which
does not exist if it is not
created. This is not worthy of
that which is necessarily
existent in all of its respects.
Then he says: “You are
now acquainted with the will of the
Being necessarily existent by virtue
of himself, and that it is itself His
knowledge and itself His
providence, and that this will is not
created. And we have explained
that we also have a will in this
sense.”

In explanation of His power:

Just as when the First Maker
displays himself, existence
follows that representation
(tamaththul), in like manner,
when we display ourselves, a
desire follows it. And when
we desire something, our
limbs move afterwards in
order to acquire it. Know that
power is that the act should be
dependent upon His will
without another thing being
inferred with it. [337] Power
in Him (exalted be He) is
through His knowledge, for
when He knows and displays
himself, the existence of
something is necessitated. But
power in us is through a
motivating principle, which is
a motivating power, not a
power of knowledge. Power in
Him is devoid of possibility
[or potentiality], and it is the
emanation of the act from Him
solely through will without the
necessity of excluding one of
two particulars with it (either
that He willed or that He
didn’t will). His power is not
like our power. Power in us is
itself potential, while in Him it
is purely actual. If it is not
considered in this way, then it
would be possible in Him, and
the Necessary Being is
sanctified from that. In like
manner, if His power being
identical to His will and His
knowledge is not maintained,
He would be multiple in His
attributes. Hence, it is
 necessary for it [power] to
return to knowledge, just as
His will returns to His
knowledge. Will in us,
however, is dependent upon an
objective. There is positively
no objective for Him other
than himself.
Then he says:
The emanation of things from
His essence is not by reason of
an objective (gharaḍ), for it is
His consent. It is not that they
proceed from Him, and then He
is pleased by their emanation
from Him. It is impossible for
His power to be potential.
Therefore, if He acts, He has
willed; and if He doesn’t act,
He hasn’t willed for the act and
power to be completed.
Wisdom is the knowledge of
the Necessary Being. He is the
First (exalted be He), and no
mind perceives Him as He
perceives himself. The Wise,
in truth, is the First, and
wisdom, according to the
philosophers, corresponds to
complete knowledge.
Complete knowledge in terms
of conception is conception of
the definition, and in terms of
assent it is to know something
through its causes, if it has a
cause. As for that which has no
cause, it is conceivable in
itself and knowable in itself,
like the Necessary Being. He
has no definition and He is
conceivable in himself, since
nothing else is needed for His
conception because He is a
primary conception, and He is
knowable through himself
because He has no cause.
Wisdom also corresponds to
consummate action, and
consummate action is that
something is given whatever it
needs for its existence and the
preservation of its existence in
accordance with possibility. If
that possibility pertains to a
matter, then it is in accord with
the disposition which is in it,
and if it does not pertain to a
matter, then it is in accord with
the possibility of the thing in
itself, like the agent
intelligences. By the
dissimilarity in the
possibilities, the ranks of
existents differ with regard to
perfections and imperfections.
If the dissimilarity of the
possible things concerns the
species, the difference [in
perfections and imperfections]
pertains to the species; and if
the dissimilarity concerns the
possibilities of the individuals,
then the difference in
perfection and imperfection
pertains to the individuals.
Since absolute perfection is
necessity without any
possibility, existence [338]
without any non-existence,
actuality without any
potentiality, and truth without
any falsity, then all [else] is
said to be less perfect than the
First, since whatever is other
than Him is possible in its
essence. Moreover, the
difference between a
continuous succession of
individuals and of species has
to do with preparedness [of
matter] and possibility. Each
one of the agent intelligences
is nobler than the one which
follows it, and all of the agent
intelligences are nobler than
the material things. And the
heavenly things among the
material things are nobler than
the world of nature. We mean
by more noble, here, that
which is more prior in its
essence. Its subsequent
 existence is only possible after
a preceding existence. These
possible things are the causes
of evil. For this reason any
particular possible thing is
certainly afflicted with evil,
since evil is non-existence,
just as good is existence. When
the possibility is greater, the
evil is greater.
Just as each thing is given
what it needs for its existence
and its continuance, in like
manner, it is given more than
what it needs with respect to
this. For example, man is given
the wisdom and science of
astronomy, but he does not need
this for his continuance and his
existence. That which is
inevitable for his existence is
the first perfection, while the
latter is the second perfection.
The Necessary Being knows
each thing as it is through its
causes, since He knows each
thing through its essence, which
is the cause of each thing, not
through the things which are
external. In this sense, He is
wise, and His wisdom is His
knowledge of His essence.
Therefore, He is wise through
His knowledge and perfect in
His actuality. He is the
absolutely wise. The Necessary
Being is also the cause of every
existent, and he has given every
existent the perfection of its
existence, which is what it
needs for its existence and its
continuance, and He has
augmented it with what it does
not need in these two respects.
The noble Qur’ān has
alluded to this theme, where it
says: “Our Lord is He who gave
to each thing its form, and
further gave it guidance.”[370]
Guidance, then, is the perfection
which it does not need for its
existence and its continuance,
while form is the perfection
which it needs for its existence
and its continuance. This theme
is also alluded to, where it says:
“Who has ordained [their
destinies] then given
guidance,”[371] and where it
says: “He who has created me,
then He guides me.”[372] The
philosophers call that which
something needs for its
existence and its continuance
“the first perfection,” and that
which is not needed for its
existence and its continuance
“the second perfection.”
As for His generosity, it is the
bestowal of the good without
any recompense. Giving is in
two respects: The first is a
transaction; the second is a
bounty. A transaction is giving
something to receive
something in return, whether an
object of material value or a
good reputation, [339] a
diffusion of fragrance or a
prayer. In short, that which
marks the giver in this respect
is a desire or an objective. So,
in reality, it is a transaction.
Although the masses recognize
the transaction where there is a
 commutative contract, and they
do not consider anything else
to be equivalent, the learned
recognize that whenever the
giver has a desire, then there is
some advantage involved.
Generosity is where there is no
recompense expected and no
desire. This pertains to a
willer and an agent who has no
objective. The action and the
will of the Necessary Being
are like this. Therefore, His
action is pure generosity.
This completes his discourse
from the Ta‘līqāt. It is clear that
they negate an objective and a goal
from the action of God with respect
to the outcome of the affair being
other than the essence of God. They
say that His essence is the objective
of objectives and the goal of goals.
Every objective and every goal
leads to Him. He is the absolute
objective and the final goal. He is
the end of goals and aims, and the
beginning of reasons and causes.
They do not negate an objective nor
a final cause, but indeed they affirm
successive objectives and goals
which lead to Him (glorified be
He). This is the opposite of the
Ash‘ariya, for they block the gate of
causality and deny an objective and
a final cause altogether.

Wamīḍ [8.13.15]
The final cause is indeed
the efficient cause by reason of its
efficient quiddity. The agent is the
efficient cause first in reality, and
the objective [or final cause] is the
object intended by the agent with
respect to its action. They are both
one in essence, dissimilar in
[mental] consideration. Thus, there
is one thing called an “efficient
cause,” insofar as it is a cause for
the agency of the agent, and [called]
a “final cause,” insofar as it is the
object of knowledge of the agent
and the goal intended with respect
to its action. In like manner, the
utility (fā’ida) and the goal (ghāya)
are united in essence, dissimilar in
[mental] consideration. The
concomitant goodness of the action,
insofar as it requires the action and
is dependent upon it, is a utility, but
insofar as the action leads to it, it is
a goal. The actions of the free-
willing Agent in this regard are four
things. The objectives and the goals
are subordinate in a series to the
final goal, which is the beginning of
the objectives and their end. It is the
objective in reality and the final
goal, which is the beginning of the
series of goals and their end. It is
the goal, upon investigation, in
reality. The objective and the goal
of the action of God return without
reservation to Providence, and it
returns in the end, upon
investigation and inquiry, to His
essence (glorified be He), insofar
as He is the complete knowledge of
the manner of the good and the real
will for the actuality [340] of the
good essentially and absolutely.
Therefore, the agent and
the goal of the Great Man, which is
the Great World—in other words,
the system of existence from its
starting point to its farthest extent,
from its beginning to its end—is,
without reservation, God (glorified
be He) with respect to His own
essence, for there is no existent nor
intelligible beyond Him save the
essence of the one true God in
reality. As for a part of the system,
its immediate objective and its
immediate goal is the good of the
system of the whole and the
perfection of the system of
existence. It returns finally, with
respect to the outcome of the affair,
upon investigation and inquiry, to
the Primal Providence, and then to
the essence of God, the One, the
Real.
 It is clear then that if the
unrestrained Agent were possible
of quiddity and deficient in essence,
the objective of His action would
definitely be to perfect His essence
or to gain advantage from the
goodness of His action in a certain
respect. But if He is necessary of
essence and completely perfect and
beyond perfection, His objective
would certainly be no other than the
most perfect action insofar as
Providence directs it and Mercy
requires it. You will receive a
detailed exposition on this later,
God willing.
 Wamīḍ [8.13.16]
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars has reached the
acme of achievement in his Naqd
al-Muḥaṣṣal in response to the
following words of the Leader of
the Doubters:
It is not possible for God to
produce anything for the sake of
an objective, contrary to the
Mu‘tazila and most of the
jurisprudents. We hold that
whatever is like this is seeking
perfection by producing that
thing, and that which seeks
perfection through other than
itself is imperfect in its essence.
Every objective which is
assumed is one of the
possibilities, and God is able to
bring its beginning into
existence. Therefore, the
intermediacy of that act is futile.
It is not being said that its
attainment is only possible
through that intermediary. For
we say: That which is suitable
to be a particular objective is
only the connection of pleasure
to a servant, and it is an object
of God’s agency without any
intermediaries.
They argue that whatever
acts without a goal is futile, and
 to ascribe futility to the All-
Wise is inadmissible. We say
that if what is meant by
“futility” is absence of a goal,
then this is the indication of
something to itself, and if
something else is meant, [341]
then explain it.
Then that most proficient
critic states:
I say: The Mu‘tazila say: The
action of the All-Wise is not
devoid of a goal, which is the
motivating factor of that action.
Otherwise, preponderation
without a determinant would be
required. The jurisprudents say:
The decree of punishment is
only given by the lawgiver so
that the people will be
restrained from killing each
other. This is the intention of the
law.
Furthermore, the
mujtahids deduce permission
and prohibition according to
that, insofar as the lawgiver
does not clarify his decree, in a
way that conforms to the
intention. Some of those who
advocate goals say that the
significance of a “goal” is the
desire of imperfect things for
their perfections, and some
perfections cannot occur except
through that desire. For
instance, it is only possible for
the body to move from one
place to another by its
impulsion (taḥrīk). Therefore, it
[i.e., movement from one place
to another] is the goal of that
impulsion. Consequently, the
attainment of certain goals
without the mediation of
particular actions is impossible,
and the impossible is not an
object of agency.
As for his words,
“That which is suitable to be a
particular objective is only the
connection of pleasure to a
servant, and it is an object of
agency without any
intermediary,” it is not a
universal proposition. For
pleasure, which is taking the
wages of industry without the
industry, is not an object of
agency. And futility is not action
devoid of a goal absolutely, for
it is necessary to add to it the
condition that it is of the nature
of that action to proceed from
its free agent for an objective.
As for his statement that the
agent with an objective is
seeking perfection by it, it is a
proposition which he borrowed
from the philosophers and used
out of context, for they do not
deny the drive of things toward
their perfections. Otherwise, the
science of the uses of organs,
the rules of the propositional
sciences in physics, the science
of astronomy, and others, would
be invalidated, and final causes
in their entirety would be
omitted from consideration.
Rather, they say: The emanation
of existents from their cause is
in the most perfect way
possible. It is not that He
creates something imperfect and
then He perfects it by means of
a secondary intention. Nay, He
creates it desiring its perfection,
not by renewing an execution
(tadbīr). And they mean by
“goal” (gharaḍ) the renewal of
that execution with respect to
perfections by a secondary
intention.
As for the Sunnites,
they say that God does what He
wills. It is not in the nature of
His action for it to be described
as good or bad. How many
imperfect things He annihilates
before they attain perfection,
and how many moving things He
 moves away from the goals of
their motions. He is not to be
asked of His doings “why?” and
“wherefore?” [342]
It is clear that the source
and cause of the claim of agreement
between the Ash‘ariya and the
philosophers with respect to
denying causation to the goal and
the final cause, as the imagination
of one of the fastidious among the
imitators has urged, is lack of
training and deficiency of learning.
The Ash‘ariya, in truth, exclude the
creation of God from the path of the
philosophers on this question.
 Wamīḍ [8.13.17]
Our companion in
instruction among the philosophers
of Islām, the master Abū Naṣr al-
Fārābī, states in the book al-Jam‘
Bayna al-Ra’ayn:
Although the Creator (exalted
be His glory) is dissimilar in
His existence and His essence
from all else besides Him, and
these belong to Him in a sense
nobler, more excellent, and
more exalted, in such wise that
nothing corresponds to Him
with respect to His existence,
and nothing either real or
figurative resembles Him or is
like Him, nonetheless, it is
unavoidable to describe Him
and to apply every perfect word
and secret understanding to
Him. Therefore, it is necessary
for us to know that despite
every word we express with
regard to any of His attributes,
its meaning in itself is remote
from the meaning which you
imagine by that word. These
[attributes], as we stated, are in
a sense which is nobler and
more exalted, so that if we say
that He is existent, we know,
despite this, that His existence
is not like the existence of
 anything else besides Him. And
if we say that He is living, we
know that it is in a sense which
is nobler than what we
understand for a living thing
other than Him. The same
applies to the rest of His
attributes.
I say: The truth of this is
corroborated in the texts of the
traditions of our pure masters, the
custodians of Revelation, the
bearers of infallibility, and the
guardians of religion (may God’s
blessings and salutations rest upon
their souls and their bodies). It is
necessary with regard to the
knowledge of God and with regard
to the affirmation of His solitary,
real essence, the attributes of His
essence, and His most excellent
names, to go beyond the two limits:
the limit of negation (ta‘ṭīl)[373]
and the limit of comparison
(tashbīh). We have expounded the
decisive doctrine on this in a
number of places, and it will be
entrusted to you again, if God, the
Almighty, the All-Knowing, wills
it.
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars has expressed
this theme commendably in the
Sharḥ Risāla Mas’ala al-‘Ilm,
where he says:
The fifteenth question is about
His being living. Does this
attribute return to His being
knowing, or is it an attribute
added to this object of
dependence [i.e., God] in
affirming life? It is that which
we have mentioned, which is
that minds intend to describe
Him (exalted be He) [343] by
the extreme which is nobler than
the extreme of the contradictory.
Since they describe Him by
knowledge and power, and they
find that whatever is not alive
cannot be described by these
 two attributes, they describe
Him by life. He is, in particular,
nobler than death, which is its
contrary, according to them.
It is indeed true what one who
was intimate with the family of the
House of Prophethood (peace be
upon them) has said:
Is He called knowing and
powerful only because He has
given knowledge to the learned
and power to the powerful?
Whatever you have
distinguished Him by in your
imaginations, in its profoundest
meaning, is but a creation and a
handiwork like yourselves and
 it returns to you. The Creator is
the giver of life and the ordainer
of death. Perhaps a small ant
may imagine that God has two
pincers like it has, for it may
think that their lack is an
imperfection in the one who
does not possess them. Similar
to this is the state of human
minds with respect to the most
highly esteemed things they
ascribe to God. We take refuge
in Him.
I stated in [my book] al-
Rawāshiḥ al-Samāwiyya that the
people of this age have improperly
altered the word zubānayayn,
“having two pincers,” the
zubānayayn of the ant or the
scorpion, which are their horns, and
the zubānayayn which are two
bright stars in one of the mansions
of the moon, into “the two
myrmidons” (zabāniyatayn) by
adding the Tā’ and inserting it
between the two Yā’s, making two
myrmidons. A myrmidon is an angel
of chastisement [who pushes
sinners into the fire]. One of them is
a demon (zibniyya), with kasra on
the Zā’, like an afreet, from zabn
with fatḥa, which means “to push,
or thrust, away.” It is spoken
zibniyy, and is likely related to
zabn. Then it was changed due to
the relationship. This is like their
saying imsiyy, with kasra on the
Hamza, in relation to ams. The root
of zabāniya, in connection to
zibniyy, is zabāniyy with tashdīd
[on the Yā’]. Thus zabāniya is said
by omitting the tashdīd and
substituting the Tā’ for one of the
Yā’s. The correct word, however,
is zubānayayn, “having two
pincers.” Zubānā with ḍamma and
without tashdīd, in the noun form of
ḥubārā [i.e., a bustard], is the
pincer of a scorpion. Or with fatḥa
on the Zā’ and kasra on the Nūn
after the Alif, it is related to zabn,
like zibniyy with kasra and
tashdīd, by substituting the Alif for
the Yā’, as in yamānī and najāshī
without tashdīd. In short, poor
scholarship is a seed whose sowing
results in lexical mistakes, and
inattention to detail is a tree whose
fruit is error. A common proverb
says: “To stumble with your feet is
better than to stumble with your
tongue, and to stumble with your
tongue is better than to stumble with
your pen.” Confirmation and
protection come from God, and in
His hands are the reins of grace and
the keys of mercy. [344] [blank
page] [345]
 The Ninth Qabas
On establishing the intelligible
substances and the stages of the
system of
existence in the two chains of
beginning and return.

Wamḍa [9.1]
Have you not heard with
respect to the sciences, especially
the science of metaphysics, that the
reality of contradiction, which is
the essential opposition of negation
and affirmation,[374] is one of two
concepts being the nullification of
the other and the other being
canceled out by it. It is in this sense
a recurrent relation between two
sides, and it is not possible
between more than two concepts,
whether between solitary terms or
between propositions. It is
therefore certainly necessary for the
reality of one of two
contradictories, within the boundary
of itself, to be a negation and a
nullification, since it is a negation
of the other and a nullification of it,
while the other is a correlative
affirmation in relation to it, since it
is negated and cancelled out by it,
not a negation and nullification of it.
Consequently, if the concept is not
an affirmation in reality, it is a
negation and a nullification of the
other.
Let it be known, therefore, that
this mode of essential opposition
(1) pertains to that which exists
between two concepts with respect
to “predication to” a single
particular subject. For example,
between man and non-man, book
and non-book, that is to say,
between an affirmative concept in
reality and its negation. Or, for
example, between non-man and
non-non-man, and non-book and
non-non-book. In other words, it is
between a correlative, affirmative
concept in relation to its negation
and its negation, as a result of
which it is impossible for any
subject to be free of these two by
reason of a “predication to,” which
is a univocal predication whose
concept is identical. Each thing,
therefore, is either man or non-man,
for example, and, similarly, it is
either non-man or non-non-man. (2)
It pertains to that which exists
between two concepts with respect
to “existence in” a single particular
subject. [346] For example,
between white and its nullification,
or between the negation of white
and its nullification, as a result of
which it is impossible for any
subject to exist detached from these
two by reason of an “existence in,”
which is a derivative predication
whose concept possesses it. Each
thing, therefore, [in this sense] is
either white or it is not white, and,
similarly, it is either not white or it
is not not white.
Consequently, the
contradictory of every proposition
is its negation by inserting the
particle of negation in it, just as the
contradictory of every solitary term
is its negation and its nullification.
The essential contradictory of the
negative is the negative of the
negative,[375] and the affirmative
is the concomitant of the
contradictory; it is not that it is its
essential contradictory. The
contradictory, then, by means of the
two types of predication is
unreservedly the negative with
respect to a simple negation. The
contradictory of “Every man is an
animal” is “Every man is not an
animal,” and the contradictory of
“No man is a stone” is “No man is
not a stone.” However, it is
required by the exhaustive negation
of the affirmation to ascertain the
negation of some with the
possibility of the affirmation of
others, and it is required by the
exhaustive negation of the negation
to ascertain the affirmation of some
with the possibility of the negation
of others. For this reason, they say:
The contradictory of the universal
affirmative is a particular negative,
and the contradictory of the
universal negative is a particular
affirmative. In short, the
contradictory of every proposition
is its negation. That in which
quantity and direction are changed
is the concomitant of the
contradictory, not it. Let it be
recognized.
 Wamḍa [9.2]
Inasmuch as you recognize
that every concept has a
contradictory by means of univocal
predication as well as a
contradictory by way of derivative
predication, and it is only possible
for a single contradictory to belong
to a single concept in each of the
two types of predication, know that
just as the coexistence of two
contradictories by means of
derivative predication is
impossible with respect to
derivative predication to a single
subject, in like manner, these two
are antagonistic with respect to
univocal predication to a single
subject. It is not possible, therefore,
for fragrance and the negation of
fragrance, for example, to be
predicated identically to the same
thing. Now the two contradictories
by means of univocal predication
cannot coexist, because the concept
pertains to predication to a single
subject with an identical
predication (ḥaml huwa huwa). But
insofar as the realization is due to
existence in a single subject, they
are definitely not incompatible.
Fragrance and non-fragrance, for
example, can coexist in terms of
existence in one subject, although
they positively cannot coexist in
terms of identical predication to
[347] a single thing. One apple, for
instance, contains fragrance and
non-fragrance also, such as shape
and magnitude.[376] Non-fragrance
is only predicated to the apple, but
it is not predicated at all to any
fragrance.

Wamḍa [9.3]
The term “contrariety”
(taqābul) in the philosophical
terminology of metaphysics is a
subject first for the opposition of
two concepts in essential
predication in relation to the same
particular subject with respect to
coexistence (ijtimā‘) and exclusion
(irtifā‘). The contrariety of
existence and non-existence is an
example in this regard. One of these
two in its particularity is strictly the
negative of the other, and it is the
contradictory by means of an
identical predication. The other is
strictly a correlational affirmative
by correlation to it. Moreover, it is
transferred from it to the essential
opposition of two concepts with
respect to simultaneity of “existence
in” in relation to one particular
subject in one qualifying
circumstantial mode.
If the two antagonistic
things are two existential notions,
then one of them is not intelligible
of quiddity in relation to the other,
and the utmost degree of opposition
exists between them, as with real
black and real white, since they are
opposites, and their contrariety is
the contrariety of opposition
(taḍādd), in accordance with the
usage of First Philosophy, which is
the science of Metaphysics.
If these two are intelligible
of quiddity in relation to each other,
then they are two correlatives
whose contrariety is the contrariety
of correlation. Each of them is a
real correlative, like paternity and
sonship, fraternity and fraternity.
If both of these two are not
existential, but one of them is
subject to the removal of the other,
and if its concept is not purely a
negation of the other, insofar as it is
negation alone, but an addition
which is a certain affirmative
notion is considered with respect to
it, then that which is subject to it if
it belongs to it is considered,
insofar as it is a privation of the
subject, either with respect to its
individual, as with blindness or
vision, or with respect to its
species, as with being male or
female, or with respect to a certain
genus of its successive genera, as
with inarticulate speech or
articulate speech, singularity or
duality. These two then are
possession and privation, and their
contrariety is the contrariety of
privation and possession.
If the object of
consideration is nothing but the
negation of the other, insofar as it is
negation alone, then these two are
two contraries by affirmation [348]
and negation, and the contrariety is
the contrariety of negation and
affirmation. The negative, which is
the contradictory by means of
derivative predication, is a simple
negation, regardless of whether
each of the two extremes be an
incomposite, without truth or falsity
in it—as with the two concepts of
blackness and the negation of
blackness, and black and not black,
and similarly the two notions of the
negation of blackness and the
negation of the negation of
blackness, and the two concepts not
black and not not black—or a
composite, namely, a statement or
proposition, as with “Zayd is
black” and “Zayd is not black,” and
similarly “Zayd is not black” and
“Zayd is not not black.”
Now according to
generally accepted usage, according
to the science of the Categories, the
existentiality of two opposites
(ḍiddayn) is not considered with
respect to the opposition (taḍādd),
and there is no ultimate opposition
between these two. But privation
being the lack of something, which
by its nature is devoid from
subjects with respect to an
individual to which it belongs and
the time which it is its nature to
belong to, not before it or after it,
and the subject being impossible of
transferal from privation to
possession, are considered with
respect to privation and possession.
The generally accepted object of
correlation is the postulation of
correlation with the subject itself,
as with father and son, and brother
and brother.

Wamḍa [9.4]
The accurate
categorization of circumstantial
modes is that the absolute
circumstantial mode is either (1) an
augmentative qualifying
circumstantial mode (taqyīdiyya)
which belongs to the essence of the
subject in mental consideration (a)
with respect to its [internal]
diversity and its [internal]
multiplicity, and it is what is
considered at the beginning of the
characterization of the essence of
the subject through qualification by
a particular concept in addition to
the root substance of the essence, or
(b) with respect to both the
characterizing and the object
characterized, as with
circumstantial modes conditioned
by thingness and negation, or (c)
with respect to the characterizing
alone, with respect to the
characterization itself, not with
respect to the substance of the
essence characterized by it, since
the signification of the root of the
essence itself and its pure substance
is without the consideration of any
particular thing in it or with it at all,
as with the circumstantial mode not
conditioned by anything, which is
absolutely and utterly unqualified in
relation to that which is outside of
the stage of the substance of the
essence in every respect. The
diversity of the object characterized
and its multiplicity in [mental]
consideration, therefore, are due to
the consideration of the condition
(qayd) or the qualification (taqyīd)
corresponding to this circumstantial
mode, which is the circumstantial
mode conditioned by thingness and
the circumstantial mode conditioned
by negation, not this circumstantial
mode which is the circumstantial
mode of the substance of the
essence itself as such, when not
considering a particular thing other
than itself with it at all, as with the
parts of extended definitions
belonging to the simples of [349]
defined things, like the supreme
genus belonging to each category
and the differentiae articulating both
the species and the genera in the
categories of beings.
Or the absolute
circumstantial mode is (2) a causal
circumstantial mode (ta‘līliyya)
whose diversity and multiplicity are
not productive of the [internal]
multiplicity of the essence of the
subject and its [internal] diversity
at all, just as a plurality of different
causes in relation to one particular
effect in one respect, or a
multiplicity of different names in
relation to one simple named object
in one qualifying circumstantial
mode.[377]
Furthermore, the varying
circumstantial modes which
necessitate diversity in the essence
of the subject and its multiplicity
are of two kinds. One kind are
essential diverse circumstantial
modes which are not contrary by
any of the modes of contrariety at
all, except accidentally, as with
shape, color, taste, odor, relation,
and motion. The second kind are
essential, opposing diverse
circumstantial modes, which belong
to one of the four kinds of
contrariety.
By another way with respect to
another categorization, one kind are
circumstantial modes which are
separate in realization and distinct
in occurrence, one not being
implied with the other with respect
to existence, as a result of which the
removal of one of them does not
imply the removal of the other with
respect to it nor accompany the
removal of the other at all, as with
the parts of external composites in
relation to other parts, like the
prime matter and the form of the
body, and the material body and the
incorporeal soul of man. In short,
they are circumstantial modes
conjoined and separate in existence
belonging to a single essence in the
real world. Another kind are
analytical circumstantial modes
(taḥlīliyya) which are blended
together in existence, the removal of
one of them implying the removal of
the others, as with the essential
constituents of the quiddity. They
are the unqualified natures to which
genera and differentiae are
predicated, and they are multiple
aspects when analyzed by the mind
belonging to a solitary essence
determinate in existence.

Wamīḍ [9.4.1]
Know, then, that the rules
for circumstantial modes in general
are: (1) A state of mixture of any of
the absolute, essential or accidental
circumstantial modes is not
possible for something insofar as
the state of mixture is with another
circumstantial mode. Non-
rationality, for example, exists
insofar as animality exists, and non-
animate exists insofar as having
form exists.[378] (2) Whatever
circumstantial mode it may be from
the kinds and types of
circumstantial modes, if the essence
of the subject takes on a qualifying
circumstantial mode by it, this
necessitates diversity and
multiplicity within the essence
subsequently with respect to it.
[350] (3) It is not possible for what
is associated with the essence due
to a particular circumstantial mode,
whichever mode it may be, to be
associated with it with respect to
another circumstantial mode
besides it at all.[379] (4) The fact
that the occurrence of the diverse
circumstantial modes, whether
contrary or non-contrary, can only
be realized by dependence upon
certain prior, causal diverse
circumstantial modes, unites them.
The necessitation that they should
only occur to a single essence after
certain prior, augmentative,
qualifying diverse circumstantial
modes, which belong to the essence
prior essentially to the occurrence,
is definitely not worthy of them
within the boundary of their
unqualified nature and absoluteness.
As for the contrary
circumstantial modes in their
particularity, it is in their natures,
insofar as they are contrary
circumstantial modes, on account of
this, that they are only possible with
respect to a single essence after
certain prior, augmentative,
qualifying diverse circumstantial
modes belonging to the essence
have occurred first.
Moreover, if certain
diverse circumstantial modes are
possible for one thing, and the
removal of a portion of them is
possible along with the persistence
of another portion, it is established
without a doubt that certain
existential diverse principles
correspond to them in the substance
of the essence.

Wamīḍ [9.4.2]
It is incumbent upon you to
recognize, after having ascertained
it, what we have recited to you: The
rule that something and its
contradictory by way of
“predication to” are not contrary
with respect to conjunction in the
realization by way of “existence in”
is only established with respect to
the real world and the sphere of the
thing itself. But with respect to a
circumstantial mode in its
particularity, whether causal or
qualifying, the rule is necessarily
invalidated, except with respect to
dependence upon the diversity of
the causal circumstantial mode.
Otherwise, it would be necessary
for this to necessitate the
coexistence of two contradictories
by way of each of the two
predications due to that predication
itself.
Is it not so, that if a
particular circumstantial mode in its
particularity, with respect to its
own essence as such, is such that
non-motion depends upon it, for
example, in a particular subject in a
particular qualifying circumstantial
mode, and if motion in that same
subject also depends upon it,
insofar as it has that same
circumstantial mode with respect to
non-motion depending upon it, then
non-motion, by natural necessity, is
a motion? This is necessitated by
the coexistence of two
contradictories by way of
“predication to,” and they are
motion and non-motion with respect
to “existence in” [351] in one
particular circumstantial mode,
with respect to their coexistence by
reason of “predication to” also.
Moreover, is not the
emanation of non-motion and its
occurrence not identical to the
emanation of motion and its
occurrence? Whoever possesses a
rational mind knows that as long as
non-motion does not proceed and
occur, motion proceeds and occurs.
So if non-motion and motion are
due to one particular mode (jiha)
and are due to one particular
circumstantial mode, it is certain
that both motion and non-motion, in
relation to that same circumstantial
mode, proceed and occur and do
not proceed and occur.
Consequently, there follows from
the coexistence of two
contradictories by way of
“predication to” with respect to
“existence in” in one particular
circumstantial mode, the
coexistence of two contradictories
by way of “existence in” due to
“existence in” also in a single
circumstantial mode. The absurdity
of this is completely self-evident.
The standard of distinction
between the conjunction of two
contradictories by way of univocal
predication with respect to
derivative predication in one
particular subject in the real world
and the sphere of the thing itself in
two diverse circumstantial modes,
and the conjunction of these two in
one subject with respect to
derivative predication with respect
to a particular circumstantial mode
among the real, non-fabricated
circumstantial modes in their
particularity, has therefore been
established. The distinction
between the non-diversity of the
subject in the qualifying
circumstantial mode and the non-
diversity of the causal
circumstantial mode is also clear.
Let it be ascertained and preserved.
Regarding the mixture of the modes
and the aspects with each other, this
is the seed of the ruin of knowledge
and the basis of the corruption of
philosophy.

Wamīḍ [9.4.3]
A fundamental scientific
principle is that from one, insofar
as it is one, only one can proceed in
that circumstantial mode, since it is
not in the nature of multiplicity,
insofar as it is multiplicity, to
proceed from a single cause in one
circumstantial mode. This
principle, which we have recited to
you as a general rule, is indeed a
self-evident premise to a clear
mind, if the mind is sound and the
intellect is not defective. Our
companions in the instruction of the
Craft and its leadership have put
forward various informative
expositions on this subject, against
which the vehement quarrelers
among the disputers and the people
of doubt have contended. [352]
Among them is that if A
and B, for example, were to
proceed from one, insofar as it is
one, but A is not B, then B and what
is not B have proceeded from it in
the same mode, and this implies the
coexistence of two contradictories.
 The Leader of the
Doubters, in al-Mabāḥith al-
Mashriqiyya, has made a
pronouncement against the people
of the house of logic without
knowledge of logic:
This proof is very feeble,
because if we say that A
proceeded from so an so, then A
has not proceeded from its
contradictory, nor has what is
not A proceeded from it [i.e.,
the former]. Therefore, the
contradictory of our statement
“It is necessary for it to be…”
is not “It is necessary for it not
to be...” How can this be
correct when they may both be
false? Rather, its contradictory
is “It is not necessary for it to
be…” In like manner, the
contradictory of “It is possible
for it to be…” is not “It is
possible for it not to be...,” for
they are both true. Rather, it is
“It is not possible for it to
be…” Similarly, the
contradictory of “A has
proceeded from it” is not “What
is not A has proceeded from it,”
but rather “A has not proceeded
from it.” Among the things
which establish this is the
following: If body is before
motion and before black, and
black is not a motion, then body
may be before motion and what
is not a motion. Contradiction is
not required by this. The same
applies to what they say. The
Master has explained this in
Chapter One, Book Two, of the
Categories of the Shifā’, which
is the chapter enumerating the
divisions of contrariety. He
states there: “Our statement
‘The body has a smell, and it
does not have a smell’ is not the
same as our statement ‘It has a
smell, and it has what is not a
smell,’ since in the first, the two
statements cannot coexist, while
in the second they can coexist.
Moreover, if the soul perceives
and moves, and the motion is
not the perception, it has
produced perception and what
is not perception, and
contradiction is not required by
this.” The likes of this argument
in invalidation is so manifest it
cannot be hidden even to feeble
minds. I know not how it is
doubtful to those who claim to
be sagacious. I am astonished
by those who devote their entire
lives to the instruction and study
of logic, so that it may be an
 instrument to protect their minds
from error, but when they come
upon the noblest objective, they
abandon the use of that
instrument and succumb to a
fallacy at which children laugh.
We say: The mind of one
who makes light of sure proofs and
dares to impute error to the leader
of the demonstrative sciences
without possessing a true measure
for assessing the criteria and
ascertaining the laws, nor a span of
skill to understand the cruxes of
recondite problems and the
solutions of mysteries, in accord
with the [353] conventions of the
philosophers and the method of the
learned, is indeed extremely
foolish. It is evident, by what we
have instructed you, that the
emanation of what is not B is
subject to the non-existence of the
emanation of B with respect to the
emanation of what is not B.
Otherwise, what is not B would
itself be B. Although it is not
subject to the non-existence of the
emanation of B in the real world
and the sphere of the thing itself,
and it is not by necessitating it,
since the emanation of what is not B
does not preclude the emanation of
B in the domain of the real world,
not with respect to the emanation of
what is not B, but through another
circumstantial mode. In like manner,
what is not odor being in the body
is subject to odor not being in it by
the circumstance of what is not odor
being in it, by rational necessity,
although it is not contrary for an
odor to be in it in actuality, not with
respect to what is not odor being in
it, but through another
circumstantial mode. In short, two
contradictories with respect to
univocal predication can coexist in
one particular subject with respect
to derivative predication in two
different causal circumstantial
modes, not in one particular causal
circumstantial mode. Otherwise,
contradiction would definitely be
required.
It is apparent that the error
does not apply to the giver of the
proof with respect to abandoning
the use of the protective instrument,
but to the opponent in his rashness
due to his ignorance of the
correctness of the balance of the
instrument. The commentator of the
Mulakhkhaṣ hit the mark when he
decided to amend the argument of
the Leader of the Doubters by
saying: “There is no contradiction
between our saying: ‘A proceeds
from it’ and ‘A does not proceed
from it’, because these are two
absolute propositions. If one of
them is qualified by permanence
(dawām), it is false.”[380] Then he
says: “I say: The two absolute
propositions only hold true for the
possibility of the occurrence of
each of them in a particular time.
But if the time is one with respect to
these two propositions, their
simultaneity is not possible.” It is
clear that he has placed the
circumstantial modes here in the
place of times, since there is no
meaning to the consideration of time
here. He intended by “two absolute
propositions” that which is not
qualified by the totality of the
circumstantial modes, and by
“permanence” that which is
qualified by their totality.
Therefore, we say: The truth of the
two absolute propositions, in this
sense, with respect to a possibility
which is different in circumstantial
mode is possible. But if the mode is
one, they cannot both be true. This
is evident. Let it be pondered and
reflected upon.

Wamīḍ [9.4.4]
Among the proofs
supporting the demonstration is
what our companion in leadership
has set forth in most of his books,
[354] such as the Shifā’, the
Ishārāt, the Ta‘līqāt, and other
works. His position is that the
notion that such a thing within the
boundary of its essence is such that
A proceeds from it is unlike the
notion that such a thing within the
boundary of its essence is such that
B proceeds from it. The two
notions, therefore, are dissimilar,
whether they are constitutive
elements of that cause, they are
concomitants of it, or one of the two
is a constitutive element of it and
the other is a concomitant of it. (1)
If they are two constitutive elements
of that cause, the cause is a
composite, and the cause cannot be
one in every respect. (2) If they are
two concomitants, and the
concomitant is an effect, this
category regresses from the
principle, because the notion that
one of the two concomitants
proceeds from it is different from
the notion that the second
concomitant proceeds from it.
Therefore, if it does not lead to a
multiplicity with respect to
constitutive elements, it is
necessary for every concomitant to
be a concomitant by means of
another concomitant. Because this
argument necessitates the assertion
of an infinite succession of
concomitants, and it affirms an
infinite series of causes and effects,
it positively requires the denial of
concomitants, because this quiddity
[which is the cause] either requires,
by virtue of itself, having a
concomitant, or it does not require
it. If it requires it, that concomitant
is a concomitant by virtue of itself,
and it is not by an intermediary,
although it was assumed that all of
them exist by an intermediary. This
is absurd. If the quiddity does not
require anything at all, this is an
acknowledgement of the fact that it
does not have any concomitants. It
is evident, then, that the doctrine
which maintains infinite
concomitants necessitates the falsity
of that same position. (3) As for
making one of the two notions a
constitutive element of the cause
and the other a concomitant of it, in
this case the two notions are not
simultaneous in the same stage,
because the constitutive element is
prior, and the prior is not what is
the not prior. The outcome of this
returns to the fact that that
concomitant is no more than an
effect, and the effect is one.
Therefore, the circumstantial mode
which is the cause necessitating that
concomitant is not the same as the
circumstantial mode of that
constitutive element. This implies
that a cause is a circumstantial
mode which necessitates another
outside of itself. Otherwise the
argument regresses. In short, with
all these postulations, composition
and multiplicity are required, either
in the quiddity of the cause, or
because they are present due to its
generation of a certain thing, or
after its existence by a
differentiation belonging to it. The
first is like what applies to a body
due to its substantialized quiddity
being composed of a matter and a
form and from a genus and a
differentia. The second is like what
applies to the first intelligence due
to the multiplicity which it requires
upon its existence. The third is like
what applies to something which is
divisible into quantitative parts
posterior to it in existence or
divisible into its constituent parts.
These are the modes of multiplicity
before existence, with existence,
and after existence. [355]
Therefore, whatever requires two
[things] simultaneously, one of the
two is not an intermediary. Hence,
it is certainly divisible of reality or
multiple of entity. It is apparent,
then, that one cause, insofar as it is
one, cannot emanate more than one
effect without an intermediary. The
only precondition is that one of the
two must not be through an
intermediary, because it is not
possible for multiple things to
proceed as a whole from the real
One. They proceed from Him not in
a single stage, but one proceeds
through the intermediary of another.
The most erudite of the
doubters objected to him,
sometimes in the form of a criticism
and sometimes in the form of an
objection, in this way: Multiple
things may be negated from one, as
in our saying: “This thing is not a
stone and not a tree.” And it may be
described by multiple things, as in
our saying: “This man is standing
and sitting.” And it may receive
multiple things, as in the case of a
single substance receiving
blackness and motion. There is no
doubt that certain concepts are the
negation of those things from it, and
its qualification by those things and
its receiving those things are
different. The mentioned category
regresses, until it is necessary for
only one to be negated from one, for
it to only be described by one, and
to only receive one.
I say: There is no basis for
objecting to this proof in any of the
ways he has mentioned. As for the
first, the truth of simple negation,
insofar as it is a simple negation,
does not need any cause or
causality. Rather, its basis and
prerequisite is the absence of the
realization of a cause for the truth of
the affirmation. As for the last two,
something which is qualified by
multiple things and by actually
receiving multiple things is only
admissible if it is dependent upon
diverse causal circumstantial
modes. There is nothing to criticize
or object to here at all. Nothing of
these two is applicable unless the
circumstantial mode differs
absolutely.
The Seal of the Most Excellent
Scholars states in the Sharḥ al-
Ishārāt:
The answer is that the negation
of something from something,
the qualification of something
by another thing, and the
reception of something by
something, are things which are
not realizable for the existence
of something which is
absolutely one. They do not
belong to one thing, insofar as it
is one, but rather they call for
the existence of multiple things
which precede them, such that
those things belong to those
things in various respects. The
emanation of multiple things
from multiple things is not
impossible. The explanation of
this is that negation requires the
affirmation of an object negated
and what is negated from it to
precede it. The affirmation of
what is negated from it alone is
not sufficient. In like manner,
[356] qualification requires the
affirmation of an object
qualified and an attribute. And
receptivity requires a receiver
and the thing received, or a
receiver and something which
causes what is received to exist
in it. The difference of what is
received, like blackness and
motion, also requires a
difference in the state of the
receiver. A body receives
blackness insofar as it is
affected by another besides
itself, and it receives motion
insofar as it has a state which
does not prevent its departure
from it. As for the emanation of
one thing from another, that
 which suffices for its realization
is the postulation of one thing
which is the cause. Otherwise,
the dependence of all of the
effects upon a single cause is
impossible.
In sum, the comparison of
the emanation of multiplicity from
the real One in every respect to
qualification by multiple attributes
and to receiving multiple things
from various causes due to the
difference of the needs of the
qualified object and the
dispositions of the receiver is
outside of the path of the intellect
and the way of the road of learning.
 Wamīḍ [9.4.5]
There is a third way which
supports the demonstration repeated
in the discourse of our companion,
especially in the Ta‘līqāt. His
student summarized it in the Taḥṣīl,
where he said:
Know that the simple, which has
no composition in it at all,
cannot be a cause for two things
simultaneously, with respect to
simultaneity by nature, and
nothing proceeds from it unless
its emanation from it is
required. Therefore, if C
proceeds from A, whereas it
 requires the emanation of B
from it, the emanation of B from
it is not necessary in this case. If
C proceeds from it, whereas it
requires the emanation of B,
then insofar as the emanation of
B from it is necessary, what is
not B proceeds from it.
Therefore, the emanation of B
from it cannot be necessary.
Consequently, whatever
proceeds from any simple first
is one in essence.[381]
I say: The fundamental
thing in this regard, after you make
inquiry into it, is that you should be
convinced that it is necessary for
every cause which necessitates a
particular effect to have an essential
particularization (khuṣūṣiyya) in
relation to that effect which
necessitates its dependency in its
particularity upon the cause’s very
essence as such. I only mean by
“particularization” the cause being,
with respect to itself, a principle
(mabda’) which necessitates the
dependency of the effect in its
particularity upon it and the effect’s
issuing forth from it. But as long as
there is no essential
correspondence (munāsaba)
between the two things in their
particularity, with respect to the
particularization of the substance of
the essence, which does not exist
between other things, the
particularization of one of them by
the other is definitely not required
by rational necessity. Consequently,
the cause in this circumstantial
mode with respect to the substance
of the essence [357] is that which is
characterized by “essential
particularization.”
In short, the existence of
every possible thing is certainly
preceded by a necessity, which is
the necessity of its emanation from
an agent. The necessity of the
emanation of the effect from the
First Cause is either due to His
essence or due to something else. If
it is due to something else, it is not
dependent upon Him essentially.
The argument concerns that which
is depended upon essentially. If it is
due to His essence, and His essence
is genuinely one, the occurrence of
two things from Him by necessity is
inconceivable.
As for that which the
imaginations of the doubters
pronounced without forethought—
that it is permissible for the real
One, with respect to the substance
of His essence, to have an essential
correspondence with two things, for
example, which He does not have in
relation to other things, as a
consequence of which these two, in
their particularity, are singled out
from among the things, due to that
correspondence, by emanation from
Him and dependency upon Him in a
single stage apart from the other
things—this is a ridiculous delusion
and a contemptible ascription, if
one were to reflect carefully with a
well-ordered mind and a refined
intellect. Is it not clear that if the
particularization of the essence of
one of these two effects is
considered in its particularity, with
respect to the essential
correspondence which is the
standard for the realization of
causality and being-an-effect
between the Maker and the made
thing and the basis for emanation
according to the mode of necessity,
then the emanation of the other of
these two from Him is definitely not
possible due to that shared essential
correspondence. If it is not
considered in its particularity, and
the particularization is of no
account and accidental in
association with respect to the
necessity of emanation from Him
and the requirement of dependency
upon Him, then the question about
the effect proceeding according to
the mode of necessity returns to the
common sum (qadr), and it is only
possible for something belonging to
the particularity of one of the two
entities to be qualified by that
accidentally, insofar as inclusion
(taḍammun) is due to the common
sum which is the essential effect,
and the common sum is one thing.
Consequently, the emanation of two
effects from a single cause in the
same stage is not possible.
Whoever persists stubbornly in his
opinion and insists upon the former
view is divorced from common
sense or divested from the attribute
of fairness. In short, he has departed
from the boundaries of the land of
intelligence and the confines of the
clime of self-evident knowledge.
By reason of the intense clarity of
this question, the meddlers agree
with the people of truth in affirming
this principle.
The commentator of the
Mulakhkhaṣ states:
You have heard that one of the
philosophers has claimed that
knowledge of this subject is
necessary not demonstrative. He
said: “I speak fairly. If we
ponder and reflect adequately,
we will recognize [358] with
 certainty that it is impossible for
the real Uncompounded Being,
without a diversity of
instruments, tools, pre-
conditions, and receptacles, to
be the source of more than one
thing.”
Methinks by “one of the
philosophers” he meant the Seal of
the Most Excellent Scholars (may
God encompass him with His good-
pleasure and His mercy).

Wamīḍ [9.4.6]
The Leader of the
Doubters states in the Muḥaṣṣal:
According to us, it is possible
for more than one effect to
proceed from one cause,
contrary to the philosophers and
the Mu‘tazila. We hold that
corporeality requires
occurrence in place and the
reception of accidents. They
argue that the notion of its being
a source of one of two effects is
different from the notion of its
being a source of the other
effect, as a result of which the
two notions are dissimilar. If
they are contained in the
quiddity of the source, then the
source is not singular, but rather
it is a composite. And if they
are outside of the source, they
are two effects. The discourse
concerning how these two can
proceed from it is similar to the
discourse concerning the first,
for it results in an [infinite]
series. If one of the two is
inside and the other is outside,
the quiddity would be
composite, because the thing
inside is part of the quiddity,
and whatever has a part is
composite. The effect is also
one, because the thing inside
cannot be an effect. The answer
is that the causality of one thing
 in relation to another thing is not
a permanent attribute, as we
have explained. If this is so, to
say that it is part of the quiddity
or outside of it is invalid.
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars responds in his
criticism [of the Muḥaṣṣal]:
I say: The Ash‘ariya say: “One
attribute does not require more
than one property (ḥukm).” But
they do not say this with respect
to one essence, since they do not
advocate the causality of what
is other than the attributes. The
Mu‘tazila and the philosophers
teach this with respect to
essences also. The author of the
book contradicts all of them.
Occurrence in place is
existential, the effect belonging
to corporeality is due to action
(ta’thīr), and the reception of
accidents is not existential,
according to him. And if it is
existential, it is due to being
acted upon (ta’aththur). But
they do not prohibit one cause
being a patient along with its
being an agent. Thus, this proof
is incorrect. Their proof is not
based upon causality being
permanent, but its notion is that
the causality of one cause has
 one effect, whose causality does
not in any respect pertain to
other than that effect. Moreover,
the two aspects are either
contained or not contained in
other than it. [359]
Then the author of the book
states:
That which proves this is that
the notion of a point being
opposite of this point in a circle
is different than the notion of its
being opposite of another point.
The dissimilarity of these
notions does not require the
point to be composite. In like
manner, the notion of A being
 not B is dissimilar to the notion
of it being not C. The
dissimilarity of these negations
does not require the occurrence
of multiplicity in the quiddity.
The same applies here.
The Brilliant Scholar
responds:
I say: Correlation and negation
are not comprehensible with
respect to a single thing.
According to them, two things
cannot proceed from a single
cause, because it is one, but they
do not prohibit the emanation of
two things from it which two
receptacles receive. The
 criticism is not applicable to
correlation and negation,
according to them.
It may be summed up from
this that if the particularization of
the essence of the agent required for
the necessity of the emanation of the
effect from it were shared between
the sum of two effects and between
each one of them in its particularity,
it would not be possible for the
emanation of the sum and the
emanation of each one in its
particularity to be individualized
with respect to that
particularization, since that
particularization would not belong
absolutely to one individual thing in
its particularity in relation to
whatever thing other than it there
may be, for it is only the
particularization of each of two
things and of their sum in relation to
what is beyond these two.
Therefore, it is an indeterminate,
unqualified particularization due to
which the emanation of these two
together is not individualized, nor
the emanation of one of them in its
particularity, since it is equally
related to each of these.
Consequently, the emanation of
these two inevitably requires two
different nows which depend upon
two different modes in the essence
of the complete efficient cause. For
were they to depend upon the
solitary essence, one in every
respect, this would require the real
One in His essence to be
particularized by one of them, by
the other, and by both of them
together. Therefore, He in His
essence cannot be related to each of
the three things, in such wise that it
is possible for Him, insofar as He
necessitates it, not another, to
necessitate another, not it. This is
absurd. Hence, there is no
alternative to their dependence
upon two different modes in His
essence, and He is, by virtue of one
of the two modes in its particularity,
the necessitator of one of two things
in its particularity, not the other. For
this reason, it is necessary for the
First Emanated (al-ṣādir al-awwal)
from the one true Creator to be an
uncompounded essence and a
solitary entity.[382] [360]
If you say: Is not the true
Creator qualified by negations and
multiple relations? Then why is it
not possible for multiple things in
the same stage to proceed from Him
by reason of those negations and
relations, so that He is with respect
to each of these aspects both
particularized of relation by one of
these things and a particularizer of
it?
I say: You know that negation
and correlation derive from an
object of negation and an object of
correlation. The argument pertains
to the First Emanated, and there is
in the station of its emanation no
negation and no correlation at all.
Negation is posited according to
two respects. The first is pure
simple negation as such. In this
respect, the realization of something
characterized by negation is not
possible, so that it could be
associated with the cause and the
cause become multiple through it,
rather it only gives information
through its word. Its denotation is
that the essence of the cause is
determined and other than it is
negated. Therefore, the multiplicity
of the cause is incomprehensible,
and it is not contrary to necessity at
all. The second is such that it is
posited with a certain portion of
affirmation and a certain share of
realization, in which case its
association with the essence is
possible, and the circumstantial
modes of the essence of the cause
are multiple in this respect.
However, this is only possible after
the occurrence of multiplicity and
its emanation from the real One
(exalted be He).
If you say: If the emanation of
the effect from the cause is due to
particularization and
correspondence, then the cause is
not a cause by virtue of itself, but
rather due to that particularization.
Therefore, it is not really one
because of its inclusion of two
different things, which are the
essence itself and the aspect of
particularization. Therefore, the
emanation of a single effect from a
single cause is not possible, since
every cause is certainly multiple in
this respect.
I say: Have we not recited to
you that what is meant by
“particularization” here is only the
principle (mabda’) which
necessitates the particularization of
the entity of the effect in its
particularity? Its characterization by
“particularization” is due to need of
an expression; it is not something
additional to the essence of the
necessitating efficient cause itself.
That principle pertaining to the
form of the emanation of one from it
is identical to its essence without
another thing added to the essence
itself at all. But upon assuming the
emanation of multiplicity, this is not
possible, since whatever belongs to
the effect with respect to the
substance of the essence, the
particularization of the entity, the
mode of existence,
individualization, and so forth, is by
reason of the efficient cause. It is
abundantly clear that if the relation
of things to their Creator is equal,
and the relation of the Creator to
them is equal, then their equality in
all [361] that belongs to them is
required. In this case, multiple
things and manifold entities are
completely inconceivable. Let it be
ascertained.
 Wamīḍ [9.4.7]
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars states in the
Sharḥ al-Ishārāt:
It may not be said: Emanation
(or: procession ṣudūr) is only
realizable after the realization
of something from which it
emanates and something which
is emanated (ṣādir), for we say
that “emanation” is applicable
in two senses. One of them is a
correlational thing which occurs
between the cause and the effect
insofar as they are simultaneous.
Our argument does not concern
this meaning. The second is the
cause being such that the effect
emanates from it, and it is in this
sense prior to the effect; then an
accidental relation applies
between these two. Our
argument concerns this meaning.
It is a single thing, if the effect
is one, and that thing may be the
essence of the cause itself, if the
cause is a cause by virtue of
itself, and it may be a state
which is accidental to it, if it is
not a cause by virtue of itself,
but due to another state. But if
the effect is more than one, that
thing will certainly be diverse,
 and multiplicity in the essence
of the cause will be required by
it, as we have explained.
We say: This argument
contains a faulty postulation
according to the standard of
learning and rational inquiry, and it
is contrary to the criterion of
philosophical investigation in the
path of the clear intellect and sound
demonstration. It is that God in His
very essence, one in every respect,
is the agent of the substance of the
essence of the First Emanated.
Emanational causality, in the
second, non-correlational sense
which he mentioned, in relation to
the First Emanated in its
particularity,[383] which is one of
the stages of the aspects prior to its
determination and its existence, is
strictly the agent Creator being in
His essence such that the actual
emanation of the First Effect from
Him in its particularity is required.
This non-correlational sense is one
of the stages prior to the essence of
the First Effect; then correlational
emanational causality applies to it,
which is the consequence of the
existence of two correlative things.
Just as this sense is prior in the
intelligible order to the substance of
the essence of the First Effect and
entails it in mental consideration, in
like manner, it is posterior in mental
consideration to the stage of the
essence of the agent Creator,
subsequent and subordinate to Him,
and not the same as the stage of His
essence. The meaning of non-
correlational emanational causality
which is the same as His essence is
only His being with respect to the
stage of His essence such that [362]
the emanation of whatever is
absolutely good in the system of
existence is required from Him
essentially.
Emanational causality,
therefore, has two non-correlational
meanings and a third correlational
meaning. That which is identical to
His essence (exalted be He) of the
two non-correlational meanings is
the circumstantial mode of the
necessity of the essential emanation
(ifāḍa) of all good things in an
absolute way, not that which
pertains to the particularization of
the essence of a particular effect in
its particularity. Consequently, that
which pertains to the
particularization of the essence of
the First Effect is only a
concomitant of His essence; it is not
identical to the stage of His
essence.
 This is demonstrated in
three ways: The first is that the
consideration of the necessity of the
emanation of the First Effect in its
particularity is one of the two
meanings of real causality
essentially prior to the essence of
the effect, essentially posterior to
the stage of the possibility of the
essence of the effect, and prior to
the stage of its determination and its
existence, as you are aware with
respect to the sequence of
intelligible stages prior to the stage
of the existence of the effect.
Therefore, how is it possible for
that which is essentially posterior
in stage to the stage of the
possibility of the effect to be
identical to the essence the Creator,
who is essentially and absolutely
prior to all else besides Him?
The second is that the
oneness of the essence of the First
Effect is a numerical oneness
included in the category of numbers,
as it is with oneness for whatever is
in the world of possibility.
Therefore, without a doubt, the
causality which is related to it in its
particularity is likewise
numerically one. But the oneness of
the real One (exalted be His
grandeur) is sanctified from
numerical oneness and exalted
above inclusion in the category of
numbers, as our companions in the
Craft have confirmed. We have
expounded upon this question in
detail in the book al-Taqdīsāt and
in the book Taqwīm al-Īmān. How
can the one which is numerically
one be the same as the essence
which is exalted above numerical
oneness?
The third is that it is only
possible for what is absolutely
perfect in existence as such to be
identical to His essence (glorified
be He) in the attributes of
perfection. It is clear that His being
such that this effect in its
particularity proceeds from Him in
actuality is not one of the absolute
perfections of existence as such,
despite disregarding every
consideration other than Him and
every particularity besides Him.
Rather, it is one of the descriptions
of glory and majesty belonging to
His essence (exalted be His
remembrance) with respect to the
consideration of His relation to this
caused essence in its particularity.
[363]
In short, we have set forth
to you in what has preceded that
His exaltation and His glory consist
of this: That He in His essence is
such that every good thing proceeds
from Him, and every existence and
every perfection of existence
emanates from Him; but it is not that
this essence in its particularity is
His handiwork and this existence in
its particularity is His emanation
(fayḍ). The latter is His perfection
and His glory with respect to His
relation to the particularizations of
existents, and the former is His
glory and His perfection with
respect to His essence absolutely.
In like manner, His might and His
exaltation consist of the fact that
His essence is such that He
regulates the system of existence,
fashions every “whatness” and
“thatness,” and produces every
essence and existence, and every
perfection of the essence and
existence; but it is not that the
system of existence in its actual
form is His creation and the
existents [individually] in their
entirety are His handiwork. The
latter is a description of Him with
respect to His relation to what is
besides Him, and the former is His
attribute with respect to His
essence. For this reason, His
perfection in terms of agency and
creativity is both prior to the
existence of the possibilities and
together with their existence in a
single mode and a single respect,
just as His perfection with respect
to knowledge of each thing is that
He in His own essence knows the
things both before their existence
and with their existence; it is not
that the things are objects of His
knowledge [as with those whose
knowledge is based upon what
already exists].
Consequently, the
emanation of every effect from Him
(glorified be He), by way of
necessity, in other words, His
complete agency in relation to it,
has, in the language of philosophy
and the terminology of the science
of metaphysics, three meanings. The
first is that He (exalted be His
remembrance) is such in His own
essence that whatever is good and
perfect in the system of the whole of
existence necessarily proceeds and
emanates from Him. This meaning
is the same as the stage of His real
solitary essence.
The second is His being
such that it is necessary for this
effect in its particularity to proceed
from Him, insofar as it is among the
good things and perfections of the
system of existence. This meaning
is one of the attributes which
substantializes the effect and is
among its sequential aspects prior
to the stage of its existence. It is
with respect to the First Effect the
concomitant of the essence of the
agent Creator issuing from His very
essence, inasmuch as the First
Effect, with respect to the
particularity of its essence and its
degree of perfection, is the noblest
of the effects and the nearest of
them to Him (glorified be He) in
essential correspondence.
Certainly, then, it is necessary for it
to be the first thing to proceed and
emanate from its Originator and its
Fashioner, in accord with its
essential possibility, without any
intermediary nor the mediation of
another cause or condition at all.
The third is correlational
agency connected to being-an-effect
occurring together in a single stage,
[364] posterior to both the stage of
the essence of the Agent and the
stage of the essence of the effect.
Therefore, real agency in
the first sense, which is the same as
the essence of the real Maker, is the
cause (mabda’) of real agency in
the second sense, which is the
concomitant of His real, solitary
essence itself in relation to His
First Effect. In the same manner,
agency in the second sense is the
cause of correlational agency,
which is the third sense. Both of the
last two senses become multiple
through the multiplicity of the
effects, in contrast to how it is with
the first sense, since it is identical
to the real solitary Essence by
reason of its being among His
absolute perfections and His real
attributes. It does not become
multiple through the multiplicity of
the effects at all. Rather, the
manifestation of its oneness is
intensified whenever the
multiplicity of effects is increased,
[384] as mentioned in the Theology
[of Aristotle].

Wamīḍ [9.4.8]
Perhaps you will say: If
the simple which is really one has
an essential concomitant which
issues from its own essence and is
added to its pure reality, it would
be necessary for it to be in its own
solitary essence both a recipient
and an agent of that concomitant, but
this is impossible, since the relation
of a recipient to what it receives is
by possibility, while the relation of
an agent to its effect is by necessity.
How then are these two possible
with respect to one circumstantial
mode?
It may be answered: This
is something which the Master of
the Illuminationists mentioned in the
same way in al-Muṭāraḥāt, in al-
Talwīḥāt, and in the Ḥikmat al-
Ishrāq, and he relied upon it to
make it impossible for God’s
knowledge of all besides himself to
be obtained by the impression of the
form of the object of knowledge in
His real essence, as it is in the
tablets of celestial and sublunar
minds. The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars followed him in
this in the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, and the
Leader of the Doubters tread this
course in order to raise many
doubts in al-Mabāḥith al-
Mashriqiyya.
We have explained the
correct path in our al-Īmāḍāt wa’l-
Tashrīqāt and in the Taqwīm al-
Īmān, where we maintain that
receptivity and agency apply with a
common name to three different
meanings. The first of them is
something being a recipient (qābil)
in relation to an attribute (or: notion
mafhūm) in the sense of its being
qualified by that attribute, and its
being an agent (fā‘il) of it in the
sense of necessitating that
qualification. The recipient in this
case is not precluded from being the
agent itself without a difference in
aspect or a dissimilarity in
circumstantial mode, since
qualification by the attribute is from
the necessity of the substance of the
essence, not by a necessitating
cause outside of the constitution of
the essence itself. The essence,
therefore, cannot be [365]
separated from that qualification in
the real world and the true thing
itself. Its separation from it is only
possible in the stage of the quiddity
as such. The same applies to the
concomitants of the quiddity in
relation to their subject-substrate.
The relation of this recipient to
what it receives is necessarily by
necessity, not by possibility.
According to this path also is the
intelligence separate from matter
and the object of intellection
belonging to its simple essence.
This does not require any
multiplicity or dissimilarity at all,
except in the essence and in
[mental] consideration.
The second meaning is
something being a recipient in the
sense of its being an acquirer and
receiver from the higher realm, and
its being an agent in the sense of
being a giver and effecter to the
lower realm, as with the separate
substances among the agent
intelligences and managing souls.
The recipient in this sense, which
also [receives] from the Most High,
does not preclude its being an agent
itself in the lower world, however,
not in one mode with respect to a
non-diverse circumstantial mode,
but in two different modes in the
constitution of the essence with
respect to the multiplicity of two
dissimilar circumstantial modes in
[mental] consideration. This
receptivity is also only by relation
to necessity, as with action without
a distinction in this way.
The third meaning is
something being a recipient through
receptivity in the sense of the
dispositional potentiality contained
within it, which is separated from
what it will receive and that for
which it is disposed at first, then
becoming attired with it actually
later, and its being an agent through
“action” (fi‘l) in the sense of
drawing what is potential from the
realm of concealment into the vast
space of actuality. The recipient in
this sense cannot be the agent itself,
but must be another thing essentially
different from it in the real world.
Something cannot draw its own
essence from potentiality into
actuality in any respect whatsoever,
since receptivity, in this sense, can
only be in relation to possibility,
while agency can only be in relation
to necessity. This rule is the
criterion of truth and the standard of
wisdom on this question.
As for the impossibility of
the knowledge of the All-Knowing,
the Real, being an occurrence by the
impression of a reflected mental
image in His real solitary essence,
which is necessary in every respect,
the path for demonstrating this is
what we have taken in al-Taqwīmāt
wa’l-Taṣḥīḥāt in several thorough
and exacting ways,[385] not what
those who have strayed from the
path have followed. Our two
companions in instruction and
leadership have already proclaimed
the likes of what we have recited to
you, each in his Ta‘līqāt
(Annotations) with the same
statements, where they say: [366]
Two meanings are inferred for
[the term] “recipient” (qābil):
The first is that it receives
something from outside, so that
it is here an affection (infi‘āl)
and a prime matter which
receives that external thing.
But a recipient of that which is
within itself from itself is not
from outside, so it cannot in
this case be an affection. If this
second meaning is correct,
then it is possible to predicate
it of the Creator.
Then they say:
The difference is between a
body being described as white
because whiteness exists in it
from outside, and its being
described as white because
whiteness is one of its
concomitants and only exists in
it because it is it, if this is
possible for a body. If the
reality of the First (exalted be
He) is considered according to
this sense, and His
concomitants are in this mode,
this meaning applies to Him. It
is that there is no multiplicity
in Him. There is neither a
recipient nor an agent, but
insofar as He is a recipient, He
is an agent. This rule is true of
all simples. Concomitants are
required of their realities and
these concomitants are in their
essences, in such a way that
insofar as they are a recipient
they are an agent. For the
simple “in it” and “from it” are
the same thing, since there is
no multiplicity in it, and
anything else is not possible
for it. For the composite, what
is from it is different from
what is in it, since in this case
there is a multiplicity, while in
the case of simplicity there is a
oneness, and its reality
requires this, as a consequence
of which “from it” and “in it”
are the same thing. All
concomitants follow this rule.
Therefore, the oneness of the
First (exalted be He) is both
from Him and in Him, because
it is one of His concomitants.
 The oneness of all else besides
Him, however, comes to it
from outside, so that it is in it,
not from it, and it is a
recipient. But in the First,
recipient and agent are the
same thing.
Then our companion in
leadership states [in his Ta‘līqāt]:
Simples have no disposition
(isti‘dād), because having a
disposition implies that
something exists in something
from another thing which
didn’t exist before, and its
disposition is to receive that
thing which precedes its
receptivity by nature.
It is not possible for the human
soul, as an agent of objects of
intellection, to be a recipient
of them when they do not exist,
because this would require a
certain potential attribute
(ma‘nan) to precede it and for
it to have a disposition. As for
that whose reality is such that
it requires objects of
intellection continuously, it
does not need to have a certain
potential attribute in it.
If the human soul were to
produce objects of intellection
after it did not produce them, it
would have [367] a certain
potential attribute.
It is not possible for that which
receives objects of intellection
to be an agent of those
intelligibles, since it is not
possible for a single thing to
be both an agent and a
recipient after it wasn’t an
agent and a recipient.
Consequently, a certain
potential attribute precedes it.
I say: Only one thing can
emanate from one thing which
is simple in every respect. And
you know that something
cannot exist through another
thing as long as that thing is not
necessitated by it. If then it is
necessary for one thing to
proceed from another thing,
then the first thing will
proceed from it insofar as it is
necessary to proceed from it,
and due to that necessity,
another thing other than the
first [will proceed] from
which it is not necessary for
the first to proceed. If it is not
simple, it is possible for it to
proceed from it [i.e., from the
first thing]. But if one thing
proceeds from it due to its
nature and another thing due to
 its will, the argument concerns
the duality of the nature and the
will and the necessity of both
of them from a simple thing
and their emanation from it,
like the argument concerning
the first. Thus it is said: It is
not necessitated by it insofar
as the nature is like so and
insofar as the will is like so.
Consequently, it is not possible
for any multiplicity to be in the
Necessary Being at all.
It may be summarized that it is
necessary for whatever is a true
excellence belonging to [His]
determination as such and an
absolute perfection belonging to
[His] existence as such to be itself
the same as His pure reality and
identical to the stage of His
necessary essence (glorified be
He), not a concomitant of His
essence added to the substance of
His reality.[386] But whatever is
not like this among the attributes of
perfection and the qualities of
splendor, like the primary
origination of one quiddity after
another and the existentiation of one
existence after another, is among
His necessary concomitants
belonging to His very reality and
subsequent to the perfection of His
essence and the grandeur of His
majesty. The concomitant nearest to
His real essence, which is one in
every respect, must also be simple
and one, and it is the necessity of
the emanation of the First Effect,
which is simple of essence, from
Him. Then His subsequent
concomitants are multiplied in
successive stages, such as the
existentiation of effects prior in
rank to their existences in the
succession of the system of the
emanation, until the farthest
existence. Then that which derives
from them, such as consequent
relations and necessary negations,
in descending order, both vertically
and horizontally, until the end of the
system. Let it be considered
carefully. [368]

Wamīḍ [9.4.9]
As you are informed, know
that just as the oneness of the
complete necessary cause
necessitates the oneness of the
effect, since it is not within the
power of the nature of multiplicity
to proceed simultaneously in the
same stage from one cause which is
genuinely one, the same applies
conversely to the effect. Therefore,
the oneness of the effect, by its
nature, depends upon the oneness of
the cause, and it is impossible for
one particular effect, with respect
to individual oneness or species
oneness, to depend upon two
independent causes, even by
alternation, whether with respect to
the impossibility of that by
succession and following one after
another in turns in the second
creation or by exchange and
alternation from the very beginning
in the first creation, whether the
successive things in the second
creation or the alternating things in
the first creation be complete
causes or prerequisites and
complements of the cause by
alternation. This also leads to the
dissimilarity of the complete cause
in notion or in number. In short, the
dependence of a particular solitary
nature upon two natures which are
absolutely different in notion or in
number[387] is impossible. Is it not
so either that (1) the
particularization of one of the two
natures in its particularity has a
certain share of inclusion in
causality, due to the effect’s need of
it in its particularity and its definite
essential connection to it, as a result
of which it is not possible for the
effect to be realized by another
[cause] and certainly impossible for
the former to relinquish the latter
with respect to its emanation and its
creation, or its perpetuation and
preservation, or (2) that the effect
does not need either of the two
particularizations as such at all,
since the particularization of each
of them is of no account with
respect to it, as a result of which the
causality is due to a common nature,
and needing the cause essentially in
reality is the common sum, which is
a single nature, and each one of the
two particularizations in its
particularity is included in that
which is the cause essentially,
although it is not the cause in
reality. In sum, it is only possible
for the effect in reality to depend
upon that which it needs, to which it
is bound, and upon which it
depends essentially in its
particularity. It only depends upon
anything other than this accidentally,
by rational necessity. It is the same
for the two essentialities, where
causality is explained by
dependence upon something
[essentially] or by a notion which
makes it possible to interpose the
[connective] Fā’. One of the
fastidious among the imitators is
confused by that which brings him
no profit. Let it be pondered. [369]

Wamīḍ [9.4.10]
Whenever the cause is
diverse outwardly, the cause in
reality is the common sum, while
the particularizations are only
considered with respect to causality
accidentally. The purport is like
what is in the Naqd al-Muḥaṣṣal,
that the effect, in this case, depends
upon what the causes as such share
in common, not their
particularizations. The premise of
the demonstration, the necessity of
preserving the essential unity
between the cause and the effect, is
based upon the recurrent
necessitation of their
correspondence with respect to the
nature of essential causality and
effectness. However, this is from
the side of the cause and with
respect to the side of the nature of
causality by necessity, and from the
side of the effect and with respect
to the side of the nature of
effectness by necessity. Therefore,
if it is meant that the thing from that
side is also according to the way of
necessitation, it may be said that the
nature of essential effectness is the
necessitating cause for one effect
being dependent upon one cause,
just as the nature of essential
causality is the necessitating cause
for one cause being the necessitator
of one effect. This is the
fundamental rule of oneness here.
As for the mode of individual,
species, or generic oneness, with
respect to the efficient cause, a
clear mind determines that it is
impossible for the oneness of its
effect and its made thing to be
superior in determinateness to the
oneness of the cause, and that a
particular action does not issue and
proceed from a universal
unqualified will (irāda) and a
universal unqualified perception
(ra’y). Therefore, since the
unqualified species nature is equal
of relation to its particular
individual instances, it cannot bring
forth a particular individual entity
from a possible relation into a
necessary relation. In like manner,
the relation of the unqualified
generic nature to all its determinate
species is the same. How then is it
possible for it to bring forth a
determinate species from a possible
relation into a necessary relation?
As for the absolute cause with
respect to conditions and helping
causes (muṣaḥḥiḥāt), there is no
closing of the mind to the fact that
one particular unqualified nature
may have, through species oneness
or generic oneness, for example, a
role in completing the agency of the
efficient cause with respect to a
particular individual entity, or this
may belong to a determinate species
nature, according to what I believe
and have shown in the course of the
demonstration.
Our companion in leadership
believes in the affirmation of the
conversion (in‘ikās)[388] of the
two sides absolutely with respect to
the absolute cause, and he maintains
in Book Four of the Demonstration
of the Shifā’, in imitation of what is
in the First Discipline and in the
metaphysics of it, that [370] the
effect which is one in species does
not depend upon the [effect which
is] one in genus at all, but the one in
species requires that its absolute
cause should have individual or
species oneness. I do not find that
the demonstration supports this,
except with respect to the efficient
cause, which is what brings forth
from potentiality into actuality, from
nullification into determination, and
from possibility into necessity, and
with respect to the circumstantial
modes of its essence, which make
possible dependency upon its actual
agency.

Wamīḍ [9.4.11]
Is not the only thing the
real cause needs essentially, and the
sole basis, spring, and source of
being an emanated effect, the nature
of essential possibility? And is not
the only requirement of essential
possibility, in broad view, want and
dependency upon an efficient cause,
and, in precise view, the efficient
cause being essentially necessary in
existence? Therefore, there is no
real essential cause except the
efficient cause, and the other causes
are helping causes (muṣaḥḥiḥāt)
which are dependent in actuality
upon the Agent of the essence and
the Fashioner of existence, since the
effect does not have in the
substance of its essence the
capability to proceed from its agent
without an intermediary, a
connector, or a preparatory
condition. It is only possible for
one particular effect to have, with
respect to the substance of its
essence, one complete efficient
cause. Its actual existence depends
upon the cause’s existence, and its
actual non-existence depends upon
the cause’s non-existence. It is only
possible for the agent and maker of
the substance of the individual
essence to be a particular
individual existent in itself. Though
it may be that the particular nature
of the essence of the effect requires,
due to its stage in possibility, the
association of a particular
unqualified nature among the
quiddities and helping causes of its
individual agent to be considered
for the completion of the
individually one, complete efficient
cause. This does not require its
removal from individual numerical
oneness, as when the agent of
indeterminate, individual prime
matter causes it [matter] to exist and
preserves it through a particular
form among the substantial forms
which arrive successively upon it,
while it [the agent] is numerically
one and individually particular.
Therefore, the individuality of the
complete cause of individually one
prime matter always preserves by
the individualizing action of its
particular individual agent in its
individual oneness through the
preservation of existence and
individualization by its individually
one complete cause. In like manner,
it is only possible for the cause of
the non-existence of the particular
effect to be the non-existence of its
single complete cause itself. As for
the non-existence of one of the
causes, whether particular or not,
and the non-existence of one of the
parts, whether particular or not,
[371] if the effect is essentially
composite, it cannot be qualified by
essential and real causality, for it is
connected to and requires that
which is the cause essentially and
in reality.

Wamīḍ [9.4.12]
It is evident that what the
imitators are pursuing and which
circulates upon their tongues—
namely, that it is possible for the
most general concomitant to be
realized in other than the
concomitant-substrate in contrast
with the equal concomitant, and that
the unity of concomitants does not
conflict with the difference of
concomitant-substrates due to the
possibility of the concomitant being
more general in fact than the
concomitant-substrate—is
something which will not result in
the knowledge of reality. Its only
outcome is the confusion of what is
accidental with what is essential.
The correct rule, according to the
balance of the clear intellect, is that
any notion which is required by
more than one particularization, and
it is associated with them or
abstracted from them, and any
concept which is predicated to
several particularizations, either
belongs to the essential constituents
of these particularizations or to
their associated accidentals. For the
basis of concomitance, the requisite
of association, the principle of
abstraction, and the correspondent
of predication, is solely the
common nature. No share belongs
to any of the particularizations, such
that it in its particularity can have
an essential role in making that
possible at all, although
particularization is contained in the
concomitant-substrate, the object of
association and abstraction, and the
subject accidentally, in the sense
that it is possible for the mind to
infer concomitance, association,
abstraction, and predication in
relation to the unqualified nature
blended in the real world.
Therefore, after
investigation through analytical
consideration, inquiry decrees that
the concomitant-substrate, the
object of association and
abstraction, and the subject
essentially is definitely no other
than the common nature, not any of
the particularizations as such. In
like manner, whenever a particular
concept is predicated to two natures
ordered by most general and most
specific, or a certain notion is
required of them in existence, or
with respect to the quiddity, it is
evident to a clear mind upon
analytical consideration that the
subject of the predicate or the basis
of concomitance essentially and by
primary intention, in reality, is the
nature described as most general.
The particularity of the most
specific nature is of no account with
respect to it with regard to meriting
that predication or concomitance
and making it possible except
accidentally.[389]
Moreover, in accord with
what we believe about the necessity
of the preservation of the principle
of numerical oneness by recurrent
necessitation upon conversion of
the two sides, whether it be species
or generic, not the mode of oneness
in its particularity, [372] the unity
of the concomitant with the species
reality only requires that the
essential concomitant-substrate be a
single nature, whether it be species
or generic. What is impossible is
the one in species being an essential
concomitant to all of the
particularizations of realities which
are diverse in quiddity or in
number, since the essential
concomitant-substrate here is the
common sum, not the difference of
the mode of oneness, whether
species or generic, in the two
natures of the two sides of
concomitance.
Now, according to what
our companion [Ibn Sīnā] and the
Teacher of the Peripatetics, the
Giver of the Craft, held—namely,
that the one in species only depends
upon the one in species—the unity
of concomitants in the species
reality is a proof of the unity of the
concomitant-substrates also with
the species reality. The Leader of
the Doubters in al-Mabāḥith al-
Mashriqiyya and in the
Mulakhkhaṣ sets forth a doubt
about this rule, which we have
refuted in al-Taqdīsāt, in Taqwīm
al-Īmān, and other works.

Wamīḍ [9.4.13]
Among the principles
derived from the principle of the
impossibility of the emanation of
many from the real One in one
circumstantial mode in the same
stage is another principle, which is
called “the rule of the noblest
possibility” (al-imkān al-ashraf). It
is a noble principle whose
significance is weighty and whose
advantage is great. The Teacher of
the Peripatetics and the Giver of the
Craft employed it in the Theology
and in On the Heavens, and our
companion in leadership used it in a
number of places in the Shifā’ and
in the Ta‘līqāt, and based upon this
principle he established the order
of the system of existence in his
other books. Our companion in
instruction also relied upon this
principle. The Master of the
adherents of intuition and retirement
embraced it wholeheartedly [in his
books] al-Muṭāraḥāt, al-Talwīḥāt,
and Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, and one of
his followers, the author of al-
Shajara al-Ilāhiyya, investigated
this theme exhaustively and in
detail.
We say: The thesis of this
principle is that for every possible
thing (mumkin) existent in the
world of Command and the domain
of primary origination, a possible
thing nobler than it is actually
existent before it in a prior
intelligible stage. The
demonstration of its meaning is that
the first thing to emanate from the
First Maker requires that it is
inconceivable for anything in the
world of possibility to be nobler
and more excellent than it in any
way, for if it were possible for the
nature of possibility to encompass
something nobler and more
excellent than it, it is certain that
either the former would exist in the
stage of the existence of the latter,
or in another stage posterior to its
stage, or it would not exist at all. If
it existed in its stage, this would
require the real One in every
respect to emanate two things [373]
in a single stage. If it existed in
another stage after its stage, this
thing prior to it in rank would
certainly be a cause of its existence
and a part of the cause of its
existence, which would require that
a primary originated effect in the
world of Command would be
nobler and more excellent than its
cause. This is absurd and
impossible. If it didn’t exist at all,
but it is essentially possible of
existence, and there is nothing
required for its emanation and its
emanation from the emanating
Originator except its essential
possibility, then it is certainly
necessary for its non-entrance into
the world of determination and
existence to be due to the non-
existence of its cause, due to the
fact that it, in the stage of its
excellence and its nobility, calls for
an agent more perfect, more noble,
more exalted, and more glorious
than the agent of this emanated thing
which is more excellent and more
noble than it. Since the agent of this
emanated thing is nothing except the
First Maker, the essentially
necessary Self-Subsistent Being
(exalted be His majesty), it
therefore calls for another
originator who will be more
exalted and more glorious than the
essentially necessary, emanating
Agent. But this is utterly
inconceivable. Immeasurably
exalted be His glory and His
exaltation above that! This is the
correct account of this
demonstration in the best of ways.
Now let us present what is
in the [Sharḥ] Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq
with its text and its commentary:
“If a baser possible thing exists,
a nobler possible thing must
have existed.” He means before
the baser. This is a great
principle upon which important
questions are based, as we will
make known, and it is a
ramification of [the principle]
that only one can emanate from
the real One. “Thus if the Light
of Lights had necessitated the
basest darkness through His
unitary aspect, no aspect would
have remained to necessitate
that which is more noble”
because He has one aspect, not
more. If it is like this, it would
either be possible for the more
noble to emanate from Him by
an intermediary or without it, or
this would be absolutely
impossible. If it is possible
without an intermediary, then it
would be possible for two
things to emanate from the
Necessary by virtue of himself
in a single stage, in other words,
the more noble and the baser,
and this is impossible. If it is
possible with an intermediary,
this would necessitate the
possibility of the effect being
more noble than its cause [i.e.,
the baser], because the
assumption is that the emanation
of the baser from Him is without
an intermediary. For were it by
the intermediary of another
effect of the Necessary Being,
and the cause is nobler than the
effect and essentially prior to it,
what is nobler would have
existed before this baser thing,
and this is what is sought. If the
emanation of the noblest by an
intermediary were possible,
then no doubt it would certainly
be baser, as a consequence of
which the emanation of the
nobler from the baser would be
possible, which is impossible,
contrary to the converse of this.
If the emanation of the nobler
from it is not possible and not
from its effect, despite its
hypothetical possibility, and the
possible is not required by the
assumption of its existence,
[374] it is impossible in itself.
Indeed, if it were required, it
would only be due to other
causes besides itself.
Otherwise, it would not be
possible, which is contrary to
what was assumed. “If it were
assumed to exist” (and its
occurrence cannot be by the
Necessary Being and not by one
of His effects, because our
present argument is based upon
the non-existence of the
possibility of its emanation from
these two), “it would require an
aspect more noble than the Light
of Lights to necessitate it” (due
to its being more noble than His
effect, inasmuch as the nobility
of the effect is through the
nobility of its cause and its
necessitation), “and this is
impossible” (because it is
impossible to conceive of an
aspect more noble than what
belongs to the Light of Lights).
This is the account of the
demonstration in compliance
with the order in the book.
As for the natural
order, if it is said: If a baser
possible thing exists, and a
nobler possible thing does not
exist before it, either the
contrary of this assumption, or
the possibility of the emanation
of many from one, or the
emanation of the nobler from the
baser, or the existence of an
aspect nobler than that
possessed by the Light of Lights,
would be required. If the
existence of the baser is by an
intermediary, the first option is
required. If it is not by an
intermediary, and the emanation
of the nobler from the
Necessary Being is also
permitted, the second option is
required. If it is possible to
proceed from His effect, the
third option is required. If these
two are not possible, then the
fourth option is required. If all
of the options which assume the
existence of the baser with the
non-existence of the nobler
essentially before it are
invalidated, this assumption is
false. And with its invalidation,
the truth of the first conditional
proposition mentioned, which is
the rule of the noblest
possibility, is required. Since
there is nothing nobler than the
Necessary Being and His
necessitation, it is impossible
for the existence of the noblest
possible thing to be distant from
His existence. Rather, it is
 necessary for the noblest to be
nearest to Him and for the
intermediaries between Him
and the baser to be the nobler.
Consequently, the nobler in the
stages of causes and effects
never proceeds from the baser.
Rather, the contrary of this is
true until the end of the stages.

Wamīḍ [9.4.14]
In this demonstration there
is difficult doubt, the surety of
whose solution is under our care,
by the leave of God and His mercy,
and there is no means of
ascertaining the colocynth of truth in
it except through us, as with the
other recondite problems and their
difficulties. It is that in his
composition [of the proof] there is a
confusion of essential impossibility
and possibility with impossibility
and possibility in relation to
another, and a disregard of the
possibility of essential
impossibility being possible in
relation to another, not in another,
[375] and the possibility of
essential possibility being such that
essential impossibility is possible,
not in it but in relation to it.
Therefore, an aspect nobler than
what belongs to the Light of Lights
is definitely an essential
impossibility, but its possibility is
not impossible in relation to the
noblest possible thing requiring it.
[390]
One of the fastidious
among the imitators states in the
Sharḥ al-Hayākil, after giving the
composition of the demonstration in
its matter and its form:
The invalidation of the last half
[of the demonstration] is only
accomplished if the possibility
of the effect necessitates the
possibility of the cause, but it is
undone because the negation of
the First Effect is possible,
despite the fact that its cause,
which is the negation of the
Necessary Being, is impossible.
The assertion is that the
possibility of the effect
necessitates the possibility of
the cause with respect to the
essence of the effect, in the
sense that if the effect is looked
to, nothing is found in it which
requires its impossibility. The
negation of this is not allowed
in the case of dispute, just as in
the case of support. It is
possible for it to be settled like
this: “That which is not existent
before a possible existent is not
a possible thing more noble than
it.” The contradictory is
reversed by conversion to our
statement: “Whatever is a
nobler possible thing is existent
before it.” The explanation of
the first is that if it is a nobler
possible thing, then assuming its
existence, either it exists
through the Necessary Being
without an intermediary (but the
existence of the baser than it
without an intermediary is
assumed, thus requiring the
emanation of many from one) or
through an intermediary (and it
is restricted to the baser, thus
requiring the cause to be baser
than the effect). The two
consequences are impossible,
and what is required of it upon
assuming its existence is also
impossible, so it is impossible.
Therefore, its possibility
requires its being impossible. In
it also is an example of the
preceding view. The truth is that
if I mean by “the impossibility
of the noblest” that which
includes impossibility by
another, then it is like this. But if
I mean essential impossibility, it
cannot be accomplished, as
mentioned.
 It is incumbent upon us to
convey to you a measure of the true
doctrine on this, whose surety is
under our care. We say: Are you
convinced by what we have
instructed you in our books, by the
leave of God (glorified be He), that
a fundamental principle of the
compounded intellect among the
principles of divine knowledge is
that you are assured that the path to
magnifying the glory and loftiness
of the essentially necessary Self-
Subsisting Being (exalted be His
remembrance) is not to say: It is
essentially impossible for a mode
of sanctity, of perfection, of
splendor, and of beauty to be more
mighty, more exalted, more
glorious, and more lofty than what
His sanctity, His perfection, His
might, and His glory already are.
Nay, rather the path is to believe
that the circumstantial mode of
essential necessity, which is pure
reality in every respect, [376] is the
state of splendor and the real
actuality of every perfect
circumstantial mode; that this
solitary, necessary circumstantial
mode, in its real oneness and its
absolute simplicity, is itself the sum
of the circumstantial modes of glory
and perfection, the totality of the
aspects of might and splendor, and
the requisite of all the most
excellent, glorious, and perfect
names, without a difference of one
circumstantial mode after another or
a dissimilarity of one aspect after
another whatsoever; and that the
essentially necessary Light of
Lights, in the pure being of His
reality and the pure circumstantial
mode of His real solitary essence
is, in every respect, perfect and
beyond perfection in all of the
perfect circumstantial modes,
infinite in intensity in all the aspects
of might and splendor, glory and
perfection, absolutely infinite.
Therefore, He is in all of the
aspects of splendor and beauty,
sanctity and perfection, beyond
what is finite as such and beyond
what is infinite as such, and that
also is infinite in actual intensity. It
is impossible to conceive of a stage
of glory, perfection, light, splendor,
might, and grandeur, or a stage of
perfection and intensity therein, or a
stage of infinite perfection and
power, or any stage of the
absolutely infinite stages, unless it
and the stages apart from it to actual
infinity are realized in their totality
in the one, real, necessary Essence
in one necessary circumstantial
mode. Therefore, the existence of
the essentially necessary Being and
the perfection of His existence, and
His reality and the perfection of His
reality, are one. In like manner, His
perfection and supreme perfection,
His infinity in stages of intensity,
and His infinite infinity are one. In
like manner, the essentially
necessary Light of Lights is the
absolute King in relation to all else
besides Him, in other words, in
relation to whatever the realm of
the nature of possibility contains,
for the absolute King is He to whom
the essence of each thing belongs
and whose own Essence belongs to
nothing. The essentially necessary
Being is like this because
everything which is possible of
essence and possible of existence is
either from Him or from that which
is from Him. The final goal of His
action is His being an agent of them
by virtue of himself. Consequently,
the essence of every possible thing
belongs to Him, and it is correct
also that the causation of the
generation of all possible things
belongs to Him by reason of their
being from Him. The possible
things in their entirety belong in
their essences to the essentially
necessary Being with or without an
intermediary, since there is no
access through it [the intermediary]
to other than Him and except for
which there is no access to other
than Him. The servant and his
property belong to his Lord. All of
this pertains to the characteristics of
the reality of the essentially
necessary Being and the
concomitants of the nature of
essential possibility. [377]
Since the basis of this
principle has been investigated, it is
manifest to you that the composition
of this demonstration does not
contain a misleading confusion of
the essentially impossible and
possible with the impossible and
possible in relation to another, but
rather in the constitution of this
doubt there is a misleading
confusion between an impossibility
which is the effect necessitating
something in the cause and an
impossibility which is an
occurrence necessitated by the
cause. The confusion is between the
effect necessitating something
which actually exists in the cause
and its necessitating something in
the cause whose occurrence is
impossible, indeed with respect to
the possibility of occurrence at all.
The explanation of this is that it is
impossible for the noblest possible
thing, in the stage of its nobility and
the particularity of its perfection, to
be a necessitator with respect to a
mode among the modes of
excellence and nobility and a stage
among the stages of glory and
perfection in the cause of its
existence. That mode and what is
above it, and that stage and what is
more exalted and lofty than it, is not
an actual occurrence belonging to
the essentially necessary Self-
Subsisting Being (exalted be His
remembrance). Therefore, whatever
perfect stage the particularity of the
noblest possible thing necessitates,
whichever possible thing it may be
in the cause, so that its dependence
upon it [the cause] for existence is
possible, it [that stage] and what is
above it without end are definitely
actually realized in the essentially
necessary Being, as you are aware.
Therefore, the proposition
which is the premise of the
demonstration in the last half is that
it is essentially impossible for the
noblest possible thing to necessitate
a stage of glory and nobility in the
cause, while that stage and what is
above it are not actually existent in
the cause of the baser possible
thing, I mean the essentially
necessary Self-Subsistent Being.
Thus it would be impossible for its
non-existence to be through the non-
existence of its cause, since its
cause which necessitated it, with
respect to glory and nobility, is
definitely actually existent. It is not
that it necessitates a cause more
glorious and more noble than the
essentially necessary Being, which
is impossible. In short, it is only
inferred through the demonstration
that the necessitation of a perfect
stage not actually occurring in its
cause is essentially impossible, as
you have ascertained. It is not that
that necessitation by it is possible
and what it has necessitated is
essentially impossible of
occurrence. Remain steadfast as
you have been exhorted, ascertain
the truth, and be not of those who
are uninformed.

Wamīḍ [9.4.15]
We have another
demonstration for this basic rule by
another simpler, more subtle path.
Do you not know through what we
have informed you that as long as
there is no essential
correspondence (munāsiba)
between two essences in their
particularity and a connective
particularization (khuṣūṣiyya)
[378] does not exist between the
rest of the things, a cause and effect
bond cannot be realized? How is it
possible for something in its
particularity to have distinguished
from among things and from the
occurrence of quiddities one thing
in particular and a quiddity in its
particularity for dependence upon it
for existence and non-existence, yet
the substance of its essence does
not have a correspondence which
makes that particularization
possible at all? Methinks, if you
allowed this, your common sense
has been blighted and your
intelligence has been smitten.
Therefore, we say: if a certain
[first] possible effect has emanated
from the essentially necessary
Creator (exalted be His
remembrance), and the nature of the
world of possibility and the realm
of primary origination[391]
contains a possible thing essentially
nobler than it, the essence which is
seated upon the throne of the
greatest perfection and glory in
relation to this actually emanated
possible thing is certainly nearer to
the necessary Creator. The
command of primary origination
and existentiation, therefore, would
have been applied to the contrary of
what the command of essential
correspondence requires, and this is
false, as is evident.

Wamīḍ [9.4.16]
By another path, it has
been firmly established in the book
al-Taqdīsāt that among the
particular characteristics of the
essentially necessary Being is that
if the dependency of a certain
possible thing upon Him, whichever
possible thing it may be, is
assumed, with or without an
intermediary, it is definitely
required by this for that essentially
possible thing to be necessary of
existence in the real world by virtue
of that dependency. If the non-
existence of its dependency upon
Him is assumed, this would
certainly require it to be impossible
of existence in the real world and
likewise among the concomitants of
the nature of essential possibility.
This is with respect to the essence
of the possible in the real world.
Therefore, we say: If the
dependency of the noblest possible
thing upon the essentially necessary
Being is not required for the
necessitation of its actual existence,
the Necessary Being would not be
essentially necessary and the
possible would not be essentially
possible. This is absurd. Since the
necessity of its existence from Him
in the stage of the existence of the
baser or after its stage is
impossible by the decree of
actuality and the rule of the
demonstration, therefore, the
necessity of its existence from Him
is determined before the existence
of the baser from Him. Let it be
ascertained.

Wamīḍ [9.4.17]
Know that this rule is only
valid with respect to what is above
the world of generation, and it
pertains to the order of the system
[379] of existence in the chain of
beginning. As for what is within the
world of generation, it is possible
for a nobler possible thing to be
obstructed from existence due to the
impediments of matter because of
its dispositional possibility. In the
chain of returning a baser possible
thing is existent before a nobler
possible thing.
He states in the
Muṭāraḥāt:
It is admissible for a certain
individual to exist in the world
of generation and corruption
who is hindered from what is
nobler and more perfect for him
due to the obstacle of celestial
causes and due to the
impediment of natural causes,
also, subsequent to the celestial
causes.[392] And it is possible
for one thing to receive
something noble and something
base, not due to its essence, but
due to the disposition of the
necessary receptacle of infinite
causes arising from the
creatures. As for the perpetual
things, it is only possible for
them to differ in their nobility
and baseness due to the
difference of their agent or due
to the difference of its modes, as
a result of which is produces by
the nobler something nobler and
by the baser something baser. It
is impossible for two agents to
be equal in nobility, and their
effect cannot to be dependent
upon other than these two.
Therefore, one of them requires
an effect baser than the effect of
the other. The same applies if
two agents and the two
recipients of their actions and
the conditions of the two actions
are equal in nobility and
perfection. If you know this
rule, then you know that
perpetual things only occur in
the noblest way it is
conceivable for them to be, and
there is no disposition, or
extraneous creature, or
accidental effect that impedes
them. It is necessary for you to
believe, then, that the celestial
things and the immaterial
worlds contain what is more
perfect and more excellent, and
that whatever perfection is
conceivable belongs to the
Necessary Being and the
intelligible celestial things, for
they are more exalted in
themselves than you can
conceive. If an intelligible
substance is nobler than the
soul, it is necessary for it to
exist before it. Inasmuch as
ethereal things are nobler than
elemental things, it is necessary
for them to exist before them, by
a kind of causality which we
will discuss. We have
expounded the details of this
theme, which was given in
summarized form by the leader
of the philosophers, Aristotle, in
a reference to it in his book On
the Heavens, whose import is
that it is necessary to believe
 that the most noble and the most
excellent belong to the celestial
world.
I affirm again that this rule
is only valid for that which is above
the world of generation with
respect to the stages of the chain of
beginning in the vertical order, in
other words, with respect to
primary originated things which
emanate from the agent Originator
through successive circumstantial
modes in different stages.[393] As
for the horizontal dimension of the
chain, the primary originated things
in the divine world emanate from
the pure Command through different
circumstantial modes interlinked in
one stage, differing in perfection
and imperfection, [380] as a result
of which the emanation of the
noblest of them is not prior to the
emanation of the less noble in
degree. For example, the second
intelligence, the first soul, and the
body of the outermost sphere
proceed from interlinked
circumstantial modes by occurrence
simultaneously in the same stage,
dissimilar by the difference of rank
in perfection and imperfection,
nobility and baseness. Let it be
recognized.
 Wamīḍ [9.4.18]
Since the appointed time of
the demonstration for establishing
rules and principles is completed,
now is the time to deduce what may
be derived from them with respect
to establishing the substances of the
immaterial world, the separate
intelligences and the incorporeal
souls, and then the order of the
stages of the system of the good in
the degrees of the emanation and
existence.
The best way to start is to
attempt to establish [the nature of]
the intellect (‘aql)—which is a
simple substance and an agent
intelligence sanctified from
connection to matter, both
essentially and actually—in a
number of ways. The first is by way
of [the principle of] the
impossibility of the emanation of
many from one. It is clear that the
First Emanated, with respect to the
particularity of its essence and the
stage of its essential possibility, is
the concomitant (lāzim) of the
essence of the Creator, the
Necessary, the Real, who is one in
every respect. It is therefore
necessary, without a doubt, for it to
be a single simple essence, free
from the accompaniment of
dispositional potentiality,
independent in its essence and in its
action from all but the Originator of
its quiddity and the Maker of its
essence, so that it is possible for it
to be the intermediary of the
emanation of its emanating Maker in
relation to the other effects. All
besides it among possible things
and effects follow after it in the
stage of emanation and being
caused. It is not possible for it to be
a body, since this would require the
emanation of multiplicity from the
real One in one stage; nor for it to
be prime matter, form, or a soul;
otherwise it would be impossible
for it to be prior in degree to the
other effects and an intermediary,
without reservation, for the
exudation (rashḥ) of the emanation
into the system of existence.
Therefore, it is nothing but the First
Intelligence, which is the noblest of
the intelligible substances and the
most excellent of the divine
essences and luminous primary
originated entities.
The second is by way of
[the principle of] the noblest
possibility. It is clear that it is not
possible in the vertical chain of
beginning for a possible thing to
emanate in a [later] stage unless the
noblest possible thing has emanated
in a prior stage. Therefore, it is
necessary for the most sanctified of
the intelligences, the most excellent
of possible things, and the most
noble of the intelligible lights to be
the First Emanated.
The third is by way of [the
principle of] the essential
correspondence between the
complete cause and its effect. Is it
not clear that the [381] essentially
necessary agent Maker, in His own
real, necessary essence, is the
complete efficient cause of the
substance of the essence of the First
Effect? It is necessary, then, for the
essential correspondence between
them to be more perfect and more
noble than is conceivable in
relation to any possible thing
assumed to be after it. It is only
allowable for it to be the noblest of
the immaterial intelligences and the
most exalted of the intelligible
lights.
The fourth is by way of
[the principle of] the passage of
what is potential from potentiality
into actuality. As you are aware,
something cannot bring itself from
potentiality into actuality. If an
essence in its own substance
necessitates coming into actuality, it
cannot be potential at all.
Furthermore, passing from
potentiality into actuality due to
actuality is nobler and more exalted
than it is due to potentiality. If its
becoming actual were from itself,
this would require its essence to be
nobler and more perfect than itself
by reason of seeking perfection and
receiving it from its own essence.
In short, nothing seeks a perfection
[which it does not already have]
from itself, and it is impossible for
the Giver of absolute perfection to
be devoid of it. Consequently, the
rational soul is unable to bring
itself from the stage of material
potentiality, which is the stage of
the passive intellect, into the stage
of actuality, which is the stage of
the actual intellect, and then into the
stage of constant, unchanging
intelligence, which is the stage of
the acquired intellect. There is no
alternative to an emanator (mufīḍ)
which is associated with the
substance of its essence and which
is an intermediary for joining the
emanation of the emanating Creator
(exalted be He) to it. Thus, that
which moves human souls to
acquire their divine stations and
their intellectual degrees is an
intelligible light and an immaterial
intellect, which is an agent of states
(aṭwār) by the power of its Creator
and a giver of forms by the leave of
its Lord. This intellect is free in its
substance from dispositional
potentiality and material affections
(infi‘ālāt). The shining of its light
through the aperture of the
speculative faculty and the eye of
the mind is like the rays of the sun
shining through window panes, the
pupil of the eye, and the vitreous
humor or the organ of vision. That
which the principles convey and the
demonstrations teach is that the
Emanator and the Mover, in reality,
into actuality is, without
reservation, nothing but the real
Agent (exalted be His sovereignty)
completely sanctified from
conjunction with the accidents of
quiddities and association with
what is potential. The work of the
intelligences, here, is like the work
of a physician with respect to
promoting health. He sets out to fix
the balance and restore health, but
the emanation of health only comes
from the emanating cause. [382]
The fifth is by way of [the
principle of] prime matter and
motion. Have we not recited to you
many times that the substance of
every existent whose essence is
possible is subject to the notion of
“what is potential” in the stage of
its essence as such, since it is “what
is actual” in the real world through
its efficient cause. Prime matter and
motion and what is dependent upon
these two, i.e., the material entities
subject to existence through
dispositional possibility, belong to
possible things, which are united
together by the fact that they have
along with (1) the nature of the idea
of what is potential by correlation
—in other words, the notion of
what is potential with respect to the
stage of the essence whenever it is
actual with respect to the real
world—(2) the nature of the notion
of what is potential by qualification
as well with respect to the real
world—in other words, their
essences occurring actually in the
first creation through the efficient
cause have potential perfections
which occur to them actually and
adorn them later in the second
creation. This is not possible for the
primary originated things which are
not qualified by dispositional
possibility. However, prime matter
and motion are distinguished from
among all possible entities by the
fact that each one of them is not
subject to what the other possible
entities have of the nature of what is
potential in the two ways, because
the aspect of what is potential is
intermeshed with the aspect of what
is actual, i.e., embodied and
included in it in its actually
occurring individual entity. Its
individual essence, therefore,
insofar as it is actually existent,
includes potentiality in its actuality.
This does not apply to any of the
existents besides prime matter and
motion. For this reason, it may be
said that they belong to [the
category of] things weak in
existence. This is also said of
extended time, which is the measure
of continuous motion. Therefore we
say: How is it possible for the
essence accumulating deficiency,
weakness, and potential to be
dependent upon the actually
necessary, pure, real Existent, who
is complete in Himself in every
perfect circumstantial mode and
above perfection, in the manner
examined earlier, not by an
intermediary compatible with both
the higher extreme and the lower
extreme in one aspect? And how
can the void and deficient in itself
in the utmost degree issue from the
essence of the Real, who is perfect
in himself in the utmost degree, and
be caused by Him himself? It is not
admissible for the intermediary to
be a soul, since the action of the
soul is only accomplished through
matter, instrument, and motion.
Consequently, there is no escape
here from choosing as an
intermediary an intelligible
substance possessing two aspects
which is not at all void in its
actuality of the notion of what is
potential, which is its aspect by
which it borders the side of the
Real, the Most Holy, except from
real actuality in its own essence
through every perfect mode; nor is
it free from the accompaniment of
the notion of what is potential [383]
with respect to the substance of the
essence, since it is what is actual
through the fashioning of the making
cause, but not with respect to what
is actual, which is the aspect by
which it borders what is
intermeshed with it, what is
potential insofar as it is actual, and
it is jumbled with what is potential
by virtue of the substance of the
essence in the two ways whenever
its own essence is actual, in other
words, with prime matter and
motion.[394]
The sixth is by way of [the
principle of] essential possibility
and dispositional possibility. Is it
not necessary, without a doubt, for
that which is not subject in its
essence to dispositional possibility,
and whose dependency upon the
essentially necessary agent Creator
is possible purely through its
essential possibility, to definitely
proceed and emanate from Him
(glorified be He)? Since there is no
dimension (shaṭr) for it, no
obstacle to it, and no restraint of the
generosity of the Real, the Most
Generous, at all, the non-emanation
of the separate Intellect from the
real Agent (glorified be He) is
therefore impossible. The same
applies, by natural necessity, to the
incorporeal celestial Soul and to all
the primary originated things in the
divine Command.
The seventh is by way of
[the principle of] the celestial
movements. It is clear that every
moved thing has a mover apart from
itself, since it doesn’t move at all
by its own essence, for [if it did,] it
would be a recipient and an agent in
an impossible way, and it would be
actually perfect insofar as it is
seeking perfection as such, and this
is impossible. Since every moved
thing has a mover, it is not
reasonable for the number of moved
things to extend to infinity;
otherwise, they would all be
intermediaries without an end, and
as long as the decree of
intermediacy continued, there could
not be any actual motion.
Consequently, it is necessary for
them to culminate in an unmoved
mover, just as that which brings
things from potentiality into
actuality and gives them existence
is something which is actual by
virtue of itself and existent by virtue
of itself. Moving things either move
(1) by accident, (2) by subjugation,
(3) by compulsion, or (4) by
aptitude (ṭibā‘). That which moves
by aptitude either moves (1) by
volition, whose cause is the soul, or
it moves (2) by nature, which is an
essential power diffused in the
body, like the other corporeal
powers which are the principles of
natural agents. It is impossible for
the Unmoved Mover to be a
corporeal power. His causation of
movement is either (1) by providing
the proximate cause by which it is
moved, or (2) by being a model for
it, an object of desire of the moved
substance, and a necessitator of it
with respect to successive desires
and imaginations. [384]
We say, therefore, that it is
impossible for circular motion to be
natural, for it is certainly volitional
and dependent upon an incorporeal
soul. All celestial things,
designated by the fifth nature, share
together in the aptitude of
continuous circular motion, the
cause of whose generation is
longing for the First Maker (exalted
and glorified be He) and the desire
to imitate Him in His real, eternal
perfection. For this reason, they
share together in circular motion
and its permanent continuity. It is
therefore necessary for each one of
them to have, in the particularity of
its circular motion, with respect to
rank and aspect, an incorporeal
soul, which is the volitional cause
of its particular motion, and a
intelligible substance, which
particularizes it and which is the
object of its love and desired by it.
It is the leader of its incorporeal
soul and the cause of its motion in
its particularity by reason of
causing love and desire, insofar as
[the soul] solicits it and imitates it
in love of the First Maker, in
submission to the majesty of His
glory, in attraction to Him, and in
longing to be illumined with the
radiance of the Light of Lights and
the effulgence of the splendor of
His sanctity and His perfection.
The eighth is by way of
[the principle of] the accumulation
of intelligibles. The decree of a
clear mind is that just as there is no
doubt in the existence of imaginal,
sensible, and estimative forms—
and in general corporeal things are
potentially intelligible, for there
must be something which abstracts
them and causes them to become
intelligible, and if that thing is also
a potential intelligible, this would
result in an [infinite] series, so it
certainly must end in something
intelligible by virtue of itself—nor
in a perfecter of our intelligences,
which, no doubt, is more perfect in
existence and superior in perfection
than ours, and the intelligibles are
that which it perfects; therefore
their giver and that which brings
them into actuality must be an actual
intellect—in like manner, there is
no doubt in the fact that just as the
accumulation of sensible and
imaginal things have a corporeal
storehouse consisting of sensible
tablets and imaginative faculties, in
like manner, the accumulation of
intelligibles and their universal
propositions must have an
intelligible storehouse consisting of
intelligent, immaterial tablets and
sanctified separate thoughts. Let it
be pondered.

Wamīḍ [9.4.19]
The teacher of the
Peripatetics and their instructor
states in the Theology, in Mīmar
Ten, regarding the First Cause and
things originated from Him:
The absolutely One is the cause
of all things, and He is not like
any of the things. He is the
origin of things, but He is not
the things. Rather, all of the
things [exist] through Him, and
He does not [exist] through any
of them. [385] That is to say, all
of them pour forth from Him, by
Him they are preserved and
subsist, and to Him they return.
If someone should ask: “How
can the things come from the
uncompounded One which
contains no duality and no
plurality in any respect?” We
say: Because He is absolutely
one and simple, none of the
things is in Him. Since He is
absolutely one, all of the things
pour forth from Him. That is to
say, since He is not an entity,
[395] entity pours forth from
Him.
I will summarize the
doctrine: Since He is not one of
the things, all of the things are
from Him. However, although
all of the things pour forth from
Him, the First Entity, by which I
mean the Intellect, is that which
pours forth from Him first
without an intermediary. Then
all of the entities of the things
which exist in the higher and the
lower worlds pour forth from
Him through the intermediary of
the Intellect and the intelligible
world.
I say that the absolutely
One is above perfection. As for
the sensible world, it is
imperfect because it originates
from the perfect thing, which is
the Intellect. The Intellect is
only complete and perfect
because it originates from the
real One, who is above
perfection. It is not possible for
that which is above perfection
to originate an imperfect thing
without an intermediary, nor is
it possible for the perfect thing
to originate a perfect thing like
itself, because the origination is
imperfect. I mean by this that the
originated cannot be in the same
station as the originator but
rather must be beneath it.
 Methinks through what we
have recited to you, you are
conversant with his commentary
and his inquiry.

Wamīḍ [9.4.20]
With regard to [the subject
of] the inattention and the
forgetfulness of intelligibles
(ma‘qūlāt), there is a doubt which
is difficult for the imitators. One
who was not a pupil of the Seal of
the Most Excellent Scholars
reported it from him (may God be
well-pleased with him), and he did
not produce what is worthy of
mentioning. The most erudite of our
jurisprudents, in the Sharḥ Tajrīd
al-‘Aqā’id, states concerning the
correspondence of mental
propositions to what is in the thing
itself (nafs al-amr):[396]
At certain times I acquired
instruction from him, and this
point came up. I asked him
about the meaning of their
statement that the truth in mental
propositions is the aspect of its
correspondence to what is in the
thing itself, and the intelligible
thought (ma‘qūl) in the thing
itself is either a mental or
external affirmation. But each of
these two options is not
permitted here. He responded:
“The meaning of “the thing
itself” is the active intellect.
[386] Every form or proposition
affirmed in the mind
corresponds to the forms
impressed in the active intellect,
so it is true. Otherwise, it is
false. I have asserted about it
that the philosophers are
obliged to advocate the
impression of false forms in the
active intellect, because they
infer this by a distinction
between forgetfulness and
inattention, such that inattention
is the disappearance of the
intellected form from the
intellecting substance and its
impression in the memory,
while forgetfulness is its
disappearance from it
altogether. But this applies to
sensible forms. As for the
object of intellection, the cause
of forgetfulness is the
disappearance of the disposition
by the disappearance of the
giver of knowledge in the case
of conceptions and assents, and
these two states may occur in
false propositions. So he did not
set forth a convincing argument
on this subject.
 I say: Yes, the intelligible
separate substance is the storehouse
of the objects of intellection of the
intellecting soul, just as the
retentive imagination is the
storehouse of its sense perceptions.
[397] Therefore, to the extent that
the disposition of the soul and its
readiness for conjunction with it is
complete, it receives its emanation,
as an exudation or as an
illumination, and the form of the
object of intellection is impressed
in it. As long as it remains turned
away from the sensible world and
continues in conjunction with it, it
is able to call to mind the
intelligible forms. If the soul turns
away from it [the intellect] to what
is near to the corporeal world, or to
another form, the representations in
it become effaced from it, as though
the mirror by which it has been
reflecting the immaterial side has
been turned by it away from it to the
physical side or to the
consideration of another immaterial
form other than what it had been
turned toward. Whenever it remains
in possession of the conjunction
which it has acquired, that which
was effaced from it and forgotten is
empowered upon its reinstatement.
As long as it is in this state, it will
be able to recollect and remember
without the delay of a new search, a
new state, or a new condition.
Whenever its acquired disposition
and state [of conjunction] ceases,
that effaced thing is forgotten again
and unable to be retrieved, unless it
takes upon itself a new acquisition
and conjunction again.
However, it is certain that
the consideration of the thing itself
is the consideration of something
being real (mutaḥaqqaq) within the
boundary of itself, not by the effort
and application of the intellect,
regardless of whether its being real
is not by the effort of the intellect in
the tablet of mind or in the
objective world. The true things
impressed in the active intellect are
insofar as they are true [or real]
within the boundary of themselves,
while the false things are insofar as
the mis-disposition of the soul
necessitates their being impressed
in it.[398] It [the soul] is the
storehouse for the two kinds in
these [387] two respects, and there
is no difficulty at all.
With regard to the
statement of one of the fastidious
imitators that the nature of the
active intellect in accumulating
intelligibles with true propositions
is memorization and assent together,
and with false propositions by
means of conception without
admission due to being free of the
evils and defects which are among
the consequents of matter, this is not
in accord with the rule of learning.
Is it not established upon its seat
that conception and assent are only
a form of impressed, renewable
knowledge belonging to the second
creation? However, the sciences
obtained by presence, such as the
intellecting soul’s knowledge of its
immaterial essence, and the non-
renewed impressed sciences, such
as the knowledges of the agent
intelligences which are
concomitants of their essences[399]
inseparable from them with respect
to concrete existence in the first
creation, these are not included in
that category. Let it be known.
In short, this path for
establishing intelligible substances
is also correct, and the Seal of the
Scholars has tread it in his treatise
establishing the intellect. He says:
Therefore, the existence of a
being subsisting in itself, not
having position, and actually
containing all of the intelligibles
which are possible to bring into
actuality, is confirmed….If this
is established, then we say: It is
not possible for that existent to
be the First of Firsts, i.e., the
Necessary Being by virtue of
himself (exalted be His names).
This is because of the necessity
of that existent containing a
multiplicity which is actually
infinite. It is impossible for the
First of Firsts to contain any
multiplicity, be it the first
principle of multiplicity or be it
a receptive substrate for
multiplicity. The existence of a
being other than the First
Necessary Being is therefore
established, which we call “the
 intellect of the whole,” which is
expressed in the noble Qur’ān
sometimes as “the Preserved
Tablet” and sometimes as “the
Lucid Book,” which contains
everything green or dry. This is
what we mean. Praise be to
God, the Lord of the worlds.

Wamīḍ [9.4.21]
Know then that the
intelligible separate substances are
multiple in number with respect to
both the vertical and horizontal
orders. The most exalted of them,
the noblest, and the nearest to the
First Maker in the vertical series is
the first of the intelligibles, which
is the primary foundation (al-‘unṣur
al-awwal) for all possible things in
the world of Command. Then one
intelligence after another succeeds
it in the stages of the emanation
until the end of the series of
separate intelligences and the last
of the intelligible stages is reached,
for each intelligence in each stage
[388] of the successive vertical
stages has another intelligence
beneath it, as well as a soul and a
celestial body whose matter and
corporeal form are apart from the
separate form which is the soul. It
has, therefore, different aspects on
account of which the emanation of
multiplicity from the real One
(exalted be His glory) in one stage
is possible. The most excellent of
the multiple emanated things follow
simultaneously the most excellent of
those multiple interlinked aspects in
the same stage. Neither the
intelligences nor the multiple
aspects in one intelligence after
another are accidental species, so
that it would be necessary for their
attributes to be accidental. The
command does not continue
infinitely, so that after each
intelligence there is another
intelligence without any end, but
rather the series stops at the last
intelligence, which is the giver of
knowledge and the giver of forms
by the leave of God. The most
likely, according to our companions
in the Craft, is that number of
separate intelligences is equal to
the number of the celestial spheres
(kurrāt).
Our companion in
leadership states in the Metaphysics
of the Shifā’ and the Najāt:
“According to the doctrine of the
First Teacher, there are close to
fifty or above, and the last of them
is the active intellect. You know
from our discourse in mathematics
the sum of their number which we
obtained.” In the second science of
the Physics in the chapter on the
movements of the stars, he says: “It
is not clear to me that the sphere of
the fixed stars is a single sphere or
that some spheres encompass other
spheres. If some spheres encompass
other spheres, the number of
intelligences and souls would
certainly be more.”
I say: In my opinion, it is
likely that the truth on this is that the
number of the separate intelligences
is equal to the number of celestial
spheres and their universal and
particular movements.
Consequently, corresponding to
each sphere (kurra), whether it be a
celestial body (falak), a star
(kawkab), or something else, and to
every movement, whether universal
or particular, there is a separate
intelligence, which is a foundation
for its order by exudation and
emanation, a leader for its soul by
illumination and radiance, and a
cause of its revolutions by inspiring
love and longing. Every sphere has
a soul which particularizes it. This
is an evident thing which no one
denies. And the body of a star,
whether fixed or traveling,
inevitably moves in its place,
circling around the center of itself.
That motion is volitional as well,
deriving from excitement, delight,
longing, and love, gleaming and
shining. Therefore, every star has
an incorporeal soul which
particularizes it as well. Its power
over the impressible soul is the
power of the human rational soul
over the corporeal faculties. It is
obvious that the number of fixed
stars [389] is so great that no one
save their Creator can estimate their
number. In like manner, it is
necessary for the multiplicity of the
separate substances, in other words,
the intelligences and souls of the
world of Command, to correspond
with the multiplicity of these stars,
bodies, spheres, and movements.
[400] God knows best the ranks of
His creation.

Wamīḍ [9.4.22]
Since extensive inquiry has
reached, through us, the summit of
the peak of the theoretical faculty,
by the leave of God, let us complete
the discourse on the beginning and
the return. Let it be pondered, then,
how the beginning of existence from
the circumference of perfection in
the loftiest station and utmost
degree descended gradually from
the noblest of the noblest until it
reached the center of abasement and
extreme imperfection, then it
returned from the center of extreme
imperfection, ascending gradually
from the basest of the basest to the
noblest of the noblest, returning to
the circumference of glory and
perfection in the highest degree,
which is the essentially necessary,
agent Creator (exalted be His glory
and His majesty). He is the
beginning of each thing and its end,
the starting point of every existence
and its returning point. The center
of extreme imperfection is prime
matter, indeterminate within the
boundary of its individual oneness.
It is the bearer for passive
potentiality and dispositional
receptivity. The arc of descent from
the circumference to the center is
the chain of beginning, and the arc
of ascent from the center to the
circumference is the chain of return.
Therefore, the basis of
nobility and perfection is nearness
in the natural order of existence to
the essentially necessary
Encompasser (exalted be His
remembrance), who is himself
farthest from prime matter. The
basis of abasement and
imperfection is nearness to the
center, in other words, essentially
potential, passive prime matter,
which is farthest from the
essentially necessary Being in the
natural order of existence. The
stages of the chain of return in the
arc of ascent parallel the stages of
the chain of beginning in the arc of
descent. Progress toward the
summit of perfection in the [chain
of] return is subsequent to descent
from it in the [chain of] beginning.
Nobility in the stages of the two
chains, whose criterion is freedom
from potentiality, depends upon
mutual correspondence and
equivalence between the two
classes with respect to an
equivalent relation of nearness to
and remoteness from the center and
the circumference, leading from the
two sides to prime matter, whose
existence is only its being potential.
Therefore, priority and posteriority
between the stages in nobility is by
virtue of priority and posteriority in
the natural order of existence.
However, this is [390] reversed in
the two chains. From the side of
beginning with respect to descent,
each thing prior in nobility in the
vertical series is also prior by
nature in the stage of existence,
while from the side of return with
respect to ascent in the vertical
series, each thing prior by nature in
the stage of existence is posterior in
nobility in the sequence of the
stages. This is what I and my
companions in leadership and
instruction have decided by legal
pronouncement. Among the
imitators is one who is doubtful of
this and for whom the path is
obscure.

Wamīḍ [9.4.23]
One of them has posited
that the natural species forms
belong to the stages of the chain of
beginning due to the fact that they,
insofar as they are a particular form
and with respect to their unqualified
nature, are a certain cause for the
formation of matter. We have also
adduced similar to this in one our
books. The truth, however, is to
consider them in the chain of return,
because they are included in the
system of existence after the
consideration of composition. Their
substrate is absolute body
substantialized from prime matter
and corporeal form. Our companion
also considered them in this way in
the Shifā’ and the Ta‘līqāt.[401]
The stages of beginning
after the First Principle, who
encompasses all things, are five:
(1) The stage of the separate
intelligences as a whole, from the
first intelligence to last intelligence.
After them is (2) the stage of the
rational, intellecting celestial souls,
from the soul of the highest sphere
to the soul of the lowest sphere.
After them is (3) the stage of the
impressible celestial souls. After
them is (4) the stage the substantial
corporeal forms, from the form of
the outermost sphere to the forms of
the elements. And after them is (5)
the stage of prime matters, from the
prime matter of the supreme sphere
to the individually one prime matter
shared by the elements. According
to this, the stages of the chain of
beginning are finite, and the chain
of return commences after them, in
other words, turning toward
perfection is after turning away
from it.
The stages of return are also
five. (1) The first of them is the
stage of the simple species bodies,
from the highest sphere to the earth,
and their substantial species forms.
After them is (2) the stage of the
first forms generated from the
composition of the simples, in other
words, the elemental compounds,
like mineral forms and so forth in
their different stages. After them is
(3) the stage of vegetative souls in
their entirety. After them is (4) the
stage of animal souls in their
diversity. According to common
belief, there are one thousand, four
hundred species of animals, eight
hundred on land and six hundred in
the sea. After them is (5) the stage
of all human rational souls. The last
stage is the stage of the acquired
intellect, which contains in a
passive way the forms of all
existents, [391] just as the
intelligences in the first stage of
[the chain of] beginning contain
them actively. Therefore, through
the acquired intellect existence
returns toward the principle from
which it sprang. The stage of the
acquired intellect in the return is
parallel to the stage of the
intelligences in the beginning
[chain]. In nobility and perfection
these two stages are equivalent and
mutually correspondent. It is not
possible for them to have between
them any disparity in excellence or
any rivalry with respect to nobility
and baseness, by reason of their
being with respect to nearness to
the circumference, which is the
essentially necessary Being, and
remoteness from the center, which
is prime matter, in the same station
and in the same relation.

Wamīḍ [9.4.24]
The author of the
Muḥākamāt states:
(1) The first of the stages of
return are the simple bodies of
the spheres and the elements,
since they are composed of form
and prime matter; consequently,
these two are prior to them. (2)
Next is the stage of composites,
since were the elements
composed, they would have a
constitution (or: mixture mizāj).
(2a) The first of the composites
is the mineral, which has a form
that conserves its constitution.
(2b) Next is a composite having
a constitution and a form which
conserves it, and freedom of
movement, i.e., growth, which
consists in plants. (2c) Next is a
composite having a constitution
and a form, freedom of
movement, volition, and sense
perception; it is the animal. (2d)
Next is a composite having in
addition to all of this the faculty
of apprehending universals,
which consists in man, and he
has various stages until the stage
of the acquired intellect. The
human soul, therefore, at the end
of the stages becomes an
intellect, however not actively
[as a giver] of perfections, but
passively by receiving
perfections from the active
intellect. This is why it is called
“the acquired intellect.” It is
evident that nobility in the
stages of beginning and the
stages of return depends upon
mutual correspondence. That is
to say, the noblest in the stages
of beginning parallels the basest
in the stages of return.
Moreover, the nobility in the
stages of beginning gradually
 decreases until prime matter is
reached, just as the baseness in
the stages of return gradually
decreases until the acquired
intellect is reached. It is
understood through this
discourse that these stages are
only considered with respect to
nobility and perfection, not with
respect to existence. It is not
supposed that the mineral is
more prior in existence than
man, but rather it is prior in the
stages of return, since it has less
nobility than him.
I say: His error in this is
not trifling, for it is obscure to him
that natural priority in the stage
(daraja) of existence with respect
to the judgment of the mind is apart
from natural priority in order
(martaba), that is, essential
priority, which definitely
necessitates a certain mode of
causality.[402] That which is with
the essentially prior in order does
not [also] need to be essentially
prior [392] in order, although it is
certainly prior in stage, due to the
prior in order and what is with the
prior in order being in the same
stage. The only object of
consideration here is natural
priority in stage (daraja), not
essential priority with respect to the
absolute order. Let it be known that
essential priority in order is what
belongs to the prior thing with
respect to its intelligible stage in its
circumstantial mode by which it is a
cause for a posterior thing.
Intellectual priority in stage,
however, is that which belongs to
what is with the thing essentially
prior in order in a circumstantial
mode agreeable to the intellectual
stage belonging to that
circumstantial mode due to which
the prior is essentially prior, not
posterior to it in intellectual stage.
Thus the soul of the highest sphere,
which is nobler than the sphere of
the fixed stars, for instance, is prior
to it in stage due to its being in the
stage of the second intelligence,
which is naturally prior to it by
essential priority in order, while it
[the soul] is not naturally prior to it
by essential priority in order.[403]
In like manner, the mineral is more
prior by nature in existence than
man with respect to stage, although
it is not essentially prior to him in
order. In accordance with what we
have explained on priority, the
distinction between the essentially
posterior with respect to order and
the intellectually posterior with
respect to intellectual stage is clear.
It is what is with the essentially
posterior with respect to order in
its intellectual stage through two
concordant circumstantial modes.
In short, if the
consideration of stages (marātib) is
with respect to nobility alone, not
with respect to existence, and
priority and posteriority in
existence is not regarded at all, the
particularization of beginning and
return cannot be determined by any
of the stages, and that singling out is
a mere exercise of mental inference,
not an inquiry into the state of real
entities existent in the system of
existence with respect to the thing
itself. The consideration of the
posterior in existence among the
stages of beginning is possible,
since it is prior by nobility. It is
true, therefore, that the noblest in
the stages of the beginning parallels
the noblest in the stages of return,
not that it parallels the basest. Let it
be recognized.

Wamīḍ [9.4.25]
Our companion has
explained what we have confirmed,
where he said in Chapter One,
Book Three, of the book al-Mabda’
wa’l-Ma‘ād:
The two discourses which
preceded this one concerned the
beginning (mabda’), and its
import called attention to the
order of existents according to
their priority and their
posteriority, with the condition
that the most prior of them by
nature be the most prior of them
in perfection and nobility. This
[393] discourse is about the
return (ma‘ād), and its import
calls attention to the order of
existents according to their
priority and their posteriority,
with the condition that the most
prior of them by nature be the
most intense with respect to
posteriority in perfection;
indeed, that the secondary in
existence be the most prior in
perfection. This order brings the
circle back to the first order.
There it begins with the noblest
and proceeds towards the basest
until it reaches the elements.
This then is the beginning of the
return from the basest toward
the noblest in reverse of the first
order. From the first stage of the
beginning until the elements is
the order encompassing the
system of principles (mabādī),
and from the elements until man
 is the order returning to the
system of principles. With man
the return is completed, and his
is the real return and likeness to
the intellectual principles.
Methinks they make a circle
back to themselves, for it is an
intellect, then a soul, then
bodies, then a soul, then an
intellect, and then it returns to
the stage of the principles.
He states in the book al-
Ta‘līqāt:
The corporeal form of each
thing is prior to the form which
belongs to the natures, their
genera and their species. The
 corporeal form of fire, for
example, is prior to its species
form, and it is the fieriness by
which fire becomes a fire. It is
prior to its species form which
is associated with it.
His path is to postulate the
substantial species form in the
stages of the return.

Wamīḍ [9.4.26]
Tell me: Are you yourself
your material, tarnished, earthly
body or your immaterial, pure,
divine soul? Do you not signify
every part of your body and the
whole of your body by “it” and
signify that by which you are you by
“I”? Is not the substrate of
intelligibles in you, that by which
you control your natural hosts and
your constitutional army, by which
you administer the storehouses of
concealed thoughts and immerse
yourself in the depths of heavenly
knowledge, not any of your five
corporeal senses, whether outer or
inner, but rather a heavenly,
intelligent sixth sense, which is a
sanctified light, a celestial spirit,
and a divine substance? Should its
lamp be lit with the oil of intuition,
it would well nigh shine even if a
fire did not touch it, attain the stage
of the acquired intellect in its fullest
degree, and become, in the
substance [394] of its spiritual
essence, knowing and cognizant of
the entire system of existence, a
mirror of it, and a true facsimile
corresponding to the book of the
universe. Whenever one of them is
revealed to the other, not a single
letter present in one of the two
facsimiles is contrary to a letter of
the other facsimile.
Know that the necessity of the
Principle of Principles (exalted be
His sovereignty) being first in the
order of beginning and last in the
order of return, and the necessity of
correspondence between the stages
of beginning and the stages of return
in the two chains, which is a
requisite of perfect, heavenly,
consummate wisdom and the
perfect, divine, primal providence,
is a principle which requires this
last intellectual stage in the [chain
of] return in the system of existence
to be parallel to the first intellectual
stage in the [chain of] beginning.
Consequently, it is necessary for the
existence of the human rational soul
in the stages of return—its seeking
the highest degree of perfection and
its attainment of the station of
perfection in the stage of its
acquired intellect—to correspond
to the stage of the separate
intelligences in the stages of
beginning. Otherwise, the order of
the stages and the harmony of the
system would be destroyed, and the
perfection of consummate wisdom
and perfect providence would be
diminished. Furthermore, just as the
first stage in the [chain of]
beginning starts from His Majesty,
the Real, and there is nothing above
it but His necessary, real essence—
and the pouring forth of
imperfection and deficiency from
the utmost perfection and its
beginning from the perfect and the
exalted is impossible without an
intermediary—in like manner, the
final stage in the [chain of] return
culminates in His Majesty, the Most
Exalted, and there is nothing above
it but His perfect, solitary essence.
The upward impulsion of
imperfection and deficiency and its
ending in stages in the supremely
perfect and the above perfect is
impossible without an intermediary.
This demonstration of the
incorporeality of the human rational
soul and its attainment of the highest
station possible in the stage of the
acquired intellect is one of the
special features of this book, and its
precept is unavoidable. Be not of
those who fail to recognize it.

Wamīḍ [9.4.27]
Since it is established that
the rational soul is not impressed in
the body, but rather it is an essence
which rules it, its linkage to the
constitution and its association with
matter is only because its creation
is entangled with them, not because
its immortality lasts through them.
Therefore, if the body due to death
is removed from the healthy state
which is an instrument for the soul,
its removal from that state does not
impair the substance of the soul’s
heavenly essence—just as the
removal of a mirror by blocking it
from receiving the light of the sun
and its reflection in it does not
impair the essence of the sun, and
the removal of a saw from the
proper state of its being an
instrument for a carpenter does not
impair the essence of the carpenter.
Nay, rather it will continue to
endure as long as [395] its
Fashioner, the Agent of its essence,
and the Giver of its existence will
endure. Just as He cannot cease to
exist, in like manner, the soul cannot
cease to exist with the perishing of
the body. In short, it is inadmissible
for the substance of the soul which
attains the grandeur of its Creator to
derive [the substance of] its essence
from an act procreation, for, in
truth, its existence is from another
world. I swear by the Beloved that
the soul—which will ascend to the
world of holiness, then to its Maker,
the Exalted, the Most High, in the
two worlds, return to its Lord in the
substance of its essence in the two
abodes, and become a sanctified,
intellecting substance—is more
exalted than that it should pass
along this path of urine twice!

Wamīḍ [9.4.28]
 The possessor of the holy
faculty, through his intelligent
power, is sulfur, and the active
intellect, i.e., the Holy Spirit and
the Giver of Forms, is fire. A force
is contained within it which it [fire]
transforms into the substance of
itself.[404] The soul in relation to
this power is “a tree…whose oil is
well night luminous though a fire
does not touch it, light upon
light.”[405] If this tree, which is its
sanctified soul, has three special
attributes corresponding to the
attainment of three faculties, it is a
prophet who has three kinds of
prophecy due to the perfection of
both the theoretical faculty, from
which the principles of
comprehension issue forth, and the
practical faculty, from which the
principles of conduct proceed. The
first [special attribute] concerns the
perfection of the rational faculty,
that all of its knowledge should
come from intuition (ḥads). The
theories of the learned, which
require deliberation, are all
intuitions in relation to him. The
intellectual miracles are all by this
means.
The second [special attribute]
concerns the perfection of the
imaginative faculty, the perfection
of the common faculty called
“naṭāṣīyā,” the intense polishing of
the mirrors of the faculties of sense
perception, and the impression of
their images in the tablets of
immaculate, selfless rational minds,
that vision and hearing in
wakefulness [of things from the
spiritual world] may be facilitated
for him, not in an external way by
passage through the vitreous humor
or through the auditory passage, but
internally by means of conjunction
with world of the intellect and entry
into the concourse of those who
abide in the realm of God (exalted
be He). This is not possible for
those who are imperfect except in a
dream. Thus the angels of God take
on forms and represent themselves
to his vision and he sees them, and
the Word of God is composed and
arranged for his hearing and he
hears it. This is the way of
inspiration and revelation, and
through this he possesses the
miracles of his utterance and the
ability to prophesize hidden things
and to warn of chastisements before
they occur.
The third [special
attribute] concerns the perfection of
the faculty of the soul in its
substance with respect to the first
creation of the innate nature, the
certainty [396] of a bond of
connection to God, and being
molded by the virtues of God with
respect to the acquired second
creation, so that he will have the
natural disposition to enter into the
Kingdom of Names and become
conjoined with the Possessor of the
dominion and the kingdom, on
account of which the matter and
forms of the elements obey him and
submit to his wishes. This is the
source of his physical miracles.
If these conditions are
empowered in him, these
dispositions take root, these special
attributes are very strong, and the
station of the perfection of these
three kinds is attained, the state of
seal of the prophets and the rank of
the Messengers is required. And it
is necessitated by the wise Qur’ān:
“[Muhammad is not the father of
any man amongst you,] but he is the
Messenger of God and the Seal of
the Prophets.”[406] Consequently,
he is such that it is inconceivable
for there to be a [higher] stage of
ascent in the stages of return
between him and the returning point
of existence, just as it is
inconceivable for there to be a
[higher] descending stage in the
stages of beginning between the
First Effect and the Cause of
existence. Therefore, after the stage
of the Seal of the Prophets (may
God bless him and his family) in the
ascension of nobility and perfection
there is only the stage of the
perfection of the essentially
necessary, real Existent (exalted be
His remembrance), without any
intermediary at all, just as prior to
the stage of the First Intelligence in
the descent of nobility and
perfection, there is only the stage of
the glory and perfection of God
without any intermediary at all. For
this reason, the station of the Seal of
the Prophets in the chain of return is
the station of the First Intelligence
in the chain of beginning, because
both of these stations are due to
nearness to the Light of Lights,
which is the basis of nobility and
perfection in the same stage.
Consequently, there is no rivalry or
difference between them.
Therefore, it is nobler than all the
other intelligences, because the
degrees of their nearness to the
Light of Lights in the chain of
beginning is remoter than its degree
in relation to God in the chain or
return. The first of the intelligences
and the last of the prophets
correspond in rank and are
equivalent in nobility. This is why
God has related him to himself in
the words: “The first thing God
created was my light.” And He says
in another tradition: “The first thing
God created was the intellect.”
From this the meaning of the
following words is also clear: “I
have a time with God which neither
a near angel nor an apostolic
prophet can share with me.” By
“time” is meant the stage of
nearness and the share of reunion in
accord with the measure of nobility
and the sum of perfection.
[Therefore, he means:] “Neither a
near angel nor an apostolic prophet
can be with me in that degree and
that stage, because the first of the
intelligible lights is my light, and
whoever is beneath it among the
lights is beneath me in the degree of
luminosity.” Let is be known. [397]

Wamīḍ [9.4.29]
Our companion states in
Book Nine of the Metaphysics of
the Shifā’:
The perfection which is
specialized to the rational soul
is that it can become a knower
cognizant of the forms of the
whole impressed within it, the
intelligible system of the whole,
the good emanating into the
whole, beginning from the
principle of the whole, a
traveler to the absolute,
spiritual, noble substances, then
the spiritual [substances]
attached by a species to bodies,
then the celestial bodies with
their states and their faculties,
and so forth, until it receives
fully in itself the state of the
entire existence, as a
consequence of which it is
transformed into an intelligible
world corresponding to the
whole existent world, a witness
 of that which is absolute
excellence, absolute good, and
absolute beauty, united with it,
engraved with its image and its
form, entering into its company,
and becoming part of its
substance.
He states in Chapter One
of Book Ten:
The most excellent of persons is
one whose soul has attained the
stage of actual intellect and the
actualization of the
characteristics which are the
practical virtues, and the most
excellent of these persons is
disposed for the station of
prophecy. He is the one whose
psychological faculties have the
three special attributes which
we have mentioned. He hears
the Word of God and beholds
His angels, which have been
transformed into a form which
he sees. We have explained how
this is possible, and we have
explained that the angels give
form to what is revealed to him.
[407] A sound is produced for
him in his hearing, which he
hears from God and His angels,
and he hears it without that
being a word from the people or
any earthly thing. This is
 revealed to him. Just as the first
of the beings from the beginning
until the stage of the elements is
an intellect, then a soul, then a
body, in this case existence
commences from bodies, then
souls are produced, and then
intellects.
Then at the end of this
Book, which is the end of the
conclusion of the Shifā’, he says:
The chiefs of these virtues are
temperance, wisdom, and
courage. Their sum is justice,
which is outside of theoretical
virtue. He who combines them
with theoretical wisdom is truly
 blessed. And he who attains
along with this the special
attributes of prophethood is on
the point of becoming a human
god. Worship of him, after
worship of God, is almost
permissible. He is the sovereign
of this earthly world and the
vicegerent of God therein.
He has mentioned the three
special attributes, elaborated upon
their meaning, and investigated the
doctrine concerning them in the
Physics of the Shifā’ and in the
book al-Mabda’ wa’l-Ma‘ād. I say:
He who has reached the highest
station of perfection with respect to
them is the chief [398] of the
prophets with the seal of
messengership. He is distinguished
in the next world with the most
great intercession, and in the stages
of the chain of return, he abides in
the highest stage in the final station.

Wamīḍ [9.4.30]
Every genus has various
species under it, and among those
species there exists one species
which is the most perfect. The same
applies to species in relation to
varieties, varieties in relation to
individuals, and individuals in
relation to organs. The noblest of
the organs and their chief is the
heart. It is the vicegerent of the
soul, just as the soul is the
vicegerent of the intellect, and its
vicegerent is the brain, through
which the faculties are spread to all
parts of the body. The vicegerent of
the brain is the spinal cord. In the
same way, man must also have a
chief. His chief will either be his
king, if outward ascendancy alone
is meant, or it will be a learned
person, if inward ascendancy alone
is meant, or it will be the prophet or
who stands in his place, if both
together are meant. The prophet is
like the heart in the body of the
world, and his vicegerent is like the
brain and the spinal cord. Just as
the faculties of perception and the
faculties of movement only issue
via the brain and the spinal cord
upon the members, in like manner,
the faculty of exposition,
knowledge, religion, and guidance
only emanates through the
intermediary of his vicegerent upon
the world. Among the special
characteristics of the vicegerent, the
guardian, is that he is able to
transmit the holy traditions by
victory over the passive name, and
such a one hears sounds and words
composed in wakefulness in a state
of health, not by the auditory
passage or sense of hearing, but by
conjunction with an angel and
devotion to the world of holiness,
but he does not see an embodied
spiritual being or an apparitional
image. Therefore, he follows in the
same path as the prophet with
respect to the enkindling of his holy
faculty, the intensity of his devotion,
the strength of his conjunction, and
the certainty of his connection to
that world, in such wise that he
frequently hears similar to what the
prophet hears. But his firm
connection to the world of the
Kingdom is not in a way that it is
possible for the angel to become
embodied and the Holy Spirit to
become personified to him in a
form which he can see and behold,
so that he can hear the Word of God
from it by means of revelation in
such a way that he is the recipient
of a revelation without the
intermediary of the Messenger. No,
he only has the power to hear
sounds without seeing an embodied
figure and an apparitional image.
Therefore, if the vicegerency and
guardianship are a deputyship for
the Seal of the Prophets, whose
stage in the chain of return is
equivalent to the stage of the First
Intelligence in the chain of
beginning, then the stage of the
vicegerent guardian in the stages of
return is equivalent to the stage of
the second intelligence in the stages
[399] of beginning.
It is true what is said of the
holy and truthful vicegerent
guardians in the wise Qur’ān:
“People of the House, God only
desires to remove abomination from
you and to make you pure.”[408]
And their nobility and their
precedence, to which the relation of
thinkers and learned men is the
relation of the senses to the intellect
and the sensible to the intelligible,
is expressed by “the soul” of the
prophet, for it is said in the verse of
mutual cursing “our souls and your
souls.” And by “the great
announcement,” for it is said in the
sura of Nabā: “About what are they
asking one another? About the great
announcement concerning which
they are at variance?”[409] And by
“a clear record book” in the sūra of
Yā Sīn: “We have reckoned each
thing in a clear record book.”[410]
And by “those who have knowledge
of the Book,” for it is said in the
sūra of Ra‘d: “Say: A sufficient
witness between me and you is God
and those who have knowledge of
the Book.”[411] The Prophet, upon
him be peace, is making it clear that
they are his partner in the tree of
nobility and his equivalent in the
station of luminosity, when he says:
“ ‘Alī and I are from the same light,
and ‘Alī and I are from the same
tree.”

Wamīḍ [9.4.31]
If the two chains are
considered with respect to the
correspondence of their stages, and
the stages are placed in parallel
with each other, the matter is in
accord with what was recited to
you. But if these two are weighed
against each other, insofar as they
are two chains of beginning and
return, they are considered as
themselves, and one of them
compared with the other with
respect to beginning and return, then
each one of these two is nobler and
more excellent than the other in a
certain respect. The chain of
beginning is nobler and more
exalted because it is the chain of
simples and intermediaries for
joining the emanation of the real
Emanator (exalted be His
sovereignty) with whatever is in the
chain of return. The chain of return
is nobler and more honored because
the gradual descent of the beginning
chain is a turning away from God,
while the gradual ascent of the
returning chain is a turning toward
God. In this last respect, it may be
said that the microcosm is the
noblest of the members of the Great
Man, that man is the object of
calling the macrocosm into being,
and that the souls of the prophets in
the stage of the acquired intellect,
by virtue of the perfection of the
station of the intellecting faculty and
the enkindling of the rays of the holy
faculty, are without reservation
superior to the ranks of the lights of
the spiritual angels and the
luminous intelligences. Let it be
ascertained.

Wamīḍ [9.4.32]
The teacher of the
Peripatetics and their instructor
states in Mīmar Five of the
Theology:
Although we suppose that we
[400] know the intelligence
more than other things, we do
not know the essence of its
knowledge. That is because
“what it is” and “why it is” with
respect to the intelligence (‘aql)
are the same thing, because if
you know what the intelligence
is, you know why it is. “What it
is” and “why it is” only differ
with respect to the natural things
which are the images of the
intelligence.
Then he says:
Every form among the
intelligible forms and the thing
because of which that form
exists are one. I do not say that
the form of the intellect is the
cause of its existence; rather, I
say that if you submitted the
form of the intellect itself and
desired to investigate it by
“what it is,” you would find in
that very investigation “why it
is” also.
Then he says:
For example, the world is a
composite of things some of
which are connected to others,
as a result of which the world is
like one thing in which nothing
is contradictory. And if you
know what the world is, you
will know why the world is;
that is to say, every part of it is
related to the whole, so you will
not see it only as a part, but you
will see it like the whole. In
other words, you will not
consequently take the parts of
the world as if some of them
derive from others, but you will
perceive all of them as if they
are one thing, without one of
them being prior to another. If
you perceive in this way, you
will make the cause
simultaneous with the effect, not
prior to it. If you perceive the
world and its parts in this
manner, you have perceived it
as an intelligible, as a result of
which if you know “what the
world is” you also know “why
the world is” at the same time.
If the totality of this world is as
we have described it, it is
befitting for the higher world
 also to be in accord with this
description.
Then he says at the end of
this Mīmar:
All of the attributes of the
intelligence are present, not one
of them preceding another. This
is because all of the attributes of
the intelligence were originated
with its essence simultaneously.
[412] If this is like this, “what it
is” and “why it is” exist in the
intelligence simultaneously, and
if their existence is
simultaneous, then certainly if
you know what the intelligence
is, you know “what it is.” And if
you know “what it is,” you
know “why it is” without “what
it is” being more fit for
intelligible things than “why it
is.” This is because “what it is”
points to the cause of the
beginning of something, and
“why it is” points to the cause
of the perfection of something.
The beginning cause is the
perfecting cause itself in
intelligible things. For this
reason, if you know what an
intelligible thing is, you know
why it is, as we have explained.
[401]
The import of what is in
the Theology is that it is
inadmissible for the knowledge of
the separate principles to be
described as “true,” for they are
reality itself, not something
corresponding to reality. He also
states in this book that the
intelligence is a circle which does
not move, while the soul is a circle
that moves. Also, the intelligence is
a circle which moves, and there are
no surface dimensions between the
circumference and the center. In the
doctrine of the pillars of
philosophy, [it is said]: “Number is
a moving intelligence.” And among
them is one who converts this and
says: “Intelligence is a moving
number.” Our companion states in
the Psychology of the Physics of the
Shifā’: “The soul is a moving
number.” Perchance, through the
rules and principles which we have
taught to you,[413] you are
conversant with the interpretation of
these riddles and mysteries.

Wamīḍ [9.4.33]
The truth which the
principal intuitive philosophers
among the companions of the Craft
and the proficient scholars among
the learned of Islam maintain is that
angels are of various races, kinds,
groups, and ranks: spiritual and
material, incorporeal and
corporeal, higher and lower,
celestial and earthly. The most
exalted in rank are those whose
food is glorification of their Creator
and whose drink is His
sanctification. The spiritual
cherubic beings among the
intelligible substances are ranked
by their species and their lights.
Among them is the Holy Spirit,
which descends with the lights of
revelation and speaks by the leave
of God in minds endowed with the
holy faculty, the separate celestial
rational souls, then the celestial
impressible souls, the active,
percipient powers, the natural
species forms, the substantial
natures, and the lords of the
species[414] for elemental
composites. They maintain that
every celestial body, indeed, every
celestial station, and similarly
every elemental nature, has a
spiritual angel in charge of its
management (tadbīr) and rising by
the [divine] Command. The wise
Qur’ān states: “No one knows the
hosts of your Lord but Him.” And in
a holy tradition it is related: “The
heaven has cried out, and it has the
right to cry, for there is not a span
within it but an angel is prostrating
and praying therein.”
Whenever the soul, in both
the substance of its innate nature
and its acquired nature, becomes
immaculate and pure in essence,
firmly connected to the intelligible
world, disdainful of the material
world, subduing the hosts of nature
and the army of the constitution,
firmly renouncing the body and
sensual things, turning to the realm
of holiness and the court of the Lord
where and when it desires by the
leave of its Lord and His mercy,
and its imaginative faculty, also,
seldom attentive [402] to the
external world, is strongly bound to
the invisible world, for it is
delivered from partnership with
nature, in control of the body,
detached from material things, and
in an awakened state, it then returns
to its world and becomes conjoined
with the Holy Spirit and with
whomever God pleases from among
His well-favored angels, and it
acquires there knowledge and
wisdom by extraction by means of
exudation or by illumination by
means of reflection, like a polished
mirror facing toward the sun.
The reality of revelation is
the direct address of the active
intellect to the rational soul in
distinct, audible, versified words. It
has different modes and various
degrees in accord with the different
stages of the soul in its different
conditions and states. It may be at
certain times with respect to certain
stations not particularized by a
visible apparitional representation
and audible versified speech in one
of the aspects of the corporeal
world in its particularity, but rather
it is general to all the aspects in
their entirety. In a tradition it is
said: “Gabriel approached the
Prophet once in his particular form,
and it was as if he covered the
whole earth.” In short, the most
excellent of the classes of angels,
according to the intuitive
philosophers and the learned who
are firmly grounded, are the
intelligences and the souls.
Our companion [Ibn Sīnā]
states in his Risāla al-Ḥudūd:
An angel is a living, intelligent,
simple substance. It is an
intermediary between the
Creator and earthly bodies.
Some of them belong to
intelligences, some to souls, and
some to bodies.
And he says in Chapter One, Book
Ten, of the Metaphysics of the
Shifā’:
Since existence commences
with the First (exalted be He),
every subsequent thing
proceeding from Him continues
to be lower in rank than the
First and the stages continue to
decline. The first of these is the
rank of the immaterial spiritual
angels who are called
“intelligences.” As for the
stages of the angels who are
called “souls,” they are working
angels. Next are the ranks of the
celestial bodies, one being
nobler than another until the last
one is reached. After them the
existence of matter receptive of
generable and corruptible forms
begins. The first thing to attire it
are the forms of the elements,
then it progresses little by little.
Thus the first existence in it is
the basest and lower in degree
than that which succeeds it.
Therefore the basest in this
regard is matter, then the
elements, then inanimate
composites, then animate things.
The noblest of these is man,
preceded by animals and then
plants. [403] The most excellent
of men is the one whose soul
attains the [stage of] actual
 intellect and who manifests the
attributes which are the
practical virtues.

Wamīḍ [9.4.34]
The existence of the jinn is
something which cannot be avoided
in the path of the demonstration.
The texts of the noble Qur’ān and
the traditions of our Lord and our
Prophet, the master of intelligences
and souls, the seal of the prophets
and the messengers, and his
immaculate chosen ones, the
custodians of the revelation, the
protectors of religion ( may the
blessings of God and His
salutations rest upon him and all of
them), have taught this, so there is
no avoidance here from believing in
them with certainty. Our companion
states in the Risāla al-Ḥudūd:
A jinn is a rational creature with
a transparent body made of the
element of air whose nature is
to assume different forms. This
is not its description, but rather
the meaning of its name.
I say: It is only a rational
creature made of air if it has an
incorporeal rational soul which
manages an airy body. The truth is
what the companions of the Craft
among the philosophers of Islam
hold, namely, that the jinn are
neither bodies nor corporeal, but
rather they are immaterial beings
contrary in quiddity to human souls
which are connected to fiery and
airy bodies and are able to act in
this world. This is the import of the
discourse of our companion and his
intention. The Leader of the
Doubters professed this in the
Mulakhkhaṣ, but in the Muḥaṣṣal
he says:
Concerning the doctrine on
angels, jinn, and devils, the
Mutakallimūn say that they are
subtle bodies able to assume
different forms. The
philosophers and the early
Mu‘tazila have denied them.
They say that if they are as
subtle as the air, they would not
have the power to influence any
of the actions and their
compositions would be
destroyed by the slightest cause.
And if they are dense, then we
should be able to see them.
Otherwise, it would be possible
for a mountain to be in our
presence, and we would not see
it. The answer to this is: Why is
it not possible for them to be
subtle in the sense of being
transparent, not in the sense of
having a tenuous constitution.
We admit that they are dense,
but we have explained that
seeing something dense in your
presence is not necessary. The
philosophers claim that they are
not spatial and do not subsist in
spatial objects, but then they
disagree. Most of them say that
they have quiddities contrary in
species to human souls. But
some of them say: If their souls,
which are separate from their
bodies, are wicked, they would
be strongly attracted to human
souls which are like them, [404]
as a result of which they would
 have some manner of attachment
to their bodies and support them
in acts of wickedness. This is a
devil, and if it is good, the
matter is reversed. God makes
known the realities of all things.
The Seal of the Most
Excellent Scholars responds in his
Naqd al-Muḥaṣṣal:
I say: It is reported from the
Mu‘tazila that they say:
“Angels, jinn, and devils are
one in species, but they differ
through the difference of their
actions. Those who only
produce good are the angels.
Those who only produce evil
 are the devils. And those who
produce both good and evil are
the jinn. This is why Iblīs is
sometimes considered an angel
and sometimes a jinn.” What the
author has reported is clear.
The superior of the two
whose courses brought them to the
desert among the imitators states in
the Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid:
Those among the philosophers
who defend the jinn and devils
maintain that jinn are
incorporeal substances that have
an influence and effect upon
elemental bodies without being
attached to them like human
souls are to their bodies, and
that devils are the imaginative
faculties of human individuals
which have overpowered the
rational faculty and turned away
from spiritual things and the
acquisition of intellectual
perfections to submission to
sensual pleasures and erroneous
desires. Some of the
philosophers maintain that if
human souls after their
separation from their bodies and
the severance of connection to
them are good and obedient to
intellectual requirements, then
they are jinn. But if they are evil
and incited to wickedness and
abomination, supportive of
error and preoccupied with
transgression, then they are
devils. In short, the doctrine of
the existence of angels, jinn, and
devils is one of the things upon
which there is a general
consensus, and the Word of God
and the words of the prophets
have pronounced it. The direct
experience of jinn has been
testified to by many of the
learned and the masters of
unveiling among the chosen
ones, and there is no reason to
deny it, just as there is no way
 to establish it by rational
proofs.
The brilliant critic, the
Seal of the Scholars, states:
His words “their knowledge is
actual” requires that they can
only know what belongs to Him
(exalted be He), because they
are not the agent of it, and the
lower cannot know what is in a
higher station than it. His words
“they are the beginning [405]
and the return” is a doctrine no
one has advocated. The
philosophers say that the
beginning is from God and the
return is to Him, not from souls
 and to them.

Wamīḍ [9.4.35]
His words, exalted be the
speaker: “By those who arrange
themselves in ranks, by those who
are strong in repelling [evil], and
by those who recite the message [of
God]…,”[415] and his words: “By
those who tear out [the souls of the
wicked] with violence, by those
who gently draw out [the souls of
the blessed], by those who glide
along [on errands of mercy], by
those who press forward with
haste, and by those who manage the
affairs [of the world]…,”[416]
refer to the stations of spiritual
entities and detail the classes of
angels in the two chains of
beginning and return. Let it be
recognized. And let us seal this
Qabas in this way.
 The Tenth Qabas
The decisive doctrine on the secret
of predetermination (qaḍā’) and
fate (qadar), how evil is related to
predetermination, the colocynth of
truth on prayer and its granting,
and the return of the command to
God in the beginning and the end

Wamḍa [10.1]
Is it not clear that it is only
possible for one of two
contradictories to be necessary if
the other contradictory is
impossible in all of its modes and
aspects? You have ascertained in
the preceding chapters that as long
as the determination and the
existence of the effect from its
efficient cause is not necessary, it
does not proceed from it.
Therefore, if the substance of the
essence of the efficient cause of the
effect’s essence and existence is a
certain possible thing among
possibles, whether it be a soul, an
intelligence, or something else, its
non-existence, insofar as it is itself,
would certainly be essentially
possible. Among the modes of the
non-existence of the effect is its
negation with the negation of its
cause, and it is essentially
impossible for something to make
its possible negation with respect to
the substance of its essence
impossible with respect to the thing
itself (nafs al-amr). Therefore, it is
inconceivable for the negation of
the effect with the negation of its
cause to become impossible with
respect to the very essence of the
cause, if it is essentially possible,
since its [the cause’s] negation is
certainly possible in this case with
respect to its own essence. How
then is it possible for the negation
of its effect due to its negation to
become impossible through it with
respect to the substance of its [the
cause’s] essence? As long as this
mode of non-existence is also not
impossible for the effect, it is
necessarily not possible for it to
have necessity of existence with
respect to the thing itself.
Therefore, it is only admissible for
the necessity of the existence of the
effect in the real world to issue
from the substance of the essence of
its efficient cause whenever its
efficient cause is an essentially
necessary being, sanctified from all
modes of multiplicity, before the
essence, with the essence, and after
the essence,[417] and exalted
above a cause with Him (bihi), a
cause belonging to Him (lahu), a
cause of him (minhu), a cause from
him (‘anhu), and a cause in Him
(fīhi); in short, above any cause
whatsoever.[418] He is the absolute
causer of causes without a cause,
and from Him the necessity of the
existence of the effect, [408] and
the necessity of the existence of the
sum of His causes and His reasons,
flows freely. He is none other than
God, the real One (glorified be He).
It is therefore settled by
demonstration that none of the
existents whatsoever except God,
the truly necessary in every respect,
is capable of being a complete
efficient cause from whose essence
the necessity of the existence of
every particular possible flows
forth.
By another way, is it not
evident to you that the substance of
the actually existent essence of
every possible thing which is
actually existent through an efficient
cause is subject to the concept of
what is potential with respect to the
stage of the essence itself as such?
Among the self-evident premises is
that what is potential, with respect
to what is potential, cannot extract a
certain thing from potentiality into
actuality. Therefore, analysis leaves
the circumstantial mode of the
possible essence as such devoid of
requiring the necessity of the
actuality belonging to a certain thing
at all, since it, as itself, is afflicted
with potentiality and destruction,
and thrown to nullification and non-
being. The Giver of the Craft,
Aristotle, has espoused this
demonstration in Mīmar Three of
the Theology.
By a third way, every
possible thing is assumed to have
an emanator of its existence and a
necessitator of its necessity.
Therefore, its efficient cause, which
gives it necessity, is superior to and
worthier than it, because it is the
emanator [of existence] and the
necessitator of necessity absolutely.
Therefore, the essentially necessary
Being is superior to and worthier
than all possible things, because He
definitely is the giver of existence
and the necessitator of necessity
absolutely. Our companion has used
this demonstration in the Shifā’, the
Ishārāt, and other works.
By a fourth way, a
dominating light does not enable a
weaker light to produce an effect.
How then could the object of setting
(mamqūl al-ufūl) in the shadow of
possibility be able, despite the
sovereign necessity of the Light of
Lights, to necessitate the emanation
and give light to the outpouring?
This proof is among the intuitions of
clear intellects according to the
mystical experience of the
Illuminationists.

Wamḍa [10.2]
Have you not heard that the
relation of the Active Intellect to the
world of the elements, nay, the
relation of the First Intelligence,
which is the foundation (‘unṣur) of
the system of the whole and the
element (isṭaqis) of the world of
possibility, to the other parts of the
system is the relation of an
inscribing (rāsima) point to an
inscribed line, a moving flame to a
visible circle, medial motion to
[409] terminal motion, and the
flowing now to continuous extended
time, with respect to its being its
marker (rāsima), despite its being
outside of it and not subsisting in it.
Know then that God (glorified be
He) is the One who created the
emanating Intelligence, the
inscribing Point, the moving Flame,
the medial Motion, and the flowing
Now.[419] Then He grasped it with
the hand of His power and held in
the grasp of His might, and He set it
in motion, caused it to rotate,
moved it, and propelled it, in
accordance with His knowledge,
His wisdom, His purpose, and His
will, until the right amount of the
inscription of the good in the system
of existence was completed.
By another way, He is the
One who created the Pen of the
Intellect. Then He grasped it with
the fingers of His knowledge, His
will, His wisdom, and His
providence, and He wrote with it,
with the ink from the inkpot of
possibility, the letters of the
quiddities and the words of the
entities, until He completed the
inscription of the right amount of the
good, in the worlds of Command
and [the physical] creation, in the
book of the system of existence.
[420] For this reason, the goal of
the drive of emanation and
existentiation in the two chains of
beginning and return (the blessings
of God and His salutations rest
upon him and his family) said: “The
first thing that God created was the
Pen.” This is the worthiest of what
may be said by making an analogy,
not with the intention of
anthropomorphism.
 Wamḍa [10.3]
In the wise Qur’ān [it is
stated]: “Nūn. By the Pen and that
which they write!”[421] If by “the
Pen” all the agent intelligences is
meant, then the [third person] plural
in “they write” is in accord with the
path of reality. But if by it is meant
the First Intelligence, then the use of
the plural is either for respect or it
is for the sake of repeating the verb
for emphasis, for the meaning of
augmentation is commensurate with
the context of the verse “My Lord,
suffer me to return” (23:99), [where
the plural form is used]. As for “the
Preserved Tablet,” it is either an
expression for the book of the
whole system of existence from
beginning to end, and the Mother
Book, which is [the domain of]
perpetuity, or it also means the First
Intelligence, which contains the
forms all the existents impressed in
it, from the fresh in existence to the
dry.[422]
The Leader of the
Doubters states in al-Tafsīr al-
Kabīr:
Evidence of the fact that the
“Pen” mentioned here is the
Intelligence, and that it is
something like the root of all
created things, is related in the
following traditions: “The first
thing God created was the Pen.”
In another tradition, [it is
stated]: “The first thing God
created was the Intellect.” And
in another tradition, [it is
stated]: “The first thing God
created was a gem, which He
gazed at with the eye of majesty.
It melted and became intensely
hot, so that smoke and dross
came from it. From the smoke
He created the heavens, and
from the dross He created the
earth.” These traditions as a
whole imply that the Pen, the
Intelligence, and that gem,
which is the first created thing,
are one thing. Otherwise
contradiction will result. [410]
 Wamḍa [10.4]
Since it is evident to you
that the system of existence, with
the totality of what is in it from the
starting point of the origin to the end
of the return, has emanated
simultaneously from the real One
(glorified be He) by necessity in the
domain of perpetuity, which
corresponds to the inner dimension
of the actual world (ḥāqq al-wāqi‘)
and the heart of the thing itself
(kabd nafs al-amr), in one
perpetual instant, not in one
intelligible stage, but in successive
intelligible stages corresponding to
multiple, successive, intelligible
circumstantial modes descending
from Him with respect to both the
vertical and horizontal orders, then
it is certainly evident that it is
necessary for the entire great,
solitary system to be naturally
harmonious in its levels and for its
worlds to be essentially connected
to each other with respect to
existence in the heart of perpetuity
and emanation from the agent Maker
in the center of the real world.
Therefore, the world of the
soul is connected to the world of
the intellect, and the world of the
four natures is connected to the
worlds of the fifth nature. In short,
the worlds of the system of the
whole require each other in
existence and correspond with and
parallel each other. The bearer of
the disposition (ṭibā‘) of what is
potential in the world of the four
natures is the substance of
individually one, common prime
matter itself, and in the worlds of
the fifth nature, it is the nature of the
common, volitional, desiring,
continuous circular motion.
Whatever is in one of the worlds
has a corresponding talisman,
image, shadow, or reflection in
another world. Thus the essence of
indeterminate, individual prime
matter in this world is an analogue
of the continuous circular motion of
that world. And the succession of
perfections, forms, and accidents
arriving successively upon the
essences of generated creatures
here, whose essences are conserved
in existence by their indeterminate,
individual oneness which is the
bearer of dispositional potentiality,
is an analogue for the [successive]
positions [of the heavenly bodies]
which pass from potentiality into
actuality one position after another
there. The millstone of temporal
creation, without reservation, turns
upon coming into actuality after
dispositional potentiality.
Receptive, individual prime matter
and continuous circular motion are
both bearers for the nature of what
is potential and receivers for
passing into actuality, by the leave
of God (glorified be He).
Consequently, the material
world absolutely and the
intermingling material
relationships, interdependent
corporeal states, and quantitative,
qualitative, spatial, and relational
properties it contains, are like a
shadow of the worlds of praise,
with respect to receiving the
emanation of the generosity of the
real Agent and His mercy, in
relation to the intermingling
relationships of divine
illuminations and intellectual
splendors, the interlinking
reflections of brilliant, necessary
rays [411] and immaterial, heavenly
lights, and the spiritual unions
between the delights of the cherubs
and the well-favored angels among
the luminous angels which they
contain. Moreover, the world of the
four elemental natures and the
intermingling relationships and
composed states it contains is like a
limited copy in comparison to the
worlds of the fifth nature and the
auspicious signs deriving from the
relationships of its noble, circular
movements and the splendid,
interlinking relations of the
positions which they contain.
 Wamḍa [10.5]
Methinks the movements of
the heavenly bodies are acts of
angelic piety and celestial worship,
and that the prime matter of the
world of the elements has a
qualitative motion in relation to
dispositional possibilities, that the
bodies of celestial things have a
rotational motion with respect to
their particular positions, that their
impressible souls have a natural
motion traced in real imaginative
faculties and particular circular
inclinations, and that their separate
intellecting souls, which directly
affect their impulsion by longing
and desire, have a loving, desiring,
illuminative motion motivated by
longings, spiritual delights,
radiance, and illuminations, which
come to them from the supremely
luminous Horizon and the most
holy, most exalted Realm.
These movements, with
their continuous attractions, depend
upon a emanational order. The
imaginative state of inclination
proceeds from the illuminational
state of love, then the circular state
of rotation proceeds from the
imaginative state of inclination, then
the elemental dispositional state of
quality proceeds from the celestial
circular state of rotation. If the
analysis of continuities into parts
and portions is considered, and the
parts are compared to each other,
the emanational order is repeated
from the two sides, not in a circular
manner. Thus each subsequent part
of each one of them proceeds from
a part proceeding from another, and
there is no vicious circle. Indeed,
this is what he meant who
maintained that appetitive and
illuminational motion is the cause
of the existence of corporeal
rotational motion with respect to
generation, while corporeal
rotational motion is the cause of the
persistence of appetitive and
illuminational motion, just as the
actual intellect is a condition for the
generation of the acquired intellect,
and the acquired intellect is a
condition for the persistence of the
actual intellect. In short, have you
not considered how whenever the
human rational soul, purified from
the imperfections of nature and the
impurities of prime matter, attains
holy splendors, and whenever
heavenly radiances attract it, it is
filled with delight and stirred in its
substance, as a result of which
movements are inspired and stirred
up in the body. Then the inspired
bodily conduct leads the substance
[412] of the soul to divine flashes at
times.
Man, therefore, through the
conduct of acts of worship and
obedience to the practices which
the Law of God has enjoined,
prepares the substance of his
incorporeal soul for holy splendors
and heavenly knowledge. This is
why the observance of the precepts
of religion is a bountiful favor
which the primal divine Providence
has required. This is why
traditional obligations cause the
servant to draw nearer than
intellectual obligations, and
traditional precepts in the category
of “recommended” cause him to
draw nearer than intellectual
recommended precepts. In the same
way, the celestial, intellecting
incorporeal soul receives influence
in its substance from the world of
the intellect, as a result of which it
becomes enraptured with holy
delights and intellectual
illuminations, which it obtains from
the realm of light. Through this its
celestial body receives the
influence, through it circular
movements are caused in it, in
accordance with those radiant
illuminations, and the soul is
inclined by each bodily motion for
another divine illumination.
Therefore, the splendors of the
lights of God are never cut off from
it and the confirmations of divine
favors and sanctified brilliant
flashes never end. The exudation
(rashḥ) of the good into the world
of the elemental natures is a
consequence of this. The renewal of
the splendors coming from the
horizon of the world of holiness
never cease there, and the motions
are renewed by the renewal of the
splendors. As it has been said: “If I
disappear, He becomes manifest;
and if He becomes manifest, He
causes me to disappear.” Thus
every rotational motion arising from
an intelligible illumination is
different from the motion which
was a numerical preparer for that
illumination. A continuous,
unceasing love and an unending,
flowing longing regulates the
quantity of the motions and the
illuminations.
The decisive doctrine
which we have related is that there
is one, continuously renewed
illumination from which one
continuous motion arises, belonging
to the immaterial celestial soul due
to love and longing for the divine
beauty.[423] Another [motion]
likewise belongs to the impressed,
substantial soul due to real
imaginations and circular
inclinations. Another also belongs
to the simple celestial body, which
is the spherical body circling
through particular positions. The
prime matter of the elemental world
is perfected by these two [motions]
by its solitary continuous progress
through its dispositional qualities.
These motions, with respect to their
solitary entities in their individual
totalities, are particularized, since
dispositional materiality depends
upon rotational corporeality, and
rotational corporeality depends
upon the longing of the soul, and
with respect to their hypothetical
parts and members, and the relation
of some parts to others, the
rotational and the soul aspects are
particularized, [413] since
dependency, subsequence,
attachment, and arising are
recurrent with these two [motions]
with respect to the members and
parts of the two sides by
correspondence, not by a circular
respect. In this way, the question of
particular volitional motion is
settled, and the other natural and
compelled motions as well, with
respect to the stages of new
inclinations differing in intensity
and weakness due to the nature of
the moving object or by reason of a
compeller. A certain kind of
causality and being-an-effect
between the two chains of
inclination and motion, and the
recurrent correspondence of the two
sides between their hypothetical
parts is confirmed. This question is
considered one of the recondite
problems of science.[424] Let it be
examined closely and pondered
carefully.

Wamīḍ [10.5.1]
 It behooves you to
recognize that every heavenly body
is a living being obedient to God,
an administrator (mutaṣarrif) of the
system of the cosmos by managing
it, and adorned with the measure of
the share of its degree and the
portion of its station through the
impression of the forms of universal
and particular existents and their
concrete and intelligible states and
attributes in the tablet of its soul,
the text of its mind, and the book of
its intellect. In the psalms of the
Family of Muḥammad and the
gospel of the People of the House,
that is to say, the Book of Worship,
in the prayer of the new moon, it is
said: “O people! Devoted
adherents, frequent visitors of the
lunar mansions of destiny which
administer from the sphere of
management.”
Our companion in
instruction has said it well in his al-
Fuṣūṣ: “The heavens worship
through their revolutions, the earth
through its forbearance, water
through its flowing, rain through its
pouring. It indeed worships Him
and it is not aware. The
remembrance of God is most great.”
By his words “and it is not aware,”
he is referring to the fact that every
existent, with the tongue of its
createdness and with the substance
of its entity, commensurate with the
state of its quiddity, calls to
remembrance and worships its
Fashioner, whether it is conscious
of this or not. The tongue of being is
more expressive and eloquent than
the tongue of speech. The Word of
God in the wise Qur’ān alludes to
this: “There is not a thing which
does not celebrate His praise, but
their utterances of praise you
understand not.”[425]

Wamīḍ [10.5.2]
The system of the whole in
its individuality is the Great Man,
which is obedient to God and which
has been given the utmost degree of
perfection and excellence in the
first creation. It is the most
deserving of His words: [414] “We
have created man in the most
excellent form.” The regulator of
the day in it is like the pia matter of
the brain, the outermost sphere is
like the head, the sun is like the
heart, and the remainder of what it
contains is like the remainder of
what is in man, such as the parts of
the brain, the nerves, the ligaments,
the arteries, the veins, the muscles,
the cartilage, the bones, the organs,
and the limbs. Its matters are like
bones, for the prime matter of the
world of generation and corruption
is “rump bone of the tail.” The
intelligences and the souls are like
the rational and practical faculties
[in man], which are the causes of
perception and behavior. The
impressible souls are like the
animate natural powers which are
in the brain, the heart, and the liver.
Just as the intelligences are
quiddities which differ in their
species, each of whose species is
its individual reality, the same
applies to the prime matters
(hayūliyāt) which equal the number
of the intelligences, since each
intelligence is the agent of the
existence of a prime matter. The
prime matter of every celestial
body, therefore, is different from the
prime matters of the other bodies by
the species quiddity. In like manner,
the prime matter of the world of the
elements is individually one and
distinct from the prime matters of
the celestial beings in species.[426]
The intelligence which corresponds
to it is the Active Intellect, which
administers the elemental world. It
is expressed in the wise Qur’ān as
“Gabriel,” “the Holy Spirit,” and
“the Spirit of Faith,” which
emanates upon human rational souls
by the leave of God. Some say that
the intelligence which is the spirit
of the sphere of the sun, the leader
of its incorporeal soul, and the
motive factor of its motion through
love and longing, is that which is
called “Gabriel” and “the Holy
Spirit.” As for the Active Intellect,
which is the basis of the things
belonging to the world of the
elements and the source of its
permanent prime matter in its
individual oneness in different
stages, it is the last intelligence in
the vertical chain, which is the
intelligence of the sphere of the
moon. In a tradition from our Lord,
the Apostle of God, [he says]: “All
of the sons of Adam shall
disintegrate except the rump bone of
the tail.” This is an allusion to the
permanent, individual prime matter
which is the bearer of generation
and corruption.

Wamīḍ [10.5.3]
The student [of Ibn Sīnā]
states in the Physics of the Taḥṣīl:
The form of the world [of
generation and corruption] is
particularized in a single matter
by which all of the things
contained in one world are
united together. It is not possible
for many worlds to exist [each
with a separate matter]. The
oneness of the world requires
this oneness to be actual, not
hypothetical. Therefore, it has
oneness of existence actually
but multiplicity of existence
[415] with respect to its parts
potentially. Thus everything
after the First must have a
possibility which is one actually
and multiple potentially and an
existence which is one actually
multiple potentially. This
oneness is the oneness of the
system or what is common to it.
 Our companion states in
the Physics of the Shifā’ at the end
of the second chapter of On the
Heavens:
The form of the world [of
generation and corruption] is
particularized in a single matter
by which all of the things
contained in one world are
united together. It is not possible
for many worlds to exist [each
with a separate matter].
Therefore, this world is one and
complete, and the varieties of
simple natures which can exist
are realized within it. The
circular and rectilinear motions
 are connected to the beings and
the composites among them.
[427] Its fashioner is full
because He causes one of them
to attain the perfection of the
Necessary in wisdom according
to the exigency of possibility in
the nature of existence without
need of augmentation for it.
The teacher of the Craft,
Aristotle, says:
The Creator in His pre-eternity
and transcendence is prior to
and exalted above change. His
dominion will last forever, and
it is through Him that
permanence endures. He made
His creatures in stages, and He
created the immaterial
substance as a habitation for the
forms. He attached to it that
which is like them from among
the spirits everlastingly and
without end. They occurred
before time, before when, and
before where.[428] He created
the fifth nature in everlasting,
not in time, and He adorned it
with the most noble of
attributes. From this it follows
that the creation of the sphere
should be magnified and
extolled due to its adhering to
the command of the Creator and
 its carrying out what the Creator
has willed, for its carrying out
is one and continuous and its
duration is unceasing. The
natures are passive, the sphere
is active. Hermes, the most
ancient in knowledge, has put it
best where he said: “Man is the
small world, and the sphere is
the great world. Whatever
belongs to the category of form
is nobler than what belongs to
the category of matter.”
I say: If you observe this Great
Man, which is the whole system of
existence in its comprehensive
individuality, it will be apparent to
you that there is no creator, no ruler,
no mover, and no manager but God
(glorified be He), since there is no
existent outside of the system of the
world of possibility in its totality
except for Him. The incorporeal
soul only rules over and manages
the body by the leave of God, not
through creation and existentiation
[of its own]. With regard to His
sovereignty over the individual of
the Great Man, it is through
providence, wisdom, fashioning,
creation, emanation, preservation,
guidance, governance, and
management. Since the system of the
whole is the most excellent thing in
the world of possibility, and the
most perfect and the most noble, it
[416] calls to remembrance the
attributes of the perfection of its
Creator and its Fashioner with the
tongue of its own perfection and
excellence, it testifies to the
Existent who is real in every
respect, and extols Him as perfect
and beyond perfection. It praises
only His reality, extols His beauty,
and celebrates His praise and His
remembrance with the attributes of
glory and perfection. Consequently,
the system of existence is itself the
praise of God in the most perfect
manner and the most consummate
respect. Indeed, the expression of
praise in His words “Praise be to
God, the Lord of the worlds”
consists of the sum of the world of
existence in its comprehensive
individuality, its universal entity,
and its solitary system. God praises
himself with the most perfect praise
through the system of existence
which pours forth from His
providence and proceeds from His
grace. Let it be known.

Wamīḍ [10.5.4]
O people! Are you not
assured in yourselves that there is
not an atom in the heavens or the
earth of the contingent world whose
actual existence does not lead back
necessarily in the chain of
dependence to the essentially
necessary agent Creator? The
necessity of existence is only
possible by dependence upon the
real Existent, the essentially
necessary Being in the stage of His
own essence. His knowledge of
whatever is good in the system of
existence including the proportion
(niṣāb) of its perfection pours forth
from Him. His agency of that good
is by means of His goodness, and
its emanation and its existence
proceeds from Him without need of
the occurrence of another thing at
all. His knowledge of the manner
(wajh) of the good and the
proportion of perfection is identical
to His will and His consent, not by
a desire or an intention, and to His
providence and His choice, not by a
desire or impulsion.
Therefore, it is certainly
only possible for whatever in
within the compass of existence and
the world of possibility to be good
for the system of existence and
complementary to the station of its
perfection, for it is included, by
demonstrative necessity, in His
knowledge being a cause of it, due
to its passing from potentiality into
actuality.
Know that His knowledge
being a cause (tasabbub) of things,
and the proceeding of things from
His providence in a state of
conjunction (ijtimā‘), unity
(ta’aḥḥud), and summation (or:
wholeness ijmāl) is
predetermination (qaḍā’), while in
a state particularization,
multiplicity, and gradual
unfoldment, it is fate (qadar). I am
not saying that His summative
knowledge is its predetermination
and His detailed knowledge is its
fate, as the generality of the
summarizers and imitators propose,
for that is a false statement and a
misleading conjecture. [There are
two reasons for this.]
As for [417] the first,
knowledge is the aspect of
something insofar as it is disclosed
and evident, not absent and hidden.
Predetermination and fate are the
aspect of something with respect to
the connection of agency itself and
the issuing of the Command for its
existence. Therefore,
predetermination is the primary
origination of the root of the
substance of something, its
fashioning, and the issuing of the
command “Be!” with respect to its
determination and its existence,
belonging to all primary originated
and fashioned things in their
collective solitary system in
accordance with the knowledge of
their being good in the perfect
system of existence and
complementary to the station of its
excellence and its perfection. Fate
is the existentiation of something
and its emanation with respect to
the particularity of its essence and
its entity due to the realization of
successive causes which lead to it
in its particularity in accordance
with the prior knowledge of its
goodness and the providence
necessary for being willed. Fate is
the particularization (tafṣīl) of the
summation (or: wholeness ijmāl) of
the primal predetermination. Both
are aspects deriving from the
necessity of the agency pouring
forth from God’s knowledge and
providence and the existentiating
command proceeding from His will
(mashiyya) and His purpose
(irāda).
As for the second, summation
and detail in the knowledge of the
soul are two modes of disclosure
(inkishāf) with respect to the form
of knowledge impressed in the
tablet of the substance of the soul
due to a single object of knowledge
being one, simple, and summative
or multiple, composite, and
detailed. The disclosure of the
detailed form is more intense, more
complete, more abundant, and
greater. The difference with respect
to the two forms of summation and
detail is only through intensity and
weakness, increase and decrease in
evidentness and disclosure. This is
a description of the mode of
perception and its order, not by a
certain thing on the side of the
perceived which enters into the
reality of the object of knowledge
in the detailed form, but not the
summative form. Otherwise,
summation and detail could not be
two aspects belonging to one
particular reality, but rather there
would undoubtedly be two things
dissimilar in quiddity, and the
assumption would be violated.
It is therefore certainly
necessary for the object of
knowledge of the two forms to be
one in reality. The only difference
is in the form of knowledge and the
mode of knowledge, not in the
object of knowledge. The one
simple form of summation is
compatible with the multiple forms
of particularization. The two
summative and detailed knowledges
differ in the stage of disclosure
through intensity and weakness or
through increase and decrease. Both
of them are an actual knowledge,
not a potential knowledge, as the
author of the Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and
the Muṭāraḥāt supposed, and in
which the Leader of the Doubters
imitated him. It is clear, as we have
explained more than once, that its
application is not possible to the
knowledge of God.
Is it not manifest through sure
demonstration by [418] way of the
compounded intellect that His
knowledge of what is other than His
essence is through His knowledge
of His essence, which is identical
to the stage of His essence itself?
Consequently, His essence, which
is genuinely one in every respect, is
identical to His perfect and supra-
perfect knowledge of all things.
Intensification in knowledge and
increase in disclosure is
inconceivable in this case, since the
basis of the evidentness of each
thing and its disclosure is the
evidentness of His own essence to
His essence by virtue of His
essence and the non-hiddenness of
His essence from His essence,
which is itself the non-hiddenness
of any of the things from Him
(exalted be His sovereignty). There
is no role for the existence of the
things in this in any respect at all.
Consequently, His complete
presential knowledge of each thing
is both prior to the existence of
things and with their existence in
the same way. Therefore, a clear
mind cannot allow the ascription of
summation and particularization to
His perfect knowledge which
encompasses each thing from pre-
eternity to everlasting before the
creation of things in perpetuity and
after their creation. But rather what
is correct is the dependence of
these two upon His objects of
knowledge, which are the things,
for they, with respect to their
essences, exist summatively at one
time and in particularized mode at
another. His perfect knowledge of
them in the stages of their collective
existence and their particularized
existences is only describable by
summation and particularization
when “knowledge” is expressed
and it means the object of
knowledge. This occurs in various
expressions, as in his words,
exalted be the speaker: “Nor shall
they encompass aught of His
knowledge except as He
wills.”[429]
In short, His fate (qadar)
pertains to existents with respect to
successive causes which lead to
each existent, existing in the
particularity of its determination.
The particularity of its entity is the
particularization of His primal
predetermination (qaḍā’) with
respect to it, due to His knowledge
being a cause of the manner of the
good in the system of existence in
relation to its existence in
perpetuity, which is completely
conjoined with the individuality of
the solitary world of the whole in
its possibility and its actual
existence. Therefore,
predetermination is the relation of
the agency of the real Creator, in
accord with His knowledge and His
providence, to the Great Man in the
stage of its unitary, collective
individuality. And fate is the
relation of His agency to this Great
Man in the stage of the
differentiation of its members and
its parts and the particularization of
its mixtures, its elements, its spirits,
and its powers due to the
realization of the successive causes
leading to the specific
characteristics of their details. Let
it be pondered.

Wamīḍ [10.5.5]
Our companion states at the
end of the Third Art of the Physics
of the Shifā’:
All of the earthly states [419]
dependent upon the celestial
motions, even choices and
wills, are certainly things
created after they were not, and
every creature (ḥādith) created
after it was not has a generating
cause and principle. This leads
to motion, and from the motions
to the circular motion. The
explanation of this is done. Our
 choices also are subject to the
celestial motions. Earthly states
of motion and rest overtaking
each other with harmonious
regularity are causes and
motives for intention (qaṣd).
This is the fate (qadar) which
predetermination (qaḍā’) has
necessitated. Predetermination
is the first, solitary divine act
exalted above all the
quantifiable things deriving
from it.
He states in Chapter One,
Book Ten, of the Metaphysics of the
Shifā’:
The principles of all these
things lead to nature, will, and
accident. The principle of
nature is from there. Our
volitions exist after they were
not, and whatever exists after it
was not has a cause. Every will
we have has a cause, and the
cause of that will is not a will
leading back in an infinite
series. But rather certain earthly
and celestial things occur
externally, and the earthly leads
back to the celestial. The
conjunction of all of this
necessitates the existence of
will. As for accident, it occurs
from the collisions of these
things.[430] If all things are
analyzed, they depend upon
causes which existentiate them
which have descended from
God. The predetermination of
God is the first simple creation,
and fate is what
predetermination becomes
directed to in stages. Methinks it
necessitates the collective unity
of simple things which are
related, insofar as they are
simple, to the predetermination
and the primal divine
Command. Were a man enabled
to know all of the creatures in
heaven and earth and the natures
 of these worlds, he would
understand the nature of
whatever will occur in the
future.
He states in the Ishārāt in
Namaṭ Seven:
Every thing is a consequence of
Him, whether by an
intermediary or without an
intermediary, leading to Him
himself. His fate, which is the
particularization of His primal
predetermination, is a necessary
realization, since that which is
not necessary does not exist, as
you know.
 The Leader of the
Doubters states in his commentary
[on the Ishārāt]:
As for the two terms
“predetermination” (qadā’) and
“fate” (qadar), he means by
predetermination His first
effect, for the predetermination
is a single decree (ḥukm) upon
which all particularization
depends and the first effect
[420] as well. As for fate, it is
the other effects proceeding
from Him both vertically and
horizontally, because they, in
relation to the first effect, take
the course of the
 particularization of the whole,
which is fate.
The brilliant commentator, the Seal
of the Most Excellent Scholars
states:
I say with respect to his
position: Inasmuch as all the
universal and particular forms
of the existents, which are
infinite, occur, insofar as they
are intelligible, in the
intelligible world through the
primary origination of the
necessary First Being, and the
existentiation of those among
them connected to matter
through matter by primary
origination is impossible—
since it is unable to receive two
forms simultaneously, let alone
multiple forms, yet the divine
generosity necessitates the
perfecting of matter by the
introduction of those forms in it
and the drawing out of that
which is potential in it into
actuality by receiving those
forms—He has ordained,
through the subtlety of His
wisdom, a time uninterrupted in
the past and in the future in
which those things pass from
potentiality into actuality one
after another. Thus the forms
during the totality of that time
become existent in their matters,
and the matters are perfected
through them. Since this is
determined, know that
predetermination (qadā’)
consists of the existence of all
the existents in the intelligible
world united in a summative
(or: collective mujmala) way
through primary origination.
[431] Fate (qadar) consists of
their existence in their external
matters after the occurrence of
their preconditions in a detailed
(or: particularized mufaṣṣala)
way, one after another. This is
in accord with what has come
down in the Revelation in his
words, exalted be the speaker:
“Nothing exists whose
treasuries are not with Us, and
We have not sent it down but in
a known measure.”[432] The
intelligible substances and what
is with them exist in the
predetermination and fate once
in two aspects.[433] The
corporeal and what is with it
exist in these two twice. From
this the meaning of the words of
the Master: “Each thing which
the First (exalted be He) causes
to exist by an intermediary or
 without an intermediary, His
fate, which is the
particularization of His primal
predetermination, leads to that
very thing necessarily,” is
apparent.
I say: We have made it
clear through demonstrations, which
we have already given, that it is not
possible for the meaning of the non-
interruption of time in the past and
the future to be the infinity of its
actual quantifiable extension with
respect to extended magnitude in the
sense of infinite magnitude in area.
[434] Be not uninformed.
 Wamīḍ [10.5.6]
The time has now come for
us to recite to you that
predetermination and fate are of
two kinds: (1) epistemological
(‘ilmī) with respect to [421] the
existence of things in His
knowledge, and (2) real (‘aynī)
with respect to their actual
determination in the real world.
Moreover, the things considered
which are encompassed by
predetermination and fate are of
three kinds: (1) the whole
harmonious system of existence,
i.e., the Great Man as an object of
consideration in its universal,
solitary, harmonious individuality;
(2) the primary originated things of
the world of Command consisting
of its parts, if it is considered in
differentiated view; (3) the
generated things of the world of [the
physical] creation in differentiated
view.
The predetermination
considered in relation to the one
harmonious system of the Great
Man is epistemological only with
respect to its being evident in God’s
knowledge by virtue of His
knowledge of His solitary essence,
which is its complete efficient
cause. His perfect knowledge is the
cause of it, and its being the most
perfect and complete system which
the nature of possibility is capable
of realizing is due to His agency of
it. Its predetermined existence is
posterior to this epistemological
predetermination associated with it
in two ways: by an essential
posteriority pertaining to the
intelligible order and by a perpetual
posteriority pertaining to creation in
perpetuity. The fate considered in
relation to it [the Great Man] is real
only with respect to the dependence
of its existence in the domain of
perpetuity and the heart of the real
world, after its non-being in the
stage of its essence and after its real
non-existence in perpetuity, upon
His knowledge and His providence
(exalted be His sovereignty). There
is no predetermination and fate in
relation to it apart from these two.
Therefore, its real existence in
perpetuity is as though it were the
particularization of its
epistemological existence, which
comprises His perfect knowledge
of its real, solitary essence, which
is the form of knowledge of the
totality of existents.
Epistemological predetermination
is connected to the divine
substances and what is with them
among the things that the Creator
fashioned without any matter[435]
and created everlastingly (bi’l-
abad),[436] not temporally, in the
domain of perpetuity, in accord
with their existence in His
knowledge (glorified be He). His
knowledge and His providence is
the cause of their primary
origination and their fashioning and
their passing from essential,
absolute non-being into the actuality
of existence and determination and
from the seal of real non-existence
into existence in the domain of
perpetuity.
Real predetermination
pertains to the aspect of their
emanation [i.e., the divine
substances] from the Creator and
the Maker and their passing from
absolute non-being into actual
existence and from real non-
existence into existence in
perpetuity by reason of Him,
inclusive of the entire harmonious,
unitary system of the totality of
existence. Real fate pertains to the
aspect of their emanation and their
existence from their Creator in
perpetuity with respect to the
particular characteristics of their
entities by particularization, not
with respect to their aspect in the
one harmonious system of the
whole. This is the meaning of
[Ṭūṣī’s words] “the intelligible
substances [422] and what is with
them exist in the predetermination
and fate once[437] in two aspects.”
As for the temporally
generated things pertaining to
material bodies and what is with
them, since they have existence in
perpetuity, existence in time,
existence in the harmonious system
of the whole, existence with respect
to the aspect of their particular
characteristics as such by
particularization, and similarly a
universal, formal existence
impressed in the tablets of the
transcendent immaterial
intelligences, which are the noblest
species and the supreme concourse
of devoted cherubs and favored
angels, and a formal existence, also,
both universal and particular,
impressed in the minds of the
celestial souls and their
[imaginative] faculties, which are
the species of managing angels,
both incorporeal and corporeal, the
stages of predetermination and fate
are certainly multiple by reason of
this in relation to this kind of
existent.
The last of the stages is
exclusively fate, which is not a
predetermination at all, due to its
being pure particularization with no
further particularization in existence
after it. It is the existence of the
temporally generated things
occurring in their times and their
moments gradually and
successively, by elapsing and
renewal, in accord with successive
dispositions occurring in the
extension of time through
successive causes which lead to
them.
The highest summative,
existential stage of the primal
divine predetermination, with
respect to determination (taqarrur)
in the heart of the real world, is the
pure existential predetermination,
which is not a fate in relation to an
existential predetermination before
it at all, due to its being the absolute
summation (ijmāl) without another
summation prior to it in the real
world, even though it is a fate in
relation to the epistemological
predetermination[438] with respect
to occurrence in the perfect
knowledge of God, which
encompasses each thing due to His
knowledge of its solitary essence
prior essentially to the other stages
of predetermination and fate and
prior also with an eternal, separate
priority in existence. This primal,
summative existential
predetermination following the
primal epistemological
predetermination is the divine Book
characterized sometimes as “the
Mother Book,” sometimes as “the
Preserved Tablet,” and sometimes
as “the Lucid Book,” which
contains everything moist and dry in
existence, in every detail. It is
nothing but the sum of all existents
from the beginning of pre-eternity
until the farthest reach of
everlasting commensurate with the
existence of everything in the
domain of perpetuity altogether. It is
the Most Great Book of God
containing every substance, every
letter, every word, every accident,
[423] and every dot and diacritical
mark belonging to those letters and
words. Summation in this stage
implies the absence of progression
and succession of one thing after
another and the presence of
[collective] order and harmony, as
a result of which all existents in this
aspect are like one existent. The
remaining epistemological and
existential stages are intermediate
between the highest, wholly
summative stage and the last, purely
particularizing stage. Each one of
them is a predetermination in
relation to what follows it among
the posterior stages and a fate in
relation to what precedes it among
the prior stages. Let it be
recognized.

Wamīḍ [10.5.7]
Often the First Intelligence
or the world of intelligences as a
whole is called “the Preserved
Tablet,” “the Mother Book,” and
“the Lucid Book,” because the
forms impressed within it are
preserved from change and
transformation, and because it is a
divine book which contains the
forms of all existing things without
progression and succession. The
same applies to the Most Great
Book of Existence in relation to the
real essences and entities as a
whole. The celestial souls are
called “the book of erasing and
recording” due to the erasing and
recording of what is impressed in
them associated with fate, including
forms which in the future will
belong to temporally measured
creatures. Sometimes time is called
“the book of erasing and
recording,” due to its being the
world of change and transformation,
elapsing and renewal.
Consequently, it is the Book of real
fate with respect to the final stages
of existence in the external world.
In short, the affair with respect to
the Book of Fate is the opposite of
the affair with respect to the Mother
Book, which is the primal
predetermination, since no change
and transformation, no erasing and
recording, takes place in it at all.
This is the meaning of the
possibility of alteration (badā’)
with respect to fate (qadar), but not
with respect to predetermination
(qaḍā’). Let it be known.
 Wamīḍ [10.5.8]
Since God is the possessor
of infinite active power, He
therefore created a matter having
infinite receptive potential to
receive the emanation. Since divine
Generosity requires for the
perfecting of matter the introduction
of infinite forms in it, and the
passing of what is potential in it
from potentiality into actuality by
receiving those forms, and since a
single matter is unable to receive
two different forms simultaneously,
let alone more than two, He
therefore ordained through the
subtlety of His wisdom a time
uninterrupted in continuity during
which [424] those things pass from
potentiality into actuality one after
another, as a result of which the
forms become existent in their
matters during the whole of time
and the substance of matter is
perfected by them.[439] And He
created a sphere having an
uninterrupted circular motion by
reason of which the states of matter
and its dispositions vary with the
variance of its motion.[440]
Thereby form after form arrives
upon matter due to disposition after
disposition [in matter]. This is the
fate after which there is no other
fate, and it is the particularization
(tafṣīl) of that which is summative
of existence in the primal
predetermination.
Know that an actual
numerical infinity is impossible in
fate, as is confirmed by
demonstration. It is only possible
for it to have a non-ceasing infinity
corresponding to the continuity of
continuous, flowing, gradual
creation, due to the impossibility of
the termination of the emanation of
the agent Emanator and the
necessity of divine generosity being
everlastingly given and
continuously bestowed upon
receptive matter. As for the primal
divine predetermination, how much
numerical infinity do you wish? We
have recited to you that the Lord of
predetermination and fate is beyond
what is finite as such and even what
is infinite as such with respect to
His generosity, His mercy, His
power, and His knowledge. He is
not restrained from encompassing
what has no numerical end, whether
in a summative or detailed sense.
“God is the All-Encompassing, the
All-Knowing.”[441] [And we have
recited to you] that an infinite series
of effects is impossible, and that
existents with respect to existence
in perpetuity do not have any
succession (tarattub) between
them, so that it is impossible for
them to have a numerical infinity.
Number itself is composed from
units, not from the degrees of
number. Hence, succession is not
admissible at all in number, in the
sense that were it also possible,
infinity would not be in the
direction of the succession leading
to the unit one in that direction.
Consequently, the relation of
predetermination to fate appears to
be like the relation of hypothetical,
intelligible, universal division of
the body to estimative particular
division, and like the relation of
rational, unitary, simple, summative
knowledge in the rational soul to its
multiple particularized knowledges.
Thus the real existence belonging to
a temporal thing is a summative
predetermination insofar as it is an
actual realization in the Book of
perpetuity and a presential
representation with the All-Seeing,
the Real, and it is a particularized
fate insofar as it is an actual being
in the horizon of the extension of
time and a generated occurrence
within the boundaries of the domain
of elapsing and renewal. It is most
fitting to call temporal existents
with respect to their occurrence in
the Book of perpetuity and the
Tablet of predetermination “real
ideas” (muthul ‘ayniyya),
“predetermined inscriptions”
“existential forms,” or “perpetual
letters,” and with respect to their
occurrence in the snare of time and
the net [425] of fate “generated
entities” and “beings of fate.” The
summation (or: wholeness ijmāl) of
predetermination is the aspect of
harmonious, coexistential unity,
while the particularization (tafṣīl)
of fate is the aspect of discrete,
differentiated multiplicity.
 Wamīḍ [10.5.9]
Methinks, therefore,
insofar as you are certain that the
totality of the system of the whole is
the individual temple of the Great
Man, and the primal, divine
Providence is the universal agent
Nature, which preserves, sustains,
and manages absolutely by an
encompassing and pervasive
knowledge, complete and perfect
power, and consummate wisdom;
that the rule of the noblest
possibility and the necessary
correspondence between the
complete cause and its effect in the
most perfect way are such that it is
not within the nature of possibility
to conceive of a system of existence
more excellent and more perfect
than what already exists; and that
the notion of a system more perfect
than this one is like other
essentially impossible notions
which have no corresponding
reality; and since the knowledge of
the true Creator of the system of the
good in existence is a knowledge
without any deficiency in it, and His
active liberal mercy is a mercy
having no obstacle to restrain it,
and that very knowledge is a cause
from which its effect proceeds and
a spring from which its dependent
object pours forth, and the system of
the whole does not have any matter
to hold it back from the highest
excellence or any dispositional
possibility to keep it from the
utmost perfection; then it is
certainly necessary for the whole to
have ever existed with the utmost
perfection and only possible for the
good in it to be as it is. It is
impossible for anything to belong to
the whole, whether of obligatory
perfections or supererogatory, that
it does not already possess actually.
For each thing in the system of the
whole, insofar as it is a part of the
constitution of the system of the
whole, is as it should be in its
substance with respect to the system
of the whole. Its function is as it
should be, even though it be
passive. Hence, its affection
(infi‘āl) is as it should be, even
though it be spatial and temporal.
Thus it is in the place where it
should be and in the time when it
should be.
As you know, in the
separate light, in other words, the
intelligible substance, the object of
“what it is” is the same as “why it
is.” Its efficient cause is identical to
its final cause. Moreover, the cause
of its beginning is the same as the
cause of its completion, since a
beginning which becomes obsolete
and a completion which diminishes
is inconceivable here. In like
manner, in the system of the whole,
which is the Great Man, “what” and
“why” are the same. If the what of
the total system is known, the why
of it is also known. It is understood
that its beginning is the same as its
completion, its existence is the
same as the station [426] of its
perfection, and its agent is the same
as its goal. It is incomprehensible
for it to have a possible good which
is anticipated and a potential
perfection which is desired, since
this is only possible for what has a
matter and requires a disposition
subject to a limit and a capability
associated with a fixed time. As for
that whose determination and
existence is not in matter, it is not
possible for it to exist debarred
from its perfection and separated
from its good and its excellence.
The system of the whole, therefore,
is the most excellent and the most
perfect it is possible for it to be,
and no evil enters into existence
with respect to it at all. The
generous true Maker in His essence
is its agent and its goal, and the
source of its beginning, which is the
same as the station of its completion
and perfection, everlastingly, not in
time. The divine Munificent Being
gives to every existent that which is
in its capacity and the nature of its
possibility to receive.

Wamīḍ [10.5.10]
It is consequently apparent
that whatever is in the system of
existence, from volitional, natural,
compulsory, and accidental things,
depends upon emanation from the
Originator of the whole and the
Fashioner of the system. A
volitional in relation to the system
of the whole is a natural, even
though in relation to an individual
particular system in its particular
individuality it may be volitional,
compulsory, or accidental. Every
set time (ajal),[442] whether it be
natural or interrupted in relation to
a particular man, is natural in
relation to the Great Man, for every
life belonging to a particular man,
animal, or plant, or to any
constitution, whether composed
naturally or artificially, is in
relation to the whole system of the
world a natural life which the
decree of the Universal Nature has
necessitated, and with respect to its
relation to the efficient Cause
(exalted and gloried be He), it is a
natural effect, which His pervasive
bounty issuing from His perfect, all-
encompassing knowledge of the
system of the good has required in
the most abundant of ways. This is
the path of the course of the
demonstration and the starting point
of the compounded intellect, upon
which the divine philosophers are
agreed.
The student [Bahmanyār]
has stated in the Physics of the
Taḥṣīl:
A chapter on how evil is
contained in the divine
predetermination. The allusion
is to the system of the world.
You know, according to our
doctrine on the Necessary
Existent by virtue of himself,
that this system is the real
system, and there is no system
more excellent or more perfect
than it. You know that the agent
intelligences are a consequence
of the absolute good and of its
necessitation, that the spheres
proceed from it also and they
imitate it in their motions, so
that they are receptive and
receive its likeness, and that the
system of these generated things
beneath the spheres is
dependent upon the motions of
the spheres, [427] which are the
most excellent of motions. It is
therefore necessary for this
system to be existent in the
world of nature also in the most
perfect and most excellent way
possible without another system
more perfect than it. Nothing
among the existents is an
accidental thing, but rather each
of them is either natural in its
essence, like the movement of a
stone to the lowest point, or
natural in relation to the whole,
although not natural in relation
to its essence, like the existence
of a hand tool belonging to a
man. And [you know] that
volitions are created, and every
creature has infinite causes, as
you know, as a result of which
their dependence upon the
motion which is proper to them
is also an infinite existence
peculiar to the continuous
eternal motion which is the
motion of the sphere. And [you
know] that motion proceeds
from the First (exalted be He),
so that it is necessary for our
volition thereby also to be
dependent upon the Necessary
Existent by virtue of himself. He
is its cause. If it is asked: Do
we have the power to act or
not? We say: We have the power
to act in relation to units, but in
relation to the whole, we do not
have such a power, except as
ordained….
Man being dead has no
cause, for the heat which leads
to the corruption of the
substance of man is an essential
constituent of bodies and one of
their concomitants. There is no
cause for such a thing. But the
First is the cause whereby he
remains for a time, which time
is the best possible for him to
 remain. This is known through
providence. Every life in
relation to the whole is natural,
even if it is not natural in an
absolute sense. In short, all
evils arise through relations and
in relation to individuals. But
with respect to the whole there
is no evil.[443]
Our companion states in
the Third Art of the Physics of the
Shifā’ in the chapter on the periods
of generation and corruption:
Every creature has a set time
(ajal) which is required by the
power which manages its body,
since it is a finite corporeal
power whose action is
necessarily limited. If it were
unlimited, matter would [still]
only preserve the moisture [of
the body] until a set time due to
internal and external causes
which disintegrate the moisture,
and the causes are an obstacle
to taking compensation from
what is disintegrated. Every
faculty of the body and every
matter has a limit which each of
them requires and which cannot
be exceeded. This means that
their causes occur in accord
with what is necessary, which is
the natural set time. However,
 other causes may occur through
the occurrence of a corruptive
factor or the loss of a beneficial
support, as a result of which that
power becomes deficient in its
action [428] from attaining its
goal. For this reason some of
the set times are natural [i.e.,
they reach their natural end] and
others are interrupted. But all
are by a fate, and all the earthly
states are dependent upon the
celestial motions, even choices
and volitions.
The Teacher of the
Peripatetics and their instructor
states in the Theology in Mīmar
Five:
Temporal things are only
generated through the set time
(or: extinction ajal) of other
temporal things. That is to say,
since temporal things are
extended and unfolded [in time],
and they are separate from the
First Maker, some of them are
the cause of the generation of
others. If all of them were
simultaneous, and not extended
and unfolded [in time] and not
separate from the First Maker,
then some of them would not be
the cause of the generation of
others, but instead the First
 Maker would be the cause of the
generation of all of them.
Therefore, since some of them
are the cause of others, the
cause only produces the effect
through the extinction of a
particular thing. The First
Cause, on the other hand, does
not produce its effects through
the extinction of a particular
thing.

Wamīḍ [10.5.11]
Is it not a self-evident fact
that the good is what each thing
desires, seeks, and aspires to, and
whose measure of perfection with
respect to its rank and station in
existence is completed by it, and
whose essence is drawn near to its
goal through the requisites of the
perfections and their supererogatory
aspects, and the complements of its
reality? Therefore, evil has no
essence, but rather it is the
privation of an essence, the
privation of the perfection of an
essence, or the privation of a
particular perfection belonging to
an essence. Whenever there is
neither a privation of the essence
nor the privation of a certain
perfection which it seeks, then it is
inconceivable for there to be any
evil at all. The whole of existence
is good, and all of evil is a
privation. Therefore, if a certain
existence requires or becomes
company to the privation of a
perfection, it is described as an evil
accidentally, insofar as it is
associated with that privation, not
insofar as it is an existence in
reality. All of evil, then, is
connected to what is potential,
while all of good pertains to
passing from potentiality into
actuality. We have already informed
you that the absolute privation of
the possible is completely due to
the absence of its complete cause,
regardless of whether its privation
is from the beginning or after
existence. Therefore, the
dependency of evil upon the
privation of the cause of the
existence of good is only possible
with respect to the deficiency of the
nature of possibility or the
deficiency of receptive matter.
[429]
Is it not clear to you that
among the existents is that which is
actually real in every respect, and
this is solely the essentially
necessary Self-Subsistent One
(glorified be His remembrance). He
is the Real Good in reality and the
Pure Good in every circumstantial
mode. Among them is that which is
devoid of a certain kind of
potentiality in the real world in the
first creation due to its sanctity from
attachment to prime matter and
dispositional potentiality. It is not
free, however, from association
with potentiality with respect to the
root of the substance of the essence
in the state of the unqualified
essence as such with respect to the
nature of essential possibility nor
from the priority of real non-
existence to the essence in
perpetuity due to the inferiority of
the degree of possibility and the
lack of capacity of the substance of
the essence to necessitate receiving
eternity. This kind of existent is
above the generation of immaterial
essences and intelligible
substances. The only evil in this
case pertains to the essential
priority of non-being to being in the
stage of the essence and the priority
of real non-existence to the actual
determination and existence in the
domain of perpetuity, not with
respect to the separation of the
actual determination and existence
from a certain perfection among the
possible perfections and a certain
good among the goods anticipated
in the real world. As for that which
is completely afflicted with
association with a certain kind of
potentiality with respect to being
stained with the drosses of the
world of nature and soiled with the
impurities of matter, this kind is the
totality of what is under the
generation of temporal things in the
world of the elemental natures,
which is filled with various kinds
of evil, insofar as it has been
smitten and blighted with defects
and vices and blocked from goods
and perfections. The cause of evil
here in general is the association of
privation with existence and non-
being with being. The non-existence
of the effect and its nullification are
only conceivable with the non-
existence of the cause and its
nullification.
It is therefore clear that the
good, absolutely, is the sanctuary of
the divine world, confined to the
court of its door and its precincts. It
is either the very essence of the true
Creator and His existence or it
consists of His emanation and His
bounty. Whatever belongs to
possible existence of good and
perfection is from the grace of the
primary origination of the
Necessary Being and is an
exudation of His fashioning, even
the root of the substance of the
essence and the reality and the
principle of the determination and
existence, since it does not have in
the substance of itself and in the
nature of its possibility save non-
being, destruction, potentiality,
[430] and privation. This is as it is
stated in the noble Revelation and
the wise Qur’ān: “Whatever good
happens to you is from God, and
whatever evil happens to you is
from yourself.”[444] The soul and
the body are a trust, and the day
will surely come when the trusts
will be returned.
 Wamīḍ [10.5.12]
In sum, the absolute good
is that which everything desires and
that by which the existence of
everything is fulfilled. The Self-
Subsisting, the Necessary Being
(exalted be His remembrance) is
pure existence, pure light, pure
perfection, and pure excellence. He
is perfect in every respect and
beyond perfection. Every possible
essence loves Him and longs for
Him in the nature of its possibility,
and every caused reality worships
Him and humbles itself before Him
in the constitution of its effectness.
He (exalted be His sovereignty) is
the Pure Good without
qualification. It is not possible for
an essence which is possible in
itself to be good by virtue of itself
because its essence in itself does
not necessitate existence; hence, its
essence in itself bears privation
(‘adam), and whatever bears
privation in any respect is not free,
with respect to its essence and all
of its aspects, from evil and
deficiency. Consequently, the Pure
Good can only be the essentially
necessary Being.
It is said also that “good”
belongs to what benefits and
provides perfections to things. It is
necessary for the real Existent, who
is necessary in Himself, to be in
His essence the Emanator and the
Provider of every reality and every
perfection of a reality. From Him
flows forth and emanates every
essence and every perfection of an
essence, and every existence and
every perfection of an existence. He
in this respect is also a pure good
which no deficiency enters and no
evil touches. It is not possible for
anything besides Him to be a pure
good or an absolute good in this
respect either. Let it be ascertained.
 Wamīḍ [10.5.13]
Evil with respect to
association with potentiality due to
the nature of possibility, i.e., non-
being in the stage of the essence and
real non-existence before existence
in the domain of perpetuity, is not
considered in the path we are upon
due to its forgiveness and its
mending by actually acquired
goodness with respect to
determination and existence in the
real world through the emanation of
the efficient cause. Our concern
now is actual evil in terms of the
privation of perfection in the real
world. We say in accord with our
companion in Book Nine, [Chapter
6,] of the Metaphysics of the Shifā’,
that essential evil [431] is privation
(‘adam), not any privation, but a
privation requisite of the nature of
something of the secondary
perfections belonging to its species
and its nature. Accidental evil, on
the other hand, is the depriver or
obstructer of the perfection from its
realization. The non-good
associated with an absolute
privation only pertains to its term,
since it is not an actual evil. If it
had a certain actuality, it would not
be general evil, since it would have
a goodness due to actualization.
 Therefore, evil does not
attach to anything whose existence
is according to its utmost perfection
and has no potential. Evil only
attaches to that whose nature has a
potential due to the matter bearing
its dispositional potentiality. The
world of praise and glorification,
therefore, is absolutely devoid of
the aspects of evil. That whose
potential is lesser, its share of
freedom from evil is greater and
more plentiful.
Evil attaches to matter due
to (1) something accidental in the
first creation and (2) something
which supervenes afterwards in the
second creation. As for the
accidental thing at the beginning, if
it is accidental to a matter at the
beginning of its existence, that
which is empowered in it is a
certain shape which blocks it from
its disposition particular to the
perfection which is being afflicted
by an evil corresponding to it, like
the matter from which a man or a
horse is generated. since it has
occurred to it through accidental
causes which made it a support of
the constitution and a staff of the
substance. Consequently, it does not
receive the inscribing and forming
of the perfect constitution, but the
form is distorted and the object of
the nature with respect to the
perfection of the constitution is not
realized, not because the agent is
hindered or prevented but because
the recipient is not prepared and
disposed to receive it.
As for the following
supervening thing, either it is an
impediment from outside which
comes between that which seeks
perfection and the perfecter, like
when the accumulation of many
clouds or the shadow of a tall
mountain obstructs the light of the
sun from ripening the fruit or
prevents a bleacher from
completing his task, or it is a
contrary within that which seeks
perfection that necessitates the
destruction of the perfection. For
example, the property of cold in
unburnt bricks is detrimental to
their perfection in their time, so that
their particular disposition and
what is subsequent to it is corrupted
thereby.
In short, “evil” is
applicable to (1) privative things
insofar as they are non-causative,
like the privation in each thing of
that which by its nature should
belong to it, like death, poverty, and
ignorance [in that which should be
living, abundant, and
knowledgeable], and it is
applicable to (2) existential things
also, like a certain existence which
obliges that which seeks a certain
perfection to be blocked from
reaching it and attaining its end,
[432] like contemptible,
blameworthy actions, such as
injustice and adultery, and their
sources among the reprehensible
traits and despicable attributes, and
like suffering and grief and that
which inflames them.
If we were to ponder on
all of this, we would find that cold,
for example, in itself, insofar as it
is a certain quality, or in relation to
its necessary cause and the causes
leading to it, is not evil, but rather it
is one of the perfections of the
system of existence. Its evil is only
in relation to the fruit with respect
to corrupting its seeds. The evil in
essence, therefore, is the
deprivation of the fruit from
attaining the perfections worthy of
it. The cold is evil accidentally due
to its leading to what is evil. The
same applies to clouds. Injustice
and adultery, also, insofar as they
issue from two powers, which are
anger and passion, for example, are
not from evil in anything, but rather
they are, in that circumstantial
mode, two perfections of those two
powers. “Evil” is only applicable
to them in relation to the oppressed
who is deprived of his good and his
perfection, or in relation to the just
law of a civilized state whose order
is disturbed by them, or in relation
to the rational soul with respect to
its weakness in reining in its two
animal powers and its turning away
thereby from the domain of light to
the abode of darkness and from the
world of sanctity to the soiled
world of the material nature. The
evil, in truth, therefore, is the
deprivation of one of those things
from the share of its perfection, the
portion of its prosperity, and the
splendor of its excellence. It is only
applicable to the causes leading to
it accidentally. The same applies to
the traits which consist of
principles and causes. Sufferings,
also, are not evil, insofar as they
are attainments (idrākāt) of certain
things, nor insofar as they are the
existence of those things in
themselves, nor with respect to
their emanation from their causes;
rather, their evil is only accidental
with respect to the state of the
sufferer deprived of the union of a
limb which naturally belongs to
him.
It is consequently
established that evil in its quiddity
is the privation of an existence, or
the privation of the perfection of an
existence, or the privation of a
certain perfection belonging to an
existent, due to the fact that that
privation is unworthy of it with
respect to the thing itself, or not a
cause to it, and due to the fact that
existents insofar as they are
existents and not insofar as they are
parts of the system of existence, are
not evil at all. It is only possible for
evil to pertain to them accidentally
when they are related to the
particular attributes of things
deprived of their perfections and
when they are considered with
respect to their relation to them, not
in terms of their essences, but with
respect to leading to those
privations. For this reason the evils
of the world are relative affairs
which are related to singular
specific individuals with respect to
considering their particular
attributes in separation from the
unified, harmonious system [433] of
all things in their entirety. But
within the boundary of themselves
and in relation to the whole, there is
no evil at all. Were anyone to
encompass the whole system of
existence and to consider all the
causes leading to the effects in
sequence descending from the
beginning of the whole, whether
vertically or horizontally, he would
see each thing in the way which is
necessary for existence and in
accord with the perfection which
the system seeks. He would not see
any actual evil in existence at all.
Let it be known.

Wamīḍ 10.5.14
If accidental relative evil
is considered with respect to
relation to individuals in their
particularities, know that things,
with respect to considering the
existence of accidental evil and its
privation, may be divided by
logical division into: (1) Things
whose existence is absolutely free
in every respect from necessitating
evil, imperfection, and corruption.
(2) Things whose existence is not
free from this at all and which
cannot obtain complete perfection
unless it is necessary for them to
exist in such a way that a certain
evil occurs from them in relation to
some things with the pressing
together of motions and the
collisions and striking together of
the objects of motion. (3) Evil
things absolutely whose accidental
evil is in existence in relation to
each thing, so that it is injured by
their existence, whichever thing it
may be, and nothing is benefited by
them at all. Their good is only with
respect to their existence in
themselves, not in relation to any
particular things in the system of the
whole apart from them.
The second division is
divided into (1) that in which
relative evil predominates over the
good relatively, (2) that in which
the two are equal to each other, and
(3) that in which relative good
predominates in relation to most
things, and its relative evil is
insignificant in relation to certain
parts of the system with their
infrequent conjunctions and
strikings together.
These are the five
divisions: The first is that in which
no relative evil exists. It is an
actual existent, since it emanates
necessarily from pure, divine
generosity, which is the source of
the necessity of the emanation of
good and true existence absolutely.
This refers to the intelligible
substances among the existents
which contain nothing [434]
potential and which cannot contain
a particular relative evil, since they
do not compete with any particular
existents nor does their existence
injure any particular things at all.
The second is that whose
goodness predominates over its
evil. This, also, therefore, is among
the good things of the system of
existence. Whenever its good is
dominant, it is positively good, and
it is necessary for its emanation to
be from pure generosity and primal
providence, insofar as a great good
does not bring about and produce as
a guard against a lesser evil a
greater evil by natural necessity.
This is like the nature of fire, for it
is not possible for it to be at its full,
beneficial virtue with respect to
completing the system of existence,
forming the constitution of the
temperaments, and fulfilling
innumerable and incalculable
wisdoms and benefits unless it is
such that whenever it happens to
contact animal bodies, it injures
them with its flames and its
exhalations and harms them with its
enkindlement and its blaze.
The emanation of these
two kinds is necessary from the
Bountiful, the Real, who in Himself
is the agent of every existence, the
giver of every perfection, and the
emanator of every good thing. For
were the outpouring from Him
restricted to the first type and this
second type did not proceed from
Him, He would be necessarily
deficient in His plentiful divine
mercy, impeded in His generosity,
and negligent of one of the two
kinds of goods included in the
manifold goods and great blessings.
As for the remaining three
kinds, which are (1) relative evil
absolutely in every respect, (2) that
whose evil is dominant, and (3) that
whose good and evil are equal, they
all belong to the categories of evil,
and their emanation from the
essentially Good, the providential
Emanator, and the perfect, wise
Agent is definitely impossible.
[445]
It may therefore be
summarized that essential, real evil
is the privation of aspired
perfection, and it is only possible
for it to depend upon the privation
of the cause, no other. This is a
principle by which the divine Plato
invalidated the doubts of the
dualists with respect to establishing
two principles, one for good and
one for evil. Evil is related
accidentally to part of what is in the
system of existence, and it is a
required existence, due to the
separation of a certain existent from
its actual perfection. Its
insignificant, accidental evil in
relation to particular individuals in
a small number of cases is one of
the concomitants of its permanent,
continuous, great goodness in
relation to the system of the whole
and in relation to most of what is in
the system. This is a principle by
which the teacher, Aristotle,
deduced the presence of evil
accidentally in the primary, divine
predetermination [435] and its
dependence upon the essentially
Good, the true Bountiful One, who
unfolds His hands with overflowing
good things and causes His
blessings to descend, not by a
primary intention by intrusion and
digression.
In short, accidental evil as
such is not intended by the Primal
Providence and not consented to
essentially, for it is not, with
respect to its accidental evil,
contained in the divine
predetermination essentially. Rather
the sole intention of the Primal
Providence and choice of the Real
Will with respect to it pertains to
the entrance of its necessary, great
goodness into the system of the
whole, not its insignificant, slight
evil, in relation to a particular
system in its particularity, requisite
of its great, constant goodness in
relation to the whole system of
existence. Therefore, just as its evil
is accidental, in like manner, its
accidental evil is neither required
essentially nor consented to
essentially. However, it is required
accidentally, consented to
accidentally, and intended by
Providence accidentally.
Accidental evil, therefore, is
accidentally contained in the
predetermination, since its trifling
accidental evil is not contained in
the predetermination according to a
primary intention, but rather with
respect to the fact that it is one of
the concomitants of its great
goodness. This is another detail in
this subject requiring careful
investigation and more profound
reflection than the ordinary
deliberation of the masses.

Wamīḍ [10.5.15]
The Seal of the Scholars
neglected this detail in the Sharḥ
al-Ishārāt, where, in his account of
the doctrine of the Master, he
contented himself with this
statement:
It appears that it is in the nature
of such existents to change and
be transformed, to be subject to
generation and corruption. But
they are insignificant in relation
to the whole, and the occurrence
of mutual opposition
necessitated by some of them
being prevented from reaching
their perfections is also
insignificant. It only applies to
the parts of the elements,
particular composites, and
specific times. As for the three
remaining divisions—which are
pure evil, evil is predominant,
 or evil is equal to what is not
evil—they do not exist, because
real existence and relative
existence in beings is certainly
greater than relative non-
existence obtained in the way
mentioned. [436]

Wamīḍ [10.5.16]
It is clear therefore that
evil is accidental, not essential, and
it is relative and insignificant, and
not most of the time, and it is not
equivalent to relative goodness. It
only enters into the divine
predetermination accidentally due
to the fact that it is a concomitant of
abundant good in relation to the
majority of existents most of the
time. The essential cause of the
concomitant of the quiddity is the
quiddity itself, and it only depends
upon the agent of the quiddity itself,
accidentally, not essentially, in
accord with what is established in
its seat. We have recited this to you
several times in the preceding
chapters.
Therefore, if you say: If the
concomitants of the quiddity depend
on the quiddity of the subject-
substrate itself and the agent of the
quiddity only has a role
accidentally, it would be necessary
for the knowledge of the Agent
Maker of His unitary essence not to
be the basis of the knowledge of the
concomitants of the possible
quiddity, because it is not possible
for the concomitants of quiddities in
this case to be objects of His
ignorance and objects of His
knowledge essentially. Therefore,
the doctrine of the firmly grounded
philosophers that His knowledge of
each thing is an efficient knowledge
by means of knowing its causes
which lead to it, contained in His
perfect knowledge of His unitary
essence in every respect, is not
established.
 I say: Have we not
explained with respect to this
misgiving that the concomitant of
the quiddity absolutely is only a
propositional, conjunctive state,
like four being even, insofar as its
purport is the joining of the subject
and the predicate? This is
something whose essential cause is
the quiddity itself. But “evenness”
with respect to its conceptual
reality, for example, is like other
quiddities in depending upon the
Agent Maker (exalted be His
remembrance), since the only
Maker and Originator of the
conceptual realities absolutely is
the essentially necessary Self-
Subsisting Being, no other.
Moreover, the propositional,
conjunctive state, also, insofar as it
is a certain possible thing, is an
effect of the Absolute Agent and a
creation of the Creator without
qualification, since the nature of
essential possibility is the
impossibility of passing from non-
being to being save through the
essentially necessary Agent. It is
only, insofar as it is mixed in its
particularity with its two particular
sides themselves, dependent on the
quiddity of the subject-substrate
itself, and only upon its agent
accidentally. Furthermore, the
efficient knowledge of the quiddity
of the subject-substrate due to the
perfect knowledge of its perfect
Agent suffices for the efficient
knowledge of its concomitant
dependent upon it essentially and
upon its Maker accidentally, since
the quiddity’s disclosure is the
basis of the concomitant’s
disclosure, and its non-hiddenness
is [437] the basis of the latter’s
non-hiddenness. Let it be
established.

Wamīḍ [10.5.17]
This principle has legal
application to evil in the abode of
resurrection (ma‘ād), also, with
respect to its two spiritual and
corporeal senses, for the misery of
the soul in the substance of itself
pertains to compound ignorance, for
example, and its misery with
respect to the body concerns its
entanglement with the emotion of
greed or anger, for example, in the
manner of the other insignificant
evils concomitant of the manifold
good things intended by the Primal
Providence. In like manner, the
divine punishments in the other
world are contained in
predetermination and fate, due to
the fact that they are concomitants
of the good things of the system of
existence, insofar as causes lead to
them, and due to the fact that they
are complements of the duty to
perform religious obligations
according to the laws of wisdom in
this world, because inspiring fear
and threatening punishments are
among the things that keep the souls
of the obliged from disobeying and
transgressing. Moreover, the
necessity of faithfulness to that [i.e.,
religious duty] is one of the
complements of the causes of
abstention [from error], while
breaking one’s covenant is one of
the things that necessitates the
curtailment of wisdom. Just as the
action of man and his will and his
choice of his actions belong to the
domain of the divine
predetermination and heavenly fate,
and the origin of all of this is the
Primal Providence and the Real
Will in accordance with the
dispositions of matters and the
requirements of quiddities, in like
manner, the reward for good deeds
and the punishment of
transgressions belong to the domain
of predetermination and fate, and
the necessity of rewards and
punishments is a concomitant of the
quiddities of the acts and deeds
which are good or evil in relation
to the particularities of their
degrees in terms of essential
goodness and baseness. Reward
and punishment only return to the
immediate agent due to will and
choice, even though he is not the
complete, necessary Cause of the
necessity of action, for he is a
receptive substrate. For example,
the properties and effects of both
harmful and healthful medicaments
only appear in the bodies and
constitutions of their takers [on
account of their will and choice to
take them]. Thus, spiritual medicine
in this regard corresponds to
physical medicine, and soul
medicaments correspond to bodily
medicaments.

Wamīḍ [10.5.18]
Our companion states in
the Ta‘līqāt:
The differences in genera, in
species, in individuals, and in
states all belong to the system
of existence; in other words,
the differences are a requisite
of one objective, and it is the
system of the whole and its
preservation. The genera [438]
of existents, like animal, for
example, their species, like
man, for example, their
individuals, like individual
men, and their various states
are all required by the system
of the good in the whole, and it
leads to an intelligible system.
If the existence of evil was
possible, it would also be
required by that system.
Necessities are consequents of
ends with respect to existents.
Even if they are not an
objective for the preservation
of the system of the whole,
they lead to beneficial things
by divine providence for the
sake of the preservation of the
system of the whole.
Although a single particular
thing to which causes lead may
be judged disapprovingly in
the mind, like the thievery of a
thief or the adultery of an
adulterer, if it were not for
[those causes], the system of
the universe could not be
preserved. For the causes
leading to it are the causes
which preserve the system of
the world. It is like a necessity
subsequent to them. The
punishment that attaches to the
adulterer and the oppressor
occur to them for the sake of
the preservation of the order of
the whole. If reward did not
come to the performance of
good deeds or punishment to
his oppression and his
reprehensible action, he would
not refrain from doing it and
would not be held back, and
then the order of the whole
would not be preserved.
The inclusion of evil in the
divine predetermination is due
to the fact that that evil is
subsequent to a necessity
which belongs to the second
category. This necessity has
been issued from the divine
decree for the preservation of
the system of the whole in the
best way it is possible for it to
be, like old age and death, for
old age is a consequent
necessity, and it is made a
cause for the purification of the
soul and the diminishing of its
animal powers, and death is
made a cause for the existence
of infinite individuals and
souls in need of existence.
No imperfection enters into the
actions of the First (exalted be
He), who is perfect in power,
wisdom, and knowledge, and
perfect in all of His actions,
nor does any weakness or
deficiency attach to Him. Were
anyone to imagine that
imperfection could enter into
the world or impairment
succeed its harmony and it
order, this would require Him
to be deficient in power,
wisdom, and knowledge
(exalted is He from that!),
because His power is the
cause of the world and the
cause of its persistence and its
order. These calamities and
maladies which befall natural
things are strictly a
consequence of necessities and
the inability of matter to
receive the perfect system.
He is the lover of His essence,
and His essence is the origin
of the entire system of the
good. Therefore, the system of
the good [439] is an object of
love to Him by a secondary
intention.
Good, in reality, is the
perfection of existence, which,
in reality, is the necessary of
existence. Evil is the non-
existence of that perfection.
We call things that are
beneficial to us “good things,”
but in reality they are not good.
The real system and the pure
good is the essence of the
Creator, while the system of
the universe and its good
emanate from His essence.
Whatever emanates from His
essence, since it is a system
and good, exists united with a
system and a good which are
worthy of it, since the end with
respect to creation is His
essence. This system and good
in each thing is evident,
because each thing emanates
from Him, but in each one of
the things it is different than
 what it is in the others. The
good belonging to prayer is
different than the good
belonging to fasting.

Wamīḍ [10.5.19]
In the Ishārāt, he took the
same path he followed in the
Ta‘līqāt, when he explained that the
punishments of souls in the afterlife
in their two kinds both occur due to
the primal divine predetermination
accidentally. Consequently, their
intelligible punishments pertaining
to their spiritual resurrection (al-
ma‘ād) and their corporeal
punishments pertaining to their
physical resurrection are equal in
this regard. He states:
A supposition and remark:
Perchance you may say: If fate
(al-qadar) exists,[446] why are
there punishments? Reflect. The
answer is that the punishment of
the soul for its transgression, as
you know, is like a malady
afflicting the body due to its
greed. It is a natural
consequence (lāzim) toward
which past states which have
definitely occurred lead. It is
not due to the occurrence of
something subsequent to them.
As for the punishment which,
according to another view, is
due to an external source, this is
another story. Now if an
external punisher is admitted,
this is also good, since it is
necessary for the threat to be
present in the causes which are
established so that it will
benefit the majority. Sanctioning
(taṣdīq) is the confirmation of
the threat. Therefore, if it occurs
through the causes of fate that
one person requiring the threat
and being warned commits
transgressions and instigates
crimes, sanctioning is necessary
for the sake of the common end,
even though it is not agreeable
to that one and not required by
the Unconstrained, the Merciful.
Were it only here the side of the
afflicted by fate, there would
not be for him with respect to
the particular heinous act a
general, universal advantage.
However, the particular is not
considered [440] for the sake of
the universal, just as the
particular is not considered for
the sake of the whole. For
example, a member may be
amputated and made to feel pain
for the sake of the body in its
wholeness. Let it be
 established.
The commentators are in
agreement with respect to his
account. According to them the
question is that if the occurrence of
beings is only through the
predetermination of God (exalted
be He) and His fate, and human
actions proceed from Him by
necessity due to their representation
together with the other particulars
in the intelligible world, and due to
the necessity of the creation of what
He creates through them in this
world corresponding to what is
represented there, then why is man
punished for something that
proceeds from him by necessity?
How is this worthy of the bounty
and generosity of the
Unconstrained, the Merciful? The
Master answered this, first, with an
answer that is required by the rules
of reason. This is where he said:
“The punishment of the soul for its
transgression, as you know, is like a
malady afflicting the body due to its
greed. It is a natural consequence
(lāzim) toward which past states
which have definitely occurred
lead. It is not due to the occurrence
of something subsequent to them.”
This is evident. Just as physical
illness afflicting the body is
necessarily due to the accumulation
of toxins consequent to avidity, in
like manner, the punishments
afflicting the soul necessarily
pertain to spiritual ailments
deriving from false beliefs and
reprehensible conduct. This kind of
punishment only befalls the human
soul on account of blameworthy
traits which are deeply rooted in it
and antithetical to the substance of
its essence. It is as if it has entered
into its essence. It is “the kindled
fire of God which breaks forth over
the hearts.”[447] But if the verses
found in the divine books about
promises and threats are taken
according to their literal sense, the
doctrine of a physical punishment
arriving upon the body of Moses
from outside, as described in
commentaries and traditions, would
be required.
The Master alluded to this
also by his words: “As for the
punishment which, according to
another view, is due to an external
source, this is another story.” In
other words, if its affirmation,
according to its common meaning,
is correct, it is traditional.
However, he desired to state that
this, also, is according to an
assumption, which is the acceptance
of its being like what the exponents
of the literal view understand in
conformity with the rational law
and such that its occurrence is
possible with respect to the law of
divine wisdom (ḥikmat ilāhī). It,
too, is only evil accidentally.
Then he said: “Now if an
external punisher is admitted, this is
also good.” He means by “good”
the good which is counter to evil,
not what the Mutakallimūn believe,
as will be discussed. He alluded to
this by the fact that the existence of
the threat in the things which are
confirmed to be the causes [441] of
punishment and in the sources of
free human acts is a good thing
necessary for the benefit of the
majority of individuals most of the
time, because through this they are
deterred and restrained from
committing crimes and
transgressions. He means by
“sanctioning” (taṣdīq) the carrying
out of that threat, its administration
by punishing the transgressor, the
confirmation of the threat, and [its
being] a requisite for the increase
of the [common] good. Therefore, it
is also a necessary good with
respect to the perfect heavenly
wisdom and the primal divine
providence. Moreover, the
appointment of this kind of
punishment for transgression is one
of the concomitants of evil acts. It is
also an exigency in the doctrine of
the nature. Therefore, if it should
occur through the causes of fate,
which God, the Exalted, has
ordained, that one person among the
individuals requiring the threat and
sanctioning known by
demonstration, the occurrence of
which is necessary by heavenly
wisdom, merits punishment by
chains and manacles in the pit of
hell, this is by virtue of both the
will of the wise, unconstrained, and
merciful Agent and the exigency of
the particular nature.
Consequently, the
administration of the threat and its
sanctioning, namely, carrying it out
with attention to will and choice, is
necessary according to the perfect,
consummate wisdom for the sake of
the universal end, which is
deterring mankind from pursuing the
causes of punishment necessitated
by corruption, even though this is
not agreeable to the disobedient
transgressor nor required by the
Unconstrained, the Merciful. Were
only this particular side [i.e., the
side of the punished] considered,
there would be no common,
universal advantage in punishment.
The purport of this discourse is
found in His words (lauded be His
name): “In punishment there is life
for you, O possessors of insight.”
The Master makes it clear
at the end that this threat is evil only
in relation to the punished
transgressor, while it is good in
relation to the individuals of his
species and in relation to the
perfection of the condition of the
species. [He says:] “The particular
is not considered for the sake of the
universal.” In other words, it is not
regarded. Therefore, this, also, is
part of the great good which
necessitates an insignificant evil.
Call to witness the severance of a
limb for the welfare of the
condition of the body. The judgment
of the necessity of this, although it
includes a certain evil, is favorable
to the masses. It is clear from this
that what is written in the Qur’ān
does not conflict with the principles
of wisdom, but rather it is
conformable to the balance of
reason and the rules of philosophy.
This is an eloquent summation of
the discourse of the commentators
on this topic. [442]

Wamīḍ [10.5.20]
 The Leader of the
Doubters states in his commentary
[on the Ishārāt], adhering to his
path of constant opposition:
It is necessary for the questioner
to say: This answer is weak in
two respects: The first is that
this answer is based upon the
assumption that the threat is
inevitable, but as it is said: “If
fate exists, why are there
punishments?” So likewise, it
may be said: “If there is fate,
why the threat?” If the argument
for the negation or the
affirmation of these two
positions is the same, it is not
possible to make one of them
prior to the establishment of the
other. The second is that this
view [Ibn Sīnā’s] is only
correct if the punished are
fewer than the saved. But the
condemned, according to the
doctrine of Muslims, are greater
than the saved, for the people of
Islām are fewer than all of the
unbelievers, notwithstanding
that the unbelievers are
condemned. If they [Muslims]
deny this, then they are
contradicting the doctrine of the
leaders of Islām. Although he
intends by this answer to
 promote their doctrine, the
correct answer to the question
“If fate exists, why are there
punishments,” is that it is an
invalid question, because
punishment also belongs to fate
and is not outside of it. If this is
so, then to ask about its cause is
futile.
The brilliant commentator,
the Seal of the Scholars, states in
his commentary [in response]:
I say about the first: The
doctrine of fate (al-qadar)
according to what the
philosophers hold, which is the
necessity of particulars being
dependent upon their multiple
causes, is contrary to the
doctrine of fate held by the
Ashā‘riya among the
Mutakallimūn, because they say
there is no agent and no cause in
existence except God. The
answer that the Master sets forth
is agreeable with his principles,
for the action of man, according
to him, depends upon his power
and his will, and both of these
depend upon their causes. One
of the causes of willing to do
good is the threat. Consequently,
the occurrence of the threat
among the causes required for
the good is necessary, along
with its being part of fate, and
causation by it is correct, as the
Master explains. He does not
exclude its being part of fate,
because everything under fate is
caused, according to him. But
according to the principles of
the Ashā‘riya, the threat has no
effect and causation by it is
false, as the learned
commentator has mentioned.
The discourse concerning fate is
only concluded, according to
them, by severing causation
absolutely. Therefore, they say:
“He is not to be asked about
 what He does.”
I say about the second:
The Master does not intend to
advance the doctrines of the
Mutakallimūn, as he has made
clear, but rather his goal is to
advance what is pronounced in
the divine books [443] on this
subject. There is nothing written
in the Qur’ān which decrees the
condemned to be greater in
number than the saved. On the
contrary, it is likely that
something may be found in it
which contradicts this judgment.
We say: What he has
presented about the first respect is
correct. The supposition of the
Leader of the Doubters that the
philosophers and the Ashā‘riya
agree on the doctrine of fate and are
on the same path is a false and
invalid claim. Instead, the path of
the philosophers, in this case, is the
doctrine of the infallible family of
the Apostle of God (may God bless
all of them and grant them
salvation), namely, that man is an
agent who carries out his action
through his power, his will, and his
new choice, which depend upon a
series of causes leading back to the
power of God, His will, and His
choice (glorified be He). There is
no determinism (or: compulsion
jabr) and no delegation of power
(tafwīḍ), but rather something
between the two positions.[448] We
have written a decisive discourse
on this subject in the Kitāb al-
Īqāẓāt.
As for what he has
presented about the second respect,
this is not right, since there is no
doubt that the saved are fewer in
number than the condemned, for the
temperament (mizāj) necessary for
the perfection of the substance of
the soul and the disposition
(isti‘dād) which attracts the
augmentation of its powers and the
perfection of its traits and its
virtues occurs rarely in elemental
composites. The tongue of the wise
Qur’ān and the tongues of the
traditions of the inspired lawgivers
proclaim this. Therefore, it is
correct to say that although the
condemned are greater in number,
nevertheless this is one of the
concomitants of the abundant good
things in relation to the perfection
of the species and its saved
individuals. The series of causes
necessarily leads to this in the
system of existence. If the existence
of the condemned were not included
in the predetermination and fate, the
non-inclusion of the series of
causes leading to them in existence,
the corruption of the system of the
whole, the deprivation of the
species from its ultimate possible
perfection, the non-inclusion of holy
human souls in existence, and the
negation of the existence the saved
individuals would be immediately
required, since the existence of the
condemned is one of the
concomitants of this existent system,
and what would be required for the
agent Maker to hold back from
calling them into existence is the
whole system. Consequently, the
evil involved in not calling them
into existence is greater than the
evil resulting through their
perdition, greater to an extent that
cannot be reckoned. Therefore, it is
established that their creation,
which is necessary for their
punishment and their perdition in
the abode hereafter, is an
inconsiderable and trifling evil in
comparison to the great and
abundant good things resulting from
this in the system of existence. Let it
be ascertained. [444]

Wamīḍ [10.5.21]
Do you not see how the
Leader of the Doubters is engaged
in opposition to the truth? Have you
not heard him say in his
commentary on the Ishārāt that the
epitome of this answer is that God
(glorified be He) chooses to punish
the transgressors among those who
are obligated to observe the
precepts of religion for the sake of
the universal good? This is only
feasible with the doctrine of a free
agent, but the philosophers do not
advocate this. What has happened
to them, [he says,] that they should
plunge into this question while it
slips away from them?
Would you not say to him:
O leader of your people and most
erudite of your companions! Are
you not embarrassed by spreading
lies about the philosophers and
attributing falsehoods to them? How
far is your invention and fabrication
from what they expound and
believe? For they say: There is no
free agent, in reality, save God
(glorified be He), and every free
agent besides Him is obliged in a
free manner[449] or obliged in a
compelled manner. But you allege
that they negate will and choice
from Him (glorified be He).
Our companion [Ibn Sīnā]
states in the Ta‘līqāt:
The soul is compelled in a free
manner, but its movements are
also subjugating, like natural
motion. This is due to certain
goals and motives it has which
are subjugating for it.
However, the distinction
between it [the soul] and
between nature is that it is
conscious of its goals, while
nature is not conscious of its
goals. Free actions, in reality,
are only possible for the First
alone (exalted be He). The
movement of the spheres is
subjugating, but it is not
natural. Natural motions are
necessary, and what is
necessary is something whose
opposite is not required also in
the same state. The mover in
the sphere moves from a
certain point to that point
itself, so it both leaves it and
seeks it at the same time.
According to the Mu‘tazila,
free will (or: choice ikhtiyār)
has a motive or a cause, and
choice through a motive is
compelled. The choice of the
Maker (exalted be He) and His
action, however, do not have a
motivating factor.
God (exalted be He) created
this universe by choice. If it is
said that He is not free, the
universe could not exist
through His consent (riḍā’). If
a free agent chooses the best
and then produces it, it is not
required to choose its opposite
as well and produce it, and if
it does not produce its
opposite, [it cannot be said] it
is not free. Although choice is
due to motives, [445] His
essence is the motive for the
good which He chooses.
The meaning of the
Necessarily Existent in
Himself is that He is necessity
itself, that His existence is
essential, that every attribute
of His attributes is actual
without any potential,
possibility, and disposition in
them. If we say that He is free
and powerful, we mean by this
that He is actually like that for
ever and ever. We do not mean
what the people have
understood by these two
attributes. For the free agent
(al-mukhtār) in common usage
is something potential. It needs
a determinant (murajjiḥ) to
bring its choice into actuality,
either a motive which
motivates it to that from itself
or from outside. Therefore, the
free agent with us is free in a
compelled sense. However, a
motive other than His essence
and His goodness does not
motivate the First (exalted be
He) to choose. He is not free
potentially and then becomes
free actually. Rather, He is
always free actually. In other
words, He is not compelled to
do what He does. He only
does what He does by virtue of
His essence and the goodness
of His essence, not due another
motive. In His case, there are
not two contending
 potentialities, as with us: the
domination of one of the two,
then its choice resulting in its
actualization.
In like manner, the
meaning our statement that He is
powerful is that He is actually
like this for ever and ever. We
do not mean what the masses
understand by being powerful
among human beings. Power
with us is a potentiality. It is not
possible for anything to proceed
from our power which is not
given preponderance by a
determinant, for we have power
based on two contrary options.
If the emanation of an act from
power [alone] were possible,
the emanation of two acts
together from one man in the
same state would be possible.
Consequently, power with us is
potential, while the First is free
from potential. If He is
described by power, it is a
description of a constantly
actual state. If we investigate
the meaning of power, it means
that when we will, and there is
no obstacle, we act. But our
statement “when we will” is not
actual, too, for we are also
powerful to will in the way
which we mentioned. Thus, the
will (mashiyya) in us is also
potential. Furthermore, power
in us is sometimes in the soul,
and sometimes it is in the
members. Power in the soul is
based on will, while in the
members it is based on
impulsion (taḥrīk). Were we to
describe the First (exalted be
He) by power in this common
sense, it would be necessary for
His actuality to be potential, and
it would remain, in this case,
something which is not drawn
into actuality; hence it would
not be perfect. In short,
potentiality and possibility
belong to things possessing
matter. The First, on the other
hand, is unqualified actuality.
How then could He be
potential? The agent
intelligences are like the First
(exalted be He) [446] with
respect to choice and power.
This is because they do not seek
a conjectured good, but a real
good, and this desire in them is
not contradictory to another
desire, as it is in us, since they
do not have two potentialities. It
[seeking] has the sense of
contradiction [in us] because of
these two. The grandeur of the
First (exalted be He) and His
glory are such that these actions
emanate from Him, while the
glory of these intelligences is in
the fact that they aspire for their
actions to be like the action of
the First.
It has been said that
man is compelled in a free
manner. This means that a
human free agent, with respect
to his choice, must have a
motivating factor which
motivates him to that. Therefore,
if the motivating factor, which is
the final cause (ghāya), is in
accordance with the strongest
potential in us, it is said “such
is a free agent in what he does.”
Sometimes that motivating
factor, in another human and in
another state, is not in accord
with us with respect to that
potential. Then the emanation of
the action from us, with respect
to it, is through compulsion. If
that motivating factor is
essential, then he is a free agent
with respect to it. Consequently,
the free agent, in reality, is he
who has no motivating factor
that motivates him to do what he
does. If we say: “Such does
such a thing freely,” it means
that his motivating factor is his
essence. But if we say: “He
does it by compulsion,” this
means that his motivating factor
is not himself. If the motivating
factor is himself, he is a free
agent with respect to what he
does. With him that motivating
factor will be either a final
cause or a good either
according to the estimative
faculty or to the intellect. If the
motivating factor is not himself,
his action, even if it is good for
the agent, proceeds from him by
compulsion.
 Inasmuch as the First
(exalted be He) is good, all
things emanate from Him. Were
they to emanate from other than
Him, He would be seeking the
good in it. But since the efficient
cause and the final cause do not
differ in Him, the emanation
these things from Him is not due
to a final cause outside of His
essence, and He, in reality, is
free. It is only in us that real
free will is not possible,
because we [always] have two
potentialities: a potential which
seeks something contrary to
what we are compelled, and a
potential which tries to obtain
the opposite of that. This does
not apply to the First (exalted be
He), because the emanation of
things from His essence is due
to His goodness, and those
things are not negated by virtue
of His essence. Consequently, in
His case, there is no contention
in the will.
It is necessary for there to be
for existence essential
existence, for choice (ikhtiyār)
essential choice, for will
(irāda) essential will, and for
power essential power, in
order for it to be possible for
 these things to not be essential
in something. In other words, it
is necessary for the Necessary
Being to be essentially
existent, essentially a free
agent, essentially powerful,
and essentially willing, in
order for it to be possible for
these things to not be essential
save through Him. [447]
Our companion, the
Teacher [al-Fārābī], has produced
similar to this in his Fuṣūṣ and his
Ta‘līqāt. The Teacher of the
Peripatetics has done the same in
the Theology. O doubters! Examine
the fairness of your leader; then
consult your hearts. Is it
permissible for anyone to imitate
him in his position or to rely upon
him with respect to his account?

Wamīḍ [10.5.22]
The Leader of the
Doubters states in his al-Mabāḥith
al-Mashiqiyya:
Know that when you investigate,
you discover that the point with
respect to the question of
eternity (qidam) and creation
(ḥudūth) and the question of
determinism (jabr) and fate
(qadar) is the same. It is that if
the agency of something is in the
stage of possibility, it is
impossible for an act to proceed
from it save by another cause.
This premise is the basis of the
two questions. However, since
it is impossible for the
necessary agency of the Creator
to be due to a separate cause, it
is necessary for its necessity to
be due to His essence. And if
His agency is due to His
essence, it is necessary for the
act to be perpetual (dawām). As
for the agency of the servant, it
is impossible for its necessity to
be due to the essence of the
servant due to the
impermanence of his essence
and the impermanence of his
agency. Without a doubt, the
dependence of the agency of the
servant upon the essence of God
(exalted be He) is necessary.
Consequently, the action of the
servant is by means of the
predetermination (qaḍā’) of
God and His decree (qadar).
It may be said: “If the
whole is by virtue of His
decree, what is the use of the
command and the prohibition,
the reward and the punishment?
Furthermore, if the whole is due
to the predetermination of God
and His decree, the existence of
the action required by the
predetermination would be
necessary and the non-existence
of the action required by the
predetermination would be
impossible. But it is evident that
power is not connected to the
necessary and the impossible.
Hence, it would be necessary
for animal not to be the agent of
action and cessation. But we
know with rational certainty that
we are able to act. Therefore,
what you have stated is
refuted.”
The answer is this: The
occurrence of the command and
the prohibition is also under
predetermination and fate. As
for the reward and the
punishment, they are among the
concomitants [or consequences]
of the actions occurring due to
the predetermination. Just as
eating bad food is the cause of
bodily ailments, in like manner,
false beliefs and worthless
actions are the cause of spiritual
ailments. The same applies to
the doctrine of reward. As for
the statement about power, the
necessity of an act does not
prevent it from being an object
of power, because the necessity
of the act is an effect of the
necessity of power. The effect
does not negate the cause.
Rather, if its necessity does not
exist because of power, then it
would be impossible for it to be
an object of power in relation to
power. That which proves the
correctness of what we have set
forth is that the supporters of
this [448] doctrine say that it is
necessary for God to give
reward and recompense in the
afterlife. Transgression
necessarily points either to
ignorance or to want, and these
two are deviation against God
(exalted be He). That which
leads to deviation is deviation.
It is therefore impossible for
God not to give reward and
recompense. Since it is
impossible for Him not to give,
the necessity of giving is
required. Consequently, the
emanation of this act from Him
is necessary, although it is an
object of His power. The
knowledge that the act is
necessary, in the commentary
which we mentioned, does not
prevent it from being an object
of power.
 He is closer to the truth
here than in what he presented in
his other books. Nonetheless, he is
upon the verge in his investigative
inquiry of disapproving of it and
criticizing it strongly.

Wamīḍ [10.5.23]
Since it is clear to you that
every individual entity is a part of
the system of existence, it is
impossible for it to be itself, with
its share of dispositional
potentiality belonging to its
individual matter and the causes
which lead to it in particular, and
not to require what befalls it of
good and evil. It is also impossible
for individuals which have
requirements that are concomitants
of their different particular
characteristics to be without those
requirements. Furthermore, [it is
clear to you] that all of these
individuals are part of the good of
the necessary existence and they
emanate from the wise Emanator
(exalted be His glory).
Consequently, you are displeased
with predetermination and fate,
whether by your words “Why am I
subjected to these tribulations?”, or
by your words “Why did God
create me and bring me into
existence?” (I do not think you say
this with the tongue of your heart or
wish that you were not created and
made existent in your inmost soul.)
Or by your words “Why am I me,
and why are you you? Why is this
this, and why is that that? Why is
this comprehensive system this
system?” Reflect, and be not of
those who are uninformed.

Wamīḍ [10.5.24]
All evil things, which are
concomitants of the abundant good
things, are only included in the
primal predetermination
accidentally. But in fate they are
included essentially, not
accidentally. Fate is the
particularization (tafṣīl) of what is
contained in the divine
predetermination essentially and
accidentally. The consideration of
“accident” in fate is not reasonable
at all except with respect to an
accidental existent, such as
accidental predicates present with
the existence of accidental subjects.
It is not according to reality.
Accidentals [449] are included in
existence accidentally in their
aspect as themselves, not the aspect
of their occurrence in fate.
Alteration of God’s will (badā’),
which is the abolishment of the
established and the establishment of
the abolished, is only possible in
fate, which is the book of
abolishment and establishment. It is
not possible in the primal
predetermination, which is the
Mother Book, the Scroll of the
system of existence, the Tablet of
the Pen of Command and creation,
and a tablet for the inscription of
primary origination, fashioning, and
generation that is preserved from
increase and decrease and guarded
from change and alteration.
Our companion in
instruction says in al-Fuṣūṣ:
“Penetrate the divine oneness (al-
aḥadiyya) and marvel at eternity!
‘If you ask about it, it is near.’ The
divine oneness casts its image and
becomes a Pen. The totality (al-
kulliyya) casts its image and
becomes a Tablet, upon which the
Pen writes the creation.”

Wamīḍ [10.5.25]
Is it not evident to the eye
of your insight that the dependence
of the system of existence in its
entirety upon predetermination and
fate, and the dependence of all
existents upon the power of God
(glorified be He), and upon His
will, His wisdom, and His
providence, does not preclude the
appointment of intermediary
conditions and causes, nor does it
conflict with the connection of the
worlds of that system and its parts
to each other, nor with the
succession of causes and effects?
God (glorified be He), for example,
is the emanator and maker of the
essence of Zayd and his existence,
even though his father, his mother,
and other things upon which his
entrance into the realm of
determination (taqarrur) depends
are among his causes, which rely, in
turn, in their vertical and horizontal
series, upon his complete Agent and
his necessary Maker (exalted be
His nature and magnified His
sovereignty). Man, likewise,
insofar as he has dispositions and
traits, deeds and acts, is such that
the agent of the substance of his
essence and the giver of the
necessity of his existence is God
(glorified be He), which requires
that the complete Maker and the
Giver of the necessity of the
existence of the made can only be
One upon whom the actualization of
that made thing in the chain of
existence from Him, the fashioned
by His fashioning, and the created
by His power, wholly depends.
Nonetheless, among the causes and
the reasons for the deeds and the
actions which he [man] effects and
carries out is his own power,
capacity, desire, resolution, will,
and choice. Therefore, he is the
immediate agent of his action,
although he is not the complete
Agent who requires his necessity
and fashions his existence.
Know, in like manner, that
prayer and entreaty are among the
causes of actualization (ḥuṣūl), the
causes of generation, [450] and the
conditions of entrance into the
system of existence. There is a
doubt, however, that if the purpose
of entreaty, asking, prayer, and
beseeching is success in attaining
one’s object, but the Pen of the
eternal decree does not ordain its
existence and the Tablet of divine
destiny is not impressed with the
inscription of its occurrence, then
why pray and what is its use? And
if it is such that the Pen decrees it
and the Tablet is inscribed with it,
what is the purpose of its
obligation, and what is the need to
burden oneself therewith? This is
refuted, because entreaty is also
part of the predetermination and
prayer is also part of fate, and both
are among the conditions of the
predetermined sought object and
among the causes of the fated hoped
thing. If the predetermination and
fate result in a certain wished or
desired thing, the entreaty and
prayer, which are among its
conditions and the causes leading to
it, also belong to what is
predetermined and fated; otherwise,
they do not. In short, the causes and
conditions of whatever is
predetermined and fated are also
predetermined and fated; and what
is not is not. If God wills
something, He prepares its causes.
 Wamīḍ [10.5.26]
In like manner, the paths
which are the causes of guidance
and error are the keys to the gates of
felicity and misery by reason of the
laws of the Tablets of
predetermination and fate. They
say: “The Prophet is the servant of
the predetermination, just as the
physician is the servant of nature, as
the science of logic is the servant of
judging the demonstration, as the
logician is the servant of a
deliberating, rational disposition,
and as the science of prosody is the
servant of the judgment of a poetic
disposition.” And it is said: “as the
syllogist (mīzānī) is the servant of
[conceptual] representations
(ṣuwar).” The correct expression
is: as the science of syllogism (or:
logic ‘ilm al-mīzān) is the servant
of the judgment (wazn) of the
theoretical faculty, and as the
syllogist is the servant of the
deliberating theoretical faculty in an
innate nature. In sum, just as the
physician is the servant of the
particular nature, the Prophet is the
servant of the predetermination and
the servant of the universal nature.

Wamīḍ [10.5.27]
Has it not been recited to
your heart in what has been recited
to your ears that the Command of
God and the Breath of the Merciful
refer to the emanation (ifāḍa) and
the making (ja‘l), which is
expressed in the wise Qur’ān by the
word “Be!” (kun), in relation to the
Great World (‘ālam al-akbar)?
Likewise, [they refer to] primary
origination (ibdā‘) and fashioning
(ṣun‘) in relation to the world of
pure intelligences; the Command
(amr) in relation to the world
immaterial things, which is the sum
of the two worlds of intellect and
soul; [the physical] creation (khalq)
in relation to the world of physical
things as a whole; and generation
(takwīn) in relation to the
specificness of corruptible existents
as such in their particularization.
[451] Furthermore, they are
connected to the world of [the
physical] creation in two respects:
(1) by a command which generates,
fashions, and calls into existence,
and (2) by a command which issues
the Book, the law, and the precepts.
That which is addressed by the
word “Be!” and commanded by the
command of emanation is the very
substance of the quiddity with
respect to the stage of the nominal
whatness which manifests the name.
The emanated (ṣādir) is its
substance, which by emanation
becomes a real whatness.
The worlds belonging to
the system of the solitary Great
World in its entirety correspond to,
parallel, and require each other, and
they are linked one to another.
Whatever is in one particular world
is a likeness (mithāl) of what
corresponds to it in the other
worlds. The world of bodies
parallels the world of spirits, the
world of elements parallels the
world of the spheres, the world of
souls parallels the world of
intelligences, the world of numbers
parallels the world of words, the
world of words parallels the world
of thoughts, and the world of
thoughts parallels the world of real
things. Every world is the shadow
(ẓill) of the world which transcends
it, a likeness, a shadow, and a
talisman of it which emulates and
follows it. The particular things,
which are the parts of each world,
in like manner, parallel the
particular things which are the parts
of the worlds which transcend that
world, and they are their likenesses,
their talismans, and their shadows,
which copy and exemplify them.
Know, moreover, that the world of
letters is like the body, and the
world of numbers is like the spirit
that pervades it. Insofar as these
two have combinations of relations
and mixtures of attributes, they
correspond to the worlds of
generation, insofar as they consist
of generative relationships and
fashioning originations, but they are
like shadows and images, fruits and
branches in relation to the rays of
the world of holy lights and
intelligible substances, insofar as
that place has marriages, which are
the junctions of modes of love and
modes of longing, and combinations
of delights which issue from the
rays of luminous radiations and
divine illuminations.
Among the basic
principles and the important themes
is this, that the relation of secondary
existents to the First is the source of
all relations. It is often said: “The
relation of the First Substance to the
self-subsisting First Maker (exalted
be His remembrance) is the source
of all relations.” Our companion
[Ibn Sīnā] has mentioned the letters,
which [correspond to] the stages of
existents, and their numbers in his
well-known treatise al-Nīrūziyya.
We have certain detailed, critical
objections regarding it, which we
have related in the book Nibrās al-
Ḍiyyā’and the book al-Jadhawāt
wa’l-Mawāqīt. We have explained
in them the gist of the principle and
the essence of the truth. Know, then,
that the world of numbers
corresponds to the world of letters,
the world of letters corresponds to
the world of thoughts, and the world
of thoughts corresponds to the
world of actuality. Letters, words,
names, utterances, remembrances,
and prayers, by their numbers, their
prescribed times (awrād), their
relationships, and their
correspondences (awfāq), are as if
they are [452] the mental and
imaginal aspect of real things. Thus,
if the form of the object pursued is
impressed and represented in it [the
mind], that representation engenders
the drawing of the occurrence into
the real world outside of the mind.
Therefore, the relation of prayers
and dreams to the actualization of
desires and the attainment of hopes
is the relation of the conceptions of
minds to the actualization of the
conceived in the real world. This is
one of the causes of the fruition of
prayers and remembrances, due to
the containment of the desire in the
vessel of occurrence. It is therefore
clear that the estimative faculty (al-
wahm) is one of the gates of the
causes of generation and
origination, and prayer is one of the
streams belonging to the rivers of
predetermination and fate. Let it be
known.

Wamīḍ [10.5.28]
Our companion states in
the Ta‘līqāt:
The cause of the granting of
prayer is the coming together
of the causes due to a divine
wisdom. It is that the cause
which is the prayer of a man,
for example, with respect to
that for which he prays, and the
cause of the existence of that
thing come together through the
Creator (exalted be He). If it is
asked: “Is the existence of that
thing possible without the
prayer, while its appearance is
due to that prayer?” We
answer: No, because the
causes of both of them are the
same, and that is the Creator
(exalted be He). He is the one
who made the cause of the
existence of that thing to be
prayer, just as He made the
cause of the health of this ill
person to be the consumption
of the remedy, and whoever
does not take the remedy will
not be healed. In like manner,
the state during prayer and its
fulfillment in relation to that
thing due to a wisdom come
together in accordance with
what has been fated and
predetermined. Prayer,
therefore, is necessary, and the
expectation of its granting is
necessary. Our utterance of
prayer is its cause, and our
prayer becomes a cause of its
answering.
The fulfillment of a prayer due
to the occurrence of the thing
prayed for are both effects of a
single cause, although one of
them may be through the
intermediary of the other.
It may be supposed that
heavenly things are affected by
earthly things; that is to say, we
invoke them, and they respond
to us, but we are their effect
and they are our cause, and the
effect certainly does not
influence the cause. The cause
of prayer, in this case also, is
only because they prompt us to
pray, and these two are the
effects of one cause.
If a prayer is not considered
desirable for that man, even
though it is seen that the goal
for which he prays is
beneficial, the reason for this
is that the beneficial goal is
only with respect to the system
of the whole, not with respect
to [453] the object desired by
that man. It may happen that the
goal with respect to his object
of desire is not beneficial [to
the whole], and therefore it is
not possible for his prayer to
be granted.
During prayer a pure soul may
be endowed by the First with a
power by which it is able to
influence the elements so that
they obey that soul according
to its will, and this is the
granting of the prayer. The
elements are the subject for the
action of the soul upon them,
and the passing of that to our
bodies is possible. Thus, we
may represent something in our
mind so that our bodies
become transformed in
accordance with what the
states of our souls and our
imaginations require.
It may be possible for the soul
to influence other than its body
in the same way that it has an
effect on its body. The soul
may also have an effect upon
another soul, if what is related
by the people of India is
correct. The first principles
may answer that soul, if it
prays for what they pray for,
and if the object for which it
prays is beneficial with
respect to the system of the
whole.
The reason for the possibility
of every prayer which is not
impossible to be granted is that
it is an object of knowledge of
the First (exalted be He), even
if it is by the intermediary of
the one who prays. Whatever
is an object of His knowledge
is called into being (kā’in) if
there is not another object of
knowledge which opposes it.
The meaning of the opposition
of another object of knowledge
which opposes it is, for
example, when someone prays
against another person for his
ruin, and his ruin is
accomplished by the
corruption of his constitution.
But it is known to Him also
from another respect that it is
necessary for that constitution
to be healthy. Consequently, it
is not possible for the prayer
to be granted. The words “in
another respect” indicate
among the causes of that
constitution. If it is known
among its causes that it is not
necessary for it to be healthy,
then the prayer may be granted,
and in this case there is no
opposition of another object of
knowledge. For this reason it
is incumbent for no one to pray
against another. He certainly
knows in the priority of His
knowledge this person and
whatever is known to him
when he prays. Therefore,
since a prayer indicates that it
is an object of His knowledge,
and whatever is known to Him,
then its existence is not
impossible.
The First (exalted be He) is
the cause of the concomitance
of His objects of knowledge
and the necessity of their
emanation from Him according
to a succession, which is the
succession of cause and effect.
He, indeed, is the causer of
causes, and He is the cause of
His objects of knowledge, but
one thing is prior to another
with respect to His knowledge
of it. Hence, it is, in a certain
respect, a cause, insofar as the
First knows its object of
knowledge. But in reality He is
the cause of every object of
knowledge, and the reason,
because He knows every thing.
For example, He is a cause
because He knows the First
Intelligence. However, the
First Intelligence is a cause
insofar as He knows the
concomitant of the First
Intelligence. Thus, although He
[454] is a cause because He
knows the First Intelligence
and its concomitants, in a
certain respect the First
Intelligence becomes a cause
insofar as the First (exalted be
He) knows the concomitants of
that First Intelligence. The
matter with respect to prayer is
the same. He, in reality, is the
cause of the prayer of the one
who prays and the cause of that
person. However, the person
who prays is a cause insofar as
his prayer is known [by the
First], and by his intermediacy
the prayer is an object of
knowledge to Him. Therefore,
the one who prays is, in a
certain respect, a cause insofar
as the First (exalted be He)
 knows his prayer. The one who
prays does not, in truth, effect
the First (exalted be He), for
He, in reality, is the cause, not
the one who prays.
In the Shifā’ and the Najāt
he has explained that the heavenly
souls [i.e., the souls of the spheres]
and what transcends them are
cognizant of particulars, and that
new conceptions and new volitions
in this world have heavenly and
earthly causes which lead to them
and require them. The same applies
to evanescent natural things, which
are generated after their non-
existence, and to compelled things.
[He also explains] that due to the
coming together of these causes,
their interaction, and their orderly
continuity, they are drawn by the
heavenly motion. Consequently, if
the primary heavenly things among
them, insofar as they are primary
things, are known, and the state of
their being drawn toward secondary
things, the secondary things are
certainly known. [He further
explains] that there is nothing which
the First Maker emanates and brings
into existence more superior, more
suitable, more worthy, and more
excellent in the system of existence
than the heavenly conceptions.
 Then he states:
The varieties of this category
are transformations in relation
to natural things, or inspirations
which are connected to the
summoned or to something else,
or a mixture of that, wherein one
of them or the combined sum
lead to a beneficial goal. The
relation of humility (taḍarru‘)
to the summoning of this faculty
is like the relation of thinking to
the summoning of exposition.
Each emanates from above. It is
not this, that He follows the
heavenly conceptions. Rather,
the First, the Real, knows all of
this according to the respect
which we have said is worthy
of Him. The generation of what
will be begins with Him, but
through mediation, and His
knowledge is in accordance
with this. Because of these
things He is not benefited by
prayers and offerings,
especially in the matter of
prayer for rain and other
matters. Therefore, it is not
necessary for punishments to be
feared for evil and rewards to
be anticipated for good. For in
the affirmation of the truth of
this is deterrence from evil, and
the affirmation of the truth of
this is through the evidentness of
His signs, which are the
existence of His holy favors.
Then he says:
If you desire to know how the
things which have been
understood as useful and
productive of benefits [455]
have been called into existence
in nature according to the
manner of calling into existence
which you know and have
ascertained, reflect on the case
of the uses of the members in
animals and plants and how
each one has been created.
There is definitely not in this
case a natural cause, but its
origin without a doubt is from
Providence, according to the
manner which you know. In like
manner, assent to the existence
of these notions, for they are
dependent on Providence in the
manner which you know
Providence makes them
dependent.
Then he says:
Know that the cause of prayer,
of almsgiving, and such is
through us also, and likewise
the occurrence of oppression
and sin is only from us, for the
sources of all these things return
to nature, will, or accident. The
principle of nature is from this.
The volitions which we possess
were generated after they did
not exist, and whatever is
generated after it did not exist
has a cause. Every volition of
ours has a cause, and that
volition is not a volition in an
infinite series, for things which
occur from outside are earthly
and heavenly. The earthly lead
to the heavenly. The conjunction
of all of this requires the
existence of will. As for
accident, it occurs through the
collisions of these. If all these
things are analyzed, they depend
upon principles whose
necessitation is sent down from
God. The predetermination of
God (glorified and exalted be
He) is the first simple creation
(waḍ‘), and the process of fate
(taqdīr) is what the
predetermination inclines itself
to in stages, as though the
consequence of the conjunctions
of the simple things which are
related, insofar as simple, to the
predetermination and the primal
divine Command.
 Wamīḍ [10.5.29]
As for the question of
pilgrimages, raising tombs for the
pure and resting places for the
godly, asking help from their divine
spirits and their radiant souls, and
seeking illumination from the
intelligible splendors pervading
their holy shrines, this branches out
from another root. It is that the
rational soul, whose mine for the
root of its substance is the city of
the world of intellect, whose abode
for the substance of its essence is
the sacred earth of the Kingdom,
has sovereignty over its material
body through a controlling
attachment in two ways: The first of
them pertains to the individual
matter, which is preserved and
endures in its individuality as long
as the heavens and the earth endure;
the second pertains to the individual
substantial form, which is subject to
generation and corruption. With
death the controlling attachment is
annihilated with respect to its
individual body in terms of form.
But [456] its attachment to it with
respect to its matter, which endures
during the transformations of forms
arriving successively upon it, is
incorruptible and constantly
enduring. This attachment, which
endures with respect to matter, is
the determinant (murajjiḥa) for
returning to the abode of the body
and commencing the attachment of
the form corresponding to this form
at the time of the corporeal
resurrection by the leave of God
(glorified be He). This enduring
attachment to this individual body
with respect to matter, therefore, is
the basis for the attraction of grace
and obtaining good by visiting the
tombs and raising shrines.
Moreover, the gathering together of
the souls of the pilgrims, who
become illumined by divine lights
and heavenly rays, has manifold
benefits in this regard, for they are
like luminous, polished mirrors
reflecting the rays of light, and the
radiance of the lights is
compounded upon them in such a
manner that weak eyes are unable to
bear them.
The most erudite of the
doubters and their leader states in
his book al-Maṭālib al-‘Āliyya:
It is the custom of all the
learned to travel to the blessed
shrines, to pray, fast, and give
alms at them, and to entreat God
(exalted be He) with respect to
certain important matters, and
they find the signs of benefit
evident and the results of
compliance manifest. It is
related that whenever the
companions of Aristotle had
difficulty with a question, they
would travel to his resting place
and inquire into it until that
question was resolved for them.
Similar to this takes place
frequently at the tombs of great
teachers and pious individuals.
If souls did not persist after the
death of their bodies, all of this
would be inconceivable.

Wamīḍ 10.5.30
Our companion has written
a well-known treatise on the benefit
of prayer and pilgrimage in which
he has explained in the most
excellent and sound way the
knowledge of the stages of
existents, from the First Principle to
the rational soul, which when it
attains its perfection becomes
similar to the unchanging
intelligible substances. He says:
We return to our theme and say
that the First Principle is the
absolute agent of all existents,
and His knowledge
encompassing them is the cause
of their existence, such that not a
particle in earth nor in heaven is
hidden from Him. Now,
according to the classification
which this requires, He
influences the intelligences, the
intelligences influence the souls,
and the souls influence the
heavenly bodies, such that they
impel them continuously in a
free circular motion in imitation
of the intelligences and through
desire for them [457] out of
love and realizing perfection.
The heavenly bodies influence
this world, which is beneath the
sphere of the moon. The
intelligence specialized to the
sphere of the moon emanates a
light upon human souls in order
to guide them in their search for
objects of thought, similar to the
emanation of the light of the sun
upon corporeal existents in
order for the eye to perceive.
Were it not for the likeness
which exists between the
heavenly souls and the earthly
souls with respect to
substantiality and percipience,
and the correspondence of the
great world to the small world,
the Creator (exalted be His
glory) could not be known. The
true Revelation pronounces it,
where He says: “He who hath
known himself hath know his
Lord.” The order of the series
of existents obtained from the
First Principle, the effect of
some of them on others, and the
return of the command to the
uncaused Agent, who is the Real
(glorified and exalted be He), is
now clear to you.
Know, moreover, that
souls differ in nobility with
respect to knowledge and
perfection. It is possible for a
soul to appear in this world,
either prophetic or not, who
conveys perfection in
knowledge and in action, either
innately or by acquisition, so
that he becomes similar to the
Active Intellect, even though he
is not of the same rank and
nobility, since the latter is a
cause and the former is an
effect, and the cause is nobler
than the effect. Moreover, if this
soul leaves the body, it will
continue to exist in its world in
a state of perpetual happiness
with the souls and the
intelligences that are like it, and
it will have an influence on this
world similar to the influence of
the heavenly intelligences.
The purpose of
pilgrimage and prayer is that the
visiting soul, who is still
connected to the body and not
separated from it, should ask for
a benefit or a felicity, or the
repulsion of an evil or an injury,
from those visited souls, and
become affiliated entirely with
the asking (istimdād) of and the
disposition for that desired
representation. There is no
doubt that the visited soul, by
reason of its similarity to the
intelligences and its
substantialization through their
substances, will have a great
effect and will provide
assistance with respect to the
asking of the asker.
The asking has various
causes which differ on account
of different states, which are
either bodily or spiritual. As for
the bodily, these are like the
constitution of the body, for if it
is in a balanced state with
respect to nature and innate
disposition, the animate spirit
(rūḥ nafsāniyya), which is in
the cavities of the brain, which
is an instrument for the rational
soul, is produced from it.
Therefore, thinking and asking
should be in accord with the
best they are possible to be,
especially when the faculty of
the soul and its nobility are
attached to them. They [the
bodily states] are also like the
places in which the bodies of
the visitors and the visited are
close together, [458] for minds
are more pure in them, thoughts
are more firmly united, and
souls more righteously
disposed, as with pilgrimage to
the House of God (exalted be
He) and the unity of convictions
because it is a house of God
through which they are drawn
near to the divine presence and
caused to approach His holy
realm. And in them are
marvelous wisdoms concerning
the benefits of the purification
of some souls by the lesser
torment, nay the greater torment.
As for the spiritual states, these
are like turning away from the
commodities of the world and
its pleasures, eschewing idle
pursuits and attachments, being
turned in thought toward the
holy Dominion, and seeking
enduring radiance in the heart
through rending the veils
connected to the rational soul.
God has guided us and you to
 the purification of the soul from
the impurities of this world
which is subjected to passing
away. He does not will the good
deed of any particular agent.

Wamīḍ 10.5.31
Prayer with the tongue of
the disposition (isti‘dād) is granted,
for the tongue of one’s state (ḥāl) is
the most eloquent of the two
tongues, the speech of the heart is
the most eloquent of the two
speeches, and the language of
worthiness (istiḥqāq) is the most
truthful of the two languages. In the
noble Qur’ān, it is stated: “Nothing
exists which does not extol His
glory.” This means with the tongue
of the nature of essential possibility,
for the speech of its [accidental]
non-existence is the root of the
possible quiddity. “But you do not
comprehend their praise,”[450] due
to the defectiveness of your
intellective faculty and the
heedlessness of your hearts in your
breasts. Take heed, O you who
make mention of God with your
tongues and your mouths, lest the
tongue of your state accuses the
tongue of your utterance with
falsehood, and lest the speech of
your hearts contradicts the speech
of your tongues!
In short, prayer with the tongue
of the disposition will be answered
and not rejected, and hope with the
measure of merit will be attained
and will not be frustrated, and
succor will be sent down from
Heaven in accord with the measure
of the difficulty. Therefore, if the
tongue of your state is remembering
God and the tongue of your
disposition is speaking, don’t
worry, even if your physical tongue
is silent and your corporeal mouth
is restrained from entreaty.
However, if the two tongues are
consonant and act together, this is
more attractive of grace and more
beneficial with respect to
remembrance. But if God should
silence the tongue of your state and
strike dumb the tongue of your
disposition, it will not profit you to
speak with your physical tongue.
From this the import of His words
“Let them listen to Me and put their
trust in Me, that they may be rightly
guided,”[451] is clear. In other
words, let them suffer themselves to
enter through the gate of merit that I
may answer their call, and let them
have faith that I am the Bountiful,
the Giver. There is no withholding
of My bounty and no [459] delay to
My gift. If I find a certain supplicant
worthy of the gift, I bestow it upon
him, and if I discover one who
hopes deserving of mercy, I issue
upon him a vast mercy, which will
not become cut off or interrupted,
and full treasuries, which will not
become exhausted or depleted.
Also, in a holy tradition, it is stated:
“If the remembrance (dhikr) of Me
distracts My servant from entreating
(mas’ala) Me, I will bestow upon
him the most excellent of what I
bestow upon those who entreat
Me.”[452]

Wamīḍ 10.5.32
 One side of this balance in
the arena of prayer belongs to the
category of praise (ḥamd), and the
most excellent station for you with
respect to praise is to make your
share of praise to your Creator the
highest possible degree of
glorification of the perfections of
existence, such as knowledge,
wisdom, justice, and generosity.
The substance of your essence will
then become the most befitting
praise of your bountiful Creator
(glorified be He). Proclaim,
therefore, with the tongue of your
state every attribute of these
attributes. They are the shadow of
His attributes (glorified be He)
within you, the outpouring of His
generosity, and the handiwork of
His bestowal. He (exalted be His
sovereignty) in His own essence
has these attributes in the highest
degree of perfection. We have
stated in the Sadrat al-Muntahā
and in al-Mu‘alliqāt ‘alā Zubūr Āl
Muḥammad ( upon whom be peace)
that the [referent of] “praise” in His
words: “Praise belongs to God, the
Lord of all the worlds,” is the
essence (dhāt) of every existent,
insofar as it is an existent, and the
being (huwiyya) of every rational
substance in accordance with its
station in existence and its share of
the attributes of perfection.
Therefore, the World of Command,
which is the world of separate
substances, is the world of praise
and the world of glorification. It is
mentioned in the wise Qur’ān by the
words “To Him belongs dominion
and to Him belongs praise.”[453]

Wamīḍ 10.5.33
Consequently, sometimes a
prayer is not granted because it
does not proceed from the tongue of
the disposition or because it is
contrary to that which is best for the
system of existence. Sometimes its
not being granted is due to the lack
of coming together of the conditions
and the incompleteness of the
causes. This may be due to not
carrying it out properly or due to its
being recited incorrectly, even if the
substance of the one praying is not
erroneous. And sometimes it is
granted to him, but the appearance
of the effect is subject to its time,
just as between His words (exalted
be the Speaker): “your prayer has
been granted”[454] and the
occurrence of their meaning the sum
of forty years passed. For this
reason the arrows of the night do
not miss [their target], but they have
a goal, and the goal has a
termination. Sometimes its
replacement [460] with something
else is more suitable for the one
who has prayed; therefore God
(glorified be He) replaces it in this
abode with something more
beneficial and appropriate. Or
sometimes what is most suitable for
the one who has prayed is for God
(glorified be He) to replace what he
has requested among the objects of
delusion in this transitory, external
world with something delightful in
the everlasting real world. In that
domain the essence of the matter
will become plain to him, and he
will be content with what his Lord,
the All-Knowing, the Wise, has
done.
Sometimes the non-
granting falls under the category of
divine tests, by which firmness in
the stage of certainty and level of
understanding in the station of
contentment and acquiescence are
assayed, even though the one who
has prayed is worthy of bestowal
and honor. Take heed lest the Satan
of fancy and the whisperings of
nature incite you when you are
turned aside [from what you desire]
by a refusal and lest they intervene
between you and the response.
Verily, your Lord, the Wise, the
Efficacious, is unsparing in His
grace, and neither unfair in His
judgment, unreliable in His justice,
nor suspect in His decree.

Wamīḍ 10.5.34
Divine punishment falls
under the category of mercy and is
for the sake of putting things right in
the next life, not for the sake of
taking revenge and gratifying the
soul with vengeance. Far exalted is
God above that! He is the one
whose mercy precedes His wrath,
whose open hand reaches beyond
His grasp, and whose vehement
force gushes forth from the purling
spring of His loving kindness.
Therefore, do not let your request
for forgiveness: “O Most Merciful,
O Compassionate One; save me by
Thy mercy from Thy chastisement,”
mislead you, for it might be that
your chastisement is a requisite of
divine mercy. Thus God says
(glorified be He): “I am the
merciful, the compassionate,
standing with justice. I punish you
with My abounding mercy, and My
grievous torment afflicts you
through My universal
providence.”[455] For this reason
He says: “I created these for
paradise, and these for hell, but for
both I am not concerned.”
Consequently, it behooves you to
strive to rectify yourself and make
your essence such that your
allotment through His abounding
mercy may be paradise, not hell,
and the measure of your merit,
through the grace of His perfect
providence, leads to reward, not
punishment. God has made you to
be of those who are near to Him,
the people of His mercy, and His
favored ones sustained by the
presence of His glory and the joy of
His meeting.
 Wamīḍ 10.5.35
Our foregone companions
have stated that the world of dust
(lit. worms dīdān), which is the
world of the elements, with respect
to bodies, [461] spirits, and souls,
has no measure (or: extent qadr) in
relation to the worlds of
transcendent things, with respect to
bodies, lights, souls, and
intelligences. Is this not inferred by
the fact that the globe of the earth in
its entirety with respect to its
measurable mass is not sensible at
all in relation to what is above the
sphere of the sun, but rather it is
there like one point? Therefore, a
difference of observational view is
not possible for what is there,
neither by calculation or sense. And
[they say] that the orbit of Mars is
greater in volume than the
representative of the sun with
respect to its interior. In like
manner, its diameter is greater than
its diameter. For this reason, Mars
is closer to the sun in comparison to
it and closer in association. What
then do you think about the sphere
of Mars and the spheres above it?
Consequently, the world of the
heavenly bodies is very vast, and
the pure heavenly intellect testifies
that the world of intellect is much
vaster and greater than the world of
sense, and the world of light than
the world of darknesses, and the
world of spirits than the world of
external shapes (ashbāḥ), just as
the founder of the our discipline
states in the Theology: “The soul is
not in the body, but the body is in
the soul, for it is more
encompassing than it.” Therefore,
no extent belongs to the world of
[the physical] creation (khalq) in
relation to the world of Command.
The master of the people
of intuition[456] states in the
Talwīḥāt: “The philosophers
consider the world a single living
thing. They call its body the
‘universal body’, and it has a single
rational soul, which is the sum of
all souls, and a single intelligence,
which is the sum of all
intelligences. They call the sum of
the souls, the ‘universal soul’ and
the sum of the intelligences the
‘universal intelligence’.” Most of
them specialize the world to the
celestial part without taking into
account the generated and
corruptible part. Often they mean by
the “whole” (kull) the whole of
three: the highest body, its soul, and
its intelligence.
Our companion states at
the end of the first chapter of the
book al-Mabda’ wa’l-Ma‘ād on the
definition of the body of the whole
and its soul:
They [the body and the soul] are
potential in a certain respect,
while the intelligence of the
whole is always actual. Know
that, according to them, the term
“heaven,” the term “whole,” and
the term “world” are
synonymous. Methinks they do
not mean by the corruptible
substance which is contained by
the sphere of the moon that it is
smaller, in relation to the
heavenly world, than the gall
stone generated in an animal
body in relation to its body.
Therefore, if it is said that gall
stone is not included in the
whole of “animal,” its absence
does not prevent life, because
the body which contains it is
living. The whole, according to
them, in relation to the First
Cause is like one living thing,
which has a rational soul and a
separate intelligence which
emanates upon it. Often they
say: “The whole belongs to the
first heaven.” [462] It is the
convention of many of the
philosophers to call it the “body
of the whole” and its motion
“the motion of the whole.” In
accord with the difference of
these two usages, sometimes
they say “the intelligence of the
whole,” and they mean by it the
sum of the separate
intelligences, as though they are
one thing, and [they say] “the
soul of the whole,” and they
mean by it the sum of the souls
which move the heavens, as
though they are one thing. And
sometimes they say “the
intelligence of the whole,” and
they mean by it the intelligence
which moves the outermost
 sphere by arousing longing,
which is the first with respect to
arousing longing after the Pure
Good, and “the soul of the
whole,” and they mean by it the
soul specialized to moving that
body.
I say: According to them, it
is as if the corruptible things are
unworthy of consideration due to
their baseness and their lowness in
relation to the noble substances
which transcend the realm of
generation, so they take interest
only in the noble substances. As for
man, with respect to the substance
of his incorporeal, living, immortal
soul, safe from the reach of
corruption, he is a small world
copying and corresponding to the
Great World, which is the Great
Man. Therefore, he is the noblest of
those things that deserve
consideration. His rational, holy,
and mature soul is in the station of
perfection in the best manner, and it
is the noblest of the actual intellects
which collect the forms of all the
intelligibles impressed in them in
the stage of the acquired intellect. It
[the rational soul] is the last
intellect at the end of the chain of
return corresponding to the First
Intelligence at the beginning of the
chain of beginning. The First
Intelligence is the noblest of the
intelligences which gather the forms
of all the intelligibles impressed in
them actually in the First Creation.
Consequently, man is the goal set by
Providence preceding the rest of the
creation. For this reason, our
companion states in al-Kalimat al-
Ilāhiyya: “You created diverse
minerals, plants, and animals
subject to generation and
corruption, being born and giving
birth, but the goal preceding all of
them is the creation of man. You
created the other beings from his
surplus lest he be caused to miss an
element due to him and fail to
receive his rightful share.”

Wamīḍ 10.5.36
Methinks, through that
which we have recited to the
hearing of your heart and revealed
to the eye of your intellect, by the
leave of God (glorified be He), in
the flashes (wamīḍāt) of these holy
blazing brands (qabasāt) and the
gleams (wamḍāt) of its rational
burning embers, you now recognize
by the compounded intellect with
the utmost certainty, perceive by the
acquired intellect in the station of
understanding, and apprehend from
the summit of the mountain of true
knowledge by way of
demonstration, that the system of
existence is a servant obedient to its
Lord, a seeker of the water bucket
[463] of grace at its pouring forth,
and a receptacle for the flow of
goodness at its outlet. Its Lord has
made it a manifest book by virtue of
His knowledge and His providence
through the agency of His
predetermination and His decree,
and He has recorded therein each
thing, dry or moist, that is in the
nature of possibility through His
creation and His command.
Moreover, you recognize that God
(glorified be He) is the Beginning
and the End, the Agent and the Goal
of this Great World in every
respect. Every part of its parts has
in a certain respect a prime agent,
who is the Agent of agents, and a
final cause, who is the Goal of
goals, and in another respect the
provision of necessity, which is the
basis of the determination and the
foundation of existence. He
(glorified be He) is both the
efficient cause and the final cause,
the First and the Last, the beginning
and the end in relation to the
microcosm as well with respect to
the station of the acquired intellect
in the two worlds: the first and the
next, then in the next world with
respect to the two returns: the
spiritual and the corporeal.
Therefore, the station of the
perfection of the intuitive soul (nafs
muta’alliha), which is the highest
stage of the soul in this world,
consists in divestment from the
garment of the body, dismissing the
veil of the senses, removing the
raiment of nature, rejecting sensual
delights and constitutional
pleasures, turning toward the world
of the intellect, ascending to the
ranks of the heavenly angels, then
communing with the concourse on
high, retiring into the precincts of
His holiness the Real, and arriving
at the most exalted divine world.
The farthest of stages and the
highest of stations is the
sanctification of the vision from
beholding anything except the real
Being, the cleansing of the
intellectual faculties from desiring
any delight or object of desire save
Him and from perceiving any other
existent or object of perception, and
sanctification from every stage,
even from recourse to this stage and
delight in this delight. It is therefore
possible for the starting point and
the ending point of the soul in this
stage to be God alone in reality.
God has made our drink to be from
this choice wine and our approach
through this station. He indeed is
near and ready to answer.
Our companion states in
the Ta‘līqāt:
Every final cause is good, but
the Necessary Being is the
final cause of the whole of
creation since everything
returns eventually to Him. As
it is said: “To your Lord is the
final return.”[457]
There is no “whyness” (or:
causation limayya) for the
action of the Creator (exalted
be He) because His action is
due to a final cause, not due to
a motivating factor which
motivates Him to that.
His blessed words “He is the
First and the Last” refer to the
fact that He is both the efficient
cause and the final cause,
[464] and His final cause is
Himself, because the source of
each thing is from Him and its
return is to Him.
The Will is His knowledge of
what existence requires and its
not being incompatible with
His essence.
The emanation (fayḍ) is the
 perpetual action of the
Efficient Cause, and His action
has no cause which motivates
Him to that, and it is not due to
a goal save the action itself.
The important thing to note in
such passages is that the Final
Cause of all final causes and the
Goal of all goals in the end is His
very Essence (glorified be He), no
other. This does not preclude the
proximate final cause nor the series
of intermediate final causes which
culminate without exception in the
Final Cause of all final causes, as
you know. A certain insight will be
increased in regard to this, if God,
the Almighty, the All-Knowing,
wills it.

Wamīḍ 10.5.37
Since you have developed
a deeper understanding by what we
have imparted to you in the contents
of these ten qabasāt, let the eye of
your vision be illumined with the
knowledge that God (glorified be
He) is the First and the Last in ten
senses.
1. He is the first absolutely
because He is before all the
existents essentially, prior in
essence and existence to them, by a
priority in order, due to every
existent other than Him being His
effect and His made thing, preceded
in essence by His essence and
preceded in existence by His
existence. He is the last absolutely
because each thing depends upon
Him for its persistence. Likewise,
He is the beginning with respect to
its existence through Him, for the
persistence of every persisting thing
is through His action and the
continuance of every continuing
thing is through His handiwork.
Thus, the persistence of each thing
and its continuance are through
Him, while His persistence and His
continuance are through Himself,
not through another thing. He is the
Maker of the existents, the Giver of
their existence, their Creator, their
Preserver, and the Provider of their
persistence and their continuance.
2. He is the first due to the
pre-eternity of His essence and the
eternity of His existence, and the
priority of real non-existence in the
domain of perpetuity to every
essence and its existence other than
the essence of the Real and His
eternal existence. He is the last due
to the necessity of His permanence
and the eternity of His essence and
His existence in His very essence,
while the possibility of extinction
and passing away and the
permissibility of negation and non-
existence belongs to every existent
besides Him, even with respect to
the stage of the essence itself as
such.[458]
3. He is the beginning of the
system of existence, which is the
Great Man, and He is its end,
because He encompasses [465] its
two chains of beginning and return.
Therefore, He is the first with
respect to the chain of beginning,
and He is the last with respect to
the chain of return.
4. He is the first and the last in
relation to every essence and
existence with respect to the two
prior and subsequent necessities,
since every possible is enclosed by
essence and existence by means of
two necessities, a prior and a
subsequent, and each of these two is
necessary through another,
dependent upon the real Maker,
who is necessary in essence and
self-subsisting in existence (exalted
be His glory and magnified be His
sovereignty). We have explained
this in al-Ufuq al-Mubīn. He
(exalted be His grandeur) is the
first and the last in relation to every
existent by these two respects.
5. He is the first and the last
because He is the efficient cause
and final cause of all existents
without exception. As for the Great
Man and the noblest of its members,
which is the First Emanated, He
(exalted be His sovereignty) is the
proximate, complete, first Agent
and the proximate, complete, final
Goal to both of them in every
respect. As for the other parts of the
system of the whole, each of them
has a series of efficient causes
leading back to the first Efficient
Cause and a series of final causes
leading up to the ultimate Final
Cause. These two are no other than
the Essence of the Real Existent
himself, who is the Cause of all
causes, the Principle of all
principles, the Agent of the whole,
and the Goal of goals.
He (glorified be He) is the
beginning of every existent
inasmuch as He is the agent of its
very essence, or inasmuch as He is
the agent of the substance of its
essence and the agent of all of its
specific causes. Through Him the
actualization of the necessity of
every essence and every existence
is possible, and of every perfection
of essence and existence. He is also
its end, since He himself is the goal
of its very essence and its existence
or the goal of the substance of its
essence, and the goal of all its
goals, and because His light and
His splendor is the beloved and
object of desire of every light, and
the object of longing of every
existent and its aspiration.
6. He in His own real essence,
in every respect, is the beginning
and the end of whatever is in the
world of time, for every temporally
generated things has a temporal
beginning and a temporal end, and a
time prior to the moment of its
generation and a time posterior to
the time of its existence. God
(glorified be He), due to His
eternity in His own essence, not
from dependence upon something
apart from His essence, exists both
with the prior time and what is
before it and with the posterior time
and what is after it in an
unchanging, eternal way and with
one everlasting relation. No other
existent is equal to Him in this. He
is the First and the Last. No final
limit enters into His eternity, nor
does any other being share in His
firstness [466] and His lastness.
7. He is the beginning of every
entity (huwiyya) because He is its
Maker according to the primary
perfections which are the requisites
of the quiddity and the Giver of
forms to the matters in the first
creation. He is its end because He
is the force which drives it toward
the secondary perfections which are
the supererogatory acts of the
reality and the bestower of lights
upon the souls in the second
creation.
8. He is the beginning of the
entities because their first stage is
the bestowals (ni‘am) preceding
existence which consist of their
principles ordered in a vertical
series toward the Principle of
principles, and [because] He has
arranged for them the series of
causes leading to the occurrence of
the effects. He is their end because
He has bestowed upon them the
subsequent graces which follow
after existence.
9. He is the starting point and
the ending point of the incorporeal
rational soul of man, which is a
copy corresponding to the Great
World in this transitory first abode
whenever it attains the stage of
perfection corresponding to the
highest station of true understanding
and turns aside from everything but
God alone. Consequently, He is the
first and the last in relation to the
small world [i.e., man], just as He
is the first and the last in relation to
the Great World.
10. He is the first and the last
in relation to the immaterial soul in
the changeless abode hereafter
because He is its origin and its end,
its source and its destiny. Its issuing
forth is from Him and its return is to
Him in both its corporeal gathering
and its spiritual resurrection
(ma‘ād). Let it be recognized.

Wrapping Things Up (lit. putting

on the turban)
with respect to a few of the
branches of the tree of this burning
brand.
 Wamīḍ 10.5.38
He says (exalted be the
speaker) in the verse of dominion:
“In thy hand is the good. Verily,
over all things Thou hast
power.”[459] He mentions good
only, and does not mention evil, as
an instruction to those who possess
insight concerning three implied
meanings. The first is that essential
evil, in reality, refers strictly to
privations, insofar as they are
privations, since privation as such
does not depend upon the existence
of an existent, but rather necessarily
depends upon the absence of an
existence.
The second is that evil things
and suffering occur in the system of
existence in both this abode and the
abode hereafter, but I mean thereby
existing things that cannot be
described as evil with respect to
their own existence but only in
relation to other existents insofar as
they cause them to become deprived
of the perfections proper to them.
Consequently, they are evil
relatively and by accident. [467]
Furthermore, their dependence upon
the divine will and heavenly
providence is also accidental, since
the providence and the will are only
connected to them insofar as they
are the concomitants of manifold
blessings and abundant good things
in the system of existence, which
requires, with respect to the mode
of the real outpouring and the
absolute giving, their inclusion in
the primal divine predetermination
and the essentially necessary,
volitional emanation. These great,
abundant blessings and manifold
good things are susceptible to these
insignificant evils. It is also that the
concomitants of quiddities only
depend upon the quiddity itself
essentially and upon the Maker of
the quiddity accidentally.
 The third is that these
accidental evils, with respect to
being willed and predetermined,
are also not essential but
accidental. Their relative,
accidental evil is only conceivable
in relation to certain particular
things and individuals in their
specificness among the parts of the
system of the whole. They are very
insignificant in comparison to the
rest of the parts. But in relation to
the total solitary system in its
comprehensive individuality, and
likewise in relation to those
individuals and particulars, not
with respect to themselves
independently and not with respect
to their entities in isolation, but
insofar as they are parts of the
comprehensive individual and the
perfect, complete, universal system,
there is no evil and no evilness at
all, neither essentially nor
accidentally. Even were an
observer of the system of existence
to find evil occurring in it
according to his observation, yet
one endowed with true knowledge
and a penetrating vision that
encompasses the whole system in
its solitary form and its
comprehensive individuality, with
all of the causes leading to the
effects in a harmonious and
systematic way, would not find in
the system of existence anything to
which the name “evil” could be
applied or “evilness” ascribed in
any respect. Let it be pondered.
Similar to the above verse are
the words in the tradition on prayer
between the seven glorifications at
the beginning of the obligatory
prayer: “Here am I! Blessed art
Thou! The good is in Thy hands,
and evil is not Thine.” The Leader
of the Doubters and his imitators in
Bayḍā and Nīshāpūr, and others
among their followers, in their
commentaries are only aware of
one of these implied meanings.
Furthermore, it is necessary to
recognize that the evils which occur
in existence only enter into the
summation of the primal
predetermination accidentally, not
into the details of subsequent fate.
Therefore, that which the
predetermination requires and
unites together either essentially or
accidentally in oneness, simplicity,
harmony, and order, fate sets forth
and differentiates essentially in all
its details through multiplicity,
progression, and succession. Let it
be understood. [468]
 Wamīḍ 10.5.39
He says (glorified be He):
“He is not to be asked about what
He does, but they will be
asked.”[460] The intent here is not
the denial of causation and the
negation of final causality from His
action absolutely, as the Ash‘ariya
among those who meddle with what
does not concern them imagine.
They do not merit addressing.
Rather, the intent of this verse is the
denial of the question “Why?” with
respect to His actions with respect
to the final goal, not with respect to
proximate and intermediate goals,
for the goal of goals with respect to
His action absolutely is no other
than His real, solitary essence in
every respect. Have you not heard
that there is a clear distinction
between successive final causes in
terms of nearness and remoteness,
as they say with respect to the
logical sciences and the non-logical
science sought for its own sake with
a primary intention, for the final
cause [or: purpose ghāya] of logic
is to serve the master of the
sciences, namely, metaphysics; and
the final cause of metaphysics is its
own self, and it has no final cause
beyond itself. The final cause of the
roundness of the brain, for example,
is for its shape to be most
encompassing, the final cause of its
encompassing shape is the
dispersion of steam and its non-
accumulation, the final cause of the
non-accumulation of steam is
excellence of apprehension, and the
final cause of excellence of
apprehension is steadfastness in the
acquisition of divine knowledge.
This final cause is the goal of goals
and the object sought for itself. The
same applies with respect to the
molar teeth being wide, and so
forth.
Know then that the non-
whyness belonging to His action
(glorified be He) is in relation to
the total system which is the Great
Man, since its final cause and its
efficient cause is the essence of the
one true Creator himself, and a goal
and final cause beyond Him cannot
possibly be conceived. As for
every part of the system of
existence, its immediate final cause
(or purpose) is the perfection of the
system of the whole and its
completion in accord with the best
proportion, while the [last] final
cause of its successive final causes
is the essence of the real Agent, to
whom every goal returns and in
whom every final cause culminates.
Consequently, the non-whyness
belonging to any of His actions
(lauded be He) in the end coexist
together, since there is no goal and
no final cause in the end save His
necessary, solitary, real existence,
which is the goal of all goals and
the final cause of all final causes
without exception. Even if His
actions do have goals and final
causes and successive proximate
and intermediate reasons, all of
them lead to Him who is the goal of
goals and the final cause of final
causes by virtue of His very
essence [being] necessary, one, and
real in every respect. Let it be
ascertained. [469]

Wamīḍ 10.5.40
Has a doubt reached you
with respect to the holy tradition:
“Whoever is not content with My
predetermination (qaḍā’), is not
patient under My calamity, and does
not give thanks for My favor, let
him depart from My earth and My
heaven and seek a lord besides
Me,” because according to this it is
necessary to be content with the
predetermination of God and His
fate, while it is established that
contentment with unbelief (kufr) is
unbelief, and unbelief is an object
of the predetermination? As a
consequence, it is implied that
contentment with unbelief is
unbelief despite its being necessary.
The Leader of the
Doubters answered this in the
Muḥaṣṣal as follows: “Unbelief is
not the same as the
predetermination, but it is
something dependent on the
predetermination. So we are content
with the predetermination, not with
the object of the predetermination.
Rūmī assented to it in the verses of
the Mathnawī.” This is wrong and
not correct. The Seal of the
Scholars responded in his Naqd al-
Muḥaṣṣal:
His answer that unbelief is not
the same as the
predetermination and is only the
object of the predetermination
comes to nothing, since the
speaker of “I am content with
the predetermination of God,”
does not intend by this his
contentment with one of God’s
attributes. Rather he intends
contentment with what that
attribute requires, which is the
object of the predetermination.
The correct answer is that
contentment with unbelief,
insofar as it is the
 predetermination of God, is
obedience, and not in this
respect unbelief.
I say: The distinction
between the predetermination and
its object does not avail him. Does
not the mode of the object of the
predetermination as such return to
the mode of the predetermination?
[The referent of] “not in this
respect” is not a mode belonging to
the object of the predetermination.
Therefore, the correct answer, as
we have ascertained, is that only
contentment with the
predetermination insofar as it is an
essential predetermination, or with
the object of the predetermination
insofar as it is an essential object of
the predetermination, is necessary.
Unbelief as such is not an essential
object of the predetermination since
the predetermination is not
connected to it essentially, but is
only connected to it [accidentally].
Consequently, it is an object of the
predetermination insofar as it is a
concomitant of many good things,
not insofar as it is unbelief.
Therefore, contentment with it is
only necessary in this respect, not
insofar as it is unbelief. Unbelief is
only contentment with unbelief
insofar as it is unbelief, not insofar
as it is a concomitant of the good
things belonging to the system of
existence. Stand firm as bidden and
be not of them that go astray.

Wamīḍ 10.5.41
With respect to the holy
tradition “I have not hesitated with
respect to anything I have called
into being as I hesitate with respect
to grasping the soul of my faithful
servant, who hates death as I hate
his evil deeds,” the meaning is
abstruse to certain groups among
the learned, for the ascription of
hesitation to the All-Knowing Agent
is not its meaning, how much less
[470] its implication! None of them
has come to that which is worthy of
relating and transmitting. Know then
that hesitation refers to something
whose cause is the conflict of the
preponderating agent with respect
to two sides, so that the caused
(musabbab) is used here, while the
cause (sabab) is meant. The import
of the tradition is that the taking of
the soul of the faithful believer by
death is good in relation to the
system of existence and evil with
respect to his sins. Consequently,
this accidental, relative evil is the
greatest of the kinds of accidental
evil and the most severe of its
members in comparison to the
divine actions whose essential
abundant goodness is manifold and
whose relative accidental evil is
inconsequential due to the nobility
of the faithful believer and his favor
with God (lauded be He). To
express this another way, the
occurrence of the action is between
the two sides of essential goodness
and its connection to the abundant
good things and accidental, relative
evil and its connection to some of
the existents. This is expressed as
“hesitation,” since goodness
motivates the performance of the
action and evil motivates its
neglect, and in this is an impulsion
to a certain hesitation.
Consequently, the meaning is: “I
have not found an evil in any of the
accidental evils concomitant to the
abundant goodnesses in My actions
like the evil which is the sin of my
faithful servant with respect to
death, which is one of the good
things necessary according to the
consummate divine wisdom. What
pertains to accidental evils
concomitant to the abundant good
things is stronger in terms of evil
and greater than this accidental evil,
but the keeping of the abundant
good and perfect wisdom in that is
sounder, stronger, and greater. Walk
the path of the clear intellect, and
be not of those who are heedless.

Wamīḍ 10.5.42
With respect to the
tradition ascribed to him (may God
bless him and his pure family and
grant them salvation) “Every child
is born with an innate nature, but
only his parents make him a
Zoroastrian, a Jew, or a Christian,”
know that every human being is
born into the world of [the
physical] creation (‘ālam al-khalq)
with his corporeal, material body
and into the world of Command
(‘ālam al-amr) with his
incorporeal rational soul. His
parents, insofar as he is born into
the world of [the physical] creation,
are prime matter and nature, and
insofar as he is born into the world
of Command, are soul and intellect,
in other words, the soul of the
whole and the intelligence of the
whole. What is meant by these two
here [i.e., in this tradition] are his
parents insofar as he is born into the
world of [the physical] creation,
which are nature and prime matter,
in other words, the material nature
and the elemental prime matter.
Our companion states at
the end of the first chapter of his
book al-Mabda’ wa’l-Ma‘ād:
The noblest of the existents after
the First (exalted be He) is the
intelligence of the whole,
followed by the soul of the
whole [or the Universal
Intelligence, followed by the
Universal Soul]. The
intelligence of the whole is
forever actual and the potential
does not mix together with it.
[471] The soul of the whole is a
mover and always potential.
You know the reason for this,
and what we will explain next
will prove true for us, namely,
that the nature of the corruptible
bodies and their subject is
generated from the body of the
whole. Hence, we call it the
nature of the whole. Moreover,
every body belonging to
corruptible generated things has
a nature which is particular to
it. Therefore, the stages of forms
are the intelligence of the
whole, the soul of the whole,
and the nature of the whole,
while the stages of bodies are
the heavenly ethereal body, the
earthly elemental body, and the
generated bodies. It will
become clear in what follows
 that the first of the existents to
originate from the real Existent
is the intelligence of the whole
in accord with its rank, then the
soul of the whole, then the body
of the whole, and then the nature
of the whole.

Wamīḍ 10.5.43
Among the common doubts
is this: If God knows of the
existence of the action of a person,
and the divine predetermination is
connected to it, then it is necessary,
and if He knows of its non-
existence and its existence is not
predetermined, then it is
impossible. How then is it fated for
the person, and how is the person
able to perform his action by
commencing and ceasing?
The Leader of the
Doubters says in the Muḥaṣṣal that
difficulty falls upon the whole and
that the answer is that God (exalted
be He) is not to be asked about
what He does. The brilliant critic,
the Seal of the Scholars, responds
in his Naqd al- Muḥaṣṣal:
If this is nullified to the power
of a person and his choice with
respect to his action, it would
also be nullified to the power of
the Lord and His choice with
 respect to His action, for He
eternally knows what He will
do without end, so that His
action in what is unceasing is
either necessary or impossible.
The answer is what he said in
what preceded, namely, that
knowledge is a consequence of
an object of knowledge, and
therefore it is not required for
necessity or impossibility with
respect to the object known.
We say: This answer is
absurd, for it would only be correct
if the knowledge of God (glorified
be He) of that which is outside of
His essence were a receptive
knowledge, and He is greatly
exalted from that. It is evident and
clear that He (glorified be He)
knows each thing with a perfect
actual knowledge through the
complete encompassment of its
causes and its reasons contained in
His perfect knowledge of His own
essence, which is real and one in
every respect. Furthermore, His
knowledge of each thing is the same
as His real, necessary essence, and
His necessary essence is the
efficient cause of each thing. How
then could His knowledge not be a
cause? Knowledge is a
consequence of an object of
knowledge in a correspondent
(wizān) with respect to a state of
correspondence, since the object of
knowledge is the source with
respect to the correspondent of the
correspondence, not with respect to
existence except with respect to
[472] receptive knowledge, as he
has inferred in the Sharḥ Risāla
Mas’ala al-‘Ilm. Therefore, the
correct answer is that although His
knowledge (exalted be He) is a
necessary cause of the necessity of
an action, it only requires the
necessity of the action of a person
to be preceded by the power of that
person and his choice due to these
two being among the causes of
action and its reasons. Necessity by
choice does not contradict choice,
rather it confirms it. Therefore, just
as His real essence (glorified be
He) is an efficient cause for the
existence of every existent and its
necessity, and this does not nullify
intermediate causes and conditions
and the chain of causes and effects,
the same applies to His perfect
knowledge of each thing, a
knowledge which is the same as
His necessary agent essence.
He states in the Muḥaṣṣal:
“The question of wills (irādāt)
returns to a necessary will, which
rebuts an infinite series. This
necessitates recognition of the
dependency of the whole upon the
predetermination of God (exalted
be He) and His fate.” The brilliant
critic responds:
I say: It is said that the
dependency of the whole upon
the predetermination of God is
either without intermediacy with
respect to calling something into
existence or it is through
intermediacy. The first does not
require the leading of wills
back to His will, and the second
does not contradict the doctrine
of choice. Choice is to call into
 existence by the intermediacy of
power and will, whether that
power and will be through the
action of God without
intermediacy or by the
intermediacy of another thing.
Therefore, some actions occur
through the predetermination of
God and His fate as a result of
the choice of their agent, and
this is only refuted by raising a
demonstration that God is the
only cause in existence.
At the end of the third
chapter of Physics of the Shifā’, our
companion has explained the
connectedness of the generated
beings in the world of generation
and corruption, even wills and
choices, by the heavenly circular
motions. Then he says:
It is fitting for us to conclude
this chapter with a brief
reference to the causes of
generation and corruption. We
say that every generated thing
has a matter, a form, an efficient
cause, and a final cause which
are particular to it. This is
derived by induction or by
means of postulation. As for the
totality of [the world of]
generation and corruption and
its continuity, the common
efficient causality which is
nearest and most prior is the
heavenly motions. What they
move and the common material
cause is the first element, while
the common formal cause is the
form which belongs to matter
and potentially to other things
which do not coexist with it.
The final cause is the
preservation of those things
which do not persist in their
units and whose conservation is
in their species. As soon as
elemental matter wears one
thing, it is divested from
anything else, and as soon as the
thing [473] is it, anything else is
corrupted. There is no means
for the persistence of generated
things through their individuals.
The preservation of their
species is brought about by the
reproduction, struggle for
sustenance, and succession
associated with generation and
corruption. The most prior to
this is the generosity of God,
which gives every existent what
it is capable of receiving and
causes it to persist to the extent
possible, either in its
individuality, as with the
heavenly bodies, or in it
 species, as with things
composed from the elements.

Wamīḍ 10.5.44
A difficult doubt arises
here, and it is that if our will comes
to us from outside, and the possible
human will of necessity leads back
to the real necessary will of God,
man without a doubt is compelled
with respect to his will to act, and
that which forces him is the
necessary will. “You do not will
unless God wills.”[461]
Consequently, even if a man acts by
his will and his choice, his will to
act is not by his will and his choice.
Otherwise, for each act he would
have unlimited successive wills,
which are the will to act, the will to
will, the will to will to will, and so
on without end. This is absurd.
Therefore, it is necessary for the
action of man to be by choice and
for his will for that action to not be
by choice. This is a doubt for which
no one among the former or latter
generations has provided a rebuttal
which has reached us.
The explanation for this is
what we have written and
established in the book al-Īqāẓāt by
the grace of Almighty God and the
blessing of His confirmation. The
gist of that is that if the successive
causes leading to man continue on
until a certain action is conceived,
and it is believed to be good,
whether real or conjectured, or it is
believed to be beneficial for a real
or conjectured good, this will
certainly cause him to desire it.
When the emotion of desire is
certain and resolution upon it
attained, the necessary will
influences the muscles and the
members of the body. Therefore,
that certain, resolved upon desire
called “will” (irāda) is a
summative desiring state of the soul
in such a manner that whenever it is
correlated to the action itself and it
is inclined toward it essentially, it
is a desire and a will in relation to
the action itself; and whenever it is
correlated to the will to act and the
resolved upon desire for it and it is
inclined toward it essentially, that
resolved upon will, not the action
itself, is a desire or a will in
relation to the will without another
new desire and another new will.
[474] The same applies to the will
to will and the will to will to will,
continuing until the rest of the stages
which the mind is able to incline
toward essentially and consider in
detail. All of these wills in detailed
consideration are by will and
choice, and they, in their entirety,
are contained in that resolved upon,
summative, desiring state called
“the will to act” and “the choice to
act.” I am not saying that these wills
are the will to act itself; rather I am
saying that the desiring soul, which
wills and chooses to act, has a
desiring, resolved upon, summative
state which is suitable for the mind
to differentiate into the will to act,
and the will to will, and the will to
will to will until the perception of
the mind applies to the path of
actual differentiation. The
succession of these wills in terms
of essential priority and posteriority
does not contradict their unity in
that summative state in its oneness.
This is only impossible for
continuous quantity and extended
entity. Therefore, as long as spatial
magnitude cannot be resolved into
essential priorities and
posteriorities which are the parts of
that magnitude and its sections, its
separation into prior and posterior
parts and sections can certainly
only be spatial. As for the singular
continuous terminal motion
corresponding to that individual
continuous magnitude, by the aid of
the estimative faculty the intellect
divides it into its successive parts
with an essential priority and
posteriority. The path of will in this
is the path of knowledge. These two
are nursed in this regard from a
single breast and the clear intellect
whispers to them in a single cradle.
The detailed explanation of this is
in the care of the book al-Īqāẓāt.
Therefore, we say with
respect to the removal of the doubt:
If it is desired to require the
occurrence of will without another
will, choice, or consent from man in
relation to it, the falsity of this is
apparent to you. And if it is desired
to require the tracing of the
dependency of will with respect to
its existence and its necessity to the
perfect necessary Power and the
real divine Will, it is recognized
that this is true. The clear intellect
cannot deny this and falsity cannot
assail it. It is not compulsion and
not the delegation of power, but
something between these two. In
short, there is no distinction
between action and the will to act
with respect to their emanation from
man by will and choice and with
respect to the necessity of their
leading in the chain of emanation
and dependency to the will of the
essentially necessary, real Efficient
Cause (exalted be His sovereignty).
[475] How is it possible for the
essentially possible to not be
dependent for existence and
necessity upon the essentially
necessary Being? Let it be
ascertained.

Wamīḍ 10.5.45
Consequently, all evils and
imperfections arise from the side of
the receptive effect, from the
imperfection of its essence, the lack
of its worthiness, and the deficiency
of its disposition, while all good
things and blessings come from the
bestowal of the emanating Creator,
from the priority of His providence
and the impetus of His guidance.
Praise be to Him who confirms His
servants with respect to His
principles and His causes through
the grace of His handiwork and the
gift of His outpouring and with
respect to His actualization and His
determination through the flowing
of His bounty and the sprinkling of
His mercy! The emanation and
issuing forth of the good things of
the system of existence, its primary
and secondary perfections, and the
obligatory and supererogatory acts
in their entirety, belonging to
quiddities, concrete entities,
essences, attributes, natures, innate
natures, characteristics,
dispositions, accidents, deeds, and
actions, are strictly due to the
power of God and His necessary
will, His real, absolute goodness,
His surpassing providence and
guidance, His overflowing and all-
encompassing mercy, and His
perpetual, active outpouring. But
their issuing forth through the
emanation of His great bounty is in
accordance with the dispositions of
matters and the worthiness of
quiddities. “Each thing with Him is
according to its measure.”[462] As
for evils, imperfections, sins,
offenses, and transgressions, these
are due to the deficiency of
dispositions, lack of worthiness, the
imperfection of realities, the
defectiveness of receptacles, the
mutual competition of the species of
material things, and the clashes of
the inhabitants of the world of
darknesses, not because of the
stinginess of the emanating Agent
and the withholding of the All-
Bountiful One, or because of a
weakness in His power and a
deficiency in His emanation.
Immensely exalted is the real
Emanator from any of this. He gives
each thing that which it merits in
accordance with its worthiness, and
He bestows upon each matter that
which suits it according to its
disposition. He is the absolute
Generous One. The handiwork of
His generosity is only conditioned
by the disposition of the receiver,
and the outpouring of His mercy
only awaits the arrival of that which
merits it. “Whatever good befalls
you is from God, and whatever evil
befalls you is from yourself.”[463]
Universal, absolute potentiality
(isti‘dād) is a characteristic of the
reality of prime matter and a
concomitant of its quiddity which is
dependent upon itself requiring
itself, not upon an external
necessitating factor. Every
subsequent particular disposition in
its particularity is a consequence of
another prior particular disposition,
as we have explained to you
previously by the leave of God.
Therefore, [476] the particular
characteristics of the dispositions
and the potentialities differ in
accordance with the difference of
the particular characteristics of the
matters, the quiddities, the
individuals, and the particulars. In
the world of the fifth nature every
prime matter belonging to a sphere
is an object of concomitance
(malzūm) of one specific, particular
disposition, which is the substance
of the object of concomitance itself
in its species reality and cannot be
separated from it, and a
concomitant (lāzim) of the quiddity
[of the sphere] in the world of
possibility absolutely. This is the
purport of the propositional mode
insofar as the copulative relation as
such is between two sides, like four
being even and three being odd.
Therefore, its copulative
occurrence, that is to say the mutual
blending of the two sides, is an
effect of the quiddity itself and its
essential requisite. As for its notion
in its conceptual reality, like the
reality of evenness and oddness, for
example, it is something made by
the fashioning of the real agent
Maker like the rest of the possible
realities and possible quiddities.
Therefore, it is specialized to the
concomitants of the essence of the
true Creator (glorified be He), like
the Great Man and the noblest of its
parts, namely, the First Emanated,
that they in their conceptual
realities are concomitants of their
essentially necessary object of
concomitance, dependent upon it,
and an effect and requisite of it. But
this is not possible for any of the
concomitants of possible quiddities.
Be not of those who are
uninformed.

Wamīḍ 10.5.46
Do you perceive with the
faculty of your discernment that the
remotest effect has the greatest need
and dependency, and the most
numerous connections and
acquisitions, in relation the real
Emanator in every respect, since it
has with respect to each of the
potentialities (muntaẓarāt) of its
determination and the causes of its
existence an aspect of dependency,
relation, need, and connection. All
of the things in the vertical chain
leading to the occurrence of the
remotest effect are blessings from
God (glorified be He) and gifts
from Him. His exaltation is indeed
lofty in relation to it, and these are
the gifts preceding existence.
From this it is established
that man, who is the last of the
stages of return, especially he who
is at the center of the level of
perfection and the final degree of
realizing perfection, and at the
ultimate goal in the chain of return,
is the nearest to His holiness the
Real, has the most acquisitions, and
is the most abundant in terms of
being an effect from Him [or “in
having signs from Him”] than
whatever else is in the world of
possibility in its two chains of
beginning and return.

Wamīḍ 10.5.47
Transform your heart into
your ear and your intellect into your
sense of hearing, and hearken to the
chief of the family of the house
[477] of Revelation and
Messengership, the gate to the
abode of the knowledge of
inspiration and prophecy, the
treasury of the revelation of the
Qur’ān, and the repository of the
secret of interpretation (upon him
be peace), when he said: “The
grandeur of the Creator before you
reduces the created before you.”
Turn away by the eternal Light from
the evanescent shadow and by the
real Existence from false
imaginings. Know that the material
life of the body in this world is the
shell of life. It is nothing but
outward life, while the divine
intelligible life in the world of
sanctity is its spiritual, luminous
core, the pith of eternal felicity, and
the quintessence of real life.
Just as graves are the
tombs of bodies, in like manner
bodies are the graves of souls. It
may be that “tombs” in the words:
“You cannot make those who are in
tombs hear”[464] (magnified be the
speaker in the wise Qur’ān), are
bodies, since common fools are
absolutely ignorant that their life is
the abode of death, that their bodies
are tombs for their souls, and that
their corporeal forms are graves for
their spirits in the transitory and
immortal worlds. In the holy
tradition “I am with their broken
hearts and their obliterated tombs,”
the obliterator is transcendent,
incorporeal souls, and their
breaking consists of their volitional
death and their abandonment of
their bodies willingly before
abandoning them by nature, which
is natural death. The tombs are the
worn material bodies worn out by
the sacrifice of obedience and the
discipline of worship. This is their
obliteration.

Wamīḍ 10.5.48
How excellent the words
of the author of the Talwīḥāt, where
he says:
Consider the nature of the
relationship of your body to the
world of elements, the nature of
the relation of the elements to
the body of the whole, the nature
of the relation of the body of the
whole to the soul of the whole,
the nature of the relation of the
soul of the whole to the
intelligences, the nature of their
relation to the intelligence
called “the most transcendent
foundation” (al-‘unṣur al-a‘lā),
which is the Throne of majesty
and glory, and not its relation to
the Lord of Grandeur, for the
elements are contained in the
heavenly bodies, which are
subject to the souls, which are
subject to the intelligences,
which are subject to the First
Effect. “God encompasses them
from behind,…He is the
Subduer standing above His
servants,...and His Throne is the
vastness of the heavens and the
earth.”[465] Everything
vanishes before His dominion.
Glory and praise be to
Thee, O My God. I testify that
every object of worship except
Thy Throne until the bottom of
the two earths [478] is vain
save Thy bountiful countenance.
No God is there but Thee.
Sanctify us through Thy might
from the dross of matter and
bestow upon us a mercy from
 Thy presence. Desire belongs to
Thee and fear is from Thee.
Thou art the Lord of all the
worlds.

Wamīḍ 10.5.49
Has it not been recited to
you in what has preceded that the
balance of true knowledge is to go
past the two limits, the limit of the
negation [of God’s attributes] and
the limit of comparison [to Him].
The application of all the names of
power and glory and of majesty and
perfection to the agent Creator and
the affirmation of perfect meanings
in their entirety to Him (lauded be
He) is departing from the limit of
negation. The knowledge that each
of these blessed names and lofty
expressions here has a sense that is
more holy and more exalted than the
meanings which minds and
intellects can comprehend and
faculties and perceptions can grasp
is going past the limit of
comparison, since every divine
expression, whether in glorification
or in sanctification, is only an
opinion of mystic knowledge by
way of demonstration. The
affirmation of its [simple]
interrogativeness and the
ascertainment of the path of the
intellect to its whatness is that there
is no path for human minds to its
whatness.[466] Or going past the
limit of comparison is the
knowledge that the meanings of
these names and these expressions
in their entirety here pertain to the
stage of the real unique Essence, not
to another stage posterior to the
stage of the essence itself, as is the
way with the names of the attributes
and the expressions of the
descriptions of possible quiddities
and possible essences. Or the path
of going past the limit of
comparison is the objective
certainty confirmed by the
compounded intellect that the
subject of all the noble names and
perfect expressions with respect to
sanctification and glorification,
negation and affirmation, is the
circumstantial mode of essential
necessity itself, which in its real
oneness is the same as all the
circumstantial modes of might and
glory, of splendor and beauty, and it
is the same as the self-subsisting,
necessary Essence, and the source
of every essence and existence, and
every perfection of essence and
perfection of existence. This is not
possible for other than the
essentially necessary, real Self-
Subsisting One, since the
correspondent of every name and
attribute in the world of possibility
is a single circumstantial mode
which completely encompasses the
circumstantial modes of the other
names and attributes.
Know that the necessity of
going past the two limits here is an
unvarying law with respect to
affirming the essence (dhāt) and
affirming the kinds of attributes,
states, actions, emanations,
concomitants, and accidents. In
sum, all the aspects and
circumstantial modes, even the
accidental relations, concomitant
effects, and attendant
characteristics, [479] are all in the
world of lordship (‘ālam al-
rubūbiyya) in another form
sanctified from the customary
ascriptions of minds and exalted
above the conjectures of thoughts.
The same applies to the real
spiritual things and the noble divine
appointments belonging to souls
who have attained the station of
perfection in the abode of
immortality and the world of return.
Therefore, it is not easy for the soul
to recognize them, for they are in
the abode of their hiddenness. The
utmost with respect to the abode of
their hiddenness is only that the
necessity of their [simple]
interrogativeness in the doctrine of
the particular nature may be
ascertained by demonstration and
by means of the primal universal
providence without a path being
made to the knowledge of their
whatness in this dark, evanescent
world and this barren, transient
abode.

Wamīḍ 10.5.50
Consequently, the established
intent of the words “Praise be to thy
Lord, the lord exalted above what
they describe” (magnified be the
speaker), is that He is above what
pious and firmly grounded scholars
and philosophers affirm of Him and
transcends what He is compared to
in their minds and their thoughts.
How much more does He transcend
what the ignorant among the
anthropomorphists and the
literalists affirm. The most beautiful
names of God are of three kinds:
(1) Those that are applicable to
Him (exalted be He) by description
and designation, like the All-
Knowing, the Powerful. (2) Those
that may be applied to Him by
designation but not by description,
such as the Persisting, the Enduring,
which are derivatives of the two
temporals “persistence” (baqā’)
and “duration” (dawām), due to
what is here being based upon
another kind which is more perfect,
more befitting, more exalted, and
more noble than that whose meaning
is understood. (3) Those that are
applicable by description but not by
designation, such as the Necessary
Existent and He who gives
existence to every existent, and
synonyms for the name of His
essence in other languages, due to
not being designated in the Qur’ān
by these names.
 The Conclusion of Wrapping
Things Up

Wamīḍ 10.5.51
Do not fear the death of the
body and the perishing of the
constitution because you were born
into the material world, for you are
alive innately because you were
born into the world of the Kingdom.
You will endure as a copy of your
two parents, the Intellect and the
Soul, in obedient servitude to the
dominion of your Lord. Rejoice, for
you are the possessor of an ample
share of ancient providence and
transcendent guidance, if your
portion of mercy is mercy and not
punishment.

Wamīḍ 10.5.52
Those who forget reason
and commune with reality are not
afraid of death, for its bitterness is
in fear of it, [480] and they delight
to leave the body, for its sweetness
is in leaving it. It is clear to those
with a penetrating perception and
encompassing vision that the reality
of death is nothing but the second
birth into the abode of life and the
realm of splendor, and the first
transferal from the domain of time
to the world of perpetuity. It is
intelligible ascent from the earth of
progression and change to the
heaven of constancy and
changelessness, and real departure
from the village of dark matter and
its people to the city of
intelligences, whose balance stands
with equity. Indeed, they disdain the
world of sensation and pay no heed
to the perceptions of the senses.
They regard unclean the pleasures
of the inane and brutish and
consider base the delights of the
animal faculties. They bathe upon
the shore of the clear intellect and
immerse themselves in the
Euphrates of pure knowledge.
Whereupon they scoop up with their
clean and sanctified hands handfuls
from the purling spring of
intelligible life and quaff it. They
will persist through the persistence
of God within the treasure-house of
glory, and they will last through His
permanence in the world of mercy.

Wamīḍ 10.5.53
Since you have ascertained
that intelligible delights and divine
sciences are the springs of real life
in this transient and evanescent
world, and that one who is able to
pierce the sensible world will
become a traveler in the intelligible
world, judge then that natural death
may be likened to a second birth
into real life and everlasting felicity
in that other abode, provided the
incorporeal soul is an essence
purified from every blemish and
flaw and a substance cleansed from
every defect and dross. For this
reason it is said: “Be born for the
sake of death, and die for the sake
of life.” And: “Whoever has not
been born twice shall not enter the
Kingdom of Heaven.” In like
manner, volitional death may be
likened to a first birth in this
evanescent abode for the sake of
changeless, everlasting, intelligible
life and a cause for not being
grieved by the sting of fate and not
being saddened by the calamity of
natural death. Therefore, when its
time arrives and its moment comes,
as appointed and written [in the
Book of Fate], it is not contrary to
the state of the substance of the
soul. It is clear that as long as the
sensed substance is not contrary to
the sensing substance with respect
to nature, it is definitely not
perceived by it. For this reason the
master of the philosophers, the
divine Plato, states: “Die by will,
live by nature.”
Since this is established, it
is clear, methinks, that the Leader of
the Doubters was heedless of the
sweetness of the spiritual delights
[481] of real knowledge and divine
sciences, and unaware of the
exultation of a soul sanctified
through the ascetic practices of
obedience and worship while in
this world, inasmuch as he states in
the Sharḥ al-Ishārāt:
After God blessed me with
flawlessness in most things, so
that it was as if I were
distinguished from most others
in this regard, when I returned
to myself and I encountered real
delights, I do not say privative
 things, with great hidden
sufferings, as we reckoned
them, we found the delights vile
nearby the pains. Since the
affair is like this, how can
delights such as these in the face
of these pains be desirable? If
not, we do not look forward to
the great delights of the other
world. Otherwise continuous
non-existence would be
preferable.
He is caught up in sensible
pleasures and sensible pains. In
short, the wise (ḥukumā’) strive to
attain intelligible delights primarily,
and they pay more attention to
spiritual things, whether these be
with respect to this evanescent
abode or to that everlasting abode.
Therefore, they prefer the miracle
of our prophet (may God bless him
and his family and grant them
salvation), in other words, the
noble Qur’ān and the wise
Revelation, which is the
intelligible, manifest Light and the
heavenly, everlasting Proof, to the
miracles of the prophets of earlier
times, since the miracle of the
revealed Word is greater and more
enduring, its residing in clear
intellects more reliable and more
worthy, and through it the souls of
the educated and the favored are
more obedient and their hearts more
submissive. Furthermore, there is
no actual miracle produced of its
kind which is greater and more
dazzling than it, except in the works
of God before us, nor more
delightful and amazing, more
excellent and perfect. The creation
of fire, for example, is greater than
its being made cold and safe to
Abraham, and the creation of the
sun and the moon, the eyes, and the
common sense are greater than the
splitting of the moon in the common
sense. Were one to ponder and think
about the creation of the regulator
of the day and the celestial girdle,
which are the two intersectors
between boundedness and
openness, not at right angles, and
about the sun’s center being made
inseparable from the plane of the
celestial girdle with respect to its
particular motion, and what pertains
to this as a requirement of the
wonders of fashioning and the
marvels of design, and as a
consequence of the emanations of
good things and the exudations of
blessings into the horizons of the
system of the elemental world,
bewilderment would seize him and
he would immediately fall down
overwhelmed in his mind and
unconscious to his senses. And this
is only one particular act among His
acts (glorified be He) and one
particular handiwork among His
handiworks (exalted be His
sovereignty)! As for the Light of the
Qur’ān, whose rays are shining and
perpetual, it was not encountered by
former generations nor will it be
encountered [482] by future
generations in such a manner that
minds can attain it and imaginations
encompass it. That which resembles
it in the precepts of philosophy and
literature or approximates it in the
varieties of pure and lofty
rhetorical style belongs to its genus.

Wamīḍ 10.5.54
In the words of the
Speaking Book and the
Distinguishing Balance (the
blessings of God upon him),
“Everything is cherished when it is
scarce, but knowledge is cherished
when it is plentiful.” In the wise
sayings of Eumīras (Homer ?) this
premise is drawn in his poem on the
Greeks: “The good things of the
physical world are its middle parts,
but the good things of the
intelligible world are more
excellent than them.” I am amazed
at the people when guidance from
God (exalted be He) empowers
them, yet they invoke that to follow
the example of beasts. Therefore,
only aspire with your intentions to
the highest stage, and do not let
delight with the middle stages hold
you from it. Have the words of the
divine and noble Plato not reached
you: “Man should look at his face
each day in a mirror. If it is ugly, do
not commit vileness, lest it combine
two uglinesses, and if it is beautiful,
mar it not with vices.” Know then
that man has two origins: a dark,
material origin with respect to his
material body, and a luminous,
immaterial origin with respect to
his separate rational soul. With
respect to his immaterial soul he
stands in need of an intelligible
mirror in which the forms of his
good qualities and his shortcomings
are represented, so that they may be
reflected to him by it. With respect
to his material body he stands in
need of a corporeal mirror.
Therefore, in the vices of the body
is the destruction of the body, but in
the vices of the soul is everlasting
destruction. The immaterial,
intelligible mirror needed by his
incorporeal soul is no other than the
soul of a wise teacher, who gives
him the principles of knowledge
and the rules of wisdom, and who
protects his faculties and his
powers from following minds
contaminated with the impurities of
vain imaginings and associating
with souls marred by the disgraces
of bodies, for the maladies of these
hearts are infectious, and the harm
of these delusions is pervasive.

Ending the Conclusion with an

Admonition and a Prayer

Address
O truthful and learned
friend, O spiritual and eloquent
scion! By the leave of God
(glorified be He), the grace of His
assistance, and the power of His
confirmation, I have presented to
you a heavenly text and a sanctified
book. The seeker, the summarizer,
the scholar, the educated, the expert,
the novice, the skilled, and the timid
not yet trained and experienced—
insofar as there is no escape for
them from it nor [483] from a
herald coming before on the paths
of its abstrusities calling on the
paths of its hidden meanings, who is
assisted by the hosts of unseen
splendors and the reinforcements of
divine flashes to instruct them,
summon them, lead them, and guide
them, and to teach them the
peculiarities of its mysteries and the
meeting points of its gleams, and to
bestow upon them the goods stored
in its treasuries and the secrets in
its repositories—are all equal and
alike; and insofar as they are in
need of it, they are all similar and
equivalent.
I swear by God! This book
is the consummation of the
perfection of the theoretical faculty,
the acme of the perfection of human
endowment, the fruition of the
constitution of the master of the
sciences, and the maturity of the
body of the philosophy of
metaphysics. It is a spring of
purling waters gushing forth for the
sake of perpetual intelligible life
and a treasury of profitable goods
whose value will never cease.

Admonition and Prayer

Take heed! These
untrained, base pretenders to
philosophy and these vile, ignoble
meddlers are a noxious rabble and
lowly, dimwitted scoundrels,
whose intellects are inverted,
whose common sense has been
erased, whose souls are darkened,
whose thinking is materialistic,
whose bodies corrode their souls
and whose souls are slaves to their
bodies, whose fancies dominate
their minds and whose minds are
subservient to their fancies. I adjure
you by God, by intellectual kinship
and by spiritual relationship,
concerning the diffusion of these
maxims and the spreading of these
secrets to them. Assuredly, a
covenant from God is given to you
for the purification of the heart, the
illumination of the soul, the
refinement of the intellect,
emigration from the sensual world,
attaining the world of the intellect,
and turning to God in repentance
(exalted be His grandeur and
sanctified be His names). God is
between me and you, and God is a
guarantor over what we say. God is
my sufficer and He is sufficient.
God hears those who pray to Him.
There is no utmost limit beyond
God.
Glory be to Thee, O Lord,
and praise be to Thee, O Loving
One, O Possessor of the Throne of
Glory, O Source of beginning and
Source of return, O He who causes
to be sent forth and causes to return.
Guide me by Thy light unto Thy
light, and adorn me with Thy light
through Thy light. O Light of the
heavens and the earth, O Light of
lights, O Maker of the darknesses
and the lights, O Light above every
light, O Light which every other
light serves, O Light before whose
sovereignty every light submits, O
Light before the splendor of whose
radiance every other light is
humbled! Lord, graciously bless us
with submission to whatsoever has
been decreed by Thy
predetermination and with
surrender to the events of fate.
Endow us [484] with love of what
Thou lovest in the prior and the
posterior, the hastened and the
postponed, and with preference for
what Thou hast chosen from the
near and the remote. Lord,
notwithstanding this, deprive us not
of the gifts of Thy compassion, the
abundances of Thy mercy, the
bounties of Thy sufficiency, the care
of Thy providence, and the
excellence of Thy protection by
virtue of Thy generosity, Thy favor,
Thy grace, and Thy power, O Most
Merciful of the merciful!
This book was completed,
praised be to God (glorified be
He), and finished in the late hours
after Wednesday night on the sixth
day of the month of the Apostle of
God (may God bless him and his
family and grant them salvation),
the revered month of Sha‘bān, in the
year 1034 after his sacred and
blessed hijra.[467] Its
commencement was on the day of
his birth (peace be upon him) in the
month of Rabī‘ al-Awwal of this
year,[468] which may be spoken
with the date “badā kitābī al-
Qabasāt” [= 1034]. The same has
flowed from the Tongue of the Time
in the composition of his poetry:
A book like a light has appeared
in the heavens encompassing
every difficult field of
knowledge.
If you belong to the Real, you
 should seek a path. Behold! The
tall mountain of its proof is
established within it.
If you desire, set the date
“according to a gleam of light”
[= 1034], and if you desire, say:
“the star of the Real is shining”
[= 1034].
It was written by the
perishable right hand of this most
needy of the servants of God, the
All-Praised, the Self-Subsisting,
Muḥammad Ibn Muḥammad, called
Bāqir al-Dāmād al-Ḥusaynī. May
God make his end blessed in both
worlds and give him to drink from
the chalice of the well-favored,
those who have drawn near Him in
the highest way and are His
cupbearers of the most exalted
share, praising, worshipping,
submitting, seeking forgiveness,
praying, hoping, and anticipating.
Praise be to God, the Lord of the
worlds, to Whom all praise is due!
 Glossary of Terms

‫( أ‬hamza)
abad everlastingness; equivalent to
perpetuity; having no end in the
direction of the future.
ta’akhkhur infikākī dahrī perpetual
separate posteriority; the state of
the existence of the world in
relation to God.
azal sempiternity, pre-eternity;
having no beginning in the direction
of the past.
aṣīl real, as opposed to mentally
posited (i‘tibārī).
ta’aṣṣul principality
ta’alluf composition.
ān sayyāl) the flowing now; the
measure of medial motion just as
extended time measures terminal
motion.
anniyya thatness; existence.

‫ ب‬b
ibdā‘ primary origination; the
emanation of the intelligences, the
outermost sphere, its motion, and
time from God without need of
matter, instrument, or time.
According to Mīr Dāmād, this type
of creation is qualified by prior real
non-existence. To Ibn Sīnā it is
equivalent to essential creation
(ḥudūth dhātī), and it therefore
does not require prior real non-
existence, but only implies eternal
dependence upon the First Cause.
mubda‘ primary originated, a
primary originated thing (see ibdā‘
).
basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa uncompounded
nature; referring to God, who is not
dual but genuinely one in every
respect.
buṭlān nullification.
baqā’ persistence.
ibhām indeterminateness (ant. of
taḥaṣṣul)

‫ ث‬th
thubūt) affirmation; fixity.

‫ ج‬j
mujarradāt immaterial things
subsisting in the intelligible world
free from attachment to matter.
jā‘il agent; maker.
maj‘ūl effect; made thing.
ijtimā‘ conjunction; simultaneity,
coexistence.
ijmāl summation, wholeness (ant. of
tafṣīl).
jawhar substance; the subject-
substrate of accidents.
jawhariyyāt essential constituents
of the quiddity.
 ‫ ح‬ḥ
ḥadd essential definition; boundary.
iḥdāth production; the outpouring of
temporal existence preceded by
time.
ḥādith creature, created (thing);
event, occurrence.
ḥudūth creation, origination; having
a beginning, a cause of existence
and being preceded by real non-
existence (ant. of qidam)
al-ḥudūth bi’l-dhāt essential
creation; considering something’s
dependency upon a cause only
al-ḥudūth al-tadrījī gradual
creation; a type of temporal
creation qualified by temporal
existence coinciding with the
extension of time and being
divisible with its divisibility.
Equivalent to terminal motion (al-
ḥaraka al-qaṭ‘ī ).
al-ḥudūth al-duf‘ī instantaneous
creation; a type of temporal
creation qualified by the occurrence
of an existent in its entirety in an
indivisible now.
al-ḥudūth al-dahrī perpetual
creation; coming into existence
preceded by real non-existence not
in the extension of time.
al-ḥudūth al-zamānī (1) temporal
creation; coming into existence in
time preceded by quantifiable,
temporal non-existence in a
boundary separate from the
boundary of existence. (2) A type of
temporal creation qualified by the
temporal existent occurring in its
entirety in every now of its
temporal nows except for the now
of the beginning and the now of the
end. Equivalent to medial motion
(al-ḥaraka al-tawaṣṣuṭī).
muḥdath created, creature.
ḥaraka tawassuṭiyya medial
motion; equivalent to the temporal
existent existing in every now of the
time of its existence but not
coinciding with its extension.
ḥaraka qaṭ‘iyya terminal motion;
equivalent to temporal existence
coinciding with the extension of
time.
ḥiṣṣa pl. ḥiṣaṣ portion/s. The
particularized existences belonging
to individual things when reflected
in the mirror of our minds are
technically called “portions” of
existence.
taḥaṣṣul determinateness (ant. of
ibhām); actualization.
taḥṣīl actualization; occurrence.
ḥāqq matn al-wāqi‘ the inner
dimension of the real world;
equivalent to perpetuity.
taḥaqquq muta’aṣṣil principal
realization.
ḥaqīqa reality; equivalent to
“essence” (dhāt).
ḥikāya signification, i.e., the
signification of the actualized
essence by “existence.”
ḥaythiyya circumstantial mode; the
mode of the quiddity insofar as it is
something.
 ‫ خ‬kh
al-khārij objective reality
(encompassing the real non-
physical world as well).
ikhtirā‘ invention; refers to the
perpetual creation of the heavenly
spheres and the simple elements.
khuṣūṣiyyāt particularities;
particular properties belonging to
individuals.
 ‫ د‬d
dahr perpetuity; having an
atemporal beginning but no end;
where all things in relation to God
are in a single stage.

‫ ذ‬dh
dhāt essence; sometimes equivalent
to the quiddity, sometimes to the
quiddity as actualized.
al-dhāt al-malzūma the substrate-
essence.

‫ ر‬r
arbāb al-anwā‘ lords of the
species; conscious intelligible
substances in charge managing the
terrestrial species.
tarattub succession.
al-martaba al-‘aqliyya the
intelligible order; the essential
order of things in terms of
dependency and need.
rājiḥiyya preponderation.
murajjiḥ determinant; that which
“tips the scales” in favor of
something.
ru’us first principles.

‫ ز‬z
zamān time; the domain of elapsing
and renewal belonging to changing
things insofar as they are changing.
al-zawj al-tarkībī composite
duality; referring to the nature of all
contingent things, which are
composed of two real principles,
unlike the Creator, who is genuinely
one.

‫ س‬s
sarmad eternity; having neither a
beginning nor an end; belonging
exclusively to the uncaused First
Cause.
masāfa mutaṣṣil continuous
distance; equivalent to spatial
magnitude.
 ‫ ش‬sh
ishtirāq participation.
tashakhkhuṣ individualization.
tashkīk analogical gradation.
al-shay’ al-mufāraq a separate
thing, meaning an immaterial entity.

‫ ص‬ṣ
al-ṣādir al-awwal the First
Emanated; equivalent to the First
Intelligence.
ṣudūr procession, emanation (syn.
of fayḍ).
ṣun‘ fashioning; to Mīr Dāmād this
term encompasses the creation of
all perpetual things including the
primary originated (mubdi‘āt). To
Ibn Sīnā, it refers to the creation of
the celestial spheres whose matter
precedes them essentially but not
temporally.

‫ ض‬ḍ
muḍammana implicate order; the
state of the predetermination of all
things in the First Emanated.

‫ ط‬ṭ
ṭabī‘a nature. ‘Alawí says this term
has five different meanings: (1) the
universal quiddity, (2) Providence,
(3) the lord of the species, (4) the
managing soul, and (5) the
corporeal nature.
al-ṭabī‘a al-mursala the
unqualified nature; equivalent to the
universal quiddity of things.
mutābaqa correspondence,
coincidence.
ṭaraf a divider (of time) equivalent
to the now (ān); an extreme.
muṭlaq absolute, unqualified,
unrestricted.

‫‘ ع‬
i‘tibār aspect; consideration.
i‘tibārī mentally posited, as
opposed to real (aṣīl).
mu‘iddāt dispositions, preparatory
conditions.
‘adam non-existence; privation.
al-‘adam al-zamānī temporal non-
existence; since this non-existence
is in a boundary of time separate
from the boundary of a thing’s
existence, it is not removed with its
existence.
al-‘adam al-ṣarīḥ real non-
existence; the true contradictory of
existence; it must be removed for
existence to occur.
al-‘adam al-muṭlaq absolute non-
existence; as a conceptual non-
existence commensurate with
possible things as such, it can
coexist with existence.
‘adam muqayyad qualified non-
existence; equivalent to real non-
existence (al-‘adam al-ṣarīḥ).
‘āriḍ accident; that which occurs to
a substance from outside.
‘aqlī mental; for example, having
mental parts, like genus and species
(ant. of ma‘nawī).
‘unsur al-awwal the primary
foundation; a reference to the World
of Command and the First
Intelligence, which contains the
intelligible forms of all things.
ma‘nawī factual; for example,
having factual parts, like prime
matter and form (ant. of ‘aqlī).

‫ ف‬f
fard a singular instance or unit of a
multiplicity
tafṣīl differentiation,
particularization, detail (ant. of
ijmāl).
infiṣāl division, discontinuity.
al-fi‘liyya the actualization;
equivalent to the essence as
actualized by the act of emanation
and blending with its individual
instances. (see al-taqarrur)
infikāk separation from,
discontinuity with the particular
being of God.
mafhūm maṣdarī an attributive or
predicated notion, such as the
notion of “existence” predicated to
actual objects.
fayḍ emanation, outpouring (syn. of
ṣudūr).

‫ ق‬q
qadar ‘ilmī epistemological fate;
God’s changeless knowledge of
particular events both before and
after their occurrence.
qadar ‘aynī real fate; the actual
course of events in time in their
particularity and multiplicity.
qidam eternity, preexistence; having
no cause of existence and not being
preceded by non-existence (ant. of
ḥudūth).
taqaddum infirādī sarmadī eternal
separate priority; the state of God’s
existence in relation to the world.
al-taqarrur the determination;
equivalent to the essence as
determined and actualized by the
act of emanation and blending with
its individual instances. Mīr Dāmād
says: “The stage of the actually
created essence itself is called the
stage of the determination and the
actualization” (al-Qabasāt 38).
al-qaḍā’ al-‘ilmī epistemological
predetermination; God’s changeless
knowledge of all things in
summative consideration both
before and after their occurrence.
al-qaḍā’ al-‘aynī real
predetermination; the intelligible
form of the system of the universe in
summative consideration;
equivalent to the primary
origination of the realities of things
and their impression as intelligible
forms in the First Intelligence.
muqawwimāt essential constituents
of an essence (syn. of jawhariyyāt).
 ‫ ک‬k
kawn generation, becoming.
takwīn generation; the outpouring of
material existence preceded
essentially, not temporally, by
matter.

‫ ل‬l
lāḥiq a separable accidental. It is
neither an essential constituent of
the quiddity nor does it attach
necessarily to the essence like a
concomitant. Having long hair is a
separable accidental.
lāzim a concomitant (accidental) ;
inseparable from an essence, but
not an essential constituent of it.
Mīr Dāmād says that God’s act of
primary origination is a
concomitant of His essence.
lays non-existence, non-being (see
‘adam).

‫ م‬m
māhiyya quiddity; (1) that which is
answered to the question “What is
it?” or (2) that by which something
is what it is. As itself it is neither
existent nor non-existent, universal
nor singular. “Insofar as its
affirmation is objective, it is called
a ‘reality’ (ḥaqīqa), insofar as it is
distinguished from others, it is
called an ‘identity’ (or: ‘entity’
huwiyya), insofar as it has
concomitants predicated to it, it is
an ‘essence’ (dhāt)…and insofar as
it is the substrate of accidents, it is
a ‘substance’ (jawhar)” (Jurjānī,
al-Ta‘rīfāt).
matn al-wāqi‘ the real world.
muthul Platonic Ideas.
imtidād extension.
ma‘iyya dahriyya perpetual
simultaneity.
ma‘iyya sarmadiyya co-eternity,
eternal simultaneity; Mīr Dāmād
rejects this as impossible since only
God can be qualified by eternity.
imkān possibility; contingency; the
state of needing an efficient cause to
become actual.
al-imkān al-isti‘dādī dispositional
possibility; the state of being a
potentiality in matter.
al-imkān al-dhātī essential
possibility; belonging to everything
besides God by virtue of needing
another for existence.
al-imkān al-ashraf the noblest
possibility; a rule by which every
nobler possible thing in the chain of
beginning must be actually existent
before a baser possible thing.
mumkin possible; a possible thing.

‫ ن‬n
intizā‘ abstraction.
nafs al-amr the thing itself; this is
the stage of something as itself
without regard to its aspect in the
mind or in external reality.

‫ ه‬h
huwiyya entity; concrete identity;
equivalent to the actualized
essence.
hal basīṭ simple interrogative. A
question by means of the “simple
interrogative” is a question about
the existence of something; for
example: “Is man existent?” where
the purport of the verb “to be” is
complete.
hal murakkab compound
interrogative. In the “compound
interrogative,” the purport of the
verb “to be” is incomplete. Such is
a question about the existence of
something belonging to another
thing, as when it is said: “Is man
rational?”

‫ و‬w
wujūd ḥaqq the existence of the
Real, real existence; the true
correspondent of the term
“existence” in external reality.
mawjūdiyya maṣdariyya attributive
existence; existence conceptually
predicated to a quiddity.
ittiṣāl continuity.
wi‘ā’ a container; one of the three
containers of existence: time,
perpetuity, and eternity.
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[1] This introduction is adapted from
the introduction to my dissertation
Time, Perpetuity, and Eternity: Mīr
Dāmād’s Theory of Perpetual Creation
and the Trifold Division of Existence:
An Analysis of Kitāb al-Qabasāt: The
Book of Blazing Brands, University of
California, Los Angeles, 2006 (UMI
Dissertation Publishing 2007).
[2] Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut, p. xi.
[3] See al-Qabasāt, p. 303.
[4] Concept and Reality of Existence,
p. 60, n. 10. ‘Alawi also notes that
“because of his [al-Rāzī’s] poor training
he did not understand his [Ibn Sīnā’s]
intent” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 430).
[5] Dhabīhullāh Ṣafā, qtd. in Dabashi,
“Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī,” 549.
[6] He was in fact much more than a
philosopher and a theologian. Like Ibn
Sīnā, he was a “Renaissance man.” He
served as the vizier of two Mongol
rulers and was versed in mathematics,
astronomy, medicine, and nearly every
branch of knowledge.
[7] Lapidus, A History of Islamic
Societies, p. 294.
[8] “The School of Iṣpahān,” p. 904.
[9] “Toward a Reconsideration of the
‘Isfahān School of Philosophy’,” p.
166.
[10] Qur’ān 31:12.
[11] Qur’ān 19:57-58.
[12] Qtd. in Nasr, Islamic Studies, p.
69.
[13] Juan Cole, “Problems of
Chronology,” p. 32.
[14] “School of Iṣpahān,” p. 907.
[15] “Mīr Dāmād,” p. 622.
[16] Nasr, “School of Iṣpahān, p.
914; Ashtiyānī, Anthogie des
Philosophes Iraniens, p. 15.
[17] “School of Iṣpahān,” p. 914, n.
40.
[18] See al-Qabasāt, pp. 72, 77, 191,
365. He also refers often to Ibn Sīnā
separately as “my companion in
leadership” and to al-Fārābī as “my
companion in instruction.”
[19] Tabrīzī Khiyābānī as translated by
Dabashi, “Mīr Dāmād,” pp. 606-607.
[20] In Mīr Dāmād, al-Qabasāt, pp.
lix-lxii.
[21] Ibid., p. xxxii.
[22] Qtd. in Dabashi, “Mīr Dāmād,” p.
605.
[23] Qur’ān 27:7.
[24] Al-Qabasāt, p. 2.
[25] There is good reason to hold that
prime matter as such is also eternal, as
I have argued elsewhere, but this is not
Mīr Dāmād’s position. See Keven
Brown, “An Analytical Summary of
the First Qabas of Mīr Dāmād’s Kitābu
al-Qabasāt,” International Journal of
Shī‘ī Studies, 3(1), 24-25.
[26] By “the world” (al-‘ālam) Mīr
Dāmād means everything other than
God, both material and immaterial.
[27] Qtd. in Seyyed Ahmad ‘Alawī,
Sharḥ al-Qabasāt, p. 395.
[28] Qtd. in ‘Alawī, Sharḥ al-Qabasāt,
p. 384. The seven divine philosophers
listed by Mīr Dāmād are Thales,
Anaxigoras, Anaximenes, Empedocles,
Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato.
[29] “Suhrawardī’s Heir?,” p. 244.
[30] Qtd. in Greene, The Fabric of the
Cosmos, p. 139.
[31] Details on the manuscript copies
used and the lithograph edition are in
al-Qabasāt, pp. xxi-xxiv.
[32] Foreword to al-Qabasāt, p. ii.
[33] Mohaghegh, introduction to al-
Qabasāt, p. xvi; Izutsu, English
introduction, p. 3.
[34] ‘Alawī states: “Time and again
while he was alive he [Mīr Dāmād]
commanded me to undertake the
commentary of this delightful book.”
Qtd. in Mohaghegh’s “Arabic
Introduction” to Sharḥ al-Qabasāt, p.
17.
[35] The term al-dhikr, lit.
“remembrance,” also means
“quotation” or “citation,” and it may
have that meaning here, since Mīr
Dāmād quotes frequently from his
predecessors to support his arguments
in the chapters of al-Qabasāt.
Alternatively, the meaning here may be
the Qur’ān, which is also called al-
dhikr (see Qur’ān 16:44).
[36] The term ḥaqq al-yaqīn refers to
the highest in a three-tiered hierarchy
of stages of certainty derived from
verses in the Qur’ān. The first is ‘ilm
al-yaqīn (cognitive certainty), which an
understanding of things reached by
reasoning, such as an understanding of
fire reached by reading books. The
second is ‘ayn al-yaqīn (visual
certainty), which is an understanding of
things obtained by seeing them with
one’s own eyes. We see the fire. The
third is ḥaqq al-yaqīn (objective
certainty), which is an understanding of
things reached by direct experience. We
are burned by the fire. (See Yusuf Ali,
The Meaning of the Glorious Qur’ān,
vol. 2, footnote 5673.)
[37] In philosophy and theology,
qidam denotes both “preexistence” and
“eternity,” the latter meaning without
beginning or end, while azal signifies
the particular aspect of eternity being
without a beginning. Dāmād uses the
term sarmad customarily in al-
Qabasāt, however, rather than qidam,
to refer to the domain of God’s
beginningless and endless eternity.
[38] I.e., Aristotle’s books on Logic.
[39] “A demonstration is a syllogism
whose premises must be accepted, i.e.,
are certain. That is why the conclusion,
too, is certain” (Shams Inati, Ibn Sīnā:
Remarks and Admonitions: Part One:
Logic, p. 38). Premises acceptable in
demonstration include those that are
self-evident based on sensible
experience or unanimous agreement.
Dialectic, on the other hand, may
employ less than certain premises, such
as propositions based on authority and
custom (Ibid., pp. 30-31).
[40] The term ḥādith is the antonym
of qadīm or azalī, both of which mean
to be “preexistent,” or “without cause
of existence or a beginning.” Thus,
ḥādith means to be “brought into
existence,” “created,” “originated,” or
“with a beginning.”
[41] Ḥudūth is the antonym of qidam,
which is usually translated as “eternity”
or “preexistence.” Qidam is thus the
state of being essentially existent, of
having no prior non-existence, no cause
of existence, and no beginning.
Ḥudūth, therefore, is the state of being
brought into existence through a cause
after non-existence and of being
originated. In English, this is the
meaning of the term “creation,”
because in theology both God’s act of
bringing the universe into existence and
the act of being brought into existence
are called “creation.” To translate the
term ḥudūth as “origination,” coming-
into-existence,” or “having a beginning”
in this context is also perfectly
acceptable. Although the divine act of
creation is a single act, according to
Mīr Dāmād, it manifests different
aspects at different levels of existence,
and these different aspects of the act of
creation are distinguished by different
names, such as ibdā‘, ṣun‘, ikhtira‘,
iḥdāth, and takwīn. The primary
divisions of creation, however, are
three.
[42] Ibn Sīnā explains that ibdā‘
“refers to existence coming to
something from another, dependent on
it only, and not on the intermediary of
matter, instrument, or time” (Ishārāt,
Namaṭ Five, Chapter 9, 524). The
intelligences of the spheres, the
universal natures, and matter and time
themselves, for example, are created
by ibdā‘, which we may translate as
“primary origination,” or “direct
creation,” because their existentiation
does not depend upon the intermediary
of matter, instrument, or time. Fazlur
Rahman interprets ibdā‘ as “eternal
emanation” (“Concept of Ḥudūth
Dahrī” 141) because, according to the
Peripatetic philosophers, the objects of
primary origination are co-eternal with
God, since they are not preceded by
real non-existence, or privation
(‘adam), although they are preceded by
an absolute (or “logical”) non-
existence, which does not conflict with
their existence. This is why Ibn Sīnā
states in the passage quoted by Mīr
Dāmād above that ibdā‘ “is the most
excellent form of giving existence,
because privation [i.e., real non-
existence] is categorically excluded and
existence is imposed upon it.” To the
Peripatetic philosophers who accept
this interpretation, something that is
created (ḥādith) and contingent
(mumkin) can still be eternal (qadīm),
as long as it is not preceded by
privation in matter. The primary goal of
Mīr Dāmād in al-Qabasāt is to dispute
this claim and to prove, on the
contrary, that all contingent existents,
even the intelligences, are radically
separated from God and preceded by
real non-existence.
[43] The use of the term “absolute”
(muṭlaq) means that this “non-
existence” is “unrestricted and
unqualified.” It belongs to all things by
virtue of the nature of possibility. In
other words, “absolute non-existence”
refers to the essential, or logical, non-
existence of things in themselves and
their existence through another. The
absolute (muṭlaq) is the opposite of the
qualified (muqayyad) and the non-
absolute.
[44] For example, the heavens, which
are considered eternal and unchanging,
have an essential but not temporal
posteriority to their cause.
[45] Sayyed Aḥmad ‘Alawī clarifies
that this privation belongs to the
perpetual celestial bodies in the stage of
their specific matters. (Sharḥ al-
Qabāsāt, 95).
[46] The term ‘adammeans both
“non-existence” and “privation,”
and Mīr Dāmād explains that ‘adam is
of three kinds in the usage of Ibn Sīnā.
It is the third kind, “real non-existence”
(‘adam ṣarīḥ), which corresponds to
“privation” because of its association
with matter. Of the three kinds of non-
existence, only privation is the true
contradictory of actual existence
because these two cannot coexist
together. In further explanation of this
passage of Ibn Sīnā, which specifies
three kinds of non-existence and three
corresponding kinds of creation, Mīr
Dāmād provided the following to his
student and commentator, Sayyed
Aḥmad ‘Alawī:
To summarize the argument of our
companion [Ibn Sīnā]: non-existence
(‘adam) is of three kinds for possible
beings (al-mumkin) in the realm of
contingency: (1) That non-existence
which is absolute non-existence (lays
mutlaq) in the stage of the essence
(dhāt), which is commensurate with
the nature of possibility; it belongs to
every possible existent from the
moment it exists. (2) Quantifiable
temporal non-existence within a
boundary separate from the
boundary of existence; it belongs to
every temporal creation, insofar as it
is a temporal creation, prior to the
time of its existence [in time]. (3)
Perpetual real non-existence (‘adam
ṣarīḥ dahrī), whose precedence to
existence is unquantifiable; it belongs
to every existent via a receiving
matter, as it is a necessary condition
for fashioning (ṣun‘).
Non-existence in the first two
senses is not contradictory to
existence. The first is united with
existence in the real world and
precedes it essentially [or logically]
with respect to the stage of the
essence. The second is in a time
distinct from the time of existence,
and one of the conditions for mutual
contradiction between temporal
things is being in the same time.
Therefore, only real non-existence, in
which no boundary whatsoever can
be conceived nor any state
distinguished, is contradictory to
existence.
This being determined, it is
apparent that creation (ḥudūth) also
has three significations which
correspond to the three kinds of non-
existence: (1) Essential creation,
which is coming-into-existence
preceded by absolute non-existence
with respect to the stage of the
essence; this is an essential priority,
not a separate priority. (2) Temporal
creation, which is coming-into-
existence following temporal non-
existence, where the posteriority is
separate and quantifiable. (3)
Perpetual creation, which is coming-
into-existence following real non-
existence, where the posteriority is
separate and unquantifiable. It is the
extraction of existence from absolute
non-existence.
If real non-existence, which is
the contradictory of existence, is not
empowered at all, but existence is
obtained eternally from the Agent,
this is primary origination (ibdā' ),
the best of the kinds of causation.
After real contradictory non-
existence, if the possible is
empowered, this is fashioning (ṣun')
 and production (iḥdāth) in perpetuity
(dahr). It is a form of bringing-into-
existence weak from the beginning,
since it only pertains to what is
possible to generate from matter. So
temporal creation and perpetual
creation, though differing
conceptually in meaning, are
inseparable in fact with respect to
existence. The same applies to the
relation between fashioning (ṣun')
and generation (takwīn). This is the
doctrine of those who oppose the
creation of the world (ḥudūth
al-‘ālam) among the philosophers, as
explained in the Ishārāt. (Qtd. in
Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 93-94)
Mīr Dāmād is saying that these
philosophers oppose the creation of the
world, though they themselves do not
admit it, because they deny that the
part of the cosmos originated by ibdā‘
is preceded by real non-existence, so
although it is contingent, they still
consider it eternal. Ibn Sīnā is saying
that contingent things which do not
require time come into existence either
after (1) absolute non-existence (lays
muṭlaq) or after (2) non-absolute non-
existence (lays ghayr muṭlaq). As for
absolute non-existence, this refers to
the logical non-existence belonging to
the possible in itself when disregarding
its existential cause; it does not cease
with its actual existence and therefore it
is not its contradictory. Dāmād
explains, however, that by “non-
absolute non-existence” “real non-
existence” (‘adam ṣarīḥ) is meant. Real
non-existence is “the contradictory of
actual existence in the real world”
(Ibid. 94). This second type of non-
existence is the same as “qualified non-
existence” (lays muqayyad) in the
sense of being qualified by not being
able to coexist with actual existence. To
Ibn Sīnā, this type of qualified non-
existence termed “privation” (‘adam)
only belongs to things having matter.
Thus, ‘Alawī goes on to explain that,
according to Ibn Sīnā, “this privation
has been excluded from the sacred
precinct of primary origination (ibdā‘),
because were it in effect there, the
primary originated (mubda‘) would be
a being preceded by matter, as he
pointed out in his statement: ‘its
coming-into-being would be impossible
except through matter, and the power
of primary origination (which he
expressed by the term “giving
existence”) would be weak’ due to its
being generated (tawkīn) [from matter],
not directly created (ibdā‘)….” (Ibid.
95). Although Ibn Sīnā recognized a
perpetual privation inherent in the
matters of the celestial bodies, he did
not extend this to their corresponding
intelligences. Mīr Dāmād differs from
Ibn Sīnā precisely on this point. He
holds that all things other than God,
even the intelligences, are preceded by
real non-existence, not just things
requiring matter. He therefore affirms a
type of privation not requiring matter
prior to the existence of the primary
originated things (mubdi‘āt), which he
calls “perpetual real privation” (‘adam
ṣarīḥ dahrī). This kind of privation is
therefore something other than the pure
potentiality of matter. As it is the true
contradictory of existence, it must be
“removed” before existence can take
place. The second kind of privation is
temporal privation, which belongs to all
changeable things insofar as they are
changeable via their matters. This is
closely related to Mīr Dāmād’s concept
of “dispositional possibility” (imkān
isti‘dādī), which is the potentiality of
matter to continually take on new
forms. Ibn Sīnā says about this type of
privation in the Physics of the Shifā’:
“Privation is a condition in order for a
thing to be changeable or seeking
perfection. Were it not for the presence
of a privation, it would be impossible
for it to be seeking perfection or to
change, for its perfection would always
be actual. Consequently, whatever is
changeable and seeks perfection
requires a privation prior to it so that its
being changeable and seeking
perfection may be realized” (qtd. in
‘Alawī, Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 171).
[47]According to Ibn Sīnā, the
transcendent intelligences are not
preceded by privation, while the
heavenly bodies, each of which
possesses a specific matter, are. Both
of these two kinds of atemporal
existents, however, are preceded by
absolute non-existence. Rahman notes
that Dāmād’s goal is to “reinterpret and
reconstruct Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine in such
a way that all ‘essential contingency’
(imkān dhātī) entails a real dislocation
of being with God and is preceded by
real non-existence [i.e., privation],
whether heavenly spheres or
Intelligences” ( “Concept of
ḤudūthDahrī ,” 147).
[48] The following clarification on the
meaning of the term “quiddity”
(māhiyya) and its close relation to the
term “essence” (dhāt) is provided by
Jamīl Salībā from the Ta‘rīfāt of
Jurjānī:
The quiddity, therefore, is (1) that
which is answered to the question
“what is it,” or (2) it is that by which
something is what it is. “It is, insofar
as it is itself, neither existent nor non-
existent, neither universal nor
particular, neither specific nor general
[otherwise, how could it receive
these contradictories?]….The term
‘quiddity’ is applied predominately to
an intellected thing, such as the
intellection of ‘man’, which is
‘rational animal’ when the gaze is
severed from external existence. The
intellected thing, insofar as it is the
answer to the question ‘what is it’, is
called the ‘quiddity’ (māhiyya). But
insofar as its affirmation (thubūt) is
objective, it is called a ‘reality’
(ḥaqīqa), and insofar as it is
distinguished from others, it is called
an ‘identity’ (huwiyya), and insofar
as it has concomitants predicated to
it, it is an ‘essence’ (dhāt)…and
 insofar as it is the substrate of
accidents, it is a ‘substance’ [or
‘entity’] (jawhar)” (Jurjānī, al-
Ta‘rīfāt)….The terms “quiddity,”
“reality,” and “essence” may be used
synonymously, but the reality and the
essence are applied predominately to
the quiddity with respect to objective
[or external] existence. (al-Mu‘jam
al-Falsafī, vol. 2, 314-315)
[49] Ibn Sīnā’s commentator, Naṣīr al-
Dīn al-Ṭūsī, explains that Ibn Sīnā
“means by ‘fashioning’ (ṣun‘) bringing
something into existence preceded by
privation….and he means by ‘primary
origination’ (ibdā‘) the opposite of this,
namely, bringing something into
existence not preceded by privation”
(al-Ishārāt wa’l-Tanbīhāt 485). As
already explained, Ibn Sīnā interlinks
“fashioning,” “production,” privation,
and matter. Mīr Dāmād, however,
makes a different distinction. He says:
“The emanation (fayḍ) of the Agent
Maker (magnified be His sovereignty)
with respect to the contents of
perpetuity is termed “primary
origination” (ibdā‘) and “fashioning”
(ṣun‘), and with respect to temporal
creatures, it is termed production
(iḥdāth) and generation (takwīn)” (al-
Qabasāt 26). Dāmād, therefore,
distinguishes ṣun‘ from iḥdāth by
having the former refer to perpetual
creation and the latter to temporal
creation. The critical point is that Mīr
Dāmād holds that any kind of real
creation must be preceded by real non-
existence, or privation. Dāmād is going
to prove that all temporal and essential
creations are ultimately dependent on
perpetual creation.
As explained by Dāmād’s
commentator ‘Alawī, for Dāmād both
ibdā‘ and ṣun‘ give rise to creation in
the realm of perpetuity. He states: “But
in our view, which is that of the
philosophers who are firmly grounded,
both the primary originated and the
generated are entirely in perpetuity and
equal with respect to the prior
predominance of real non-existence
contradictory to existence over them.
Then its predominance was removed
and the wall of its power collapsed with
the creation of existence in the realm of
perpetuity through the fashioning (ṣun‘)
of the Maker. The only difference is
that the generated is preceded by
matter while the primary originated is
not” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 147).
[50] Extension and non-extension refer
to line and plane vs. point (which is
non-extended), and duration and non-
duration refer to time vs. the now
(which is non-extended and indivisible).
[51] Ibn Sīnā is here referring to the
creation of the heavenly spheres, which
exist for the whole duration of time but
which require the pre-existence of
matter for their creation.
[52] Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī is the author
of this work.
[53] ‘Alawī explains that to Dāmād
Baghdādī’s argument shows that any
real non-existence preceding creation is
not in time. For this reason, Dāmād
consistently equates “real non-
existence” with “perpetual non-
existence,” i.e., non-existence prior to
existence in dahr. (See ‘Alawī, Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 100-101.)
[54] The term ḥāqq means “the
middle,” or “the center,” of something;
or it may mean “true” and “real.” The
term matn primarily means “the main
part” of something. As a part of the
body, it is “the loins.” Sajjādī states
that: “Mīr Dāmād means by the term
matn al-wāqi‘ mostly the world which
transcends time and temporal things”
(Farhang-i ‘Ulūm-i ‘Aqlī 524).
Rahman translates both matn and ḥāqq
in the sense of “domain,” “field,” and
“level” (“Concept of Ḥudūth Dahrī”
141). Another term that Dāmād often
uses in correspondence with ḥāqq and
matn is kabd, which means “heart,”
“core,” and “center” (see example of
all three together in al-Qabasāt 410).
In light of Mīr Dāmād’s usage of these
terms, I believe that “inner dimension
of the real world” is a fair translation
for ḥāqq matn al-wāqi‘.
[55] Through the large number of
quoted passages which follow, Dāmād
draws support for establishing the
characteristics of the domains of
eternity, perpetuity, and time.
[56] “According to Ibn Sīnā,
estimation is a reasoning faculty whose
function, unlike theoretical reasoning, is
to make particular judgments in terms
of the particulars of sense. It is,
however, incapable of abstract and
universal thought. When it attempts to
make judgments about nonsensible
particulars, it is prone to err” (Marmura
in Ghazālī, Incoherence 230, note 9).
Thus, it cannot follow abstract
arguments that maintain that God has
no spatial existence or that there is no
time before the world’s existence.
[57] ‘Alawī comments upon this
passage at length, and he brings up one
of the main points of difference
between Mīr Dāmād and his
predecessors. He says: “It is clear that
this relationship [of the changeless to
the changeless] is eternity (sarmad),
whether it be (1) through simultaneity
or (2) through priority and simultaneity
together in two respects: As for the
first, the philosophers who advocate
eternity (qidam) hold this view, since
they have determined that the
absolutely changeless things belonging
to the incorporeal intelligences exist
together with Him eternally. The
second view, which our teacher, the
author, holds, is conformable to what
the divine philosophers teach” (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 104). The gist is that,
according to Mīr Dāmād, God is prior
in actual existence to the incorporeal
intelligences, but He is simultaneous
with them in the sense that two
correlatives, such as priority and
posteriority, are inseparable in the
mind. Hence, one cannot imagine a
prior thing without assuming at the
same time the existence of something
posterior to it. Correlatives always
exist simultaneously in the mind,
though not necessarily in objective
reality. The point is that where the
Creator is concerned, His priority to all
else is actual, while His simultaneity
with other changeless things is only in
the mind. In Wamīḍ 3.7.4, Mīr Dāmād
denies that eternal simultaneity, or co-
eternity, applies in any actual sense to
God, since He is the sole possessor of
eternal priority.
[58] This passage points out the
necessity of perpetuity as the domain
where the perpetual principles of the
causes of bodies exist. If these
principles were not changeless, bodies
and their motions could not exist.
Dāmād often says that the changeless
aspect of changeable things, insofar as
they are changeless, exists in
perpetuity. ‘Alawī comments: “In other
words, the parts of their existence
which are their causes are united to the
principles of their existence, which are
purely incorporeal things among the
intelligible substances. From this it is
apparent that time is like an effect of
perpetuity” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 111).
Eternal existence (sarmad), in turn, is
“the efficient cause of the perpetual
existences, and thus necessarily
encompasses them” (Ibid. 106).
[59] Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī.
[60] Bahmanyār.
[61] According to Bahmanyār and Ibn
Sīnā, just as the meaning of perpetual
(dahrī) “withness” is the relationship
between the unchanging and the
changing to which it corresponds, the
meaning of eternal (sarmadī)
“withness” is the relationship between
the self-subsistent Unchanging and the
contingent unchanging. But in the
Third Qabas Mīr Dāmād is going to
refute the very notion of eternal
withness, or coeternity, and replace it
with the notion of eternal priority-
perpetual posteriority, with “withness,”
or simultaneity, being limited to the
domains of perpetuity and time.
[62] A similar statement is made by
Suhrawardī in the Talwīḥāt: “The body,
insofar as it is a body, is not in time,
but insofar as it is in motion, is in time.
Absolutely unquantifiable,
unchangeable things, like the
intelligences, and that which is both
changeable and unchanging in some
respect, like bodies, are with time, not
in it” (qtd. in Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 120).
Yet according to ‘Alawī, time, as
generated through the motion of the
outermost sphere, “encompasses all
bodies, the highest of them and the
lowest of them from the outer limit to
the center” (Ibid. 117). The principle is
this: “In sum, the relation of something
to time by occurrence in it is only with
respect to the changeable in actuality,
as is the case with motion, or
potentially, as is the case with rest.
Thus, the meaning of its being in an
hour is that insofar as motion transpires
in its place, it is in an hour. As for the
unchanging, its relation to time is
through occurrence with it” (Ibid. 138).
Mīr Dāmād confirms this position
and takes great pains in al-Qabasāt to
develop the proposition that all
temporal things are simultaneously
changeless and incorporeal in one
respect and changing and material in
another respect. They are changeless
and incorporeal with respect to their
existence and their creation in relation
to God, which occurs in perpetuity,
while they are changing and material
with respect to their motion and
appearance in time. Thus, Mīr Dāmād
states: “It is not possible for body,
insofar as it is body, to occur in time,
nor insofar as it is existent, since only
the unfixed state occurs in time, and
this is motion. Thus body, insofar as it
is body, is in place; insofar as it is
existent, it occurs in perpetuity; and
insofar as it changes and moves, it
occurs in time. Motion with respect to
itself occurs in time essentially, and
insofar as it is existent, it is in
perpetuity, as with time itself” (al-
Qabasāt 93).
[63] Mīr Dāmād has shown through
the preceding quotations how the
theory of three containers of existence
was developed by Ibn Sīnā and his
philosophical successors. Dāmād is
now going to give evidence for the
nature of the domain of perpetuity
from a book erroneously ascribed to
Aristotle known as the Theology of
Aristotle, a work which is actually a
paraphrase from the Enneads of
Plotinus. See Jill Kraye, et al, eds.,
Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages:
The Theology and Other Texts
(Warburg Institute 1986) for the origins
of this work in Arabic.
[64] ‘Alawī explains that the “active
words” refer to the incorporeal
intelligences, which are actualized by
the existential Command “Be!” without
the intermediary of any matter, while
the “receptive words” refer to receptive
essences (dhawāt) belonging to the
world of souls (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt121).
The intelligences have no matter,
composition, or potentiality, and they
are unable to change, become multiple,
or choose freely. They are strictly
transcendent forms (Ibid. 132).
[65] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.
[66] Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.
[67] Sajjādī explains: “The term nafs
al-amr refers to the boundary (ḥadd)
of the essence (dhāt) of each thing”
(Farhang-i ‘Ulūm-i ‘Aqlī 596).
[68] ‘Alawī comments:
He means non-existence in the sense
of the [simple] negation of existence
from it [the quiddity], for the
application of non-existence to the
quiddity does not necessitate its
subsistence (thubūt) in it, such that it
would preclude the quiddity, insofar
as it is itself, from being anything but
itself, for the intention here is the
non-subsistence of its accidents in its
 own stage….To express this another
way, neither of the extremes of the
two contradictories [i.e., existence
and non-existence] belongs to the
quiddity by reason of itself. This is
the correct meaning, which does not
imply that the quiddity lacks one of
these two, for it is possible that it
may not lack one of them by reason
of something outside itself. (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 139-140)
The point is that the existence
of contingent entities is distinct from
their quiddities, even though quiddity
and existence are inseparable in the
state of actualization. If it is accepted
that possible realities are receptive of
both existence and non-existence, then
both existence and non-existence must
be other than the quiddity as itself. A
quiddity cannot receive what it already
has as an essential constituent.
Therefore, if it does not exist actually
but remains possible, it has “received”
non-existence, while if it does exist
actually, it has “received” existence. In
both cases, it has received one of these
contradictories in a manner analogous
to a subject receiving an accident from
outside. Existence and non-existence,
therefore, are necessary accidents of
the quiddity, but neither one is an
essential constituent of it. The same
applies to the quiddity being universal
or particular.
[69] In other words, each temporal is
simultaneously in some respect in
perpetuity and in time. The thing itself
(nafs al-amr), therefore, transcends
any of its aspects, such as its quiddity,
its particular incorporeal nature, and its
particular temporal reality. ‘Alawī,
comments: “This conceptual stage [of
the quiddity] and likewise the
intelligence and the external reality (al-
khārij) are all dimensions [lit.
“containers”] of the thing itself.
Therefore, it is more encompassing
than them, in the same way that
perpetuity [is more encompassing than
time and than the real world that
transcends time]” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
141).
[70] The compound intellect (‘aql
muḍā‘af) is another name for the stage
of the acquired intellect (‘aql
mustafād), which acquires intelligible
forms directly from the Active
Intelligence (see Sajjādī, Farhang-i
‘ulūm-i ‘aqlī, 389).
[71] Note that the term imkān has two
meanings: (1) It refers to the state of
being possible, and (2) it refers to the
state of being dependent or contingent
on something else, which is a necessary
consequence of being possible.
Regarding the first definition, Ibn Sīnā
adds: “We call the ‘possibility of
existence’ the ‘potentiality of existence
(quwat al-wujūd)’.” (Shifā’ 2:477)
[72] Mīr Dāmād explains:
Dispositional possibility as such is a
necessary accompaniment of motion
and time. Its only requisite is the
actual non-occurrence of that for
which the disposition exists during
the time of the occurrence of the
disposition. The precedence of the
potential to the actual, accordingly, is
a quantifiable precedence in time.
However, this alone does not render
it impossible that the disposition, the
matter that bears it, and that for
which the disposition exists, all may
exist together in perpetuity with a
perpetual simultaneity. The priority
of matter and its disposition to that
for which it is disposed, with respect
to occurrence in perpetuity, is a
natural priority [like the priority of
the number two over three, for
example], not a perpetual real priority
[like that of a cause over its effect,
for example]. (al-Qabasāt 226)
[73] Mīr Dāmād’s thesis is that
everything besides God is perpetually
created. Therefore, only God can be
perpetually eternal. Yet the
philosophers who advocate the eternity
of the world say that the intelligences
and the bodies of the spheres and their
souls have perpetual eternity, even
though some are preceded by
privation. (See ‘Alawī, Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 112-113)
[74] Qur’ān 28:88. Note that since the
active participle hālik does not have an
accusative object, it is not required to
translate it with a future tense.
[75] In other words, the dependency
of a possible thing upon another for
existence is the very meaning of
essential creation. Whether or not that
essence is preceded by real non-
existence (‘adam ṣarīḥ) is not
considered.
[76] To be precise, this is causal
priority, one of three kinds of essential
priority, which are explained by Mīr
Dāmād in the Second Qabas. Causal
priority “means that the non-existence
of the antecedent necessarily leads to
the non-existence of the consequent,
but not the other way around. This is
like the antecedence of the cause to the
effect, or of the condition to the
conditioned, or of primary act to the
secondary or generated act, e.g. the
movement of a finger is antecedent to
the movement of the ring on the finger:
the latter is necessarily presupposed by
the former but not vice versa”
(www.muslimphilosophy.com).
[77] An example of negative
equivalence in logic is “like someone
who says: Zayd is non-seeing,” where
“non-seeing” is equivalent to the
positive term “blind” (Ibn Sīnā qtd. in
Goichon, Lexique de la Langue
Philosophique d’Ibn Sīnā 212). Also
called an obverse proposition
(ma‘dūla), this type of proposition is
derived from another one by denying
the opposite of whatever the given
proposition affirms. Thus the obverse
of “all A is B” is “no A is not B,” and
the obverse of “no S is P” is “all S is
non-P.”
[78] The possible, or essentially
contingent (mumkin), is that whose
existence is neither necessary in itself
nor impossible in itself, and therefore it
does not require either the necessity of
existence or the necessity of non-
existence like the other two categories,
since what requires non-existence in
itself is impossibly existent, and what
requires existence in itself is necessarily
existent. The possible can only become
necessarily existent through another
which is the cause of its existence. The
possible in its own stage, however,
which is the same as the unqualified
quiddity, has two types of non-
existence associated with it: (1)
absolute non-existence, which is its
logical non-existence when considered
by itself, and (2) real non-existence,
which is its actual non-existence in the
absence of its cause. The first type of
non-existence can coexist with actual
existence since it is only a mental
construct. The second type of non-
existence cannot coexist with actual
existence but must be replaced by it.
[79] ‘Alawī says this is a reference to
Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
152).
[80] Mīr Dāmād is making a
distinction here between essential
possibility, potentiality, and privation,
probably due to his belief that God
creates the very possibilities of things
when He creates them while they are
yet preceded by a real non-existence,
or privation, which is different from
that possibility. This view, which is the
same as creation ex nihilo, is
problematic, however, because the
privation of existence can only be in
that which has the capacity to exist,
just as the privation of vision can only
be in something that has the capacity to
see, not absolute nothingness, which
does not have the capacity to exist, and
this is the same as possibility and
potentiality. If God is the complete
cause of the possibility of the universe,
then it can be no other than a part of
Him or an extension of His being. To
make the universe in both its corporeal
and incorporeal domains separate from
God and fashioned by Him, as Mīr
Dāmād desires, it would be necessary
to make God the cause of the form of
the universe but not of its prime matter,
and prime matter would have to be
interpreted in a non-Peripatetic way as
completely independent of time and
space. Matter without form would be
non-existent (ma‘dūm), relatively
speaking, while through form provided
by an Agent from outside it would
become existent (mawjūd), and this
would fulfill the requirement of
creation being preceded by non-
existence.
[81] What Mīr Dāmād means is that
since time and its contents, insofar as
changeless, are contained in perpetuity,
no particular temporal creature can be
separately prior or posterior to anything
else in perpetuity, since all things there
are simultaneous in existence in relation
to each other, while they are all
separately posterior to their Creator
with an unquantifiable posteriority, or
one thing may be separately prior or
posterior to another in time, insofar as
both are temporals, with a quantifiable
priority or posteriority. If one is not a
temporal, however, it cannot be
separately prior or posterior to that
which is a temporal. This is a theme
which Mīr Dāmād develops extensively
in the Third Qabas.
[82] So far Mīr Dāmād has explained
the three kinds of creation and the
corresponding kinds of non-existence
and shown how they all apply to a
single temporal subject; introduced the
three containers of existence (eternity,
perpetuity, and time), related their
development in Ibn Sīnā and his
successors, and described the nature of
the domain of perpetuity from the
Theology of Aristotle; compared the
quiddity and its relation to the thing
itself to the relation between perpetuity
and time; established that only
perpetual creation can explain the
creation of things by the removal of
real non-existence in perpetuity;
examined the interrelation between two
of the types of non-existence with
respect to the quiddity and existence;
clarified that to be qualified as
“created,” which means having
existence after non-existence, is due to
the fact that a possible essence, by its
very nature, is incapable of being
eternal, and that to be qualified as
“perpetual” is due to the perpetuity of
the Agent’s action, not a concomitant
of a created essence; described three
kinds of temporal creation; explained
the difference between dispositional
possibility and essential possibility; and
introduced the relationship of temporals
to temporals and temporals to non-
temporals in terms of priority and
posteriority. Now he is going to return
to the question of the eternity of the
world versus its creation with the
intention of showing that the real area
of dispute among the eminent
philosophers is not essential creation or
temporal creation, but perpetual
creation.
[83] ‘Alawī identifies these six
philosophers prior to Plato as
Pythagoras, Empedocles,
Anaximander, Thales, Agathodaemon,
and Hermes. He says: “What our
teacher stated is that upon this question
these philosophers are our fellow
believers. In truth, we thirst for them
and hold fast to their hands” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 162).
[84] According to Mīr Dāmād, Plato
and his followers believe that
everything other than God, whether
material or immaterial, is created and
not eternal, so God is both the
originator and the fashioner of all
things. Aristotle and his followers, on
the other hand, believe that the
intelligible part of the cosmos as well as
the outermost sphere, its motion, and
time are co-eternal with God and not
created, so He is only the originator of
that part of the cosmos, but not its
fashioner. To the Peripatetics, primary
originated things (mubda‘āt) are not
preceded by real non-existence, and
hence do not fit under the category of
being created, or fashioned, though
they do demonstrate contingency, while
generated things (mukawwanāt) in the
domain of time are preceded by real
non-existence, and they are therefore
created and fashioned.
[85] The term al-amr refers to the
intelligible world originated by God’s
command, while the term al-khalq
refers to the spatial, temporal world of
physical things; cf. Wamḍa 3.1.
[86] Aristotle is referring dialectical
problems, whose syllogisms rely upon
generally accepted premises. See
Topics 104b.
[87] In another work, Mīr Dāmād uses
this statement from Aristotle that the
universe has no temporal beginning as
evidence for perpetual creation. He
says:
It has become evident to a sound
intellect impregnated with the seed of
wisdom that this only rules out, as
this master teacher has stated, a
temporal beginning for the creation
of the universe from an extended,
hypothetical non-existence continuing
until the moment of the existence of
the world. This is the common belief
familiar to ordinary minds and
followed by those who pretended to
be philosophers among the ancients
and by the masses in recent times
who feign learning among the
community of orthodox Muslims.
 But it does not rule out the creation
of the universe following a definite,
real non-existence in the actual world
and the heart of objective reality, not
in time and space, nor via extension
and non-extension, through the
knowledge of the Agent Maker, His
providence, His will, His agency, His
origination, and His creation of it all
at once perpetually, not in time or in
a now, and not by motion,
deliberation, meditation, and design
[which are linear forms of cognition],
in accord with the belief of the leader
of the Greeks, the divine Plato, and
those who share his view among the
leaders of true wisdom. (Qtd. in
‘Alawī, Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 172)
[88] Mīr Dāmād has clearly stated
here the thesis which he wishes to
prove in al-Qabasāt: namely, that the
Creator extracted the system of the
world in its entirety from real non-
existence all at once, perpetually, not in
time, and not through matter,
instrument, or motion. Aristotle and his
followers did not posit its extraction
from real non-existence, but only
submitted that the world as a whole is
essentially posterior to God, not
actually so. It is to Dāmād’s credit as
an independent thinker that he
questions the judgment of Al-Fārābī in
holding that Aristotle and Plato agreed
in their views on the subject of
creation.
[89] ‘Alawī comments:
He has only included privation,
 insofar as it is not temporal and not
associated with the now, with respect
to generated creatures as such due to
their partnership with the purely
separate, incorporeal intelligences in
this regard, although those generated
creatures, insofar as they are
changeable and seek perfection, have
another privation, which is
temporal….It only arises from the
particular property of their being
changeable or seeking perfection, not
insofar as they are created, because
insofar as they are created, they are
preceded by a real atemporal
privation, just as it is with the
separate intelligences. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 169-170)
[90] Though Proclus agreed with Plato
on many issues, such as the Forms,
and like many of his fellow
Neoplatonists he attempted to
harmonize Plato and Aristotle wherever
possible, he took the side of Aristotle
on the question of the eternity of the
world. See Philoponus’ De Aeternitae
Mundi Contra Proclum, ed. H. Rabe
(Leipzig 1899).
[91] In this Wamīḍ, Mīr Dāmād gives
six arguments for why the world as a
whole cannot have been created in
time, and in the following Wamīḍ he
presents similar arguments from Ibn
Sīnā, who points out that if the
opponents’ postulates were true—
namely, that the priority of the Creator
is a quantitative priority and that an
infinitely extended, flowing non-
existence exists before the creation of
the world in which bodies and motions
are possible—then they would be
obliged to accept the eternity of time
and the world based on their own
premises. Mīr Dāmād explains that the
refutation of this extended, temporal
non-existence preceding the creation of
the world, however, does not invalidate
the antecedence of real non-existence,
which is not temporally qualified, and
hence it does not invalidate perpetual
creation.
[92]‘Alawī comments: “ His position is
that it is a demonstration which
invalidates the non-existence preceding
the existence of the world being an
extension, that is to say, non-existence
insofar as it is like existence. Thus, just
as existence in itself is neither extended
nor non-extended, the same applies to
non-existence insofar as it is non-
existence, since the qualification of
either of them by extension and non-
extension can only be in association
with a particular time or now. Since
this qualification is impossible with
respect to the non-existence which
precedes the world, then that non-
existence must be a real, perpetual non-
existence, not a temporal one” (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 177).
[93] ‘Alawī explains that essential
priority (taqaddum bi-dhāt) is of three
kinds: “(1) The priority of the complete
agent to the effect. This is called
‘causal priority’. (2) The priority of the
constituent parts of the quiddity to
itself [= priority in quiddity]. (3) The
priority of the quiddity to its existence
[= priority by nature]. The majority of
the moderns are unaware of this
definition” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 97).
[94] The meaning of these two types
of interrogative is explained by Sajjādī:
“A question by means of the ‘simple
interrogative’ is a question about the
existence of something; for example:
‘Is man existent?’ where the purport of
the verb ‘to be’ is complete. This
contrasts with the ‘compound
interrogative’, where the purport of the
verb ‘to be’ is incomplete. Such is a
question about the existence of
something belonging to another thing,
as when it is said: ‘Is man rational?’ In
short, the existence of something is
asked by means of the simple
interrogative, and the existence of
something belonging to another thing is
asked by means of the compound
interrogative” (Farhang-i Iṣṭilāḥāt-i
Fasafī-yi Mullā Ṣadrā 529). In other
words, if the existence of something is
different from and superadded to its
quiddity at the moment of its actual
creation, this would require that the
question “Is man existent?” be a
compound interrogative instead of a
simple interrogative. But Mīr Dāmād is
saying, to the contrary, that the
existence of something at the moment
of its existentiation is not something
added to it as a new factor; rather, its
existence is the same as the very
occurrence of that thing.
[95] Suhrawardī provides similar
arguments against those who think that
existence is something literally added to
the quiddity in concrete things (he
erroneously makes this criticism against
Ibn Sīnā). For example, if existence is
something occurring to a quiddity from
outside, that very quiddity would be
existent before being qualified by
existence (see Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 46
ff.).
[96] This passage establishes that
quiddity and existence are so
inseparable in the real world that actual
existence is the same as the very
becoming of the quiddity in the real
world. ‘Alawī explains that the separate
existence of the quiddity (i.e., the
universal intelligible nature) does not
exist except in the mind (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 138-139). This nature as
abstracted from concrete individuals by
the human mind, however, should not
be confused with the universal Platonic
Form, which is real and separate.
[97]The attributes which are
predicable of quiddities are of three
types :
(A) that which is essential, (B) that
which is accidental, yet unavoidably
attaches to the subject, and (C) that
which is accidental, and which is
separable from the subject.
(A) The term “essential” is
used by Ibn Sīnā to refer to the
constituents of the essence; that is, to
that which cannot be removed from
the essence, without, at the same
time, leaving the essence other than
what it was…. Examples are
“animal” and “rational” for human
being….
(B) The concomitant accidental
[= lāzim] is that quality which
necessarily attaches to the essence—
by virtue of the essence—yet without
being a constituent of the
essence….Two examples of the
concomitant accidental: “equality of
angles to two right angles” for
“triangle” and “capacity for laughter”
for “human being.”
(C) The separable accidental [=
lāḥiq] differs from the essential in
that it is not a constituent of the
essence; and it differs from the
concomitant accidental in that it does
 not necessarily attach to the essence;
and hence it can be eliminated from
the conception of the essence….A
separable accident is something like
“two hundred pounds weight” for
“this man.” (Shams Inati, Ibn Sīnā:
Remarks and Admonitions: Part
One: Logic 16-17, 19)
[98] See also Wamīḍ 2.4.4.
[99] Concomitants (lawāzim) are
“properties that are invariably
associated with a thing but without
necessarily being parts of its essence”
(Glossary, Philosophy of Illumination
196). “Constituents” (muqawwimāt),
on the other hand, are the parts of the
quiddity.
[100] “Absolute existence” [or
“unqualified existence”] (wujūd
muṭlaq), according to Ṭūsī, “may be
predicated equivocally (bi’l-tashkīk) to
both existence which has no cause and
to existence which has a cause. That
which is predicated of different things
equivocally is not the quiddity of these
things, nor is it a part of their quiddity.
Rather it is only an accident, and thus
an effect dependent upon a cause” (al-
Ishārāt 3:435). In other words,
“absolute existence” is the same as the
self-evident concept of existence,
which is a simple notion applicable to
all things and abstracted from them.
Concrete things, whose very becoming
constitutes their real existence, are thus
the cause of absolute existence.
[101] Mīr Dāmād has already
established the principle that existence
is not literally added to the quiddity at
the moment of creation (as an ordinary
accident occurs to a substance), but
rather its existence is the very
occurrence of the quiddity as an
actualized existent (see Wamḍa 2.1).
But when the process of the
actualization of the quiddity is mentally
analyzed, the stage of existence is seen
to be posterior to the stage of the
quiddity as itself. Hence, in relation to
the quiddity, existence is like an
accident occurring to it.
[102] i.e., substance and accident.
[103] See Wamīḍ 2.4.2, where Mīr
Dāmād quotes Ibn Sīnā, who has
devoted a chapter of the Shifā’ to
refuting this.
[104] In other words, what leads to
fallacy are statements which lead to the
idea that a substance in itself can be
both a substance and an accident in
two respects. It is not the substance
itself, but only the particular mode of
its existence which is accidental in
relation to its substrate. ‘Alawī explains:
I say: You are aware that what my
teacher [Mīr Dāmād] held is in
harmony with what his companion,
the Chief [Ibn Sīnā], affirmed,
namely, that a substance (jawhar) in
the mind is a substance, and that
particular circumstances have no
effect upon its being a substance,
whether this be in the mind or in
external reality…[despite the fact]
“that knowledge of it [the substance],
 which is its existence impressed in
the mind, is an accident.”…In brief,
there is no contradiction between
something being a substance in itself
and being an accident with respect to
its existence in the mind. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 187-188)
[105] ‘Alawī makes a similar point:
The application of [the term]
“substance” to it [an object of
intellection] does not preclude its
subsistence in the mind with respect
to the particularity of its mental
impression, just as the corporeal
form subsisting in primary matter is
[still] a substance due to its lack of
need of matter in itself. This is the
basis of its substantiality, even if it
does subsist in primary matter in its
 individual accidents. Consequently, if
a substance is in something, in itself
it does not need what it is in, whether
we are referring to intelligible
substantial forms or to corporeal
material forms. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
196-197)
[106] In other words, statement (1) is
merely a description (rasm) of a
substance, while statement (2) is a true
definition (ḥadd). The same applies to
the two statements concerning
“accident” below. ‘Alawī takes
Suhrawardī to task for ascribing to the
Peripatetics in his Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq a
definition of “substance” which was
only a description, and then attempting
to refute them based on it (see Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 200-201).
[107] ‘Alawī comments:
In sum, the basis of substantiality
and accidentality is independence
from a subject and need of a subject,
whatever and however the subject
may be, whether mental or concrete.
A substance in concrete reality is a
substance in the mind, and vice
versa. The same applies to an
accident. So there is no meaning to
becoming a substance in one of them
and an accident in the other….In
short, the accidentality of its [a
substance’s] mental acquisition does
not preclude the substantiality of its
essence, because its acquisition in the
mind is one thing and its substantial
form is another. Therefore, a
substance is a substance and an
 accident is an accident in an absolute
sense. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 195)
[108] This is a reference to the theory
of Porphyry that the very same quality
can be both accidental and substantial
in relation to two things. For example,
heat pertains to both to hot water and
to fire. Whereas it is accidental in
relation to water, Porphyry claims it is
substantial in relation to fire. Ibn Sīnā
firmly rules out this possibility and says
that the term “quality” is equivocal. In
other words, in the case of the
“quality” of heat in water and in fire,
we are talking about two different
things, not one thing with two respects.
“Heat” in the case of fire is a true
differentia, not an accidental quality at
all, whereas in water it is a common
accident. The true differentia is a
power which produces a related
accidental quality in its sensible effects.
Using the example of the “form of
water,” Ibn Sīnā explains: “The form of
water, for example, is a power which
constitutes the matter of water as a
species, and that [form of water] is not
sensible, but from it issue sensible
effects, such as sensible cold and
weight [and dampness]….And these
[qualities of] cold and dampness are
accidents which are concomitant to this
nature when there is no impediment”
(Physics of the Shifā’, Book 1, chapter
6, 34-35). Thus the sensible heat felt
from fire, in like manner, is accidental;
it is not substantial.
[109] Ibn Sīnā points out in Book
Three of the Categories: “As for using
the word “existent” in the description
of substance…, it is a problem. It is
proper for us to solve [this problem].
So we say that in our statement on
substance, that it is “an existent not in a
subject,” we do not mean by “existent”
the state of the existent insofar as it is
existent. For were this the case, it
would be impossible to refer to
universals as substances, and this is
because they have no existence in the
real world at all” (qtd. in ‘Alawī, Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 200).
[110] See also Wamḍa 2.3. Mīr
Dāmād is saying here that the thing
itself encompasses the intelligible stage
of the quiddity, which in turn
encompasses the stage of concrete
existence. When the quiddity becomes
actualized in external existence, its
effects proceed from it and its
accidents encompass it in such a
manner that the quiddity itself is
completely blended with them.
[111] ‘Alawī explains: “The gist of his
argument is that the universal nature
has two existences: a singular
composite existence in the real world
and a separate existence in the mind.
The first is unified with the individual,
encompassed by the individual, and
blended with it” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
203).
[112] In this Wamīḍ, Mīr Dāmād
presents two arguments validating
mental existence based upon the real
distinction of the quiddities of things
from their existence. In Wamīḍ 2.5.1,
he also quotes the following argument
from Ibn Sīnā in the Ishārāt on this
theme: “Also the causes of its existence
are other than the causes of its
quiddity. Humanity, for example, is in
itself a particular reality or quiddity,
and its existence in individuals or in
minds is not an essential constituent of
it; rather it is something added to it. If
concrete existence were an essential
constituent of it, it would be impossible
to represent the concept of humanity in
the soul free from that which is its
constitutive part” (al-Qabasāt 54).
[113] These two principles are (1) the
distinction of existence and quiddity in
all besides God, and (2) the principality
of the quiddity and the accidentality of
existence in relation to it. See also
wamīḍs 2.7.9 and 2.7.10. In Wamīḍ
2.7.11, Mīr Dāmād makes these two
principles the basis of a proof for
perpetual creation because of God’s
separate priority, not just His essential
priority, to what He creates.
[114] Izutsu explains that when we
analyze entities into existence and
quiddity,
we mentally put between parentheses
the parts corresponding to quiddity.
In this way, we obtain the notions of
particularized existences: existence of
(man), existence of (table), etc. Each
‘existence of’ is a particular act of
existing containing within itself a
relational reference, indicated by the
word ‘of’, to something….These
 particularized existences as reflected
in the mirror of our consciousness
are technically called ‘portions’
(ḥiṣaṣ) of existence. Although
existence in its purity cannot…be
directly represented in our minds, the
particularized existences can be
mentally represented, albeit
indirectly, because each is essentially
involved with a particular quiddity.
(Concept and Reality of Existence
78)
[115] Right after this passage, Ibn Sīnā
explains, as paraphrased by Inati, that
“logic treats of nothing except the
natures [i.e., quiddities of things]
inasmuch as accidents and states attach
to them in the mind; and has nothing to
do with the natures as they exist either
externally or mentally, or as they are
free from both modes of existence”
(Remarks and Admonitions, Part One:
Logic, p. 10). Izutzu explains that “the
word i‘tibār (pl. i‘tibārāt) means a
subjective manner of looking at a thing,
something produced or posited through
the analytic work of the reason. It is an
aspect of a thing which primarily
appears in the subject and which, then,
is projected onto the thing itself as if it
were an objective aspect of the thing”
(Concept and Reality of Existence, p.
98).
[116] See Wamīḍ 2.5.1.
[117] See also Wamīḍ 8.8.12.
[118] See also Wamḍa 10.1.
[119]This and the preceding selection
make it clear that quiddities do not
contain the cause of their own
existence, but rather they need an
emanating cause to provide actual
existence from outside. In themselves
quiddities are non-existent and need a
cause to replace this non-existence with
existence.
[120] ‘Alawī comments:
This refers to the emanating and
composing causes with respect to the
composite. This is in the sense that it
is a composing cause of the
composite without being an
intermediary and an emanating cause
of it by being an intermediary
through its emanation of the other
constituent part and giving existence
to it, such that it is among the
conditions of the action of the agent,
like matter with respect to a
fashioned composite, such as a
throne composed from it and from a
composing shape subsisting in it, for
it [the matter] is a composing cause
belonging to it as well as an
emanating cause due to its being
constitutive of the quiddity subsisting
in it.
As for the case in terms of
the real composite, it is the opposite
of this, since the particular form is a
composing cause of the composite
without being an intermediary, and
an emanating cause of it through the
emanation of matter from it, due to
its being a partner of the efficient
cause with respect to its giving
 existence to the matter which is a
composing cause of it. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 213)
[121] ‘Alawī clarifies: “The negation
of the non-existence of the whole—
with the existence of the constituent
parts altogether, insofar as it is qualified
by it as such—has two instances: its
existence with their existence and its
non-existence with their non-existence,
since it is true of them that the non-
existence of the whole is negated with
their existence. The essential necessity
of this does not require the necessity of
both these two instances. But rather
the necessity of only one of them is
required, and it is its negation with their
negation, not its existence with their
existence, even though it is true that the
negation of its non-existence depends
upon their existence” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 214).
[122] ‘Alawī comments: “This
concerns the possibility of the non-
existence of the whole with respect to
itself when disregarding the existence
of the constituent parts altogether.
Thus this non-existence may be
prevented by its efficient cause, but
this does not preclude its being
prevented by the existence of its
constituent parts” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
215).
[123] Sajjādī explains: “The
constituent parts of the definition are
differentiated in the station of the
essence and the substantialization, but
they are united [non-differentiated] in
the station of existence” (Farhang-i
‘Ulūm-i ‘Aqlī, vol. 1, p. 212).
[124] ‘Alawī comments:
This alludes to nothing more than the
fact that the acquired definition gives
the complete reality of the object of
definition, and this corresponds with
what the Master set forth in his last
chapter upon defining the relation
between the definition and the
defined, where he says: “Rather we
say that the definition, in truth,
provides the notion of a single
nature. For instance, when you say
‘rational animal’, the notion of one
thing, which is itself the animal which
is rational, is acquired from this.”
The outcome of this is that the
definition consists of two definitions:
 (1) the acquired, and (2) the unified
with the object defined. The former
provides an explanation of the reality
of the object defined which is not
one with it, and it has a part which
does not belong to the object
defined. The latter is one with the
object defined, and there is no [extra]
part belonging to it. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 215)
[125] ‘Alawī comments:
He is alluding here to the fact that
two, for instance, has two aspects:
One of them is its being composed of
two units only. In other words, a
number which has no other
constituent parts than one and one.
In this aspect, it is a real species [=
the object of definition], not a
 constituent part of something
belonging to its species. The second
of them is its being composed of two
units, whether another unit be
together with it or not. In this aspect,
it is a generic notion [= the
definition], which allows it to become
a constituent part of another species.
The “two” which is a constituent part
of “three,” for example, is this
[conceptual] two composed of two
units, not the two composed of two
units only… (Sharḥ-al-Qabasāt 218)
[126] Mīr Dāmād is clear here, as he
establishes the logical order of the act
of creation, that the necessity
associated with every possible is not
essential but concerns it logical relation
to what precedes it and what follows it.
 ‘Alawī comments:
It is evident that the necessity prior
to the determination is the
impossibility of all the modes of its
nullification, and although it is prior
essentially, it is simultaneous with the
determination. In short, that the
attributes precede the determination
in this manner is due to the fact that
they are present with the
determination, which is the
actualization (fi‘liyya) of the
quiddity; they are not by means of it.
Furthermore, although these
attributes belong essentially to the
determination, they entail the same
attributes with respect to existence on
account of its being subsequent to
the determination. For example, the
 necessity prior to existence is the
impossibility of all the modes of its
non-existence. Therefore, just as
existence is subsequent to the
determination, in like manner its
possibility, its need, its being
necessitated, its becoming necessary,
and its being made are also
subsequent to the determination.
The truth is that the effect
(athar) of the Maker is this essence
(dhāt), and existence is an abstracted
thing [logically] subsequent to it. In
like manner, its attributes which
precede it follow its attributes in the
same way. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 220-
221)
[127] These seven, according to
‘Alawī, are priority in (1) eternity and
perpetuity, (2) time, (3) causality, (4)
nature, (5) quiddity, (6) nobility, and
(7) order (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 221-222).
A similar list is provided by Mīr Dāmād
in Wamīḍ 2.7.1. In Ibn Sīnā, only five
kinds of priority are enumerated: that
of (1) time (which includes priority in
eternity and perpetuity), (2) causality,
(3) nature (which includes priority in
quiddity), (4) nobility, and (5) order.
(See also Wamīḍ 9.4.24 on kinds of
natural priority.)
[128] “Antecedence in order
(taqaddum bi’l-martaba) is of three
kinds: first, the antecedence of one
thing to another with reference to its
position in space, e.g., Baghdad to
Kufah, but this is relative to the place
from where one starts one’s journey;
secondly, the antecedence of one thing
to another with reference to a goal or
destination, when one says that Medina
is nearer to Mecca than Baghdad; and
thirdly, the antecedence of one thing to
another in the order of nature, e.g. it
may be said that in the order of nature
animality is antecedent to humanity not
only with reference to time but also
with reference to extension and
denotation. But this notion of
antecedence too is relative and not
absolute, for humanity being a more
specialized form of animality is
antecedent to it with reference to
intension or connotation”
(www.muslimphilosophy.com).
[129] “Antecedence in status or
excellence, e.g. of the learned to the
ignorant or the believer to the non-
believer; this kind of antecedence
always presupposes a value-judgment,
i.e. the superiority of one thing or
individual to the other with reference to
a norm or standard”
(www.muslimphilosophy.com).
[130] By “essential priority” here
“natural priority” is meant, which is
one of the three kinds of essential
priority. ‘Alawī comments on this
passage as follows:
This is where he made the decision
of the leader and his power the
reason for the decision of the
subordinate and his power. As he
stated, “he is set in motion through
his decision.” Consequently, this
returns to priority by nature, not
nobility….Although both [teacher
and student] share in possessing
knowledge, nevertheless the former
has a surplus of it compared to the
latter, and becomes knowledgeable
by means of his [the teacher’s]
knowledge. It is in this way that the
master and the leader is regarded as
prior [by nature]. For decision occurs
to the leader but not to the
subordinate. It only occurs to the
subordinate after it has occurred to
the leader. Thus he is set in motion
through the decision of the leader.…
[The category of priority
depends upon the common notion
which is its basis.] Therefore, if this
common notion is [the logical order
of] existence, it is prior by nature. If
it is necessity [of existence], it is
prior in causality. If it is virtue and
perfection, it is prior in nobility, like
the priority of the teacher over the
student, for that very notion by
which precedence and priority is
[judged in this case] is knowledge.
The same applies to the precedence
of a leader and his priority over his
subordinate, for that by which
precedence is [judged in this case] is
power and ascendancy. But nothing
belonging to these two is prior to the
other in necessity and existence. But
rather [what has priority] is
knowledge and ascendancy. This is
priority in nobility….
In sum, the leadership and
the perfection of knowledge
belonging to the leader and the
teacher are prior by nature to that
which belongs to the subordinate and
the student. But the precedence of
the leader and the teacher to the
subordinate and the student with
respect to knowledge and leadership
is strictly priority in nobility.
However, the view of our teacher [in
this passage] is that knowledge
belongs to the teacher and power and
decision to the leader because he is
the cause of the knowledge of the
student and the decision of the
subordinate. Thus the argument
returns to the fact that the leader, as
such, is prior to the subordinate, as
such. The same applies to the
relation between teacher and student.
 Consequently, the essential priority
of the leader and the teacher to the
subordinate and student is implied [in
this case]. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 223-
225)
[131] Unlike Mīr Dāmād, Ibn Sīnā
limits essential priority to causal priority
and priority by nature; he does not
mention priority in quiddity (see Wamīḍ
2.7.3). His student, Bahmanyār, in his
Taḥṣīl gives the following explanation
of these two types of essential priority:
“As for the prior by nature, it is like the
priority of one over two and lines over
the triangle. If the lines are removed,
the triangle also disappears. But the
lines do not [necessarily] disappear
with the destruction of the triangle.
What is being considered in this priority
is what pertains to the quiddity apart
from existence. The difference
between the prior by nature and the
prior in causality is that in the prior by
nature the existence of the prior is not
the cause of the existence of the
posterior. But in the prior in causality,
just as it is prior in existence, its
existence is also the cause and reason
of [the existence of] the posterior”
(qtd. in al-Qabasāt 65-66).
If one considers
Bahmanyār’s definition of priority by
nature “as what pertains to the quiddity
apart from existence,” along with
Aristotle’s definition that those things
are prior by nature and substance
“which can be without other things,
while other things cannot be without
them” (Metaphysics 1019a, 3-4), then
priority in quiddity, which ‘Alawī has
defined as “the priority of the parts of
the quiddity to itself,” is no other than
priority by nature.
[132] ‘Alawī comments: “He means
by this that the simultaneity posited for
the prior in causality together with its
effect corresponds to what the
substance of the effect itself requires
and allows….Therefore, the world, its
determination, and its existence being
posterior to its Creator with respect to
concrete reality, insofar as it contains
imperfection and deficiency, does not
preclude its simultaneity with Him,
insofar as the substance of its caused
essence calls for Him in the tongue of
its state and the contingency of its
emanation. His eternal priority to it
does not imply that He is not prior in
causality to it, because this is from the
side of the effect, not from the
deficiency of the cause” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 225-226).
[133] An example of this is a quiddity,
which ‘Alawī notes is “one of the
conditions of its [own] existence and it
precedes it by nature,” but it is not the
efficient cause of its existence because
then it would be giving existence to
itself, which is impossible (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 227).
[134] ‘Alawī comments: “In sum, the
cause will either be complete, in which
case its priority over its effect is called
“priority and precedence in causality,”
or it will be incomplete, in which case
its priority over its effect is called
‘priority and antecedence by nature”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 227).
[135] ‘Alawī comments:
The gist of [Mīr Dāmād’s] answer is
that these intelligible substances in
relation to that which is after them
function as conditions, not efficient
causes, even if they are necessary for
the emanation. What follows after
them is not like a shadow to them;
rather all of these causes and effects
are like shadows of the true Agent,
Who emanates their determination,
their actualization, and their
abstracted existences subsequent to
Himself….Therefore, it [one
substance] is not more praiseworthy
and superior [to another in this
 respect].
Furthermore, what he
[Suhrawardī] understood about those
intelligible substances being efficient
causes and his confining their priority
to what is after them to priority in
quiddity is not sound, for they have,
in their abstracted existences, priority
to what is after them by nature as
well. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 234-235)
This passage indicates a
major difference between Suhrawardī
and Mīr Dāmād on the nature of the
Platonic Forms. Suhrawardī conceived
of them as self-conscious beings, as
self-subsistent abstract lights, each of
which is the lord of a terrestrial species
(rabb al-naw‘) or the lord of an image
(rabb al-ṣanam). This is why he refers
to them here as efficient causes. In Mīr
Dāmād, however, they are realities,
which are conditions for the emanation
of the act of the true Agent.
[136] ‘Alawī comments:
For example, possibility (imkān)
[adheres to the quiddity itself], due to
its not requiring either determination
or non-determination, existence or
non-existence, for it is fixed in the
quiddity itself in the stage of its
essence with respect to itself, not in
the sense that it requires the non-
necessity of these two, but in the
sense that it does not require the
necessity of these two.
Consequently, it belongs to the
sphere of priority in quiddity in
relation to what it has through
another, such as necessity through
another. The author of the Shajara
Ilāhiya states: “Possibility is prior to
necessity through another, which is in
reality the effect of the Maker.”
In sum, essential possibility
is one of the prior stages. It is
essentially prior to the stage of
existence in the consideration of the
intellect with respect to the quiddity,
but it is not separated from union
with existence and necessity with
respect to the thing itself (nafs al-
amr), for although it is a simple
negation of the two extremes of the
essence, nevertheless it is the non-
existence of the determined essence
with respect to itself at the time of its
determination by the Maker.
 Therefore, it is, in relation to
potentiality, more similar than it to
privation (‘adam). It has a certain
accidental connection to the Maker
through that circumstantial mode.
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 235)
[137] The simple interrogative refers
to the fact that something is, i.e. its
existence. The compound interrogative
refers to what something is, i.e., its
quiddity.
[138] In this Wamīḍ, Mīr Dāmād is
referring to Suhrawardī’s doctrine that
individuals of the same species are
distinguishable from one another by a
change of intensity within their
quiddities. This is different from the
view of the Peripatetics for whom the
individuals of species are
distinguishable by their accidents. This
position of Suhrawardī, known as the
“analogical gradation of quiddity”
(tashkīk al-māhiyya), is the exact
converse of the position of those who
accept the analogical gradation of
existence. (See Concept and Reality of
Existence 108)
Mīr Dāmād is critical of
Suhrawardī for holding that analogical
gradation pertains to the qualified
quiddity, or substance, though he does
not deny that it applies to concrete
identities in their accidental properties.
‘Alawī elaborates upon his teacher’s
criticism as follows:
And he [Suhrawardī] says in the
book al-Muṭāraḥāt:
One quantity in not increased in
completeness or deficiency over
another by an accident, nor is there
a differentia which is divided for
the quantity….The difference in
quantities is due to quantity itself.
There is nothing outside of the
quantity which increases it. Rather
what increases it is likewise what
makes it equal in reality. The
distinction between two different
lines in length and shortness is only
due to the perfection of the line
and its deficiency. The same
applies to perfect and deficient
blackness. These two share in
blackness and are not distinguished
by something that is outside of
blackness, whether this be another
differentia or something else.
 Consequently, the difference is in
blackness itself. The sum of all
these things is perfection and
deficiency in the quiddity itself.
Our teacher [Mīr Dāmād]
has pointed out the falsity of this
claim and its proofs with his
statement: “There is no substance
more perfect with respect to its
substantiality than any other
substance.”...Therefore, perfection
and deficiency apply to the singular
concrete identity with respect to
intensity and remission of quality,
paucity and abundance of discrete
quantity, and increase and decrease
in continuous quantity.
We say, for instance…if a
long line and a short line are
considered with respect to the nature
of lineness, namely being one
dimension, each of them is an
absolute length (ṭūl ḥaqīqī)
resembling the other insofar as it is
one dimension. With respect to this
nature, no difference is posited
between them at all. But if one of
them is considered in relation to the
other, the longer line will have a
relative length (ṭūl iḍāfī) greater than
the other in the particularity of its
singular concrete identity. Therefore,
absolute length is not subject to
increase and decrease, but only the
length which is related to another. In
like manner, plurality without a
relation is number, while plurality in
relation is an accident with respect to
number. Absolute plurality does not
admit of being more or less; this is
only applicable to plurality which is
related.
The nature of blackness
also is, in one way, in various blacks
differing in intensity and remission.
That difference, however, is only
with respect to the particularities of
the individual instances of the nature,
and insofar as the accidental relation
is not in the substance of the quiddity
and the root of the reality. Absolute
blackness, therefore, does not admit
of being more or less intense. Rather,
something which is black in relation
to one thing is white in relation to
another….
Consequently, one substance,
 insofar as it is a substance, is not
more perfect than another substance,
even though one substance may be
more perfect than another [with
respect to their concrete instances].
The same applies if some people are
more understanding and others are
more ignorant. The rational faculty is
liable to increase and decrease;
indeed if one person does not
understand anything, he is certainly
like a child. But his excellence is that
he possesses in his substance a
power which can perform rational
feats, if no barrier impedes it, and it
is the same faculty [in all men]….
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 236-238)
[139] What Mīr Dāmād means is that
the differentiae of quiddities, which are
simple derivative concepts, are outside
of the category of substance, for he has
already identified the qualified quiddity
with the category of substance (see al-
Qabasāt 40, 68). It is apparent from
‘Alawī’s commentary on this passage,
however, that the term “differentia”
has two distinct meanings: (1) the
logical differentia, which is a
derivative concept conjoined with a
genus by which a species is defined in
definition (such as the notion “rational”
in “rational animal” said of “man”) and
(2) that which is itself the real
differentiaof a substance (such as the
rational soul characterizing man). It is
clear that “differentia” in the first sense
is a concept which signifies and
corresponds to “differentia” in the
second sense. Furthermore, the
differentia, which is constitutive of a
species, has no differentia itself, since it
is a “simple” in itself. As such it is
neither a substance nor an accident.
(See ‘Alawī, Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 242-
245.)
[140] An example of this is the
differentia “rational” giving rise to the
property “amazement,” which in turn
may give rise to the property
“laughter.”
[141] ‘Alawī comments:
The first of them is [logical]
qualification. If that received in what
is qualified by it corresponds to it,
then, in this case, “in it” and “from
it” are the same. This is like
qualifying four by “evenness.”
 The second of them is
essential passion (infi‘āl dhātī). This
is where that received in what is
qualified by it does not correspond to
it, like the forms subsisting in the
incorporeal intelligences and the
sanctified substances due to their
dependency upon their true Maker.
Consequently, the “in them” is not
“from them,” but “from other than
them.” In this case, there are two
[distinct] factors: receptiveness and
passion, and influence and act.
The third of them is
temporal passion (infi‘āl zamānī). It
is the absence of that received from
what receives it with respect to a
particular time, then its adornment
with it later. This is receptivity
 commensurate with dispositional
possibility…. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
248)
[142] In other words, in the case of
God, existence is identical to His
essence, while in the case of His
creatures, existence is superadded to
their quiddities (though not as an
ordinary accident subsists in its
subject). Mīr Dāmād is not saying here
that the existence of God and the
existence of His creatures is the same
existence.
[143] ‘Alawī comments: “It is clear
that what some of these philosophers
hold concerning the immaterial
dimension shows that they do not
believe in its conjunction with the
material dimension, which is the
corporeal form, for it is clear that they
consider it to be mutually incompatible
in kind. This is why you see the Master
in the Physics of the Shifā’ and the
Najāt undertake to refute it by
principles whose millstone turns upon
the impossibility of a distinction in one
species nature with respect to
immaterial and material existence….”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 251).
[144] ‘Alawī repeats that “existence is
not a species reality, but rather an
attributive concept abstracted from
essences and quiddities” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 253). There appears to be
three conceptions of existence
mentioned so far: (1) real existence
which is identical to God’s essence, to
which all else that bears the name
“existence” corresponds, (2) existence
which is the same as the becoming of
the determined essence (see Wamḍa
2.1), and (3) existence as an attributive
concept abstracted from concrete
identities. Numbers 2 and 3, however,
are not really different from each other
due to the principality of the quiddity.
It is clear that attributive existence is
the same as absolute existence to Mīr
Dāmād.
[145] See Wamīḍ 2.7.6.
[146] See also Wamīḍ 6.9.4. ‘Alawī
comments:
The summary of [Dāmād’s] solution
of the doubt is this: If what is meant
by “existence” is this attributive
concept itself, taken absolutely, its
meaning is a attributiveness which is
not intelligible except in relation to a
subject from which it is abstracted
and by which it is particularized. The
requisite of this attributive [species]
nature is no different. It is not
possible at all for it to be the same as
the principal quiddities and realities,
as with other attributive concepts.
And if what is meant by it
[existence] is its correspondent
(muṭābiq), its prerequisite, its
standard, its basis, the realizer
(muṣaḥḥiḥ) of its abstraction, and the
criterion from which true predication
is derived in relation to whatever
subject and existent it may be, taken
absolutely, [its meaning is] the reality
of existence determined by itself,
subsistent through itself, independent
of quiddity. It is nothing but real
Existence (wujūd ḥaqq) in the real
world by reason of itself. So all the
possible quiddities from which
existence is abstracted are altogether
void of consideration in themselves
in relation to the true basis for the
abstraction of existence from them.
The prerequisite, the basis, the
correspondent, the standard, and the
essential realizer, in reality, is nothing
but the causal circumstantial mode,
which is their connection to real
Existence by reason of itself (not by
its quiddity apart from itself) and
their dependence upon it. Therefore,
in like manner, the attributive
“humanity” is abstracted from Zayd,
‘Umar, Khālid, and others who
participate in the species, for
example, but the correspondent of
the abstraction and its basis is strictly
the shared reality of man, while the
particular properties of the
individuals in their entirety do not
apply. Thus it may be correctly said
of every individual in its particularity
that the concept of attributive
humanity is abstracted from it, not
figuratively, but in reality. Yet the
correspondent of the abstraction and
its basis and what corresponds to it is
nothing but the common substantial
human species nature. No part of the
particular properties of individuals as
such are included in that at all.
Rather, the real basis for the
abstraction of attributive humanity is
 the connection of all of the particular
properties to the common substantial
human species nature, which in
reality is the correspondent of
attributive humanity and its
prerequisite, its basis, and its
standard by necessity….
I say that his words: “He
(exalted be His glory) is the existence
of every existent in the sense of the
correspondent of the abstraction in
reality” allude to his refutation of the
Sufis, since they believe that what is
other than Him (exalted be He) is not
existent in reality, but that existence
is a self-manifestation of Him….
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 253-255)
[147] ‘Alawī comments:
The meaning of his assertion that all
besides Him is posterior in perpetuity
(dahr) pertains to the entire system,
notwithstanding that among its parts,
its members, and its elements are
immaterial substances and permanent
sanctified intelligences whose relation
to the changeless Truth is eternity
(sarmad) [according to the
Peripatetics]. This is due to the fact
that he has considered eternal that
whose existence is incompatible with
prior nullification and supervening
non-existence. But this does not
include those intelligible lights, even
assuming their preexistence (qidam),
since they belong in themselves to
the realm of possibility….For this
reason he maintained the posteriority
of the entire system in relation to the
 True Creator in perpetuity and the
priority of its Creator to it in eternity.
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 257)
[148] ‘Alawī comments: “It is evident
that what he means by “One” here is
the denial of existence being added to
His true essence and reality, for in
whatever thing its quiddity is different
than its existence, its existence is from
another than itself. Neither is its
concrete identity its quiddity by reason
of itself, nor is it itself by reason of
itself. However, the First Cause is
Himself by reason of Himself, and thus
His existence is identical to His
quiddity” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 259).
[149] In al-Qabasāt, pp. 147-148, Mīr
Dāmād contrasts the term mubham
“indeterminate” with muḥaṣṣal
“determinate,” a meaning noted by
Afnan, but muḥaṣṣal also means
“actualized” or “actual,” which is
Goichon’s translation. Ibn Sīnā states in
the Shifā’: “The existent (mawjūd), the
affirmed (muthbāt), and the
determinate/actualized (muḥaṣṣal) are
synonymous terms having one
meaning” (qtd. in Goichon, Lexique
78). In Logic muḥaṣṣal refers to a
proposition in which both the subject
and the predicate are in the affirmative,
which is the opposite of the obverse
proposition.
[150] “Continuous quantity, i.e., the
quantity of the kind the parts of which
are so contiguous to one another that
they form a single continuum; it is
either a spatial continuum or a temporal
continuum, i.e., time. The spatial
continuum is of three kinds, viz. (1)
one-dimensional, i.e., line (khaṭṭ); (2)
two-dimensional, i.e., surface (saṭḥ),
and three-dimensional, i.e., volume
(ḥajm). All of these are static continua
classed under the category of fixed
continuous quantity. The temporal
continuum, though constituted of the
series of past, present, and future, is
uni-dimensional, and, being in
perpetual flux, is named an unfixed
continuous quantity. The discrete
quantity, as represented by integral
numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.), is the
opposite of the continuous quantity”
(www.muslimphilosophy.com).
[151] ‘Alawī comments:
“Without qualification” here means
whether motion is a substratum for
time or not, since it is not possible
for what is measured by something
to be a substratum for it. The Master
says in the Ta‘līqāt: “The sphere is
the bearer of time, and the power of
movement in it is the agent of time.
The measurer cannot subsist in the
measured but is separate from it, as a
ruler measures what it distinct from
itself.” And in the Physics of the
Shifā’: “There is a difference
between saying that time is the
measure of every motion, and saying
that its existence is dependent on
every motion. Similarly, there is a
difference between saying that the
essence of time is an accident of
motion, and saying that time is
 connected to motion itself in such a
way that it is accidental to it. The
meaning of the first is that one thing
is an accident to another thing, while
the meaning of the second it that one
thing follows another thing without
necessarily being its accident.”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 264)
[152] ‘Alawī comments: “He means
by “motion” here terminal motion,
which exists in the real world and
corresponds to time by identity
(‘ayniyya), not with-ness (ma‘iyya), as
it the case with the incorporeal
intelligences and the substances
sanctified from the dross of matter”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 267).
[153]‘Alawī clarifies that Mīr Dāmād
does not mean that time is literally the
container of motion, but only
figuratively so in the sense that motion
depends upon time for its
measurement. In fact, motion is the
container of time in the sense of being
its bearer. ‘Alawī states: “T ime is not
the container of its existence, but rather
the reverse is true. For example, the
motion of the outermost sphere is not
in time, but time is in it, as a
consequence of which it is measurable
by it. What he means by
“containment” implied by his words
“by in-ness” is this” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
268).
[154] Mīr Dāmād’s understanding of
rest as the privation of motion
conforms to the position of Ibn Sīnā in
the Physics of the Shifā’, where he
says: “It is well-known from the theory
of natural philosophy that the
opposition of rest to motion is the
opposition of privation to
possession….Therefore, if the
opposition of privation and possession
is between them [rest and motion], it is
not possible for motion to be the
privative thing of the two, for we say:
If the body is a certain cause of
motion, it is in its nature to move
before being at rest” (qtd. in Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 101-102).
‘Alawī thinks that Mīr Dāmād
may differ from Ibn Sīnā on the
question of rest, since Ibn Sīnā states in
the ‘Uyūn al-Ḥikmat: “Time is not
connected to rest, and it does not
measure it except accidentally.” But he
explains that what Dāmād means is
“that since rest consists of the privation
of motion in that which by its nature
moves, time is a measure of it in this
respect, and this is not incompatible
with saying that it is a measure of
motion” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 269-270).
[155] ‘Alawī reminds us that the
matter of the celestial bodies, unlike
sublunar matter, does not bear
potentiality, since their matter is only
the cause of their subsistence (qiwām),
not of their generation (kawn) (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 270).
[156] According to ‘Alawī, these two
ways are (1) “as the potency of that
which tends toward a certain form by
its motion by reason of the potential
nature” and (2) “by the connection of
its individual being to the unqualified
nature belonging to substantial forms”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 270-271).
[157] ‘Alawī comments: “What he
says here about prime matter includes
the celestial bodies as well. Although
their matters are not bearers for the
potentiality of receiving form, they are
bearers for the potentiality of
successive positions, renewed motions,
and conceptual longings, so that they
are potential with respect to their
hypothesized positions” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 271).
[158] ‘Alawī comments: “This
includes the spheres and the souls
connected to them, on account of their
being subject to potentiality with regard
to their new perfections, even though
their matters are not subject to
potentiality with regard to the forms
subsisting in them” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
272).
[159] Goichon points out that Ibn Sīnā
occasionally uses the term mādda in
the sense of “secondary matter” in
contrast to hayūlā, which is always
“prime matter” (Lexique 378).
[160] ‘Alawī reminds us that the use
of the term “eternal” (sarmadiyya)
here is “in accord with the convention
of the exponents of transcendent
philosophy, namely, that the relation of
unchanging things to unchanging things
is eternity (sarmad).” But it is contrary
to Mīr Dāmād’s position that only God
is eternal, so that nothing in the realm
of dahr can really be called eternal.
Thus he maintains that “His priority
(exalted be He) is eternal (sarmadī)
and the posteriority of the system of
existence to Him is perpetual
(dahran).” ‘Alawī next clarifies
precisely what the subjects of temporal
priority-posteriority, eternal priority,
and perpetual posteriority are: “The
essential subject in temporal priority is
the parts of time, and in perpetual
priority [i.e., eternal priority and
perpetual posteriority] it is the
essentially necessary and the essentially
possible….His intention is this: The
basis of eternal priority and perpetual
posteriority is essential necessity and
essential possibility respectively, and
these two are their essential subjects”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 272-273).
[161] This is because the objects of
perpetuity have an atemporal beginning
with God but no end. Once created,
their existence is perpetual (dahrī) and
everlasting (abadī). The objects of
time, on the other hand, have both
beginnings and ends.
[162] ‘Alawī comments on this
passage:
His position is that the relation of the
intelligences sanctified from time to
the whole of time is unquantifiable,
as a result of which it will be a
perpetuity, not a succession of one
thing after another from its beginning
to its end, with respect to them. Just
as the intelligences have one
unquantifiable relation to time, in like
manner they have one perpetual
 unquantifiable relation to the
existents specialized to its parts,
which are the temporal creatures.
Consequently, there is no succession
and no renewal belonging to these
creatures with respect to them, and
they have in relation to them [the
intelligences] a perpetual
simultaneity. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 273-
274)
[163] Suhrawardī.
[164] ‘Alawī comments: “This means
[only motion occurs in time]
essentially, in the sense of denying an
intermediary for its occurrence (‘urūḍ),
though not for its subsistence (thubūt).
This is unlike the case of time, for it
has no intermediary for its subsistence”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 275). In other
words, motion occurs essentially in
time, but it needs self-subsisting
magnitude (i.e., body) for its
subsistence. Time, on the other hand,
both subsists and occurs essentially in
motion.
[165] ‘Alawī comments, in this
connection, upon a statement by Naṣīr
al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in the Tajrīd in response
to someone who said: “If the
Necessary Being were to know
corruptible existents and changing
particulars with a knowledge that is the
same as them while they are
changeable, this would necessitate
change in His knowledge.” Ṭūsī
answered that change in His relation to
His objects of knowledge would be
required, but not change in His essence
and His real attributes. ‘Alawī asserts
that this position is also unsound: “How
can it be so, when the relation of the
changing to the changeless is
perpetuity? There is no succession in
this relation and no renewal; otherwise
it would be time, not perpetuity. It
encompasses each thing, the entire
system of existence, …from pre-
eternity to post-eternity, in summary
and in detail on behalf of the Self-
Subsistent Necessary Being (glorified
be His mention) in accordance with
what the grandeur of His reality and
the sovereignty of His might requires”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 276-277).
[166] What this means is that God
does not create things by a new
knowledge based upon a former
knowledge, as occurs in the case of
deliberation and meditation. Rather, He
created the entire system of existence
all at once by one primal wisdom.
‘Alawī comments on this passage:
“ The allusion here is to primary
origination (ibdā‘). According to what
the elite among the philosophers hold,
it pertains to that which only needs its
Originator without the interposition of
any other condition whatsoever, let
alone matter. The system of existence
proceeds from His pre-eternal
Providence in this way, for it is the
Manifest Book from which nothing
small or large is left out but His
knowledge encompasses it. It is not
possible for anything to exist which is
outside of it except for its true Creator,
exalted be His glory” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 277-278).
[167] A more complete version of this
passage attributed to Aristotle is found
in Wamīḍ 5.4.16.
[168] ‘Alawī explains: “The intention
of the “form” (ṣūra) which is one of
the principles of generation (kawn) is
either the separate substance which
gives forms by the leave of its Lord, or
it is the substantial form impressed in
the corporeal substance by which it is a
certain form, since it pertains to the
original nature unconditioned by
anything, not to the individual form,
which is not a principle of generation”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 278).
[169] ‘Alawī states:
It is clear that what was recounted in
the inception of the book: “the third
is privation not in time or space” [al-
Qabasāt 29], alludes to perpetual
privation, in the sense that its
causality pertains to perpetual
creatures as well as changeless and
changing existents. Therefore, it
concerns the impossibility of their
realization, insofar as they are
existents preceded by non-existence,
without it. The question of change
and corruption is not considered with
respect to this; rather only privation
as such preceding them is
considered. Now its priority to them
is an accidental priority, not an
essential priority, inasmuch as it is
dependent upon what is an essential
 cause to them, like the agent, for
example….
In brief, privation is either going
to be temporal or not. According to
the former, its priority to existence is
accidental due to the creature
needing something else without
which it cannot be realized, which is
motion….According to the latter, its
priority to it is accidental due to its
existence needing a cause associated
with it, which is not motion, but
another thing, like the agent, for
example, although its causation of it
is also dependent upon certain
conditions. (Shar ḥ al-Qabasāt 280)
[170]Although form can reasonably be
explained as a creation of God, to say
that prime matter, as prime matter, is
created by God is problematic. It
leaves open the question of what God
created prime matter from. If we say
from absolute nothingness, absolute
nothingness, like the impossible, does
not have the capacity to exist. Even
supposing that it could exist, one could
then ask what absolute nothingness
was created from. The result of this
line of questioning is an infinite regress
with no final answer. To say that
matter is “prime matter” implies that it
is prime, that there is nothing before it.
In fact, prime matter, possibility, and
privation all imply the same thing: the
capacity to exist, the capacity to
possess form. So when God gives
existence, what He is giving is form to
prime matter. Only in this sense is it
reasonable to say that He has created
matter.
[171] ‘Alawī comments:
This is one of his statements on His
knowledge of corruptible, changeable
particulars, not insofar as they are
changeable and corruptible, but
together with their changes within the
limits of themselves they are
unchangeable in relation to Him….It
is clear that all things are known to
Him from pre-eternity to post-
eternity in a state of perpetual
duration and continuity, occurring in
a way transcending the imagination
of ordinary intellects, apart from
flowing duration and extended
continuity, but all at once,
perpetually, as an implicate order
 (muḍammina) in which are contained
all the temporal stages and temporal
nows until everlasting. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 282-283)
[172] Mīr Dāmād is opposed to the
idea of eternal simultaneity, or co-
eternity (ma‘iyya sarmadiyya), and
differs on this point from Ibn Sīnā. See
Wamīḍ 3.7.4.
[173] ‘Alawī comments:
It may be that by relating this
statement from the Master he is
alluding to the priority of potentiality
to the temporal creature as such, but
this contrasts with how it is with
atemporal creations, for they have no
need of it and it is not prior to them.
However, non-existence is prior to
them without being temporal, since it
 is a non-flowing, unextended non-
existence. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 285-
286)
[174] Shams al-Dīn Mu ḥ ammad
Shahrazūrī, a follower of Suhrawardī.
[175] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.
[176] Suhrawardī describes these
kindof philosophers in Ḥ ikmat al-
Ishrāq, p. 3, as those who subordinate
discursive philosophy to intuitive
philosophy. Later the term came to
apply specifically to the school of
philosophy associated with
Mullā Ṣ adrā. See Nasr, Sadr al-Din
Shirazi & His
Transcendent Philosophy (Imperial
Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1979),
p. 85 ff.
[177] ‘Alawī comments:
The purport is that the aspect [of
something] which has no fixity in the
now is an existent fixed in the
container of perpetuity with respect
to the purely unchanging. What the
philosophers mean by perpetuity
being the relation of the unchanging
to the changing is this: if the
existence of the changing in itself is
related to the unchanging, it is
perpetuity, and its lack of fixity in the
now does not preclude its fixity with
respect to it [the unchanging].
Therefore, two extremes (ṭarafayn)
exist in perpetuity, and it is possible
for one of them to be related to the
other….
The purport of his words
“with respect to perpetuity, not with
respect to time” is that just as God
(lauded be He) is sanctified in His
essence, His attributes, His states,
and His names from progression and
succession, since “was” and “will be”
are only via time, which is the
container of changing things, in like
manner, He is sanctified from
temporal simultaneity and
instantaneous time, since these only
pertain to time and to the now, which
is one of the boundaries of time. His
glory is far exalted above both time
and perpetuity. The quiddity of
motion is progression and flow, and
the reality of time is the extension of
elapsing and renewal. These two
exist in the real world by their
continuity with respect to an unfixed,
extensional being, which is unable in
itself to have two of its parts or two
of its boundaries coexist within the
same boundary. Moreover, each of
the generated beings in its time with
respect to the boundaries of the
temporal extension occurs in the
domain of perpetuity.
Therefore, the unchanging,
the fixed, the changing, the renewed,
the progressing, the instantaneous,
and the temporal not corresponding
to the extension of time, with all their
details, small and large, moist and
dry, are present with Him (exalted be
He) all at once perpetually, due to
being made by the Maker and
created by the Creator without
qualification. His primary origination,
His calling into being, His fashioning,
and His outpouring do not belong to
anything in terms of progression,
temporality, or instantaneous time,
but according to another mode
beyond the means of the estimative
faculty to perceive, sanctified from
all of that.
Have you not ascertained
that time, according to the principles
of philosophy, pertains to an entity
extended from pre-eternity to post-
eternity, which is one individual
existing in the container of perpetuity.
There is no plurality in it except with
respect to what occurs to it by
hypothetical division due to causes
which lead to hypothetical divisions
[such as past, present, and future].
This does not make a breach in its
oneness or its individuality in itself
with respect to the real world. The
same applies to motion. If parts are
hypothesized in these two, they are
realized in succession with respect to
temporal creation and continuance
(baqā’) with respect to their
existences in themselves in relation to
what is in the horizon of temporal
things, and in the relation of some of
these parts to others, and with
respect to their relation to the now.
But with respect to continuous
subsistence, i.e., their existence due
to their cause and their presence with
it, and in relation to what transcends
the horizon of time, indeed, with
 respect to existence in itself in the
container of perpetuity, there is no
succession between them at all, nor
between temporals absolutely, for
they are equally prior in presence and
realization in this respect. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 292-294)

[178]‘Alawī comments: “ The purport

is that, in the opinion of the Imām
Rāzī, the priority of the non-existence
preceding the existence of the world is
essential, like the priority of some of
the parts of time to other parts. In like
manner, His priority to it is like that.
He advocates this priority in opposition
to the philosophers who maintain
God’s eternal priority and the priority
of perpetual non-existence to creatures
in their perpetual existence” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 294). In other words,
according to Rāzī, since in actuality the
parts of time coexist in one whole, why
is it not possible for God to coexist in
time with His creation?
[179]‘Alawī comments: “ The
substantiation of this is that the
accidental relations belonging to His
true solitary Essence (exalted be His
sovereignty) do not occur in succession
one after another, for they are no other
than pure actuality in every respect.
These relations only have succession
and progression with respect to the
object of relation [in the world of
contingency]” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 294-
295).
[180] For ‘Alawī’s refutation of this,
see Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 295-296.
[181]‘Alawī comments: “ He does not
understand that the permanence of the
immaterial primary originated things is
in a mode more exalted and more
sanctified than temporal permanence,
for it is the permanence of pure
changelessness” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
296-297).
[182] ‘Alawī clarifies: “He means here
[there is no time] before the temporal
existences and non-existences occurring
in the world” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 297).
[183] ‘Alawī comments: “The
meaning of pressing [the problem] is
that it has been submitted that the
categories of priority are seven. Among
them are priority in quiddity and eternal
priority. So if perpetual simultaneity
occurs, then a corresponding perpetual
priority should occur as well, as a result
of which its categories would become
eight. The gist of his answer is that the
basis of eternal simultaneity and
perpetual simultaneity is the same
thing, for the relation and the object of
relation are one, though the object of
relation differs, as we shall explain, due
to its being changing or changeless. But
the changing does not have change in
relation to the changeless” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 297-298).
[184] ‘Alawī comments: “Medial
motion is an individual attribute which
subsists in the moving object,
remaining from the beginning of the
distance to its end, and requiring time,
not by way of correspondence to it, but
according to another mode. It needs
time, but not in such a way that it
corresponds to it, since no parts belong
to it [medial motion], but rather in such
a way that whichever of its [time’s]
boundaries is assumed, it exists in it in
its entirety….As for terminal motion, it
corresponds to the distance and to
time, for its parts coincide with their
parts, as the author, our teacher,
indicated by his words “in a particular
time according to progression” (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 298).
[185] See Wamīḍ 6.12.11.
[186] ‘Alawī comments:
The gist of his meaning in this
passage is that qualifications,
negations, and receptivities are
mental postulations which have no
realization (taḥaqquq​) in the external
world. If this is admitted, then they
do not attach to what is one, insofar
as it is one, but rather they need a
plurality to which they attach.
Negation, for example, needs
something negated and an object of
negation. In like manner, qualification
needs an attribute and an object of
qualification, and receptivity needs a
receiver and what is received.
If this is settled, then we
say: The thought of a thinker and the
intellection of a perceptive mind do
not pertain to real non-existence.
There is no credibility here of a
simultaneity belonging to Him
(exalted be He) with respect to the
negation of the world and its non-
 existence due to its absence, for there
is no realization of the negation so
that it could have a simultaneity with
Him. This is a principle upon which
many things are constructed, such as
the impossibility of the emanation of
multiplicity from what is one in every
respect, or the impossibility of
qualifying Zayd, for example, with
infinite negations. The Master has
explained this in more than one place
in his books. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 301-
302)
[187] The absolute (or non-modal)
proposition in logic is one that does not
have an expressed modality (jiha). In
other words, it does not state explicitly
whether the relation between the
predicate and the subject is possible,
necessary, or impossible. It simply
affirms or denies a certain relation
between subject and predicate as it is
to be found in our experience of
matters of fact without referring to the
necessity, possibility, or impossibility of
that relation. For example, statements
like: “Ruminants are cloven-footed”
and “Horses are not blue” are non-
modal, or absolute, propositions. (See
Inati, Ibn Sīnā: Remarks and
Admonitions, 24-25.)
[188] ‘Alawī comments:
He is outside of the boundary of
comparison (tashbīh) due to His
being the exclusive occupant of the
Throne of Eternity. What is other
than Him is not like him by reason of
being posterior to non-existence. He
is outside of the boundary of
comparison due to being sanctified
from being attained, for the essence
of His glory cannot be reached, while
what is other than Him is not like
Him by reason of the possibility of
being attained.
In short, His essence is
holy and exalted above any
comparison to the realities or
resemblance to the essences in their
manifold aspects and the two aspects
which precede their thirdness. He
(glorified be His sovereignty) is the
Wellspring of the essences, the
Maker of the realities, and the
Producer of the quiddities. The same
applies to existence and thingness,
for He is an existent unlike all other
existents and a “thing” unlike all
other things, with respect to the
thingness of each thing and the
existence of each existent. The same
may be said of His real attributes. As
for His being outside of the boundary
of negation (ta‘ṭīl), this is with
respect to His eternal existential
essence, which is sanctified from
potentiality, possibility, negation,
annihilation, and nullification. The
same applies to His real attributes
and His most excellent names….
It is incumbent upon you to
know that every name among those
holy names and every expression
among those perfect expressions
applied to any of His attributes, His
qualities, His conditions, and His
aspects, is only credible insofar as it
corresponds to another mode (sabīl)
which is sanctified and exalted above
the mode of the concept which we
understand and conceive with respect
to that name and that expression and
whatever expression we use in place
of it. Every perfect expression,
therefore, in the station of divinity,
has a meaning more sanctified and
more exalted than it is possible for
human minds and imaginations to
comprehend, and every sacred name,
with respect to its real perfection,
pertains to Him (glorified be He) in a
sense more exalted and more sublime
than that it should comprehend and
describe the true Creator, inasmuch
as nothing in its existence and its
 essence, nor in any of its attributes or
circumstantial modes, corresponds to
Him, resembles Him, or comes close
to Him, so that if we say: “He is an
existent,” we know, notwithstanding,
that His existence is not like the
existence of anything else besides
Him, and if we say: “He is alive,” we
know that this is in a sense more
sanctified and more exalted than
what we understand life to be.
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt, 303-304)
[189] Mīr Dāmād means by the
“divine philosophers” the ancient
philosophers culminating in Plato who
are said to have acquired their wisdom
from the Prophets. He calls Plato “the
seal of the divine philosophers.” See
Sharh al-Qabasāt, p. 384.
[190]‘Alawī says that Mīr Dāmād
means here the questioner having
assurance of the following: “ that
temporal existents, purely intelligible
changeless things, the celestial spheres,
and the lower elemental generated
things are all in relation to Him (exalted
be He) in the container of perpetuity
and the domain of pure changelessness,
without the precedence of one thing
over another with respect to it, and
without succession, elapsing, and
cessation touching it, for this only
pertains to some temporals in relation
to others” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 307).
[191] Aristotle.
[192] In the following ‘Alawī clarifies
that “primary origination” (ibdā‘ ) is
limited to the existentiation of the
incorporeal intelligence, which have no
matter preceding them, whereas
“invention” (ikhtirā‘ ), which is
restricted to the heavenly spheres and
the universal simple elements (‘anāṣir),
assumes the essential, though not
temporal, priority of matter. He says:
Primary origination, according to
him, is the making of the substance
of the quiddity and giving existence
to the essence from the seal of
absolute essential non-existence, and
extracting it from the domain of
perpetual real non-existence without
any matter or duration preceding it,
either temporally, perpetually, or
essentially. This only pertains to
incorporeal things which are
completely separate from matter and
its attachments. The most worthy of
the primary originated things is the
First Emanated, which is a pure
intelligible substance which is only
preceded in essence by and
dependent in existence upon the true,
self-subsistent Maker without
qualification.
The followers of Proclus
and Aristotle among the Peripatetics
and those who hold to the eternity of
primary originated things do not
admit the perpetual priority of real
non-existence together with primary
origination. According to them, only
absolute non-existence essentially
precedes the existence of primary
originated things in perpetuity. They
claim that primary origination is
strictly giving existence from absolute
non-existence with respect to
essential creation.
A group of them restrict
primary origination to the First
Intelligence, since nothing essentially
precedes it except the essence of its
self-subsistent Originator (exalted be
His remembrance). He is the One
who gave it existence, who originated
it and extracted it from absolute non-
existence apart from the intelligences
which succeed it in the vertical order
due to its priority in being an
intermediary for them, although not
matter. This is the course charted in
the Metaphysics of the Shifā’ and in
Namaṭ Six of the Ishārāt.
It is evident that the root
(‘unṣur) is two roots: (1) the root of
subsistence (qiwām), and (2) the root
of generation (takwīn). The object of
the first is its being a bearer for the
existence of something, while the
object of the second is its being the
bearer of its potentiality and its
aptitude. The first is invention
(ikhtirā‘), which is the making of the
substance of the essence and its
extraction from the void of essential
non-being and the domain of
perpetual real non-existence together
with the essential, not temporal,
priority of matter. This only pertains
to the spheres and the universal
simple elements. This is in accord
with the practice of the author, our
teacher.
 But those who believe in
eternity (qidam) consider it to be the
extraction [of existence] from
essential non-being together with the
essential priority of matter without
the precedence of a perpetual real
non-existence.
He who believes in
particularization (takhṣīṣ) considers it
to be giving existence from non-being
together with the essential priority of
the separate intermediate substance
without the priority of matter and
duration, and he says that the other
intelligences subsequent to the First
Emanated are invented, not primary
originated.
As for generation (takwīn),
it is the extraction of the concrete
identity (huwiyya) of a generated
creature from the extension of
privation and the actualization of its
generated existence in a segment of
time temporally preceded by the
existence of the matter which bears
its potentiality and the time of its
continuous non-existence. For this
reason the Master in the Shifā’ states
without reservation that the existent
(kā’in) is from the generated
sometimes, and that the generation of
one thing through another thing
sometimes is applicable here and not
applicable there.
Moreover, the course taken
by our teacher here concerning these
three kinds of creation differs from
the course taken by the Chief in
Namaṭ Six of the Ishārāt, where he
appointed three kinds of creation: (1)
primary origination, (2) generation,
and (3) production. Production
(iḥdāth) is the outpouring of
temporal existence preceded by time,
whereas generation (takwīn) is the
outpouring of material existence
preceded essentially, not temporally,
by matter. Each of these two is the
opposite of primary origination in a
certain respect, and it is prior to both
of them, since the occurrence of
matter by generation is not possible
nor is the occurrence of time by
production; otherwise it would be
necessary for primary matter to have
another matter and for time to have
another time. Consequently,
 generation and production are
subordinate to primary origination,
and primary origination is higher than
them in rank, more prior in
occurrence, and positively nearer in
relation to the Maker of all things.
However, the path of our teacher
corresponds to what the Master
holds in some of his epistles. (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 312-313)
[193] Qur’ān 5:64.
[194]Qur’ān 31:28.
[195]Qur’ān 55:29.
[196]Qur’ān 57:4.
[197] Qur’ān 58:7.
[198]Qur’ān 13:39.
[199] Qur’ān 15:21. ‘Alawī
comments:
It is clear that the treasuries are
present in the predetermination
(qaḍā’) in a purely unchanging way
in perpetuity, and nothing exists but it
is treasured and concealed in them
and united in their totality. This is
real predetermination and its
measure. As for epistemological
predetermination and its measure,
according to what the divine
philosophers hold, it consists of the
forms of all possible existents,
whether universal or particular, in the
intelligible world by virtue of the
Necessary Being originating them.
The unity of those among them
which are attached to matter by way
of primary origination is impossible,
since it [matter] is unable to receive
 two forms simultaneously, let alone
more than two….
Therefore, the
predetermination consists of the
existence of all existents in the
intelligible world coexisting as a
whole by way of primary origination,
and fate (qadar) consists of their
existence in external matters,
separated one after another….
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 315-316)
[200]Qur’ān 56:49-50.
[201]Qur’ān 18:49.
[202]Qur’ān 10:28.
[203]Qur’ān 41:25.
[204]Qur’ān 7:44.
[205]Qur’ān 20:36.
[206]‘Alawī comments: “ It is the
world of immaterial things….The word
“Be!” (kun) is without any matter
which bears the substance of the
essence and its dispositional possibility.
A disposition is required for the
occurrence of the emanation and the
actualization of the determination”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 316).
[207] Qur’ān 92:5-7.
[208] Qur’ān 13:39.
[209] Qur’ān 58:7.
[210] Qur’ān 6:103.
[211] Cf. Wamīd 10.5.8 on God
creating matter with infinite receptive
potential in order to receive the
emanation of existence. If matter is
created, however, one wonders what
receives matter in order for it to be
separate from God? This is one of the
problems with the theory of creation ex
nihilo.
[212] Qur’ān 51:49.
[213] Qur’ān 51:49.
[214] Ibn Sīnā says: “As for the
species, it is the nature as determined
(mutaḥaṣṣala) both in existence and in
the mind” (Shifā’, qtd. by Goichon
78). ‘Alawī elaborates: “It is clear that
differentiae, insofar as they are things
contained in the reality of the genus,
are not external to it in the sense of
being added to it, as it is with individual
accidents in relation to the species
nature. He said: ‘the substance as
blended by inclusion’; he did not say:
‘by addition’ (munḍamm). Therefore, it
is clear that the aspects of being
conditioned by something, being
negatively conditioned, and being non-
conditioned pertain to unity (ittiḥād),
not conjunction (muqārana), as the
author indicates here by his words ‘a
unitary mixture’ ” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
341). In other words, in reality, the
quiddity, in any of these three aspects,
is one solitary thing whose components
are inseparable; it is only in the mind
that the concepts which compose its
reality can be separated from each
other and conjoined.
[215] ‘Alawī explains that the
existence of a negatively conditioned
quiddity in the mind “requires positing
it by abstraction” [i.e., in isolation from
other concepts], for example, the
notions of “animal” or “rational”
without consideration of anything else.
That is why it is either intelligible
matter or form, but not both. The
existence of a quiddity in this state is
strictly conceptual, because “if it were
an existent with real existence, it could
never be conjoined to an accident or to
the particular, individual material
accidents which belong to it” (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt341-342). ‘Alawī explains
that “ essentials, like ‘animal’ and
‘rational’, taken as negatively
conditioned, are disparate, but if they
are taken as non-conditioned, they are
true together. In the first aspect, they
are [intelligible] matter and form; and
in the second aspect, they are genus
and differentia” (Ibid. 367).
[216] A quiddity in the state of being
non-conditioned in the mind is
equivalent to the universal intelligible
form, for example, the genus, which is
capable of predication to various
species. “Animal,” as non-conditioned,
for example, is free to be predicated
equally of “horse,” “dog,” “cat,”
“man,” etc. As such, the quiddity in
this state is not yet actualized. It is
general, not specific; universal, not
particular. Ibn Sīnā says that in this
stage the quiddity (as genus, for
example) is abstracted in the mind not
actually mixed with the differentiae, but
conditioned by potential mixture.
Hence, in this state, the genus is like
matter to the differentiae, which, in
turn, are like its potential forms. This
aspect is more specific than the aspect
of “animal” insofar as it is only animal,
but it is more general than the aspect of
“animal” as conditioned by something,
i.e., a differentia. This is why Mīr
Dāmād says: “The non-conditioned,
therefore, is the basis of making
general predication possible, whether
essentially or accidentally, while the
negatively conditioned is the basis of
the absolute impossibility of
predication” (al-Qabasāt 153). ‘Alawī
adds about this aspect: “In sum, it is
not possible for the quiddity which is
actually shared between its individuals
to have a real existence (wujūd aṣīl),
nor is it conjoinable to particular
accidents which belong to it in its
particularity” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 342).
[217] This is the most generally
inclusive of the four aspects. ‘Alawī
differentiates this aspect from the one
which is negatively conditioned as
follows:
It is correct to say that “animal”
insofar as it is animal does not
require the predication of either
“specific” or “general.” This is
because “animality” does not need
the predication of either “specific” or
“general.” It is not a specific animal,
and it is not a general animal. For this
reason, it is necessary to distinguish
between saying: “Animal,” insofar as
it is purely animal, is conditioned by
nothing else [= negatively
conditioned], and saying: “Animal,”
insofar as it is animal, is non-
conditioned. It is not possible for
“animal,” insofar as it is purely
animal, conditioned by nothing else
being with it, to have existence in the
real world, for the existence of
“animal” conditioned by nothing else
[being with it] is solely in the mind.
But “animal” as purely non-
conditioned by another thing has
existence in the real world, for it is in
itself and its reality not conditioned
by another thing, even if a thousand
conditions are associated with it. This
does not require it to be separate, for
that which in itself and its reality is
free of attached conditions exists in
the real world, while conditions and
states encompass it from outside. It
is within the boundary of its essence
 that which by itself is one, and in this
respect, pure animal, without the
condition of another thing. (Sharh al-
Qabasāt 355-356)
In another place, he says: “The
gist of what is in the Shifā’ is that
‘animal’ has a meaning, regardless of
whether it be in the real world or in the
mind, which is itself neither general nor
specific, neither universal nor
particular, for if it had in itself one of
these meanings, it could not have an
individual or it could only have one
individual. Consequently, it is in itself
solely ‘animal.’ As for its becoming
general or specific, for example, this
occurs to it from outside and is
accidental to it” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
344-345).
[218]‘Alawī comments: “ That is to
say, the indefinite propositions
(muhmilāt), since they are unqualified
and completely free of a quantification
sign [such as, “all” or “some”],
whether they be universal or
particular….Its validity is through the
validity of the particular [proposition]
by means of inclusive mental
consideration” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
346).
[219]‘Alawī comments: “ His words
‘by a kind of mental consideration’
refer to the aspect of its mental
abstraction and its mental isolation
from the differentiae despite their
potential mixture with it” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 346-347).
[220] See Wamīḍ 2.7.6 for a
discussion on the difference between
the logical differentia and the real
differentia. ‘Alawī adds here:
Indeed, he means by the essential
constituents of the quiddity that
which corresponds to them;
otherwise, it is clear that a derivative
concept, like “rational,” is not one of
its essential constituents, but rather
its principle [i.e., the principle of
“rational’] belongs to them, as we
have already explained [see Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 242-245]….The Master
says in the Logic of the Shifā’:
Know that all of the logical
differentiae are predicable upon the
species, and only the species are in
the subject, although other than
them may be by mental inference
 (i‘tibār). If the logical differentia is
derived from an attribute (ma‘nā)
which is existent in the species and
not predicable upon the species,
the species is differentiated by a
differentia which is other than it,
like “man who is rational,” and he
is only rational by a rationality
(nuṭq) which actually exists in him,
and that rationality cannot be
predicated to man….
(Sharh al-Qabasāt 352-353)
[221] In other words, the quiddity
“man,” for example, is determinate in
relation to its genus, but it is
indeterminate in relation to its
individuals.
[222]‘Alawī comments: “ He means
that in this mode of consideration
characterized by determinateness and
indeterminateness there are two states:
(1) determination and actualization, and
(2) non-determination and non-
actualization. The explanation is that
‘animal’ in this consideration, with
respect to the thing itself (nafs al-amr),
is actualized by the differentia and
determined by it, and with respect to
this consideration it is [also]
indeterminate and unactualized.
Therefore, this consideration with
respect to this consideration is one
state, and with respect to the actual
world, it is another state” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 360).
[223] ‘Alawī comments:
The explicit meaning of this
statement is that individuation and
existence necessarily accompany
each other and they are inseparable
from each other in the individual
entity, whether they be one thing, as
the concourse of intuitive
philosophers hold, including the two
Masters, or not one thing, as some
subsequent thinkers hold.
The eminent scholar made
this statement an evidence for the
exclusion of existence from the
natural universal in the real world in
his commentary upon the
Muḥākamāt. He thought that if it
were something existent, it would be
individual and cannot be universal.
Our teacher, the author, has
mentioned this statement in order to
show that he is not in agreement with
what the intuitive philosophers hold
regarding existence in the real world.
Thus, he answered him, saying that
the meaning of the individualized is
that which is individualized or united
with it, and the natural universal
existent in the real world is
individualized in the second sense,
not the first sense. Hence, it is not
implied that it is an individual.
The upshot is that the
species or generic quiddity has two
existences: One of them is distinct
and separate, and the second is
blended and unified. Another way of
saying this is that the first of them is
mental, and with respect to this mode
of existence, it is separate from its
individuals, not mixed or united with
 them….The second of them is its
external existence, which is identical
to its individuals and united with
them, if it has individuals. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 360-361)
[224] An existence which is individual
in its own essence cannot have a
universal quiddity (see ‘Alawī, Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 362).
[225]‘Alawī comments: “ In other
words, they [the particular natures] are
not an object tended toward essentially
for the sake of the system of the world,
despite their being free of potential and
need, since what is meant by them are
the intelligences and the souls, as will
be explained. Moreover, the goal of
these particular natures is the individual
natures, but not by a primary intention.
In like manner, the goal of the nature
which is the divine Providence is the
species natures” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
370).
[226] ‘Alawī comments:
The Master explains in the Ta‘līqāt:
“Providence (‘ināyāt) is the act of
the First, the Exalted, the Good,
contemplating His own essence and
loving Himself, as the source of what
is other than Him. Consequently, He
is His own object of desire, and the
object of desire of whatever
emanates from Him is the good
which is His essence.” In another
annotation, he says: “Providence is
the emanation of the good from Him
by virtue of His essence, not due to a
command outside of His essence, nor
 due to a will which is renewed in
Him….” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 371)
[227] ‘Alawī says that, according to
Mīr Dāmād, this is not the correct
doctrine of Plato on the Platonic
Forms, but is attributable to another
group of philosophers. He says that
what Plato and Socrates taught on this
subject is in accord with the position of
Ibn Sīnā and Mīr Dāmād (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 372).
[228] The term “suspended forms”
refers to forms or images, such as
those seen in mirrors, dreams, and
visions, which are not embedded in
matter.
[229]‘Alawī comments: “ Many recent
thinkers [i.e., the followers of
Suhrawardī] hold that these [intelligible
substances] are formative (muṣawwira)
in wombs by the leave of their
Lord….They ascribed all these effects
[of species in nature] to an angel which
regulates them, and they named it the
“lord of the species” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 373). Although Mīr Dāmād
accepts the existence of “lords of
species,” he does not consider them
Platonic Forms. His own interpretation
of Platonic Forms is elaborated upon in
wamīḍs 5.4.8 and 5.4.9.
[230] In philosophy the term ittifāq
normally means “chance” or
“accident,” which is the occurrence of
something without dependence upon a
cause, but Ṭ ūsī clarifies that what
people call “chance” (ittifāq) actually
has causes which are concealed from
their vision (qtd. in Ṣ adrā, Asfār, vol.
1, p. 174). Therefore, what Mīr
Dāmād means here by ittifāq is simply
“the occurrence” of things in or
through individuals, the causes of
which may not be evident but which
are there nevertheless.
[231] In his commentary ‘Alawī
quotes Ibn Sīnā’s discourse on the
principle reasons for the errors of the
Platonists, quotes Mīr Dāmād’s
response to Ibn Sīnā from his book
Taqwīm al-Īmān, and then gives his
own response in clarification of Ibn
Sīnā’s position. Ibn Sīnā gives his
reasons, in summary, as follows: (1)
The first of them is their supposition
that if an aspect associated with
something is separated from it in the
mind, it can be separated from it in
existence as well. (2) The second is
their supposition that “humanity,” for
example, is a notion whose number is
one, yet it itself exists in many. (3) The
third is their ignorance of the fact that
to say something is both one and many
is a contradictory statement. Man, for
example, insofar as he is man, is man
only, and neither one nor many. (4)
The fourth is their supposition that to
say “humanity exists perpetually” is the
same as saying “humanity is both one
and many.” (5) The fifth is their
supposition that if material things are
caused, this requires their causes to be
separate. (See Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 375-
376.)
Mīr Dāmād counters that the
five things which Ibn Sīnā mentions are
not among the causes of the error
attributed to the Platonists, that they
only weaken their argument, but they
do not invalidate their doctrine. He
affirms that the unqualified nature as
such non-conditioned by anything is
“certainly free of material matter and
its attachments” and “wholly
dependent upon the primal divine
Providence” for its separate existence.
“The only reason for their error here,”
he says, “ is their failure to investigate
the divine existence belonging to the
unqualified reality itself as such being
non-contrary to conjunction with the
natural existences by occurrence
(ittifāq) without inclusion of that in the
consideration of the reality” (Ibid.
377).
Mīr Dāmād continues:
As for the second, they were
endeavoring to establish an existence
for the unqualified quiddity non-
conditioned by anything within the
boundary of its non-conditionedness
distinct from the existences of the
individuals in their entirety. So how is
it right to say that they made it a real
one among the individuals?
As for the third, in exactly the
same way they desire to establish
existence for the quiddity as itself not
conditioned by unity or multiplicity,
and not conditioned by anything at all
apart from its own substance. How
then can it be said that they are
making the quiddity as such another
thing distinct in definition!?
As for the fourth, they are
making “humanity” perpetually
existent such that it is everlastingly
the nature of unqualified humanity as
such, not a particular singular
humanity or particular multiple
humanities.
As for the fifth, the
partisans of the doctrine of
mathematicals are the Pythagorians,
not the followers of Plato and
Socrates. Plato has invalidated the
theory of an incorporeal fixed
dimension and a separate flowing
extension, and he has raised clear
proofs in refutation of this.
Furthermore, they ascribe created
things to separate causes and
 establish for the geometrical forms
principles also among the
mathematicals, which exist in the real
world in their unqualified natures
through another existence apart from
their existence through the existence
of their individuals. (Ibid. 377-378)
‘Alawī, for his part, distinguishes
two different senses of the logical
universal acquired by the mind with
which Ibn Sīnā in his critique of the
Platonists appears to confuse the
Platonic Form: (1) universal in the
sense of participation, and (2) universal
in the sense of correspondence. The
first is the intelligible form of something
abstracted from each individual and
shared between them in common, “like
human individuals sharing in one
notion, which is humanity.” The
second pertains to the same intelligible
form, or intellection, insofar as it is
impressed in the mind, in which case it
is a separate, individual mental form
which corresponds to like forms but
does not participate in them. (Ibid.
378-380)
In reference to Mīr Dāmād’s
response to Ibn Sīnā’s second reason,
‘Alawī says:
Perhaps the Master had in mind that
if the unqualified nature exists
separately in the real world, it must
be an individual, since something
which is not individualized does not
exist. In our preceding commentary
we have made it clear that its
separate mental existence, insofar as
it is an intellection, is an individual
thing belonging to the retentive
imagination, like the figure of a seal
impressed in a piece of wax. The
question of the natural universal in its
separate existence is this; hence,
correspondence (mutābaqa) is
possible for it, but not
participation….Consequently, what
the Master set forth in the third
instance in refutation of Plato is
correct, necessitating that if the
quiddity in its separate existence
exists in the real world, it would be
both one and many, as a result of
which it would be, insofar as it is
one, many, which is a contradictory
statement.
The truth with respect to
 this is that the quiddity in the real
world does not have an external stage
which is neither one nor many. This
is in contrast to how it is for the
quiddity if it exists in the mind with a
separate existence, because it is then
true to say of it that it is as itself
neither one nor many. (Ibid. 381)

[232] In the Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, for

example, Suhrawardī corrects the
common Peripatetic misunderstanding
of Platonic Forms (i.e. understanding
them as “universals” meant in logic)
and explains how as “lords of species”
they can be unitary in themselves while
corresponding to the many and not in
the many:
Do not imagine that these great men
[i.e., Plato, Socrates], mighty and
possessed of insight, held that
humanity has an intelligible that is its
universal form and that is existent,
one and the same, in many. How
could they allow something to be
unconnected to matter yet in matter?
How could one thing be in many and
uncounted material individuals? It is
not that they considered the human
archetype, for example, to be given
existence as a copy of that which is
below it [referring to the Aristotelian
view on logical universals]. No men
hold more firmly that the higher does
not occur because of the lower. Were
this not their view, the form would
have another form, and so on to
infinity….
They [Platonists] did not
deny that predicates are mental and
that universals are in the mind [as in
logic]; but when they said, “There is
a universal man in the world of
intellect,” they meant that there is a
dominating light containing different
interacting rays and whose shadow
among magnitudes is the form of
man. It is a universal, not in the
sense that it is a predicate, but in the
sense that it has the same relation of
emanation to these
individuals….This universal is not
that universal whose conception does
not preclude being shared; for they
 believe that it has a particularized
essence and that it knows its essence.
How, then, could it be a universal
idea (ma‘nā ‘ām)? (108-109)
[233] ‘Alawī says that Suhrawardī
says this in the Muṭāraḥāt (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 383).
[234]‘Alawī comments: “ This means
the infinity of those individuals, not
with respect to pre-eternity (azal), as
the advocates of pre-eternity hold, but
only with respect to their infinity in the
direction of post-eternity….It is clear
from this that it is not necessary for it
to have a temporal beginning, as he
pointed out in this book [al-Ufuq al-
Mubīn], where he said: “Moreover,
although it is clear that it is impossible
to extend time to an actual infinity, it is
not necessary to assert the necessity of
the existence of an actual now in the
beginning.” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 383-
384)
[235] ‘Alawī comments:
In his [Mīr Dāmād’s] view, the
natures of the generated existents are
completely like them [the generated
existents] with respect to perpetual
and temporal creation….
These Meddlers only
understood by “creation” temporal
creation, and they maintained that
this prior non-existence is a
hypothetical extension. Therefore,
the natures of the generated existents
together with these existents,
[according to them,] are a temporal
creation, not a perpetual creation. In
the following passage from the al-
Ufuq al-Mubīn, the author refutes
them. He states:
Pre-eternity (azal) is of two kinds:
(1) temporal pre-eternity, and (2)
eternal pre-eternity. Temporal pre-
eternity is the entire extension of
time in the direction of the past in
such a manner that another time or
another temporal thing does not
precede it whatsoever. In sum, it is
an extended time in the direction of
the past, such that no other time or
now can exist before that time
either actually or hypothetically.
Time itself, its bearer, and
the bearer of its bearer are both
temporally eternal and perpetually
created, and what is besides these,
like the generated existents and their
natures, are both temporally and
perpetually created with respect to
real definite non-existence, which the
Meddlers held to be temporal….
He says in that book:
“Since we have established the
finitude of the extension of time in
the direction of the beginning, we
have invalidated temporal pre-
eternity according to its common
philosophical sense. Hence, it is
confirmed that temporal pre-eternity
is no more than the extension of time
in the direction of the beginning,
without another time or any other
thing temporally preceding it.” …
The natures and their
concrete existence [in individuals],
 therefore, are all simultaneously
created in time and perpetuity. The
singling out of each of their
individuals to a particular time does
not contradict the non-singling out of
a nature to it. As for time, its bearer,
and the bearer of its bearer, it is
strictly a perpetual creation. (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 385-388)
[236] Shahrastānī.
[237]‘Alawī comments: “ It is evident
that he is maintaining temporal creation
for each of its individuals,
notwithstanding that the first individual
thereof is certainly not preceded by a
particular time or moment, although it
is preceded by a perpetual real non-
existence” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 390).
[238] Mīr Dāmād is clear in Wamīḍ
5.4.6 that “the primal divine
Providence controls it [the Great Man]
through direction (tadbīr) and
subjugation (taskhīr)” (al-Qabasāt
157).
[239] See also Wamīḍ 6.12.11. ‘Alawī
comments: “He did not mean by those
conditions and aspects being accidental
to Him their being like this in the
manner of an accident. This is a figure
of speech…[and] does not imply the
subsistence of an extra-mental
multiplicity in His transcendent,
peerless essence” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
392).
[240] See Translator’s Introduction,
“Kitāb al-Qabasāt,” for the eight
principles.
[241]‘Alawī comments regarding
temporal privation: “ It is evident that
the generated beings require matter,
form, and privation, which is the
change of the first, its transformation
or its transferal, from one form to
another form by the corruption of the
first [form] and the generation of the
second [form]” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
394).
[242]‘Alawī comments: “ He is
referring here to the domain of the
causal forms and their sanctuary, and
the locus of these forms with respect to
the generation of the higher and the
lower. They are sometimes designated
the Pen, sometimes the Intellect, and
sometimes the Light….It is likely that
he means by the forms the separate
intelligences and that the incorporeal
substance is an abode for them and a
condition for their emanation from the
Creator. He alludes to the souls of the
spheres with the term “spirits,” and
they resemble those separate forms
among the pure intelligences... (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 397).
[243]‘Alawī comments: “ This means
that real non-existence, which is more
specific in these aspects, is more
general when disregarding them, since
it includes the real non-existence
embracing the horizon of perpetuity in
its entirety, due to the fact that it is
absolutely not a particular generated
thing…, or not embracing it due to the
fact that it is a particular generated
thing following after it in an atemporal
way” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 398).
[244] ‘Alawī comments:
It is provided [by Mīr Dāmād]:
It is very clear that the privation
which is a principle by accident
pertaining to generation is strictly
real non-existence not in time or in
place, as is the way of the Giver of
the Craft [Aristotle]. It is that
which by its removal and negation
the generated thing is no longer
temporally non-existent, as you
have repeatedly been informed, for
non-existence in the prior time is
never cancelled or removed, and
non-existence in the time of
existence does not occur at all, so
how is it possible to conceive of its
removal. Be not uninformed.
 I say: For were this
[temporal] non-existence to be
removed, the generated, insofar as it
is a changeable existent seeking
perfection, would be removed as
well. This is in accord with what he
states in the Shifā’:
Privation (‘adam) is a condition in
order for a thing to be changeable
or seeking perfection. Were it not
for the presence of a privation, it
would be impossible for it to be
seeking perfection or to change, for
its perfection would be always
actual. Consequently, whatever is
changeable and seeks perfection
requires a privation prior to it so
that its being changeable and
seeking perfection may be
 realized….
It is understood from this
that temporal privation is one of the
principles of creatures and
changeable things insofar as they are
changeable, and that with its removal
they would be removed and cease to
exist, not being able to take on form
and receive existence. This is the
opposite of how it is with perpetual
real non-existence, because through
its removal the changeable existents
are given existence….
Furthermore, in what he
related from the Najāt, namely, “for
it is the absence of the potentially
existing essence,” since he has
qualified it [the essence] by its being
potential, this refers to the temporal
 privation belonging to the generated
existent associated with it due to its
dispositional possibility (imkān
isti‘dādī) and dispositional
potentiality, which accordingly is the
potential existence of the generated
thing. This is the opposite of how it
is with its perpetual real non-
existence, as our teacher, the author,
has already ascertained. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 398-399)
[245] Making matter a principle of the
unqualified natures appears to
contradict Mīr Dāmād’s often stated
position that the natures belong to the
category of primary originated things,
which are brought into existence
without the intermediary of matter,
instrument, or time.
[246] ‘Alawī says Ibn Sīnā is referring
to Muḥammad Ibn Zakharīyā al-Rāzī
or Ya‘qūb Ibn Isḥaq al-Kindī.
[247] Qur’ān 67:1-2.
[248] ‘Alawī comments:
He means here the simple body. In
summary, he is first affirming its
essential continuity by its occupation
of space and its essential unfoldment
in the directions, then he is branching
out from this to the impossibility of
its composition from indivisible parts,
contrary to what the Master and
others hold. The proof for this is that
if it is not essentially continuous of
itself, it does not occupy the space
essentially or fill it in reality. So it is
demonstrated that it is not composed
of something indivisible, due to the
 fact that nothing of it [the indivisible]
occupies space….In particular, the
contiguity of indivisible parts depends
upon their superimposition
(tadākhul), which does not result in a
continuous quantity occupying space.
Rather what is obtained from their
sum is only a volume equal to the
volume of one part. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 405-406)
[249] Aristotle states in On the
Heavens: “The continuous, then, is that
which is divisible into parts which are
always divisible….Of magnitudes, that
which is divisible in one direction is a
line; in two, a surface; in three, a
body” (1.1, 268a; see also Metaphysics
5.6, 1016b).
[250] Naẓẓām, according to Wolfson,
rejected the theory of Democritus and
most of the Mutakallimūn that bodies
are ultimately aggregates composed of
discrete, indivisible atoms and accepted
Aristotle’s counter theory that bodies
are continuous in themselves and
consist of infinitely divisible matter,
though Aristotle (and Naẓẓām, too,
according to Wolfson) understood this
to be a potential infinite, not an actual
infinite. (Philosophy of the Kalam 495-
496)
Wolfson sums up the position
of the Mutakallimūn as follows:
In Greek philosophy, Aristotle has
shown that spatial magnitude, that is,
distance, and time, and motion are
either all infinitely divisible or are all
composed of atoms [Physics 6, 7,
 237b and 6, 1, 231b]. The masters
of the Kalam, generalizing as they
did that everything in the world is
composed of atoms, included under
this generalization also distance,
motion, and time….Thus also
Maimonides, restating the atomistic
views prevailing in the Kalam of his
time, says that it maintained that
“time is composed of nows…
distance is not continuous but
composed of parts at which
divisibility stops,” and “motion is the
translation of an atom, of those
atoms [which constitute a body],
from one atom [of the distance over
which the body moves] to another
atom of it.” (Ibid. 494)
[251]‘Alawī comments: “ This is the
final part after which there are no other
parts; hence, it is the opposite of the
beginning. The purport is that these
extremes (aṭrāf) do not belong to the
genus to which the divisions of bodies
belong whose parts are infinite in
number. Thus, their finitude [in
measure] does not preclude the non-
finitude of their parts in number”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 407).
[252] ‘Alawī notes that advocating the
existence of indivisible parts
necessitates this belief in finite divisions
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 407).
[253] This is essentially the position of
Aristotle as explained in the Physics,
Book Zeta. All continuums are made
up of infinitely divisible parts in
potentiality. Motion, time, and spatial
magnitude (= distance) are
interdependent continuums which
correspond precisely to each other, so
that a change in one effects a
corresponding change in the others.
Aristotle illustrates this interdependent
relationship as follows:
Since every magnitude, being
continuous, is therefore divisible into
magnitudes…it follows necessarily
that of two moving bodies, the faster
travels (1) a greater distance in an
equal time, (2) an equal distance in a
shorter time, and (3) a greater
distance in a shorter time…. Every
movement takes place during a
time….Every moving thing can move
relatively quickly or slowly…in any
period of time….The faster body
 covers an equal distance in a shorter
time…for time and magnitude are
subject to divisions which are in the
same ratio and which are equal in
number….It becomes evident that
since time is continuous, spatial
magnitude must also be continuous.
A moving body goes a half of a
distance in a half of a time or, at any
rate, a shorter distance in a shorter
time. The reason for this is because a
time and a spatial magnitude are
subject to the same divisions. If
either is infinite, so is the other….
(Physics 6, 2, 232a-233a)
In continuums, the imaginary
dividers used to mentally distinguish
the infinitely divisible parts are not
themselves considered parts of the
continuum; hence, they are indivisible.
If they were divisible, they would be
parts, not dividers. Aristotle explains
this in regard to the now, which divides
time:
The now also must be indivisible:
that is, the now in the essential and
primary sense in which the now is
inherent in all time; not, indeed, the
now in the derived sense of a period
of time…This now, which functions
as the border between both past and
future, must, indeed, be
identical….If the now were separate
limits [of both the past and the
future], there would be a time
between them, since every
continuum must have something of
the same kind between its limits; and
 the time between them would be
divisible, since we have proved that
all time is divisible. Accordingly, the
now would be divisible [and it would
not, then, be the now we are talking
about]….Thus, it is clear that time
includes something indivisible, which
we call a “now.” Obviously, too,
nothing can be moving during a now.
(Physics 6, 3, 234a)
[254] I.e., the second way to establish
the continuity of time. The first way is
explained in Wamḍa 6.1.
[255] ‘Alawī comments:
He is alluding by this to the refutation
of what is imagined, namely, that
priority and posteriority [as essential
aspects of time] belong to the
category of relation. Time is a
continuous quantity, so how can
relation be the same as the reality of
quantity while the categories are
different?
The purport of the
refutation is that time is one
continuous quantity without any
actual parts in it at all. If the mind
analyzes it into parts and relates each
of them to one another, it is found
that some of them are prior and
some of them are later, such that the
denotation of the predication of prior
and later is the same as these two
parts, not another thing by which
priority and posteriority
exist….Priority and posteriority do
not augment the reality of time
[because they are essential to it]
 ….As for that which has a fixed
reality with which they are
associated, the predication of prior
and posterior to it is only possible by
conceiving their occurrence to it.
Hence, if we say “today” and
“yesterday,” we do not need to say:
“Today is posterior to yesterday,”
because these two concepts
themselves contain the notion of this
posteriority and priority. But if we
say “non-existence” and “existence,”
for example, we need to associate the
notion of priority with one of them
so that it becomes prior. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 408-409)
[256] Sajjādī says: “Ta‘alluq consists
of the relationship and connection
between two things; in other words, the
connection of one thing to another
thing with respect to a need which it
has” (Farhang-i ‘Ulūm-i ‘Aqlī 167).
[257]‘Alawī says that Mīr Dāmād
“ means there is no use and no benefit
in [applying the concept of] a
succession of causes to entities which
are mutually separated in existence,
which means that individuals and
entities insofar as they are individuals
and entities within the boundaries of
themselves do not have a relation of
priority and posteriority between them.
….He means there is no being prior
and subsequent for individuals in
relation to each other insofar as they
are existents and non-existents” (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 409-410).
[258]‘Alawī comments: “In other
words, since the existence of time is
self-evident, while its reality is not self-
evident, the author is maintaining that
its reality is a continuous, unfixed
quantity, which is not composed of
successive nows, as the Meddlers
believe. The same applies to the other
fixed quantities by affirming their
continuity after affirming their
existence” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 410).
[259] Aristotle confirms that a line, a
plane, a body, and time and place, are
all continuous quantities, and that for
these it is possible to find a common
boundary at which their parts are
joined. The boundary of a line is the
point, the boundary of a plane is the
line, and the boundary of a body is the
plane. Because the body occupies
place, place, too, is continuous, and its
parts are joined at the same boundaries
which join the parts of the body. Of the
five continuous quantities, however,
Aristotle holds that only the line, the
plane, the body, and place are
composed of parts which have a
relative position to each other. He says:
“For example, the parts of a line have a
relative position to each other, for each
part lies somewhere, and one could
mark off each part and state where it
lies in the plane and with which of its
other parts it is joined” (Physics 5a,
16-20). The same applies to the plane,
the body, and place.
Aristotle does not see this
same relation applying to time,
although it can be argued that each
body also lies in time just as it lies in
space. He asserts: “In the case of
number, one could not point out how
its parts have a relative position to each
other or lie somewhere, or which parts
are joined to other parts. Nor could one
do so in the case of time, for no part of
time continues to exist; and how could
a thing have position if it cannot
continue to exist?” (5a, 25-35).
[260] ‘Alawī comments:
It is evident that the outer sense of
the Master in the Shifā’ is the
impermanence of mathematical
corporeality in its individual entity
and its lack of conservation with
respect to forms which change
shape. This is where he said:
Equivalence may be predicated to
 that which is equal to another thing
potentially, and it may be
predicated to that which it is equal
to actually. The equivalence
between a cube-shaped and round
piece of wax, for example, belongs
to the first category. As for our
argument on the second, the
sameness of the area of the body in
two states does not prove the
permanence of the mathematical
form.
Therefore, the deduction for the
difference of the mathematical body
to the continuous corporeal form is
settled by this statement of his: If the
mathematical body is not an accident
inhering in the body, it is one of its
essential constituents (muqawwimāt).
But since the consequent is false so
is the premise.
As for the premise, what it
includes is restricted to the essential
constituents [of the body] and its
accidents. As for the falsity of the
consequent, it is because with a
determinate body like a candle,
mathematical bodies may arrive
successively upon it while not
changing its essence. Consequently,
were it [the mathematical body] one
of its essential constituents, the
situation could not be so. We only
say it is so when, if the candle is
round, it has a mathematical body
restricted by a specific boundary. But
if it is made cube-formed, it does not
cease to exist. Only the specific
dimensions which it had at first have
ceased to exist. Consequently, one of
them cannot be the other nor its part.
But the situation, according to what
our teacher, the author, holds,
concerns its very permanence in a
state which changes shapes.
Therefore, he asserts that this only
necessitates that if the change strictly
pertains to the boundaries of the
body. But it is not so. The area of
the body being the same in each of
two states guides to that. As for the
explanation of the difference of the
mathematical body to the corporeal
form despite its remaining with it, as
our teacher has pointed out by the
fact that it may be said it is a stage
which particularizes it, there is no
 doubt that it is other than it. (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 416-417)
[261] Ibn Sīnā explains that
“corporeality as such is a solitary,
simple determinate nature with no
dissimilarity in it…whose species
reality is not acquired by something
being added to it.” But “it cannot be
acquired in our souls except as [its
essential constituents] matter and
continuity alone” (Shifā’, Ilāhiyyāt, p.
71, 70).
[262]‘Alawī comments: “ He means
by this the species form, which is the
first perfection of the body of the
sphere. Its secondary perfections are
motions and positions which are drawn
from potentiality into actuality” (Sharh
al-Qabasāt 418).
[263] ‘Alawī comments:
In other words, insofar as it is a
natural body, not a mathematical
body. If it is with respect to the
particularity of its being spherical or
elemental, it has another species
form, in accord with which it is a
species included under “body.” The
intention of the “natural body” does
not include the nature, but what is
parallel (or opposed) to the
mathematical body, as we have
stated….
The gist is that continuity and
division into dimensions are inferred
in the definition of body, such that it
is impossible for body as body to be
contrary to them, since body as body
is absolute continuity and division
 into dimensions. This is contrary to
how it is for the continuity and
division which are not included in the
definition of body and its reality,
inasmuch as specified continuity and
determinate specified division may
differ from one body to another….
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 418-419)
[264] ‘Alawī comments:
This is due to the impossibility of
superimposition (tadākhūl), since the
basis of this [impossibility] is two
volumes and two magnitudes
becoming one without their volume
increasing, or two spatial substances
becoming one substance without
increasing in size. The Master has
invalidated place (makān) in the
sense of incorporeal dimension in the
 Physics of the Shifā’ by means of
superimposition. Incorporeal
dimension being immaterial does not
remove its impossibility, for its basis
is [still] magnitude, quantity, and
volume…. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 420)
[265] Mīr Dāmād is referring here to
actual division, which is finite, not to
imaginary division, which is infinite.
Actual bodies, for example, are
composed of simple discrete elements
which are blended together to form a
whole possessing qualities different
than any of its parts taken alone.
[266]‘Alawī comments: “ Hence,
existence and individualization signify
one thing which is expressed by these
two terms. Insofar as they are different
concepts, but their reality is one thing,
it is not possible for one of them to be
a predicate of the other as in primary
essential predication” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 423-424).
[267] Mīr Dāmād is clear that the very
thing that distinguishes contingent
existence from God’s existence is its
dual nature. His idea of an existential
separation between God and things also
determines that it is not in any sense
identical to God’s existence. This is
logically impossible, however, without
the existence of an eternal prime matter
which perpetually receives the act of
creation.

[268] See also Wamīḍ 2.7.10. ‘Alawī

comments:
Hence, He is real Existence and real
 Individualization in relation to what is
besides Him, for its being existent
and being individualized is through
Him….It is apparent from this that
just as He (exalted be He) is the
correspondent of the existence and
the individualization of what is other
than Him, in like manner, He is the
correspondent of knowledge, power,
will, and life [in them]. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 425-426)
[269] ‘Alawī comments:
Furthermore, since the corporeal
form is one continuous thing, none of
the elements are a part of it, even if
they are a part of the tree, since the
form is continuous. This is contrary
to how it is if it is composed of
elements, since this does not
 preclude its continuity, as is evident.
His words “Be on guard, then,
against taking what is accidental for
what is essential,” refer to taking the
corporeal form, which is composed
of fire and air accidentally, in place
of what is essentially, in other words,
the tree which is composed of these
two essentially. Since he maintains
the continuity of the corporeal form
and its non-composition from what
precludes its continuity, he said:
“This is also one of the principles for
establishing prime matter.” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 426)
[270]‘Alawī comments: “ It is evident
that whatever has individuation has
numerical oneness, but whatever has
oneness does not necessarily have
individuation, since the concept of
man, for instance, has numerical
oneness but not individuation….
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 428)
[271] ‘Alawī comments:
He intends by this to invalidate what
is conjectured regarding the
possibility of the composition of the
body from the small, hard bodies of
Democritus, for those small, hard
bodies are dissimilar in reality, while
the reality of each one of them is
required for their continuity.
Therefore, a separate, supervening
discontinuity is not possible for them.
Assuming their participation in the
species reality, the discontinuity of
two discontinuous parts among them
can only be due to innate nature.
Thus, it is impossible for any of them
to receive supervening discontinuity,
although it is possible for one of two
hypothetical parts to be
discontinuous from the other with
respect to the first creation. He has
pointed out the impossibility of initial
alternation, just as it is not possible
with respect to subsequent
succession in the second creation.
Otherwise, it would be possible for
one individual among those bodies to
become two bodies in the first
creation, which is impossible. In like
manner, it is not possible for one
individual to become two individuals
in the second creation. The
explanation of this was already given
in two ways in the previous
 Wamīḍ….
What is this but the
possibility of one individual becoming
two individuals? Just as this is
impossible by succession, in like
manner, it is impossible by
alternation. Do you not see that it is
impossible for Zayd to become two
Zayds or for two Zayds to become
one Zayd? (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 429-
430)
[272] ‘Alawī comments:
It is clear that this path is raising a
judgment against the falsity of what
Rāzī advocated near the end of his
commentary on Namaṭ Four of the
Ishārāt on the unitary composition of
matter with form….I say that the
realization of matter by form and its
actualization through it precludes its
oneness with it, because the effect is
actualized by the cause, and it is not
possible for it to be united with it. To
ascribe this belief to the great Master
[Ibn Sīnā] is inadmissible. Because of
his poor training he did not
understand his intent. What will
guide you in this regard is what the
Master states in the Metaphysics of
the Shifā’, where he says:
The substantiality which belongs to
prime matter does not make it an
actual thing among things. Rather it
disposes it to become an actual
thing through form. The meaning
of its substantiality is nothing more
than its not being in a subject.
Consequently, what is affirmed
 here is that it is one thing.…Its
differentia is that it is disposed for
each thing, so its form, which you
imagine it to have, is that it is
disposed to receive. Consequently,
there is no reality belonging to
prime matter by which it is actual
and another reality by which it is
potential. Rather a reality occurs to
it from outside by which it
becomes actual, for it is in itself
and with respect to the existence of
itself potential, and this reality is
form.
He explicitly points out
here that matter has no actual reality
apart from form, but he does not say
that form is one with it in essence.
All of the effects have no actual
reality apart from the cause, and
because of this they have essences
and existences which are dissimilar to
the cause. In the same way, it is
permissible for both matter and form
to have an existence and an essence
unlike the essence and existence of
the other. In this way, form is a
cause of matter, and therefore prime
matter has no reality within the
boundary of itself apart from
form….
I say once again that if Rāzī
meant that the Master believed in the
unity of prime matter with the body
in this respect, there is nothing to
dispute with him. This does not
imply that prime matter, in another
respect, is not a part of it and
dissimilar to another part of it, which
is form, even though its actualization
(taḥaṣṣul) in the external world is
through it. More clear than all of this
are the following words of the
Master in the Shifā’:
…the unity of things with that
which is in them is unity according
to several kinds: One of them is
like the unity of matter and form,
where the matter is something
which has no existence in the
isolation of its essence in any
respect and only becomes actual by
form, in the sense that form is
something external to it, not one of
them the other…
He is alluding to the fact
that form precedes matter essentially,
 such that form exists first and then
prime matter. His statement: “the
matter is something which has no
existence in the isolation of its
essence in any respect and only
becomes actual by form, in the sense
that form is something external to it,
not one of them the other,” alludes to
the fact that both prime matter and
form have an essence and an
existence, that the actuality of prime
matter is by means of form. There is
no unitary relation between them.
Rather, their unity only consists in
the occurrence of a natural thing
through them. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
430-433)
[273] The Arabic term for “terminal
motion,” ḥaraka qaṭ‘iyya, more
precisely means “intersecting motion.”
In other words, it is a motion which
intersects all the hypothetical
boundaries in a distance, unlike medial
motion, which is limited to those
boundaries themselves.
[274] ‘Alawī spends several pages to
show that Ibn Sīnā does not actually
deny the predication of particulars to
particulars. He says:
It is clear that the individuality of
Zayd does not preclude generality [in
him] with respect to states, but only
precludes generality with respect to
individuals, and that the
multiplication of circumstantial
modes and aspects does not preclude
predication and oneness….It is clear
that the Master did not deny the
 predication of the particular to
itself….The gist is that the
multiplication of circumstantial
modes and aspects does not diminish
the correctness of predication and
does not remove it from being an
intelligible proposition, and that it is
possible to predicate individual things
to individual things, just as it is
possible for them to exist in them.
Relative generality does not remove
it to the state of isolated generality.
The author has invalidated this, and
the Master does not deny it. (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 448-449)
[275]‘Alawī explains: “I f the real thing
could be removed from the domain of
perpetuity, its removal would be within
a particular boundary, just as it
occurrence would be in another
boundary, and this would require
extension in perpetuity, which is
absurd” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 452).
[276]‘Alawī comments: “ Otherwise
[i.e., if not for this continuity], the
succession of two [real] indivisible
nows or boundaries would be required,
which would require the existence of
the part which is indivisible [in time,
motion, and magnitude]….As this is
groundless, it is determined that
between every two boundaries and
nows there is a single continuous thing”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 452-553).
[277] This may be a reference to
Naẓẓām’s theory of the leap (ṭafra),
which he proposed in answer to Zeno’s
criticism of the infinite divisibility of
space. As explained by Wolfson:
Zeno’s first argument, as restated by
Aristotle, reads as follows: “It is
impossible for a thing to traverse
infinite things or to touch infinite
things one by one, in a finite time”
[Physics 6, 2, 233a and 6, 9, 239b].
What he means to say is this: On the
assumption of the infinite divisibility
of distance, it would be impossible
for an object to traverse any finite
distance in finite time, for, since any
finite distance is infinitely divisible,
the object moving over it would have
to traverse and touch an infinite
number of parts of distance in a finite
time, which Aristotle himself would
have to admit to be impossible….
As reported by Shahrastānī
in his Milal, Naẓẓām’s solution of
the difficulty reads: “He originated
the theory of the leap, because his
assumption of infinite divisibility
would make it necessary that, if an
ant walked over a rock from peak to
peak, it would traverse an infinite [in
finite time], but how can [one in] that
which is finite [i.e., finite time]
traverse that which is infinite? He
explained it by saying that the ant
traverses the distance partly by
walking and partly by the leap.”…
The fallacy of [Naẓẓām’s]
argument has been stated by
Shahrastānī as follows: “He does not
know that jumping is also the
traversal of a distance which
corresponds to another distance, so
 that the difficulty which follows from
his view of the infinite divisibility of
space is not removed by this theory.
The difference between walking and
jumping amounts only to the
difference between the rapidity of
time and its slowness.” (Philosophy
of the Kalam 515-517)
[278] ‘Alawī comments:
He said “it is possible” only in
reference to the body insofar as it is
moving or at rest in time, for when
disregarding this it is not in
time….The Master states in the
‘Uyūn al-Ḥikmat: “The natural body
is in time not due to itself but
because it is in motion, and motion is
in time.”
The stirrer of the revolt of
 doubt raised an objection against
him, a revolt for which there is no
direction in the house of guidance,
when he said: “Know that this
argument is very weak, because
time, inasmuch as it is the measure
of motion, is an accident existing in
motion, and motion is an accident
existing in body. Consequently, it is
necessary for time to be an existent
in an existent in a body….and the
notion of body being existent in time
does not follow from this.” (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 460-461)
A rebuttal to this is found in
another passage from Ibn Sīnā in Book
Two, Chapter Thirteen, of the Physics
of the Shifā’, where he says: “There is
a difference between saying that time is
the measure of every motion, and
saying that its existence is dependent
on every motion. Similarly, there is a
difference between saying that the
essence of time is an accident of
motion, and saying that time is
connected to the essence of motion in
such a way that it is accidental to it.
The meaning of the first is that one
thing is an accident to another thing,
while the meaning of the second it that
one thing follows another thing without
necessarily being its accident.” (qtd. in
Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 264)
[279] Sajjādī says: “Takhalkhul is a
term which refers to a body increasing
in volume without another body being
added to it. By another expression, it
consists of increase of volume, while
takāthif, which is its opposite, refers to
decrease in volume” (Farhang-i
‘Ulūm-i ‘Aqlī, vol. 1, 151).
[280]‘Alawī comments: “ He means
by “in actuality” with respect to the
container of perpetuity with respect to
the existence of their two markers in it”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 461).
[281] ‘Alawī comments:
In sum, correlational causality and
correlational being-an-effect are due
to the fact that emanation (or:
procession ṣudūr) is of two kinds:
correlational and non-correlational.
As for the causality of the Necessary
Being (exalted be He) with respect to
His origination of the second
intellect, its requiring the soul of the
first sphere, and its correlational
agency of the body of the first
sphere, these three have simultaneity
in being-an-effect, while the
Necessary Being has with respect to
these aspects simultaneity in
correlational causality. Let it be
pondered.
The elaboration of this is
according to what is provided: By
emanation I mean that making (ja‘l),
existentiation (ījādiyya), and
emanation (ifāḍa), as expressed in
scientific usage and philosophical
language, have three meanings.
(1) The first of them is
correlational agency connected to
being-acted-upon. These two
correlatives occur simultaneously in a
single stage, and they are posterior
simultaneously with respect to order
to the two stages of the essence of
the Maker and the essence of the
made. The reality of the relation is
nothing but recurrent relation in
contrast to absolute relation, since
recurrence in not considered with
respect to it [i.e., absolute relation],
for it is more general and more
encompassing.
(2) The second of them is
the circumstantial mode of real
agency which is a consequence of
the essence of the made thing. The
substance of its essence is sent forth
through it [this mode]. This is the
Maker being such that it is necessary
through Him and such that this made
thing proceeds from Him in its
particularity. This real agency is the
cause of correlational agency, and it
is prior to it in two stages, because it
is the source of the necessity of the
made and its actualization and the
wellspring of its determination and its
existence. It is one of the stages
preceding the substance of its
essence. As for correlational agency,
it is a derivative which is the
realization of the two correlatives.
The preceding stages are a limited
categorization, as is evident. It [the
circumstantial mode of real agency]
corresponds to correlational agency
in its being one when the made thing
is one and multiple with respect to
the multiplicity of made things, and
also due to the fact that it is without
reservation not the same as the
essence of the real Maker; rather it is
something added to His very essence
(exalted be His grandeur). The same
applies to correlational agency, since
it is not an absolute perfection
belonging to existence, insofar as it is
the existence of the real attributes
belonging to the true Existent as
such, so that it would be necessary
for it to be identical to the reality of
the Self-Subsisting, the Real, the
Necessary. Rather, it is one of the
concomitants of the essence of the
real, self-subsistent Reality and one
of His essential accidents with
respect to the particularity of the
essence of this made thing, its
goodness for the system of existence,
its perfect suitability, and the
nearness of its substance to the
principle of the perfection of the
reality and the share of the splendor
of existence from the court of the
Most Holy….
(3) The third of them is the
agency which is an absolute
perfection belonging to existence as
such. It is the same as the stage of
the essence of the real Existent
(exalted be His glory). This is His
being in the stage of Himself such
that the good things of the system of
existence are required and proceed
from Him absolutely, and such that
every existence, every perfection and
grace, and every perfection of an
existent overflows from Him. Agency
 in this sense is the cause of agency in
the second sense, just as that is the
cause of the substance of the essence
of the made thing, then of
correlational agency. It is not
essentially posterior in that stage to
the possibility of the essence of the
made thing, as that is posterior.
If this is settled, then we
say that there is no difficulty in the
occurrence and realization of
correlational causal simultaneity and
likewise in correlational simultaneity
in being-an-effect. What the Master
stated about a difficulty refers to
non-correlational simultaneity. Let it
be pondered. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
463-465)
[282] ‘Alawī comments:
His words “a conjunction of certain
interdependent circumstantial modes”
allude to the non-separation of those
modes from each other in actuality,
whether the dependence of the many
upon Him with respect to them be in
a single stage or not in a single
stage….Indeed, we say that these
circumstantial modes and aspects are
not in a single stage [in the
intellectual order] due to the quiddity
of something preceding its existence
with respect to priority in quiddity.
The same applies to the question of
possibility, since it belongs to the
domain of priority in quiddity with
respect to the quiddity….The Master
states in the Metaphysics of the
Shifā’: “That which attaches to the
 substance of something by virtue of
itself is prior to what attaches to it
through another in a posterior stage.”
The attachments of the determinate
quiddity, therefore, are prior to the
attachments of its existence….The
same applies to the consideration of
its possibility and its necessity
through another. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
467)
[283] See also Wamīḍ 5.4.14. ‘Alawī
comments: “Primary origination here is
predicated upon that which the
educated philosophers affirm with
respect to the dependence of the
primary originated strictly upon the
essence of its Originator without any
other condition at all, such that it could
be extracted from it” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 468).
[284] ‘Alawī comments:
This includes the intelligences and
the universal soul connected to the
body of the primary originated
outermost sphere, since time is
dependent upon its motion, which is
existent in it. It does not include the
souls of the other spheres, due to
their attachment to the non-primary
originated ethereal bodies.
Consequently, they do not belong to
the changeless things exalted in every
respect above occurrence in the
extension of the world of time….It is
evident that the primary foundation,
which is the First Intelligence, is the
noblest thing in the bosom of the
world of Command. (Sharh al-
 Qabasāt 469-470)
[285] This is a form of proof whose
premises proceed from a cause to its
effect. The cause may be a form or a
universal as well as an efficient cause.
It is the opposite of an inductive
demonstration (burhān innī), whose
premises proceed from an effect to its
cause, or from a particular to a
universal.
[286] For an excellent discussion of
Plato’s identification of the subject of
properties with “space” in the Timaeus,
also called the receptacle of recurring
qualities, and Aristotle’s interpretation
of this as prime matter, see Richard
Sorabji, Matter, Space, and Motion,
pp. 32-36. ‘Alawī comments on Plato’s
view as follows: “ He held that
continuous substance subsistent in itself
is simple without any parts or
composition within it in the eternal
world, and that it receives the
occurrence of continuity and
discontinuity along with its persistence
in the two states” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
470).
[287] ‘Alawī comments:
Can it be anything except perpetual
real non-existence, which is neither in
a moment nor in time? His words
[Ibn Sīnā’s]: “because the generated
exists through its removal” prove
this, because the temporal non-
existence belonging to the generated
is not contradictory to its existence
due to the particularization of each of
them to a particular time. Nor is
 essential non-existence, which is the
non-being of the substance of the
generated within the boundary of
itself, combined with its existence
and it is not removed by it, because it
pertains to dependency upon its
Maker, which belongs to it by virtue
of itself. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 472-473)
[288]‘Alawī comments: “ This is due
to its conjunction with it in the existent
in contrast to how it is with privation
and prime matter, for these two
precede the generated thing” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 473-474).
[289] ‘Alawī comments:
It is clear, as already established and
agreed upon by the philosophers, that
through the negation of the non-
existence contrary to the existence of
 the generated, which is its perpetual
non-existence, it is a perpetual
creation as well, and that which it
requires is nothing but essential
possibility. It is evident, then, that
this precludes pre-eternity of
existence in perpetuity. If not for this
it would be possible to say that the
generated is pre-eternal (azalī)
despite its temporal creation, that
essential possibility requires pre-
eternal existence, while its
dispositional possibility requires its
temporal creation. This is contrary to
how it is. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 474)
[290] ‘Alawī provides the following
summation by Mīr Dāmād of his
demonstration of perpetual creation:
The gist of the doctrine with respect
to establishing being and non-being to
the creation of the world in all of its
aspects, whether material or
incorporeal, is that it may be said
with certainty that the existence of
temporal creatures is subject to
dispositional possibilities, that not one
of them can exist in the real world
except by the removal of its non-
being, implying that the realization of
one of the two contradictories in the
real world definitely necessitates the
nullification of the other. Neither
prior temporal non-existence, to
which something being a temporal
creation corresponds, nor essential
absolute non-existence, to which an
existent being an essential creation
corresponds, is nullified in the real
world by the occurrence of actual
existence.
As for the first, there is no
incompatibility between temporal
non-existence temporally preceding
in a prior time and subsequent
existence created in a later time due
to the non-oneness of time.
Therefore, each of these is realized
together in the real world, each in its
time. As for the second, absolute
non-existence pertaining to the stage
of the essence itself as such is not
contrary to the existence actually
occurring in the real world via the
efficient cause. Indeed, it is definitely
united with it. Consequently, the only
non-being which is cancelled in the
real world through the occurrence of
actual being is real non-existence in
perpetuity, not in a time nor in a
place. This is the meaning of
perpetual creation posited for every
temporal creature by the decree of
the clear intellect.
We say then that it is not
possible for this proven notion,
which is perpetual creation, to arise
from dispositional possibility, because
only the particularization of the
existence of the creature to a specific
boundary among the boundaries of
the extension of time and a specific
duration among successive durations
is able to proceed from dispositional
possibility, by reason of its relation to
the accidents of matter peculiar to
motion, time, flow, and change. This
is the meaning of temporal creation.
It is only proper, therefore,
for temporal creation, and no other,
to proceed from dispositional
possibility. By the decree of the
intellect and the consensus of the
learned, nothing whatsoever besides
essential possibility and dispositional
possibility are the prerequisite of
creation. Since dispositional
possibility is not suited for perpetual
creation to arise from it, while
essential possibility, by its nature, is
certainly appointed to this, it is
therefore established that essential
possibility is the source from which
perpetual creation proceeds, for it
does not have the capacity to merit
receiving eternity (sarmadiyya). Just
 as essential creation springs and
arises from it, and essential
possibility is general to all possible
things in their entirety, in the same
way, the two types of creation, the
essential and the perpetual, arising
from it are general to all of them.”
(Qtd. in Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 475-476)
[291] See wamīḍs 6.12.9, 6.12.11,
6.12.12, 6.12.15, and 6.12.16.
[292] Mīr Dāmād is here taking a
position opposite that of Aristotle, who
argued in the Physics against the
finitude of time. In fact, Aristotle takes
the infinity, or eternity, of time to be
self-evident. He has already arrived at
the conclusion that “there is no body
which is actually infinite” (Physics
206a, 7-8). He then raises this doubt:
“Yet to suppose that the infinite does
not exist in any way leads to many
impossible consequences, namely that
time would have a beginning and an
end, that magnitudes would not be
divisible into magnitudes, and that
numbering would not be unlimited”
(Ibid. 206a, 9-12). In order to avoid
these apparently impossible
consequences, Aristotle distinguishes
between an actual infinite and a
potential infinite. An actual infinite, he
confirms, does not exist, but a potential
infinite does exist. Aristotle mentions
several kinds of potential infinite, but
the one we are concerned with is an
infinite in which the parts exist
successively, as compared to an actual
infinite whose parts would have to exist
simultaneously. Examples of an infinite
by succession, according to Aristotle,
are the succession of days, time, the
generations of man, and movement.
“The infinite accordingly has the kind
of being which a day has…namely,
inasmuch as one after another is
continually generated….The infinite in
time and in the generations of men
clearly differs from the infinite in the
division of magnitudes. Although
generally the infinite has this mode of
existence: one thing is always being
taken after another, and each thing that
is taken is always finite, but always
different….In time and in the
generations of man, the parts taken
pass away, but the supply does not
fail” (Ibid. 206a, 21-29; 206b, 2-3).
Since time and movement are bound to
the celestial bodies, their revolutions
are infinite in succession as well, and
what is infinite is eternal. The infinite,
as endless potential, is related to
matter. Aristotle states: “As potential,
the infinite does not have the
independent being which the finite has,
but the infinite is the matter [of the
actuality]” (Ibid. 206b, 14).
[293] A key point of difference
between Aristotle and Philoponus is
that Philoponus sees the series of
motions and individuals extending into
the past as an actual series, not a
potential series. He says: “If the world
is eternal, it will necessarily follow that,
in this world, from the beginning to the
present moment, the number of
generated beings, of men or of plants
or of other individuals of every species,
will be actually infinite….[but] in no
manner whatsoever does an actual
infinite exist—neither as existing all at
once [i.e., simultaneously] nor as being
generated bit by bit [i.e., in
succession]” (qtd. in Wolfson,
Philosophy of the Kalam 413). What
Mīr Dāmād and Philoponus both see is
that past events, even if past, are still
actual in the sense that they form a
continuous chain of causes and effects
that are physically linked together.
[294]‘Alawī comments: “ That which
the finitude of the measure of time in
the past refutes is only temporal pre-
eternity [“in its common philosophical
sense”], as first introduced by the
teacher of the Peripatetics and his
followers, not permanent occurrence in
the container of perpetuity” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 479, 480).
[295] ‘Alawī adds:
Bahmanyār states in the Taḥṣīl: “If
there was no extreme which is not an
effect, everything would be an effect
and a possible. Regardless of
whether it be one or infinite, it would
not be possible for those effects to
exist.” This is in agreement with
what the Master says [in the Shifā’]
and in the Ishārāt and the Ta‘līqāt,
with these words: “If there is a final
effect and the cause of that effect,
but this cause is also an effect, and
this intermediary does not terminate
in an extreme which is not an effect,
 their existence is not possible,
because the attribute of an
intermediary is to need another
cause, regardless of whether it be
one or infinite….” He also said: “It is
not possible for things to be in
existence which are causes and
effects without leading to a cause
which is not an effect.” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 483-484)
[296] This appears to be related to the
first of Philoponus’ three arguments for
a beginning of the world built upon the
impossibility of an infinite number of
past events. It is based upon the
principle stated by Aristotle that “the
infinite cannot be traversed.” In other
words, if the series of effects goes back
infinitely, the cause that sets them in
motion will never be reached. (see
Davidson, Proofs for Eternity,
Creation, and the Existence of God
87-88).
[297] ‘Alawī says this means that this
proof for an uncaused first cause does
not require the series to be either finite
or infinite. In either case, a first cause,
which is the Necessary Being, is
needed (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 485).
[298] Ibn Sīnā used this method to
prove finite magnitude. Davidson
explains it:
Ibn Sīnā is, to be precise,
demonstrating the impossibility of an
infinite “continuous quantity” of the
type whose parts “exist together” and
“have [relative] position,” that is to
say, the impossibility of an infinite
line, plane, solid, or place. He
proceeds as follows: In order to
demonstrate the impossibility of an
infinite magnitude of the type
specified, account need be taken only
of magnitudes supposedly infinite at
one end while finite at the other. As
for magnitudes that are supposedly
infinite at both ends, they can be
assumed to be cut in the middle, so
that the required finite end is
provided. Given, then, a magnitude
that is supposedly infinite at one end
while finite at the other, the first step
is to assume a segment removed
from the finite end. The result, in
effect, will be two magnitudes, each
of which is finite at one end and
infinite at the other, namely, the
magnitude under consideration
before the segment was removed and
what remains of it after the segment
is removed. The next step is to
assume that the smaller of the two
magnitudes is superimposed on, or
“applied” to, the larger with the finite
ends coinciding. The infinite ends
could not now coincide; for should
they coincide, the smaller magnitude
would be equal to the larger, which is
absurd. If, however, the infinite ends
do not coincide, the smaller
magnitude would be finite by virtue
of consisting of two finite
magnitudes, to wit, the smaller
magnitude and the segment that had
been removed from the larger
magnitude. The supposed infinite
 magnitude turns out to be finite, and
an infinite magnitude is consequently
impossible. [Najāt 124]… (Proofs
for Eternity 126)
[299] This was Philoponus’ second
argument for creation built upon the
impossibility of an infinite number of
past events. It is based on the principle
that since an infinite cannot possibly be
exceeded, one infinite cannot be greater
than another. Philoponus states: “Since
motions yet to be generated, when
added to those already generated,
increase their number, and since,
moreover, the infinite cannot be
increased, it follows that the motions
already accumulated cannot be infinite”
(qtd. in Davidson 88). Since eternity
involves disparate infinities when one
infinite series is considered to be
greater than another, the series must be
finite and hence created.
[300] ‘Alawī comments:
He distinguishes with respect to
impossibility between infinity in the
direction of pre-eternity, since this
series of causes is conjoined in the
stage of the final effect, and between
infinity in the direction of post-
eternity, since, according to opinion
(ray), it concerns causes for which
there are infinite effects, which have
no conjunction (ijtimā‘) in the stage
of the essence of the cause….
He maintains in his book
al-Ufuq al-Mubīn…: “Is it not
decided by what has preceded that
progression (tadrīj) only occurs in
the horizon of time, not in the
container of perpetuity, and that its
presence from pre-eternity to post-
eternity before the All-Knowing, the
All-Wise, is all at once perpetually.…
After that he maintained [in
al-Ṣirāt al-Mustaqīm] non-
progression in the future with respect
to the real Creator, where he said:
If the future of the progressive
existent in post-eternity is
considered with respect to
occurrence in the container of
perpetuity, and with respect to
what the true Seer sees of its
occurrence, it is decided that it is
an actual infinity. The judgment of
the demonstration for the
impossibility of infinity does not
penetrate here due to non-
succession in that occurrence, for
all existents and multiplicities with
respect to that existence and with
respect to that presence are in the
condition of a single existent fixed
in its existence. This is similar to
what is stated in the wise Qur’ān:
“We have not created you and sent
you forth but as one soul.”
But if it is considered
with respect to its progressive
occurrence in the horizon of
elapsing and renewal, and with
respect to what the faculty of
temporal vision sees of its actual
occurrence, it is said that it is finite,
though not with a final end which
nothing exceeds. Therefore, the
 demonstration judges that the
necessity of finite quantity only
applies to what comprises actual
existence in the horizon of change
and succession. If it is not
simultaneous [in perpetuity], but
according to the way of
progression, whether that be in the
direction of pre-eternity or in the
direction of post-eternity, then the
past and the future in the horizon
of time are equal in the
impossibility of infinity with respect
to quantity.
….He is occupied in this book
with the impossibility of infinite time
in the direction of pre-eternity in
contrast to how it is with post-
eternity. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 486-488)
[301] ‘Alawī comments:
The Teacher of the Craft of the
Peripatetics and his followers
maintained its [time’s] temporal pre-
eternity based on the assumption of
its infinity, as was previously
provided, and that which [they think]
would invalidate it [temporal pre-
eternity] is its [time’s]
finiteness….As for affirming its
[time’s] finiteness, there is no
invalidation of what the followers of
the philosophers thought, namely,
that its infinity requires its temporal
pre-eternity, indeed, its perpetual pre-
eternity as well. But the matter is not
like this, for its finiteness does not
preclude its temporal pre-eternity, but
rather requires it, due to the fact that
 it is not preceded by a temporal non-
existence, due to the absence of time
as required by the intellect by way of
demonstration. Otherwise, its
existence would be required upon
assuming its non-existence. (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 489)
[302] Sections 7.1 to 7.3.3 elaborate
upon the common theme of the
essential impossibility of temporal non-
existence preceding or supervening
upon time, which Mīr Dāmād says is
used in a worthless dialectical argument
for the creation of the world.
[303] Mīr Dāmād clarifies in Wamīḍ
7.3.1 that “what is essentially
impossible for time is only the temporal
supervening of temporal non-existence
or the temporal priority of temporal
non-existence to its existence, for that
would imply the hypothetical existence
of time upon assuming its non-
existence” (al-Qabasāt 242). In other
words, without this essential
impossibility of temporal non-existence
in relation to time, a “time” before time
must be assumed. Absolute non-
existence and perpetual real non-
existence, however, are not ruled out
for the essence of time. As an
essentially possible thing in itself, time
requires neither existence nor non-
existence, nor are these impossible for
it. Real non-existence, therefore, is not
essentially impossible for time; it only
becomes impossible through another,
i.e., through its efficient cause.
[304] The answer to this is clearly no,
when it is understood that only
temporal non-existence is essentially
impossible for time. As Mīr Dāmād will
point out here, the essentially necessary
mode of existence does not belong to
the essence of time, since the necessity
belonging to it is acquired from
another.
[305] ‘Alawī comments:
Nullification in the container of
perpetuity perpetually and
unquantifiably after the determination
[of things] in it is impossible for each
thing, not with respect to the possible
essence of things, but with respect to
the nature of the container of
perpetuity, for what occurs in the
container of perpetuity cannot be
removed from it, even though its
occurrence may come to an end in
the horizon of time. The
determination of the possible is only
given form in the container of
perpetuity after nullification in it, not
its nullification in it a second time
after that determination. Therefore,
this is not singled out to the reality of
time, nor is it with respect to the
essences of possible realities and
possible natures. That which is
singled out to the reality of time is
strictly the impossibility of
nullification temporally and
quantifiably preceding its
determination and the determination
temporally and quantifiably preceding
its nullification with respect to its
essence. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 494)
[306] ‘Alawī comments:
In other words, the impossibility of
perpetual non-existence prior to the
existence of perpetual things through
another is also not singled out to the
reality of time, just as the
impossibility of perpetual non-
existence through another
subsequently is not singled out to
time. Rather, he includes in their
claim that which is not subject to
dispositional possibility, whether it be
the immaterial intellects or the
celestial bodies, and this is contrary
to how it is for temporal non-
existence, regardless of whether it be
prior or subsequent. Therefore, he
singled out its impossibility to the
essence of time. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
 494-495)
[307] This argument is equivalent to
Aristotle’s argument for the eternity of
the world from the nature of motion.
Aristotle stated that motion can occur
only if an object undergoing motion is
present. Hence if an absolute beginning
of motion is assumed, this would
require, according to Aristotle, the
object undergoing the first motion to
have come into existence first.
Since coming into existence is also a
kind of motion, then before the world
performed its first motion, it had
already performed another motion,
namely the motion of coming into
existence, which is a contradiction.
Thus, Aristotle reasoned the world
must be eternal (cf. Physics 251a, 8
ff). Mīr Dāmād makes it clear in the
next paragraph, however, that the
absolutely first movement is identical to
the coming into existence of the
physical universe. There is no need to
posit another motion before it, because
on this view, motion and the physical
universe came into existence together.
[308]‘Alawī comments: “ I am
astonished that the Seal of the Scholars
maintained the possibility of this
position despite the fact that creation is
nothing but existence after non-
existence. How then can it be apart
from existence” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
499)?
[309] ‘Alawī comments, after refuting
the position of the Mutakallimūn:
The gist is that just as the
qualification of the possible by
existence in the time of its creation
and its existence is not a requirement
of its essence, in the same way its
qualification by it in the time of its
persistence is not a requirement of its
essence. Just as it is impossible for
this possible to be realized through
itself at the beginning of its creation,
in like manner it is impossible for its
existence to be realized through itself
during its persistence, for it needs a
cause for its creation and its
persistence. Its need of it in the state
of its persistence is like its need of it
in the state of its creation. Therefore,
if the outpouring of the light of
existence were assumed to be cut off
from the world in a particular now,
 the existent would not persist….In
short, the outpouring of existence in
the time of its existence corresponds
to it. If it is related to the beginning
of the time of its existence, it is its
creation, and if it is related to what
follows, it is its persistence through
that continuous outpouring. (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 501-502)
[310] This is based on the assumption
of the philosophers, as explained by
Ghazālī, that the posteriority of the
world to God and His priority to it can
only be in two ways: (1) “That He is
prior in essence, not in time, in the way
that one is prior to two (which is a
priority by nature, although it can
temporally coexist with it); and like the
priority of cause to effect, as with the
priority of a person’s movement to the
movement of his shadow that follows
him, the hand’s movement and the
movement of the ring…for all these are
simultaneous, some being a cause,
some an effect” (Incoherence 30). The
philosophers who advocate the
temporal eternity of the world accept
this option. (2) “That the Creator is
prior to the world and time—not
essentially, but in time, [which implies
that] before the existence of the world
and time, a time would have existed in
which the world did not exist, since
nonexistence precedes existence” (Ibid.
31). This position, which is that of the
Mutakallimūn, is rejected by both
Ghazālī and the philosophers. Ghazālī’s
own position appears to coincide with
that of Mīr Dāmād, when he says:
“The objection to this is to say: Time is
originated and created [with the world],
and before it there was no time at all.
We mean by our statement that God is
prior to the world and time that He was
and there was no world, and that then
He was and with Him was the world”
(Ibid. 31). Our urge to suppose the
creation of the world to be in time,
Ghazālī goes on to explain, “is due to
the inability of the estimative faculty to
comprehend an existence that has a
beginning except by supposing a
‘before’ for it. This ‘before’, from
which the estimation does not detach
itself, is believed to be a thing realized,
existing—namely, time” (Ibid. 32).
This is the same as the inability of our
estimative faculty to grasp that there is
no space beyond space.
Averroes argues that this proof
which Ghazālī gives in the name of the
philosophers is unsound,
for it is not of the nature of the
Creator to be in time, whereas it
belongs to the nature of the world to
be so; and for this very reason it is
not true that He is either
simultaneous with it or prior to it in
time or in causation….for we have
already proved that there are two
kinds of existence: one in the nature
of which there is motion and which
cannot be separated from time; the
other in the nature of which there is
no motion and which is eternal and
cannot be described in terms of
time….And it has also been
established that the entity in the
nature of which there is no
movement is the cause of the entity
in the nature of which there is
movement….Therefore, the priority
of the one entity over the other is
based neither on a priority in time,
nor on the priority of that kind of
cause and effect which belongs to the
nature of things in motion, like the
priority of a man to his shadow. For
this reason anyone who compares
the priority of the unmoved being to
the thing in motion to the priority
existing between two things in motion
is in error….It is the later
philosophers of Islam who made this
mistake, since they enjoyed but slight
comprehension of the doctrine of the
ancients. So the priority of this one
being to the other is the priority of
the unchanging timeless existence to
the changing existence which is time,
and this is an altogether different
type of priority. It is therefore not
true of these existences that they are
simultaneous, or that the one
precedes the other, and Ghazālī’s
observation that the priority of the
Creator to the world is not a
temporal priority is true. But the
posteriority of the world to the
Creator, since He does not precede
the world in time, can only be
understood as the posteriority of
effect to cause. (Tahāfut al-Tahāfut I,
37-39).
 Van den Bergh believes that since
Averroes’ whole argument against the
theologians is built upon the idea of
God as the cause and the world as the
effect, this lands him in “the most
flagrant contradiction…since causation
is in time, [and] a time-relation is the
necessary condition of any causal
relation” (Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, Notes, p.
38.1). This criticism, however, is
invalid, because a causal relation need
not be bound to time. The Creator’s
relation to the world is obviously one
of cause to effect, but it is also, as
Averroes notes and Mīr Dāmād
confirms, not a relation in time. The
conclusion, therefore, should simply be
that the causal relation between the
Creator and the world is not a temporal
relation, as is the causal relation
between things within the physical
world, but rather it is an essential
relation.
[311] The purport is that the nature of
the created is such that it is incapable
of receiving eternal existence. God
cannot create what is impossible to
create, but He can only create what is
essentially possible. This is why in the
next Wamīḍ Mīr Dāmād calls asking
the question: “Why did the emanating
Creator not give existence to the world
of possibility in pre-eternity not
preceded by real non-existence?”
“useless prattle” and “simpleminded,
profitless inquiry” (al-Qabasāt 250).
[312] Mīr Dāmād distinguishes
between dispositional possibility, which
requires matter and time, and essential
possibility, which only requires the
possibility of a thing in itself. The
creation of actual entities separated
from God in existence which bear the
nature of essential possibility alone
without the intermediary of matter,
however, is problematic, since the
actualization of possibility in the real
world requires something real, like
matter, to which that possibility is
connected. Otherwise, such entities
cannot be truly separate but merely
intelligible constructs of the Creator’s
act of thinking.
[313]‘Alawī comments: “ The gist is
that pre-eternal existence is impossible
[for it] in itself. Therefore, its non-
existence in pre-eternity is necessary,
not possible, in itself, and it does not
need a cause….since it is established
that the cause of the non-existence of
the effect is the absence of the cause of
its existence, although the cause of the
existence of the creature is not non-
existent in pre-eternity” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 506).
[314] See Wamḍa 8.9 for the related
question of God’s willing and desisting
to will. This is one of the proofs of the
philosophers for the eternity of the
world based on the nature of God’s
attributes. The position of the some of
the philosophers first, then the
response of their opponents to this
proof, is described by Davidson as
follows:
Proclus…lays down the proposition
that “when an agent does not act, he
fails to act either because he does not
wish to or because he is unable to.”
In the issue at hand…it is impossible
that the agent should not have
wished to act. For it is unimaginable
that the supreme being should be
merely “sometimes beneficent
(jawād), sometimes not.” He
undoubtedly is “eternally
beneficent”; and, being eternally
beneficent, he must eternally “wish
the universe to resemble him,” to
exist and be good, even as he exists
and is good….Proclus’ argument
concludes that God’s beneficence…
must give rise to a single eternal
universe, as distinct from an eternal
succession of universes. [see Ibn
Sīnā, Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt 380]…
It might be argued, Aquinas
observes, that since God is eternally
the “Lord,” he must eternally have
subjects with respect to whom he
can be designated as the Lord; and a
universe must therefore always
exist….
Rebuttals take three
forms….[1] [Denial that the
attributes concerned are essential
attributes]: Shahrastānī…denies that
beneficence is an “essential attribute
added to the essence,” and interprets
it instead “as an attribute of action,”
or “a relation.”…
[2] A second form of
response consists not in denying that
the attributes are eternal or that God
possesses them, but in denying that
they entail the eternity of the
world….Aquinas replies…by
observing that God’s goodness
should be expected to express itself
by producing creatures who
“represent the divine goodness” in
the most accurate possible manner.
The relation of the creator to what he
creates is surely not a relation of
equals but a relation of the superior
to the inferior, of the infinite to the
finite. And the “superiority of divine
goodness over what it creates is best
expressed [precisely] in the latter’s
not being eternal.”…
Aquinas and Gersonides
make virtually identical replies to the
argument. God’s knowledge and
thought, they stress, is in no sense
dependent on the world, being,
instead, the cause of the world and
prior thereto….In Gersonides’ words:
The “[intelligible] order may exist
even if the existent things, whose
existence can flow from that
[intelligible] order, do not exist.”…
[3] The third form of
response to arguments from the
eternity of God’s attributes consists
in showing that it would be utterly
impossible for God’s attributes to
give rise to an eternal
universe….Proclus had argued that
the eternity of the world is implied by
the deity’s “goodness,” and
Philoponus counters…with the
truism that God can produce only
 what is possible. Since it can be
demonstrated definitively…that an
eternal world is absolutely
impossible, even God could not
produce such a world. The most that
God could produce, the most his
goodness could express itself in, is a
created world. If an eternal world is
impossible, the eternity of God’s
goodness obviously cannot entail the
eternity of the world. (Davidson,
Proofs for Eternity, 61-64, 79-84)
[315] Mīr Dāmād’s argument
responding to this proof is twofold.
First, he states that the whole question
of “suspension” is misplaced, because
it implies again a temporal extension
before creation took place, which is
impossible. The eternal and the
temporal cannot mix. Second, he
emphasizes, like Philoponus in the third
form of rebuttal mentioned by
Davidson above, that whatever is
possible, but not necessary, in itself is
incapable of sustaining eternity. All of
this does not conflict with the eternity
of God’s attributes and the
unchangeability of His nature.
[316]‘Alawī comments: “ According to
the first option [namely, the First’s
priority only in essence], the eternity of
creatures would be implied due to their
being simultaneous with Him
externally, even though they are
created (ḥāditha) in their essence and
the Creator precedes them essentially”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 508). This is
according to the doctrine of the
simultaneity of cause and effect in
time.
[317]‘Alawī notes that “ eternal
priority is a logical notion apart from
the logical notion of the two things.”
One of them is: “He was in the stage of
His essence and there was no
creation.” The second of them is: “He
was in a past time before the existence
of time and His creation.” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 509)
[318] Ghazālī incorporates the proof
summarized by Ibn Sīnā above,
namely, that nothing could have led a
creator to create the universe at a
particular moment, into his first proof
of the philosophers for the eternity of
the world, which is based upon the
premise of the unchangeability of the
first cause. Davidson provides the
following background on this proof and
responses to it:
In the course of proving that what is
indestructible cannot have been
generated, Aristotle remarked:
“Why…after not existing for an
infinite time, would the thing be
generated…at a particular moment?”
[De Caelo I, 12, 283a, 11-12; cf.
Physics VIII, 1, 252a, 15-16]…
Ibn Sīnā…asks: “How
within [the stretch of] non-existence
could one time be differentiated for
[the Creator’s] not acting and
another time for [his] starting [to
act]? How might one time differ
from another?” [Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt
378; paraphrased by Ghazālī,
Incoherence 21]…
Maimonides…portrays the
proponents of eternity as reasoning:
“An agent acts at one time and not at
another because of either
preventative factors (māni‘) or
motivating factors (dā‘in) which
occur in him. The former bar an
agent from accomplishing what he
wills; the latter lead the agent to will
what he previously did not will. Since
the creator, [who must be absolutely
self-sufficient] is subject to neither
motivating factors…nor preventive
factors…it is impossible for him to
act at one time but not at another”
[Guide II, 14(6)]….
[According to] Proclus’
version…if the world were created,
 the creator would, up to the moment
of creating the world, have been a
“potential creator,” and something
would have had to “activate” him.
But the activating factor would,
before inducing the creator to create
the world, have been a “potential”
activating factor, and hence would
have stood in need of a prior factor
to activate it as well, [and so on]
….Since an infinite regress of causes
is absurd, the world…must be
eternal…. (Proofs for Eternity 51-
55)
Response:
Augustine’s position, in sum, is that
the world cannot legitimately be
described as having been created at a
moment in time. No new factor
motivated the creator to act, for the
previous nonexistence, and
subsequent existence of the world
were determined eternally and
immutably through an eternal divine
plan and an eternal act of the divine
will. [This is also Ghazālī’s first
objection; see Incoherence 15]…
John Philoponus was
confident that the creation of the
world was not merely defensible, but
demonstrable, and his response to
the proof for eternity…builds on his
demonstration of
creation….Philoponus insists upon
the distinction between God’s
eternally willing that a thing should
exist and his willing that a thing
should exist eternally….
 Ghazālī…too explains, [it
is] of the nature of will, and not
merely divine will, precisely to
differentiate between things that are
similar in every respect….He
observes, much as Augustine had
done, that adherents of eternity who
recognize a cause of the existence of
the universe cannot avoid
acknowledging wholly arbitrary
determinations in the spatial realm.
The location of the north and south
poles at a given pair of points on the
celestial sphere [for example] is…
wholly arbitrary [Incoherence 23-26]
….
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī takes
up the question: What tipped the
scales in favor of creation at a
particular moment? He responds that
no factor had to “tip the scales,” for
the selection of the moment was
accomplished exclusively by God’s
“will.” The arbitrary selection of a
moment for creation, Rāzī adds, is
analogous to the arbitrary selection of
a location for the stars on the
celestial spheres. [Muḥaṣṣal 91]…
[This response and the preceding fall
into the trap of assuming a temporal
extension before the creation of the
world.]
Ṭūsī…addresses the
familiar question: How could God
have settled upon a moment for
creation in preference to the infinite
other possible moments when
creation might have occurred? To
handle the matter properly, Ṭūsī
asserts, one must understand that
time did not precede the existence of
the world. The supposed time before
creation was “imaginary,” not real,
and any “differentiation” between
moments before creation is equally
“imaginary.” In no true sense was a
choice made between moments, and
it is illegitimate even to ask how God
could have settled upon a particular
moment. [Gloss to Muḥaṣṣal 92]…
(Davidson, Proofs for Eternity 69-
74) [This is the line of reasoning that
Mīr Dāmād takes in response to this
question in this Wamīḍ. He clearly
enunciates the position that God’s
priority to the world is not temporal,
but rather it is both an essential and a
 real separate priority.]
[319] Wolfson summarizes the two
arguments of the Mutakallimūn for
creation at a particular time based on
particularization and preponderation as
follows:
Juwaynī [reasons]: “…with regard to
that which is created…[it is possible]
that, at whatever time the creation of
the world took place, its actual taking
place could have been preceded by
lengths of time and so it is also
possible that it could have been
delayed by hours. When, however,
the admissible existence rather than
the admissible nonexistence has
taken place [at a certain given time],
reason immediately concludes that
existence was in need of a
particularizer (mukhaṣṣiṣ) to single it
out as the one which is to be
realized.”…The inevitable conclusion
is, he maintains, that “the
particularizer of created things is an
agent who acts upon them by free
choice, a particularizer who produced
them with certain particular
characteristics at certain moments.”
… (Philosophy of the Kalam 434-
435)
Ibn Sīnā [makes] the following
argument: If we assume that the
world proceeded into existence from
God after it had not existed…then,
“in order to make it necessary for
existence to proceed from God or to
give preponderance to the emanation
of existence from Him [over its
 continuing nonexistence] there must
inevitably appear a distinction
occasioned by the occurrence in the
meantime of something which did
not exist when there was a
preponderation of non-existence and
He was in a state of inactivity.”
[Najāt 416]…He tentatively suggests
that that something might have been
a “will.”…This suggestion is rejected
by him on the ground that if the
world was created in time by a
created will, then the question arises
why the will and hence the world
were not created before [Najāt 418].
(Ibid. 444-445)
[320] See also wamīḍs 1.7.6 and
1.7.7.
[321] Lit. “Those who suspend”
God’s attributes during the “time”
before the creation of the world.
[322] ‘Alawī comments:
It is evident that this statement is
outwardly in contradiction with what
he stated in the Metaphysics of the
Shifā’, where he said: “Every
existent consists of something actual
and persisting and a disposition
receptive of something. It is therefore
a composite of matter and form. It is
not possible for prime matter [by
itself] to be like that.”
I say: Although prime
matter consists of an actual
something which is an essential
disposition and receptivity for
successive forms through successive
dispositions, there is nothing actual in
 it like it which shares in its
receptivity. This the opposite of what
we quoted from him above
[regarding the existent], because its
meaning is that, besides the
disposition, there is another actual
thing which is its partner, as result of
which it is a composite of matter and
form. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 517-518)
[323] Aristotle argued for the eternity
of the underlying matter of the universe
as follows:
If matter came to be, there would
have to be something underlying out
of which, as a constituent, it came to
be. But to be such is the nature of
matter itself, for by matter I mean
the primary underlying thing in each
case out of which…something comes
 to be. So if matter came to be, it
would have to be before it had come
to be. And if it passed away, this
would be what it would ultimately
arrive at, so it would have passed
away before it had passed away.
[Consequently, matter is eternal.]
(Physics i.9, 192a, 29-34)
Averroes similarly argued:
The summary of this is that
everything that becomes is possible
before it becomes, and that
possibility needs something for its
subsistence, namely, the substratum
which receives that which is
possible….Thus the possibility of the
patient is a necessary condition for
the possibility of the agent, for the
agent which cannot act is not
possible but impossible….There only
remains as a vehicle for possibility
the recipient of the possible, i.e.,
matter. Matter, insofar as it is matter,
does not become; for if it did, it
would need other matter and we
should have an infinite regress.
Matter only becomes insofar as it is
combined with form….That
possibility demands existing matter is
clear….When we say that something
is possible, we cannot but understand
that it needs something in which this
possibility can be. As regards his
[Ghazālī’s] proof that the possible is
not dependent on an existent,
because the impossible is not
dependent on an existent, this is
sophistical. (Tahāfut al-Tahāfut I, 59-
 61)
Davidson explains:
In the Aristotelian physical system,
possibility and matter are closely
related concepts, matter being the
locus of potentiality, or possibility
[Metaphysics XIV, 1, 1088b, 1].…
The germ of the proof from the
concept of possibility can be
discovered easily enough in Aristotle.
In one passage, for example,
Aristotle established that the process
of coming into existence
“necessarily” requires “the prior
presence of something existent
potentially [or: possibly], but not
existent in actuality” [De
Generatione I, 3, 317b, 16-17]; it
follows that nothing whatsoever,
including matter, can come into
existence from absolute
nothingness….
Ibn Sīnā lays down the
proposition that prior to a thing’s
coming into actual existence, its
existence must have been possible;
were its existence necessary, he
explains, the thing would already
have existed, and were its existence
impossible, the thing would never
exist. The “possibility (imkān) of the
existence” of a thing must, moreover,
in some sense have its own
existence….Mere possibility of
existence is plainly not a substance. It
can only belong to the class of
entities that are “present in a
subject.” Thus whenever anything
comes into existence, the possibility
of its existence must previously have
subsisted in a subject. The
“possibility of existence” may also be
termed the “potentiality of
existence”; and the subject in which
possibility or potentiality is found is
called “matter.”…Ibn Sīnā
concludes, if an already existent
matter must precede everything
coming into existence, clearly
nothing, including matter, can come
into existence ex nihilo, that is, from
absolute nothingness. An absolute
beginning of the existence of matter
is impossible [Najāt (Cairo 1938)
219-220; Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt 177-178].
(Proofs for Eternity 16-17)
Response: This argument of Ibn
Sīnā is paraphrased by Ghazālī in his
Tahāfut al-Falāsifa (see M.
Marmura’s translation, 40-41). He
counters that “since possibility,
impossibility, and necessity have no
objective existence in the external
world, they do ‘not require anything
existent’ to serve as their substratum”
(Ibid. 37). Aquinas held that to say
the possibility of the world preceded
its actual existence means “either that
the creator had the power to create
the world, or else that the creation of
the world was logically possible”
(Ibid. 38). Maimonides responded
that “the requirement that the
possibility of existence must be
located in a substratum is…a
characteristic of change and
 generation within the world, but not
necessarily a characteristic of the
creation of the world” (Ibid. 38).
Mīr Dāmād agrees with Acquinas and
Maimonides, since he denies the
eternity of matter and asserts that
matter, like the possibilities of things, is
created ex nihilo.
[324] What Mīr Dāmād means, and
what Ibn Sīnā confirms in the
subsequent passages, is that when God
creates the very essences of things
through primary origination and
fashioning, this does not require a
substratum in which their possibilities
exist. As Ibn Sīnā has explained,
primary origination does not require
matter, instrument, or time. When
these quiddities are created, then
essential possibility is abstracted from
them. This kind of possibility,
therefore, should not be confused with
dispositional possibility, which is an
actual attribute of matter. Ibn Sīnā’s
argument succeeds, therefore, only in
proving that generated things always
require a prior substratum in which
their possibility exists, which proves
that matter as itself is eternal.
[325] In other words, in Ibn Sīnā’s
system primary originated things are
concomitants of God’s essence and
subsist through Him directly. Their
relation to Him is like the relation our
thoughts have to us: they are existent in
relation to us, but non-existent in
themselves. Their actual existence
requires the presence of matter to be
realized independently of the thinker.
Mīr Dāmād’s theory is that both
primary originated things and generated
things exist separately from God in
perpetuity with a real, unquantifiable
posteriority.
[326] ‘Alawī comments: “In other
words, its existence as non-
conditioned. The purport is that since
possibility is the mode (kayfiyya) of the
relation of existence or non-existence to
the quiddity, its affirmation is only
dependent upon the notion of the
quiddity and existence, not upon the
qualification of the quiddity by
existence….Consequently, its
dependence upon a cause is not
required by its dependence upon these
two [notions]” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
523).
[327] ‘Alawī comments:
[Ibn Sīnā argues that if the
incorporeal intelligences are
absolutely non-existent prior to their
existence], how then can they receive
existence from the real Emanator?…
It is evident that what the Master has
mentioned here may be in his view a
demonstration of the eternity of the
world, and it is the careful
examination which leads to
demonstration. His position,
according to his system, is that it
may be said that the absolutely non-
existent cannot receive existence by
reason of its being essentially
impossible, and the world, upon
assuming its creation [ex nihilo], is
like that…due to the absence of
essential possibility.…Therefore, the
pre-eternity of matter is necessitated,
and this is contrary to creation [ex
nihilo].…
The author, our teacher,
has thoroughly answered the
argument of the Master in the
Ta‘līqāt with these words: “The mind
recognizes instinctively…” etc.,
according to which his position is that
the absolutely non-existent without
qualification, which is essentially
impossible, cannot receive existence
at all in contrast to how it is with the
absolutely non-existent in pre-
eternity, in the sense that there is
neither an essential possibility nor a
disposition [there]….Therefore, it
returns to the impossibility of the
mode of their pre-eternal existence,
and this is not contrary to its
receiving existence continuously, so
there is no conversion from essential
impossibility to essential possibility.
In sum…essential
impossibility is that for which
existence is impossible. Do you not
see that it is impossible for the
Necessary by virtue of Himself,
whose existence is necessary, to be
qualified by possible existence or
existence preceded by non-existence!
…Therefore, it is admissible that pre-
eternal existence is not possible for
the world, and it is non-existent
absolutely in this case [i.e., at the
level of pre-eternity], but not without
 qualification, as a result of which it is
capable of receiving existence
continuously. The sanctified
incorporeal things, therefore, by their
essential possibility at the moment of
their existence are realized
continuously, while the generated
things are particularized in existence
to specific times by dispositional
qualities and their essential possibility
at the moment of their existence.
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 520-522)
[328] Dispositional qualities (al-
kayfiyyāt al-isti‘dādiyya) are qualities
belonging to something either as a
capacity to act in a certain way or to
suffer a certain change. If this capacity
is active and resistant to outside
influence, it is called a strength, but if it
is passive, non-resistant, and easily
suffers change, it is called a weakness
(see www.muslimphilosophy.com ).
[329] ‘Alawī says that Mīr Dāmād is
referring here to the Mu‘tazila and
Ash‘ariya who believed in a new
intention or new will occurring in the
Creator when He created the world
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 523).
[330] Ibn Sīnā is here following the
argument first developed by Aristotle in
the Physics, and adopted by other
Peripatetics, that past motions and time
are potential infinities.
[331] “Non-ceasing infinity” appears
to be equivalent to potential infinity.
‘Alawī comments: “Just as the Master
believed in the non-ceasing infinity of
the revolutions along with the infinity
of time and motion, in like manner, he
believed in the infinite [divisibility of
magnitude] along with the finiteness of
fixed continuous quantity….He states
in the Shifā’: ‘The meaning of infinite
divisibility is that the capacity for
division cannot be separated from a
body and its parts, not that they can be
divided into [actual] parts whose
number is infinite’” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
525).
[332]‘Alawī comments: “ This is
against the assumption of the pre-
eternity of the possible, despite its
impossibility, for it [essential
possibility] is one of the things
abstracted from the possible at the
moment of its existence. Since it
[essential possibility] does not exist in
pre-eternity, there is no pre-eternity of
the possible; otherwise its subsistence
in itself or in the essence of its Maker
would be required, and both of these
are false and groundless” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 528).
[333] Though Proclus agreed with
Plato on many issues, such as the
Forms, and like many of his fellow
Neoplatonists he attempted to
harmonize Plato and Aristotle wherever
possible, he took the side of Aristotle
on the question of the eternity of the
world.
[334]‘Alawī comments: “ The position
of the doubt which the author, our
teacher, has quoted is that the circular
motions of the spheres have no
contrary motion and are not subject to
generation and corruption. It follows
then that they are eternal and that their
bearers are likewise eternal. The
answer which he [Dāmād] indicates is
that the non-applicability of generation
and corruption to them requires that
they not be subject to temporal
generation and creation, but this does
not conflict with their being created in
perpetuity” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 536).
[335] A supporter of the eternity of
the world.
[336] Aristotle’s books on logic.
[337] See Wamīḍ 1.7.3.
[338]‘Alawī comments: “ This is
because what is assumed is that its
existence necessitates the negation of
something real, which is a perpetual
non-existence, and if that non-existence
were not nullified, there would be a
violation of the assumption” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 553).
[339] ‘Alawī says that this premise is
the sophistical dilemma (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 556).
[340] ‘Alawī comments:
The upshot is that the non-existence
of the requiring of the negation of an
actual thing, which necessitates
perpetual existence, is one thing,
while the non-existence of the
concomitant, upon assuming the
requiring of an object of
concomitance for it, is another thing,
due to the fact that the non-existence
of this concomitant requires the non-
existence of that which is its object
of concomitance, regardless of
 whether it be a complete non-
existence or a non-existence after
existence. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 555-
556)
[341] In other words, all planes
terminate in lines, and all lines
terminate in points.
[342] ‘Alawī says: “This is Dawānī
who believed that the point at the top
of the cone is annihilated when the
cone is divided, assuming that the
substratum of the point of the cone is
the same as the essence of the cone”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 562).
[343] ‘Alawī says that the word qidda
literally means “whip” or “lash,” as in
the verse: “The object of His lash in
paradise is the good of the world and
what is within it.” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
563).
[344] ‘Alawī comments: “He is
refuting the one whose imagination
carried him away into thinking that
division by the difference of the
accident necessitates external
separation and concrete discontinuity
with the vanishing of that accident”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 563-564).
[345] ‘Alawī comments: “The limit is
either one, as in a sphere enclosed by
one plane; or two, as in half of a
sphere enclosed by two planes; or
more than two, as in other polygons.
He means by the mathematical body
that which is the magnitude….As for
the angle, in his opinion, it is either a
plane or a state accidental to it
encompassed by two lines which meet
at a point” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 566).
[346] In other words, an actual
boundary requires the parts of the
extension to have particular positions in
space, whereas since no part of time
continues to exist, it cannot have a
position. This is Aristotle’s argument in
Categories 6, 5a.
[347] Mīr Dāmād affirms that the
universe does have a beginning, that
time in the direction of the past is
finite, but the argument here is that
there is no actual now or starting place
from which this beginning commences,
because this would be like admitting a
time before time or a place before
place.
[348]‘Alawī quotes from a passage of
Ibn Sīnā in the Physics of the Shifā’:
“Time, according to them, is nothing
but the sum of [successive] moments.
So if you arrange the successive
moments and joint them together, do
not doubt that their sum is time. If you
know the moments, you know time.”
Then ‘Alawī adds: “The upshot
[according to this view] is that time is
an extension composed of multiple
moments which end in an extended
non-existence” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 568-
569).
[349]‘Alawī comments: “T ime in
perpetuity and in the retentive
imagination has position in its
conventional sense due to the
coexistence of its parts there; however,
it is infinite of position since it has no
actually existent boundary for its
circularity” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 569).
[350] This is a reference to Ghazālī’s
belief in the Ash‘arite doctrine of
occasionalism, according to which each
and every event is a direct, non-
mediated creation of God, invented by
him and called into being out of
nothing. In the Tahāfut, after giving his
refutations of the position of the
philosophers on the necessity of eternal
circular motion as the mediator
between the eternal and the generated,
he states: “We will show that the
circular motion is not suitable to be the
principle of temporal events and that all
events are the inventions of God in the
beginning” (Tahāfut I, 30).
Ghazālī’s argument is as
follows:
You [philosophers] deem the
generation (ḥudūth) of a temporal
event (ḥādith) through an eternal
(qadīm) improbable when it is
incumbent on you to acknowledge it.
For in the world there are temporal
events which have causes. If
temporal events were to depend on
other temporal events ad infinitum,
this would be impossible—this is not
the belief of a rational person. If this
were possible, you would then have
no need to acknowledge the Maker
and affirm a Necessary Existent who
is the ground of all possible
existents….
[The philosophers] may
say: We do not deem improbable the
proceeding of a temporal event…
from an eternal; rather we deem
improbable the proceeding from an
eternal of an event which is a first
event. For the state of generation
does not differ from what precedes it
with respect to the preponderation of
the mode of existence, not with
respect to the presence of a particular
moment, instrument, condition,
nature, purpose, nor any other cause.
But if the event is not the first event,
then it is possible for it [the temporal
event] to proceed from it [an eternal]
with the generation of another thing,
such as the preparedness (isti‘dād)
of the receiving substrate and the
presence of a suitable time, or
something of this sort.
To this we say: The
question regarding the occurrence of
the preparedness, the presence of a
[suitable] time, and whatever is
renewed remains. Either [these
occurrences] regress ad infinitum or
they terminate with an eternal from
which the first temporal event comes
about.
[The philosophers] may
say: …As regards the events
contained in the sublunar sphere, …
all of these are events dependent on
each other in an intricate way. In the
end, the principles of their causes
terminate with the circular heavenly
movement, the relations of the stars
to each other, and their relation to the
earth. The outcome of all this is that
the perpetual, everlasting circular
motion is the basis (mustanad) of all
temporal events. That which imparts
the circular motion of the heavens is
the souls of the heavens…which are
eternal (qadīm). Certainly, therefore,
the circular motion necessitated by
those souls is also eternal….It is
consequently inconceivable for a
temporal event to proceed from an
eternal except through the mediation
of an everlasting circular motion that
resembles the Eternal in one
respect…and resembles the temporal
in another respect, since each
hypothetical part of it is generated
after it was not. Hence, insofar as it
is temporal in terms of its parts and
its relations, it is the principle of
temporal events, while insofar as it is
everlasting in terms of similar states,
it proceeds from an eternal soul….
To this we say: This
lengthy elaboration does you no
good. For is the circular motion,
which is the foundation [of all
temporal events], temporally
originated or eternal? If eternal, how
does it become a principle for the
first temporal event? If temporal, it
would require another temporal
event, and [so on], regressing [ad
infinitum]. As for your statement that
in one respect it resembles the eternal
and in one respect it resembles the
temporal, being both constant
(thābit) and renewed (mutajaddad)
—that is, it is constant in renewal
and renewed in constancy—we say:
 Is it the principle of temporal events
inasmuch as it is changeless or
inasmuch as it is being renewed? If
inasmuch as it is changeless, how is
it, then, that there would proceed
from something changeless whose
states are similar something that
occurs in certain times but not
others? If inasmuch as it is renewed,
what is the cause of the renewal in
itself? It would then require another
cause, and this would regress
[infinitely]. (Tahāfut I, 27-30)
[351] Qur’ān 2:255.
[352] Qur’ān 35:41.
[353] This seems to mean that the
only real non-existence belonging to
something is prior to its existence,
because once it has been called into
being, its existence can neither be
negated from perpetuity nor from the
time of its existence in time. The non-
existence belonging to it in the time
after its temporal existence is also pre-
eternal, because it is part of its pre-
eternal non-existence.
[354] ‘Alawī comments:
He means that the particularity of the
effect is a shadow of the particularity
of its cause, and its individualization
emulates the individualization of its
cause….It is therefore determined
that those caused individualizations
and their multiplicity are due to
dependency upon their Maker, and
that individual made existences are a
consequence of the making of the
Maker, just as their individual non-
 existences are a result of His non-
making and not a result of the non-
existence of His essence, just as the
former is a result of His making, not
His essence. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 577)
[355] See sections under Wamḍa 2.5
for the difference between being an
effect by composition and being an
effect by emanation. ‘Alawī comments:
His position is that the parts of the
effect are the compositional cause of
it, not the emanational cause. This is
like the question of its possibility,
because the Maker cannot bring into
existence something which is not
possible. So just as possibility is
outside of the Agent and His
completers and the conditions of His
action, the same applies to its parts
 when it issues from the cause of the
composite. It is therefore
necessitated by what is outside of the
Maker and the conditions of His
making, for the parts belong to the
composite which is voided of them
when issuing from its cause, namely,
its emanational cause, although each
of them is a compositional cause of
it. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 580-581)
[356] ‘Alawī comments:
[These are two statements] of the
philosophers for explaining power
and choice, without ascribing
anything of these two to Him
(exalted be He) to admonish that the
philosophers do not hold these two
explanations with respect to His
power….
 I say: It is manifestly clear
after solid inquiry to one who is
granted transcendent wisdom that the
aim of the Master in what he set
forth in this chapter [on potency and
act] is an explanation of the
inseparability of these two notions.
But as for the existence of one of
these two in Him (exalted be He),
this is not possible….Rather, power
with respect to Him…consists of His
essence contemplating the whole as
an intellect, which is the principle of
the whole, as the Master states.
Then he says: “If He is
called powerful, this only means that
He is the Necessary Being in relation
to the fact that existence other than
Him is only possible through Him.”
This is his discourse in the
Metaphysics of the Shifā’ in
explanation of His attributes….This
is the meaning of real, self-subsisting
power, unlike power in the two
inseparable senses, which is the
power belonging to the animal….It is
that the animal is such that an action
proceeds from it if it desires and does
not proceed from it if it does not
desire….
[In another place, he says]:
“The will of the Necessary Being is
neither essentially nor conceptually
dissimilar to His knowledge. We have
explained that the knowledge which
He has is identical to His will. It is
also clear that His power is His
essence being contemplative of the
whole as an intellect, and it is the
principle of the whole, not taken
from the whole, and it is a principle
by virtue of itself.”…
It is clear and evident that
the philosophers do not disagree with
the Mutakallimūn on the definition of
power and its explanation. Rather,
the controversy concerns its
applicability to its instances. For
instance, does power include will
being its concomitant or not? The
philosophers advocated the former,
and the Mutakallimūn the latter.
Therefore, the act of giving existence
in this respect is an act of giving
existence by power according to the
philosophers, but not according to
the Mutakallimūn. The controversy
returns to the question of whether
this is by means of power and choice
or not, not to whether will is a
concomitant or not….
Abu’l-‘Abbās al-Lūkarī
states in the Bayān al-Ḥaqq: “Power
in His case is devoid of possibility
(or: potentiality imkān), and it is the
emanation of the act from Him by
His will alone.” …The Master says
near the beginning of his book al-
Ta‘līqāt:
Among the properties of the
possibly existent is that it needs
something from the Necessarily
Existent in order to exist. If the
First is described as being
powerful, according to what they
say, this means that it is possible
for an act to proceed from Him, or
if He wills, He acts. Thus they
have compared Him, with respect
to this power and will, to man,
since he is able to act if he desires.
This means (1) that He acts by
reason of a motivating factor which
motivates him to act, or it means
(2) He acts when he has a
preponderating cause….This is the
meaning of “power” according to
them. If the First is necessary by
virtue of himself, and power is
ascribed to Him potentially, a single
thing would be both necessary and
possible, or possibility would be an
attribute belonging to the
Necessarily Existent. This is
impossible. Therefore, it is
 necessary for all of Him to be
necessary and actual, since He is
the Necessarily Existent by virtue
of himself. We only mean by our
words “He is powerful actually”
that His power is His knowledge,
and that insofar as He is powerful
He is knowing. In other words, His
knowledge is a cause for the
emanation of the act from Him.
His power is not a motivating
factor which motivates Him to act.
His power is His knowledge. The
meaning of “the powerful” to them
is “that which an act is able to
proceed from.”
From this what was said
about them agreeing that the
Necessary is unconstrained in the
 sense that if He wills, He acts, and if
He does not will, He doesn’t act, is
invalidated. (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 582-
587)
[357] See also Wamīḍ 7.3.11 on the
question of the eternity of God’s
attributes. This argument is very similar
to the argument for eternity based on
the unchangeability of the cause of the
universe, which Davidson summarizes
as follows:
Should an unchangeable cause of the
existence of the universe be
presupposed, an argument for
eternity can be framed which runs:
An unchangeable cause is known to
be responsible for the existence of
the universe. But an unchangeable
cause would not pass from a state of
inaction to a state of action. The
cause of the universe cannot,
therefore, have acted to bring its
effect into existence after having
failed to do so, and the universe must
be eternal….
The unchangeability of the
ultimate cause must be posited in
order to avoid an infinite regress of
changeable causes. Creation is
thereupon found to be untenable
because it would imply that a cause
which must be unchangeable
nevertheless changes. [see Ibn Sīnā,
Shifā’: Ilāhiyyāt 376]…
Proclus argues…that the
decision to create the world at a
particular moment would constitute a
change in God’s will….The argument
 is that on the assumption of creation,
the cause of the universe, or the
deity, would enter a new relationship.
(Davidson, Proofs for Eternity 56-
60)
Response:
The advocates of creation…agree
that the ultimate cause, or deity, must
be unchangeable. But the line they
take is that since the deity must be
unchangeable, the act of creating the
world would not, in his case, have
constituted a change….Philoponus,
Shahrastānī, and Gersonides…belong
to the circle of philosophers who are
confident that the creation of the
world can be demonstrated
definitively. Taking the truth of
creation and the impossibility of
 eternity as a premise, they explain:
The deity eternally wills the creation
of the world (Philoponus and
Gersonides) and is eternally an
“actual creator” (Shahrastānī), but
since an eternal world is intrinsically
impossible, the world cannot possibly
be produced by God from eternity.
The world comes into existence as
soon as it can, and the soonest it can
come into existence is in the finite
past…. (Ibid. 76-78)
[358] ‘Alawī comments: “What is
meant by “not by this evidence” is not
by the fact that it is impossible for the
pre-eternal to need a cause. As for
what he means by the remaining
words, the Mutakallimūn give evidence
for its cause being powerful and having
choice as follows: If the world is
created, its cause is powerful and has
choice; since the premise is true, so
likewise is the consequent” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 587-588).
[359] ‘Alawī comments:
This is because “creation” is an
attribute of existence, which consists
of its being after non-existence, so it
is definitely posterior to it….The
Master states in the Ta‘līqāt:
“Existence, insofar as it is existence,
is existence dependent upon the
agent, not insofar as it is creation.
Therefore, whenever the agent
ceases to exist, existence ceases to
exist with it. The meaning of creation
is “existence after not existing,” and
“existing after not existing” is an
 attribute of this created existence, but
it is not an attribute which belongs to
it from the agent, but rather this
attribute belongs to it by reason of
the priority of non-existence.” (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 591)
[360] ‘Alawī comments:
This is based upon the fact that what
is dependent upon the act [of the
agent] is the essence, not existence,
and as long as it is not necessary it is
not given existence in an accidental
manner….His position is that if it is
not necessary, it is either (1)
impossible of substantialization in
relation to Him, or (2) it is possible
of substantialization, although in
terms of priority (awlawiyya)….If
the complete cause exists, it is
 impossible for its effect to be
posterior to it [in time], or conversely
[for the cause to be posterior]. So if
the effect exists, it is necessary for its
agent to exist with all the aspects of
the action. Otherwise, the
preponderation of one of the two
extremes of the possible would be
required without a preponderator.
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 592-593)
[361] See Ghazālī’s elaboration of this
argument in the Tahāfut I, 23-27.
[362] Similar to this objection is given
by Ghazālī, where he says: “We say
that an agent consists of one from
whom an act proceeds together with
the will to act according to choice and
the knowledge of what is willed. But
according to you the world proceeds
from God in the way an effect
proceeds from a cause, as a necessary
consequence, which it is inconceivable
for God to prevent, just as a shadow is
a necessary consequence of a person
[casting it] and light is a necessary
consequence of the sun. But this is not
a [voluntary] act at all” (Incoherence
56).
The response of Averroes to
this objection is as follows:
We observe in the empirical world
two kinds of agents, one which
performs exclusively one thing and
this essentially, for instance warmth
which causes heat and coldness
which causes cold; and this kind is
called by the philosophers natural
agents. The second kind of agents
are those that perform a certain act at
one time and its opposite at another;
these, acting only out of knowledge
and deliberation, are called by the
philosophers voluntary and selective
agents. But the First Agent cannot be
described as having either of these
two actions, insofar as they are
ascribed to transitory things by the
philosophers….There is no
counterpart to His will in the
empirical world….There is no
difference between one who says
that God wills with a will which does
not resemble the human will, and one
who says that God knows through a
knowledge which does not resemble
human knowledge. (Tahāfut al-
Tahāfut III, 88)
 The philosophers believe that
there are four causes: agent, matter,
form, and end. The agent is what
causes some other thing to pass from
potency to actuality and from non-
existence to existence; this
actualization occurs sometimes from
deliberation and choice, sometimes
by nature, and the philosophers do
not call a person who throws a
shadow an agent, except
metaphorically, because the shadow
cannot be separated from the man…
and the philosophers certainly believe
that God is separated from the world,
and according to them He is not to
be classed with this kind of natural
cause. Nor is He an agent in the
sense in which any empirical agent,
 either voluntary or involuntary, is; He
is rather the agent of these
causes….The philosophers do not
deny absolutely that God wills, for
He is an agent through knowledge
and from knowledge….They only
affirm that He does not will in the
way that man wills. (Tahāfut al-
Tahāfut III, 89-90, 95)
[363]‘Alawī quotes from Ibn Sīnā in
the Ta‘līqāt:
The meaning of our saying that He is
powerful is that He is actually like
this always and forever. We do not
mean what the masses confess to
each other with respect to a powerful
person among one of us, for power
in us is a potentiality (quwwa). Thus
it is not possible for anything to
proceed from our power, as long as it
is not given preponderation by a
determinant. For we have power
based on two
contraries….Consequently, power in
us is potential, whereas the First is
free from potential. If He is
described by power, He is being
described by perpetual action….The
will in us is also potential, and power
in us is sometimes in the soul and
sometimes in the members. Power in
the soul is according to the will and
in the members according to
impulsion. So if we describe the First
by power, according to way admitted
by the masses, it would be necessary
for His action to be potential. He
would remain as something which
 does not proceed into action, and He
would not be perfect….
His knowledge is the cause
of action proceeding from Him, and
His power is not by reason of a
motivating factor which motivates
Him. Hence, His power is His
knowledge. The meaning of
“powerful,” according to them, is
that which permits an act to proceed
from Him. (qtd. in Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
594-595)
[364]‘Alawī comments: “ He means
by ‘mental considerations’ correlations
and relations. For example, His
knowledge of possible existents insofar
as their emanation and non-emanation
from Him is possible, pertains to
power, and insofar as their emanation
from Him is necessary, it pertains to
will” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 595).
[365] Qur’ān 12:76.
[366] L. Gardet explains about the two
terms al-qaḍā’ and al-qadar: “When
combined into one expression, these
two words have the overall meaning
of…the eternal decree (the most
frequent meaning of qaḍā’) and the
decree given existence in time (the
most frequent sense of qadar). Other
translations are possible: for example,
qaḍā’, predetermination…; qadar,
decree…or fate, destiny, in the sense
of determined or fixed. It is also
possible to use qaḍā’ alone for decree
in its broadest sense and define qadar
more precisely as existential
determination” (Encyclopedia of Islam,
al-ḳaḍā’ wa al-ḳadar). Jurjānī in his
Ta‘rīfāt summarizes the Ash‘arite
conception of qadar and qaḍā’ in the
following definition: “Qadar is the
passage of possible entities from non-
being into being, one by one, in
accordance with qaḍā’. Qaḍā’ pertains
to pre-eternity, while qadar belongs to
the present order of things.” Ibn Sīnā’s
definition in the Ishārāt is similar:
“Every thing…is attained by His
existential determination (qadar),
which is the particularization (tafṣīl) of
His first decree (qaḍā’)” (Ibid.). My
translation of qadar as “fate” stems
from the qadar of something being the
realization of the divine decree, or
predetermination, in time, due to the
series of causes and effects which led
to it. The meaning of these two terms
is reversed, however, in the writings of
Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsā’ī based upon
traditions of the Shī‘ī Imāms (see, for
example, his Sharḥ al-Mashā’ir, p.
15).
[367]Qur’ān 12:43.
[368] I think Mīr Dāmād has erred in
linking the word “limit” (ḥadd) to
“named” (or “object named”
musamman). A new sentence should
start after ḥadd, and the subject of its
verb “is not” (lam yakun) should be
God; in other words, His essence
negates qualification and limitation by
names.
[369] Qur’ān 26:83.
[370] Qur’ān 20:50.
[371] Qur’ān 87:3.
[372] Qur’ān 26:78.
[373] Ta‘ṭīl is a theological concept
denying God all human attributes,
whereas tashbīh is a theological
concept whereby God is compared to
human attributes.
[374]‘Alawī comments: “ He alluding
by this to the fact that opposition
occurs between two propositions, not
with respect to their being propositions
and not with respect to the subject of
the proposition, but with respect to
affirmation and negation being related
to the same thing in the same respect.
In short, the opposition of affirmation
and negation only occurs when one of
two things is related to a third thing to
which the other is related by
affirmation and negation” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 603).
[375] ‘Alawī comments: “This is
assuming that a negative is related to
the negative, not to the affirmation of
the negative, according to what one of
the eminent held, supposing that
negation is only correlated to
affirmation, not to negation” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 603).
[376] ‘Alawī points out that this sense
of “non-fragrance” is not the negation
of fragrance, such as when we say “A
fragrance exists in it” and “A fragrance
does not exist in it,” since these two
cannot coexist (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 604).
[377] Sajjādī gives the followings
definitions of ḥaythīyya:
With regard to propositions, if the
subject of a proposition is “insofar as
it has another thing associated with
it” outside of the subject of the
proposition, this is the associative
circumstantial mode (ḥaythīyya
inḍimāmī). If the subject of a
proposition is “insofar as another
thing is derived from it,” this is the
derivative circumstantial mode
(ḥaythīyya intizā‘ī)….
Lastly, absolute circumstantial
modes are either qualifying (taqyīdī)
or causal (ta‘līlī). The first kind is
where the circumstantial mode and
insofarness (taḥayyuth) is like part of
the subject, as is the attribute of
speaking in man. The second is
where the insofarness is outside of
the subject itself, like something
being a cause and an effect, where
the causality and effect are outside of
the essence.…The diversity of causal
circumstantial modes does not
necessitate multiplicity in the subject
itself. Rather it necessitates
multiplicity in what is outside of the
subject. But diversity in qualifying
circumstantial modes requires
multiplicity in subjects, in other
words, in the subject itself.
In the case where multiplicity
of modes necessitates multiplicity in
subjects, i.e., the essence of subjects,
there are also two kinds. One is
where the diverse circumstantial
modes differ essentially in
themselves, but are not contrary by
one of the kinds of contrariety,
except accidentally, such as with
shape, quantity, taste, being, smell,
heat, and so forth among the
categories of accidents, which are the
different circumstantial modes of
bodies. Their contrariety is an
accidental contrariety. The other kind
is where the circumstantial modes are
contrary essentially, such as the
contrariety of black and white,
knowledge and ignorance.
In short, whenever the intent of
insofarness is to determine the
subject, and the intent of
qualification (taqayyid) is non-
qualification of the subject, and this
is where the subject is determined
absolutely as subject, this kind of
circumstantial mode is the absolute
circumstantial mode. For example,
the quiddity (māhīyya) insofar as it is
neither existent nor non-existent. Or
the intent of its insofarness may be
that the circumstantial mode and the
insofarness are part of the subject
insofar as it is a subject. “The body
with respect to being a plane is white,
and from the respect that it is white,
it is seen,” which is the qualifying
and associative circumstantial mode.
Whenever the intent of
insofarness is to determine the cause,
this is like saying “Man insofar as he
apprehends strange things is
 astonished, or from the standpoint of
being astonished is laughing,” which
in this case is the causal
circumstantial mode. (Farhang-i
‘Ulūm-i ‘Aqlī 240-241)
[378] Although qualifying
circumstantial modes are blended as a
unity in the essence, they are distinct in
mental consideration. In other words,
there is a hierarchy of distinct concepts
that make up the essence and some
have a natural priority to others.
[379] In other words, when any
particular circumstantial mode is
considered, another circumstantial
mode belonging to the same subject
cannot be considered at the same time.
Man insofar as he is rational cannot be
considered at the same time as man
insofar as he is animal, even though
both concepts are united in the
essence. Zayd insofar as he is striking
‘Umar cannot exist simultaneously with
Zayd insofar as he is comforting
‘Umar.
[380] An absolute proposition does not
have a modality (jiha). Such a
proposition simply affirms or denies a
certain relation between subject and
predicate without referring to the
necessity or impossibility of that
relation, such as: “Ruminants are
cloven-footed” and “Horses are not
blue.” (muslimphilosophy.com) From
the above, it is apparent that absolute
propositions also do not have
circumstantial modes.
[381] ‘Alawī comments: “The upshot
is that the necessity of the emanation
of A and B from C simultaneously
through the same circumstantial mode
is impossible” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 613).
[382] This appears to conflict with the
earlier discussed doctrine of Mīr
Dāmād that everything other than God
is a composite duality of essence and
existence. If the First Emanated is also
absolutely one, in the way God is one,
then the problem of how multiplicity
derives from oneness is merely
transferred to the First Emanated.
However, it becomes clear in the next
Wamīḍ that Mīr Dāmād distinguishes
between God’s absolute oneness and
the numerical oneness belonging to all
possible things. The First Emanated,
being a possible thing, can only have
numerical oneness, but not absolute
oneness.
[383] ‘Alawī comments:
This is with respect to the vertical
series, inasmuch as this sense is
primary origination (ibdā‘),
according to what the eminent
philosophers hold, due to its sole
dependence upon the Originator
himself in His solitary essence. The
same applies with respect to the
individual of the system of existence
with respect to the horizontal series it
contains, due to its sole dependence
upon emanational causality in the
second sense, which in turn depends
upon God’s essence, which is one in
every respect. That emanational
causality is primary origination. The
 Seal of the Scholars overlooked this
causality when he made the first
emanation His essence (exalted be
He) and the second emanation the
real correlation with respect to the
First Emanated. He failed to propose
the middle way between His real,
solitary essence and the correlational
emanation posterior to the two sides
of the agent Essence and the made
entity, which is the First Emanated
Thing in the vertical series and the
system of existence in the horizontal
series. Let it be pondered. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 617-618)
[384] ‘Alawī says: “This is because
the manifestation of something is
increased by the manifestation of its
opposites” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 619).
[385] ‘Alawī comments:
It is clear that his position is that
knowledge in an absolute sense is a
perfection of the absolute Existent. If
His knowledge were an occurrence
by impression, this would require its
completion together with its
posteriority to the stage of His
essence, upon assuming His eternity,
and its completion together with its
posteriority to His essence with
respect to the container of
perpetuity….It befits us to recount
what he stated in that book, where
he said: “In like manner it is not
possible…to suppose that things have
determined forms in His essence, and
that His essence has a certain
knowledge consisting of impressed
forms. Exalted is He above that!…
[Rather,] God knows all things in all
their details upon their existence
through an illuminational presential
knowledge….
In a third way: Either that
form is a constituent of His essence,
so that His constitution is by the
things, or it is accidental to His
essence, so that it occurs to His
essence after the stage of His
essence, as a result of which there
would be no knowledge of things in
the stage of His essence….
In a sixth way, according to
this assumption, the essentially
necessary Maker would be a
substrate for His possible made
things, real pure existence would be
 conjoined in essence with void
quiddities and evanescent entities,
and multiple things would be
impressed in Him who is the real
One in every respect….” In sum…
His knowledge of things is His
knowledge of His own real essence
and His absolute entity. (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 619-622)
[386] ‘Alawī comments:
It is clear that those who believe that
knowledge impressed by occurrence
belongs to Him (exalted be He), as is
the literal sense of the Master in al-
Ishārāt and other works, do not hold
that it is an excellence belonging to
the determination and a perfection
belonging to existence, but rather
they maintain that it is an imperfect
 attribute. Nevertheless, [by this view]
His freedom from it is required in the
stage of His essence, then He is
adorned with it later. Exalted is God
above that! (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 624)
In other words, it is not Ibn
Sīnā’s position that God only has
knowledge of His creatures by the
occurrence of an impressed form in His
essence, since this would contradict the
intent of the passages in al-Ta‘līqāt
quoted by Mīr Dāmād above. Ibn
Sīnā’s doctrine is that God’s knowledge
is the cause of objects of knowledge,
not derived from objects of knowledge,
as is the case with human knowledge.
‘Alawī explains Ibn Sīnā’s theory on
God’s knowledge of particulars in
Sharḥ al-Qabasāt, pp. 113-115.
[387]‘Alawī comments: “ He means
by ‘different in notion’ the species
quiddity, and by ‘different in number’
the individual entity” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 624).
[388] Conversion is “the
transformation of one proposition into
a second whose subject is the predicate
of the first and vice versa and which
has the same affirmation or negation
and the same truth value as the first.
‘All men are mortal’ thus converts to
‘Some mortals are men’.” (Glossary of
Philosophy of Illumination 196)
[389] ‘Alawī comments:
If it is said that it is possible to say
about a universal thing, like absolute
heat, that it has many causes, this is
predicated upon the possibility that
many causes do not determine that
its particulars should occur by one of
them alone. For some of the
particulars of heat may occur
because of the proximity of fire,
others may occur because of the rays
of the sun, and yet others may occur
because of motion, due to each one
of them necessitating heat.
The Seal of the Scholars
states in one of his books on logic:
“They say that multiple
demonstrations for one objective are,
in reality, a single demonstration,
since one thing has only one
complete cause.” This is his
argument, and it implies that one
species effect has only one complete
cause….
 In short, the effect,
whether it be of the species or of the
genus, only needs a certain thing
without which it cannot be realized.
This thing may be something
individually one, whose multiplicity is
impossible, or it may not be like this.
According to the first option, that this
individual has a cause in one aspect
alone, the cause is this thing in this
circumstantial mode. If it is not like
this, but the cause has multiple
aspects, the cause, in reality, is the
common sum (qadr) between them.
The effect only depends upon the
particularity of each of them
separately due to its inclusion in the
[complete] cause, not due to its being
a cause of it in its particularity. For
example, if the effect is one in
species and multiple in individuals,
each individual depends implicitly
upon another cause as well.
The import is that if the
one in species or in genus occurs
sometimes by one thing and at others
by another thing, or if it depends
sometimes on one thing and
sometimes on another thing, this is
not due to each one of these two
being its complete cause, since this is
impossible, but rather because its
complete cause is one of the two
things or the common between
them. The effect’s dependence upon
these two, therefore, is due to their
inclusion in what is the cause in
reality, not due to each of these two
 being an independent cause, since
one thing can only have one cause.
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 629-630)
[390] In other words, it is essentially
possible for the noblest possible thing
to require an aspect nobler than itself,
but it is essentially impossible for the
Necessary Being to require this.
Therefore, what is essentially
impossible in the Necessary Being is
possible in relation to the noblest
possible thing.
[391] The realm of primary origination
and the world of possibility are
equivalent terms here. In other words,
the realm of primary origination
contains the possibilities and quiddities
of all things prior to their connection to
space and time. Sajjādī, in defining the
term “primary originated sciences”
(‘ulūm ibdā‘ī), explains that this refers
to “the separate substances which are
the forms of God’s knowledge”
(Farhang-i ‘Ulūm-i ‘Aqlī 418). Mīr
Dāmād, as seen in Wamīḍ 9.4.8, does
not believe that such forms are
impressed in God’s mind by
occurrence, as occurs with human
objects of knowledge. Rather, he holds
that God’s knowledge is identical to His
essence.
[392] ‘Alawī comments:
The Chief in the Ta‘līqāt referred to
something like this, where he stated:
The separate causes which produce
human souls are not such that a first
soul is produced from them, which
then produces another soul and a
subject for the soul, which is
absolute matter [in the manner of the
emanation of the intelligences, souls,
and their spheres in the vertical
order]. In like manner, a first soul
does not occur in it and from that a
second soul, unless matter is
particularized by something so that it
is receptive to this soul instead of
that soul. That thing is a constitution
by which matter is particularized, as
a result of which matter thereby
gives preponderance to the existence
of this soul over another one. The
same applies to the forms in matter
and the accidents in subjects. Matter
does not give preponderance to this
form over another form, unless there
is a particularizing factor
 (mukhaṣṣiṣ), and a subject does not
give preponderance to this white, for
example, over another color, except
through a particularizing factor.
However, the particularizing factor of
forms and accidents particularizes
them through matters and subjects
and causes them to exist in them.
With respect to souls, it particularizes
them through bodies, which are
subjects to them, but it does not
impress them in them, because souls
subsist in themselves, while those
others [i.e., accidents and forms] do
not subsist in themselves. (qtd. in
Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 633)
The separate causes
mentioned above refer to the active
intellect, the last intelligence in the
series of emanated intelligences, and
the continuous motion of the celestial
spheres. As Davidson explains Ibn
Sīnā:
The active intellect is (1) the
emanating cause of the matter of the
sublunar world, (2) the emanating
cause of natural forms appearing in
matter, including the souls of plants,
animals, and man, and (3) the cause
of the actualization of the human
intellect….All natural forms are
contained in the active intellect in a
unified, undifferentiated mode, and
the active intellect eternally emanates
them not through choice but as an
eternal, constant, necessary
expression of its being. Ibn Sīnā
therefore calls the active intellect the
“giver of forms.” And yet the active
intellect is an incorporeal, unitary
being, and “a unitary [cause]
produces only a unitary [effect] in a
unitary [subject].” If the active
intellect acted upon undifferentiated
matter, no differentiation of effect
would be possible, and matter would
not exhibit a plurality of forms. A
“particularizing factor” (mukhaṣṣiṣ)
must consequently “tip the scales”
(yurajjiḥ) and “prepare” matter for
receiving a given natural form to the
exclusion of another. One set of
factors particularizing matter and
preparing it to receive a natural form
is the “influences” emitted by the
celestial spheres; for although
themselves free of qualities, the
 spheres instill the four basic qualities
—heat, cold, dryness, and wetness—
in matter. Another set is the motions
proper to the several spheres, as
distinct from the daily motion
common to all. The difference in the
movements of the several spheres
“prepares matter for [receiving]
divers forms.” Still other factors
preparing matter for natural forms
are forces indigenous to the sublunar
world. (Davidson, Alfarabi, Ibn
Sīnā, & Averroes on Intellect 76-78;
see Ibn Sīnā, Shifā’, Metaphysics,
Book 9, Chapters 4-5)
[393] ‘Alawī comments:
This is due to the fact that the stages
of the intelligences in the vertical
series derive from successive
circumstantial modes, and the
circumstantial mode of the emanation
of the First Emanated is the First
Concomitant of the Real Agent
(exalted be His majesty). The
circumstantial modes of the
emanation of the subsequent
emanated things are successive
concomitants which engender the
order of those subsequent emanated
things. The apparent meaning of the
Master, as we have transmitted it
previously, is that the First Emanated
from Him is the First Concomitant,
which is dependent in its essence
upon His essence. In like manner, the
apparent meaning of our teacher in
the next “Wamīḍ” is that the
immaterial, primary originated things
 depend upon successive
circumstantial modes, and the order
of the celestial souls and the ethereal
bodies in this series are posterior to
the stages of the intelligences. (Sharḥ
al-Qabasāt 633-634)
[394] This last part is confusing. Mīr
Dāmād appears to be saying that an
intellect is the intermediary between
God and motion and prime matter,
because it has an aspect of potentiality
by which it borders God and an aspect
of actuality by which it is linked to
motion and prime matter.
[395] ‘Alawī explains that by “entity”
(huwiyya), quiddity is meant here,
“since God is a pure existence
sanctified from quiddity” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 638).
[396] Sajjādī says: “The term nafs al-
amr means the boundary (ḥadd) of the
essence of each thing. Some say the
intent is the stage of the active intellect.
The first intelligence and universal soul
are also called nafs al-amr” (Farhang-i
‘Ulūm-i ‘Aqlī 596).
[397] The relation of the human soul
to the active intellect with respect to
acquiring theoretical knowledge,
according to Ibn Sīnā, is explained by
Davidson as follows:
Ibn Sīnā advances a set of arguments
to establish that the human soul,
unlike other natural forms emanated
by the active intellect, is an
incorporeal substance, “which does
not in any sense exist in a body as a
power or as a form of the body.”
The burden of the arguments is that
intelligible thoughts, by which Ibn
Sīnā appears here to specifically
mean concepts as distinct from
propositions, are indivisible and can
be present only in an indivisible and
hence incorporeal subject. Since the
human soul is “the subject” that
“receives” intelligible thoughts, the
soul must, he concludes, be an
incorporeal substance. [Shifā’: De
anima 209 ff.; Najāt 174 ff.]
At birth, the incorporeal
human soul contains no thought
whatsoever and has merely an empty
potentiality for thinking. As the child
grows, the potentiality develops….
[Ibn Sīnā] thus differentiates three
stages of the human potentiality for
thought….(1) “Material” intellect is
the wholly “unqualified potentiality”
for thought which belongs to “every
member of the species.” It is a
“disposition” (isti‘dād) inhering in
the incorporeal human soul from
birth. (2) “Intellect in habitu” (bil-
malaka) is the “possible potentiality”
in which the human subject
possesses the “first intelligible
thoughts.” These are theoretical
propositions of the sort man affirms
without being able to “suppose that
they might ever not be affirmed”;
examples are the propositions that
“the whole is greater than the part”
and “things equal to the same thing
are equal to each other.”…(3)
“Actual intellect,” despite the name,
is a further stage of potentiality—the
stage of fully actualized potentiality.
It is the “complete potentiality” that
is attained when both “second
intelligibles” and “intelligible
forms”—that is to say, derivative
propositions and concepts—have
been added to the “first intelligibles,”
with the proviso that the human
subject is not thinking the
propositions and concepts. At the
stage of actual intellect, the human
subject does not “actually…attend
to” his knowledge, yet he can do so
“whenever he wishes.”…
In addition to the three
stages of potentiality for thought, Ibn
Sīnā distinguishes a level of a
different character: (4) “acquired
[mustafād] intellect,” which alone is
an “unqualified actuality.” At the
level of acquired intellect, “intelligible
forms” are actually “present” to man,
and he “actually attends” to
them….Ibn Sīnā’s acquired intellect
is, literally, acquired from the active
intellect. The unqualified actuality of
thought is “called…acquired,
because…potential intellect passes to
actuality” by establishing contact
with the active intellect and having
“forms acquired from without
imprinted” in man’s intellect. [Shifā’:
De anima 48-50, 241; Najāt 165-66]
…
Each level is therefore the
result of a passage from potentiality
into actuality. Ibn Sīnā postulates,
following Aristotle, that “whatever
passes from potentiality to actuality”
does so “only through a cause that is
actually [what the other is
potentially].” “There must
consequently be a [wholly actual]
cause that makes our souls pass from
potentiality to actuality in respect to
intelligible thoughts,” and the cause is
the “active intellect.” [Najāt 192-93]
Ibn Sīnā…assumes [in this
case] that one thing renders another
actual by “providing the actuality of
the second.” Inasmuch as the
actuality of the human intellect is
actual intelligible thought, actual
intelligible thoughts must be what the
active intellect provides the human
intellect. And if the active intellect
provides the human intellect with
intelligible thoughts, it must consist in
them itself. It must “provide and
imprint upon the soul the forms of
intelligible thought from its own
substance.” [Najāt 192]
Everything said so far
relates exclusively to theoretical
thought. The principles of man’s
practical intellect do not, according to
Ibn Sīnā, have their source in the
active intellect; they are “commonly
accepted views, traditions, opinions,
and flimsy experiences.” [Shifā’: De
anima 207]…Judgments based on
experience carry certainty only for
the individual instances witnessed or
for exactly similar instances. To take
an example, although perhaps “all
animals we have observed move
their lower jaw when chewing,” the
judgment should not be generalized
and applied to species beyond those
observed…. “The crocodile,” [for
example,] moves not its lower jaw
but “its upper jaw when chewing.”
Since universal judgments carrying
the stamp of certainty cannot be
grounded in empirical evidence, they
must be “acquired” from outside the
physical realm, “from a divine
emanation that conjoins with the
rational soul and with which the
rational soul is conjoined.”…
Ibn Sīnā’s mature
philosophic works distinguish five
“internal senses” belonging to animal
and human souls. All five are
physical, operating through different
parts of the brain, and two of the five
have the function of preserving the
perceptions of other senses. The
retentive imagination (khayāl;
muṣawwira) preserves sensations
processed by the sensus communis,
which is the internal coordinating
faculty for the five external senses;
and memory (ḥāfiẓa; dhākira)
preserves the perceptions of the
estimative faculty (wahmiyya), which
is the intuitive faculty whereby
sheep, for example, recognize the
wolf as dangerous and to be avoided.
[Shifā’: De anima 44-45; Najāt 163]
Now, Ibn Sīnā reasons,
when a perception is forgotten, it
does not disappear from the animal
or human organism but remains
“stored” in the part of the brain
serving either the retentive
imagination or the memory.
Forgetting is an instance of the soul’s
ceasing to attend to a percept that is
stored in the brain, while recollection
is the soul’s attending to it once
again. But, he continues, whereas the
memory and the recollection of sense
perceptions are thus amenable to
physiological explanation, a different
kind of explanation is needed for
memory of “intelligible thoughts.”
Intelligible thoughts—which I
understand here to mean concepts—
are, as he has proved, indivisible.
Being indivisible, they cannot subsist
in a divisible substratum and hence
cannot be present in a physical organ
or known through a physical faculty.
[Shifā’: De anima 209 ff; Najāt 174-
78] They are therefore not stored
anywhere in the human organism
after they have been learned. Nor
can they be “actually present” in the
soul when not attended to, since the
soul is perforce conscious of
whatever thought is actually in it.
When not attended to, intelligible
forms must exist outside the human
soul and outside the physical realm.
Ibn Sīnā dismisses the Platonic
theory of separately existing
incorporeal Forms, and having
eliminated all the unacceptable
alternatives, is left with the
conclusion that intelligible thoughts
exist in an incorporeal being from
which they are “emanated” upon the
human soul. Actually to know them
is to enter into “conjunction” (ittiṣāl)
with the incorporeal “principle that
gives intellect,” in other words, with
the “active intellect”; and actual
human knowledge of a thought is
“acquired intellect.” Learning a
thought is the process of replacing
the soul’s original “defective”
disposition for the thought with a
“perfect [tāmm] disposition” that
enables the soul to establish
conjunction with the active intellect
at will. Memory of the thought is the
possession of the perfect disposition
for it. To recall a thought is to
reestablish conjunction with the
 active intellect vis à vis the given
thought. [Shifā’: De anima 245-48]
(Davidson, Alfarabi, Ibn Sīnā, and
Averroes on Intellect 83-89)
[398] ‘Alawī comments: “This is a
persuasive and satisfying answer to
[the question about] the impression of
false things in the active intellect with
respect to conception, for whatever is
in it is real (ḥaqq) within the boundary
of itself, a trueness (ṣidq) which no
doubt touches. Those true forms
impressed in the active intellect are
impressed in the human mirrors along
with false forms by reason of their mis-
disposition” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 640).
[399]Mīr Dāmād explains: “ By
‘concomitants of the essence’ is not
intended here the concomitants of the
quiddity, according to the usage of the
Craft. Rather what is meant are
concomitants from which the essence
cannot be separated in existence” (qtd.
in Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 642).
[400] Suhrawardī’s position on the
number of celestial intelligences is
similar. He holds that the number of
intelligences in the horizontal order are
beyond calculation, being at least as
numerous as the number of stars in the
heavens and the number of species in
the world. (See Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 99-
103.)
[401] See Wamīḍ 9.4.25. This is
evidence of Mīr Dāmād’s Aristotelian
tendency in al-Qabasāt as opposed to
a Platonic tendency, which he may
have exhibited earlier in his life. One
wonders what is the nature of the
forms given to matter by the active
intellect if they are not natural species
forms?
[402] See Wamḍa 2.7 ff. on the types
of priority.
[403] ‘Alawī comments: “There is no
natural priority or posteriority between
the celestial souls in existence, due to
the lack of one of them being a cause
of the other. There is only a priority or
posteriority in existence with respect to
stage, in the sense that whatever is
nobler in this horizontal order is
naturally prior to what follows it in
stage.” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 647)
[404] In other words, the prophet,
because of the nature of his prophetic
faculty, has the capacity, unlike other
human souls, of becoming one with the
Active Intellect (F. Rahman, Prophecy
in Islam 35).
[405] Qur’ān 24:35.
[406]Qur’ān 33:40.
[407] For the precise process, as
explained by Alfarabi and Ibn Sīnā, see
F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam, 37-38.
[408] Qur’ān 33:33.
[409] Qur’ān 78:1-3.
[410] Qur’ān 36:12.
[411] Qur’ān 13:43.
[412] ‘Alawī comments:
Through this the secret of what he
said about the intelligence being a
circle which does not move comes
into sight. First, this is due to the
capacity of its encompassment, and
second, since all of its attributes are
actually present simultaneously
without one preceding another, the
intelligence is [not] transferred from
one to another, in contrast to the
soul. This is why the soul is said to
be a circle which moves.
Furthermore, although the
attributes of the intelligence are all
simultaneously present without one
preceding another, they are posterior
to the stage of its essence, as a
consequence of which its
qualification by its attributes is
essentially after it wasn’t so qualified.
The secret of what he said about it
being a circle which moves also
comes into sight. This means it is
 transferred from the simplicity of its
essence to its attributes all at once
perpetually, not in time or a now due
its sanctity from both of these.
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 659-660)
[413] ‘Alawī comments:
He is referring here to what he
established earlier, namely, that
God’s oneness is not numerical, due
to the impossibility of number
occurring from it, since number is the
repetition of one….
Furthermore, some of the
ancient philosophers believed that
diverse regulations (tadābīr) and
multiple functions, and shapes and
states, are astonishing things which
the bodies of animals and humans
contain, and it is not possible for
 their principles to be confined to the
souls attached to them, for we know
by necessity our unawareness of
these [automatic] regulations and
functions. [Since] it is impossible for
them to proceed from one who has
no consciousness of them, therefore
their agent is another thing which
knows all these functions, and they
called it “the lord of the species.”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 660-661)
[414] See Wamīḍ 5.4.7, where Mīr
Dāmād allows interpreting Platonic
Forms in this sense of “lords of the
species.” He is clear there, as he also
states in Taqwīm al-Īmān (p. 369), that
God’s knowledge of things is not
through the Platonic Forms. Mīr
Dāmād’s position on God’s knowledge
of things, and the cause of creation, in
fact, appears to mirror what A. H.
Armstrong states for Thomas Aquinas:
“God who is not merely the most
perfect of substances and fully self-
sufficient but is Absolute Being, infinite
in all His perfections, knowing all
things in His single and simple act of
complete self-knowledge which
necessarily comprehends knowledge of
all His effects, on Whose free will all
things depend absolutely for their
being, so that the cosmos only exists at
all by reason of His continual, most
intimate, actuating presence” (An
Introduction to Ancient Philosophy,
90-91).
[415] Qur’ān 37:1-3.
[416] Qur’ān 79:1-5.
[417] ‘Alawī comments:
By “before the essence (dhāt)” he is
referring to predicable parts [like
genus and species] and factual
(ma‘nawiyya) parts, in other words
objective (khārijiyya) parts [like
prime matter and form]. By “with
the essence” he means sanctified
from multiplicity with the essence in
terms of a quiddity [or: “whatness”]
and an existence [or: “thatness”]. By
“after the essence” [he is referring]
to something like added attributes, as
the Ash‘ariya believed in, and
quantitative parts, which are
subsequent to a quantifiable
individual entity, for they are parts
after the whole, just as the first are
parts before the whole. (Sharḥ al-
 Qabasāt 669)
[418] ‘Alawī comments:
Since multiplicity before the essence
is of two kinds: (1) factual
(ma‘nawiyya) parts, like prime
matter and form, and (2) mental
(‘aqliyya) parts, like genus and
species, it is said that the first are the
cause of existence and that the
second are the cause of the quiddity.
He is alluding to the denial of the first
in the Necessary Being by his words
“a cause of Him,” and to the denial
of the second by his words “a cause
from Him.” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 669)
[419]‘Alawī comments: “ This is the
meaning of their statement: ‘Number is
the moving intelligence’, or ‘the
intelligence is a moving number’ ”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 670). In other
words, the First Intelligence is like the
number one, and through its repetition,
or movement, number, or the other
things, come into existence.
[420] It may be noted here, that if the
Pen is to inscribe the realities of things
in the book of existence, it needs some
medium on which to inscribe first
before it can inscribe. This is an
argument for the pre-eternity of prime
matter, but this is not supported by Mīr
Dāmād, who states that God is the
creator of matter. He says: “God has
brought things into existence and
created them in their entirety in
perpetuity, not from matter and not
from anything at all….The Creator has
invented both matter and what
possesses matter in perpetuity, not
from matter and not from anything, but
after real non-existence, not in any time
or place at all” (al-Qabasāt 4.6, 134).
Ibn Sīnā holds that the prime matter of
the sublunar world is the first
emanation of the Active Intellect.
[421] Qur’ān 68:1.
[422] A reference to the verse: “There
is not a grain in the darkness of the
earth, nor anything fresh or dry, but it
is [inscribed] in a clear book” (6:59).
[423]‘Alawī comments: “ The gist is
that the motions of the spheres do not
depend upon their corporeal faculties,
but rather they only depend upon their
immaterial souls, which move them by
volitions subsequent to universal
intellections. Particular imaginations
can only exist in corporeal faculties
receptive to these particular
perceptions, like the imaginative faculty
in us. Thus the relation of the
[imaginative] faculty of the sphere to
motion is not by agency but by
receptivity” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 671).
[424] ‘Alawī discusses problems
related to will and motion in Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 672-674.
[425]Qur’ān 17:44.
[426] It is clear from this that Mīr
Dāmād does not believe in a single
prime matter underlying all things,
because the prime matter of each
celestial body is distinct from the prime
matter of the other celestial bodies and
from the prime matter of the world of
the elements. It would be very
problematic if Mīr Dāmād were saying
that each species in the corruptible
world has an intelligence associated
with it which also creates its prime
matter, as he is maintaining for the
celestial bodies, since this would imply
that the corruptible species in our world
are discrete units with no actual
connection to other species. It would
definitely obviate evolution, except
within a species itself. But by saying
that the prime matter of the world of
the elements is one, he is saved from
this problem. This means, as already
given by Ibn Sīnā, that there is only a
single intelligence which produces the
prime matter of the world of generation
and corruption. Once the corruptibility
of the entire visible cosmos is
recognized, the solution, which Mīr
Dāmād would no doubt have perceived
had he known what we know today, is
to get rid of the whole hierarchy of
separate intelligences and to have only
one universal Intelligence which
contains the forms of all things and
only one universal prime matter.
[427]‘Alawī comments: “ Like what
belong to the spheres, and the
rectilinear are like what belong to the
planets and others among the
changeless beings, since they are
transferred from place to place, even
though they are moving in a circular
motion around themselves and rotate
around their centers. Thus they have
both circular and rectilinear motions.
His words ‘the beings’ are the simple
elements” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 674).
[428]‘Alawī comments: “ He means
by ‘the immaterial substance’ the first
intelligence, which is the abode of
intelligible forms….And He attached to
that immaterial substance and divine
light spirits, which are the incorporeal
souls of the spheres, which resemble
those immaterial forms” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 674-675).
[429] Qur’ān 2:255.
[430] ‘Alawī maintains that every
action has a goal (ghāya), and he
refutes the position of those who
believe that “accident” is a separate
cause outside of the four causes, such
as is Democritus’ theory of atoms
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 676).
[431] What Ṭūṣī means here by a
collective unity of diverse existents in
the intelligible world is described well
by Armstrong in his description of the
Divine Mind-World of Plotinus:
“Another important development is that
the union of Mind and Forms in the
Divine Mind-World is so close that the
Forms are themselves living
intelligences and everything There is
awake and alive. And, being live
intelligences, by the laws of Aristotelian
psychology, they interpenetrate. Each
Form-Intelligence thinks the whole
World of Forms and so becomes it; so
that There the part is the whole and the
whole is in every part….It enables him
to present his Mind-World as perfectly
unified, containing real diversity but no
separation” (Introduction to Ancient
Philosophy 187-188).
[432] Qur’ān 15:21.
[433] Mīr Dāmād explains the
meaning of this in Wamīḍ 10.5.6.
[434] ‘Alawī comments: “Or [in the
sense of infinite magnitude] in position,
due to the removal of a beginning and
an end for the rotation [of the sphere]”
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 676).
[435]‘Alawī comments: “ He means
without any elemental matter here,
since ‘what is with them’ includes
forms of knowledge, the souls, the
celestial bodies, and the impressible
faculties subsisting in them. Matter is
not applicable to them in this
[elemental] sense, though they are
[fashioned] from a celestial matter, and
their prime matters differ in species,
which restricts each species to one
individual” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 677).
[436] The meaning here is that God
has created all things in perpetuity with
a beginning but without any end. If
they were created temporally, they
would have to have both a beginning
and an end.
[437]‘Alawī says: “He means by
‘once’ here ‘perpetually’ in the real
world” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 677).
[438] ‘Alawī comments:
It is clear that in a literal sense the
Master [Ibn Sīnā] holds that
predetermination consists in the
forms of knowledge subsisting in His
essence…and this is contrary to what
the author holds. Moreover, evils are
not things to which His existentiation
is connected, for they are the
concomitants of the good things of
fate….Thus it is clear from the
contents of his words that His
predetermination is the first existent
to emanate from Him, and it is the
forms of knowledge subsisting in His
essence, not the impressed forms of
knowledge, since they are not the
first existent to emanate from Him
due to their being preceded
essentially by the Pen and the Tablet.
However, that which the
author [Mīr Dāmād] holds concerns
God being—by reason of His self-
subsisting existence (wujūd
qayyūmī), which is knowledge of all
the existents, which is
predetermination—without the
subsistence of the forms of
knowledge in His essence due to His
sanctity….He is sanctified and
exalted above them, as indicated by
his previous words: “The
predetermination considered in
relation to the one harmonious
system of the Great Man is
epistemological only with respect to
its being evident in God’s knowledge
by virtue of His knowledge of His
solitary essence, which is its
complete efficient cause.” He is the
genuine Real Being, by assent. For
this reason, He is the Pure Good
without any evil in Him either
essentially or accidentally. This, then,
is the first predetermination. Then he
referred to other stages of the
predetermination and to the stages of
fate….
The Master says at the end
of his commentary on the Sūra of the
Dawn [re: Say: I seek refuge with the
Lord of the Dawn from the evil
which He has created” (113:1-2)]:
This Sūra alludes to how evil
proceeds from the divine
predetermination. Its meaning is
accidentally, not essentially. The
source of evil is due to the
human soul, which is the animal
and vegetative faculties and
attachment to the body….
(Sharḥ al-Qabasāt 677-679)
[439] These words of Mīr Dāmād are
similar to Ṭūṣī’s in Wamīḍ 10.5.5,
though Mīr Dāmād is careful to leave
out any implicit reference to the pre-
eternity of time. Though if “infinite
forms” are required to perfect matter,
this implies an infinite amount of time
in the future, which Mīr Dāmād calls a
“non-ceasing infinity,” which is
different from an actual numerical
infinity.
[440] It seems that the motion of the
sphere would have to be constant in
speed; hence, maybe the “variance”
comes from the difference in the
position of the sphere through the
motion.
[441] Qur’ān 2.115, etc.
[442]‘Alawī comments: “ The
philosophers hold that each thing has a
natural set time in which its moisture is
dissipated and its heat is extinguished,
but this set time may be cut short by
diseases and plagues. They do not
mean that if someone is killed, his
death has not occurred in his time, but
rather they mean that it is not in the
nature of composite life to always exist
due to the [gradual] dissipation of its
moisture and the extinguishing of its
heat. As it is impossible to live without
these two, its corruption is an inevitable
consequence…” (Sharḥ al-Qabasāt
679).
[443] ‘Alawī comments: “He is saying
that death, for example, is not good in
relation to the one who is dying,
although it is good in relation to the
system of the whole, since were matter
to remain permanently engaged with a
specific form, the other particulars
would be obstructed” (Sharḥ al-
Qabasāt 680).
[444] Qur’ān 4:79.
[445] Ibn Sīnā states that these three
kinds of evil do not exist at all (see
Shifā’ p. 346).
[446] In other words, if something is
decreed to happen.
[447] Qur’ān 104:6.
[448] He means that God decrees that
mankind must will and choose, and this
is compelled, but we are free to will
and choose as we desire in response to
our circumstances.
[449] In other words, obliged to
choose between two contrary options.
[450] Qur’ān 17:44.
[451] Qur’ān 2:186.
[452] The implication is that
remembrance of God is worthier than
entreating Him.
[453] Qur’ān 64:1.
[454] Qur’ān 10:89.
[455] Paraphrased from various verses
of the Qur’ān.
[456] Suhrawardī.
[457] Qur’ān 53:42.
[458] Mīr Dāmād is here stating that
even the quiddities of things can
become non-existent, although he has
explained in the first and second
qabasāt that they are accidentally non-
existent in any case in the absence of
the cause of their existence and
absolutely non-existent, logically, in
themselves.
[459] Qur’ān 3:26.
[460] Qur’ān 21:23.
[461] Qur’ān 76:30.
[462] Qur’ān 13:8.
[463] Qur’ān 4:79.
[464] Qur’ān 35:22.
[465] Qur’ān 85:20, 6:61, 2:255.
[466] The simple interrogative is to
ask: Does something exist? This is to
ask about its “thatness.” The
compound interrogative, on the other
hand, asks both: Does it exist and what
are its attributes? This is to ask about
its “whatness.” In other words, that the
names of God exist may be affirmed,
but exactly what they are cannot be
encompassed by human minds.
[467] May 13, 1625.
[468] December 23, 1624.