Washingtonpost.

Newsweek Interactive, LLC

Broken Promises
Author(s): Arjun Appadurai
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 132 (Sep. - Oct., 2002), pp. 42-44
Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183453 .
Accessed: 17/06/2014 11:44

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Foreign Policy.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 216.165.95.66 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:44:44 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 WhatIs the International
Community?
The site of the WorldSocial Forumin 2001 and
2002, the medium-sizedBraziliancity of Porto Ale-
gre has become a byword for the spirit of this bur-
geoning global community.Galvanizedby the slo-
gan "anotherworld is possible,"some 50,000 people
flocked to this coastal city from January31 to Feb-
ruary 5, 2002-more than three times the number
attending in 2001. The pilgrims included Indian
fisherfolk, Thai farmers,U.S. trade unionists, and
indigenous people from Central America. Seattle
symbolized the first major victory of the transna-
tional anticorporateglobalization movement, but
Porto Alegrerepresentsthe transferto the South of
that movement'scenter of gravity.
Now taking place annually, the Porto Alegre
forum performsthree functions for the real global
community.First, it representsa physical and tem-
poral space for this diversemovementto meet, net-
work, and affirmitself. Second,it enablesthe move-
ment to gather the energies needed to escalate the
struggleagainstthe processesand structuresof glob-
al capitalism. (Naomi Klein, author of No Logo,
put it well when she told the PortoAlegreparticipants
that the movementneeds "lesscivil societyand more
civildisobedience.")And third,PortoAlegreprovides
a venue for the movementto debate the vision, val-
ues, and institutionsof an alternativeworld order.
Among the shared understandings emerging
from this enterprise are two approaches. At the
national and communitylevel, the movement'sgoal
BROKEN PROMISES
By Arjun Appadurai
heinternational is neither
community inter-
national nor a community. It is not inter-
national because, as a moral idea, it does
not exist in any recognizable organizationalform.
It is not a communitybecauseit has little to do with
social relations,spatialintimacy,or long-termmoral
amity. Yet there is something compellingly real
about this misnamed object. That reality lies in its
moral promise.
Arjun Appadurai is the William K. Lanman Jr. professor of
international studies at Yale University.He is the author of
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization
(Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press, 1996) and edi-
tor of Globalization (Durham:Duke UniversityPress, 2001).
42 FOREIGN POLICY
This content downloaded from 216.165.95.66 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:44:44 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
must be to consciously subordinatethe logic of the
marketand the pursuitof cost efficiencyto the val-
ues of security,equity,and solidarity.In the language
of the great social democraticscholar KarlPolanyi,
this effort is about reembedding the economy in
society ratherthan letting the economy drive soci-
ety. For this dynamic to unfold, the global context
must move from a centralized governance regime
that imposes rules in the service of one model of
economic growth to a pluralistic system in which
institutional power and global economic gover-
nance are decentralized.Only in such a global con-
text-more fluid, less structured,more pluralistic,
with multiplechecks and balances-will the citizens
and communitiesof the South and North find ways
to develop based on their own unique values,
rhythms, and strategies.
The price of failure would be high. In the early
20th century,the revolutionarytheorist Rosa Lux-
emburgwarnedthat the futuremight belongto bar-
barism.Today,corporate-drivenglobalizationis cre-
atinginstabilityand resentmentsthat in turncan give
way to fascist, fanatical,and authoritarianpopulist
impulses.The forces representinghuman solidarity
and truecommunitymust step in quicklyto convince
the disenchantedmasses that a betterworld is pos-
sible. The alternativeis to see the vacuum filled by
terrorists,demagogues of the religious and radical
right, and-as in the 1930s-the purveyorsof irra-
tionality and nihilism.
The moralpromiseof the ideaof the international
community rests on a moral premise and a wish.
Sometimein the period afterthe birthof the League
of Nations,and fortifiedby the ascendanceof the idea
of human rights in the international order after
WorldWarII, a decisiveshift took place away from
the notion that relationsbetween nations were fun-
damentally premised on power and interest and
towardthe ideathat all nationscould formsome sort
of genuine moral system on a planetaryscale. The
emergenceof the United Nations and its affiliated
agencieswas the main expressionof this shift. Ever
since, a deep battle has raged between these two
visions of politics beyond the nation-one funda-
mentallyrealistand instrumental, the othermoraland
moralistic. The international community is today nation as wealthy as the United States no longer
less a social fact and more a way to remindnation- escapesthe net of the globaleconomy,if nothingelse
states of the common humanityof theircitizensand because its runaway financial engine can hardly
of the essential decencies that must guide relations function wholly within the confines of the U.S.
between nations. It is the single strongestslogan of nationaleconomy.More generally,both on the street
the liberal value of empathy at a distance, the idea and in the chambersof the technocrats,the fraught
that makeseveryonefeel obligedto recognizethe suf- debatesabout an institutionsuch as the WorldTrade
fering and needs of all human beings. Organizationare more than indicatorsof resistance
The social expression of this moral slogan is, of to reformor of anti-Americanismin many quarters.
course, not completely ephemeral. It appears in a They are symptoms of the impossibility of con-
web of relations and institutions defined by those structing new global organizationson an interna-
nations springingdirectlyfrom the democraticrev- tional conceptual foundation.
olutions of the 18th century-along with theirdirect A certainvision of internationalismis therefore
supportersoutsidethis originalset-and those inter- coming to an end. The world needs global organi-
national organizations zations and transnation-
that either came out of al arenas for citizenship
the Leagueof Nations or "The international
the BrettonWoods con-
community... and sovereignty. of the
The
inter-
exclusivity
sensus. But for most of is the single strongestslogan of national community is
the world, the interna- not just one more chap-
tional community is less the liberalvalue of empathy ter in the story of how
a communitythan a club wealthy nations have
for the world'swealthiest at a distance." always behaved-carv-
nations, notably those in ing up the world in the
North America and names of their own civ-
Western Europe, which have combined relatively ilizing missions. Rather,the challengefor the inter-
strongdemocraticpolitieswith high standardsof liv- national community is to transform itself into an
ing for the bulk of their citizens. instrumentof global governance.This objectivecan-
Thus, as a social and political reality,the inter- not be achieved by stretching the current liberal
national community does not inspireany real sense vision of internationallaw and a common human-
of ownership among the poorer 80 percent of the ity to accommodate more countries and points of
world's population. And even among the upper 20 view. Rather,new ideas about global governanceare
percent, it remains a network for a relativelysmall a prerequisitefor tacklingthe problemof inclusion.
group of politicians, bureaucrats,and intervention- So, what of the premiseand promiseof the inter-
ist opinion makers.Yet its political exclusivenessis national community, as primarily a landscape of
not its most difficult challenge. consciencemore than a political or legal formation?
The central problem is that the international Those who today speak on behalf of the interna-
community today is a Westphalianform struggling tional community must tackle the following chal-
to remain the ruling authority in an era of increas- lenges: Can notions of global equity, peace, and
ingly transnationalloyalties, regional polities, and freedom remainregulatedby the relations between
global economic regimes. Each of these trends is nations, when markets, migrants, and money have
bad news for polities, economies, and societiescon- all slipped substantiallybeyond the control of the
ceived in national terms. Diasporic affiliations and nation-state?Can the world continue to behave as
mobile, media-linkedcommunities of migrantsare if covenants between nations exhaust the limits of
redrawingthe relationshipsof location and affilia- what happenswith air,water,land, and all otherbio-
tion. Sri LankanTamils,Kurds,Chineseemigrants, logical resources,when the fate of the environment
Indian techno-coolies, each in their own way, owe is clearly affected by transnationalprocesses, inter-
their allegiance to multiple forms of citizenship. ests, and profit-making strategies?Can the world
Their mental geography is surely no longer West- continue to behave as if nations are the most sig-
phalian. In this sense, these communitiesmimic the nificant receptaclesof large-scaleloyalty in a world
global market, which is now strikinglybeyond the where various forms of religious,moral, and polit-
regulativecapabilitiesof most nation-states.Even a ical affiliations are plainly transnationalin scope?
SEPTEMBER IOCTOBER 2002 43

This content downloaded from 216.165.95.66 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:44:44 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 What Is the International Community?

And finally,can the world rely on any sort of inter-
national force to bring peace when it is increasing-
ly clearthat wars have becomean affairof everyday
life and of civil society itself in many countries?
If the answersto these questionsare not built on
a new culturalarchitecturethat recognizesthat glob-
al politicsarenot justinternationalpoliticsby anoth-
er name,the internationalcommunity-with its moral
promise-may well be reducedto an exclusiveclubor
a museumdevotedto memoriesof Westphalia.

GALLANT DELUSIONS
By Ruth Wedgwood
community"is a dangerousrefer- deaths or shorten the war. Even after the fighting
nternational
ence point for the naive. Its connotation of began, Izetbegovic rejected more than one peace
sociability and commitment invites unwise plan, still betting that the West would enter with
relianceby those who must ultimatelyfend for them- guns blazing. The United Nations issued dozens of
selves. Its diffusion of responsibilityexcuses coun- resolutions, but Security Council rhetoric did not
tries that have no intention of lending a hand. The intimidate armed militias. NATO's belated involve-
conceptamountsto a moralhazard,inspiringimpru- ment finally separatedthe parties,but today Bosnia
dent behavior by leaderswho expect that someone remainsin tatters.
else will pull their fat out of the fire. Or consider Cambodia in 1992-93, scene of a
in
Some illustrations:Startwith Bosnia the years massive U.N. peacekeepingoperation designed to
of Yugoslavia's collapse. Sarajevo was urged to organize democratic elections. The Khmer Rouge
refrain from any precipitous move toward inde- leadership wouldn't play, opting to exclude thou-
pendence. Negotiations for a looser form of sands of lightly armed blue berets and election
Yugoslav federation organizers from the
remained possible, and Khmer territorial
the Bosnian Serbsmade "The lawless scoff at an redoubt. Vietnam's pro-
clear that, push come to tege and former Khmer
shove, they would cast internationalcommunitywhose Rouge leader Hun Sen
their lot with Serbia, was defeatedat the polls,
even boycotting Saraje- words have no supporting but he ignoredthe ballot
vo's nationalreferendum box and successfully
on independence. A cannon fire." demanded a joint prime
close advisor asked ministership.An election
Bosnian President Alija notch on its belt, the
Izetbegovic how he would control the thousands UnitedNations promptlywithdrewfrom Cambodia,
of Yugoslav troops stationed within Bosnia, still leaving behind only a few human rights workers.
loyal to Belgrade.Izetbegovicreplied, "I will order Hun Sen later forced out coruler PrinceNorodom
them out"-wistfully supposing that the interna- Ranariddh and rebuffed a prolonged attempt to
tional communitywould back him up with military organize a joint war crimes tribunal. Hun Sen is
might.The 42-monthSerbbombardmentof Sarajevo now opening luxury hotels near Angkor Wat and
began soon after.Internationalpeacekeepersdeliv- runninga corrupteconomy.
ered food to civilians and (de facto) to combatants, Next is East Timor in 1999. This extraordinary
but this thin gruel did not prevent200,000 civilian periodfeaturedthe U.N.-brokeredplan for a nation-
al referendumon independence-a plan pushed by
Ruth Wedgwood is professor of law at Yale University and Portugal and accepted by Indonesia's remarkable
the Edward B. Burling professor of international law and PresidentB.J. Habibie. Aware that Jakarta-backed
diplomacy at Johns Hopkins University. She is a senior fel- militiasin EastTimorwere planningretaliatoryvio-
low at the Council on Foreign Relations and editor of After lence, the U.N. secretariatstill felt unable to make
Dayton: Lessons of the Bosnian Peace Process (New York: any plans to summon deterrent military commit-
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999). ments, fearful of deriding the word of a sovereign
44 FOREIGN POLICY

This content downloaded from 216.165.95.66 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 11:44:44 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions