Central and Eastern European Review

CENTRAL AND EASTERN

EUROPEAN REVIEW
Volume 11, 2017

WHAT WENT WRONG IN THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS?

THE THREE ELEMENTS THAT LED TO FAILURE
by
Nikolaos Stelgias
Eastern Mediterranean University

Abstract
In the wake of the interruption of the negotiations in mid-2017, this study aims to
investigate and underline the reasons that led to the new failure in the Cyprus talks.
Why did the negotiations collapse after a remarkable two-year effort? Who were the
main protagonists in this fiasco? What were the main points of disagreement at the
negotiations’ table? What were the disputes in the fields of security and equality?
What was the role of local society in the failure? This analysis attempts to answer the
questions mentioned above by putting the official positions of the two sides and the
related opinion articles and publications which have had an impact on the Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot press, under its microscope.

Keywords
Cyprus Problem, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Security, Political Equality

ISSN 1752–7503

10.1515/caeer-2018-0002

© 2017 CEER

First publication

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WHAT WENT WRONG IN THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS?

THE THREE ELEMENTS THAT LED TO FAILURE
By
Nikolaos Stelgias
Eastern Mediterranean University

Introduction
Ten years after the rejection of the United Nations’ reunification plan (Annan Plan), the
ascendance of two political men with a federal agenda to the leadership of the two communities
once again raised hopes for the final peaceful settlement of the Cyprus Problem. The election of
Mustafa Akıncı, a centrist politician with a social and democratic profile, to the leadership of the
Turkish Cypriot community, revived the hopes of those sections of Cyprus society which still
believe in the solution of the Cyprus Problem. Akıncı met Nicos Anastasiades, the only Greek
Cypriot political leader who supported the Annan Plan in 2004, at the helm of the leadership of
the Greek Cypriot community. Anastasiades’ political ascendancy also revived the prospects for
a ‘quick’ and viable solution to the Cyprus Problem on both sides of the Green Line as well as
in Ankara and Athens.
The two leaders remained at the negotiating table for approximately two years during
which the two communities managed to record significant progress in many fields.
Anastasiades and Akıncı managed to clarify their communities’ perceptions of the necessary
parameters of the federal solution which was an essential element of disagreement. For half a
century, the two communities had different expectancies of what the final settlement of the
Cyprus Problem would bring. Toward the end of 2016 and during the first half of 2017 the two
communities, the guarantors and the UN intensified their efforts for the final solution through
ground-breaking dialogue procedures. The said effort came to a halt when the UN Secretary-
General declared on the morning of 7 July 2017 the end of the last conference on the Cyprus
Problem which was held in Switzerland.
In the wake of the interruption of the negotiations, this study aims to investigate and
underline the reasons that led to the new failure in the Cyprus talks. Why did the negotiations
collapse after a remarkable two-year effort? Who were the main protagonists in this fiasco?
What were the main points of disagreement at the negotiations’ table? What were the
disagreements in the fields of security and equality? What was the role of local society in the
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failure? This analysis attempts to answer the questions mentioned above by putting under the
microscop the official positions of the two sides and the related opinion articles and publications
which have had an impact on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot press. As part of this
effort, we benefit from the rich archive of newspapers from the periods between 2008–2010 and
2015–2016. For our analysis, we have chosen to research the Greek Cypriot newspapers and
news sites ‘Χαραυγή’, ‘Σημερινή-Sigmalive’, ‘Πολίτης’, ‘Newsbomb’ and the Turkish Cypriot
‘Yeni Düzen’, ‘Halkın Sesi’, ‘Afrika’ and ‘Yeni Düzen Site’. The newspapers ‘Χαραυγή’,
‘Πολίτης’ and ‘Yeni Düzen’ follow a pro-solution political line. The other newspapers
mentioned and news sites have certain reservations regarding a federal solution and express the
nationalist positions of the two communities. For the needs of this paper, we choose to focus on
the periods of 2008–2010 and 2015–2016 because these are the two times since the Annan Plan
period during which the two communities discussed the immediate solution of the Cyprus
Problem based on the federal model.
Concerning the point mentioned above, we should underline that in aiming to provide a
more comprehensive reading of the latest developments in the Cyprus issue, we will not limit
our analysis to the negotiation process of the last two years. In the following sections, our study
highlights the fundamental disagreements that emerged at the negotiating table during the
leadership of Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat (2008–2010). Moving on we will be
focusing on the current phase of the Cyprus talks, with some notable variations, the analysis of
which goes beyond the limits of our study.
Thus, with the help of rich archive material, we will be approaching the new failure in the
negotiation process on a multidimensional level that will include the points of views of both
communities. Within this framework, our study focuses on the three elements that contributed
to the new failure. In the first section of our research, we will discuss the disagreement of the
two communities regarding the element of security. As is known, the dramatic events and the
armed confrontation of the 1963–1974 period have cast a dark shadow over the relations
between the two communities which have since attached great importance to the security factor.
The Turkish Cypriot community firmly believes that the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces
on the island will ensure its safety from threats such as the Greek Cypriot majority. For its part,
the Greek Cypriot side calls for the immediate removal from the island of the Turkish army,
which is described as an ‘occupation army’.
In the second section, we will approach the issue of equality between the two
communities and the different approaches of both sides to this vital aspect of the Cyprus
Problem. Political equality is perceived by the Turkish Cypriots as an additional ‘barrack’ that
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will ensure the community’s survival in the face of the danger of assimilation as a result of the
Greek Cypriot majority’s dominating tendencies. For its part, the Greek Cypriot community
rejects the said accusations and claims that its vision for a federal Cyprus insures the peaceful
co-existence of all Cypriots in conditions of freedom and equality. Moving on, in the third
section, we will focus on the absence of society from the process of solving the Cyprus
Problem. The study of the attitude of the local press toward the talks will help us understand that
‘high politics’ was not the only factor contributing to the negative outcome. ‘Low politics’,
namely the societies of both communities, had a significant part in the said failure.
In discussing the three elements of the new failure in the Cyprus talks, the present study
wishes to provide researchers, the academic community, politicians and diplomats with a
roadmap that contains answers to many questions concerning the multidimensional negotiating
process of the Cyprus issue.

The three elements of the failure

The element of security: the Turkish Cypriot insistence on the continuation of the
guarantee system, Turkey’s stake and the Greek Cypriot Veto
Beyond the original goal of the two communities to unite Cyprus with their respective
‘motherland countries’, at the epicentre of the Cyprus Problem, which for half a century has
attracted the attention of global public opinion, we identify the problem of political equality,
which we will analyse in more detail in the next section. In the early 1960s, the disagreement
about the principle of political equality led to an armed struggle that lasted about a decade, the
Turkish invasion of the island and the de facto partition of Cyprus. According to the Greek
Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot community was a minority which unjustifiably insisted on
claiming excessive rights and privileges. For its part, the Turkish Cypriot community
approached the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus as a unique structure, which resembled other
modern federations and constitutively guaranteed the political equality of the two communities
regardless of the existing population ratio of the island. The unbridgeable gap between these
two approaches led Cyprus to a bloody civil war that lasted from 1963 until 1974.
In the early 1960s, the disagreement surrounding the principle of political equality and the
division of the powers and structures in the new democracy went hand in hand with one of the
critical elements of the Cyprus Problem, the issue of security. Forty-three years after the de facto
partition of Cyprus, the two sides continue to disagree on the subject of the security model that
will be established in Cyprus along with the founding of the new federation. The Greek Cypriot
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side demands the transformation of the security and guarantee system on the island into a new
model according to which the Turkish army will have a symbolic role, and new safeguards will
be created to respond to the fears and concerns of the two communities that arose after the
events of 1963 and 1974. The Turkish Cypriot side rejects this proposal, stressing that the
perpetuation of the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus is necessary to safeguard and
monitor the principle of political equality and to ensure the safety of Turkish Cypriots. In a
similar tone, Turkey points out that while there are unrest and bloody confrontations in the
broader region, the need to safeguard her interests prevent her from withdrawing the army
forces stationed on the island.
According to Turkish Cypriots, the presence of the Turkish army on the island is a
necessary condition for the achievement and preservation of a solution. Within this framework,
the army’s role is to guarantee the security and stability of the proposed federation, the
transformation of the ‘TRNC’ into a founding element of the new federation and the
perpetuation of the Turkish Cypriot character of the northern founding state. During the period
2008–2010, the leadership of Mehmet Ali Talat and Ankara continued to maintain that the
security of the Turkish Cypriots depended on the presence of Turkish troops on the island:

‘President Mehmet Ali Talat underlined that at a time of current instability and the
restarting of the Cold War, security had become a significant issue. The Turkish
Cypriot people have secured their safety thanks to the Headquarters Peacekeeping
Forces and the Turkish Peace Forces in Cyprus, which carry out their duties selflessly.
To prevent the recurrence of war and instability (…) the preparedness and the force of
the Headquarters Peacekeeping Forces is important. (...) It is very crucial to guarantee
the security of the Turkish Cypriots under any conditions.’

Following in the footsteps of the previous leadership, the new Turkish Cypriot leader
favoured the perpetuation of the guarantees system which was inaugurated by the treaties of
1960. According to Akıncı, the Turkish Cypriot leadership aimed to ensure a solution that would
provide security for the Turkish Cypriot community. Akıncı’s position was also supported by
the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other officials of the Turkish government.
The Greek Cypriots on their part oppose the prolongation of the presence of the Turkish
army on the island and also demand the abolition of the right of intervention provided to Turkey
by the guarantee treaty. At the same time, the community advocates the creation of alternative
structures and security mechanisms that will ensure peace and stability within the island,
without the need for military intervention by a force foreign to Cyprus. During the period 2008–
2010, the Greek Cypriot side reserved the most severe stance for the issue of guarantees.

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Immediately after his election to the leadership of his community, Christofias specified that,
since the war of 1974, the Greek Cypriots had grown to fear and mistrust the Turkish military
and called for the revision of the system of guarantees as well as the withdrawal of the army
troops. As the government’s spokesman, Stefanos Stefanou stressed:

‘The Government’s fundamental position is that the presence of the Turkish army in
Cyprus since 1974 and the continuing occupation of a significant part of the territory
of the Republic of Cyprus constitute the cause of problems and of the Cyprus Issue
itself.’

As mentioned above, Christofias’ leadership didn’t aim at the absolute abolition of the
system of guarantees. As underlined in a publication of Politis, the Greek Cypriot side wished to
review the guarantees system:

‘(...) Several models that could replace or vary the existing system of guarantees are
already examined and discussed behind the scenes. The two sides appear, at this time,
to have diametrically opposite views. The G/C side pursues the review the guarantees,
but not the abolition of the Treaty of 60’, which would jeopardise the continuation
and transformation of the Republic of Cyprus into a federal state. (...) The European
military force will include Greek, Turkish and British forces. (...) The commander of
the force must be European. (...) The idea of establishing NATO forces on the island
which will take over security has not been excluded.’

The specific strategy remained in force during the leadership of Nikos Anastasiades.
Supported by Athens, Anastasiades’ administration demanded the immediate revision of the
system of guarantees, mainly the abolition of the right of intervention and its replacement with a
new alternative security model, in which the Turkish army would not play the leading role.
In mid-2017, the unbridged gap in the security aspect of the Cyprus Problem played a
decisive role in the collapse of new efforts to find a solution. The Greek Cypriot leader’s related
comment is evidence of the situation that was created:

‘We deeply regret that Turkey’s unwillingness to negotiate within the framework set
by the UN Secretary-General, and in particular Turkey’s intransigent stance on the
key chapters of security and guarantees, and its insistence on maintaining guarantees,
troops and intervention rights in reunited Cyprus, did not allow for a positive outcome
during the Conference on Cyprus in Crans Montana, Switzerland this past July,
President Anastasiades pointed out. (…) The Turkish Foreign Minister repeated
Turkey`s traditional positions on maintaining a system of security and guarantees, and
a permanent presence of troops on a reunited Cyprus. Moreover, contrary tο the UN
framework on territorial adjustments, Turkey steadfastly refused to address Greek
Cypriot concerns.’
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Rejecting the positions of the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and
Ankara clarified that they were ready to discuss only the transformation of the system of
guarantees under a transitional plan that would ensure the presence of the Turkish army in the
northern part of the island as part of the solution. The Turkish Cypriot side also advocated
maintaining ‘special relations’ with Turkey in the field of security. For the second biggest
community of Cyprus, in the new formula of the solution, the ‘effective assurance of Turkey’
was a necessity in order to secure equality, freedom and security in the whole island.
Thus, 43 years after the 1974 war, the issue of security once again stood in the way of the
peaceful coexistence of the two communities and the immediate solution of the Cyprus
Problem. In addition to the fear and suspicion of one community regarding to the true intentions
of the other, in the framework of the new impasse, the element of security was directly linked to
another major obstacle that the two sides did not manage to overcome: the element of the
political equality, which we analyse further in the next section of our study.

The elements of political equality: two different approaches for the United Cyprus
Federation
43 years after the de facto partition of the island, the element of security contributed to the
emergence of the talks’ new impasse. The archival material shows that the element of security is
at the epicentre of the Cyprus Problem and that the issue of political equality is its starting point.
In the mid-20th century, the Greek Cypriot side attempted to integrate Cyprus into Greece,
assuming that the Turkish Cypriot minority of the island would not object if it was awarded
several political privileges. But the Turkish Cypriot side not only rejected the plan but at the
same time called for the establishment of a federation that would not take into account the
population ratio of Cyprus and would be based on the principle of equal political representation.
The Turkish side proposed the partition of the island if the plan for Greek-Turkish co-
management of the Cyprus would be rejected. This difference in opinions and goals eventually
paved the way for the dramatic events of the summer of 1974.
Today, 43 years after the war of 1974, the element of the political equality continues to
play a crucial role in discussions about the future of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot side agrees to
discuss the possibility of the transformation of the Republic of Cyprus from a unitary state,
which has been under its control since 1963, into a federation. According to this plan, the
Turkish Cypriots will enjoy a number of rights and privileges, with the precondition that those
will not overshadow or hinder the smooth functioning of the new bi-communal structure. But at
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the same time, the Greek Cypriot side is reluctant to reveal the details of the said plan, if the
Turkish Cypriot side does not beforehand accept its positions on the issue of security. These
preconditions are a matter of concern for the Turkish Cypriot side, which regards the principle
of equality and thus its active participation in the new federation, as a cornerstone of the desired
solution.
During the leadership of Demetris Christofias, the Greek Cypriots focused on the
objective of reintegrating the Turkish Cypriot community and the northern part of the island into
the structures and the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, the ultimate aim of the Greek
Cypriot leadership in 2008–2010 was the transformation of the unitary state of the Republic of
Cyprus into a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, in which the northern part of the island
would integrate. The newspaper Haravgi, which as a party organ contributed greatly to
Christofias’ election as President of the Republic of Cyprus, on May 29, 2008, explained the
Greek Cypriot side’s position regarding the transformation of the Republic into a federal state
structure.

‘The Government, clearly and unequivocally, rejects the parthenogenesis and seeks a
solution on the basis of the UN resolutions, whose essence is the 'transformation of
the Republic of Cyprus into a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with the existence
of two states and a single Republic of Cyprus, a single sovereignty, a single
citizenship and a single international personality.’

From the standpoint of Demetris Christofias’s leadership then, the ultimate aim is the
reunification of Cyprus through the transformation of the Republic. The Greek Cypriot
leadership believed that this particular strategy would also offer a solution to the problem of
‘invasion and occupation’ by removing the ‘state structure’ that was de facto created in the
northern part of the island in 1983. According to the Greek Cypriot side, the ‘TRNC’ was
illegally established. Thus it controls unlawfully 37% of the island’s territory and the lives of the
Turkish Cypriot community. Within this framework, the Greek Cypriots believe that the
reintegration of the 37% of the island and the Turkish Cypriot community into the federally
transformed Republic will not only offer a solution to the illegality that is the ‘TRNC’, but also
guarantee that a two-state structure will not be established on the island.
For Demetris Christofias’s leadership, the transformation of the Cyprus state from a
single state structure into a federal state structure means creating two autonomous provinces, in
which each community will have the right to manage its affairs separately. But under no
circumstances are the autonomous provinces to be identified with ‘state structures’. Also, the

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Greek Cypriot side claims that the ‘effective’ participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in
decision-making mechanisms and the principle of rotating presidency that ensures the frequent
alternation of elected presidents coming from both communities, indicates in effect political
equality. However, in no case, does the Greek Cypriot side accept the idea of the representation
of the two communities in the new federation based on the principle of arithmetic equality.
Thus, when the two communities met at the negotiating table during the period 2008–2010 the
difference of opinion was evident on issues such as the bi-communal composition of public
structures and the distribution of power in the new federal state.
According to the archival material we have collected, Nicos Anastasiades followed in the
footsteps of his predecessor on the Cyprus issue. Within this framework Anastasiades, having
obtained the support of Christofias’s party that was then in opposition, supported the
transformation of the Republic of Cyprus into a federation. According to Haravgi, the ultimate
aim of the Greek Cypriot side during the new period remained the reintegration of the northern
part of the island in the territory of the Republic through its transformation into a federation and
the avoidance of the creation of two independent states on the island of Cyprus.
During the period we are studying, both Turkish Cypriot leaderships that were elected to
office, strove to ensure the constitutional and international legitimisation of the ‘state structure’
which was established in 1983 in the northern part of the island. Mehmet Ali Talat’s leadership,
taking into account the impact that the unrecognised status of the ‘TRNC’ had on Turkish
Cypriot political and social-economic life (through its resulting isolation from the international
community), tried during the period 2008–10 to launch an updated and modernised form of the
Annan Plan. According to this new strategy, the Turkish Cypriot side would no longer aim for
international recognition of the ‘TRNC’ as a sovereign and independent state structure, but
would strive to transform it into a founding member-element of the new United Cyprus
Federation. In the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, the ‘TRNC’ is the
product of the developments that occurred during the period 1960–1974 when the bi-communal
Republic of Cyprus (1960) was de facto transformed into a bi-zonal federal state (1974). What
remains then to do is to constitutionalise the said transformation, thus solving the Cyprus
Problem. According to Mehmet Ali Talat after the de facto emergence of a bi-zonal federation in
1974, the two leaderships should have focused on establishing the federation in a constitutional
and international framework based on the co-operation of the Republic of Cyprus, which since
1963 was under the control of the Greek Cypriot side and the ‘TRNC’, which has controlled the
northern part of the island since 1974 and the socio-economic life of the Turkish Cypriots since
1983. In other words, the key to the solution of the problem is the simultaneous transformation
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of the ‘TRNC’ and the Republic of Cyprus into the federal states of the new United Cyprus
Republic. In other words, Mehmet Ali Talat proposed a parthenogenesis:

‘(The new federation) will have two founding nations. We agreed on a bi-zonal bi-
communal federation (...). We do not claim that this system will be identical to that of
the US. As you know, the United States has a unique system. (...) From my
perspective, it is clear that the new federation will consist of the Republic of Cyprus
and the ‘TRNC’.

For the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the plan to transform the ‘TRNC’ into a founding
state of the new federation with increased responsibilities and powers is the core of the principle
of political equality. Within this framework, the Turkish Cypriot side underlines the importance
that arithmetic equality has for its community, while the Greek Cypriot leadership insists on the
principal of political equality that entails that the Turkish Cypriot minority will be represented
‘effectively’ in the new federation. From Talat’s point of view, the ‘TRNC’ will join forces with
the Republic of Cyprus to create the new federation on equal terms, and thus the Turkish
Cypriots should have a strong presence in all positions and all decision-making mechanisms of
the new central federal administration.
The vision of parthenogenesis that was revived in the statements of Talat, who pointed
out that the northern founding federal state would be the natural continuation of the ‘TRNC’,
lived on through the next leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mustafa Akıncı. In his first
public appearances, Akıncı implied that from his point of view, the solution to the Cyprus
Problem ran through the transformation of the ‘TRNC’ into a founding federal state and co-
operation with the Republic of Cyprus. In other words, there was no issue of dissolving and
abolishing the ‘TRNC’. Moving one step further than his predecessor, Akıncı underlined the
importance of ensuring the principle of bi-zonality by ensuring that, even after the solution of
the Cyprus Problem, the Turkish Cypriots will be the majority of the northern part of the island
regarding population and property. From this perspective, Akıncı’s leadership the compensation
of the Greek Cypriot owners and the exchange of the Greek Cypriot properties in the northern
side with the Turkish Cypriot properties in the southern side of the island were the most
appropriate formulae to solve the property issue. Akıncı. Like Talat before him, believed that
both the owner and the current user of a property should have an equal say in the decision of the
future of the property and that a property committee with absolute power should be established
to that effect.

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Concluding the second section of our study, we would like to emphasise that the elements
of the impasse preventing the solution of the Cyprus Problem can be traced not only to long-
standing issues like security and equality but also to more current developments that have
affected the island’s internal political arena during the last decade. The presidential elections in
the Republic of Cyprus and the referendum on the modification of the Turkish constitution are
some of the contributing factors to the new impasse.

The element of society: the local community’s lack of engagement with the peace and
reconciliation process—examples from the press
Since the middle of the last century, that is to say since the dawn of the Cyprus
Problem, talks on the final solution of the problem were a matter of interest
exclusively to foreign governments, the UN and the two leaders. Apart from the
bloody civil war period, during which members of the two communities attempted to
take the law into their own hands following the instructions of their leaders and the
short phase of mass demonstrations in connection with the Annan Plan, Cyprus’s
societies themselves have never played a leading role in the bilateral talks. It is our
opinion that the societies’ disengagement from the negotiation process, in
combination with the obstacles arising regarding the issues of security and equality,
contributes to the repeated failure of the joint talks for the solution of the Cyprus
Problem. We will attempt to analyse this deadlock and its association with the
element of society we in the third section of our study.
By ‘the element of society’ we refer to that part of the local Cypriot community
that is absent from the discussions about a solution. Recent polls show that during the
last decade, local society not only did not have a leading role in the solution but at the
same time with its lack of interest / confidence in the settlement process it contributed
to the gradual derailment of the talks. From 2008 until today, regardless of the
intentions and political agendas of their political leaders, the Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot communities continued to have feelings of suspicion and fear for the
‘other’. Within this framework, the emotions of mistrust and indifference toward the
intentions and the wishes that both communities hold for one another create a toxic
climate. Thus, both community representatives are deemed unable to take new
initiatives that could help build new bridges of communication and co-operation. For
example, a recent survey shows that 8 out of 10 Greek Cypriots are in favour of the

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immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. About nine out of ten
Turkish Cypriots do not agree with this view.
The adverse climate that is evident in local publications regarding bi-communal
relations also helps us understand the significant challenges that those participating in
the solution process have to face. From 2008 up to 2010, the majority of the local
media outlets adopted a negative-pessimistic writing style in analysing the significant
developments of the period. The widespread assumption at the time was that the
negotiations between Christofias and Talat would not produce a final settlement for
the Cyprus Problem, nor would they lead to any other positive results. During the said
period, the newspapers and the media outlets with a nationalist ideology and
affiliations to the right-wing opposition on both sides of the Green Line were not the
only promoters of the school of pessimism. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper Afrika,
which has for years supported the direct reunification of the island through the
reintegration of the Turkish Cypriots in the reorganised Republic of Cyprus, also had
a warning and pessimistic stance toward the bilateral talks. The majority of newspaper
headlines and opinion articles of this period used a variety of negatively charged
words and expressions when discussing the developments in the negotiations. Typical
examples of this pessimistic school of journalism are the following article titles from
the newspapers Simerini and Halkın Sesi:

‘The Turks are provoking in Ledras since morning’

‘Christofias’s veto over Turkey’s accession to the EU’
‘The intensive talks in the intensive unit’
‘It isn’t possible to return Morfou to the Greek Cypriots’
‘Thanks to the army there is no issue of security’
‘The Turkish Cypriot (leader) does not abide by Christofias’s thoughts’
‘We do not accept a lukewarm bi-zonality’

Both in the titles and the content of the publications mentioned above
‘aggressive’ and ‘negative’ terms such as ‘provocation’, ‘veto’, ‘hard’ etc. are used.
Also, the columnists of these newspapers use nationalistic and militaristic expressions
in their opinion articles and news reports. An important indicator of the negative and
pessimistic climate cultivated by these newspapers is the frequent use of the word
‘not’. The language used by the pessimistic school of journalism is often characterised
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by cynicism, sarcasm, distrust, negative thoughts and aggressiveness. This writing
style leaves no room for the constructive analysis of the sensitivities and priorities of
the ‘other’ side.
After a brief intermission in mid-2015 when the bilateral talks resumed the
pessimistic school of journalism resurfaced. For example, during the period 2015–
2017, the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Halkin Sesi, faithful to its negative stance
toward the negotiation process chose to highlight the ‘red lines’ of the Turkish
Cypriot community, cultivating thus a mode of pessimistic and disruptive
‘cautiousness’:

‘Osman Ertug, who spoke in Halkin Sesi said that the President’s declaration stating
that “the Turkish Cypriots would have the majority of the population and property (in
the northern part of the island, after the solution)” is a welcome development.
However, he emphasises that he (Akıncı) did not refer to the term “absolute
(majority)”. Ertug stated that: “In the issues of population and property the absolute
majority is important. The percentage of the absolute majority will be determined by
the two sides in the talks.” At the presidential press conference, we did not hear the
term “absolute (majority)”. In the relevant report which had also been adopted by the
UN Security Council, the term absolute majority is used. This is very important. The
1% is a majority. But yet, this is not enough.’

The Greek Cypriot newspaper Simerini adopted a similarly ‘cautious’ and

pessimistic attitude during the period of the bilateral talks between the leaders
Christofias and Talat. The newspaper did not rush to adopt any eschatological
speculations for the future of the negotiations, but still opted to remind its readers that
the positive climate in relations between the two communities would not be enough to
overcome the major obstacles that might occur during the negotiation process:

‘Despite the creation of a positive climate between the leaders of the two
communities, mainly because of social interaction, direct negotiations will continue
today under the dense shade—which is not publicly mentioned yet—of the positions
put forward by the Turkish Cypriot team regarding a number of relevant chapters of
the Cyprus Issue. According to Simerini’s information from the team of legal advisors
that supports both the President of the Republic and the Greek Cypriot negotiator, it is
reported that divergences from the Turkish Cypriot side are limited to the level of the
atmosphere and mood under which the dialogue is conducted. “In the essence of the
chapters, not only were substantial positive variations recorded, but in some cases,
there is slippage which is likely to cause many problems in the course of the talks,” a
member of the team commented to our newspaper.’

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Thus, journalism, the ‘mirror’ of modern societies, indicates how during the periods
discussed above the two communities continue to face each other with suspicion and
concern. In short, in a social and political environment where the feeling of distrust
and suspicion toward the ‘other’ sets the political and diplomatic agenda, avoiding a
stalemate on the issues of security and political equality is a challenging task.

Conclusion: transforming the three obstacles to opportunities for a solution

This paper sheds light on a crucial turning point in the history of the Cyprus Problem.
In mid-2017, the two communities of Cyprus were close to forming an agreement
regarding a solution framework that would pave the way for separate referenda on
both sides of the Green Line. In the previous sections, we saw how the three elements
of security, equality and society functioned as obstacles to the negotiation process and
contributed to the loss of this opportunity. The two sides have failed to settle the issue
of the security of the new federation. The Turkish Cypriot side insisted that the
Turkish army must remain in the island after the implementation of the solution, while
the Greek Cypriot side demanded its immediate its withdrawal from Cyprus. At the
same, in the field of the political equality, the two sides had different positions. As for
the element of society, the peoples of both communities have once again failed to
overcome their feelings of mistrust of the ‘other’. They limited themselves to the role
of the spectator and allowed pessimistic voices within the two communities to
dominate the public sphere and to smear all the efforts to find a solution to the
Problem.
In short, it is our opinion that the solution to the Cyprus Problem will be
significantly advanced if, in the future, the two communities manage to transform
these three elements from obstacles into opportunities. This analysis suggests that in
the future, the fields of co-operation and bridges of communication between the two
communities will increase. In particular, if the two communities manage to agree on a
transitional period regarding the issue of security which will ensure safety and
stability both inside and outside the new federation, then a significant obstacle on the
road to a solution will have been lifted. For this to happen, the two sides should
decide on the legal framework surrounding the pre-agreed limited time presence of
foreign troops on the island during the transitional period and the future of the
invasive rights that the three guarantor powers, namely Turkey, Greece and Great
Britain, have since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. Both these
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issues of security have been a ‘red line’ for the two communities, and the leaderships
have not shown the required political will to make the necessary compromises that
would take the Cyprus Problem one step closer to a solution. Also, Turkey’s
insistence on the perpetuation of the existing circumstances on the issue of security
makes it even more difficult to reach an agreement. Thus we wonder, couldn’t the two
sides agree to appease each other’s and Turkey’s fears by negotiating the extension of
the transitional period in exchange for the definitive abolition of invasive rights at the
end of the interim period? Or could they not agree to an alternative framework for the
issue of security that would entail a portion of the Turkish army remaining in the
northern part of the island under pre-approved conditions after the transitional period?
If the political leaderships show the required determination for a compromise solution
and if the local societies choose to overcome their fear of the ‘other’, then the obstacle
of security could be transformed into an opportunity.
Moving further down the road, for the solution of the Cyprus Problem the two
sides will also have to reach an agreement on the issue of implementing the principle
of political equality. In this field, as in the case of security, the two sides need to
compromise by finding the balance between appeasing the Turkish Cypriots’ fears
that their political status will be demoted by the majority and the Greek Cypriots’
concerns that crucial decisions of the new federation will be blocked by the minority.
Within this framework, two factors may have a fundamental role in transforming
these obstacles into opportunities for the solution of the Cyprus Issue. First, the Greek
Cypriots must recognise the importance that adequate representation in all structures
of the federation has for the Turkish Cypriot community and second the commitment
of both communities to create appropriate political and legal safeguards for the
smooth functioning of the new alliance.
A possible solution to the issues we have discussed above requires launching the
procedure of an all-embracing dialogue between the leaderships and societies of the
two communities. The transformation of obstacles into opportunities is a task for
which the two political leaders must show willingness. Also, the political will of the
two leaders must remain unaffected by political power struggles both internally and
externally. During the period we are studying, the political will of the leaders has
wavered in line with current developments. Taking into account the upcoming
electoral contests and the political events on both sides of the Green Line as well as in
Greece and Turkey, it is our opinion that a similar development will not be avoided
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shortly. But the active involvement of the local societies in the solution process and
the pressure they can apply may keep the leaders’ political will from shifting. By
active participation, we don’t mean only the direct involvement of society in the talks
but also the establishment of communication and co-operation channels between the
two communities in the fields of culture, education and the economy etc. The energy
reserves of Cyprus and collective economic partnerships, e.g. the joint project of
rebuilding the buffer zone and the closed city of Famagusta, as well as bi-communal
efforts to address the problems of everyday life and the economy could play a
fundamental role in this process.
In conclusion, if the leaderships and societies of two communities fail to create a
climate of confidence in bilateral relations and fail to turn current obstacles into
opportunities for a solution, the de facto partition of Cyprus will be definitive. In this
case, a public debate should be launched to determine a new model of resolution since
the two sides have so far failed to impose their versions on one another.

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About the author

Dr.Niko Stelgias was born in Istanbul in 1982. He completed his doctorate in
Panteion University of Greece (Department of Political Science and History) in 2011.
Dr Stelgia is a well-known author and researcher in Cyprus and Greece. His research
interests focus to the Cyprus Problem, the modern Turkish reality and the modern
political and social affairs of Greece. Dr Stelgias is a senior instructor in the
Department of New Media and Communication in the Eastern Mediterranean
University. His email address is stelgias@gmail.com.

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