Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Normalisation
of Cyprus’ Partition
Among Greek
Cypriots
Political Economy and Political Culture
in a Divided Society
Gregoris Ioannou
School of Law
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, UK
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
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To Ilektra
Acknowledgements
Many people have contributed in various ways, direct and indirect, to the
writing of this book. I would like to thank all those with whom I have
conversed in the last 20 years in the context of the peace movement. From
my academic colleagues I would like to thank in particular Andreas
Panayiotou, Theodoros Rakopoulos, Giorgos Charalambous, Antonis
Hadjikyriacou, Olga Demetriou, Danae Karydaki, Athena Skoulariki,
Sertac Sonan, Umut Bozkurt, Christos Mais, Pafsanias Karathanasis,
Alexis Heraklides, Serephim Seferiades, Nicos Trimikliniotis, Serkan Karas
and Niyazi Kızılyürek.
I would like to thank Konstantinos Tzikas for translating the original
Greek edition into English, allowing me to focus on the refining rather
than the re-writing of the text and thus making the editing, updating and
expanding of the manuscript an easier task. I would like to also thank the
University of Glasgow for supporting me in this.
As a book written not only from the perspective of social science, but
also from the perspective of peace activism, it is inspired from and speaks
to all those who believed and who continue to believe, acted and act for
peace in, and reunification of, Cyprus, as envisioned by the late Costis
Achniotis.
Finally, I want to thank Evgenia Nikiforou, my partner in life, and wish
our daughter Ilektra gets to experience a Cyprus that is better than the
one our generation experienced.
vii
Contents
ix
x Contents
References201
Index217
CHAPTER 1
‘If they choose to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in a separate, inde-
pendent entity, then they should be restricted to what is attributable to the exclu-
sive economic zone of that unlawful entity. Therefore, they have no reason to
question the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus.’ (Nicos Anastasiades,
2/1/2018, quoted in:
Alphanewslive. (2018) ‘Anastasiades’ statement provokes reactions’
[Αντιδράσεις προκαλεί η δήλωση Αναστασιάδη για την ΑΟΖ] (3/1/2018)
Alphanewslive https://www.alphanews.live/politics/antidraseis-prokalei-e-
delose-anastasiade-gia-ten-aoz)
The aim of the book is to record the basic dynamics that have shaped
the Cyprus problem since 1974, especially since the 1990s, a crucial time
in the building of partition. It does not adopt a historical logic, although
it approaches the subject matter historically and builds a more or less
chronological narrative of developments. The perspective and logic of the
text lies within the field of political sociology and approaches the Cyprus
issue in the light of power relations in society, focusing on the interaction
between the political elite and society, the political system and civil society.
I define normalisation as a societal process whereby people become accus-
tomed to prevailing conditions, accept them and treat them as the normal
state of affairs. Whereby they rationalise and naturalise that which is irra-
tional, arbitrary and abnormal and become accustomed to operating
within its political bounds. Although this is a historically determined pro-
cess, and of a structural character, it is neither solid nor inexorable. It is
enmeshed in contradictions and it is inherently fluid and potentially unsta-
ble. There are numerous cracks in what appears as a totalising system that
can and should be opened further. However, in order to identify where
the cracks are and how they can be made bigger one needs to examine the
whole wall on which they are situated.
The book focuses on the ideological field and analyses the political
dynamics, especially the recent ones, in relation to society and their depic-
tion in the public sphere. It also focuses on the Greek Cypriot community
without ignoring the parallel international developments, but also on the
dynamics within the Turkish Cypriot community insofar as they have
influenced or contributed to the process of partition. It was originally
published in Greek in 2019 by Psifides and subsequently translated and
published in Turkish in early 2020 by Baranga under the title Denktaş in
the south: the normalisation of partition in the Greek Cypriot side. This
English edition is an updated and expanded one, re-worked at some points
and enriched with some additional theoretical and empirical insights. The
Covid-19 pandemic, which overshows everything at this moment, has
served as an excuse and as a context for political developments in divided
Cyprus, rendering the book yet more topical and its argument yet stron-
ger. As of mid-March 2020, all the crossings between the northern and
the southern part of Cyprus have been forbidden and not only there has
been no cooperation between the two sides in dealing with the threat
posed by Covid-19 but the Republic of Cyprus restricted its reporting of
incidences and deaths only to those occurring in the south, as if the north-
ern territory is a separate country. More importantly it remains uncertain
4 G. IOANNOU
as to when and how the checkpoints will open again allowing movement
across the dividing line after this ‘temporary suspension’.
This book does not aspire to present a comprehensive and extensive
analysis of all the factors that have shaped the socio-political development
of the Greek Cypriot community in recent decades in relation to the
Cyprus issue. Nor can it account in detail for all the aspects of the develop-
ment of complex issues such as nationalism, peace talks, inter-communal
relations and the international environment. It has a much more limited
analytical agenda and much more specific questions to ask. However, it
does have the ambitious aim of articulating a general overview of how
partition has been normalised during the last decades. Or, to turn it on its
head, how partition was not disputed and not eroded sufficiently at a time
when it was geopolitically, politically and economically vulnerable both as
a balance and as a framework. This book aims to honestly raise the ques-
tion and discuss publicly and openly a kind of hidden but common secret.
The analysis of the normalisation of partition in the Greek Cypriot side
also has a political weight, that of reversing a firmly founded ideological
structure—but for this reason it also brings a sense of liberation to the
extent that it succeeds in this endeavour.
The book is divided into nine chapters dealing with various themes
focusing on periods, nodal points and fields that shaped the conditions of
normalisation of partition. It also includes a postscript after the conclusion
that is sort of autonomous from the rest of the book, in the sense that it
reverses the analytic frame by approaching the Cyprus conflict from the
outside as opposed to from the inside as the rest of the book does. After
this introduction, the second chapter sets the historical context and exam-
ines the creation of partition, introducing also conceptual issues in relation
to the political system, the political balance of forces and the dynamics of
identities and ideologies at a societal level. It essentially narrates the basic
developments of the 25-year-long period 1950–1975 that led to the sepa-
ration of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The third chapter discusses
sociologically the separation, as it was almost completely imposed between
1975 and 2003, and its consequences at the level of collective conscious-
ness between the two communities. Having outlined the key issues that
have historically constituted the Cyprus problem, the next chapters deal-
ing with the latest developments deepen the analysis and discuss the
parameters of the failure to be resolved.
The fourth chapter focuses on the opening of the barricades and the
big social potential that it created in 2003, but also how that failed to
1 INTRODUCTION: HISTORY, NEED AND CHOICES 5
assume a direct political form resulting in its erosion and in the leading
back to the margins of those logics and forces that persistently articulated
an anti-partitionist political stance. It also discusses the importance of the
existence of open checkpoints and crossings from 2003 to 2020 and their
impact on inter-communal relations. The referendum on the Annan Plan
is the central theme of Chap. 5, serving as a pillar on which the basic argu-
ment of the book is laid: that the consolidation of the partition was neither
automatic nor de facto, nor did it happen behind the back of the Greek
Cypriot community. It was not the resounding ‘No’ to Annan Plan which
sealed the partition. More important was the repulsion by many of the
consequences of the loud ‘No’ and hence their inability to work out alter-
native practices and other scenarios in the years to come. But the demysti-
fication that came with the referendum process meant the end of the fog
and the end of innocence for all.
The sixth chapter discusses the last battle between federation and parti-
tion in the 2007–2017 decade at the political level and how, despite the
apparent victory of the federalist forces, it was ultimately the forces of
partition that really prevailed defining the game. It reviews the internal
dynamics in the two communities, the international changes and the
developments in the negotiations until the collapse of the last round of
talks in 2017, distinguishing between the formal and substantive attitude
of the various actors, the form and content of the actions at the political
and societal level. Subsequently, the seventh chapter focuses on the role
played and not played by education and the media both historically and at
crucial moments in the development of the Cyprus issue, thus opening up
the discussion on the structures and institutions of the Republic of Cyprus
of emergent necessity and their impact on collective memory, social per-
ceptions and public opinion. The central theoretical concept here is the
idiosyncratic, deep state that has historically been shaped and reproduced
preserving certain dominant, ideological and political frames that impact
on present political time.
Finally, the eighth chapter opens up the analytical perspective and dis-
cusses in more theoretical terms the argument and, more specifically, the
political balances and political stakes as shaped by recent internal and
international developments. It deals with the class and political equilibria
within the Greek Cypriot society, briefly describes the left-wing approaches
and discusses the various lines, positions and plans of the Greek Cypriot
bourgeoisie and their association with the popular and worker strata. The
goal here is to explain the shifts, the legitimisation of policies and the
6 G. IOANNOU
Ending this introduction, I reiterate that history does not end and
everything can change. The future of the country will ultimately depend
upon its people and their action or inaction—people make their own his-
tory—as Marx’s famous saying goes. But it will happen in conditions
‘given by the past’. These conditions from the past are what this book
records, realistically and without any wishful thinking that may blur the
analysis. With the burning desire at the same time, however, to overthrow
the consolidation of the partition that is illustrated in the book. Because it
is my belief that the ‘any partition’ policy which the dominant section of
Greek Cypriot leadership is working upon and which is accepted and/or
desired by a strong portion of the Greek Cypriot community will be nei-
ther velvet nor advantageous nor will it solve the problem which will con-
tinue to haunt us, even if in the coming years some regulation is imposed
on its external aspects.
CHAPTER 2
1
Kitromilides, P. (1977) ‘From coexistence to confrontation: the dynamics of ethnic con-
flict in Cyprus’, in Attalides, M. (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed. Nicosia: Zavallis Press, pp. 35–70.
2 FROM NATIONALISM TO PARTITION 1950–1975 11
Muslims alike, began to adopt the Greek and Turkish identity respectively,
with pretensions to their neighbouring nation states.2
The rising Cypriot bourgeoisie was predominantly Christian, bearing in
mind that the Christian population dominated the marketplace during the
Ottoman period. Of course, there were also cases of Muslim businessmen
who usually also had greater access to public administration.3 The irredentist
concept of Greek nationalism that was imported in Cyprus by the Greek
state and the Greek communities of the broader region, such as the Greek
community of Egypt, had successfully taken root in the middle and upper
classes already by the early twentieth century through the education sys-
tem.4 This development was tolerated and indirectly supported by the
British Authorities, being perceived as a way of counterbalancing the exist-
ing Ottoman sovereignty of the island.5 However, after World War I, the
British no longer felt this need. At the same time, Greek nationalism was
disseminated among the rural classes and became an instrument in the
hands of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie and the Church.6 Simultaneously,
the traditional Muslim officials who still adhered to the Ottoman order of
things began losing ground before the emerging doctrine of Kemalist
Turkism that prevailed within the Turkish Cypriot community.7
2
Loizos, P. (2004) [1975] The Greek Gift: Politics in a Cypriot Village. Manheim:
Bibliopolis.
3
Nevzat A. (2005) Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave. PhD thesis.
Oulu: University of Oulu.
4
Bryant R. (2004) Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus. London:
I.B. Tauris.
5
An ideological and self-referential aspect can also be traced to the British forces’ initial
support of Greek nationalism: it was a testament to the idea that their ‘civilising’ mission, this
force that legitimised the narratives of colonialism and modernity, could also expand to
include populations that were referred to as descendants/heirs of ancient Greece. Of course,
when Cyprus was later formally made a Crown colony and Greek nationalism was reinforced
in Cyprus to the extent that it threatened the British presence on the island by capitalising on
the idea of ‘glorious ancestors’ in claiming a superior, non-colonial status, the British narra-
tive was reversed and the Eteocypriots came to be referred to as the true ancestors of
Cypriots.
6
Panayiotou A. (2006) ‘Lenin in the coffee shop: The communist alternative and forms of
non-western modernity’, Postcolonial Studies, 9(3), pp. 267–280.
7
Ktoris S. (2013) Turkish Cypriots: From Margins to Partnership. [Τουρκοκύπριοι: από το
περιθώριο στο συνεταιρισμό] Athens: Papazisis.
12 G. IOANNOU
Following the formation of Turkish trade unions, even the labour move-
ment was divided on an inter-communal basis, in addition to the intra-
communal left-right division. The fact that many Turkish Cypriots
remained registered with the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO)
[Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία, ΠΕΟ] until the second half of the
1950s12 does not mean that they endorsed the enosist position, which had
been adopted by the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)
[Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, ΑΚΕΛ] since its inception in 1941
as a long-term anti-imperialist goal, a goal not shared by the Communist
Party of Cyprus.13 In fact, when AKEL accepted enosis as an immediate
goal in 1949–1950, contributing to the Church’s petition for signatures,
the possibility of PEO jointly representing both the Greek Cypriots and
the Turkish Cypriots was further undermined.14
The 1950s was a crucial decade as far as the evolution of inter-communal
relations in Cyprus is concerned. The development of distinct ‘national
consciousnesses’, that is the politicisation of ethnic origin and cultural
identity that had previously been unfolding in a slow and gradual manner,
was accelerated, given that already by the end of World War II the depar-
ture of the British forces seemed a tangible possibility.15 The emerging
Greek and Turkish nationalisms had already succeeded in determining the
12
Slocum J. (1972) The Development of Labour Relations in Cyprus. Nicosia: Government
Printing Office.
13
In fact, many Turkish Cypriots are still registered with PEO for practical reasons, bearing
in mind that Turkish trade unions are powerless and incapable of protecting their interests.
That being said, a group of Turkish Cypriots led by Derviş Ali Kavazoğlu remains registered
with AKEL for ideological reasons as well. However, inter-communal relations deteriorate as
Turkish Cypriots are undervalued and marginalised even within the left-wing trade union
movement provoking resentment. See Kızılyürek, N. (2019) A Story of Violence and
Resentment: the Birth and the Development of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, [Μια ιστορία βίας και
μνησικακίας. Η γέννηση και η εξέλιξη της εθνοτικής διένεξης στη Κύπρο] Nicosia: Heterotopia
Publications, Vol. 1, pp. 80–89.
14
Kakoullis L. (1990) The Left and the Turkish Cypriots [Η Αριστερά και οι Τουρκοκύπριοι]
Nicosia: Kasoulides./Paionides P. (1995) Andreas Ziartides: Without Fear or Favour
[Ανδρέας Ζιαρτίδης: Χωρίς φόβο και πάθος] Nicosia: Dorographics./Varnava P. (2004) Joint
Union Struggles of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (Facts Through History) [Κοινοί
εργατικοί αγώνες Ελληνοκυπρίων-Τουρκοκυπρίων (Γεγονότα μέσα από την ιστορία)] Nicosia,
NP./Fantis A. (2005). The Union Movement in the Years of British Rule 1878–1960 [Το
Συνδικαλιστικό Κίνημα στα Χρόνια της Αγγλοκρατίας 1878–1960] Nicosia, NP.
15
Bozkurt U. and Trimikliniotis N. (2014) ‘Incorporating a Class Analysis within the
National Question: Rethinking Ethnicity, Class, and Nationalism in Cyprus’, Nationalism
and ethnic politics 20(2): 244–265.
14 G. IOANNOU
16
In his presentation of the irredentist Greek nationalist movement of the 1950s, of which
he was a participant, Takis Chatzidimitriou emphasises its differences to other anti-colonial
movements of the same period, arguing that the entire project and its management ulti-
mately brought Cyprus to a worse position at the end of the decade than it had been at the
beginning. See Hadjidemetriou T. (2018) Cyprus 1950–1959: The End of Irredentism
[Κύπρος 1950–1959: το τέλος του αλυτρωτισμού] Athens: Papazisi.
17
Kitromilides P. (1979) ‘The dialectic of intolerance: ideological dimensions of ethnic
conflict’ in Kitromilidis P. and Worsley P. (eds.) Small States in the Modern World: The
Conditions of Survival. Nicosia: The New Cyprus Association./Aristodimou A. (2018)
‘Beyond Heroes and Terrorists: Comparing the EOKA and TMT organisations during
1955–1959.’ [Πέρα από τους Ήρωες και τους Τρομοκράτες: Οι οργανώσεις ΕΟΚΑ-ΤΜΤ σε
σύγκριση 1955–1959] Unpublished dissertation. Berlin: Freie Universitaet Berlin.
18
Katsiaounis R. (2000) The Consultative Assembly. [Η Διασκεπτική] Nicosia: Scientific
Research Centre.
19
Panayiotou 2006.
2 FROM NATIONALISM TO PARTITION 1950–1975 15
20
EOKA was founded by Georgios Grivas, a monarchist, far-rightist Greek colonel of
Cypriot origin as a vertically hierarchical guerrilla warfare organisation based on small sabo-
tage and hit teams as well as an execution section that killed in cold blood. It was funded by
the Church and was based on Church networks for recruiting its members. It was effectively
the tool of the Greek Cypriot leadership under Makarios to promote enosis and constituted
the first form of systematic violence and ideological imposition within the community, man-
aging to marginalise AKEL. After 1960 it staffed the state apparatus and developed its myth
which is the dominant ideology of the Greek Cypriot state. TMT was founded in 1957 by
Turkish army officers as the counterbalance to EOKA and operated in an analogous manner
as the monopolisation of violence within the Turkish Cypriot community, imposing in an
absolute way the authority of the nationalist Right for many decades. In the new conditions
after 1974 it was dissolved as the Turkish army became directly responsible for the security
of the community.
21
Poumpouris M. (1999). Days of Trial [Μέρες δοκιμασίας] Nicosia, NP.
22
Anti-communism, prominent in both organisations, was instrumental in that respect,
bearing in mind the 1950s political climate worldwide.
23
Crouzet F. (2011) [1973] The Cypriot Conflict 1946–1959 [Η κυπριακή διένεξη
1946–1959] Athens: National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation. The Turkish Cypriot
auxiliary police were targeted by EOKA, further feeding into Turkish Cypriots’ fears. The
contribution of the Turkish Cypriot auxiliary police to the repression of Greek Cypriots
reinforced anti-Turkish sentiments within the Greek Cypriot community.
16 G. IOANNOU
24
Significantly, the Turkish Cypriot community was unaffected by the major class, political
and ideological conflicts between the right and the left which peaked in 1948 and divided
athletic clubs, leading to the formation of the AC Omonia Nicosia and other new leftist
football teams which held their own separate championship until 1954. The Turkish Cypriot
football teams had remained registered with the Cyprus Football Association under the con-
trol of the Greek Cypriot right.
25
Panayiotou A. (2009) ‘Coping with the pain of the Cypriot tragedy’, [Η διαχείριση του
πόνου της κυπριακής τραγωδίας] Chroniko 73, (19/7/2009) Politis].
26
When a few Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Kontemenos headed to the neighbouring
mixed village Skylloura in order to aid its Greek Cypriot residents against their fellow Turkish
Cypriot villagers, they were arrested by the British police, transferred to Nicosia and subse-
2 FROM NATIONALISM TO PARTITION 1950–1975 17
quently released. On returning to Kontemenos on foot, they were attacked and murdered in
the flatlands of the Turkish Cypriot village Gönyeli. See Kızılyürek N. (2015) A Period of
Violence. The Dark 1958. [Μια εποχή της βίας: Το σκοτεινό 1958] Limassol: Eterotopia,
pp. 111–167.
27
Markides D. (1998) The Issue of Separate Municipalities and the Birth of the New
Republic. London: University of London.
28
Kızılyürek, 2015.
18 G. IOANNOU
29
This tragedy culminated in the assassination of two Turkish Cypriot journalists, Ayhan
Hikmet and Ahmet Gurkhan in 1962, followed by the assassination of Derviş Ali Kavazoğlu
himself in 1965.
30
Drousiotis M. (2005) The First Partition. Cyprus 1963–1964. [Η πρώτη διχοτόμηση.
Κύπρος 1963–1964] Athens: Alfadi.
31
The Republic of Cyprus was established as a sovereign state consisting of two politically
equal communities, the Greek community and the Turkish community. The Constitution
also recognised three religious minorities: the Maronites, the Armenians and the Latins,
without however granting them collective political rights. After 1960 these three Christian
groups were integrated into the Greek Cypriot community. The Latins formed a very small
group that was assimilated in the next few decades. The assimilation process of the Armenians
and the Maronites has also substantially advanced.
2 FROM NATIONALISM TO PARTITION 1950–1975 19
now jointly controlled the state apparatus but also provided an easy frame-
work for the explication of power struggle.
Enosis was an ideology of power from the very first moment it was
articulated as a political stance in the early twentieth century. It served at
once as the loan sharks’ motto as noted by the Communist Party of Cyprus
since the 1920s and as the response of the Church and the bourgeoisie to
their privileges being curtailed both due to British intervention from
above and from below and due to the rise of the left and the claims of the
masses. Along similar lines, taksim, the annexation of a part of Cyprus by
Turkey, was from the get-go an ideology of power, a defensive stance vis-
à-vis the claims of the Greek Cypriot majority and pivotal in the political
dynamics within the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Both enosis at first and
taksim later were linked to certain coteries of the Greek and Turkish states
respectively, a connection that was crucial amidst the circumstances of the
late 1950s.32 It should be stressed here that even when the two ideological
constructs of enosis and taksim reached the peak of their popularity among
the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively, they also came with
a very strong class dimension. Beneath their purported universality and
cross-class inclusivity, the two versions of Cypriot nationalism, the Greek
Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot nationalism, carried a distinctly bour-
geois identity.
The Zurich agreement between Greece and Turkey and its ratification
in London by the British, Archbishop Makarios and Fazıl Küçük on behalf
of their respective communities, truly ushered in a new era. However, it
was right at that moment, when enosis and taksim seemed to have exhausted
their power and been effectively defeated as political frameworks, that they
assumed their purest form as ideological apparatuses in the service of
power-seeking elites. If prior to 1960 enosis and taksim served as, among
other things, instruments for the manipulation of the masses from which
not even the Cypriot left could escape, during 1960–1975 they were uti-
lised first and foremost as instruments of parastate violence. They became
ideologies of power in their purest form, instruments for disciplining the
population and sources upon which the elites drew and to which they
32
By focusing on the Greek Cypriot community, Marios Thrasyvoulou (The Nationalism
of the Greek Cypriots, [Ο εθνικισμός των Ελληνοκυπρίων] Thessaloniki, Epikentro 2016) per-
ceives this correlation primarily as an export from Cyprus to Greece, an approach which
downplays the bilateral correlations between the Greek Cypriots and the Greek state, while
also overlooking the equivalent interplay between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish state.
20 G. IOANNOU
33
‘Destiny’ could not have been more different than the one envisaged by leftist politicians
such as Kavazoğlu and by liberals such as Lanitis. See Lanitis N. C. (1963) Our Destiny: A
Consideration of Some Problems Pertaining to Cyprus. Nicosia, NP.
34
On the Greek Cypriot side, the drafting process was carried out by the broader national-
ist milieu, which included Vassos Lyssarides, founder of the United Democratic Union of
Centre (EDEK). On the Turkish Cypriot side, which lacked an equally powerful left, the
conscription was almost universal. The fact that the main Greek Cypriot paramilitary organ-
isation acted under the direct commands of the Minister of the Interior, Polycarpos
Georkadjis, speaks volumes as to how blurred the lines were between the state and the para-
state. Rauf Denktaş played an equivalent role in the Turkish Cypriot community.
35
Drousiotis 2005.
2 FROM NATIONALISM TO PARTITION 1950–1975 21
36
Loizos L. (1988) ‘Inter-communal killing in Cyprus’, Man, 23(4), pp. 639–653.
37
Uludağ S. (2005) The Oysters that Lost their Pearl. Nicosia: Ikme. Journalist Sevgül
Uludağ has been consistently tackling this issue. The Politis newspaper recently published an
extensive series of stories on the various crimes that have gone unpunished. http://politis.
com.cy/article/tribute/fakelos-p-ta-egklimata-pou-eminan-atimorita-stin-kipro
38
Drousiotis M. (2002) EOKA B and CIA: The Greco-Turkish Parastate in Cyprus. [ΕΟΚΑ
Β and CIA: το ελληνοτουρκικό παρακράτος στη Κύπρο] Athens: Alfadi/Kızılyürek N. (2010a)
‘Rauf Denktaş: Fear and nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot community’, in Aktar A.,
Kızılyürek N., Özkırımlı U. (eds.), Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle. Cyprus, Greece and
Turkey. Palgrave Macmillan: New York.
22 G. IOANNOU
ground for the first territorial partition. The Greek Cypriot paramilitary
organisations that were active in the first half of 1964 were closely linked
to the Greek Cypriot political leaders. In their capacity as armed organisa-
tions, they also acted as murderous gangs on the ground, given that the
dialectics of violence acquired its own dynamics.39 Under these circum-
stances, this first partition could neither expand nor be overthrown with-
out military means, as evidenced by the Greek Cypriot attack at Kokkina
and the bombings of Tylliria by the Turkish air forces in the summer
of 1964.40
The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaderships realised they could
not secure a political leverage through the actions they had perpetrated or
allowed to happen. Bearing the whole responsibility, at least in terms of
moral agency for a number of war crimes, they showed no intention what-
soever of changing their course of action and pursuing new compromises.
On the contrary, both sides adopted tougher stances, the former by again
putting the enosis claims on the table and the latter by claiming separate
sovereignty. On the ground, the population transfers, mostly of Turkish
Cypriots, were followed by property looting, to which no objections were
raised, with very few exceptions. As early as mid-1964, various powers,
both within the Greek Cypriot community and worldwide, began coming
up with scenarios for resolving this crisis based on the segregation of the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. This partition, having
now acquired territorial dimensions following the establishment of the
Turkish Cypriot enclaves, started becoming more permanent, a situation
to which the Americans also adopted particularly easily.41
39
Clerides G. (1989) My Testimony Vol. 1 and 2. Nicosia: Alitheia. The Greek Cypriot
Akritas plan is revealing as to how the Republic of Cyprus and its Turkish Cypriot commu-
nity were perceived by the Greek Cypriot elite, while also demonstrating the blurry boundar-
ies between the state and the parastate. Akritas Plan was a parastate action plan aiming to
bring the state under Greek Cypriot control in order to promote enosis via the controlled use
of force against any Turkish Cypriot reaction to this.
40
Kokkina was a small Turkish Cypriot village on the north-western coast of Cyprus which
served as a weapon import point from Turkey and comprised the main Turkish Cypriot
enclave in the Tylliria area. The village was attacked by the Greek Cypriot military in 1964.
Turkey retaliated by bombing Cyprus for the first time, thus preventing the Greek Cypriot
forces from decimating the enclave. To this day, Kokkina remains a Turkish Cypriot enclave
that receives supplies by sea. The Battle of Tylliria and its casualties form an integral part of
national narratives and rituals for both communities.
41
Packard M. (2008) Getting it Wrong: Fragments from a Cyprus Diary 1964. Milton
Keynes, Author House.
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doctrine, and fills up the greater part of the epistle with reproofs of
these errors.
“‘Silver shrines,’ verse 24. The heathens used to carry the images of their gods in
procession from one city to another. This was done in a chariot which was solemnly
consecrated for that employment, and by the Romans styled Thensa, that is, the chariot of
their gods. But besides this, it was placed in a box or shrine, called Ferculum. Accordingly,
when the Romans conferred divine honors on their great men, alive or dead, they had the
Circen games, and in them the Thensa and Ferculum, the chariot and the shrine, bestowed
on them; as it is related of Julius Caesar. This Ferculum among the Romans did not differ
much from the Graecian Ναὸς, a little chapel, representing the form of a temple, with an
image in it, which, being set upon an altar, or any other solemn place, having the doors
opened, the image was seen by the spectators either in a standing or sitting posture. An old
anonymous scholiast upon Aristotle’s Rhetoric, lib. i. c. 15, has these words: Ναοποιοὶ οἱ
τοὺς ναοὺς ποιοῦσι, ἤτοι εἱκονοστάσια, τινα μικρὰ ξύλινα ἅ πωλοῦσι, observing the ναοι here to
be εικονοστάσια, chaplets, with images in them, of wood, or metal, (as here of silver,) which
they made and sold, as in verse 25, they are supposed to do. Athenaeus speaks of the
καδισκος, ‘which,’ says he ‘is a vessel wherein they place their images of Jupiter.’ The
learned Casaubon states, that ‘these images were put in cases, which were made like
chapels. (Deipnos. lib. ii. p. 500.) So St. Chrysostom likens them to ‘little cases, or shrines.’
Dion says of the Roman ensign, that it was a little temple, and in it a golden eagle, (Ρωμαικ,
lib. 40.) And in another place: ‘There was a little chapel of Juno, set upon a table.’ Ρωμαικ,
lib. 39. This is the meaning of the tabernacle of Moloch, Acts vii. 43, where by the σκηνη,
tabernacle, is meant the chaplet, a shrine of that false god. The same was also the סכות דנות
the tabernacle of Benoth, or Venus.” Hammond’s Annotations. [Williams on Pearson, p. 55.]
“Chapter xvi. 10, 11. ‘Now, if Timotheus come, see that he may be with you without fear;
for he worketh the work of the Lord, as I also do: let no man therefore despise him, but
conduct him forth in peace, that he may come unto me, for I look for him with the brethren.’
“From the passage considered in the preceding number, it appears that Timothy was
sent to Corinth, either with the epistle, or before it: ‘for this cause have I sent unto you
Timotheus.’ From the passage now quoted, we infer that Timothy was not sent with the
epistle; for had he been the bearer of the letter, or accompanied it, would St. Paul in that
letter have said, ‘if Timothy come?’ Nor is the sequel consistent with the supposition of his
carrying the letter; for if Timothy was with the apostle when he wrote the letter, could he say,
as he does, ‘I look for him with the brethren?’ I conclude, therefore, that Timothy had left St.
Paul to proceed upon his journey before the letter was written. Further, the passage before
us seems to imply, that Timothy was not expected by St. Paul to arrive at Corinth, till after
they had received the letter. He gives them directions in the letter how to treat him when he
should arrive: ‘if he come,’ act towards him so and so. Lastly, the whole form of expression
is more naturally applicable to the supposition of Timothy’s coming to Corinth, not directly
from St. Paul, but from some other quarter; and that his instructions had been, when he
should reach Corinth, to return. Now, how stands this matter in the history? Turn to the
nineteenth chapter and twenty-first verse of the Acts, and you will find that Timothy did not,
when sent from Ephesus, where he left St. Paul, and where the present epistle was written,
proceed by a straight course to Corinth, but that he went round through Macedonia. This
clears up everything; for, although Timothy was sent forth upon his journey before the letter
was written, yet he might not reach Corinth till after the letter arrived there; and he would
come to Corinth, when he did come, not directly from St. Paul, at Ephesus, but from some
part of Macedonia. Here therefore is a circumstantial and critical agreement, and
unquestionably without design; for neither of the two passages in the epistle mentions
Timothy’s journey into Macedonia at all, though nothing but a circuit of that kind can explain
and reconcile the expressions which the writer uses.” (Paley’s Horae Paulinae, 1
Corinthians No. IV.)
“Chapter v. 7, 8. ‘For even Christ, our passover, is sacrificed for us; therefore let us keep
the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the
unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.’
“Dr. Benson tells us, that from this passage, compared with chapter xvi. 8, it has been
conjectured that this epistle was written about the time of the Jewish passover; and to me
the conjecture appears to be very well founded. The passage to which Dr. Benson refers us,
is this: ‘I will tarry at Ephesus until Pentecost.’ With this passage he ought to have joined
another in the same context: ‘And it may be that I will abide, yea, and winter with you:’ for,
from the two passages laid together, it follows that the epistle was written before Pentecost,
yet after winter; which necessarily determines the date to the part of the year, within which
the passover falls. It was written before Pentecost, because he says, ‘I will tarry at Ephesus
until Pentecost.’ It was written after winter, because he tells them, ‘It may be that I may
abide, yea, and winter with you.’ The winter which the apostle purposed to pass at Corinth,
was undoubtedly the winter next ensuing to the date of the epistle; yet it was a winter
subsequent to the ensuing Pentecost, because he did not intend to set forwards upon his
journey till after the feast. The words, ‘let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with
the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth,’
look very much like words suggested by the season; at least they have, upon that
supposition, a force and significancy which do not belong to them upon any other; and it is
not a little remarkable, that the hints casually dropped in the epistle, concerning particular
parts of the year, should coincide with this supposition.” (Paley’s Horae Paulinae. 1
Corinthians. No. XII.)
“Chapter ii. 12, 13. ‘When I came to Troas to preach Christ’s gospel, and a door was
opened unto me of the Lord, I had no rest in my spirit, because I found not Titus my brother;
but taking my leave of them, I went from thence into Macedonia.’
“To establish a conformity between this passage and the history, nothing more is
necessary to be presumed, than that St. Paul proceeded from Ephesus to Macedonia, upon
the same course by which he came back from Macedonia to Ephesus, or rather to Miletus
in the neighborhood of Ephesus; in other words, that, in his journey to the peninsula of
Greece, he went and returned the same way. St. Paul is now in Macedonia, where he had
lately arrived from Ephesus. Our quotation imports that in his journey he had stopped at
Troas. Of this, the history says nothing, leaving us only the short account, ‘that Paul
departed from Ephesus, for to go into Macedonia.’ But the history says, that in his return
from Macedonia to Ephesus, ‘Paul sailed from Philippi to Troas; and that, when the disciples
came together on the first day of the week, to break bread, Paul preached unto them all
night; that from Troas he went by land to Assos; from Assos, taking ship and coasting along
the front of Asia Minor, he came by Mitylene to Miletus.’ Which account proves, first, that
Troas lay in the way by which St. Paul passed between Ephesus and Macedonia; secondly,
that he had disciples there. In one journey between these two places, the epistle, and in
another journey between the same places, the history makes him stop at this city. Of the
first journey he is made to say, ‘that a door was in that city opened unto him of the Lord;’ in
the second, we find disciples there collected around him, and the apostle exercising his
ministry, with, what was even in him, more than ordinary zeal and labor. The epistle,
therefore, is in this instance confirmed, if not by the terms, at least by the probability of the
history; a species of confirmation by no means to be despised, because, as far as it
reaches, it is evidently uncontrived.
“Grotius, I know, refers the arrival at Troas, to which the epistle alludes, to a different
period, but I think very improbably; for nothing appears to me more certain, than that the
meeting with Titus, which St. Paul expected at Troas, was the same meeting which took
place in Macedonia, viz. upon Titus’s coming out of Greece. In the quotation before us, he
tells the Corinthians, ‘When I came to Troas, I had no rest in my spirit, because I found not
Titus, my brother; but, taking my leave of them, I went from thence into Macedonia.’ Then in
the seventh chapter he writes, ‘When we were come into Macedonia, our flesh had no rest,
but we were troubled on every side; without were fightings, within were fears; nevertheless,
God, that comforteth them that are cast down, comforted us by the coming of Titus.’ These
two passages plainly relate to the same journey of Titus, in meeting with whom St. Paul had
been disappointed at Troas, and rejoiced in Macedonia. And amongst other reasons which
fix the former passage to the coming of Titus out of Greece, is the consideration, that it was
nothing to the Corinthians that St. Paul did not meet with Titus at Troas, were it not that he
was to bring intelligence from Corinth. The mention of the disappointment in this place,
upon any other supposition, is irrelative.” (Paley’s Horae Paulinae. 2 Corinthians No. VIII.)
return to asia.