Topic: RA 9165
ordered them to inside the Mapayapa Compound.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMIL GALICIA Y
CHAVEZ, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 218402, February 14, 2018
Facts
Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 6, 11, 12, and 15, Article II of RA 9165.
Arnel Tugade (Tugade), a camera man of the television program "Mission X," received
an anonymous call regarding a shabu tiangge inside the Mapayapa compound where
there was rampant selling and use of shabu. Tugade verified the tip by bringing a
camera in the compound where he conducted an undercover surveillance and filmed
the drug-related activities he witnessed inside the said compound.
On January 30, 2006, Tugade went to the office of the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) to report the rampant selling and use of shabu
within the said compound. After watching the surveillance footage, the PNP conducted
several other surveillance, since the reported selling and use of shabu in the compound
were confirmed, the police apply for a search warrant
Thereafter, they raided the Mapayapa Compound to serve Search Warrant No. 4271-06
against several persons. There were numerous shanties inside the compound requiring
the raiding team to divide the compound into different target areas. Assigned to
implement the search warrant in Target No. 8 When the team entered the target area,
persons found inside scampered away. P/Insp. Pertoza presented the search warrant to
appellant who was then found inside the shanty designated as Target No. 8. together
with his pregnant wife.
Appellant and his wife were inside the shanty during the search. Appellant was sitting
in front of a drug paraphernalia when the team started to conduct its search. In the
course of their search, the team found appellant's driver's license inside a wallet found
in the sala. The team discovered that the address of the appellant as stated in his
driver's license was F. Soriano St., Sto. Tomas, Pasig City, which was the same as the
address of Target No. 8. The team likewise noticed that the appellant had a picture of
himself inside the house although the same was not seized since it was not listed in the
search warrant.
In the course of the search, the team was able to find and seize from the appellant
plastic sachets containing crystalline substances, weighing scale, cellphone, assorted
lighters, wallet containing dollars and a few coins, aluminum foil, and assorted cutters
and scissors.
For his defense, appellant claimed that in the morning of February 10, 2006, he was
with his pregnant wife on their way to a hospital for a check-up. They were about to
board a tricycle when men in uniform who looked like soldiers stopped them and
Issue
whether or not appellant is guilty of maintenance of a (1)drug den, (2)illegal
possession of dangerous drugs and (3)drug paraphernalia, and (4)use of dangerous
drugs.
Ruling
(1)
No, the prosecution failed to prove that appellant was guilty of maintenance
of a drug den.
In this case, the evidence relied upon by the RTC to convict the appellant of
maintenance of a drug den consists of the following: (1) existence of drug
paraphernalia inside the shanty known as Target No. 8; (2) the appellant's driver's
license allegedly found in the living room; and (3) appellant's picture found inside the
shanty.
After scouring through the records of the case, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to clearly establish that the appellant was guilty of violation of
maintenance of a drug den. From the testimonies of the arresting officers, it is clear that
the prosecution failed to establish that the shanty where appellant was found was a
place where dangerous drugs were sold or used. The prosecution's witnesses merely
testified that when they entered Target No. 8, they found drug paraphernalia inside the
shanty and sachets of crystalline substance in the person of the appellant. The
prosecution failed to allege and prove an essential element of the offense - that
dangerous drugs were being sold or used inside the shanty located at Target No, 8.
What was clear was that appellant was caught in possession of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. There was nothing in evidence that would indicate that the arresting
officers saw that dangerous drugs were being sold and/or used at Target No. 8 in the
course of the search of the premises. Since there was no evidence that dangerous drugs
were sold and/or used in the shanty located at Target No. 8, appellant may not be held
liable for violation of Section 6, Article II, RA 9165 on maintenance of a drug den.
(2)(4)Use of dangerous drugs is absorbed by illegal possession of drugs.
Section 15, Article II, RA 9165 on use of dangerous drugs, provides:
A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any
dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of
six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the
second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section
shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her
possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this
Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
Appellant is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia.
Appellant was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs after being caught
with eight sachets of shabu with a total amount of 1.15 grams in his possession.
Likewise, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia for
having possession of seven disposable lighters, five improvised aluminum foil tooters,
four sheets aluminum foil, and two weighing scales.
Bernabe, Khristienne Rian C. JD 4B
R.A. 9165 (THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RANDY TALATALA GIDOC
G.R. No. 230553
August 13, 2018
Facts:
Appellant Gidoc was charged in four (4) separate Informations for violations of
Sections 5, 11, 12 and 15 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise
known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
A confidential informant told Chief Police Bagonghasa that there was a trading activity
of illegal drugs by the appellant in Calauan, Laguna. Immediately thereafter, a buy-
bust operation was conducted at two o'clock in the morning of October 15, 2006 where
the appellant could be found. (1) plastic sachet of suspected shabu was bought in
exchange of a P100.00 bill and thus, the transaction was completed. The informant, who
also acted as the poseur-buyer took of his cap as a pre-arranged signal that the
transaction was consummated. SPO1 Mortel witnessed and heard the transaction
between appellant and the informant. Immediately, the team approached and arrested
the appellant. They informed the appellant of his rights and the reason for his arrest.
When appellant was subjected to a preventive search, the police officers recovered from
his pocket another small plastic sachet containing a suspected shabu which was then
marked by SPO1 Mortel as "A" and the plastic sachet found in appellant's pocket as "B."
He also prepared the letter-request for laboratory examination and personally
delivered the same, together with the two (2) plastic sachets, to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
Appellant denied the charges against him claiming that he was in San Pablo, Laguna on
October 15, 2006. When he boarded a jeepney on his way home, the jeepney was
flagged down in front of the Municipal Hall of Calauan by four (4) armed men in
civilian clothes. Thereafter, he was arrested for allegedly selling illegal drugs. The RTC
rendered its Decision stating that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed appellant's conviction
Issue:
Whether or not accused –appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the
doubtful existence of a valid buy-bust operation
Ruling:
No, he is not. The evidence submitted by the prosecution that found that the police
operatives, who conducted the buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of appellant,
have failed to comply with the safeguards under RA 9165 and its implementing rules.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the legitimacy of the buy bust operation
simply because it failed to proffer any documentary proof of the same. The testimony
of SPO1 Mortel during cross-examination revealed that there was no coordination
report submitted with the PDEA prior to the buy-bust operation. While minor
deviations from the procedures under RA 9165 would not automatically exonerate an
accused, this rule, however, could not defeat the findings that the police operatives are
negligent of their duties to preserve the integrity of the seized items from the appellant.
The nature of a buy-bust operation necessitates a stringent application of the
procedural safeguards specifically crafted by Congress in R.A. 9165 to counter potential
police abuses. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have been
followed in proving the elements of the defined offense. 
Consequently, Section 21(a) of the [2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
9165 (IRR)] provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined under Section 21(1)
of R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those procedural aspects that may
be relaxed under justifiable grounds.
It cannot brushed aside the apparent lack of coordination with the PDEA and the
failure of the police operatives, having initial custody and control of the drugs, to
physically inventory and photograph the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation. What is particularly disturbing is that no prosecution witness did ever
explain why these procedures were not followed. Further, the justifiable ground for
non-compliance must be proved as a fact. Here, it was markedly absent.
In sum, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the
crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the appellant.
Considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items not having
been sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt, the acquittal of the appellant
must follow.
PEOPLE v. MARCELINO COLADO et al
G.R NO. 185719 June 17, 2013
Section 14 R.A. 9165 – Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
Facts:
In Criminal Case No. 13784-D, Cipriano, Latario, Ranada, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong
and Madarang (Cipriano et al., for brevity) were charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of Section 14, Article II of RA 9165. The appellants were
arrested after a buy-bust operation conducted by PO2 Richard Noble and his team.
Upon reaching the area of the buy-bust, PO2 Noble was introduced to Marcelino
Colado. The latter handed a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming
from a table inside the house of the couple around which were seven persons. After he
gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the scene. SPO2 Cruz and
another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where they found
Cipriano et al. gathered around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia such as
an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white substance,
disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking
marijuana was recovered from Ranada.
The RTC found Cipriano et al guilty of the offense charged. The CA affirmed the
conviction of Ranada as he was caught having custody and control of a drug
paraphernalia intended for smoking and injecting illegal drugs to one’s body. As
regards, Cipriano,Latario, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang, the appellate
court found them guilty not as principals but only as accessories.
Issue: WON the CA correctly convicted Cipriano et., al. as accessories
Ruling: NO.
The CA erred in convicting Cipriano, Latario, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and Madarang
as accessories. As pointed out by Justice Brion:
"[I]llegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs during parties, social gatherings or meetings under Section 14 of R.A.
No. 9165 is a crime of malum prohibitum, that is, the act is made wrong or evil because
there is a law prohibiting it. x x x
Since violation of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of mala prohibita, the degree of
participation of the offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated the prohibited act
are penalized to the same extent. There is no principal or accomplice or accessory to
consider. In short, the degree of participation of the offenders does not affect their
liability, and the penalty on all of them are the same whether they are principals or
merely accomplices or accessories.
The Court is convinced that only Ranada should be held liable for violation of Section
14 of RA 9165. It is clear that it was only Ranada who was caught having in his
possession an aluminum foil intended for using dangerous drugs. As to the other co-
accused, not one drug paraphernalia was found in their possession. The police officers
were only able to find the other drug paraphernalia scattered on top of a table. It is
already established that there was no conspiracy between Ranada and the other co-
accused. As the CA correctly held, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not
imply conspiracy.
2. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165. AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
G.R. No. 233702; June 20, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL GAMBOA
FACTS:
During a buy-bust operation, PO2 Nieva asked appellant if he could buy
P200.00 worth of shabu, handing as payment the buy-bust money. In turn, appellant
gave PO2 Nieva a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Nieva
removed his bull cap, prompting the back-up officers to rush towards the scene and
arrest appellant. Subsequently, they recovered another plastic sachet and the buy-bust
money. PO2 Nieva immediately marked the two (2) plastic sachets and inventoried the
items at the place of arrest in the presence of appellant and a media representative
named Rene Crisostomo. Photographs of the confiscated items were also taken by PO3
Benitez during the marking and inventory. Thereafter, PO2 Nieva brought appellant
and the seized drugs to the police station where PO3 Benitez prepared the Request for
Laboratory Examination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld appellant’s conviction for Illegal Sale
and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
HELD:
No, the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed
chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value
of the items purportedly seized from appellant.
 Under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom
the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same.
An examination of the records reveals that the same was not done in the
presence of any elected public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ. In fact,
such lapse was admitted by PO2 Nieva. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide
justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances exist which would excuse their
transgression, the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from appellant have been compromised.
In a prosecution for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs, the State
carries the heavy burden of proving the integrity of the corpus delicti failing in which,
renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
MICHAELA DE GUZMAN
RA9165
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GLEN PIAD
January 25, 2016
G.R. No. 213607
Facts:
Pasig City Police received an information, from a confidential informant that
Piad was selling drugs along Ortigas Bridge, Pasig City.They then decided to conduct a
buy-bust operation.
The team arrived at Piad residence at around 6:45pm. The back-up team
positioned themselves 5 meter away from Piad’s House. The informant accompany
PO1 Arevalo, the poseur-buyer, to Piad’s door. When Piad opened the door, PO1
Arevelo noticed that there were a group of male individuals inside, who were later on
identified as Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis. Apparently, they were celebrating Piad’s
birthday. The informant introduced the PO1 Arevelo with Piad as buyer of shabu.
Piad asked PO1 Arevalo how much he wanted and the latter answered
P150.00. Thereafter, Piad closed the door and returned after a few seconds. PO1
Arevalo handed to Piad the P150.00 marked money. In turn, Piad handed to PO1
Arevalo a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
After the transaction was completed, PO1 Arevalo immediately grabbed
Piad’s right arm and introduced himself as a police officer. Piad, however, struggled to
free himself. PO1 Arevalo was eventually forced to enter the house amidst the struggle.
The back-up team followed suit and entered the house.
After arresting him, PO1 Arevalo asked Piad to bring out the marked money.
Piad complied. PO1 Arevalo also asked him about the source of the drugs he sold. Piad
pulled out a metal box from his pocket and it revealed two (2) other plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. PO1 Arevalo marked all the items confiscated
from Piad at the place of the arrest. Meanwhile, the back-up team saw Villarosa, Davis
and Carbo inside the house, sitting on the floor. They were surrounded by three (3)
sachets of white crystalline substance (one was heat sealed, while the other two were
unsealed), aluminum foil, a tooter and disposable lighters. The items were confiscated
and were marked by PO1 Bayot thereat.
The team brought Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis to the police
headquarters. There, PO2 Pacurib, PO1 Bayot and PO1 Arevalo executed a joint
affidavit on their arrest. P/Insp. Sabio prepared the requests for laboratory
examination and drug test, which were brought by SPO1 Bayot to the Eastern Police
District Crime Laboratory. PSI Ebuen examined the confiscated items which tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Issue: WON the accused were guilty of section 11, Section 5 and Section 14 of RA no.
9165.
Ruling: Yes, the accused were guilty of section 11, Section 5 and Section 14 of RA no.
9165.
Piad was properly convicted of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It
was proven that, on April 23, 2005, the police went to his house to conduct a buy-bust
operation; that PO1 Arevalo acted as the poseur-buyer; and that when PO1 Arevalo
gave the marked money to Piad, the latter handed to him a small plastic sachet. A
laboratory examination confirmed that the plastic sachet contained 0.05 gram of shabu.
Clearly, all the elements of the said crime were established.
The prosecution was also able to prove that Piad committed the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. When he was arrested in flagrante delicto, he
was asked about the source of his drugs. He then brought out a metal box, which
contained two (2) more sachets. It was confirmed in a laboratory test that these sachets
contained 0.06 gram of shabu.
With respect to the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a
party and the crime of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party, the
prosecution also established that after the arrest of Piad, the team found Villarosa,
Carbo and Davis sitting on the floor and surrounded by one (1) heat-sealed sachet and
two (2) unsealed sachets. A laboratory report showed that these sachets contained a
total of 0.03 gram of shabu. The said persons were also found with an aluminum foil, a
tooter and disposable lighters, which were considered drug paraphernalia. As correctly The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is at the top of the hierarchy of
held by the RTC, the elements of such crimes were proven because there was a rights for the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the
proximate company of at least two (2) persons without any legal authority to possess foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
the illicit items, citing Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165.
PEOPLE vs. SAPLA A search and seizure opereation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020 court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause
Topic: R.A. No. 9165 through the personal examinaton under oath oraffirmation of the complianant and
witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons pr
things to be seized particularly described.
Facts:

In 2014, the Kalinga Regional Police Safety Battalion received an anonymous tip made
In upholding the warrantless search and seizure, the RTC and the CA considered the
through their hotline that a man would be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to the
police operation as a valid warrantlesss search of a moving vehicle. However, this kind
Province of Isabela. The hotline received another text that the man would be on board a
of searches are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited
jeepney, plate number indicated.
to visual inspection.
At Talaca Checkpoint, the police flagged down a jeepney. The Police aproached the
Routine inspection do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct
jeepney and saw accussed Jerry Sapla. The Police asked Sapla if he was the owner of
intrusive warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. Further, law enforces
the blue sack in fornt of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. They
cannot act solely on t he basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still
requested Sapla to open the sack where they four (4) bricks of suspected marijuana
hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable
leaves. The Police then subsequently arrested Sapla, while the other officers further
cause in the absence of any other circumstances that will arouse suspicion. In this case,
searched the accussed.
no overt physical act could be properly attributed to the accussed as to rouse suspicion
As defense, accussed denied the charges and claimed that he went to Tabuk to visit a in the minds of the arresting officers.
certian relative. Upon reaching Talaca, police flagged down the jeepney in order to
In the situation presented in this case, it cannot be considered as a asearch of a moving
check their baggages. The police found marijuana inside a sack and were ;ooking for a
vehicle. The target ofthe search was the prson who mathced the description given by
person who wore fatigue pants at that time. The police identified him as the owner of
the prson who called the police hotline. In search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle is the
the marijuana found inside the sack. He denied ownership of the sack, but the police
target and not a specific person.
arrested and brought him him to Talaca barracks.
The Supreme Court ruled that anonymous tips are not valid probable cause to search a
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, covicted the accused for violating Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165
moving vehicle. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the grounds for a reasonable
and rueld that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of the
warrantless searches and seizures.
crime.
People vs. Manabat Y Dumagay (G.R. No. 242947, July 17, 2019)

Issue: FACTS:

Whether or not there is a valid searchand seizure conducted by the police officers. Two informations were filed against Manabat which stated that in the evening of the
17th of June 2013 in ABC Printing Press, Dipolog City, Manabat sold to a poseur-buyer
one small transparent plastic sachet of a substance more popularly known as "Shabu"
Ruling: for which he received a marked Five Hundred Peso bill. The second information stated
that at the same incident, he has in his possession and control nine pieces small
The Supreme Court finds for the accussed Sapla and orders his release from transparent also allegedly containing the same illegal drug. Upon arraignment,
incarceration. appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Thereafter, joint pre-trial and trial of
Criminal Case Nos. 18353 and 18354 ensued.
The defense, for its part, presented Manabat himself as its sole witness. He testified that
there was no buy bust operation conducted against him as he was just grappled by
persons near Casa Jose. He testified that he was just on his way home on a motorcab,
when two motorcycles with two unknown riders each, blocked their way. Mario did
not alight from the motorcab but a person pointed a gun at him. For said reason, Mario
alighted.  accused-appellant was already apprehended by PO2 Barral. On cross-examination,
He recalled, however, that there were other persons who arrived after 30 minutes. His
wallet and cellphone were taken and he was surprised that they took "something
contained in a cellophane". They also took P500 from his pocket, which he denies
owning because he had only P70 in his possession. There was also no lawyer during the
search and inventory.
The RTC convicted Manabat of the crimes charged and the CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both the RTC and CA is correct in convicting accused-appellant
Manabat of the crimes charged.
HELD:
No. The Court acquits Manabat for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In buy-bust operations, while it is true that the same is a legally effective and proven
procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the
law nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to
ensure that rights are safeguarded.
The three required witnesses not being complied with;
Among the procedure that police operatives must follow under RA 9165 to maintain
the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence, was the requirement that the
physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately
after seizure and confiscation must be done in the presence of the required witness, all
of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the
physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be
made  immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is
not practicable that the IRR allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon
as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team. In this connection, this also means that the three required
witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension -  a
requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that
the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Verily, a buy-bust team
normally has enough time to gather and bring with it the said witnesses.
In this case, the buy-bust operation was not conducted in accordance with law. The
witnesses were called and eventually arrived at the scene of the crime only  after the
One of the apprehending officers readily admitted that during the apprehension, the
witnesses were not present. Considering that the buy-bust operation was
conducted seven days after the day it received information about accused-appellant
and was instructed to conduct the buy-bust operation, the apprehending team had
more than enough time to ensure that all the mandatory procedures for the conduct of
the buy-bust operation would be sufficiently met.
The Certificate of Inventory being irregularly executed;
The law also requires that the copies of the inventory should be signed by all the
following persons: (a) accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected
public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
In this case, the Certificate of Inventory itself reveals that the document was  not
signed  by accused-appellant Manabat or by his counsel or representative.  Nor did the
prosecution provide any explanation whatsoever as to why accused-appellant Manabat
was not able to sign the Certificate of Inventory.
The marking of the plastic sachets allegedly recovered was irregularly done;
In the instant case, as incontrovertibly revealed by the photographs of the plastic
sachets allegedly retrieved from accused-appellant Manabat, only the date and initials
of the seizing officers were inscribed on the specimens. The time and place of the buy-
bust operation were not indicated in the markings, in clear contravention of the PNP's
own set of procedures for the conduct of buy-bust operations.
At this juncture, it is well to point-out that while the RTC and CA were correct in
stating that denial is an inherently weak defense, it grievously erred in using the same
principle to convict accused-appellant Manabat. Both the RTC and CA overlooked the
long-standing legal tenet that the starting point of every criminal prosecution is that the
accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. And this presumption of
innocence is overturned only when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof
in criminal cases and has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is
also worth emphasizing that this burden of proof never shifts. Indeed, the accused need
not present a single piece of evidence in his defense if the State has not discharged its
onus. The accused can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent. It is thus
immaterial, in this case or in any other cases involving dangerous drugs, that the
accused put forth a weak defense.
To reiterate, breaches of the procedure committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti would have been compromised.
Topic: R.A. No. 9165- Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
People of the Philippines vs. Jayson Cijrillan Hambora
G.R. No. 198701 | December 10, 2012
Facts:
According to the prosecution, Hambora was caught of selling and delivering shabu
during a buy-bust operation conducted by the CIDG. On the other hand, according to
Hambora, he was on his way home from collecting debt when he was arrested by
Police Officer Lasco, and was told that he was selling prohibited drugs. He denied the
accusation that he’s selling prohibited drugs, nonetheless, he was charged of violation
of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting HAmbora for illegal sale of shabu as it gave
full credence to the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation vis-à-vis Hambora’s denial of the charge against him. On appeal, the CA
upheld the finding of the RTC.
Hence, the appeal. He questions the chain of custody of the shabu confiscated in view
of police officers failure to comply with the statutory guidelines laid down in Section 21
of RA 9165.
Issue: Whether or not Hambora is guilty of vilation of sec. 5, Art. II of RA No. 9165;
Ruling:
Yes, Hambora is guilty of violation of sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165.
The essential elements for illegal sale of shabu, to wit: (a) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment for the thing. What is material in prosecutions for illegal sale of
shabu is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
A thorough examination of the records herein confirms the presence of all these
elements, viz: (1) PO2 Lasco acted as poseur-buyer to entrap persons suspected of
selling shabu during a legitimate buy-bust operation; (2) Hambora approached PO2
Lasco and asked if the latter wanted to buy shabu from him; (3) PO2 Lasco, as poseur-
buyer, tendered four (4) marked ₱100.00 bills to Hambora; and (3) Hambora, in return,
handed one (1) sachet of shabu to PO2 Lasco. The chemistry report conducted on the
specimen resulted in shabu with a total weight of 0.0743 gram.
Moreover, Hambora’s contention of precution’s violation of sec 5, Art. II of RA 9165
must fail. Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that substantial
compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily
render the seized drug items inadmissible.
In the instant case, although the police officers did not strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165, their noncompliance did not affect
the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from Hambora as the chain of custody of the
evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case
G.R. No. 210610
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
MARILOU HILARIO y DIANA and LALINE GUADAYO y ROYO, Accused
Facts: The prosecution charged Hilario before the RTC through two separate
Informations: (a) Crim. Case No. 10-2008 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which
involved a sachet of shabu weighing 0.04 gram, referred to as "specimen A (NBS-1);"
and (b) Crim. Case No. l I- 2008 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, which
involved a sachet of shabu weighing 0.03 gram, referred to as "specimen B (NBS-2)."
However, the prosecution changed its theory before the Court of Appeals, stating in its
Brief for the Appellee that only one sachet of  shabu was confiscated from Hilario and
agreeing in the acquittal of Hilario in Crim. Case No. 11-2008 for the reason that she
"cannot be convicted for possession of the prohibited drugs she sold because possession
of dangerous drugs is generally inherent in the crime of sale of illegal drugs.
Conviction for both crimes is not feasible." Meanwhile, the Information in Crim. Case
No. 13-2008 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs against Guadayo involved a
sachet of shabu weighing 0.04 gram.
Second, the documentary evidence of the prosecution, particularly, (a) the
Inventories of the items seized, dated January 22, 2008, prepared by PO1 de Sagun and
witnessed by Mrs. Loma Orlina and Simplico "Sims" Garcia, representatives of the DOJ
and the media, respectively; (b) the Laboratory Examination Requests dated January 23,
2008 for the specimens seized, prepared by Police Superintendent Gaudencio Del Valle
Pucyutan; and (c) Chemistry Report Nos. BD-O12-08 and BD-OI3-08 dated January 23,
2008, issued by P/Cinsp. Delantar, all consistently state that there were two sachets
of shabu from Hilario marked as "NBS-I" (weighing 0.04 gram) and "NBS-2" (weighing
0.03 gram) and one sachet of shabu from Guadayo marked as "AAM-1."
Third, PO2 Magpantay did not testify before the RTC. PO1 de Sagun conceded that he
was not present when PO2 Magpantay supposedly apprehended Guadayo and seized
one sachet of shabu from her possession, so PO1 de Sagun's testimony on said matters
are hearsay.
And finally, the two sachets of shabu presented before the RTC were marked with
"NBS," the initials of PO1 de Sagun.
Issue: (1) Whether or not Hilario is guilty of the crime charged.
(2) Whether or not Guadoyo is guilty of the crime illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
Ruling: (1) No. Hilario is not guilty of the crime charged.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is important is that the sale transaction
of drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is properly presented
as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.
Clearly, the identity and integrity of the sachet of shabu allegedly seized by PO1 de
Sagun from Hilario were not preserved, despite PO1 de Sagun's assertion that he had
been in possession of the said sachet from its seizure from Hilario until its turnover to
the crime laboratory. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti, much less, the identity of the corpus delicti with moral certainty. When there are
doubts on whether the seized substance was the same substance examined and
established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or
illegal sale of a prohibited drug. The prosecution's failure to prove that the specimen
allegedly seized from Hilario was the same one presented in court is fatal to its case
The evidence for the prosecution were insufficient in material details and fraught with
discrepancies and contradictions. PO1 de Sagun himself, who claimed to have seized,
marked, and kept custody of the sachet of shabu seized from Hilario, could not
positively identify which between the two sachets of shabu he was presented with at the
trial, marked as "NBS-I" and "NBS-2," was the one he actually seized from Hilario.
Absent proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court cannot merely rely on the
presumption that PO1 de Sagun regularly performed his official duties.
(2) No. Guadoyo is not guilty of the crime illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
No shabu allegedly seized from appellant, Guadayo was identified before the trial
court.
As aptly held by the Supreme Court in Malillin v. People:
The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of
its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.
People v. Arposeple and Sulogaol
G.R. No. 205787; November 22, 2017
J. Martires
FACTS: Arposeple and Sulogaol were both charged with three counts of violation of
certain provisions of R.A. No. 9165 (Sec. 5, Art. II; Sec. 11, Art. II; and Sec. 12, Art II)
before the RTC of Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On 21 September 2005, Jimenez, who was the
Assistant City Drug Enforcement Officer, held a briefing at his office on a buy-bust
operation to be carried out at Ubujan District, Tagbilaran City. The briefing, with the
appellants as the subjects of the buy-bust operation, was attended by the buy-bust team
composed of Bagotchay, Bafiocia, Sanchez, Brunidor, Tizon, Ramos, Tabuelog Baculi,
and the informant. After the conduct of buy bust and the arrest and search of
appellants, Ramos turned over the seized items to Bagotchay who filled out the
certificate of inventory. The inventory was witnessed by the appellants and by
Barangay Ruiz and Ligue, and Castro and Maestrado, who acted as representatives of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, respectively. Except for the appellants
who refused to sign the certificate of inventory, the other witnesses did.
On the same day, the Philippine Provincial Crime Laboratory Office of Camp Francisco
Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City (laboratory), received a request for the laboratory examination
of the following: one piece transparent cellophane sachet (labelled PA/JS-09-21-01 YB);
two pieces empty transparent cellophane sachets (labelled PA/JS-09- 21-05-02 YB and
PNJS-09-21-05-03 YB); two pieces aluminum foil used as tooters (labelled PA/JS-09-21-
05-04 YB and PA/JS-09-21-05-05); and two pieces aluminum foil (labelled PA/JS-09-21-
05-06 YB and PA/JS 09- 21-05-07 YB). These were marked as specimens "A" "B" and "B-
1 "· "C" and "C-1" "D" and "E," respectively. After the laboratory examination, De
Guzman came up with a chemistry report stating that, except for specimen "E", all the
specimens were positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride. The
screening laboratory test and the confirmatory examination conducted the following
day were done in the presence of the appellants. The screening tests on both appellants
yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride and
negative for marijuana. The appellants were convicted by the RTC. The CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Were the appellants guilty?
RULING: No. Jurisprudence dictates that to secure a conviction for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution must establish the
following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and its
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The
essential elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11 are as follows:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possesses the said drug. On the one hand, the elements of illegal possession
of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
under Sec. 12 are the following: (1) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body;
and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.
In People v. Jaafar, we declared that in all prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 9165,
the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself, the existence of which is essential to a
judgment of conviction; thus, its identity must be clearly established. Equally
significant therefore as establishing all the elements of violations of R.A. No. 9165 is
proving that there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs and PEOPLE v. SULLANO
paraphernalia. It would be useless to still proceed to determine the existence of the
G.R. No. 228373 (2018)
elements of the crime if the corpus delicti had not been proven beyond moral certainty.
Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division
Jurisprudence dictates the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a
buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the FACTS
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
Following a random drug testing conducted pursuant to Section 36(e), Article
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, Police Officer Johhny K. Sullano was charged with
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Illegal Use of Dangerous Drugs), after
Ramos, Tabuelog, and Jimenez failed to explain how and when the seized items were the urine samples taken from him tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
marked. Ramos stated that after the inventory of the items the appellants were brought (shabu).
to the police station for proper disposition, i.e., the booking of the appellants, and the
team's preparation of their report. Ramos and Tabuelog executed their respective The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on the ground that the
affidavits relative to the buy-bust operation but both failed to mention anything therein prosecution failed prove that Sullano was apprehended or arrested or actually caught
as to what had happened to the seized items after the inventory and when these were using any dangerous drug. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
probably brought to the police station for marking.

De Guzman admitted that she had no knowledge as to who made the markings on the
ISSUE
evidence. Even Ruiz's testimony never made mention of the marking. True, there were
already markings on the seized items when these were submitted to the laboratory for Whether Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehension or
examination but not one of the prosecution witnesses testified as to who had made the arrest of a person to be considered as violating the provision.
markings, how and when the items were marked, and the meaning of these markings.
Conspicuously, the uncertainty exceedingly pervades that the items presented as
evidence against the appellants were exactly those seized during the buy-bust
RULING
operation.
Yes. An analysis of the construction of Section 15 yields no other conclusion:
The first link in the chain of custody was undoubtedly inherently weak which caused
the phrase “apprehended or arrested” immediately follows “a person,” thus qualifying
the other links to miserably fail. The first link, it is emphasized, primarily deals on the
preservation of the identity and integrity of the confiscated items, the burden of which the subject person. It necessarily follows that only apprehended or arrested persons
lies with the prosecution. The marking has a twin purpose, viz: first, to give the found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug may be prosecuted under the
succeeding handlers of the specimen a reference, and second, to separate the marked provision. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 9165, confined and restricted the liability
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the moment of arising from use of dangerous drugs to those who were apprehended or arrested if
seizure until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating charged with a violation of Section 15.
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. Absent therefore the certainty that
The information in this case did not specifically allege that accused was
the items that were marked, subjected to laboratory examination, and presented as
apprehended or arrested, an essential element in the crime charged. An information
evidence in court were exactly those that were allegedly seized from Arposeple, there
must be complete, fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been
would be no need to proceed to evaluate the succeeding links or to determine the
committed as an information is a recital of the essentials of a crime, delineating the
existence of the other elements of the charges against the appellants. Clearly, the cases
nature and cause of the accusation against the accused otherwise accused will be
for the prosecution had been irreversibly lost as a result of the weak first link
deprived of the opportunity to prepare his defense and violate his constitutional right
irretrievably breaking away from the main chain.
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Accused acquitted.
2. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. 9165)
People v. Chi Chan Liu
G.R. No. 189272 – January 21, 2015
FACTS:
The Philippine National Police (PNP) a radio message about a suspicious
looking boat seen within the vicinity of an island in Occidental Mindoro. Police officers
responded thereto and headed to the specified location wherein they spotted one
person on board a fishing boat and two persons on a speed boat transferring cargo
from the former to the latter. The fishing boat hurriedly sped away as the police officers
moved closer to the area. Due to the strong waves, the police officers were prevented
from chasing the same, and instead, went towards the speed boat where the officers
found two Chinese nationals, appellants Chi Chan Liu and Hui Lao Chung with
several transparent plastic bags containing white, crystalline substance suspected to be
as “shabu.” Upon apprehension, appellants were repeatedly saying, “call China, big
money.”
The suspected prohibited drugs were then turned over to the PNP and
appellants were consequently charged with violation of Sec. 14, Art. III of R.A. 6425 or
illegal importation of regulated drugs. Both the trial court and the CA found appellants
guilty of the crime charged.
In appealing their conviction before the Supreme Court, appellants maintain
that there is no importation of regulated drugs because the elements thereof were not
established. Thus, according to them, if it is not proven that the regulated drugs are
brought into the Philippines from a foreign origin, there is no importation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all of the elements of the crime of importation of regulated
drugs are present in this case
RULING:
No, not all of the elements of the crime of importation of regulated drugs are
present in this case.
The mere fact that appellants were Chinese nationals, as well as their penchant
for making reference to China where they could obtain money to bride the
apprehending officers does not necessarily mean that the confiscated drugs came from
China. The records only bear the fact that the speed boat on which the appellants were
apprehended was docked on the coast of an island in Occidental Mindoro, but it could
have easily come from some other locality within the country and not necessarily from
China or any foreign port. The Court also notes that for a vessel which resembles a speed boat,
it is rather difficult to suppose how appellants made their way to the shores of Occidental
Mindoro from China.
Appellant’s exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs, does not,
however, free them from all criminal liability for their possession of the same is clearly
evident. As a rule, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
Information, and that proved or established by evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged.
Appeal denied. Judgment and resolution affirmed with modification that
appellants are found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs instead.
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE SORIN y TAGAYLO
G.R. No. 212635
March 25, 2015
FACTS:
According to the prosecution, on November 2, 2005, the Philippine National
Police (PNP) intelligence section chief of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental received a
report that Sorin was selling illegal drugs at his residence in Barangay Amoros, El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Prior to this date, or on October 25, 2005, a test-buy was
conducted by the PNP where Sorin sold illegal drugs to a civilian asset. As a result,
Police Chief Inspector Rolindo Soguillon formed a buy-bust team. The poseur-buyers
were provided with four (4) one hundred peso bills as marked money.
At around 7:30 in the evening, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area.
After which, PO2 Dador turned over the seized items and the marked money to SPO1
Mugot, who marked the same, prepared the inventory and request for laboratory
examination, and sent the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Sorin, on the other hand, claimed that the sachets of shabu were planted by
the police officers, and that no buy bust operation occurred in Novemnber 2, 2005.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sorin’s conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165 should be upheld.
RULING:
YES. In order to convict an accused charged with violating Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165, the prosecution must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
Accordingly, it is of paramount importance for the prosecution to establish
that the transaction actually took place, and to present the corpus delicti, i.e., the seized
drug/s, before the court.
Similarly, it must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of such seized
items have been preserved. In other words, the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of
custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed. In People v. Viterbo, citing People v. Cervantes, the Court had
occasion to elaborate on the requirement’s rationale:
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller,
object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for
it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the  corpus delicti of
the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account
for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it
was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of
the corpus delicti.
The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the
identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed."
It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation
of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of
proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. The lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly militates
against a finding of guilt, as in this case. Therefore, as reasonable doubt persists on the
identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, the latter’s acquittal should
come as a matter of course.
Lescano vs. People
G.R. No. 214490
January 13, 2016
J. Leonen
(R.A. 9165)
FACTS
The City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Team (CAIDSOT) was informed that
drug-pushing activities were taking place in a street in Olongapo. After confirming the
information, they planned a buy-bust operation and designated their roles. During the
operation, the informant introduced PO3 Javier to accused Lescano who asked how
much marijuana he was willing to buy. PO3 Javier responded by handing the marked
P100 bill to Lescano. Lescano then gave PO3 Javier a medium-sized plastic sachet
supposedly containing marijuana. PO3 Javier then gave the pre-arranged signal to the
buy-bust team. PO1 Mataverde approached them, introduced himself as a police
officer, and then frisked Lescano and recovered the buy-bust money. PO3 Javier
marked the medium-sized plastic sachet with the initials "HJ" and turned it over to
SPO1 Delos Reyes. Lescano was then brought to the CAIDSOT office for investigation.
Inside the CAIDSOT office, an inventory was allegedly conducted and photographs of
the marked money and the sachet were taken. The sachet allegedly containing
marijuana weighed 1.4 grams. An Information was filed charging Lescano with illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. Testifying during trial, PO3 Javier positively identified the
drug specimen. The Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory also issued a report
on Lescano’s urine stating that dangerous drugs were present in Lescano’s system. The
laboratory examination on the sachet also yielded a positive result for marijuana.
ISSUE
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the requisites of
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
RULING
NO.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and; (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. As regards
corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as
amended by Republic Act No. 10640 stipulates requirements for the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of
corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, non-
compliance will acquit the accused.
Four links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: 1. the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; 2. the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; 3. the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and 4. the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two
(2) actions, namely: 1. physical inventory and 2. photographing. Physical inventory
must be done immediately after seizure and confiscation. As to where, it depends on
whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served,
the physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that
the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done
"at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable."
Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the
physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: 1. the accused or the
person/s from whom the items were seized; 2. an elected public official; and 3. a
representative of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to
the first and the third. As to the first, his or her representative or his or her counsel. As
to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the media
may be present in his or her place. These requirements are imperative. Even the doing
of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actually comply with the
requirements of Section 21 does not suffice. Accordingly, the mere marking of seized
paraphernalia, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking of photographs, and in
the absence of the persons required by Section 21 to be present, does not suffice.
In this case, the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of chain of custody.
It merely gave sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs. Not
even the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties will suffice.
While an inventory was supposed to have been conducted, this was done neither in the
presence of accused, the person from whom the drugs were supposedly seized, nor in
the presence of his counsel or representative. Likewise, not one of the persons required
to be present was shown to have been around during the inventory and
photographing.
It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that
"noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." However, the
prosecution has not shown that there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with
compliance with Section 21. Hence, with the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crime
for which accused was charged is cast in doubt, accused must be acquitted.
MEDEL CORONEL y SANTILLAN, RON ALDO PERMEJO y ABARQUEZ,
NESTOR VILLAFUERTE y SAPIN and JOANNE OLIVAREZ y RAMOS vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 214536 March 13, 2017
FACTS:
A PDEA team meeting was held for the implementation of a search
warrant. I02 Paragasa designated IO2 Discaya as the seizing officer. While, IOI Million
and IOI Albao are the arresting officers. The PDEA team coordinated with a team from
the PNP - Southern Police District in implementing the search warrant. They arrived at
the subject building at around 2:00 p.m., knocked on the door, and announced that they
had a search warrant. During the search, the team recovered, among others,
transparent plastic sachets, aluminium foils, containers of white crystalline substance
and white powdery residue, disposable lighters, improvised plastic scoops, a total
amount of ₱580.00 in assorted bills, and ₱165.00 in coins.
Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte, and Olivarez were arrested and apprised of
their constitutional rights. The confiscated items were also inventoried, photographed,
and marked in their presence, as well as in the presence of the Barangay officials and
the Department of Justice and media representatives. Subsequently, the arrested
suspects were brought to the PDEA Headquarters for investigation and mandatory
drug testing, together with the seized objects, one of which was identified
as shabu. Coronel, Villafuerte, Permejo, and Olivarez tested positive for shabu.
After trial on the merits, the RTC found Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte, and
Olivarez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Sections 7 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 9165 for knowingly and illegally visiting a drug den and using
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9165
RULING:
No. Section 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes the act of knowingly
visiting a drug den. Before a person may be convicted under the foregoing provision, it
must be shown that he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still
visited the place despite this knowledge.
True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs
some time before their arrest. However, assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the
alleged drug den before their arrest, there was no showing how long petitioners were
at the alleged drug den, or how long the drugs had been in their system. In other
words, there is no basis to assume that petitioners used drugs at the moment
immediately before arrest, and thus, at the location of the arrest.
Assuming that persons who test positive for drugs used them at the place of
arrest is not sufficient to show that they were aware of the nature of the suspected drug
den before visiting it, absent any other circumstantial evidence.
Furthermore, there was no attempt to show that petitioners knew the nature
of the alleged drug den, or even that they used drugs in the premises.  The petitioners
were not found to be in possession of any drugs. When petitioners were arrested,
nobody was found "in the act of using, selling or buying illegal drugs, nor packaging
nor hiding nor transporting the same." There were no acts alleged or evidence found,
which would tend to show a familiarity with the nature of the place as a drug den.
 The crime of knowingly visiting a drug den under Article II, Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 9165 carries with it a minimum penalty of imprisonment of 12 years
and one (1) day, and a maximum of 20 years. It is not to be taken so lightly that its
elements can be presumed to exist without any effort to show them. Given the dearth
of evidence in this case, the Court is constrained to acquit petitioners of this particular
charge. However, petitioners do not assail the determination that they violated Article
II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165, and this conviction must be sustained.
Zanoria vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 110163 December 15, 1997
Facts:
Herein petitioner was indicted for violation of Section 9, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425 or “knowingly, planting, growing or raising of any plant which is the
source of a prohibited drug.”
Some members of the Philippine Army with the Narcotics command had a
mission to uproot full-grown marijuana plants in the mountains of Sitio Kabulihan,
Brgy. Guba and Talamba, Cebu, allegedly cultivated or cultured by a certain Eddie.
While casing the area, they noticed petitioner Eduardo Zanoria ermerging from a nipa
hut to inspect the plantation, the agents immediately apprehended him.
Petitioner denied the charge against him and implicated another person, and
alleged that his military friends are framing him. He alleged that when his wife woke
him up because somebody was calling him downstairs. When he opened the door,
several persons pointed their firearms at him and effected a search of his house. He also
argues that his mere presence at the site during the operations cannot justify his
conviction for “knowingly, planting, growing or raising of any plant which is the
source of a prohibited drug.” He contends that conviction under Section 9 of R.A. No.
6425 requires a series of human activities, that is, the deliberate planting, growing or
raising of these plants.
Issue:
Whether or not denial can prevail over positive identification of the accused.
Ruling:
No.
Evident on record is that petitioner failed to adequately explain his presence at
the site teeming with fully grown marijuana plants. His claim that he has never seen
nor heard of marijuana is incredulous. Needless to state, the defense of denial cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused.
PEOPLE VS. PHILIP DILAO
GR NO. 170359, July 27, 2007
FACTS:
On July 19, 2002, an informant called Caloocan City Police Station reporting one alias
Philip was rampantly selling shabu along the streets of Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. It
was identified to be the accused, Philip Dilao. After meeting with the police team,
informant informed that the accuses was standing outside a billboard court along
Panagko St. The police, disguised as a civilian, told the accused that he is a buyer of
shabu and handed him the marked money. Appellant seized him up and confiscated
the plastic sachet containing a white chrystalline substance. The forensic chemist
confirmed that it was indeed methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
While the defense alleged that while they were playing billiards, a group of police
officials approached them and frisked them. Nothing illegal was recovered from all of
them. He denied the charges leveled against him. He explained that he first saw PO2
Modina when he was allowed to alight the jeep at Toyota Motors, EDSA and that he
saw PO2 De Ocampo only during the inquest. He admitted that he had no previous
quarrel or misunderstanding with the arresting police officer who he came to know
only when he was arrested.
Jose Bandico alias "Joker" substantially corroborated the testimony of appellant on the
ownership of the billiard hall, the fact of the latter’s arrest on July 19, 2002 and that
nothing illegal was taken from appellant when frisked by the police in the hall. Alias
"Joker" also testified about the accused playing rotation billiard with him since 2:00
p.m. and how the police officers, after the arrest, even got the ₱260.00 bet.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Section 5 and 11
of RA 9165.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals
rendering the accused guilty of RA 9165. It cannot be over-emphasized that a buy-bust
operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law at that, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. It is often utilized by law enforcers for
the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious
activities. Credence of the buy-bust operators cannot be undermined by the mere fact
that law enforcers are perceived to resort to the practice of planting evidence to gain
favor from their superiors. In the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute a serious
crime against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall
prevail over appellant’s often self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been a
victim of a frame-up.
An affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses without motive to perjure is
far stronger than a negative testimony. Records show that appellant and the police
officers are strangers to each other. Thus, there is no reason to suggest that the police
officers were ill-motivated in apprehending appellant. Moreover, there is nothing in the
records which shows even an iota of evidence that the prosecution witnesses merely
fabricated their testimonies to wrongly impute such a serious crime against the
accused-appellant.
The Supreme Court is convinced that the prosecution’s evidence more than proved
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal
sale of "shabu," to wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The
delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust operation between the entrapping police
officers and the appellant. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2000 (RA 9165)
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) vs. RICHARD BRODETT
AND JORGE JOSEPH
G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.
Doctrine:
The Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Sec. 20 of RA
9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of
the trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who
is not liable for the unlawful act.
Facts: Accused Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph were charged with the violation RA
9165. Brodett then filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence. He averred that
during his arrest, PDEA had seized several personal non-drug effects from him,
including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551. The Prosecutor
interposed its objection but the RTC, however, ordered the release of the car. Hence,
PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals but the CA dismissed the
same.
Hence, PDEA filed the present appeal contending that even if the car had belonged to
Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release,
because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge
of the commission of the crime. Brodett counters that Sec. 20 of RA 9165 clearly and
unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of
the supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless
such proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the
unlawful act; and that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person
must still prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the commission of the
crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the order for the release of the car to
Ms.Brodett
Ruling:
NO. The CA did not err in affirming the order for the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act, including the properties or proceeds derived from
illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential chemicals is Sec. 20
of R.A. No. 9165. There is no question that the text of Sec. 20 of RA No. 9165 is similar
to that of Article 45 of the RPC. The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45 of the
RPC in People v. Jose holding that Article 45 of the RPC bars the confiscation and
forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense”. Such interpretation is extended by
analogy to Sec. 20.
However, the Office of the City Prosecutor proposed that the delivery to the RTC of the
listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the
trial, would be necessary to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their
possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the
return of the car because it appeared to be the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale
of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission of the
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable
laws and the primordial intent of the framers of RA 9165, and contends that the car
should not be released from the custody of the law because it had been seized from
accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to
Return Non-Drug Evidence did not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a
third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her
ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation
to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. It
insists that the car is a property in custodia legis and may not be released during the
pendency of the trial.
The Court agrees with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor. Indeed, forfeiture, if
warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the RPC and Sec. 20 of RA 9165, would be a
part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car (or
any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject to
forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the
proceedings. Sec. 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for
the duration of the trial in the RTC as being in custodia legis is primarily intended to
preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it before the
judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as
evidence. Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not
enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the
Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention with
the express language of Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 9165.
B. P. 22 (BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22)
RAFFY BRODETH AND ROLAN B. ONAL, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND ABRAHAM G. VILLEGAS, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 197849, November 29, 2017
FACTS:
On 16 August 2001, petitioners were charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 30 Manila (MeTC), with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. on 23 November 2000 a
complaint was filed by Villegas, the Operations Manager of Vill Integrated. He alleged
that in the course of his company's operations, he transacted with L&S Resources, Inc.
by providing the latter equipment and tugboats for its own operations. After the
execution of the service contracts, L&S Resources started using the equipment and
tugboats, and even made partial payments to Vill Integrated. However, L&S Resources
had not fully paid all of Vill Integrated's billings and its officers only made promises to
settle them but never did.
According to Villegas, among the payments made by L&S Resources were
three (3) checks drawn against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank).
Two (2) out of these three (3) checks, particularly: (a) Metrobank Check No. 2700111415
dated 31 August 1999, and (b) Metrobank Check No. 2700111416 dated 5 September
1999, are the subject checks in the instant case. When the subject checks were deposited
to Vill Integrated's account, they were dishonored as they were "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds (DAIF)." The complainant made demands for payment but they
were unheaded hence the filing of the criminal complaint
On 2 July 2008, the MeTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the offense charged. The MeTC held that the dishonor of the subject checks was
sufficiently shown by the letters "DAIF" written at the back of the checks, which is
prima facie evidence that the drawee bank had dishonored the checks. Moreover, the
MeTC ruled that petitioners had known the checks were dishonored because they
admitted they had the demand letters.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erroneously affirmed reliance on hearsay
evidence to establish territorial jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial court of manila;
Ruling:
No, A careful review of the rulings of the lower courts would show that the
only piece of evidence they considered connecting the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22
within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC is the affidavit-complaint of Villegas. In
this affidavit, the allegation that the subject checks were issued in Manila was
mentioned only once even though the circumstances behind the issuance of the checks
were referred to a couple of times. Moreover, the phrase "in Manila" only appeared in
the ninth paragraph of Villegas' affidavit where the elements of the offense were
already being summarized. Looking at the affidavit itself already casts some doubt as
to where the subject checks were really issued.
More importantly, we agree with petitioners that Villegas could not have
testified or alleged in his affidavit that the checks were issued in Manila because he was
not privy to the contractual negotiations with L&S Resources nor was he present when
petitioners issued the checks. In fact, his position in the company did not give him any
opportunity to deal directly with his clients as brought out in his cross-examination:
Furthermore, petitioners claimed in defense that the checks were issued as a
guarantee for the payments. As admitted by Vill Integrated's liason officer, their
company collects payments from its clients in their respective offices. Considering that
L&S Resources' principal place of business is in Makati City, it would be out of the
ordinary course ofbusiness operations for petitioners to go all the way to Manila just to
issue the checks.
Violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A
suit on the check can be filed in ariy of the places where any of the elements of the
offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored.

B. P. 22 (BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22)
IVY LIM vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and BLUE PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC.
G.R. No. 224979
December 13, 2017
Facts:
Private respondent Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc. granted Rochelle Benito a loan
amounting to ₱1,149,500.00 as evidenced by a Promissory Note acknowledged before a
notary public. Petitioner Lim signed as a co-maker of her sister Benito. To secure
payment of the loan, Benito and Lim issued eleven (11) Equitable PCI Bank checks with
a face value of ₱67,617.65 each, or a total amount of ₱743,794.15. Later on, 10 of these 11
checks were dishonored when presented for payment for having been drawn against a
closed account. BPHI sent Lim various demand letters, but to no avail. On June 28,
2005, BPHI sent a final demand letter, which Lim supposedly received as shown by the
registry return card bearing her signature.
For failing to pay the amounts corresponding the dishonored checks, Lim was charged
with 11 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. During the preliminary conference, the
parties admitted the following matters: (1) the jurisdiction of the trial court; (2) the
identity of Lim as the accused, (3) the existence of the complaint affidavit, (4) the
existence of the promissory note and Lim's signature thereon, and (5) the existence and
due execution of the 11 checks with BPHI as payee.During trial, the prosecution
presented its witness, BPHI Finance Officer Enriquez, and documentary evidence
consisting of the complaint-affidavit, the promissory note and the 11 checks, and the
demand letters, among others. For the defense, Lim claimed that the subject checks
were unauthenticated because she was out of the country on July 29, 2003, as shown by
the certification of her travel record issued by the BID. She refuted the testimony of
Enriquez that he personally saw her signed the checks before him.
The MeTC rendered a decision finding Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt vor
violation of B.P Blg. 22. On appeal, the RTC found no reversible error and affirmed the
MeTC Decision. The CA then affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Lim is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22
Ruling:
The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for
value;
2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reasons, ordered the bank to stop payment;
and
3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for payment of the check in
full upon its presentment.
All the foregoing elements were established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution, as thoroughly discussed by the MeTC.
As to the first element, the Court finds that the checks were issued for value. Accused is
the co-maker of the promissory note (Exhibit "D") wherein she voluntarily bound
herself to be jointly and severally liable with Rochelle Benito, her sister, to Blue Pacific
Inc. for the amount of ₱605,000.00 plus interests. Accused is also a signatory to the
eleven checks issued, along with her sister, in favor of Blue Pacific. These checks
constitute the means for payment of the promissory note signed by the accused and her
sister.
As to the second element, except for Exhibit "G", the evidence shows that the ten (10)
checks were presented for payment and subsequently dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed". The check dated May 29, 2004 with check number 0105461 in the
amount of ₱67,617.65 was not presented for payment, and hence to criminal liability
attached thereto.
As to the third element, Exhibit "Q", the demand letter dated May 18, 2005 addressed to
Ivy Benito Lim and signed by Juanito Enriquez was undisputedly received by the
accused Ivy Lim as shown in Exhibit "Q-6". The distinctive strokes in writing the name
"Ivy" and the flourish of the stroke in writing "im" in the latter part thereof, compared
with the signatures appearing on all the checks shown that these signatures were made
by one and [the] same person. No evidence was presented by the defense to refute the
sending, receipt and existence of the signature of accused Ivy Lim in Exhibits "Q" and
Q-6".
Bondoc, Elmira Noleen G.
JD 4A - Special Penal Laws
Evangeline Danao v. Court of Appeals & People
G.R. No. 122353 June 6, 2001
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG.22 – BOUNCING CHECKS LAW
FACTS:
Complainant, Luzviminda Macasieb, entered into a loan agreement with Appellant
Danao. As security for the loan, Apellant issued two postdated checks in the total
amount of P29,750. On the maturity dates of the two checks, Macasieb deposited the
same to PCIB Branch Quezon City. However, the checks were dishonored for the
reasoned that the account of appellant had already been closed. Appellant was
informed of the dishonor of the checks and was asked to redeem the same but to no
avail. A letter was sent by Atty. Jose Padolina, counsel for private complainant,
demanding that appellant settle her obligation. However, the latter failed to heed the
demand letter. Appellant was then charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The Trial Court convicted the appellant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: WON all the elements of Bouncing Check Law violation is present in this case
RULING: No.
The Information in each of the two criminal cases charges that petitioner Evangeline
issued the subject check, "knowing that at the time of issue thereof," she "did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face
amount of the check upon its presentment," and that "despite receipt of notice of
dishonor, the said accused failed to pay the payee the face amount of the check or to
make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice."
The elements of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22 are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or
for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment.
The Court further ruled in King v. People, "in order to create the prima facie
presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that
he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed
to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment."
If such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or
drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by
the drawer then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided under Section 2
cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
In the present case, no proof of receipt by petitioner of any notice of non-payment of the
checks was ever presented during the trial. There is no way of determining when the 5-
day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end. Thus, the
presumption or prima facie evidence of knowledge by the petitioner of the
insufficiency of funds or credit at the times she issued the checks did not arise.
It is clear that the essential element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit on
the part of petitioner is absent in this case not having been proved by the prosecution.
On this ground alone, petitioner should be acquitted.
CLEMENTE, Marie Immaculate L. Case Digest 2
JD 4B
Special Penal Laws
1. BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR
DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR
CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
G.R. No. 203583; October 13, 2014
Leonora B. Rimando v. Spouses Winston and Elenita Adaba and People of the
Philippines
FACTS:
The petitioner Rimando is charged with the crime of estafa through the use of
false manifestations and fraudulent representations. Petitioner was also charged with
violation of BP 22, which she was acquitted in the ground of reasonable doubt. The
RTC likewise acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa but found her civilly liable to
Spouses Aldaba.
Facts reveal that Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under
the assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest.
Convinced by Rimando’s proposal and taking into consideration their long friendship,
Sps. Aldaba gave Rimando a check in the amount of ¬500,000.00 as an investment in
her business.
In turn, Rimando gave Sps. Aldaba three (3) postdated checks, one for
¬500,000.00 and the other two (2) for ¬40,000.00 each, and made them sign an
investment contract with Multitel International Holding Corporation. Upon maturity of
the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were dishonored for being
drawn against insufficient funds.
In her defense, Rimando denied friendship with the spouses and that she
enticed them to invest in her own business, as she had none. She contends that her
acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in the BP 22 cases should have barred
spouses Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in the estafa case.
ISSUE:
Whethere or not the civil liability of Rimando in the estafa case extinguished
by virtue of her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases.
HELD:
NO, Rimando’s exoneration of the civil liability in the BP 22 case does not
extinguish her criminal liability in the estafa case. The acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act
constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed
any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil
liability was correctly traced from being an accommodation party to one of the checks
she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in
effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such, she may be held directly liable for the
value of the issued check.
Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no
effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual
circumstances. Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an
identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under
the law, are considered “separate, distinct, and independent” from each other.
Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal
and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a
BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given
any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in
this instance.
Hence, Rimando is still civilly liable in the estafa case despite her exoneration of her
civil liability in the BP 22 case.
RUIZ V, PEOPLE
G.R. No. 160893
November 18, 2005
Facts:
Ruiz contracted several loans from Norberta Mendoza amounting to
₱184,000.00. Ruiz then issued a check for Mendoza but it was dishonored by the bank,
as the account against which it was drawn was already closed.
The bank notified Mendoza of the dishonored check. Mendoza , through
counsel informed Riz that the check had been dishonored "for the reason that her
account with the drawee bank was already closed." Mendoza also demanded the
payment of the amount of the check plus interest thereon. Ruiz received the letter and
promised Mendoza that she would pay the amount of the check. However, Ruiz
reneged and failed to pay.
Mendoza was charged with violation of B.P 22.
Ruiz admitted that she drew the check and delivered the same to Mendoza.
However, she declared that she did so with the conformity of her sister, Gina Parro,
who was the owner of UCPB Account No. 320-000534-5, and that this was done in the
presence of Mendoza. Ruiz further declared that Mendoza had asked her to draw and
issue the check for the purpose of showing the same to an insurance agent with whom
she (Mendoza) had applied for a ₱1,000,000.00 life insurance. Ruiz further testified that
sheagreed to draw and issue the check to Mendoza merely for accommodation
purposes. She claimed that she informed Mendoza that the check was not funded, and
the latter assured her that the check would not be encashed nor deposited.
She contented as well that, criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 only arises
if the maker of the check is a depositor of the draweee bank or has a checking account
therein. She posits that one who issues a check against a checking account owned by
somebody else cannot order the drawee bank to pay the amount of the check to the
payee.
ISSUE: WON Ruiz is guilty of B.P 22

Ruling: Yes, Ruiz is guilty of B.P 22
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the prosecution is burdened to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the following elements:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting
them in circulation. The law includes all checks drawn against banks. The law was
designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of
issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor.
Such practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be
abated. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, either as a deposit, as a guarantee, or
even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt or as a mode of payment is covered by B.P. .
It is a crime classified as malum prohibitum. The law is broad enough to include,
within its coverage, the making and issuing of a check by one who has no account
with a bank, or where such account was already closed when the check was
presented for payment.
ONGKINGCO v. SUGIYAMA
G.R. No. 217787, September 18, 2019
Topic: B.P. 22
Facts:
Respondent Kasuhiro Sugiyama entered into a Contract Agreement with New Rhia Car
Services, Inc. where petitioner Socorro Ongkingco is the President and Chairperson of
the Board of Directors, and petitioner Maria Paz Ongkingco is a Board Director. Under
the Agreement, Sugiyama would receive a monthly in exchange for his investment.
To cover Sugiyama's monthly dividends, petitioners issued six (6) checks. The first
three (3) checks, dated September, October, and November, were good checks, but the
remaining 3 checks bounced for having been draw against insufficient funds.
In October, Socorro again obtained a loan from Sugiyama. As a guarantee and payment
for the said obligation, Socorro issued a Bank Check.
When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds, just like the 3 other checks initially issued by petitioners. A
formal demand letter was delivered to Socorro's office, but no payment was made.
Thus, Sugiyama filed a complaint against petitioners for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P.) 22. Accordingly, four (4) separate Informations were filed against
petitioners.
Petitioners' argued that they cannot be made liable for the value of the dishonored
checks as the same were issued without any consideration begs the question.
The MeTC rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty of four (4) counts of violation
of B.P. 22. The MeTC ruled that the first and third elements of violation of B.P. 22 are
present, namely: the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or
for value, and the subsequent dishonor by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit. The MeTC noted that the petitioners admitted the issuance of the said checks
to Sugiyama in consideration of the loan; thus, the subject checks were issued on
account or for value. As regards the second element, MeTC ruled that the demand
letter for the payment of the dishonored checks was received by the secretary of
Socorro as shown by the handwritten signature on the letter. And contrary to
petitioners argument, B.P. 22 punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check, and not
the purpose for which the check was issued or in consideration of the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance.
The RTC and the CA affirmed the said decision.
On appeal, petitioners raised that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Socorro received the notice of dishonor and also raise for the first time that
the four (4) Informations filed before the MeTC do not bear the approval of the city
prosecutor.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Socorro and Maria Paz are guilty for violation of B.P. 22
Ruling:
Yes, Socorro is guilty of violation of B.P. 22, but not Maria Paz.
To sustain a conviction of violation of B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt three (3) essential elements, namely: 1. The accused makes, draws or
ssues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of
the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee
bank for payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit; or it
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reasons, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. However, while the
prosecution established the second element with respect to petitioner Socorro, it failed
to do so in the case of petitioner Marie Paz.
When service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that notice was served must
prove the fact of service, and the burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence. Failure of the prosecution to prove that the person who issued
the check was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for acquittal. It
bears emphasis that the giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply
proof for the element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up, but
also affords the offender due process.
Further, It is of no moment that the subject checks were issued as a guarantee and upon
the insistence of private complainant Sugiyama. What is significant is that the accused
had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and those same checks
were dishonored upon presentment, regardless of the purpose for such issuance. It is,
therefore, clear that the real intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of
issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and, thus, punishable under such law.
As a general rule, when a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate's
name, he or she may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute. However, he
or she can only be held civilly liable when convicted.
Galita, Chloe Anne S. (17-167510)
Chua v. People (G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)
FACTS:
Chua and private complainant Philip See were long-time friends and neighbors. On
different dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of
varying amounts to See pursuant to their rediscounting arrangement at a 3% rate.
However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored either
due to insufficient funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make
good the checks. Hence, See filed in December 23 1993 a Complaint for violations of BP
22 before the OPP of QC. He attached thereto a demand letter dated December 10, 1993.
The prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing of charges against
Chua before the MeTC of QC.
In his defense, he maintained that the demand letter attached by See in the complaint,
among others, does not contain Chua's signature that would serve as proof of his actual
receipt thereof, that the purported demand letter was still blank when presented to him
for signature, and that he signed the same for another purpose. The defense then
surmised that the prosecution fabricated the demand letter to remedy the lack of a
proper notice of dishonor upon Chua. They also argued that while the demand letter
contains Chua's signature, the same should not be given any probative value since it
does not contain the date when he allegedly received the same. Hence, there is simply
no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period that the law affords an issuer to make
good the check from the date of his notice of its dishonor.
Nonetheless, MeTC convicted Chua of violations of BP 22. The RTC and the CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chua is correctly held liable for violation of BP 22;
HELD:
No. The prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the offenses charged.
In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following
essential elements must be present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in br credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, witjhout any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment." 
In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. The Court
has discussed the importance of proving the date of actual receipt of the notice of
dishonor, that is, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored.
It must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew 'at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment.' And because this element involves a state of mind which is
difficult to establish, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.
Thus, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or
drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by
the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of
B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial
5-day period." 
In the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section
22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received
the demand letter. The MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the demand letter
was likewise the date of Chua's receipt thereof. Given also Chua's reasons of denial, it
behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the demand
letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to present it without adducing any
evidence as to the date of Chua's actual receipt thereof. It must be stressed that the
prosecution must also prove actual receipt of the notice of dishonor because the fact of
service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by
the accused. And since the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice" which the Court finds
wanting in this case.
However, an acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
preclude the award of civil damages. For this reason, Chua must be directed to restitute
See the total amount of the face value of all the checks with legal interest reckoned from
the time the said checks became due and demandable until fully paid.
Grande, Mhel Rose Camille G.
JD 4B; 2017-167473
Topic: BP 22
Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125059 | March 17, 2000
Facts:
Sycip agreed to buy, on installment from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a
townhouse. Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC 48
posdated checks to cover the monthly installments.
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit which
FRC ignored. Thus, Sycip served on FRC two notarial notices to the effect that he was
suspending his installment payments pending compliance with the project plans
approved by HLRUB. Sycip and other buyers filed a complaint with HLURB, where it
ordered FRC to finish the incomplete feature of its townhouse project.
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashement
Sycip’s postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent “stop payment orders” to the
bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank as the
due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying
bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks.
Due to the closure of petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six
postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22
involving said dishonored checks.
Issue: Whether or not Sycip is guilty of violating BP 22;
Ruling:
No, Sycip is not guilty of violating BP 22.
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), an offense is
committed when the following elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the
check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment
thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the
second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are
present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will
suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. Such knowledge
of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his
checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot hold if there is
evidence to the contrary.
The checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell. But
there’s no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge
that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when
presented for encashment. As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of
petitioner's Account with Citibank was not for insufficiency of funds. It was made
upon the advice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each time
petitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent encashment of postdated checks in
private respondent's possession. Said evidence contradicts the prima facie presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. This does not suffice to prove the second
element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which explicitly requires "evidence of
knowledge of insufficient funds" by the accused at the time the check or checks are
presented for encashment.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case,
would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for conviction under the law. It
must be stressed that every element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the
punishable act must come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute.
In this case, although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Guilals, Christian James S.
JD-4B
BP 22
G.R. No. 75243 March 16, 1987
PAZ M. DINGLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: Paz M. Dingle, herein petitioner, and her husband Nestor Dingle, are owners of a
family business known as "PMD Enterprises" which was managed by the latter.
Nestor Dingle entered into a transaction with one Ernesto Ang whereby PMD
Enterprises would sell 400 of washed silica sand to Ang and Ang gave as advanced
payment a certain amount to Nestor Dingle.
Nestor Dingle, however, failed to deliver the 400 tons of washed silica sand, so he
issued to Ang two (2) postdated checks drawn by him and his wife as authorized
signatories of PMD Enterprises in the total amount of P51,885.93 representing the value
of the undelivered washed silica sand. The checks were dishonored for being "drawn
against insufficient funds." When informed of the dishonor Nestor Dingle replaced the
checks with one (1) Equitable Banking Corporation Check in the amount of P51,885.93
which was also signed by both spouses. This was also dishonored. Two (2) letters were
sent to and received by Nestor Dingle for the payment of the amount covered by the
dishonored check. No payment was made. Hence, the spouses were charged with the
violation of BP Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Anti-Bouncing Check Law.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner incur any criminal liability under BP 22.
Ruling: No. Petitioner did not incur any criminal liability under BP 22.
The Solicitor General in his Memorandum recommended that petitioner be acquitted of the
instant charge  because from the testimony of the sole prosecution witness Ernesto Ang,
it was established that he dealt exclusively with Nestor Ang. Nowhere in his testimony
is the name of Paz Dingle ever mentioned in connection with the transaction and with
the issuance of the check. In fact, Ang categorically stated that it was Nestor Dingle
who received his two (2) letters of demand. This lends credence to the testimony of Paz
Dingle that she signed the questioned checks in blank together with her husband
without any knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of
dishonor.
In the case of Florentino Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, promulgated December 18, 1986, it
was held that an essential element of the offense is  knowledge on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds.
Dela Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 163494; 3 August 2016
J. Reyes
FACTS: Tan entered into several business transactions with the petitioner sometime in
1984 to 1985, whereby the former supplied and delivered to the petitioner rolls of
textile materials and that for every delivery made, the petitioner issued post-dated
checks made payable to "Cash". When presented for payment, however, some of the
checks issued by the petitioner to Tan were dishonored by the drawee-bank for being
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" or "Account Closed". The replacement checks later
issued by the petitioner were still dishonored upon presentment for payment. The
fourth batch of 23 replacement checks issued by the petitioner to Tan became the
subject of his complaint. Said checks were still dishonored and the amounts thereof
remained unsatisfied. Twenty three informations for violation of B.P. Blg 22 were filed
in court against the petitioner. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded “not guilty”. The
prosecution was able to present its evidence during the trial but the defense failed to
present its evidence after it had sought several hearing postponements and resettings.
The RTC issued an Order that deemed the petitioner to have waived her right to
present evidence. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty under B.P. Blg 22?
RULING: No. To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following essential elements
must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of
the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
Although a notice of dishonor is not an indispensable requirement in a prosecution for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as it is not an element of the offense, evidence that a notice of
dishonor has been sent to and received by the accused is actually sought as a means to
prove the second element. Jurisprudence is replete with cases that underscore the value
of a notice of dishonor in B.P. Blg. 22 cases, and how the absence of sufficient proof of
receipt thereof can be fatal in the prosecution's case.
The presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought
into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor
and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check
or to make arrangement for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as
provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank
is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-
day period. This requirement cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides for an
opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the amount appearing on the
check, within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence of said notice
therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In
other words, procedural due process demands that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner.
The prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the actual receipt by the petitioner of the
demand letter sent by Tan. No witness testified to authenticate the registry return card
and the signature appearing thereon. The return card provides that the letter was
received by one Rolando Villanueva, without even further proof that the said person
was the petitioner's duly authorized agent for the purpose of receiving the
correspondence.
Accused acquitted.
ALBURO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 196289 (2016)
Per J. Peralta, Third Division
FACTS
Elizabeth Alburo was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22
after four (4) checks which she issued as payment for a house and lot were dishonored
for being drawn against insufficient funds. In her defense, Elizabeth argues that she
never received any notice of dishonor.
ISSUE
Whether Elizabeth has been actually notified of the dishonor of her checks.
RULING
No. The first (the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or
for value) and third (the dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the drawee bank to stop payment) elements of the crime charged are present in this case.
Elizabeth issued checks as payment and when presented for payment, the same were
dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds.
To establish the second element (the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment), it must be shown that the accused
knew at the time of the issuance of the check that he or she did not have sufficient
funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment. B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge.
For this presumption to arise: (a) the check must be presented within 90 days
from the date thereof; (b) the drawer or maker must receive a notice that the check has
not been paid by the drawee; and (c) the drawer or maker failed to pay the holder of
the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within
five banking days after receiving such notice. This presumption cannot arise, if such
notice is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice
was received by the drawer, since there would be no way of reckoning the 5-day
period.
In this case, it was not proven that Elizabeth received the demand letter sent
through registered mail. Although the letter was received by her housemaid, it was not
proven that the same person is Elizabeth’s duly authorized agent. To assume that the
housemaid had given the letter to Elizabeth is not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
1. Bouncing Check Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22)
Ngo v. People
G.R. No. 155815 – July 14, 2004
FACTS:
Private complainant Paul Gotianse is a businessman and an officer of
Northern Hill Development Corporation, with which the accused, Kenneth Ngo is
indebted. In the settlement of his indebtedness, he issued eight (8) post-dated checks
payable to the private complainant. The first five (5) checks were honored by the
drawee bank, but the three others were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Thus,
three separate Informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against the accused. Both
the trial court and the CA found him guilty of the crime charged.
The accused, in appealing his conviction, points out that the Informations
indicated that the checks had been issued in favor of private complainant, yet the
prosecution’s evidence established that the actual obligation for which they had been
issued was in favor of Northern Hill. On this basis, he alleges that the prosecution
failed to prove all the elements of the crime, since there is no valuable consideration
insofar as private complainant is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all the elements of the crime are present
RULING:
Yes, all the elements of the crime are present.
There are two ways of violating B.P.22: 1) by making or drawing and issuing a
check to apply “on account or for value,” knowing at the time of issue that the check
was not sufficiently funded; and 2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank at the time of issue, but failing to keep sufficient funds or credit with the
said bank to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank
within a period of ninety (90) days.
Pertinent to the present case, the elements of the offense under the first
situation of BP 22 are the following: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check
to apply on account or for value; (2) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3)the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the
courts a quo that all the elements of the crime are present. Petitioner’s argument is
immaterial and irrelevant. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason
for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under
B.P.22.
Appeal denied.
RAMOS, ANDREA ALMIRA S.
JD – 4B
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CRISTINA YAO
G.R. NO. 19524
November 22, 2017
FACTS:
Sometime in the year 2000, petitioner's mother mentioned that her son would
be reviving their sugar mill business and asked whether Yao could lend them money.
Yao acceded and loaned petitioner ₱1 million on 3 January 2001; ₱1 million on 7
January 2001; and ₱l.5 million on 16 February 2001. She also lent petitioner an
additional ₱2.5 million in June 2001. As payment petitioner issued four (4) checks in
these amounts but which were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account. Upon dishonor of the checks, Yao personally delivered her demand letter to
the office of the petitioner which was received by his secretary. Petitioner was thus
charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove actual receipt of the notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chua is guilty of B.P. 22.
RULING:
No. To be liable for violation of B.P. Big. 22, the following essential elements
must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of
the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified
that the personal secretary of petitioner received the demand letter, yet, said personal
secretary was never presented to testify whether she in fact handed the demand letter
to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne
in mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was
sent to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice,
because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such
notice of dishonor by the accused.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Duque
G.R. No. 216467
February 15, 2017
J Peralta
(B.P. 22)
FACTS
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation is a lessee of Shell House building. PSPC
subleased the same to the The Fitness Center. However, TFC encountered problems in
its business, prompting it to assign its rights and obligations under the sublease
contract with Fitness Consultants, headed by accused Carlos Duque as proprietor and
Teresa Duque as corporate secretary. Subsequently, FCI failed to pay its rentals to
PSPC. FCI then issued a check, with accused as signatories, which would supposedly
cover FCI's obligations to PSPC. However, the check was dishonored, thus, leading to
the filing of a criminal complaint against the accused for their alleged violation of BP
22. The MeTC found them guilty and besides ordering payment of fine, they are also
ordered to pay civil indemnity in favor of PSPC. On appeal to RTC, they were acquitted
but they were still order to pay civil indemnity.
ISSUE
Whether or not they are liable for civil indemnity even if they are acquitted
RULING
NO.
The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can
be held civilly liable when he is convicted. The civil liability of a corporate officer in a
BP 22 case is extinguished with the criminal liability. This is without regard as to
whether his acquittal was based on reasonable doubt or that there was a
pronouncement by the trial court that the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
Moreover, in the case, nothing in the records would show that accused made
themselves personally nor solidarily liable for the corporate obligations either as
accommodation parties or sureties. On the contrary, there is no dispute that accused
signed the subject check in their capacity as corporate officers and that the check was
drawn in the name of FCI as payment for the obligation of the corporation and not for
the personal indebtedness of accused. Neither is there allegation nor proof that the veil
of corporate fiction is being used by accused for fraudulent purposes. Generally, the
stockholders and officers are not personally liable for the obligations of the corporation
except only when the veil of corporate fiction is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud
or illegality, or to work injustice, which is not the case here. Hence, accused cannot be
held liable for the value of the checks issued in payment for FCI's obligation.
TONI CASSANDRA B. SANTOS JD 4-A
Topic: BP 22
BETTY KING vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 131540 December 2, 1999
FACTS:
Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jaime A. Adoc filed against petitioner
eleven separate Informations, which are identically worded, except for the check
number, the amount and the date. The facts of the case are as follows. On several
occasions, petitioner discounted with complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable
Bank checks postdated from July 23 to 29, 1992 in the total amount of P1,070,000.00 in
exchange for cash in the amount of P1,000,000.00. When the checks were deposited for
payment, they were dishonored by the drawee bank because they were drawn against
an account without sufficient funds. Petitioner failed to make good the checks despite
demand. During the hearing, the prosecution offered its documentary evidence.
Petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented.
After the prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case, petitioner filed a
Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, on the ground that the prosecution failed
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the said Demurrer
and found petitioner guilty. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violation of BP 22
RULING:
No, the elements of the crime charged have not all been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for
value.
2. The checks subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
 3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in full Facts:
upon its presentment.
Accused-appellant Eliza is the Vice-President of Hometown Development, Inc
(HDI). Representing HDI, she entered into a Construction Agreement with F.M.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to establish the third element. To
Francisco & Associates (FMF) where the set forth manner of payment would be on a
hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was
monthly progress billing based on accomplishment reports. For the accomplishment for
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the
the month of November, accussed-appellant paid P23,739.09 to FMF with Philtrust
check knew "at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
Bank Check No. A000913 dated 28, 1993.
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because
this element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law
However, upon presentment for payment, the subject check was dishonored.
creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge.
Accused-appellant contended that the Check was dishonored not because it was drawn
against insufficient funds but because of her order to stop payment. She also argued
The prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. Thus, in order to that although the bank had stamped “DAUD” in subject check that time, she had
create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it sufficient funds to cover the check because that that time she had a credit limit of P25
must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking million with Philtrust Bank.
days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment. Issue:

In this case, the Court find no evidentiary basis for the holding of the lower Whether a dishonored check stamped as “Payment StoppedFunded” and
courts that petitioner received a notice that the checks had been dishonored. True, “DAUD” is in violation of B.P. 22
complainant sent petitioner a registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q" informing the
latter that the checks had been dishonored. But the records show that petitioner did not Ruling:
receive it. In fact, the postmaster's letter addressed to complainant's counsel certified
that the "subject registered mail was returned to sender. No.

Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster's certification, the

The elements of the offense defined and penalized in Section 1 of Batas
prosecution failed to adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office
Pambansa Blg. 22 are:
notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. It is possible that the
drawee bank sent petitioner a notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present “1.That a person makes or draws and issues any check;
evidence that the bank did send it, or that petitioner actually received it. It was also
possible that she was trying to flee from complainant by staying in different address. “2.That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account
Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot take the place of proof. Conviction or for value;
must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand
demonstrates the indelible fact that petitioner did not receive notice that the checks had “3.That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows
been dishonored. Necessarily, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
funds cannot arise. with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
The Court stressed that BP 22, like all penal statutes, is construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Likewise, the prosecution has the “4.That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime. Henceforth, insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for
petitioner is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
crimes charged. ordered the bank to stop payment.”

In this case, the third and fourth elements of the offense charged were not
established or proved.
Tan vs. People

G.R. No. 141466 January 19, 2001

 In the first place, the bank’s representative testified that petitioner’s account at
the time of the presentment of the check she issued was funded, as she had a credit line
to the extent of P25 million, much more than the amount of the check issued.
In the second place, even without relying on the credit line, petitioner’s bank
account covered the check she issued because even though there were some deposits
that were still uncollected the deposits became “good” and the bank certified that the
check was “funded.”
Actually, the check in question was not issued without sufficient funds and
was not dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. What was stamped on the check in
question was “Payment StoppedFunded” at the same time “DAUD” meaning drawn
against uncollected deposits. Even with uncollected deposits, the bank may honor the
check at its discretion in favor of favored clients, in which case there would be no
violation of B.P. 22.
Judgment reversed, petitioner acquitted.
PETER NIERRAS VS. HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY
GR # 59568-76, January 11, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner purchased oil products from it. Simultaneous to the delivery of the products,
he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the Philippine
National Bank of Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his
account is already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly
demanded of petitioner either to deposit funds for his checks or pay for the oil products
he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either.
Petitioner argued that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements of
estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code are also present in that crime
punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely (1) "the postdating or issuance of a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt under BP 22.
HELD:
Yes. The mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds
and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa,
may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be
limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of
offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense
in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy
because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the
two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What
is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2)
sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22)
CECILIO S. DE VILLA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z.
LORAYES
G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991
PARAS, J.
Doctrine:
Foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though
payable outside thereof, are within the coverage of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the RTC of Makati with violation of BP
22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) the court
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) no offense was committed since
the check involved was payable in dollars. The trial court, in denying the Motion to
Dismiss, ruled that foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the
Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of BP 22.
Petitioner then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the CA dismissed the
petition. In this appeal, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against
the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the
Bouncing Checks Law.

Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 covers foreign checks drawn and issued in the Philippines
though payable outside thereof or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines
though drawn and issued outside thereof
MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a check in
whatever currency. This would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check may be in
French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. If drawn, then this bill will apply.
MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.
MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

xxx xxx xxx

Ruling:

YES. BP 22 covers foreign checks drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable
outside thereof or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
issued outside thereof. It will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency
involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled, Under the Bouncing Checks
Law, foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines
though payable outside thereof are within the coverage of said law. It is a cardinal
principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts
should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make
any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to
justify it.

More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute
of doubtful meaning. Thus, where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or
discussion on the bill may be adopted.

A perusal of the records of the Batasan unmistakably show that the intention of the
lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The
discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view, as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who
interpellated that any check may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are
talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our
currency, and many others.

THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.