J Forensic Sci, 2018

doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.13985
PAPER
PSYCHIATRY & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

Joel A. Capellan ,1 Ph.D.; Joseph Johnson,1 Ph.D.; Jeremy R. Porter,2 Ph.D.; and
Christine Martin,1 B.A.

Disaggregating Mass Public Shootings: A

Comparative Analysis of Disgruntled
Employee, School, Ideologically motivated,
and Rampage Shooters

ABSTRACT: This study compares the demographic, background, motivation, and pre-event and event-level behaviors across four types of
mass public shooters: disgruntled employee, school, ideologically motivated, and rampage offenders. Using a database containing detailed
information on 318 mass public shootings that occurred in the United States between 1966 and 2017, we find systematic differences in the
characteristics, motivations, target selection, planning, and incident-level behaviors among these offenders. The results show that ideologically
motivated shooters to be the most patient, and methodical, and as a result the most lethal. Conversely, disgruntled employees, who are driven
by revenge, tend to have little time to plan and consequently are the least lethal shooters. These, among other differences, underscore the need
for prevention strategies and policies to be tailored to specific types of offenders. Furthermore, the results also highlight commonalities across
offender type, suggesting that the social and psychological pathways to violence are universal across offenders.

KEYWORDS: forensic science, mass public shootings, ideological extremism, homicide, school shootings, mass murder

The literature on mass shootings has given us valuable
insights on the incidence (1), demographic and background char-
acteristics of offenders (2), motivations (3), and individual, and
macrolevel processes that may be responsible for their incidence
and distribution (4–6). While their findings have been instrumen-
tal for our understanding, this body of research implicitly ignores
the heterogeneity found in the characteristics, behaviors, and
motivations of mass shooters. Understanding this diversity
requires us to disaggregate offenders into different subtypes that
may account for the heterogeneity found within this social phe-
nomenon. Different types of mass shooters may be characterized
by different patterns, explanations, and situational contexts.
Previous research has compared U.S. mass shooters to differ-
ent, but related phenomena such as suicide bombers in the Mid-
dle East (7) and assassins (8). Additionally, studies have also
made comparisons between different types of mass shooters.
These include comparisons between “lone wolf terrorists” and
“deranged shooters” (9), suicide terrorists to various types of
mass casualty shooters (10), family annihilators, felony mass
murder, and public mass murderers (11), as well as comparisons
of offender by their motivation for the attack (3). These studies
highlight the importance of comparative work not only within
1
Law & Justice Studies, Rowan University, 201 Mullica Hill Road,
Glassboro, NJ 08028.
2
Brooklyn College, Sociology and Criminal Justice Programs, 2900
Bedford Avenue, New York, NY 11220.
Corresponding author: Joel A. Capellan, Ph.D. E-mail: capellan@rowan.edu
Received 11 Oct. 2018; and in revised form 19 Nov. 2018; accepted 29 Nov.
2018.
the field of mass murder but also across different areas of terror-
ism studies.
In the current study, we expand on this literature by examin-
ing the demographic, background characteristics, motivations,
pre-event and event-level behaviors of disgruntled employee,
school, ideologically motivated, and rampage mass public shoot-
ers in the United States between 1966 and 2017. Identifying the
commonalities and differences among these four types of offend-
ers is not only crucial for our understanding the etiology of mass
shootings, but also for creating policies and crime prevention
strategies tailored for each type of shooter.
Definitions
Consistent with the growing literature, we define a mass pub-
lic shooting as an incident of targeted violence where an offen-
der has killed or unequivocally attempted to kill four or more
victims on a public stage (e.g., workplace, schools, parks, and
businesses) in one or multiple closely related locations within a
24-h period (2–7,9–12). Both familicides and felony-related mass
shootings are excluded from this operationalization (12). Famili-
cide mass shootings are targeted events where the majority of
the victims are members of the offender’s immediate or extended
family. Felony-related mass shootings are exclusive to shootings
carried out in conjunction with other criminal activity (e.g.,
gangland, drug-related shootings, home invasion).
As noted, this study includes incidents where offenders unam-
biguously attempted to kill four or more individuals but may
have failed to meet the death-toll criterion. Cases where the

© 2019 American Academy of Forensic Sciences 814

815 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
perpetrator unambiguously attempted to kill four or more victims
but failed are theoretically relevant cases as the underlying psy-
chological and sociological processes that propel an offender to
commit a mass public shooting are not associated with his/her
ability to do so successfully. Therefore, cases like Robert Lewis
Dear Jr. (who in 2015, attacked a Planned Parenthood clinic in
Colorado, killing three and injuring nine others) or Jason Bur-
nam (who shot, but failed to kill, four coworkers in 2007) are
just as theoretically relevant as cases like Adam Lanza’s and
should be included in any analysis.
In the current study, we compare four types of mass public
shooters: disgruntled employee, school, ideologically motivated,
and rampage. Consistent with the mass murder literature, dis-
gruntled employee shooters are defined as individuals who target
their current or former place of work (13–15). We also classify
individuals who were not necessarily employees but were part-
ners, co-owners, or investors as disgruntled employee shooters
(13,15). School shooters are defined as individuals who target
their current or former schools or individuals in that school (15–
17). Shootings perpetrated by teachers and school staff are
excluded from this definition as these would be classified as a
disgruntled employee shootings. Additionally, for an attack to be
classified as a school shooting it must occur on school grounds.
Offenders who targeted schoolmates in other venues were not
classified as school shooters (15–18). Mass public shooters who
were motivated by ideological extremism (e.g., jihadist, far-right,
Black Nationalism) were categorized as ideologically motivated
shooters (9). Lastly, the term rampage shooter has been used in
the media to describe mass public shootings in general (19).
However, in the mass shooting literature, it has been used to cat-
egorize offenders that do not fall in any of the preceding cate-
gories (10). Effectively, a rampage shooter represents the “other”
category.
Methods
Data Collection Strategy
Consistent with most studies on the subject (1–12,14–19), we
employed an open-source data collection strategy to identify and
collect information on both failed and successful mass public
shootings that occurred in the United States from 1966 to 2017.
Open-source data are information that is open to the public (20).
These data often come in the shape of searchable electronic doc-
uments such as newspaper articles and government documents.
In order to identify all relevant cases, specific search terms (e.g.,
mass shooting, mass public shooting, random shooting, and
deranged shooting) were employed in eight different search engi-
nes (Lexis-Nexis, ProQuest, Yahoo, Google, Copernic, News
Library, Westlaw, and Google Scholar). Double quotations and
Boolean operators were used to increase the number of relevant
results. Once the final list of mass public shootings was gener-
ated, eight online search engines were used to obtain information
on the offenders, victims, and incidents. Open-source materials,
such as media accounts, legal documents, blogs, videos, and
government documents, were used to piece together the most
complete picture possible of the attack including information
about the offender’s motivation, pre-event behaviors, the location
of each event, victim information, and the manner in which the
attack was carried out and concluded.
It is important to highlight some limitations inherent to open-
source data collection strategies (21). We aimed to capture all
mass public shootings that met the definitional criteria, but it is
impossible to know for sure whether cases have been missed.
Open-source data collection strategies tend to be biased against
older events (time-period effect) and events that are less publi-
cized (publicity effect). Cases that occurred further in the past
and less sensational shootings (i.e., fewer media coverage) are
less likely to be identified and included in the sample. While
bias caused by publicity and time-period effects cannot be elimi-
nated, this study tries to minimize this in several ways. First, the
key words were run through eight different search engines to
maximize exposure and identify as many incidents as possible.
Second, once the initial list of potential mass public shootings
was compiled, it was then cross-referenced with fifty-five addi-
tional lists of mass shooting and databases provided by peer-
review journals, books, news organizations, school-sponsored
reports, blogs, and online encyclopedias. The cross-reference
process is critical in identifying additional mass public shootings
that otherwise would not have been detected.
Another limitation inherent to open-source data collection
strategy is reliability. Reliability problems come in the shape of
conflicting accounts of the same event by different sources.
When inconsistencies in the open-source data where encoun-
tered, this study followed the guidelines established by Sageman
(22). Trusted sources of information were given more weight. In
decreasing order of reliability, this study favored (i) court docu-
ments, police reports, news reports that provided corroborated
accounts of witnesses, family members, friends; (ii) uncorrobo-
rated statements from witnesses, family members, friends; and
(iii) accounts from people that heard the information second-
hand.
Despite these limitations, open-source data offer richer accounts
than official crime statistics. Media reports and government docu-
ments often include the names of offenders and victims, their
motives, criminal histories, preparation, execution, and conclusion
of homicides, allowing researchers to reconstruct these events in
great detail. Furthermore, while the noted sources of error could
not be eliminated, they can be significantly reduced through a sys-
tematic and rigorous data collection strategy, such as the one
employed in this study. For example, Parkin and Gruenewald (23)
have demonstrated that open-data sourcing can produce databases
of crime that are just as accurate and comprehensive as official
crime statistics.
Measures
Although most characteristics presented in this study are rather
straightforward, some measures are more abstract and require
further clarification. Ideologically motivated attacks represent
mass public shootings that were motivated by the offender’s ide-
ological extremist beliefs. Ideological extremism is a set of
beliefs that diverge widely from mainstream policy preferences.
To determine whether the attack was motivated by ideological
extremism, we relied on the Extremist Crime Dataset’s (ECDB)
Strength of Association measurement protocol. This coding pro-
tocol is a continuum of certainty based on “pro association” and
“con association” evidence (24). This measure ranges from 0 to
4, with four being the highest level of certainty that the attack
was ideologically motivated. Perpetrators that score greater than
“one” were classified as an ideologically motivated offense.
We also collected information on the offender’s history of
mental illness. This is a categorical variable with “0” represent-
ing no evidence of mental illness, “1” indicating confirmed men-
tal illness, and “3” representing offenders with a suggested
history of mental illness. Offenders who received a formal
 CAPELLAN ET AL.
medical diagnosis were coded as “confirmed mental illness.”
Unfortunately, research has demonstrated that significant por-
tions of criminal offenders have never been diagnosed despite
suffering from severe mental illnesses (25). Therefore, relying on
formal medical diagnoses will ignore the full extent of the men-
tal illness in this population. For that reason, we also measure
suggested history of mental illness. To determine suggested his-
tory of mental illness, we reviewed open-source documents for
characterizations by family members and close friends of the
offender in regard to mental health status. To assess the accuracy
of these characterizations, only detailed accounts that included
examples or statements by the perpetrators that well-predated the
attack were considered.
Lastly, we include a measure of the offender’s level of plan-
ning. This is an ordinal-level variable with “0” representing no
planning, and levels one, two, and three indicating low, med-
ium, and high levels of planning, respectively. Consistent with
Capellan’s (9) study, this measure is based on the observable
indicators before and during the attack. “No planning” involves
an offender who had no time to plan as the catalyst for the
shooting occurred minutes before the shooting. “Low level of
planning” involves offenders who had an hour or multiple
hours pass between the catalyst and attack. Generally, these
individuals go back to their homes or cars to get firearms in
order to carry out the shooting. These offenders did not use
additional nonfirearm weapons (i.e., knives and blunt objects)
and additional gear. Offenders who employed multiple firearms
brought additional nonfirearm weapons and gear (i.e., bullet-
proof jacket, ammunition, and tactical clothing.) were catego-
rized as “medium level of planning.” In addition to the noted
behaviors, offenders who engaged in “high levels of planning”
also acquired tactical and logistical information though surveil-
lance and online searches.
Analytic Strategy
In the current study, we compare disgruntled employee,
school, ideologically motivated, and rampage mass public
FIG. 1––Type of mass public shootings through time.
. DISAGGREGATING MASS PUBLIC SHOOTINGS 816
shootings across demographic, background characteristics, pre-
event, and event-level behaviors. To this end, we rely on
descriptive statistics and bivariate tests (i.e., chi-square, t-tests,
and Fisher’s exact test) to identify significant differences across
these different types of mass public shooters.
Results
Through the data collection strategy, we identified 318 mass
public shootings in the United States between 1966 and 2017.
According to the results, rampage shootings are the most com-
monly occurring (36.1%), followed by disgruntled employees
(29.8%), school (19.1%), and ideologically motivated shooters
(14.7%). This trend is not constant through time. Figure 1 pre-
sents the type composition of mass public shootings for each
decade in the analysis. The results show substantial temporal
variation in the incidence between offender type. For example,
school mass public shootings used to make up the majority of
mass public shootings in the 1960s and 1970s; however, its rela-
tive incidence has been shrinking in the last few decades. Con-
versely, rampage and disgruntled employee shooting were not
relatively common in the 1960s and 1970s, but it has become
more common over time. Ideologically motivated mass public
shootings, however, have remained relatively stable, accounting
for approximately 15% of all attacks.
Demographic and Background Characteristics
Table 1 compares disgruntled employee, school, ideologically
motivated, and rampage mass public shooters across a range of
demographic and background characteristics. Consistent with the
literature, the results show mass public shootings are almost
entirely male-dominated with over 96% of shootings executed
by men across the typology. There are, however, significant dif-
ferences in the age and racial background of these offenders.
Compared to disgruntled employee (39.7), ideologically
motivated (37.7), and rampage (37.7), school shooters are signif-
icantly younger with an average age of 20.6. These differences
817 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES

TABLE 1––Offender characteristics.

Disgruntled (n = 95) School (n = 61) Ideological (n = 45) Rampage (n = 115) Chi-square/t-test

Male 96.8 98.3 97.8 96.3
Age 39.7(Avg) 20.6(Avg) 37.7(Avg) 37.7(Avg) ***
Race
White 51.5 77 57.4 53.9 ***
Black 32.6 8.2 27.6 22.6
Hispanic 10.5 3.2 0 14.7
Asian 3.16 8.2 0 5.2
Middle-Eastern 0 0 14.8 2.6
Other 2 3.2 0 0.8
Single/divorced 72.6 93.4 76.6 75 ***
Employed 65.9 8.3 34 33.3 ***
Education level
High school or less 72.8 75.8 61.3 71
Some college 3.7 11.6 13.6 10.1
College 16 5 18.1 13
Graduate 7.4 8.3 6.8 6
Criminal record 25.8 6.7 48.9 40.1 ***
Military service 15.2 4.9 27.6 10.6 ***
History of substance abuse 16.6 18 20 30
Mental Health
Confirmed illness 21.2 36 29.7 16.5
Suggested illness 18 13.1 12.7 22.6
*p ≤ 0.05
**p ≤ 0.01.
***p ≤ 0.001.

hide a significant amount of variation. Figure 2 presents Kernel
density to estimate the age–crime curve across four types of
offenders. The age–crime curve for disgruntled employee, ideo-
logically motivated, and rampage offenders do not follow the
traditional crime–age curve; instead, it follows a platykurtic dis-
tribution centering around the late 30’s. We also find significant
differences in the racial composition of these offenders. School
shooters are significantly more likely to be White (77%). Dis-
gruntle employees have the highest share of Black mass public
shooters (32.6%). Rampage shooters have the highest percentage
of Latino offenders (14.7%), and ideologically motivated shoot-
ers have the highest share of offenders of Middle-Eastern des-
cend (14.8%).
Our analysis also reveals significant differences in background
characteristics across the four offenders. We find that school
shooters are significantly more likely to be single (93.4%). Dis-
gruntled employee offenders are significantly more likely to be
unemployed at the time of the attack (65.9%). Ideologically
motivated (48.9%) and rampage shooters (40.1%) are
significantly more likely to have a criminal record. Ideologically
motivated shooters are also significantly more likely to be an
active or former military serviceman at the time of the shooting
(27.6%). Despite these differences, these offenders share some
important similarities. For example, there are no significant dif-
ferences in educational attainment across these offenders. The
majority (approximately 70%) of all offenders have a high
school or lesser degree. Importantly, there are no significant dif-
ferences in confirmed or suggested mental illnesses. Approxi-
mately 40% of all offenders suffer from confirmed or suggested
mental illnesses.
Motivations and Pre-Event Behaviors
Table 2 compares the motivations and pre-event behaviors
of disgruntled employee, school, ideologically motivated, and
rampage mass public shooters. Research (3) suggests that
motivations for mass public shootings could be grouped into
three categories: autogenic, revenge, and ideological. Auto-
genic motivations are “self-generated” due to the offender’s
internal psychological processes and issues (26). Generally,
autogenic motivations are not anchored in the external world.
As a result, attacks fueled by autogenic motivations are often
seemed as motiveless or random. Our analysis reveals that
school (60.3%) and rampage (55.6%) shooters are signifi-
cantly more likely to be driven by autogenic motivations.
Conversely, disgruntled employees (83.1%) are significantly
more likely to be motivated by revenge against specific indi-
viduals or organizations. This finding is not surprising as
73.6% of disgruntled employee shootings could be traced to
precipitating events such as getting fired, being bullied, or
reprimanded at work. Not all significant differences are sub-
stantive. Some significant differences are the product of defi-
nitional choices. For example, ideologically motivated mass
public shooters (100%) were significantly more likely to be
motivated by extremist ideologies.
Previous research (3) has stressed the act of obtaining a fire-
arm affords law enforcement a great opportunity to intervene
and potentially prevent mass public shootings. Our results sug-
gest this opportunity to intervene at this stage of the process is
greatest with school shooters. 79.3% of school shooters acquired
firearms for the shooting. This finding suggests that most dis-
gruntled employee, ideologically motivated, and rampage shoot-
ers had access to firearms, eliminating the need to obtain
additional weapons. Although school shooters are significantly
more likely to obtain firearms, the findings suggest that when
ideologically motivated (x = 2) and rampage mass public shoot-
ers (x = 2.5) do acquire firearms for their attack, they tend to
acquire a significantly higher number of guns than their counter-
parts.
Threats have been long considered by the U.S. Secret Service
to be reliable and actionable intelligence that may signal an
impending violent act (27). The results show that ideologically
motivated (51%) and school shooters (49.1%) are significantly
more likely to make such threats prior to the attack. There are
 CAPELLAN ET AL. . DISAGGREGATING MASS PUBLIC SHOOTINGS 818

also significant differences to whom threats are directed. The
analysis reveals that disgruntle employees (60%) and rampage
shooters (46.1%) are more likely to make threats directly to the
potential victims. Conversely, school shooters (63.1%) are more
likely to make threats around family members and friends. Ideo-
logically motivated shooters (38.4%) are significantly more
likely to use public forums (e.g., social media sites) to make
threats. We also find that not all threats are equally trustworthy
as actionable intelligence on the potential time, target, and
method of impending attack. Among the different offenders, dis-
gruntled employees and ideologically motivated mass public
shooters are significantly more likely to follow through on all
aspects (e.g., time, method, and target) of said threats. Con-
versely, school shooters (63.1%) are more likely to change some
aspects when carrying out their threats.
FIG. 2––Kernel Density function of offender’s age.
Consistent with the literature (3,9), the ideologically motivated
shooters display significantly higher levels of preparatory behav-
iors prior to attacks. Compared to its counterparts, ideologically
motivated offenders are significantly more likely to train, acquire
tactical gear (25.3%), acquire logistical information (44.6%), and
conduct surveillance (21.2%) of targets prior the shooting. As a
result, ideologically motivated offenders (38.3%) are significantly
more likely to have the highest levels of preparation for the
attack. Conversely, rampage offenders are more likely to have
no (13.9%) or low levels of planning (42.6%).
Event-level Behaviors
Table 3 presents the event-level behaviors of disgruntled
employee, school, ideologically motivated, and rampage mass
public shooters. The results show that mass public shootings are
carried out by lone offenders in that they plan and execute these
shootings on their own and in one location. The findings suggest
that over 90% of all mass public shooters are executed by a lone
actor. Despite this commonality, the results show significant dif-
ferences in whom they target. Ideologically motivated shooters
(91.4%) are significantly more likely to target strangers. Dis-
gruntled employee offenders (88.4) are significantly more likely
to target coworkers and managers. Conversely, school shooters
(81.1%) to target classmates with whom they have or had a per-
sonal or intimate relationship.
Additionally, we find that ideologically motivated mass public
shootings (8.6%) are significantly more likely to involve multi-
ple offenders. We also find disgruntled employees (96.7%) and
school shooters (100%) to be significantly more likely to attack
locations they are familiar with. There are also significant differ-
ences in the type of locations these offenders target. For exam-
ple, the results show that disgruntled employee offenders
(68.4%) are significantly more likely to target businesses. Ideo-
logically motivated shooters are significantly more likely to

TABLE 2––Motivations and pre-event behaviors.

Disgruntled (n = 95) School (n = 61) Ideological (n = 45) Rampage (n = 115) Chi-square/t-test

Motivations
Autogenic 16.8 60.3 0 55.6 ***
Revenge 83.1 39.3 0 44.3
Ideological 0 0 100 0
Precipitator 73.6 47.5 36.1 55.6 ***
Acquires firearms 36.1 79.3 37.7 26.2 ***
No. firearms acquired 1.4(Avg) 1.6(Avg) 2(Avg) 2.5(Avg) *
Threat 31.5 49.1 51 34.7 *
Threat bystanders
Potential victims 60 21 23 46.1 *
Family/friends 28 63.1 38.4 34.6
Public Forums 12 15.7 38.4 19.2
Threat follow-through
Exactly 48 26.6 46 51.8 *
Somewhat 40 63.1 46.1 29.3
Diverged completely 12 10.5 7.6 18.5
Trained 10.5 9.8 25.3 6.9
Logistics 10.5 21.3 44.6 18.2 ***
Surveillance 7.3 4.9 21.2 3.6 **
Level of planning
No 6.3 3.28 4.26 13.9 ***
Low 32.9 37.7 25.5 42.6
Medium 47.8 31.1 31.9 30.4
High 12.7 27.7 38.3 13.1
*p ≤ 0.05.
**p ≤ 0.01.
***p ≤ 0.001.
819 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES

TABLE 3––Event-level behaviors.

Disgruntled (n = 95) School (n = 61) Ideological (n = 45) Rampage (n = 115) Chi-square/t-test

Number of offenders
Single 100 96.7 91.4 100 **
Multiple 0 3.3 8.6 0
Relationship with victims
Stranger 9.5 22.9 91.4 58.6 ***
Professional 88.4 0 8.6 12.7
Personal/intimate 2.1 81.1 0 28.7
Type of location
Business 68.4 0 14.8 39.1 ***
Government 17.8 0 36.7 12.1
School 8.4 100 4.2 8.7
Religious institution 0 0 17 3.4
Open-space 2.1 0 23.4 21.6
Other 3.1 0 4.2 14.7
Security 21 42.6 55.3 26.9 ***
Number of firearms 1.5(Avg) 1.7(Avg) 1.8(Avg) 1.8(Avg)
Type of firearms
Handgun 63.1 44.2 46.8 56.5 *
Shotgun 11.5 11.4 8.5 6
Rifle 9.4 18 6.3 13.9
Combination 15.7 26.3 38.3 23.4
Additional weapons 9.4 21.3 21.2 14.9
Fatalities 3.4(Avg) 3.2(Avg) 4.5(Avg) 3.8(Avg)
Number injured 2.9(Avg) 4.7(Avg) 6(Avg) 3.8(Avg)
Lethal resistance 19.1 14.7 53.1 40.8 ***
Nonlethal resistance 6.4 49.1 23.4 20.1 ***
Conclusion
Subdued and arrested 5.2 37.7 29.7 13.9 ***
Killed 11.5 8.2 27.6 23.4
Suicide 41 21.3 19.1 33.9
Flees, later arrested 18.9 13.1 17 15.6
Flees, later suicide 10.5 1.6 0 6
Surrenders 12.6 18 6.3 6.9
*p ≤ 0.05.
**p ≤ 0.01.
***p ≤ 0.001.

target government institutions (36.7%) and religious institutions
(17%). As noted, some of the significant differences presented
here stem from definitional choices. For example, given the way
school mass public shooters were defined, it is not surprising
that 100% of school shooters targeted schools. However, it is
important to note that schools are not only targeted by school
shooters. Schools have been attacked by disgruntled employees
of the school, ideologically motivated offenders, and rampage
shooters. Additionally, we find that ideologically motivated
offenders are significantly more likely to target locations with
security officers.
The results show no significant differences in the number of
firearms used during the attack. On average, all offenders use
between 1.5 and 1.8 firearms in the shooting. There are also no
significant differences in the percent of incidents where addi-
tional nonfirearm weapons (e.g., knives, IEDs, blunt objects, and
others) were used during the attack. However, there are signifi-
cant differences in the types of firearms employed. Compared to
its counterparts, we find that a disgruntled employee is more
likely to use handguns (63%) and shotguns (11.5%). Rampage
shooters (13.9%) are significantly more likely to use rifles, and
ideologically motivated mass public shooters (38%) are more
likely to use a combination of different firearms.
Among all the individual- and event-level characteristics that
we have discussed, none get more attention than the human
costs of these massacres (15,28). Our results suggest that while
ideologically motivated offenders have the highest number of
fatalities (x = 4.5) and injured victims (x = 6), there are no
statistically significant differences among different types of
offenders. Figure 3 presents the Kernel density to estimate the
distribution of fatalities among the types of offenders. This graph
illustrates several important points. First, there is a great deal of
variation in the number of victims killed across the four types
of shooters. Second, the number of fatalities across all types of
offenders follows a negative binomial distribution, with most
shootings resulting in less than four fatalities. Third, this finding
exemplifies the need to include and analyze mass public shoot-
ings where the perpetrator intended but failed to kill four or
more victims. The decision to exclude such cases may bring in
bias, as ‘successful’ mass public shooters may differ systemati-
cally from ‘failed’ mass public shooters. Such bias would inhibit
our ability to identify opportunities to mitigate the lethality of
these massacres. In order to identify the determinants of ‘failure,’
we must inevitably compare successful and unsuccessful offend-
ers.
The Department of Homeland Security’s active shooter
response protocol (29) dictates that potential victims evacuate
and not engage the shooter. Our findings, however, show poten-
tial victims, security, and police officers often resist the shooter
in lethal (e.g., gunfire) and nonlethal ways. Importantly, we find
that not all offender types have the same risk of being engaged
during the shooting. The results show that ideologically moti-
vated (53.1%) and rampage shooters (40.8%) are more likely to
be met with lethal forms of resistance than their counterparts.
Conversely, school shooters (49.1%) are significantly more
likely to be met with nonlethal forms of resistance compared to
 CAPELLAN ET AL.
FIG. 3––Kernel Density function of the number of killed victims.
their counterparts. Whether or not a shooter is met with lethal
and nonlethal forms of resistance seems to be associated with
the conclusion of the attack. For example, school shooters
(37.7%) are significantly more likely to be subdued and arrested,
whereas ideologically motivated offenders are more likely to be
killed during the attack compared to their counterparts. Relative
to school, ideologically motivated and rampage offenders, dis-
gruntled employees are significantly more likely to commit sui-
cide during the incident (41%) and flee and later commit suicide
(10.5%). Additionally, school shooters are more likely to surren-
der during the attack (12.6%).
Discussion
Reality versus Perception
The results show systematic and substantive differences across
the offender types. Perhaps the most notable difference is related
to their relative incidence. We find that rampage (36.1%) and
disgruntled employee (29.8%) offenders carried out approxi-
mately 65% of all mass public shootings in the United States
between 1966 and 2017. This finding is in direct contrast with
the public attention given to these shooters. Silva and Capellan
(15) find, for example, that rampage and disgruntled employee
offenders receive 15-20% of total news coverage on mass public
shootings. Conversely, school and terrorist offenders receive 75-
80% of all news coverage. Public officials also pay dispropor-
tionate attention to school and terrorist shootings. Take for
example, President Barack Obama. Silva and Capellan (15) note
that during his tenure the U.S. experienced 123 mass public
shootings. However, President Obama spoke in the immediate
aftermath of fourteen of those incidents. Nine of those remarks
were in response to terrorist mass public shootings, and three
were in response to school mass public shootings.
This attention has historically led to legislation specific to
types of shootings. Schildkraut & Hernandez (30) identified that
a hundred pieces of legislation were introduced as a direct
response to school shootings. For example, in 1994 the U.S.
Congress passed the Gun-Free School Act, which allowed
schools to expel students who bring a firearm onto school
grounds. Similarly, ideologically motivated shootings have
sparked policy discussion on banning individuals on terrorist
lists from buying firearms among many other policy discussions.
Although the attention and legislative efforts to prevent ideologi-
cally motivated and school mass public shootings are to be
applauded, such efforts ignore the majority of mass public shoot-
ings. Our findings demonstrate that a significant reduction in
. DISAGGREGATING MASS PUBLIC SHOOTINGS 820
mass public shootings could only occur if public officials
develop crime prevention strategies specific to rampage and dis-
gruntled employee shooters.
Threat Assessment
One promising prevention strategy is threat assessment (31–
33). Threat assessment is the process of identifying, assessing,
and managing the threat that certain persons may pose (27,31–
33). As conceptualized by the Secret Service (27), threat assess-
ment is predicated on communication from potential offenders
that may signal an impending violent act. Our results show that
a considerable number of shooters make threats prior to their
attack. Unfortunately, our findings also suggest threat assessment
may not be equally effective across all offender types. School
and ideologically motivated offenders were significantly more
likely to make such threats compared to disgruntled employee
and rampage shooters.
Another potential roadblock to the success of threat assessment
is the reporting of threats. Research suggests that an important
determinant of reporting of crimes and threats is the bystander’s
relationship with the offender (31–34). This literature finds that
threats and crimes made in the presence of friends and family are
less likely to be reported to the authorities (35). Our results show
that while school shooters and ideologically motivated offenders
are more likely to express their intention of the impending
attacks, they are also more likely to express these threats toward
the people (family and friends) less likely to report them. In addi-
tion to being a window into the offender’s state of mind, the
Secret Service’s threat assessment model (27) also sees threats as
actionable intelligence on the potential time, target, and method
of an impending attack. Our findings suggest that not all offen-
der’s threats provide reliable information on the specifics of the
attack. We find that rampage shooters are more likely to follow
through exactly with all said elements in their threats. Con-
versely, school shooters are significantly more likely to somewhat
follow through with all said elements in their threats.
The differences in threat behavior across offender type bolster
the underlying justification of this study: Effective prevention
strategies must account for the heterogeneity in the characteristics
and behaviors of mass public shooters. Our results do not suggest
that threat assessment cannot be effective across-the-board, rather
for it to be effective, it must be tailored to specific shooters. For
example, we believe that threat assessment could be particularly
useful in preventing school mass public shootings. Schools pos-
sess the infrastructure, workforce, and information to carry out
effective threat assessments on a student’s threats. However,
schools must account for the potential problem of reporting of
threats. One possible solution is to create a public awareness
campaign where students and parents are made aware of warning
signs of mass public shootings, and the importance of reporting
all manners of threats. Importantly, students and parents must be
made aware that all reports will be taken seriously, reports will
be confidential to the public, and the process will be conducted
in a respectful, holistic, and fair manner for all involved. As is
the case for school shooters, threat assessment could be tailored
to maximize its effects in preventing disgruntled employee, ideo-
logically motivated, and rampage mass public shootings.
Motivation
We also find significant differences in the motivations among
disgruntled employee, school, ideologically motivated, and
821 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
rampage shooters. Disgruntled employee shooters are signifi-
cantly more likely to be driven by revenge, whereas school
shooters are significantly more likely to be driven by autogenic
or self-generated motivations. Naturally, all ideologically moti-
vated shooters were motivated by ideological definitions.
According to Osborne and Capellan (3), the motives behind
mass public shootings are predictive of behaviors and character-
istics of offenders. Using a script analysis, they find that offend-
ers motivated by revenge tend to target individuals with whom
they have personal/professional relationships. Their victims are
connected to what they called “precipitating events”—incidents
that caused acute emotional or financial strain. Due to the short
time passed between the precipitating event and decision to com-
mit the shooting, these offenders have the lowest levels of plan-
ning, which translates into lower death tolls. Osborne and
Capellan (3) also find that offenders motivated by revenge
embody different characteristics. These offenders tend to be non-
White, in their late 30’s, and in a relationship/married. Our
results are consistent with such characterizations. Disgruntled
employee shooters who have the highest percentage of offenders
motivated by revenge (83.1%) are most likely to experience
acute strain from a precipitating event. Relative to their counter-
parts, disgruntled employee shooters are least likely to have high
levels of planning. Moreover, while not the lowest, disgruntled
employee shooters have the second lowest number of fatalities
and the lowest number of injured victims. Consistent with
Osborne and Capellan’s (3) findings, disgruntled employee
offenders had the highest percent of Black and the second high-
est percentage of Hispanic mass public shooters.
Osborne and Capellan (3) note that offenders fueled by
autogenic motivations are overwhelmingly White males and are
relatively younger (mid-twenties). Since the shooting is
“self-generated” and due to the offender’s internal psychological
processes, these offenders are more likely to have a history of
mental illness. These offenders generally have medium levels of
preparation, making them quite lethal, and second only to ideo-
logically motivated offenders. Our results are also consistent
with such characterizations. School shooters (60.3%) have the
highest percentage of autogenic-motivated offenders. As hypoth-
esized by Osborne and Capellan (3), they also have the highest
percentage of White offenders with an average age of 20.6.
Although the differences are not significant, school shooters
have the highest percentage of confirmed diagnosis of mental ill-
ness. Consistent with Osborne and Capellan’s (3) characteriza-
tions, school shooters have the second highest levels of
planning, and while their attacks result in the lowest number of
deaths (x = 3.2), they yield the second highest number of injured
victims (x = 4.7).
Research has consistently shown ideologically motivated mass
public shooters to be particularly methodical and lethal
(3,9,10,34). According to Osborne and Capellan (3), offenders
motivated by ideological extremism are very patient and unlikely
to attack because of a precipitating event. They engage in a
range of preparatory behaviors and use a higher number of fire-
arm and nonfirearm weapons. As a result, ideologically moti-
vated offenders have been found to have a higher number of
fatalities and injured victims (3,9,10,36). Our results are consis-
tent with these findings. Our results show that ideologically
motivated shooters are least likely to be affected by precipitating
events. They are however most likely to engage in predatory
behaviors for the shooting and, consequently, are significantly
more likely to have high levels of planning. Although there are
not any significant differences in the average number of firearms
used in their attack, ideologically motivated shooters are signifi-
cantly more likely to use a combination of different types of
firearms. Consistent with the noted literature, we find that ideo-
logically motivated mass public shootings yield, on average, the
highest number of fatalities and injured victims. Meloy and
Richard’s (37) work on mass murder may be vital in understand-
ing how ideology influences the behaviors of ideologically
motivated offenders. According to Meloy and Richards (37),
ideologically motivated mass murderers tend to be fixated with
military tactics and weaponry. They see themselves as warriors
fighting for a just cause. It is perhaps this warrior mentality that
influences them to care about planning and execution, which,
in turn, makes them particularly lethal.
Resistance and Outcomes
Next to the decision to start the attack, the second most
important decision a mass public shooter can make is to stop
shooting. Often, this is not a decision at all. Our results show
that a substantial number of mass public shooters encounter
lethal and nonlethal resistance during their attack. Interestingly
however, there are systematic differences among offender types.
Ideologically motivated shooters are significantly more likely to
be met with lethal forms of resistance. This finding may be
explained by target selection. Our results show that ideologically
motivated offenders are significantly more likely to target loca-
tions with security, such as government institutions. Security
officers are trained to meet the lethal form of threat used by
offenders and therefore rely on lethal forms of resistance to
bring the shooter to a halt. We also find that school shooters are
significantly more likely to be met with nonlethal resistance.
This finding is surprising given that after the Columbine shoot-
ings in 1999 first responders were trained to take immediate
action and to isolate and incapacitate the offender (38). Figure 4
presents the percent of mass public shooters that are met with
lethal resistance before and after the Columbine school shooting
by offender type. This figure shows us that changes in training
in the wake of the Columbine school shooting have only
impacted school and ideologically motivated shootings. There
has been an 11% and 45% increase in the number of school and
ideologically motivated shootings that have been met with lethal
forms of resistance, respectively. The new guidelines seem not
to have affected disgruntled employee and rampage shooters.
Undoubtedly, differences in lethal and nonlethal forms of
resistance have an impact on how the attack ends. We find that
school shooters who are most likely to encounter nonlethal resis-
tance are to be the most likely to be subdued and arrested. Con-
versely, ideologically motivated shooters who are most likely to
be encountered with lethal resistance are the most likely to be
killed during the attack.
Target Hardening
The link between lethal resistance and the outcome of the
attack underscores the importance of target hardening to prevent
and mitigate the lethality of all mass public shooters. Target
hardening refers to a wide range of measures to strengthen the
security of a location. These may range from architectural design
elements to employing security staff. Although implementing
security measures is likely to reduce the lethality of future
attacks, our findings suggest that similar to threat assessment,
target hardening practices must be tailored to specific offenders
to maximize its effects. For example, organizations seeking to
 CAPELLAN ET AL.
FIG. 4––Resistance before and after Columbine shooting by offender type.
prevent disgruntled employee shootings must focus on security
measures that protect from within as the offender, by definition
currently works there or is a former employee. This means
removing access to the workplace to employees that are fired or
placed on probation; conducting a risk assessment on current
employees involved in conflicts; creating a zero-tolerance policy
on violence, sexual harassment, and psychological bullying; and
establishing the mechanisms through which incidents can be
reported and conflicts resolved peacefully. Conversely, organiza-
tions trying to prevent ideologically motivated attacks, as our
results suggest, must protect themselves primarily from out-
siders. Accordingly, measures that restrict access to and screens
outsiders are particularly important. Given the level of sophisti-
cation and planning of ideologically motivated shooters, organi-
zations must rely on armed and trained professionals that may
repel potential offenders from attempting to enter by force.
Additionally, architectural elements that create natural barriers
divide access to the building, and provide clear exits to potential
victims could be effective in mitigating the lethality of these
attacks.
Similarities among Offenders
The similarities shared among offender types are just as infor-
mative as the differences we have noted above. One of the most
important commonalities these offenders share is their gender.
We find that mass public shootings are carried out almost exclu-
sively by men. This is the most universal and yet the most
understudied aspect of this phenomenon. Several scholars, how-
ever, have argued that to further understand the causes of mass
public shootings we must examine the role that masculinity and
gender, as well as macrolevel patriarchal hegemony and gender
inequality, interact together (39). In addition to gender, mass
. DISAGGREGATING MASS PUBLIC SHOOTINGS 822
public shooters across the board share a very similar dysfunc-
tional) backgrounds. They tend to be single/divorced, unem-
ployed, and have low levels of education. A significant number
of these offenders have a history of substance abuse and mental
illness. Consistent with previous comparative studies (6–10),
these similarities suggest that social, economic, and psychologi-
cal processes behind mass public shootings are the same for dis-
gruntled employee, school, ideologically motivated, and rampage
shooters.
Additionally, disgruntled employee, school, ideologically moti-
vated, and rampage shooters could be characterized as lone
actors, as these shootings are perpetrated by a lone actor whose
tactics and methods are absent of direct outside support, com-
mand, or direction (40). Given the solitary nature of this phe-
nomenon, it is almost impossible for law enforcement agencies
to detect, infiltrate, and foil these attacks unless perpetrators
openly discuss their plans (e.g., threats) or raise other behavioral
flags (e.g., leakages) that can be used as intelligence by law
enforcement. This finding underscores the importance of threat
assessment as a prevention tool.
Conclusions and Future Research
In this study, we aimed to advance our understanding of mass
public shootings by comparing disgruntled employee, school,
ideologically motivated, and rampage shooters across a wide
range of individual characteristics, pre, and incident-level behav-
iors. To that end, we examined and compared 318 mass public
shootings that occurred in the United States between 1966 and
2017. A number of important differences emerged through this
comparative analysis. For example, we find that there are signifi-
cant differences in the motivations behind the attacks. As dis-
cussed above, the motivation driving the shooting plays an
823 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
important role in the preparatory behaviors, target selection, and,
consequently, how deadly these massacres are. Furthermore,
some of the differences identified in this research underscore the
need for prevention strategies to be tailored to specific types of
offenders. For example, we noted that for a threat assessment to
be successful in preventing school shootings, schools must
account for the potential problem of reporting of the threats.
Similarly, the effectiveness of target hardening measures is unli-
kely to be homogeneous. Consequently, organizations must tailor
their security measures to minimize their specific threats.
Our findings highlight the benefits of disaggregating mass pub-
lic shootings into typologies that may explain some of the hetero-
geneity found in the characteristics and behaviors of mass public
shooters. It is important to note that no typology will account for
all of these variations. Accordingly, research should continue to
disaggregate mass public shootings, and other forms of mass mur-
der, into different typologies and use comparative analyses to iden-
tify the uniqueness and universal characteristics and behaviors in
this phenomenon. These, in turn, will help in the creation of policy
and crime prevention strategies that can be tailored to specific
shooters or targets. One possibility is to disaggregate mass public
shootings by targets. For example, our research shows that ideo-
logically motivated offenders are significantly more likely to target
government institutions. However, those interested in understand-
ing the full range of motives, preparation, and event-level behav-
iors behind mass public shootings directed at government
institutions and agents must examine all government attacks and
compare them to shooters who did not target government institu-
tions. The same comparative analysis could be performed for
schools, private businesses, and religious institutions.
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