FIRST DIVISION
In defense, respondent claimed that its valuation was based on DAR
G.R. No. 218867, February 17, 2016
SPOUSES EDMOND LEE AND HELEN
HUANG, Petitioners, v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated January 28, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated June 5,
2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 133533 finding
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1 (RTC), sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC) in Civil Case No. 7171, for dismissing the appeal filed by
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (respondent) for failure to
prosecute.
The Facts
Petitioners-spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang (petitioners) are the
registered owners of parcels of land with an aggregate area of 5.4928
hectares (has.) situated in Mambog, Hermosa, Bataan and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-26257 of the Register of
Deeds of Bataan (subject property). The subject property was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
in accordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,4 as amended,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988."5
DAR offered the sum of PI09,429.98 as just compensation for the
1.5073-ha. portion of the subject property. Rejecting the valuation,
petitioners instead filed the present petition for determination of just
compensation against Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and
herein respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 7171.6
Administrative Order (AO) No. 11, series of 1994,7 as amended by
DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.8 It also contended that petitioners'
appraisal was biased.9
The RTC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
After due proceedings, the RTC, sitting as a SAC, rendered a
Decision10 dated January 17, 2002 rejecting the valuation given by
respondent and setting the just compensation for petitioners' 1.5073
has. at P250.00 per square meter, or a total amount of P3,768,250.00.
It took judicial notice of the fact that the lots within the vicinity of the
subject property are valued between F200.00 to P500.00 per square
meter.11
Respondent's motion for reconsideration12 was denied in an
Order13 dated June 14, 2002.
Several years later, or sometime in September 2006,14 petitioners filed
a motion for execution of the RTC's January 17, 2002 Decision,
alleging that while they received a copy of respondent's Notice of
Appeal dated June 19, 2002, upon verification, no such appeal was
actually filed before the RTC. Respondent denied petitioners' claim
and asserted that it filed a Notice of Appeal in accordance with the
rules and has, therefore, perfected its appeal. As such, the RTC's
January 17, 2002 Decision was not yet final and executory.15
Finding that respondent had perfected its appeal and based on
equitable considerations and the highest interest of justice, the RTC, in
an Order16 dated June 7, 2007, gave due course to respondent's appeal
and directed that the entire records thereof be transmitted to the CA.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration,17 which the RTC denied in an
Order18 dated August 27, 2008. The RTC clarified that respondent was
able to file its Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period and that a
postal money order in the amount of P520.00 had been issued by
respondent in favor of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Balanga City,
Bataan, representing the payment of the appeal fee.19
Almost five (5) years later, or on April 26, 2013, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss20 the appeal of respondent for failure to prosecute,
asseverating that from the time the RTC gave due course to its appeal
in 2008, respondent had not made any further action on its appeal,
particularly with regard to the payment of the prescribed appeal fees.
In its defense, respondent argued that the RTC no longer had
jurisdiction to entertain petitioners' motion after its Notice of Appeal
had been given due course. It maintained that petitioners' motion
should have been filed not before the RTC, but before the CA.21
In its assailed Order22 dated July 5, 2013, the RTC, through Judge
Angelito I. Balderama (Judge Balderama), granted petitioners' motion
and accordingly, dismissed respondent's appeal for failure to
prosecute. Upon a meticulous inspection of the records, the RTC found
that respondent failed to pay the prescribed appeal fees. While it is true
that Postal Money Order No. J8353389-390 had been issued by
respondent as purported payment therefor, records show that the
amount pertaining thereto had not been remitted or credited to the
account of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC. According to
the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Clerk of Court of the RTC, Mr. Gelbert
Argonza (Mr. Argonza), respondent's failure to pay the appeal fees
was the reason why the records of the case were not transmitted to the
CA, explaining that proof of payment of the appeal fees is a required
attachment that forms part of the records to be transmitted to the CA.23
As payment of docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period
is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the RTC, therefore, held that
respondent's appeal was not duly perfected. As such, it did not lose
jurisdiction over the case and, accordingly, pursuant to Section
5,24 Rule 141 on Legal Fees of the Rules of Court, dismissed
respondent's appeal for failure to prosecute.25cralawred
Respondent's motion for reconsideration26 was denied in an Order
dated December 11, 2013; hence, the matter was elevated before the
CA via a petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC in dismissing its appeal.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated January 28, 2015, the CA found grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing respondent's appeal for
failure to prosecute, holding that the validity of the latter's appeal had
already been passed upon in the RTC's earlier Orders dated June 7,
2007 and August 27, 2008 that gave due course to the appeal and
directed the transmittal of the records to the CA. It also ruled that upon
the perfection of respondent's appeal, the RTC had already lost
jurisdiction over the case. Thus, any orders subsequently issued by the
RTC after the filing of respondent's Notice of Appeal on June 19, 2002
were of no force and effect.28
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,29 which the
CA denied in a Resolution30 dated June 5, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it
dismissed respondent's appeal for failure to prosecute.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit.
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the
period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of
payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record or the record on appeal.
In Gipa v. Southern Luzon Institute,31 citing Gonzales v. Pe,32 the Court
clarified the requirement of full payment of docket and other lawful
fees under the above-quoted rule in this wise:
[T]he procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely
directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the
prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears
stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the
CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period,
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees
must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from. The requirement of paving the full
amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is
not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of
docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not
perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section
1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of
the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as
provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount
of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees.33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In relation thereto, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 9.  Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. - A party's appeal by
notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the
notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him
with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the
case upon the perfection of appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over
the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the
record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with
section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
After a punctilious review of the records of this case, the Court finds
that respondent failed to perfect its appeal before the RTC by not
paying the full amount of the prescribed appellate docket fees.
Consequently, the RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the case and, as a
matter of discretion, properly dismissed the appeal for failure to
prosecute.
The Court gives credence to the statement given by the OIC Clerk of
Court of the RTC, Mr. Argonza, who, upon meticulous inspection of
the records, found that while respondent had indeed issued a postal
money order in favor of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC,
the amount pertaining thereto was never remitted or received by the
court. There being no proof of payment of the required appellate fees,
Mr. Argonza explained that the case records cannot be transmitted to
the CA and therefore, remained with the RTC. This fact sheds light
and lends credibility to petitioners' allegation that they originally
attempted to file their motion to dismiss appeal before the CA, which
was unsurprisingly rejected, there being no case docket and court
records pertaining to respondent's appeal.34
Further militating against respondent's cause is the fact that almost five
(5) years had already lapsed from the time its Notice of Appeal had
been originally given due course by the RTC up to the time the
petitioners moved for its dismissal. And yet, respondent failed to
pursue its case. In fact, had petitioners not taken any action, the instant
case would have continued to languish in the RTC dockets. Besides,
even if it were true that respondent had paid the required appellate ASIDE.Accordingly, the Orders dated July 5, 2013 and December 11,
docket fees in this case, it still failed to exercise diligence and 20.13 of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1,
prudence in ascertaining that the records of the case had been sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, are AFFIRMED.
transmitted to the CA and that its appeal had been given due course.
As it is, respondent miserably neglected its case and may, thus, be SO ORDERED.
considered to have abandoned its appeal.35 Clearly, the RTC, through
Judge Balderama, cannot be faulted for dismissing the appeal for
failure to prosecute.

That the RTC retained jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal is beyond

cavil, as provided under Section 9, Rule 41 above-quoted. As a result
of respondent's failure to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by
law, no court could exercise appellate  jurisdiction to review the RTC
decision.36 To reiterate, perfection of an appeal within the period and
in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance
with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of
rendering the judgment final and executory.37It bears to stress that the
right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that
right must comply with the statute or rules.38

In the light of the foregoing, the CA erred when it found that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed respondent's
appeal for failure to prosecute. While it is true that the RTC previously
gave due course to respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the
latter had issued a postal money order in payment of the required
appellate docket fees, the RTC, however, is not precluded from
perusing the records a second or a third time, if only to ensure that all
the requirements for perfecting an appeal have been complied with.
The Court further notes that if it were true that respondent actually
paid the appellaite docket fees, it could have easily produced proof of
payment if only to dispel any doubts thereon and consequently, prove
compliance with the rules on the perfection of appeals. Unfortunately,
no such evidence was forthcoming. Indubitably, the dismissal of
respondent's appeal was in order, and the RTC's January 17, 2002
Decision, as a result, had attained finality.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

January 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated June 5, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133533 are hereby REVERSED and SET
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 219510, November 04, 2016
MARLON CURAMMENG Y PABLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
1
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari   are the Resolutions
dated October 20, 20142 and June 30, 20153 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36802, which dismissed petitioner Marlon
Curammeng y Pablo's (Curammeng) petition for review for his failure
to attach, inter alia, a certification of non-forum shopping.
The Facts
The instant case arose from an Information4 filed before the Municipal
Trial Court of Bauang, La Union (MTC), charging Curammeng of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution alleged
that on the night of September 25, 2006, a Maria De Leon bus going to
Laoag, Ilocos Norte being driven by Francisco Franco y Andres
(Franco) was traversing the northbound lane of the national highway
along Santiago, Bauang, La Union, when its rear left tire blew out and
caught fire. This prompted Franco to immediately park the bus on the
northbound side of the national highway, and thereafter, unloaded the
cargoes from the said bus. At a little past midnight of the next day, an
RCJ bus bound for Manila being driven by Curammeng traversed the
southbound lane of the road where the stalled bus was parked and hit
Franco, resulting in the latter's death.5
In his defense, Curammeng averred that he was driving the RCJ bus
bound for Manila and traversing the southbound side of the national
highway at less than 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he saw from
afar the stalled Maria De Leon bus at the road's northbound side which
was not equipped with any early warning device, thus, prompting him
to decelerate. When the RCJ bus was only a few meters away from the
stalled Maria De Leon bus, a closed van suddenly appeared from the
opposite direction, causing petitioner to steer his bus to the west
shoulder, unfortunately hitting Franco and causing the latter's death.
Out of fear of reprisal, petitioner surrendered to the Caba Police
Station in the next town. Eventually, petitioner was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charge.6
The MTC Ruling
In a Decision7 dated November 26, 2013, the MTC found Curammeng
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and ordered him to pay Franco's heirs the
amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P200,000.00 as actual
damages.8
The MTC found that Curammeng showed an inexcusable lack of
precaution in driving his bus while passing through the stalled Maria
De Leon bus, which resulted in Franco's death. Moreover, it found
untenable Curammeng's assertion that he decreased the speed of his
bus when he was nearing the stalled bus, considering that the evidence
on record showed that he was still running at around 60 kph when he
hit Franco. In this relation, the MTC pointed out that if Curammeng
had indeed decelerated as he claimed, then he should have noticed the
barangay tanods near the stalled bus who were manning the traffic and
signalling the other motorists to slow down.9
Aggrieved, Curammeng appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 (RTC).
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated June 3, 2014, the RTC affirmed Curammeng's
conviction in toto.11 It found that as a professional public utility
vehicle driver, his primary concern is the safety not only of himself
and his passengers but also that of his fellow motorists. However, he
failed to exhibit such concern when he did not slow down upon seeing
the Maria De Leon bus stalled on the northbound side of the national
highway, especially so that the area where the incident happened was
hardly illuminated by street lights and that there is a possibility that he
might not be able to see oncoming vehicles because his view of the
road was partially blocked by the said stalled bus. In view of the
foregoing circumstances, the RTC concluded that Curammeng was
negligent in driving his bus, and such negligence was the proximate
cause of Franco's death. As such, his liability for the crime charged
must be upheld.12
Curammeng moved for reconsideration but was denied in an
Order13 dated July 22, 2014. Dissatisfied, he filed a petition for
review 14 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated October 20, 2014, the CA dismissed outright
Curammeng's petition based on procedural grounds. Specifically, the
CA found that Curammeng violated Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court as he failed to attach a certification of non-forum shopping as
well as material portions of the record (e.g., affidavits referred to in the
MTC Decision, transcript of stenographic notes of the MTC,
documentary evidence of the parties).16
Undaunted, Curammeng filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Compliance17 dated November 6, 2014, praying for the relaxation of
procedural rules so that his petition will be reinstated and given due
course. He explained that the failure to comply with the rules was only
due to a plain oversight on the part of his counsel's secretary. To show
that such failure was unintentional, he attached his certification of non-
forum shopping as well as copies of the pertinent records of the case.18
In a Resolution19 dated June 30, 2015, the CA denied Curammeng's
motion for lack of merit. It held that Curammeng failed to give any
convincing explanation which would constitute a compelling reason
for a liberal application of the procedural rules on appeal.20
Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
CA correctly dismissed Curammeng's petition for review based on
procedural grounds.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction are taken by filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court.21 Section 2, thereof, provides that such petitions
shall be accompanied by, inter alia, material portions of the record
which would support the allegations of said petitions as well as a
certification of non forum shopping, viz.: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 2. Form and contents. -The petition shall be filed in seven (7)
legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names
of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the
specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by
the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for
the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible
duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders
of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof
and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced
any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes
to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or
agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
It must be stressed that since a petition for review is a form of appeal,
non-compliance with the foregoing rule may render the same
dismissible. This is in furtherance of the well-settled rule that "the
right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to
avail of the right must, therefore; comply with the requirements of the
rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost."22 Verily,
compliance with procedural rules is a must, "since they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of
delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice."23
Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend
to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in light of
the prevailing circumstances of the case, such as where strong
considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the
Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction.24 The Court's pronouncement
in Heirs of Zaulda v. Zaulda25cralawred is instructive on this matter, to
wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it
would be attained by precipitate, if not preposterous, application of
technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors
technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty
is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of
action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party
litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life,
liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. At this juncture, the Court reminds
all members of the bench and bar of the admonition in the often-cited
case of Alonso v. Villamor  [16 Phil. 315, 322
(1910)]: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities.26 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Otherwise stated, procedural rules may be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that
the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed
where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the
client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.27
In the instant case, the Court notes that the dismissal of Curammeng's
appeal is based solely on his counsel's negligence in failing to attach a
certification of non-forum shopping as well as material portions of the
record. Notwithstanding the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
with Compliance dated November 6, 2014, the CA upheld its earlier
dismissal, ratiocinating that the reasons presented by Curammeng's
counsel were not compelling enough to relax the technical rules on
appeal.
While the Court understands and applauds the CA's zealousness in
upholding procedural rules, it cannot simply allow a man to be
incarcerated without his conviction being reviewed due to the
negligence of his counsel. To note, Curammeng, a public utility
vehicle driver and his family's sole breadwinner, is appealing his
conviction for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide where he stands to be sentenced with imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, among others. In view of these
circumstances, as well as his counsel's eventual - albeit irregular -
compliance with the technical rules of appeal, the CA should have
disregarded the rules and proceeded to make a full review of the
factual and legal bases of Curammeng's conviction, including the
attendance of modificatory circumstances (e.g., the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender which Curammeng argues to be
existent in his case), if any, pursuant to the principle that an appeal in
criminal cases opens the entire case for review. 28

In sum, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of

procedure in order to afford Curammeng the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his appeal, rather than to deprive him of such
and make him lose his liberty on procedural blunders which he had no
direct hand in. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the CA
for resolution of the appeal on its merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the

Resolutions dated October 20, 2014 and June 30, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36802 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
resolution of the appeal on its merits.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

FIRST DIVISION
 G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016
TERESITA TAN, Petitioner, v. JOVENCIO F. CINCO, SIMON
LORI HOLDINGS, INC., PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, FORTUNATO G. PE, RAYMUNDO G. PE,
JOSE REVILLA REYES, JR., AND DEPUTY SHERIFF
ROMMEL IGNACIO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated January 22, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated June 11,
2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
122492, which reversed and set aside the Orders dated August 5,
20114 and October 17, 20115 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
City, Branch 257 (Parañaque RTC) and directed the allowance and
approval of respondents' Notice of Appeal6 filed on June 17, 2011.
The Facts
In 2001, respondents Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), Fortunato G.
Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F. Cinco, and Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr.
(individual lenders) extended a loan to one Dante Tan (Dante) in the
amount of P50,000,000.00. The loan was facilitated by PentaCapital
Investment Corporation (PentaCapital) and was secured by Dante's
shares in Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC).7 When Dante
failed to pay the loan upon maturity and despite demands, he proposed
to settle the same by selling his shares in BWRC and assigning the
proceeds to SLHI, the individual lenders, and PentaCapital
(respondents).8chanrobleslaw
However, when he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of
assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving his obligations
unpaid.9 Hence, respondents filed an action for sum of money against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146
(Makati RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-357 (collection
case).10 After due proceedings, the Makati RTC rendered
judgment11 on May 21, 2002 ordering Dante to pay respondents the
sum of P100,100,000.00 with legal interest from June 26, 2000 until
the principal amount is fully paid, plus attorney's fees and costs.
Dante's attempts to reverse the decision on appeal proved futile, thus, a
Writ of Execution12 (writ) was issued on February 16, 2005.
In order to enforce the writ, Deputy Sheriff Rommel Ignacio (Sheriff
Ignacio) levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 12698113 registered in Dante's name (subject property). An
auction sale was then conducted on March 29, 2005.14 Consequently,
Dante sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit
executed by his wife, herein petitioner Teresita Tan (Teresita) attesting
to the conjugal nature of the subject property. Meanwhile, the period to
redeem the subject property lapsed without redemption having been
made; hence, a Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale15was issued in favor of
respondents.16chanrobleslaw
Undeterred, Dante filed an Omnibus Motion17 alleging that the subject
property was a family home and therefore, exempt from execution, and
that being a conjugal property, it cannot be made to answer for his
personal obligations without any showing that it had redounded to the
benefit of the family.18 The Makati RTC denied19 Dante's Omnibus
Motion, ruling that Dante had belatedly raised the issues respecting the
conjugal nature of the subject property, and besides, the issue on
whether the subject property was a family home had already been
previously resolved.20 Moreover, he had contracted the obligation
while engaged in his business; hence, it can be presumed that the
conjugal partnership was benefited.21 Finally, the Makati RTC held
that attachment and levy on the subject property had been validly
done.22 Consequently, it directed the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of respondents and ordered Dante and all persons claiming rights
under him to vacate the subject property.23 Dante's motion for
reconsideration was denied, and there being no appeal taken therefrom,
the Makati RTC's disposition of the case became final.24chanrobleslaw
On May 2, 2007, Teresita - Dante's wife - filed before the Parañaque
RTC a complaint25cralawred against respondents, respondent Sheriff
Ignacio, and the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 07-0134, for the nullification of the auction sale and the
cancellation of the certificate of sale issued in favor of respondents
(nullification case).26chanrobleslaw
The Proceedings Before the Parañaque RTC
After due proceedings, the Parañaque RTC initially dismissed27 the
nullification case on the ground of res judicata, ruling that the issues
raised therein had already been passed upon by the Makati RTC with
Teresita's active and voluntary participation.28 However, upon
Teresita's motion for reconsideration,29 the Parañaque RTC, in an
Order30 dated January 6, 2011, reversed its initial disposition and
instead, nullified the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final
Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.31 It held that Teresita was
considered a third party in the collection case before the Makati RTC,
not having been impleaded therein together with her husband Dante,
and that the submission of her Affidavit before the Makati RTC did
not make her a party to the said case.32 Moreover, she had not waived
her right to institute a separate action to recover the subject property,
and the nullification case was not, after all, barred by res
judicata.33chanrobleslaw
Respondents' motion for reconsideration34 was denied in an
Order35 dated April 27, 2011, which they received on May 23,
2011.36 Intending to file a petition for certiorari before the CA, they
filed a Motion for Extension of Time37 on June 2, 2011. Eventually
realizing their error, and apparently unaware that the CA had already
denied their motion for extension in an Order dated June 13, 2011,
respondents withdrew their motion for extension before the CA on
June 17, 2011 and instead, simultaneously filed a Notice of
Appeal38 before the Parañaque RTC. Unfortunately, it was filed ten
(10) days late.39chanrobleslaw
In an Order40 dated August 5, 2011, the Parañaque RTC denied the
Notice of Appeal for having been filed out of time. Respondents'
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order41 dated
October 17, 2011.42 Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari43 before the CA, arguing, inter alia, that the Parañaque
RTC had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a co-
equal court.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision44 dated January 22, 2013, the CA granted the petition and
directed the Parañaque RTC to allow respondents' Notice of Appeal.
While conceding that the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, the CA
nonetheless found meritorious and sound reasons for the exceptional
allowance of respondents' appeal.45 It held that it was a more prudent
course of action for the Parañaque RTC to excuse respondents'
technical lapse in order to afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal instead of disposing the case based on technicality.46 Citing
the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court, it found that the affirmance of
the Parañaque RTC's assailed issuances would allow Teresita's
husband, Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which was
already finally adjudicated by the Makati RTC, a co-equal court and
the first one to take cognizance of the controversy, on the basis of
technicality.47chanrobleslaw
Teresita's motion for reconsideration was denied in the
Resolution48 dated June 11, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
At the core of the issues advanced for the Court's resolution is the
question of whether or not the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of
judicial stability when it took cognizance of the nullification case filed
by Teresita and declared as null and void the auction sale, the
certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
In Barroso v. Omelio,49 the Court explained the doctrine of judicial
stability as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in
the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with
the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over
all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order
has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the
proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and
to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents
arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious
to the orderly administration of justice.
xxxx
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court
may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized
that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy,
however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher
court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is
precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article
VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has
operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
To summarize, the various branches of the regional trial courts of a
province or city, having as they do the same or equal authority and
exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should
not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective
cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would
obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of
justice.50chanrobleslaw
In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the
doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of Teresita's
nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it
emanated falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. Verily, the
nullification case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for lack of
jurisdiction, as the Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the
levy and sale of the subject property that was legitimately ordered by
the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal court. In fact, the
Parañaque RTC was already on the right track when it initially
dismissed the nullification case in its Decision51 dated July 8, 2010.
However, it changed its stance and reconsidered its disposition upon
Teresita's motion for reconsideration, thereby committing reversible
error. To reiterate, the determination of whether or not the levy and
sale of a property in the execution of a judgment was valid properly
falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and
issued the writ of execution.52chanrobleslaw
Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was
improper and in glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability.
The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as
well as the execution thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom,
may not be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a court of
concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open,
modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed but
is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or
issued.53 Consequently, the Parañaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over
the same, rendering all the proceedings therein, as well as the Decision
and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction.
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void
and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no
effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum
is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a
total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment
at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from
it have no legal effect.54chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated January 6,
2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch
257 in Civil Case No. 07-0134, the proceedings therein, as well as all
orders issued thereafter are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack
of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

FIRST DIVISION
 G.R. No. 214241, January 13, 2016
SPOUSES RAMON AND LIGAYA
GONZALES, Petitioners, v. MARMAINE REALTY
CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY MARIANO
MANALO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions
dated April 24, 20142 and September 10, 20143 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132871, which dismissed the petition for
review filed by herein petitioners-spouses Ramon and Ligaya
Gonzales (Sps. Gonzales) before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
The instant case arose from a Complaint4 dated October 30, 1997 for
Recognition as Tenant with Damages and Temporary Restraining
Order filed by Sps. Gonzales against herein respondent Marmaine
Realty Corporation (Marmaine) before the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), Region IV (Tenancy Case). After initially filing a Motion
to Dismiss,5Marmaine seasonably filed an Answer with
Counterclaim6 and, thereafter, trial ensued.  Us pendens only pertains to the Tenancy Case and does not involve
On January 6, 1998, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) issued a Resolution7 ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in Sps. Gonzales' favor. In view thereof, Sps.
Gonzales filed a Notice of Lis Pendens8 dated September 26, 2000
before the Register of Deeds of Batangas, which was then annotated
on the certificates of title of Marmaine's properties.
9
After due proceedings, the PARAD issued a Decision  dated June 27,
2002 in the Tenancy Case, dismissing Sps. Gonzales' complaint for
lack of merit. Sps. Gonzales moved for reconsideration,10 which was,
however, denied in an Order11 dated August 7, 2002. Aggrieved, they
appealed12 to the DARAB, but the latter affirmed the PARAD ruling in
a Decision13 dated October 17, 2008. Dissatisfied, Sps. Gonzales
moved for reconsideration14 of the DARAB's October 17, 2008
Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution15 dated March 23,
2009. Due to the failure on the part of Sps. Gonzales to further appeal,
the DARAB Decision became final and executory on May 7, 2009,
and an Entry of Judgment16 was issued on January 19, 2012.
In view of the finality of the ruling in the Tenancy Case, Marmaine
filed a Motion for Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens17 dated
January 31, 2012.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The PARAD Ruling
In an Order18 dated May 15, 2012, the PARAD initially denied
Marmaine's motion on the ground of, inter alia, prematurity because a
civil case involving the same parties is still pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87, docketed as
Civil Case No. RY2K-052. However, on Marmaine's motion for
reconsideration,19 the PARAD issued an Order20 dated December 4,
2012 setting aside its earlier Order and, accordingly, directed the
Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title.21 The PARAD
held that such cancellation is warranted in view of the final and
executory judgment in the Tenancy Case in Marmaine's favor. In this
relation, the PARAD pointed out that the cancellation of the notice of
Civil Case No. RY2K-052.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sps. Gonzales moved for reconsideration23 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution24 dated October 16, 2013. Dissatisfied,
petitioners went straight to the C A via a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.25cralawred
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution26 dated April 24, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It held
that Sps. Gonzales improperly elevated the case to it via a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, pointing out that the
proper remedy from a PARAD's denial of a motion for reconsideration
is an appeal to the DARAB, and not a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Undaunted, Sps. Gonzales moved for reconsideration,28 but was denied
in a Resolution29 dated September 10, 2014; hence, this
petition.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The issues raised for the Court's resolution are as follows: (a) whether
or not the CA en-ed in dismissing the petition for review before it due
to petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (b)
whether or not the PARAD correctly ordered the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of title of
Marmaine's properties.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies.
Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from
a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed.30 In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a
pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of
judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal
to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or
estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
However, it must be clarified that the aforementioned doctrine is not
absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is when the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice.32 In Vigilar v. Aquino,33 the Court had
the opportunity to explain the rationale behind this exception, to wit:
It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said
question at best could be resolved tentatively by the administrative
authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them
but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies docs not apply, because nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical
knowledge and experience but one that would involve the
interpretation and application of law.34 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the case at bar, Sps. Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue
they raised before the CA, i.e., the propriety of the cancellation of the
Notice of Lis Pendens, falls within the aforesaid exception as the same
is a purely legal question, considering that the resolution of the same
would not involve an examination of the probative value presented by
the litigants and must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Verily, the CA erred in dismissing Sps. Gonzales' petition for review
before it, considering that the matter at issue - a question of law - falls
within the known exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. In such a case, court procedure dictates that
the instant case be remanded to the CA for a resolution on the merits.
However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper
evaluation of the merits may be had, as in this case, the Court may
dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to
prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve
the ends of justice.36 In view of the foregoing - as well as the fact that
Sps. Gonzales prayed for a resolution of the issue on the merits37 - the
Court finds it appropriate to finally settle the conflicting claims of the
parties.
"Lis pendens" which literally means pending suit, refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over a property
involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis
pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the
power of the court until the litigation is terminated; and to prevent the
defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is
an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in
litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest
over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the
result of the litigation over said property. The filing of a notice of lis
pendens has a two-fold effect: (a) to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final
judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive
alienations; and (b) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land
subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Since the Tenancy Case had already been decided against Sps.
Gonzales with finality, it is but proper that the PARAD order the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens subject of this case. In this
relation, the PARAD correctly ruled that its cancellation of the
aforementioned notice of lis pendens only pertains to the Tenancy
Case and, thus, would not affect any other case involving the same
parties, such as Civil Case No. RY2K-052 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87.
In sum, the PARAD properly ordered the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens that Sps. Gonzales caused to be annotated on
Marmaine's certificates of title in view of the finality of the decision in
the Tenancy Case,
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 
SO ORDERED.

Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis

pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the notice is for
the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused, it to be recorded." In the
same vein, case law likewise instructs that a notice of lis pendens may
be cancelled in situations where: (a) there are exceptional
circumstances imputable to the party who caused the annotation; (b)
the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other party
because of several continuances procured by petitioner; (c) the case
which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-
prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or (d) judgment was rendered
against the party who caused such a
notation.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
FIRST DIVISION
In the case at bar, records show that the notice of lis pendens that Sps.
Gonzales caused to be annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title G.R. No. 221062, October 05, 2016
stemmed from the Tenancy Case filed by the former against the latter.
 ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS, Petitioner, v. THE ESTATE OF
ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. AND ROLANDO OGSOS,
JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated February 28, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated October
1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 03710,
which affirmed with modification the Decision4 dated July 2, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36 (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 12708, thereby: (a) ordering petitioner Elizabeth Sy-Vargas
(petitioner) and her sister, Kathryn T. Sy (Kathryn), to pay respondents
the Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. (Ogsos, Sr.) and Rolando Ogsos, Jr.,
(Ogsos, Jr.; collectively, respondents) the amount of P10,391,981.76,
representing the value of the sugar and molasses that could have been
produced from 1999 to 2004, if only respondents were not deprived by
petitioner and Kathryn of possession and enjoyment of the leased
agricultural farm; and (b) deleting the awards for moral and exemplary
damages, as well as the attorney's fees and costs of suit against
respondents.
The Facts
On February 10, 1994, Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico
(Fermina), represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Catalino V. Noel,
entered into a Contract of Lease5 (lease contract) covering five (5)
parcels of agricultural land owned by the latter, with an aggregate area
of 23 hectares, more or less, situated in Maaslum Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental (leased premises). Based on the contract, Ogsos, Sr. agreed to
pay the Heirs of Fermina 230 piculs or 290.95 liquid-kilogram (lkg.) of
centrifugal sugar every crop year, starting from crop year 1994-1995 to
crop year 2000-2001, as lease rental.6chanrobleslaw
On June 5, 1996, the term of the lease contract was extended for three
(3) years, or until the end of crop year 2004, due to Ogsos, Sr.'s
introduction of improvements on the leased premises.7 Thereafter, or
on December 30, 1996, the said contract was amended, modifying the
lease rental from 230 piculs or 290.95 lkg. of centrifugal sugar every
crop year to P150,000.00 cash, beginning the crop year 1996-
1997.8chanrobleslaw
Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, claimed
that the lease rentals from crop year 1994-1995 to crop year 1998-1999
were not paid. Thus, on April 27, 2000,9 they filed a Complaint10 for
Specific Performance and Damages against respondents, before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 12708, to recover the unpaid lease
rentals. Pertinently, they did not include in their claim the lease rental
for crop year 1999-2000 because respondents had already abandoned
the leased premises since the said crop year.11chanrobleslaw
Summons was served in May 2000, but respondent Ogsos, Jr. only
filed a motion to admit answer12 and answer13 to the complaint after
more than two (2) years, or on December 17, 2002.14 Thus, petitioner
and Kathryn filed on January 28, 2003, an opposition thereto, and
moved to declare respondents in default, which the RTC granted in an
Order dated March 7, 2003.15chanrobleslaw
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the RTC,
respondents, then, elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari to
the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79463, wherein the CA granted
respondents petition and remanded the case to the RTC. The CA
ordered the RTC to admit respondents' answer so as to give them the
opportunity to be heard and to present their side on the merits of the
case.16chanrobleslaw
In their answer,17 respondents alleged that they had faithfully complied
with their obligations as embodied in the lease contract and its
subsequent amendments.18 They denied abandoning the leased
premises and claimed that sometime in December 1998, petitioner and
Kathryn unlawfully took possession of the leased premises and
appropriated for themselves the sugarcane ready for harvest under the
pretext that they would apply the proceeds thereof to the unpaid
rent.19 They likewise alleged that in the same year, Ogsos, Sr. and his
wife fell ill, which incidents forced respondents to obtain loans from
several businessmen, namely: Emiliano "Nonette" Bacang, Zaldy
Roleda, and Pastor Domocol.20 The arrangement regarding the
foregoing loans was that the said creditors would be allowed to harvest
the sugarcane from the leased premises and apply the proceeds thereof
to the loans.21 However, when the creditors were about to harvest the
sugarcane, they were prevented by petitioner and Kathryn; resulting in
respondents' default in the payment of their debts.22 On March 22,
2000, Ogsos, Sr. died.23chanrobleslaw
Respondents also averred that since crop years 1994 to 1997-1998, the
average production of sugarcane is 1,308.68 lkg. of sugar and 30.409
tons of molasses per year, as computed on the basis of the Planter's
Production Reports. Thus, when petitioner and Kathryn took
possession of the leased premises, respondents lost their profits
equivalent to the aforesaid production starting from crop year 1999-
2000 until the termination of the lease contract on crop year 2003-
2004.24 Accordingly, respondents filed a counterclaim for these lost
profits plus damages.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
On June 6, 2005, respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint
in view of the absence of the required Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping. In a Resolution dated November 9, 2005, the RTC
dismissed the case without prejudice.26chanrobleslaw
On December 15, 2005, respondents moved for the hearing of their
counterclaim, to which the RTC required petitioner and Kathryn to
submit a comment, but none was filed. Hence, in an Order dated
February 9, 2006, the RTC set the case for reception of evidence on
respondents' counterclaim.27chanrobleslaw
On February 28, 2006, respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set
Case for Pre-Trial, which was granted by the RTC on March 1, 2006,
setting the pre-trial on March 30, 2006. Petitioner, Kathryn, and their
counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial and to file their pre-trial brief.
Thus, respondents filed a manifestation with motion to present
evidence ex-parte on June 7, 2006, praying that petitioner and Kathryn
be declared in default, and that respondents be allowed to present
evidence on their counterclaim ex-parte, which the RTC granted in an
Order dated June 28,2006.28chanrobleslaw
Thereafter, or on August 16, 2006, petitioner and Kathryn moved to
quash the June 28, 2006 Order, which was, however, denied on
September 1, 2006 on the ground that the period to ask for
reconsideration or for the lifting of the order had already
lapsed.29chanrobleslaw
On October 17, 2006, petitioner and Kathryn filed a motion to dismiss
respondents' counterclaim arguing that the same were permissive and
that respondents had not paid the appropriate docket fees.30However,
the RTC, in its November 16, 2006 Order,31 denied the said motion,
declaring respondents' counterclaim as compulsory; thus, holding that
the payment of the required docket fees was no longer
necessary.32chanrobleslaw
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision33 dated July 2, 2007, the RTC granted respondents'
counterclaim, and consequently, ordered petitioner and Kathryn to pay
respondents the following amounts: (a) P10,391,981.76 worth of sugar
and molasses produced representing the value of 1,308.68 lkg. of sugar
and 30.409 tons of molasses for each crop year that defendant and
Ogsos, Sr. were deprived of possession and enjoyment of the leased
premises; (b) P500,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (d) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and P1,000.00
for each personal appearance of respondents' counsel before the RTC;
and (e) P50,000.00 as costs of suit.34 In so ruling, it found that Ogsos,
Sr. faithfully paid the lease rentals during the crop years 1994 to
199735 but eventually stopped their payments when petitioner and
Kathryn took possession and harvested the sugarcane in the leased
premises sometime in December 1998, despite respondents'
objection.36 Accordingly, petitioner and Kathryn reneged on their
obligation to maintain respondents' peaceful and adequate enjoyment
of the leased premises when the former forcibly and unlawfully
deprived the latter of possession thereof in December 1998, despite
payment of the lease rentals. Due to this, petitioner and Kathryn were
held liable for breach of the lease contract.37chanrobleslaw
Dissatisfied, petitioner and Kathryn appealed to the
CA.38chanrobleslaw
 The CA Ruling
In a Decision39 dated February 28, 2014 (CA Decision), the CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC but deleted the awards for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as the attorney's fees and costs of suit due
to the absence of proof that petitioner and Kathryn acted fraudulently
or in bad faith.40chanrobleslaw
The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in ruling that respondents'
counterclaim is not permissive but compulsory; hence, payment of
docket fees was not necessary.41 Further, the CA ruled that even
though the counterclaim was compulsory, the same would not be
automatically dismissed upon the dismissal of the action if the
dismissal was caused by the fault of the plaintiff, as in this
case.42chanrobleslaw
The counsel of petitioner and Kathryn received the CA Decision on
March 14, 2014.43 On March 31, 2014, petitioner and Kathryn filed
their motion for reconsideration,44 which was denied in the
Resolution45dated October 1, 2015 for being filed out of time; hence,
the instant petition solely filed by petitioner.46chanrobleslaw
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues for resolution in this case are whether or not the
CA correctly ruled that: (a) petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
filed out of time; (b) respondents' counterclaim for damages is
compulsory and not permissive in nature, and thus, no payment of
docket fees is required; and (c) respondents are entitled to such
counterclaim.
The Court's Ruling
I.
Records bear out that in the assailed October 1, 2015 Resolution, the
CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for being
purportedly filed out of time. The CA explained that since the registry
return receipt showed that petitioner and Kathryn's counsel received
the assailed March 14, 2014 Decision, it only had until March 29, 2014
to file a motion for reconsideration. However, they only filed such
motion on March 31, 2014, thus, rendering the assailed CA Decision
final and executory.
Notably, however, the CA failed to take into consideration that March
29, 2014 fell on a Saturday. In these situations, Section 1, Rule 22 of
the Rules of Court provides that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section. 1. How to compute time. - In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by
any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date
of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
Since March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday, petitioner and Kathryn were
completely justified in filing their motion for reconsideration on the
next working day: Monday, March 31, 2014. Accordingly, the CA
should not have considered it filed out of time, and instead, resolved
such motion on the merits. In such an instance, court procedure
dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on
the merits. However, when there is already enough basis on which a
proper evaluation of the merits may be had - as in this case - the Court
may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order
to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better
serve the ends of justice.47 In view of the foregoing as well as the fact
that petitioner prayed for the resolution of the substantive issues on the
merits48 - the Court finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive
issues of this case.
II.
Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or
not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in
permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket
fees.49 On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to
compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.50chanrobleslaw
In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may
have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of
or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up
in the same action.51chanrobleslaw
On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out
of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may
be filed separately in another case.52chanrobleslaw
In Spouses Mendiola v. CA,53 the Court had devised tests m
determining whether or not a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised
by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the
defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court? Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the
logical relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in
the counterclaim. Such relationship exists when conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the
multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the
claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the
parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers, the
counterclaim is compulsory.54 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on the abovementioned standards, the Court finds that the
counterclaim of respondents is permissive in nature. This is because:
(a) the issue in the main case, i.e., whether or not respondents are
liable to pay lease rentals, is entirely different from the issue in the
counterclaim, i.e., whether or not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for
damages for taking over the possession of the leased premises and
harvesting and appropriating respondents' crops planted therein; (b)
since petitioner and respondents' respective causes of action arose
from completely different occurrences, the latter would not be barred
by res judicata had they opted to litigate its counterclaim in a separate
proceeding; (c) the evidence required to prove petitioner's claim that
respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise different from the
evidence required to prove respondents' counterclaim that petitioner
and Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts in bad faith;
and (d) the recovery of petitioner's claim is not contingent or
dependent upon proof of respondents' counterclaim, such that
conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication
of the time and effort of the court and the parties.
In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not
compulsory as held by the courts a quo, respondents are required to
pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that respondents' failure
to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to
the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that while
the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the
initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided
that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was
no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the
government.55chanrobleslaw
Here, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in
connection with their counterclaim, primarily because as early as
November 16, 2006, the RTC had already found such counterclaim to
be compulsory in nature.56 Such finding was then upheld in the July 2,
2007 RTC Decision and affirmed on appeal by the CA in its assailed
Decision. As such, the lower courts did not require respondents to pay
docket fees and even proceeded to rule on their entitlement thereto.
Verily, respondents' reliance on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit
erroneous, exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much
more their intention not to defraud the government. Thus, the
counterclaim should not be dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees.
Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the
monetary awards in respondents'  favor. In Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation v. Legasto,57 citing, Section 2, Rule 14158 of
the Rules of Court, the Court held that in instances where a litigant's
non-payment of docket fees was made in good faith and without any
intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the
court a quo should be ordered to assess the amount of deficient docket
fees due from such litigant, which will constitute a judgment lien on
the amount awarded to him, and enforce such lien,59 as in this case.
That being said, the Court now resolves whether or not respondents are
indeed entitled to their counterclaim.
III.
In this case, the RTC found that under the lease contract, petitioner and
Kathryn were bound to keep respondents in peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the leased premises for the entire duration of the lease
and that respondents faithfully paid their lease rentals for a period of
four (4) years, or until crop year 1998. Despite the foregoing,
petitioner and Kathryn unlawfully took possession (sometime in
December 1998) and harvested respondents' crops over their
objections. The RTC further found that due to such unlawful
dispossession of the leased premises, respondents were deprived of
profits for six (6) crop years (i.e., from crop year 1999 to crop year
2004, which was the last crop year of the lease) in the amount of
P1,731,996.96 per year, or a grand total of P10,391,987.76.60 Such
factual findings were then affirmed by the CA in its assailed ruling. It
has long been settled that factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by
the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal,61 save for certain exceptions,62 which petitioner failed to show
in this case. As such, the grant of said counterclaim is upheld.
Nonetheless, the Court finds it proper to deduct from the counterclaim
award of P10,391,987.76 the amount of P900,000.00, which represents
the lease rentals that should have been paid by the lessee, i.e.,
respondents, during the six (6) crop years (i.e., crop years 1999 to
2004) that they were deprived possession of the leased premises. As
the Court's counterclaim award of lost profits during the said period
stems from the recognition that the lessor, i.e., petitioner and Kathryn,
should have complied with their obligations to keep respondents in
peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises for the entire
duration of the lease, it is but fair and just that respondents be also held
to their obligations thereunder that is, to pay the lease rentals for the
entire duration of the contract. Perceptibly, respondents' gain of profits
during such period presupposes a valid and subsisting lease contract,
which is rendered legally possible if only they themselves discharged
their own obligation to pay the lease rentals therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
February 28, 2014 and the Resolution dated October 1, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 03710 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deducting from the
counterclaim award of P10,391,987.76 in favor of the Estate of
Rolando Ogsos, Sr. and Rolando Ogsos, Jr. (respondents) the amount
of P900,000.00, which represents the unpaid lease rentals for the crop
years 1999 to 2004 as above-discussed. Moreover, a judgment lien
shall be imposed on the monetary award given to respondents
corresponding to the unpaid docket fees on the permissive
counterclaim. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36, or his duly authorized deputy, is
hereby ordered to enforce the judgment lien and to assess and collect
the appropriate docket fees from respondents.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 210972, March 19, 2016
 ROGER ALLEN BIGLER, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND LINDA SUSAN PATRICIA E.
BARRETO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated May 16, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated January 21,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 119160, which
affirmed in toto the Order4 dated November 3, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 99-
2439 denying petitioner Roger Allen Bigler's (petitioner) Urgent
Omnibus Motion (To: [1] Reopen proceedings and allow Accused to
file his Notice of Appeal; [2] Recall the Warrant of Arrest dated 22
May 2006), thus, rendering final and unappealable the RTC's
Decision5 dated November 25, 2003 convicting petitioner of the crime
of Libel.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Libel before the RTC for
allegedly maligning his former spouse, private respondent Linda Susan
Patricia E. Barreto, through a letter sent to her lawyer purportedly
containing various malicious and defamatory imputations against her.
Petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, and thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.6 On November 21, 2003, petitioner's counsel, Capuyan
Quimpo & Salazar, filed a Withdrawal of Appearance7 and requested
therein that "all notices, legal processes, and pleadings intended for
petitioner be sent to his address at Portofmo, Small La Laguna,
Sabang, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro or to his new counsel who
shall enter an appearance in due time."
In a Decision8 dated November 25, 2003, the RTC found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel and, accordingly,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty one (21) days to two (2)
years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days, and to pay the costs of
suit.9 Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,10 which was,
however, denied in an Order11 dated May 22, 2006. On even date, a
Warrant of Arrest was issued against petitioner.12 Consequently, he
was arrested and taken into custody on October 8, 2010.13
Following his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion14 dated October 13, 2010 praying that the RTC: (a) reopen the
criminal proceedings against him; (b) allow him to file a notice of
appeal; and (c) recall the Warrant of Arrest issued against him. In said
Motion, petitioner questioned the validity of the promulgation of the
RTC Decision convicting him of Libel, claiming that he never received
notice of the same and that he was not present during such
promulgation.15 He likewise questioned the validity of the service of
the Order dated May 22, 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration,
maintaining that he never received a copy thereof.16 In this relation,
petitioner likewise filed a Notice of Appeal17 dated October 22, 2010,
claiming that he only knew of the RTC's Order dated May 22, 2006 on
October 11, 2010.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order18 dated November 3, 2010, the RTC denied petitioner's
Urgent Omnibus Motion and, likewise, denied due course to his Notice
of Appeal.19
The RTC found that the Notice of Promulgation was sent to
petitioner's address through registered mail and was even received by a
certain Sally Tanyag, his employee. In this relation, the RTC held that
petitioner is estopped from feigning ignorance of the judgment of
conviction against him and the promulgation of such judgment,
considering that: (a) the RTC's Order dated January 27, 2004 clearly
stated that "the subject judgment was promulgated by reading the same
and furnishing [a] copy thereof to accused who was duly assisted by
Atty. Danilo Macalino;" and (b) he caused the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 9, 2004 as evidenced by the
Verification attached to the said Motion which bore his signature.20
Further, the RTC found as immaterial petitioner's contention that he
did not receive the Order dated May 22, 2006, considering that he filed
his Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2004 only on
February 13, 2004, or two (2) days beyond the prescribed 15-day
period reckoned from the promulgation of the RTC order on January
27, 2004. Hence, the RTC concluded that its Decision convicting
petitioner of the crime of Libel had long attained finality.21
Petitioner moved for reconsideration22 but was denied in an
Order23 dated March 8, 2011. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari24 before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated May 16, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling in toto. It held that while the service of the Notice of
Promulgation via registered mail was indeed a slight deviation from
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires
personal service to the accused or through his counsel, such departure
from the rules was completely justifiable given that petitioner's
previous counsel withdrew its representation shortly before the
judgment was set for promulgation. In any event, the CA opined that
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of such promulgation as records
reveal that he was present thereat. Further, the CA agreed with the
RTC that petitioner's filing of his Motion for Reconsideration was
made out of time, thus, rendering the guilty verdict against him final
and executory.26
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,27 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution28 dated January 21, 2014; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding that: (a) the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction against petitioner was
valid; and (b) petitioner belatedly filed his Motion for Reconsideration,
thus, rendering said judgment final and executory.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in this case, both the RTC
and the CA found that the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
was valid, as records reveal that petitioner, assisted by Atty. Danilo
Macalino, attended the same. Similarly, the courts a quo both found
that petitioner belatedly filed his motion for reconsideration assailing
said judgment of conviction, thus, rendering such judgment final and
executory. Undoubtedly, these are findings of fact which cannot be
touched upon in the instant petition.
It must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable,29 absent any of the exceptions recognized by case
law.30 This rule is rooted on the doctrine that findings of fact made by
a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can
otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not be
ignored.31 Hence, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or
capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and
conclusive upon this Court,32 as in this case.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Libel. Applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. Unfortunately, the
Decision dated November 25, 2003 of the RTC convicting petitioner
of the said crime - which had long become final and executory -
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of
one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty one (21) days to two (2)
years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
immediately be struck down.33 Nonetheless, the immutability of final
judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and
prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of
substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c)
the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e)
the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.34

In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect their

appeal on their respective judgments of conviction,35 the Court
corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the
decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by
law. There is thus, no reason to deprive herein petitioner of the relief
afforded the accused in the aforesaid similar cases. Verily, a sentence
which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty
in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to
impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void
for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.36

In sum, petitioner should only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of

imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision

dated May 16, 2013 and the Resolution dated January 21, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119160 are
hereby AFFIRMED. However, in the interest of substantial justice,
the Decision dated November 25, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 99-2439
is MODIFIED, sentencing herein petitioner Roger Allen Bigler to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four