Case Title: MARLYN MONTON NULLADA, PETITIONER, v. THE HON.

CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO AND ALL PERSONS WHO HAVE
OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST, RESPONDENTS.
GR Number: G.R. No. 224548
Promulgation Date: January 23, 2019
Ponente: A. REYES, JR., J.:
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Summary of facts:
Petitioner Marlyn Nullada claims that on July 29, 1997, she and Akira got married in
Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of Marriage that was issued by the
Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The document was registered with both the Office of the
Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division.
The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship,
however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual
agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. She sought a
recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines by filing with the RTC a petition for
recognition of foreign divorce.
Issue/s:
General: Whether or not the petitioner was able to prove the foreign law that allows the alleged
divorce decree
Controlling:
Whether or not paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code shall apply in the present case
where the Filipino wife also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with the foreign husband
Ruling:
The petition is granted. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the
Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,
it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to
exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are
freed from the marital bond.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know
that meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words
of a statute there should be no departure."
IN this case however, petitioner was not able to prove the existence of the Japanese law that
allows divorce because the records only include a photocopy of excerpts of The Civil Code of
Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan,
2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300. The Court ruled that this does not constitute sufficient
compliance with the rules on proof of Japan’s law on divorce.
Case title: HEIRS OF PAULA C. FABILLAR, AS REPRESENTED BY
AUREO* FABILLAR, PETITIONERS, v. MIGUEL M. PALLER, FLORENTINA P.
ABAYAN, AND DEMETRIA P. SAGALES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No.: G.R. No. 231459
Promulgation Date: January 21, 2019
Ponente: Justice Perlas-Bernabe
Nature of action: Petition for review on certiorari
Summary of Facts:
Respondents claimed that the subject land was a portion of a bigger parcel of land originally
owned by their grandfather, Marcelino Paller. After the latter’s death, his children, Ambrosio
Paller, Isidra Paller and Ignacia Paller, along with several others, orally partitioned his properties
and took possession of their respective shares. In 1995, respondent Demetria, daughter of
Ambrosio, mortgaged the subject land to Felix R. Aide with right to repurchase. Upon her return
from Manila in 2000, she redeemed the same but discovered that the Custodios took possession
of the land and refused to vacate therefrom despite demands; hence, the complaint.
In their Answer,13 the Custodios claimed to be legitimate and compulsory heirs of Marcelino who
can validly and legally possess the subject land which has not been partitioned, and thus,
commonly owned by his heirs. They further averred that Ambrosio is not a child of Marcelino
and, as such, has no right to claim the subject land.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents’ predecessor, Ambrosio,
is a child of Marcelino and is entitled to inherit the subject land
Ruling:
The petition is Granted.
it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove
filiation only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation.53 Because the putative parent
has no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, the same has scant evidentiary value if
taken in isolation;54 while it may be considered a public document, "it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified, but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the child's paternity."55 As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to
resolve a disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead of relying
only on a canonical record.56
In this case, the MCTC, the RTC, and the CA did not appreciate any other material proof related
to the baptismal certificate of Ambrosio that would establish his filiation with Marcelino,
whether as a legitimate or an illegitimate son. Contrary to the ruling of the said courts, the
burden of proof is on respondents to establish their affirmative allegation that Marcelino is
Ambrosio's father,57 and not for petitioners to disprove the same, because a baptismal certificate
is neither conclusive proof of filiation58 /parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy
of the person baptized.59 Consequently, while petitioners have admitted that Marcelino's heirs
had partitioned Marcelino's properties among them,60 the Court finds respondents' evidence to be
inadequate to prove the claimed filiation with the property owner, Marcelino, as to entitle
Ambrosio and his successors-in-interest, herein respondents, to share in the properties left by
Marcelino. However, it is well to point out that the portion of the property supposedly inherited
by Ambrosio from Marcelino involved only a one (1)-hectare portion of the subject land.
Case title: Virgilia Aquino v. Estate of Tomas B. Aguirre
G.R. Number: G.R. No. 232060
Promulgation Date: January 14, 2019
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo
Nature of Action: Petition for Review of Certiorari
Summary of facts:
In 2009, Virgilia Aquino, Nazaria Aquino, Avelina Ronquillo, Patrocinio Aquino, Manuela
Aquino, Lucita Bamba, Ramoncito Nepomuceno, and Domingo Manimbao (Aquino et. al.) filed
for reconstitution of the lost copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3269 registered in
the name of their deceased parents. TCT No. T-3269 was entered on March 21, 1956.

The RTC issued an Order, granting the petition for reconstitution filed by Aquino et.al.

Estate of Tomas B. Aguirre (Estate of Aguirre) filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of General
Default with Motion to Admit Attached Opposition claiming that the property subject of the
petition for reconstitution is covered by another existing title – TCT No. T-6874 which was
entered on March 21, 1963. The RTC denied the same. The Estate of Aguirre file a Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals annulled the RTC’s order to reconstitute the original copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-3269. The CA held that there are badges of fraud present in the case at
bar which are committed by Aquino et. al., which warrant the annulment of the RTC’s order,
such as: they never made the Estate of Aguirre a party to the reconstitution proceedings; and that
they never stated that there are other persons claiming rights over the property subject of their
reconstitution proceedings.

Issue/s:

Ruling:
Case Title: Food Fest Land, Inc and Joyfoods Corporation v. Romualdo Siapno
G.R No.: 226088
Promulgation date: February 27, 2019
Ponente: Justice Peralta
Nature of Action: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court
Summary of facts:
Respondents Romualdo C. Siapno, Teodoro C. Siapno and Felipe C. Siapno are the registered
owners of a parcel of land in Dagupan City. On April 14, 1997, respondents entered into a
Contract of Lease5 involving the subject land with petitioner Food Fest Land, Inc. (Food Fest), a
local corporation who wanted to use such land as the site of a fastfood restaurant. The contract of
lease also featured a non-waiver clause.
In October 1998, Food Fest assigned all its rights and obligations under the Contract of Lease
unto one Tuck:y Foods, Inc. (Tucky Foods).14 In September 2001, Tucky Foods assigned all the
said rights and obligations under such contract to petitioner Joyfoods Corporation (Joyfoods). At
the start of the eleventh year of the lease,23 however, respondents called the attention of Food
Fest and Joyfoods regarding its intent to enforce the rental escalation clause of the Contract of
Lease for the said year.
In reply, Food fest and Joyfoods sent to respondents a letter wherein they acknowledhe that the
applicable rate of rent following the Contract of lease would indeed be P133,867.89 per month,
but proposed that the same be reduced to only P80,000 per month. The proposal was rejected.
Respondents filed the present case for collection of sum of money. The lower courts granted.
Issue:
General:
Whether or not the Food Fest and Joyfoods’ position pegging the unpaid balance at P382,055.22
is tenable
Controlling:
Whether or not novation exists in the present case
Ruling:
1. No, the Food Fest and Joyfoods’ position pegging the unpaid balance at P382,055.22 is
untenable.
Such an assumption was already rebuffed by the RTC and the CA. Both courts did not
consider the first and second agreements as established facts, mainly because they found
 that the existence of such agreements is not supported by any credible evidence on
record.
2. No. Novation does not exist in the present case.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by its modification and replacement by a
subsequent one. It takes place when an obligation is modified in any of the following
ways: (a) by changing its object or principal conditions, (b) by substituting the person of
the debtor, or (c) by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In such
instances, the obligation ceases to exist as a new one — bearing the modifications agreed
upon — takes its place. Novation is, thus, a juridical act of dual function— for as it
extinguishes an obligation, it also creates a new one in lieu of the old.
The settled facts do not show that respondents had expressly consented in writing to the
substitution of Food Fest by Joyfoods. Furthermore, the consent of respondents to the
substitution of Food Fest, just the same, cannot be deduced or implied from any of the
established acts of the former.
Case title: Victoria Fajardo v. Belen Cua Malate
G.R. No.: 213666
Promulgation date: March 27, 2019
Ponente: Justice Caguioa
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Summary of Facts:

Petitioner and respondents entered into an agreement to partition the estate of their deceased
mother, Ceferina Toregosa Cua. However on the date of the signing of the written compromise
agreement, petitioner did not appear, while all her other siblings appeared.  It was subsequently
explained by petitioner Victoria's counsel that petitioner Victoria was not able to attend the
meeting as she did not have enough money to travel from Manila to Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
Respondent Belen and the other siblings proceeded to sign the Compromise Agreement and
submitted the same before the RTC for approval.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC erred in rendering its decision based on the compromise agreement
entered into by the parties during the mediation conferences before the PMC even if the
petitioner failed to sign the same

Ruling:

No, the RTC did not err in rendering its decision based on the compromise agreement.
The fact that petitioner Victoria failed to sign the written document bearing the terms of the
parties' agreement is of no moment. As explicitly held in Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, an
oral partition may be valid and binding upon the heirs; there is no law that requires partition
among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is
an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.

The Court further added that the partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some
of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property because it does not involve transfer of
property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
Hence, an oral partition is not covered by the Statute of Frauds.
Case title: Rogelio Logrosa v. Spouses Cleofe and Cesar Azares, et al.
G.R. No.: 217611
Promulgation date: March 27, 2019
Ponente: Justice Caguioa
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Summary of facts:
In his verified complaint for partition, petitioner Logrosa alleged that he, together with the
respondents are co-owners of eight (8) parcels of land in Tagum, Davao del Norte. The TCTs all
indicate that petitioner Logrosa together with the respondents are co-owners of the subject
properties.
Petitioner Logrosa likewise claimed that the aforementioned titles were issued to the parties
herein on May 19, 1987, hence the co-ownership over the aforementioned properties had already
existed for more than ten (10) years, without the parties having entered into any subsequent
agreement to keep the above-said properties undivided.
Respondents contended that while it may be true that petitioner Logrosa’s name appeared in the
titles of the properties aforementioned, however, they belied petitioner Logrosa’s claim that he is
a co-owner of the same, as he never contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for
their maintenance, much less paid the taxes due thereon.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is a co-owner of the subject properties

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner is a co-owner of the subject properties.
The Court notes that petitioner Logrosa does not rely merely on his own testimony to prove that
he is a co-owner of the subject properties. No one disputes the fact that there are eight certificates
of title, i.e., TCT No. T-52508, TCT No. T-52509, TCT No. T-52510, TCT No. T-52511, TCT
No. T-52512, TCT No. T-52513, TCT No. T-52514, and TCT No. T-52515, all of which clearly
and unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of the subject properties.
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of
indefeasibility has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of
the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application. In the instant
case, there is no accusation whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-owner in the
TCTs through means of fraud or bad faith.
Case Title: Rolando D. Cortez v. Luz G. Cortez
G.R. No.: 224638
Promulgation date: April 10, 2019
Ponente: Justice Peralta
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari

Summary of Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 5, 1990. On June 9, 2003, petitioner filed an
Amended petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of his and
respondent’s psychological incapacity. He alleged that respondent was introduced to him by the
former's brother and the latter's friend. In February 1990, he was invited to a birthday party of
respondent's cousin at the latter's house, and after consuming three bottles of beer, he became
dizzy and passed out. When he woke up, he was already in a room with respondent and was clad
only in his underwear and they were covered with a blanket. Petitioner averred that while he was
abroad, respondent gave birth to a son.
Respondent alleged that she and petitioner were introduced by a common friend in 1988; that
they began to have a deep relationship sharing each other's pains and secrets; that she intimated
to petitioner that she had been sexually abused before and bore a child; that they became
sweethearts and he would sleep over at her apartment. When she got pregnant, they decided to
get married on March 5, 1990 before a Municipal Trial Court Judge of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
When petitioner left for overseas work, they stayed in touch; that he is a responsible husband
who saw to it that his wife be named as his allottee. On September 14, 1990, their son was born
and petitioner came home for his baptism. She declared that she was five months pregnant when
petitioner left again for abroad on October 16 1991 and that the child was baptized upon
petitioner's return in October 1992. She claimed that their marital woes started in 1994 when
petitioner told her that his new year's wish was to be with another woman, Susan Barry; that they
began to have fights and petitioner left their apartment in 1995. She filed a complaint for
abandonment and demanded support for their children. She learned that petitioner and Susan
Barry are now living together.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform marital obligations

Ruling:
No, petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated.
We find that the report failed to show how petitioner's personality traits incapacitated him from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. On the contrary, the report established that
because petitioner was forced to marry respondent without love, he had no intention to do his full
obligations as a husband. Mere "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Petitioner's claim of lack of realization that he has marital obligation to perform as husband to
respondent is not a consideration under Article 36 of the Family Code as what the law requires is
a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital
obligations.
Respondent was shown to be a caring wife and a loving mother to her children. The findings and
conclusions made by Dr. Soriano that respondent did not have the mind, will and heart to
perform the obligations of marriage as she did not show concern for petitioner and was just
contented to get money from the latter cannot be given credence. There was no other basis for
Dr. Soriano to arrive at such finding other than the information supplied by petitioner. To make
conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information
fed by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness
of the content of such evidence.
Case Title: Angelita Simundac Keppel v. Georg Keppel
G.R. No.: 202039
Promulgation Date: August 14, 2019
Ponente: C.J. Bersamin
Nature of Action:

Summary of facts:
Angelita Simundac Keppel worked in Germany as a nurse. She came to know one Reynaldo
Macaraig, another Filipino who became a naturalized German citizen. They fell in love and got
married in Germany. After a few years of marriage, Angelita became attracted to another
German nurse and co-employee, Georg Keppel. They developed an intimate affair. Angelita
obtained a divorce decree in Germany in her marriage to Reynaldo. Angelita and Georg
thereafter got married in Germany. In 1991, they entered into an agreement for the complete
separation of their properties. Georg resigned from his job and was diagnosed with early multiple
sclerosis and could not work. Angelita stopped giving Georg money in 1994 when she
discovered that Georg was having extramarital affiars. She filed the instant petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground of Georg’s alleged psychological incapacity.

Issue:
General:
Whether or not it is correct for the petitioner to invoke Article 36 of the Family Code

Controlling:
Whether or not Georg was suffering from psychological incapacity rendering him incapable of
fulfilling his essential marital obligations

Ruling:
1. No. It is not correct for the petitioner to invoke Art 36 of the Family code.
Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction, and pursuant to
which laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad, it was the pertinent German law that governed. In short, Philippine law finds no
application herein as far as the family rights and obligations of the parties who are
foreign nationals are concerned.
2. No, neither the petitioner nor George was suffering from psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not
merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will. The disorder consists of: a. a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; b.  the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the
procreation and education of offspring; and c. the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality.
Here, however, the petitioner presented no evidence to show that the anti-social behavior
manifested by both parties had been grave, and had existed at the time of the celebration
of the marriage as to render the parties incapable of performing all the essential marital
obligations provided by law. As the records bear out, the medical experts merely
concluded that the behavior was grave enough as to incapacitate the parties from the
performance of their essential marital relationship because the parties exhibited
symptoms of an anti-social personality disorder. Also, the incapacity was not established
to have existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In short, the conclusion
about the parties being psychologically incapacitated was not founded on sufficient
evidence.
Case title: Miller v. Miller
G.R. No.: 200344
Promulgation date: August 28, 2019
Ponente: Justice Leonen
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari

Summary of Facts:
After the death of one John Miller, Joan Miller, through her mother Lennie Espenida, filed
before the RTC a petition for Partition and Accounting of John’s estate. Alleging that she is
John’s illegitimate child with Lennie, Joan presented her Certificate of Live Birth which showed
John to be her registered father.
Glenn filed a separate petition praying that Joan's Certificate of Live Birth be canceled. With it,
he also prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Gubat, Sorsogon be directed to replace Joan's
surname, Miller, with Espenida, and that Joan use Espenida instead of Miller in all official
documents. He claimed that John did not acknowledge Joan as a natural child, pointing out that
John’s signature was not in her birth certificate. It was also not shown that John knew and
consented that his name would be indicated in the certificate.

Issue:
Whether or not petition for Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy in impugning the legitimacy of a child

Ruling:
No, Rule 108 is not the proper remedy in impugning the legitimacy of a child.
The summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under article 412 of the
Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to "innocuous or clerical errors, such
as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" or
corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence.

Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her birth certificate
registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use her mother's surname,
Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an acknowledged illegitimate child of
John.

What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a
single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent's
filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from Miller to Espenida will also
change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her successional rights as well.
Certainly, this change is substantial.

Legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack. Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is
governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Case title: Heirs of Satramdas Sadhwani et. Al. v. Gop Sadhwani et. Al.
G.R. No.: 217365
Promulgation date: August 14, 2019
Ponente: Justice Caguioa
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45

Summary of Facts:
Spouses Satramdas and Kishnibai Sadhwani, both Indian Nationals, owned a parcel of land
located in Makati and a condominium unit also located in Makati. Upon their death, the titles
thereof were allegedly placed in the name of their son, herein respondent Gop S. Sadhwani, in
trust for his parents and siblings.
On November 2013, other legitimate children of the Sps. Sadhwani filed the present petition for
reconveyance, Partition, Accounting, against their brother Gop, his wife, Union Bank and PSB
praying that they likewise be declared lawful owners of the subject properties as heirs and
legitimate children of Sps. Sadhwani, in accordance with a purported express trust agreement
and the provisions of the Civil Code on succession.

Issue:
Whether or not the present complaint states a cause of action

Ruling:
No, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private
lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent
the provision by trying to own lands through another. 
In sum, aliens are absolutely prohibited from acquiring public or private lands in the Philippines,
save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. In Ang v. So.,the Court further stated that
"[t]he prohibition against aliens owning lands in the Philippines is subject only to limited
constitutional exceptions, and not even an implied trust can be permitted on equity
considerations.
After a judicious examination of the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that petitioners
failed to sufficiently allege the basis for their purported right over the subject properties. Since
the Sps. Sadhwani were prohibited from owning land in the instant case, they were likewise
prohibited from transmitting any right over the same through succession.
Case title: The Republic of the Philippines v. Arthur Tan Manda
G.R. No.: 200102
Promulgation date: September 18, 2019
Ponente: Justice J. Reyes, Jr.
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari

Summary of facts:
Respondent alleged that he was born to spouses Siok Ting Tan Manda and Chin Go Chua Tan.
His birth certificate reflects his father’s and mother’s citizenship as Chinese implying that he is
also a Chinese citizen. Respondent averred that the foregoing entries were erroneous because his
father Siok Ting Tan Manda is a Filipino citizen by birth and his mother Chin Go Chua Tan is
also a Filipino citizen by marriage. He filed the present special proceedings case Petition for
correction of Entry in the Birth Certificate.
Petitioner argues that the changes sought to be effected with respect to the citizenship of
respondent's parents as appearing in his record of birth are substantial because these may have an
effect on the citizenship of his parents and siblings, thus, an adversarial proceeding should be
had where all interested parties are impleaded, or at least notified, and allowed to be heard before
the intended changes are effected.

Issue:
Whether or not the the contention of the petitioner is correct

Ruling:
Yes, petitioner is correct.
Indeed, it is true that in some cases, failure to implead and notify the affected or interested
parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing. In those cases, however, earnest
efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; the interested
parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out.
Consequently, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule
108 of the Rules is mandated. "If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed
through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief
would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching."
Case title: Republic of the Philippines v. Remar Quinonez
G.R. No.: 237412
Promulgation date: January 6, 2020
Ponente: Justice Caguioa
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Summary of facts:
Petitioner Remar Quinonez and Lovelyn were married and stayed at the house of the latter’s
parents. Tosupport his family, Remar started working as a security guard at the NFA warehouse
in October 1997 and later on transferred to Cebu City. In 2001, Lovelyn asked her husband’s
permission to go on a 2 month vacation inManila. During the first three months, Lovelyn
constantly communicated with Remar through cell phone. The calls became fewer and fewer
until there is none. Ten years after, petitioner filed the present case for declaration of
presumptive death of his wife.

Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient legal basis to uphold the declaration of Lovelyn’s presumptive
death

Ruling:
No, there is not sufficient legal basis to uphold the declaration of Lovelyn’s presumptive death.
Culled from this provision, the essential requisites for a declaration of presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage are:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
The Petition is anchored on Remar’s alleged failure to prove compliance with the third requisite.
Unfortunately, Remar failed to allege, much less prove, the extent of the search he had conducted
in the places where he claims to have gone. This leaves the Court with no way to ascertain the
extent of Remar’s search.
The allegations in Remar’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death[37] suggest that he is
aware of the true cause of Lovelyn ‘s disappearance, thus:

In the first three (3) months that his wife was in Manila[,] [there] was x x x constant
communication through cellphone calls and [texts]. [Remar] relayed to [Lovelyn] that he is x x x
working in Surigao City as a security guard in the Hall of Justice. x x x
Then the calls and [texts] got fewer and fewer until [they] stopped. He thought that the cell
phone of his wife was just lost so he started inquiries from his and her relatives in [Bislig] City.
One confess[ed] that his wife is now [cohabiting] with another man and will not be going home
because of shame. He could not believe and refuse[d) to believe the devastating news.
Case title: Generoso Sepe v. Heirs of Anastaia Kilang
G.R. No.: 199766
Promulgation date: April 10, 2019
Ponente: Justice Caguioa
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Summary of facts:
The deceased Anastacia before she died, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of
the petitioner. The present petition was filed by the heirs of the deceased claiming that the late
Anastacia was then 84 years old, illiterate, rheumatic and bedridden and that there was no
consideration given; taking advantage of the ignorance of respondents’ family, petitioner
managed to have the DOS executed and misled Faliciana and Donata believing that the
document was the instrument of subdivision.

Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale between Anastacia and Sepe is valid

Ruling:
Yes, the contract between Anastacia and Sepe is valid.
Article 1354 of the Civil Code provides: "Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is
presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary." Otherwise stated, the
law presumes that even if the contract does not state a cause, one exists and is lawful; and it is
incumbent on the party impugning the contract to prove the contrary.61 If the cause is stated in
the contract and it is shown to be false, then it is incumbent upon the party enforcing the contract
to prove the legality of the cause.
Furthermore, According to Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules, documents acknowledged before a
notary public, except last wills and testaments, and public records, kept in the Philippines, of
private documents required by law to be entered therein, are public documents. The certificate of
acknowledgment in a notarial document is prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
Given the foregoing, the Court is not persuaded by the CA's postulation that the oral refutation
by respondents Feliciana and Maria of the consideration stated in the DOS has reached the
threshold of the required quantum of proof of clear and convincing evidence. Their mere oral
declaration that no consideration was paid to their mother Anastacia is simply not enough given
the presence of the following notarized and public documents in petitioner's favor.
Case title: Mary Christine Go Yu v. Romeo Yu
G.R. No.: 230443
Promulgation date: April 3, 2019
Ponente: Justice Peralta
Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

Summary of facts:
Petitioner filed the present petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of
the Absolute Community of Property against herein respondent, alleging that they got married on
June 11, 1999, after their wedding, the parties’ sexual activity decreased considerably; petitioner
was unable to conceive and even tried to convince respondent that she undergo in vitro
fertilization but the latter refused, as a result, the parties grew apart as a married couple leading
them to live separate lives even though they stay under the same roof. Petitioner was eventually
diagnosed with Narcisssistic Personality Disorder which was found to exist before the parties’
marriage.
Respondent denied the material allegations of petitioner’s Petition and contended that he offers
his love and affection for petitioner and he desires for them to reconcile and save their marriage
in spirit of love, forgiveness and Christian values on marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the facts of the present case constitutes psychological incapacity as construed
under the law

Ruling:
No, psychological incapacity does not appear in the present case.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a. Gravity, it must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, b.
Juridical antecedence, it must be rroted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and c. Incurability, it must
be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure must be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Indeed, contrary to petitioner's claim that she is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
ordinary duties and responsibilities of a married woman, the Court agrees with the observation of
the OSG, as well as the respondent, that petitioner's documentary and testimonial pieces of
evidence prove otherwise — that she is, in fact, fully aware of and has performed the essential
obligations of a married individual. The following instances prove such capacity: first, petitioner
expressed concern over the decrease in their sexual activity after their wedding, that she also has
needs and that, unlike her and respondent, it is normal for married couples to have a healthy
sexual relationship; second, she wanted to have a baby with respondent because she believes and
understands that one of the purposes of marriage is procreation and she also thought that having a
baby could somehow save their marriage; third, she made adjustments and sacrifices by giving
up luxuries she had gotten used to when her husband's financial resources started to dwindle;
and fourth, she helped her husband manage their finances and run their household.
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. This Court has repeatedly stressed
that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. Resultantly, it has always been held that mere irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.
Case Title: In Re: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce between Minuro Takahashi
and Juliet Rendora Morana v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No.: 227605
Promulgation date: December 5, 2019
Ponente: Justice Lazaro-Javier
Nature of Action: Petition for Review of certiorari

Summary of facts:
Petitioner and Minoru Takahashi got married in San Juan, Metro Manila on June 24, 2002. 10
years later, the couple got estranged. Petitioner alleged that her husband failed to perform his
marital obligations to her. He refused to give support to their 2 children and worse, stated
cohabiting with another woman. Her husband suggested that they secure a divorce so the
Japanese government would give financial assistance to their children and send them to school.
Believing it was good for the children, petitioner agreed to divorce her husband. They jointly
applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama, Japan.

Petitioner, on October 2, 2012, filed with the RTC Manila an action for recognition of the
divorce report. The petition was denied for failure to present in evidence the Divorce Decree
itself.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce report may be recognized before the Philippine court

Ruling:
Yes, it may be recognized before the Philippine courts.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the law confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the
idea is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or her national law.
A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized in the Philippines although it was the Filipino
spouse who obtained the same. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
Records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan issued to petitioner and
her husband when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce judgment" to speak of
because the divorce proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but through the Office
of the Mayor of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since the Divorce
Report was issued by the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of
an official body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly the
equivalent of the "Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce
obtained by petitioner and her former husband.
Case Title: Simon Paterno v. Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno
G.R. No.: 213687
Date Promulgated: January 8, 2020
Ponente: J. Reyes, J. Jr.
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari

Summary of facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on December 27, 1987. After living together for about a
decade, the petitioner left the family abode in June 1988. On June 9, 2000, petitioner filed a
petition before the RTC seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage to the respondent on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The petition was granted by Branch 144 of
RTC Makati. However, the proceedings for the liquidation, partition, distribution of the common
properties and the delivery of their children’s presumptive legitimes remain pending before
Branch 144. The list of properties to be partitioned includes the properties in Ayala Alabang and
in Rockwell, Makati. Petitioner objected. He contended that while the Ayala Alabang and
Rockwell properties were purchased during the parties’ union, the mortgage payments for these
properties have been made after they separated in fact solely from his exclusive funds.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Rules on co-ownership as per Art. 147 of the Family Code shall apply in the
present case
Whether or not the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties shall be considered as exclusive
property of the petitioner and therefore should not be included in the computation of properties
to be partitioned

Ruling:
1. Yes, the rules on co-ownership shall apply in the present case.
There is no quarrel that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent had long been
declared an absolute nullity by reason of their psychological incapacity to perform their
marital obligations to each other. The property relations of parties to a void marriage is
governed either by Article 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Since the petitioner and the
respondent suffer no legal impediment and exclusively lived with each other under a void
marriage, their property relation is one of co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.
2. Yes, the properties shall be included in the computation of properties to be partitioned.
It must be borne in mind, however, that the presumption that the properties are co-owned
and thus must be shared equally is not conclusive but merely disputable. The petitioner
may rebut the presumption by presenting proof that the properties, although acquired
during the period of their cohabitation, were not obtained through their joint efforts, work
and industry. In such a case, the properties shall belong solely to the petitioner. If the
respondent is able to present proof that she contributed through her salary, income, work
or industry in the acquisition of the properties, the parties' share shall be in proportion to
their contributions. In the event that the respondent had not been able to contribute
through her salary, income, work or industry, but was able to show that she cared for and
maintained the family and the household, her efforts shall be deemed the equivalent of
the contributions made by the petitioner. However, equal sharing of the entire properties
is not possible in this scenario since the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were
still being amortized when the parties' separated. As such, respondent's equal share shall
only pertain to the paid portion before their separation, for in this peculiar kind of co-
ownership, and in keeping with the pronouncement in G.R. No. 180226, the partnership
is considered terminated upon the parties' separation or desistance to continue said
relations. Hence, from the moment of separation, there is no more family or household to
speak of that the respondent could have cared for or maintained. If the allegation of the
respondent that the payments for the amortizations of these properties were taken from
their common funds, then the respondent would have an equal share in such portions
because the payments made therefor were actually taken from the co-ownership.
Case Title: Cynthia Galapon v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No.: 243722
Date Promulgated: January 22, 2020
Ponente: J. Caguioa
Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari

Summary of facts:
Petitioner Cynthia Galapon and Noh Shik Park, a Korean national were married in Manila,
Philippines on February 27, 2012. Unfortunately, their relationship turned sour and ended with a
divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed on July 16, 2012
by the Cheongju Local Court, Cynthia filed before the RTC a paetition for the Judicial
Recognition of a Foreign Divorce. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that
the divorce decree in question cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as Cynthia is
concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement. According thereto, from pertinent law and
jurisprudence, the foreign divorce contemplated under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code must have been initiated and obtained by the foreign spouse. Thus, the Supreme
Court had made it also clear that in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would
come within the pale of the country’s policy against absolute divorce.

Issue:
Whether or not the present petition where divorce is obtained through mutual agreement may be
recognized in this jurisdiction

Ruling:
Yes. A divorce obtained through mutual agreement may be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Art 26 applies to mixed marraiges where the divorce
decree is obtained by the foreign spouse, obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse and
obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under the
law of South Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance
of said divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park was not put in issue.
In fact, the CA considered said evidence sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the
divorce in question.