Arrianne A.

Obias Civil Law Review 1

MLC – 4th Year Student Assignment: Case Digest No. 1

Doctrine: Effects and application of Laws

“The law in force in the location of property governs the real or

personal property involved. It is a universal principle that real or
immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or
state where it is located following the doctrine of Lex Loci Rei Sitae.”

1. Case Title: Orion Savings Bank Vs. Suzuki; GR No. 205487; (J. Brion)
(November 12, 2014)

FACTS:

The petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion) filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) sustaining the decision of the RTC insofar as Suzuki’s right over the
properties. Orion said that the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki for the
sale of a condominium unit and a parking slot located at City Land Mandaluyong City is
null and void being against the Korean Law, which requires that any conveyance of a
conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses. According to Orion,
CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Deed of Sale is null and void for failure to follow Korean Law
which requires spousal consent before the transfer of a real property.

HELD:

The Deed of sale is valid. Korean Law should not be applied in this case. It is a
universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of
the country or state where it is located following the principle of lex loci rei sitae.

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally
by the national law of the spouses.

Accordingly, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall
be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to conjugal nature of the property
shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In this case, Orion, failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification does not
qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing
that it was properly authenticated.

Therefore, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or

processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even
if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine
Law.

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung"
is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his
name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to declare as
invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
Doctrine: Effects and application of Laws

“Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its

purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.”

2. Case Title: NMSMI vs. DND, GR No. 187587; (C.J. Sereno) (June 5, 2013)

FACTS:

By virtue of Proclamation No. 423, Former President Carlos P. Garcia reserved

parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of Rizal and
Pasay City for military reservation. Later, Former President Marcos issued a
proclamation amending Proclamation No. 423, which excludes certain area of the
reserved land. Again, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 that further
amended the proclamation that excluded the barangays of Lower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village and a handwritten addendum which includes Western
Bicutan for the disposition of the area. The proclamation was published in the Official
Gazette without the handwritten addendum. Demolition of illegal structures existed to
prevent the area from the increasing number of informal settlers. Members of petitioner
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot
Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with Commission on Settlement
of Land Problems (COSLAP) praying for the reclassification of the areas they are
occupying as is already alienable and disposable.  COSLAP ruled that the said
handwritten addendum of President Marcos is valid because it was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President
could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and
effect of law though it was not included in the publication.

HELD:

No, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos did not have the force and
effect of law since it was not included in the publication. The Supreme court held that
the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.”
 Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided.

In this case, though Proclamation No. 2476 was published in an Official Gazette,
the handwritten addendum of President Marcos declaring the Western Bicutan as
alienable and disposable was not included, hence, it never had any legal force and effect.

The petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Doctrine: Effects and application of Laws

“Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be

obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject
to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations
under the Territoriality Principle.”

3. Case Title: Norma A. Del Socorro vs. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
GR No. 193707; (J. Peralta) December 10, 2014

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland.
They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their
marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to
Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since
the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again in the Philippines
particularly in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien.

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto

reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 195 of
the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262
which equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality.
The RTC-Cebu issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. Whether a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.

HELD:
 1. YES, a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law. While it is true that respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not
obliged to support Norma’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws
on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national
law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their
child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if
the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. YES, foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find

strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation
to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that
“Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law
and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing
acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in
the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As
such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.

The Supreme Court granted the petition and the Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Cebu are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
Doctrine: Effects and application of Laws

“There is no conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is

expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal
systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be
governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of the contract." This is
the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or
the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci
intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such factors as
substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or
domicile of the parties.”

4. Case Title: Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Rebesencion, et. al., G.R. No.
198587 (J. Leonen) (January 14, 2015)

FACTS:

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established

and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with an office in the
Philippines located in Makati City.

Respondents were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants

with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration and later became permanent fight attendants after complying with all
the requirements and entered into a Cabin Attendant Contracts with Saudia.
Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from
service on various dates. Respondents contended that the termination of their
employment was illegal as the termination was made solely because they were pregnant.
Respondents filed a complaint against Saudi for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter (LA). Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter claiming that the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens. LA dismissed
the respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction/merit but on appeal,
the NLRC reversed the decision of LA, hence an appeal was filed before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission may
exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines and apply Philippine law in resolving
the herein dispute.

HELD:
 Yes, the Labor Arbiter and NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. Saudia asserts
that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws
of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into
operation the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for
Philippine tribunals to refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens must
not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal, but it must also be pleaded as such
at the earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.

Further, forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to
divest Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law.
Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the
Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.

As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment

of flight attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy
is an occurrence that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s policy excludes from and
restricts employment on the basis of no other consideration but sex.

The court do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical
limitations that may render difficult the performance of functions associated with being
a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a
disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail the termination of one’s
employment. It is clear that any individual, regardless of gender, may be subject to
exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, they fail to appreciate how
pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but
the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living. Oddly
enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the
termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves.

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable
Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact, in this
case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabian Airlines was held liable for moral and exemplary damages. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner
Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents.

This case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of

the amounts due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay
without delay.
Doctrine: Effects and application of Laws

“A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our

jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal
law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence,
like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.”

5. Case Title: Grace J. Garcia-Recio vs. Rederick A. Garcia, GR No. 138322;

(J. Panganiban) October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989,  an Australian family court issued a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a

"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner –
a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual
Help Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as "single" and "Filipino."

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that
she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November 1997.

The Regional Trial Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and
both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by respondent in foreign country can
automatically capacitated him to contract a subsequent marriage.

HELD:
 No, the divorce decree obtained by respondent in foreign country cannot
automatically capacitated him to contract a subsequent marriage.

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce, hence, our courts cannot
grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,

provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,

we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner, and failing in that, of
declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
costs.
Doctrine: Effects and Application of Laws

“The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is

declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a
total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed.”

6. Case Title: Millarosa vs. Carmel Development Inc., G.R. No. 194538 (C.J.
Sereno) (November 27, 2013)

FACTS:

Mirralosa, et.al filed Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of

the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court
RTC, Caloocan City. The RTC had reversed the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
MeTC), ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property in this case for ejectment.

Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan

property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City.

The lot that petitioner presently occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by
the titles above-mentioned.

 On September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.

293 (P.D. 293), which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them open for
disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI).

Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI,

then occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there.

 On January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason and Remedio

V. Tuason, Attorney-in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan City,
Ministry of Justice and the National Treasurer14 (Tuason), which declared P.D. 293 as
unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts.

 Sometime in 1995, petitioner took over Lot No. 32 by virtue of an Affidavit

executed by Pelagio M. Juan.

 On 14 January 2003, respondent filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer before

the MeTC.

METC ruled in favour of the respondent; RTC reversed the decision of MeTC, and
in CA, the decision was in favour of the respondent.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can validly invoke the defense of builders in good
faith under the doctrine of operative fact.

HELD:

No, petitioner is not builder in good faith for want of knowledge of any infirmity
in the promulgation of P.D. 293. He said that being a builder in good faith, he is entitled
to the reimbursement of his useful expenses and that he has a right to retain possession
of the premises, pending reimbursement of the value of his improvements to be proven
during trial, in accordance with Article 545 of the Civil Code.

Upon perusal of the records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder in good
faith. A builder in good faith is "one who builds with the belief that the land he is
building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is
ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title." Since petitioner only started occupying the
property sometime in 1995 (when his predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in
his favor), or about seven years after the Supreme Court promulgated the case of
Tuason, he should have been aware of the binding effect of that ruling. Since all judicial
decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence should be "on one hand, x x x
matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia legis non excusat."He thus
loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity, in accordance
with Article 449 of the Civil Code.

The petitioner CANNOT also invoke the doctrine of operative fact.

The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an

exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. The
doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law, but it can never be invoked to
validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act.

In this case, petitioner could not be said to have been unduly burdened by
reliance on an invalid law. Petitioner merely anchored his right over the property to an
Affidavit allegedly issued by Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHIA, authorizing
petitioner to occupy the same. However, this Affidavit was executed only sometime in
1995, or approximately seven years after the Tuason case was promulgated. 

At the time petitioner built the structures on the premises, he ought to have been
aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case and the subsequent unconstitutionality
of P.D. 293. These circumstances necessarily remove him from the ambit of the
operative fact doctrine.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105190
are AFFIRMED.

Doctrine: Effects and Application of Laws

“In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their

constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that
the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment.”

7. Case Title: Acaac vs. Azcuna, G.R. No. 187378 (J. Perlas-Bernabe)
(September 30, 2013)

FACTS:

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a

non-governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is
engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects
within Misamis Occidental.  In line with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made
of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as
a seminar cottage in 2001 which it rented out to the public and became the source of
livelihood of its beneficiaries, among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo
Bulawin.

In 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and

Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction
against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of
its buildings in violation of National Building Code of the Philippines. Respondent
ordered the stoppage of all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL
failed to comply with the requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and
Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8,
2002, but still the same remained unheeded.

In 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) in Misamis Occidental

adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002 (subject ordinance) which
prohibited the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the
sanctuaries and the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the
premises, except if authorized by the local government. 

On the same year, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was
submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn,
conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the
designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government
property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.
 A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove
the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of
the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served against individual petitioners on
October 25, 2002.

PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the grounds that it was
adopted without public consultation and it was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No.7160, otherwise known as
The Local Government Code of 1991 and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its
implementation should be enjoined.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject ordinance was validly enacted.

HELD:

Yes, the subject ordinance was validly enacted.

The Local Government Code (LGC) provides that, if no action has been taken by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) within 30 days after submission of such ordinance,
the same shall be presumed consistent with the law and therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain the subject ordinance cannot be deemed

approved through the mere passage of time. It, however, bears to note that more than
30 days have already elapsed from the time the subject ordinance was submitted to the
SP for review. Hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to the LGC.

While LGC required the main features of an ordinance duly enacted or adopted
be published in a newspaper of general circulation, petitioners failed to present evidence
to show no publication of the subject ordinance was made.

In accordance with presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, the

constitutionality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment.

Likewise, petitioners had burden of proving their own allegation, which they,
however failed to do.
Doctrine: Effects and Application of Laws

“To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable

—to the present or future enjoyment of property. One may not be
deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.”

8. Case Title: Quiao vs. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556 (J. Reyes) (July 4, 2012)

FACTS:

Petitioner Brigido B. Quiao and respondent Rita C. Quiao were gotmarried on

January 6, 1977 or during the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines and were
blessed with four children. Their property relation was governed by the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains under the said law. On October 26, 2000, respondent filed
a complaint for legal separation with the trial court herein petitioner. The trial court
granted the decree of legal separation and was declared petitioner as the guilty spouse.
Hence his net conjugal shares were forfeited in favor of the common children. Petitioner
contended that since their property relations is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, he acquired vested rights over half of the
properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil
Code. Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the conjugal
partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after the
promulgation of the Family Code and he insisted that no provision under the Family
Code may deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code
which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a
person's vested right.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the family code of the Philippines be given retroactive effect for
purposes of determining the net profits subject of forfeiture as a result of the decree of
legal separation without impairing vested rights already acquired under the civil code.

HELD:

Yes, the Family Code can be applied retroactively in the case at bar.
 Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties'
property relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains.

From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the
marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the
operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not
agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. Article
119 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements

agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property
relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And
under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry." The
husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of
gains. rνll

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant
case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2)
of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of
the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law."

As to the petitioner's claim of vested right, we define and explained "vested right"
in the following manner:

To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable—to the present

or future enjoyment of property.

The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of

due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable
title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable.64 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his "vested
right," he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in
law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he
was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties.
 
Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the
petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed
as "net profits," pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested
right" is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of
the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the
forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits. The said
provision says:

Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the
conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of both, and the
children of the guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal
partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from the
wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this
forfeiture shall not apply.

In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the net
profits.

From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the conjugal
partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a legal separation case.
Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the chance to present his evidence,
the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the
trial court found him the guilty party.

Furthermore, prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of

each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes
neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that
there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The
interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder resulting from the liquidation of
the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife
to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which
can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.69 (Citations omitted)

From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies to the
present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains and since the trial court's Decision has
attained finality and immutability.

Doctrine: Effects and Application of Laws

“Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the

nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval and cannot be enforceable against the assets
of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.”

9. Case Title: Soledad Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, G.R. No. 171914
(J. Bersamin) (July 23, 2014)

FACTS:

Atty. Juan Luces Luna married to Eugenia Zaballero-Luna in a civil wedding in

MeTC of Paranaque City. They begot seven (7) children. They eventually agreed to live
apart from each other and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered
into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT", whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership of property, which was submitted by Atty. Luna before the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. A divorce decree of his
marriage with Eugenia was granted and at the very same day, he also contracted a
subsequent marriage with the petitioner (Soledad). Thereafter, they returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna abroad is valid.

HELD:

1. No, the divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna abroad is void in the under the
Philippine law.
 The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and
Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until
the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been
the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.

Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.

Extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of

either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as this public
policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.

With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for
being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement
was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their
marriage.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of
the Civil Code
Doctrine: Effects and Application of Laws

“In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive

phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments.

10. Case Title: Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, G.R. No. 138322 (J. Panagniban)
(October 2, 2001)

FACTS:

Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm entered into an Independent Contractor

Agreement (ICA) in Japan with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national
permanently residing in the Philippines. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as
the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the
Philippines.

On 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its

International Division, informed respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up
to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for
the ICA’s expiry.

Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer,

requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI
project.

Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract was for a fixed term. As he was not
able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent consequently
initiated an action for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial
Court. Petitioners contended that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by
and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.

They asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent’s ICA
could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles
of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. 

The RTC, denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners on certiorari invoked the
defense of forum non conveniens. On petition for review before this Court, petitioners
dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and
introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most
significant relationship rule.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases
for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country
by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus, the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non
conveniens.

HELD:

Yes, RTC Lipa City has jurisdiction over the complaint for specific performance
filed by respondent against petitioners involving contracts executed outside the country
by foreign nationals.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the

sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law
and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.59 To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, 60 the movant must show that the court
or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power
to adjudicate the claims.61

In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the
trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy
for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.
What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most
significant relationship rule."

The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

 Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" or the law
of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to be
performed." It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may
pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly. Under the "state of the most significant relationship rule,"
to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state
has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case
involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates
them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be
resolved.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive
the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to
dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground.
Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said
doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction.
Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more carefully considered a matter of
defense.

Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear
the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that
jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED.