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Libertarianism in Ancient China

LEE EST O EN ESPAÑO L

TAGS Free Markets, World History, Entrepreneurship, Political Theory

12/23/2009 • Murray N. Rothbard

[This article is excerpted f rom Economic Thought Before Adam Smith. An MP3 audio le of this article, read by Jeff
Riggenbach, is available f or download.]

 
The three main schools of political thought: the Legalists, the Taoists, and the Conf ucians, were established f rom
the sixth to the f ourth centuries BC. Roughly, the Legalists, the latest of the three broad schools, simply believed
in maximal power to the state, and advised rulers how to increase that power. The Taoists were the world's rst
libertarians, who believed in virtually no interf erence by the state in economy or society, and the Conf ucians were
middle-of -the-roaders on this critical issue. The towering gure of Conf ucius (551–479 BC), whose name was
27 Ch'iu Chung-ni, was an erudite man f rom an impoverished but aristocratic f amily of the f allen Yin dynasty,
actually
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 who became Grand Marshal of the state of Sung. In practice, though f ar more idealistic, Conf ucian thought
differed little f rom the Legalists, since Conf ucianism was largely dedicated to installing an educated philosophically
minded bureaucracy to rule in China.

By f ar the most interesting of the Chinese political philosophers were the Taoists, f ounded by the immensely
important but shadowy gure of Lao Tz u. Little is known about Lao Tz u's lif e, but he was apparently a
contemporary and personal acquaintance of Conf ucius. Like the latter he came originally f rom the state of Sung
and was a descendant of lower aristocracy of the Yin dynasty. Both men lived in a time of turmoil, wars and
statism, but each reacted very differently. For Lao Tz u worked out the view that the individual and his happiness
was the key unit of society. If social institutions hampered the individual's owering and his happiness, then those
institutions should be reduced or abolished altogether. To the individualist Lao Tz u, government, with its "laws and
regulations more numerous than the hairs of an ox," was a vicious oppressor of the individual, and "more to be
f eared than erce tigers." Government, in sum, must be limited to the smallest possible minimum; "inaction"
became the watchword f or Lao Tz u, since only inaction of government can permit the individual to ourish and
achieve happiness. Any intervention by government, he declared, would be counterproductive, and would lead to
conf usion and turmoil. The rst political economist to discern the systemic effects of government intervention,
Lao Tz u, af ter ref erring to the common experience of mankind, came to his penetrating conclusion: "The more
arti cial taboos and restrictions there are in the world, the more the people are impoverished — The more that
laws and regulations are given prominence, the more thieves and robbers there will be."

The worst of government interventions, according to Lao Tz u, was heavy taxation and war. "The people hunger
because thef t superiors consume an excess in taxation" and, "where armies have been stationed, thorns and
brambles grow. Af ter a great war, harsh years of f amine are sure to f ollow."

The wisest course is to keep the government simple and inactive, f or then the world "stabiliz es itself ."

As Lao Tz u put it: "Theref ore, the Sage says: I take no action yet the people transf orm themselves, I f avor
quiescence and the people right themselves, I take no action and the people enrich themselves—"

Deeply pessimistic, and seeing no hope f or a mass movement to correct oppressive government, Lao Tz u
counseled the now f amiliar Taoist path of withdrawal, retreat, and limitation of one's desires.

Two centuries later, Lao Tz u's great f ollower Chuang Tz u (369–c.286 BC) built on the master's ideas of laissez-faire
to push them to their logical conclusion: individualist anarchism. The in uential Chuang Tz u, a great stylist who
wrote in allegorical parables, was theref ore the rst anarchist in the history of human thought. The highly learned
Chuang Tz u was a native of the state of Meng (now probably in Honan province), and also descended f rom the old
aristocracy. A minor official in his native state, Chuang Tz u's f ame spread f ar and wide throughout China, so much
so that King Wei of the Ch'u kingdom sent an emissary to Chuang Tz u bearing great gif ts and urging him to
become the king's chief minister of state. Chuang Tz u's scornf ul rejection of the king's offer is one of the great
declarations in history on the evils underlying the trappings of state power and the contrasting virtues of the
private lif e:

A thousand ounces of gold is indeed a great reward, and the office of chief minister
is truly an elevated position. But have you, sir, not seen the sacri cial ox awaiting the
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 sacri ces at the royal shrine of state? It is well cared for and fed for a few years,
caparisoned with rich brocades, so that it will be ready to be led into the Great
Temple. At that moment, even though it would gladly change places with any
solitary pig, can it do so? So, quick and be off with you! Don't sully me. I would rather
roam and idle about in a muddy ditch, at my awn amusement, than to be put under
the restraints that the ruler would impose. I will never take any official service, and
thereby I will [be free] to satisfy my own purposes.

Chuang Tz u reiterated and embellished Lao Tz u's devotion to laissez-faire and opposition to state rule: "There has
been such a thing as letting mankind alone; there has never been such a thing as governing mankind [with success]."
Chuang Tz u was also the rst to work out the idea of "spontaneous order," independently discovered by Proudhon
in the nineteenth century, and developed by F.A. von Hayek of the Austrian School in the twentieth. Thus, Chuang
Tz u: "Good order results spontaneously when things are let alone."

But while people in their "natural f reedom" can run their lives very well by themselves, government rules and
edicts distort that nature into an arti cial Procrustean bed. As Chuang Tz u wrote, "The common people have a
constant nature; they spin and are clothed, till and are f ed — it is what may be called their 'natural f reedom.'" These
people of natural f reedom were born and died themselves, suffered f rom no restrictions or restraints, and were
neither quarrelsome nor disorderly. If rulers were to establish rites and laws to govern the people, "it would indeed
be no different f rom stretching the short legs of the duck and trimming off the long legs of the heron" or
"haltering a horse." Such rules would not only be of no bene t, but would work great harm. In short, Chuang Tz u
concluded, the world "does simply not need governing; in f act it should not be governed."

Chuang Tz u, moreover, was perhaps the rst theorist to see the state as a brigand writ large: "A petty thief is put in
jail. A great brigand becomes a ruler of a State." Thus, the only difference between state rulers and out-and-out
robber chief tains is the siz e of their depredations. This theme of ruler-as-robber was to be repeated, as we have
seen, by Cicero, and later by Christian thinkers in the Middle Ages, though of course these were arrived at
independently.

Taoist thought ourished f or several centuries, culminating in the most determinedly anarchistic thinker, Pao
Ching-yen, who lived in the early f ourth century AD, and about whose lif e nothing is known. Elaborating on
Chuang-Tz u, Pao contrasted the idyllic ways of ancient times that had had no rulers and no government with the
misery in icted by the rulers of the current age. In the earliest days, wrote Pao, "there were no rulers and no
officials. [People] dug wells and drank, tilled elds and ate. When the sun rose, they went to work; and when it set,
they rested. Placidly going their ways with no encumbrances, they grandly achieved their own f ul llment." In the
stateless age, there was no warf are and no disorder:

Where knights and hosts could not be assembled there was no warfare a eld —
Ideas of using power for advantage had not yet burgeoned. Disaster and disorder
did not occur. Shields and spears were not used; city walls and moats were not built
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 — People munched their food and disported themselves; they were carefree and
contented.

Into this idyll of peace and contentment, wrote Pao Ching-yen, there came the violence and deceit instituted by
the state. The history of government is the history of violence, of the strong plundering the weak. Wicked tyrants
engage in orgies of violence; being rulers they "could give f ree rein to all desires." Furthermore, the government's
institutionaliz ation of violence meant that the petty disorders of daily lif e would be greatly intensi ed and
expanded on a much larger scale. As Pao put it:

Disputes among the ordinary people are merely trivial matters, for what scope of
consequences can a contest of strength between ordinary fellows generate? They
have no spreading lands to arouse avarice — they wield no authority through which
they can advance their struggle. Their power is not such that they can assemble
mass followings, and they command no awe that might quell [such gatherings] by
their opponents. How can they compare with a display of the royal anger, which can
deploy armies and move battalions, making people who hold no enmities attack
states that have done no wrong?

To the common charge that he has overlooked good and benevolent rulers, Pao replied that the government
itself is a violent exploitation of the weak by the strong. The system itself is the problem, and the object of
government is not to bene t the people, but to control and plunder them. There is no ruler who can compare in
virtue with a condition of non-rule.

Pao Ching-yen also engaged in a masterf ul study in political psychology by pointing out that the very existence of
institutionaliz ed violence by the state generates imitative violence among the people. In a happy and stateless
world, declared Pao, the people would naturally turn to thoughts of good order and not be interested in
plundering their neighbors. But rulers oppress and loot the people and "make them toil without rest and wrest
away things f rom them endlessly." In that way, thef t and banditry are stimulated among the unhappy people, and
arms and armor, intended to pacif y the public, are stolen by bandits to intensif y their plunder. "All these things are
brought about because there are rulers." The common idea, concluded Pao, that strong government is needed to
combat disorders among the people, commits the serious error of conf using cause and effect.

The only Chinese with notable views in the more strictly economic realm was the distinguished second century
B.C. historian, Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-c.90 BC). Ch'ien was an advocate of laissez-faire, and pointed out that minimal
government made f or abundance of f ood and clothing, as did the abstinence of government f rom competing
with private enterprise. This was similar to the Taoist view, but Ch'ien, a worldly and sophisticated man, dismissed
the idea that people could solve the economic problem by reducing desires to a minimum. People, Ch'ien
maintained, pref erred the best and most attainable goods and services, as well as ease and comf ort. Men are
theref ore habitual seekers af ter wealth.
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 Since Ch'ien thought very little of the idea of limiting one's desires, he was impelled, f ar more than the Taoists, to
investigate and analyz e f ree market activities. He theref ore saw that specializ ation and the division of labor on the
market produced goods and services in an orderly f ashion:

Each man has only to be left to utilize his own abilities and exert his strength to
obtain what he wishes — When each person works away at his own occupation and
delights in his own business, then like water owing downward, goods will naturally
ow ceaselessly day and night without being summoned, and the people will
produce commodities without having been asked.

To Ch'ien, this was the natural outcome of the f ree market. "Does this not ally with reason? Is it not a natural
result?" Furthermore, prices are regulated on the market, since excessively cheap or dear prices tend to correct
themselves and reach a proper level.

But if the f ree market is self -regulating, asked Ch'ien perceptively, "what need is there f or government directives,
mobiliz ations of labor, or periodic assemblies?" What need indeed?
Ssu-ma Ch'ien also set f orth the f unction of entrepreneurship on the market. The entrepreneur accumulates
wealth and f unctions by anticipating conditions (i.e., f orecasting) and acting accordingly. In short, he keeps "a sharp
eye out f or the opportunities of the times."

Finally, Ch'ien was one of the world's rst monetary theorists. He pointed out that increased quantity and a
debased quality of coinage by government depreciates the value of money and makes prices rise. And he saw too
that government inherently tended to engage in this sort of in ation and debasement.

Author:

Murray N. Rothbard
Murray N. Rothbard made major contributions to economics, history, political philosophy, and legal theory. He
combined Austrian economics with a f ervent commitment to individual liberty.

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