VIII.
BILL OF RIGHTS funds for the general welfare of the 　 inhabitants of
A. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
(POLICE, EMINENT DOMAIN, TAXATION)
1. Concept, application and limits
a. Police power
Constitutional Case: MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
petitioner herein, is a Government 　Agency　tasked
with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Bel-Air Village 　 Association (BAVA), 　 respondent
herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner
to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use
of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will
be for the safe and 　 convenient movement of
persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati
City. This was 　 pursuant to MMDA law or Republic
Act No. 7924.　On the same day, the respondent was
appraised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street
and demolition of the wall, filed a 　 preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order.
Respondent claimed that the 　 MMDA had 　 no
authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor
of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed　the decision
of the lower courts and claimed that it has the
authority to open Neptune Street to 　 public traffic
because it is an agent of the State that can
practice police power in the delivery of 　 basic
services in Metro Manila.
Issue:　Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate
to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to
its regulatory and police powers.
Held: No.
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the
capacity to exercise police power. Police power 　 is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However,
police power may be delegated to　government units.
Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political government 　 unit. Therefore, the MMDA
cannot exercise police power because it cannot be
delegated to them.
It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic
Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA　to enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants
MMDA police power.　It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
various 　 national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and
the 　 private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area.
Ermita-Malate Hotel Operations vs. City of Manila
Facts
On July 5, 1963 the petition for prohibition against
Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, who is
"the latter’s president and general manager" against
the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was
sued in his capacity as such "charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the
City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." It was alleged that the petitioner non-
stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members
"operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national
and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing
and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person
and representing an investment of more than P3
million." It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by
the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at
the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. There
was the assertion of its being beyond the powers
of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to
enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the
ground that in the revised charter of the City of
Manila or in any other law. Sec. 1: It was a violation
of privacy and it was against self-incrimination and
that is why it is unconstitutional and void. Sec. 2:
classifying rooms and prohibiting persons under 18 to
be given any room without the company of parents.
On August 3, 1963 an answer was filed regarding the
respondent mayor that the petitioners are licensed to
engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of
Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a
denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds the petition did fail to state a
cause of action and that the challenged ordinance
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bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose,
which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper
exercise of the police power and that only the guests
or customers not before the court could complain of
the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte
was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Issue: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila
is violative of the due process clause
Ruling:
The lower court held that it is and adjudged it
"unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." Nor
does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar
as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room
or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a
limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against
the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. The right of the individual
is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by
general law for the common good x x x The liberty of
the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the
public health, or of the public order and safety, or
otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power."28The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.31
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.The attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success.
Churchill vs. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572, December
21, 1915 ( 32 Phil 580)
CASE DIGEST
FACTS: The case arises from the fact that defendant,
Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or
remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property
of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign,
signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the
sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise.
ISSUE:Was there valid exercise of police power in
this case?
HELD: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise
of the police power of the Philippine Government
belongs to the Legislature and that this power is
limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of
all republican forms of government. An Act of the
Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly
foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and
interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property
would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where
the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of
and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it
should not be disturbed by the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of
the subjects of the same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not
received a full and complete definition. It may be said,
however, to be the right of the State, or state
functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good
order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience
and morals of the community, which do not ... violate
any of the provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the
improvement of social and economic conditioned
affecting the community at large and collectively with
a view to bring about "the greatest good of the
greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely
declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects
calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and
is exercised from time to time as varying social
conditions demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police power
extends to all the great public needs. It may be put
forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by
the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant
opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to
the public welfare."
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"It is much easier to perceive and realize the
existence and sources of this police power than to
mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its
exercise."
Binay vs Domingo Case Digest GR No. 92389
Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause,
Police Power, Powers of Municipal Corporations
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its
Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends
P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose
gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a
month. The funds are to be taken out of the un-
appropriated available funds in the municipal treasury.
The Metro Manila Commission approved the
resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary
certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the
Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution
and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons:
(1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public
safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants
of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for
public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal
protection clause since it will only benefit a few
individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of
the police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public
purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection
clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. It is founded largely on the
maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas (use
your own property in suc a manner as not to injure
that of another) and "Salus populi est suprema lex
(the welfare of the people shall be the supreme law).
Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in
municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be
a valid delegation of such power by the legislature
which is the repository of the inherent powers of the
State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under
the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they
are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances
and issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and insure the protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope,
over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad,
and has been said to be commensurate with, but not
to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private
rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in
a broad sense includes all legislation and almost
every function of the municipal government. It covers
a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security,
health, morals, and general welfare of the community,
it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with
conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number
of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to
provide adequate social services, the promotion of the
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general welfare, social justice as well as human
dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the
poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause.
Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the
hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors,
is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the
bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No.
243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a
member of a family is a painful experience, and it is
more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very
words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of
inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
(Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11,
1991)
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. &
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION,
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR
announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR
decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.the reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No.
3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted
a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the
ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental
petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31,
1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact
permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement
that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D.
1869. This decree has the status of a statute that
cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-
93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary
to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein
and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Sunday, November 13, 2011
Beltran vs. Sec. of Health
FACTS: This case involves a law seeking to promote
voluntary donation of blood and to phase out
commercial blood banks within 2 years from its
effectivity. The purpose of the law is to prevent blood
transfusion transmissible diseases which were proven
in studies to be more prone in blood transfusions w/c
come from the commercial blood banks as compared
to those coming from the Phil. National Red Cross.
Petitioners assailed the latter’s constitutionality on the
ground of deprivation of property and liberty.
ISSUE: WON RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act)
constitutes as unlawful deprivation of personal liberty
and property.
HELD: No. It was a VALID legislation. The interest of
commercial blood banks must yield to a greater
interest of the public.
The assailed law and its implementing rules are
constitutional and valid. What may be regarded as
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a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a
question not always easily determined. No rule that
will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring
others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is
permitted.
The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a)
must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class.
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood
Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the
promotion of public health and welfare. Based on
the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the
law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed.
To effectuate its policy, a classification was made
between nonprofit blood banks/centers and
commercial blood banks. We deem the
classification to be valid and reasonable for the
following reasons: First, it was based on substantial
distinctions. The former operates for purely
humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while
the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the
former wholly encourages voluntary blood
donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of
commodity. Second, the classification, and the
consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide
the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service
rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves
the phase out of commercial blood banks based
on the fact that they operate as a business
enterprise, and they source their blood supply from
paid blood donors who are considered unsafe
compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the
USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood
banking system. Third, the Legislature intended for
the general application of the law. Its enactment was
not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of
the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the
existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to
all commercial blood banks without exception. The
promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation
of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern.
Basically, the National Blood Services Act was
enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power
in order to promote and preserve public health
and safety. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to over overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to
whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation,
considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is
for Congress to determine.
ABS-CBN v. Philippine Multi-Media System (G.R.
No. 175769-70)
Facts:
Petitioner ABS-CBN, a broadcasting corporation, filed
a complaint against respondent PMSI alleging that
the latter’s unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2
and 23 infringed on its broadcasting rights and
copyright. PMSI posits that it was granted a franchise
to operate a digital direct-to-home satellite service and
that the rebroadcasting was in accordance with the
NTC memo to carry television signals of authorized
television broadcast stations, which includes
petitioner’s programs. The IPO Bureau of Legal
Affairs found PMSI to have infringed petitioner’s
broadcasting rights and ordered it to permanently
desist from rebroadcasting. On appeal, the IPO
Director General found for PMSI. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s broadcasting rights and
copyright are infringed.
Ruling: NO.
The Director-General of the IPO correctly found that
PMSI is not engaged in rebroadcasting and thus
cannot be considered to have infringed ABS-CBN’s
broadcasting rights and copyright.
Section 202.7 of the IP Code defines broadcasting as
“the transmission by wireless means for the public
reception of sounds or of images or of representations
thereof; such transmission by satellite is also
‘broadcasting’ where the means for decrypting are
provided to the public by the broadcasting
organization or with its consent.” On the other hand,
rebroadcasting as defined in Article 3(g) of the
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International Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, otherwise known as the
1961 Rome Convention, of which the Republic of the
Philippines is a signatory, is “the simultaneous
broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the
broadcast of another broadcasting organization.” The
Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat of the
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights
defines broadcasting organizations as “entities that
take the financial and editorial responsibility for the
selection and arrangement of, and investment in, the
transmitted content.” Evidently, PMSI would not
qualify as a broadcasting organization because it
does not have the aforementioned responsibilities
imposed upon broadcasting organizations, such as
ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals;
PMSI merely carries such signals which the viewers
receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does not produce,
select, or determine the programs to be shown in
Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself
off as the origin or author of such programs. Insofar
as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely
retransmits the same in accordance with
Memorandum Circular 04-08-88. With regard to its
premium channels, it buys the channels from
content providers and transmits on an as-is basis
to its viewers. Clearly, PMSI does not perform the
functions of a broadcasting organization; thus, it
cannot be said that it is engaged in
rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
American Inter-Fashion Corporation vs. Office of
the President, Garments and Textile Export Board
and Glorious Sun Fashion Garments
Manufacturing Co. (G.R. No. 92422)
Facts:
Glorious Sun Fashion was found guilty by GTEB of
dollar salting and mis-declaration of importations. As a
result, its export quotas were cancelled. After GTEB
rendered its decision, Glorious filed with the Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that
its right to due process of law was violated and that
GTEB decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. The Court then issued a resolution ordering
GTEB to conduct further proceedings. However, on
July 25, 1984, Glorious filed a manifestation of its
intention to withdraw the petition. The Court granted
the motion for withdrawal. Glorious filed another
motion to dismiss with prejudice which the Court duly
noted.
After two years, Glorious filed with GTEB a petition for
restitution of its export quota allocation and requested
for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April
27, 1984. Glorious once again alleged that the
charges against them were not supported by
evidence. Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision
cancelling its export quota was rendered as a result of
duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence
exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in
order to transfer Glorious export quotas to “Marcos
crony-owned” corporations. Glorious further alleged
that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to
withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 67180 and to enter
into joint venture agreements paving the way for the
creation of De Soleil Apparel and AIFC.
On Sept. 4, 1987, GTEB denied the petition of
Glorious. An appeal was then taken on Oct. 5, 1987 to
the Office of the President. AIFC filed its opposition to
Glorious’ appeal claiming that the GTEB decision
dated April 27, 1984 has long been final. The Office of
the President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded
the case to GTEB for further proceedings. The motion
for reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. W/N the previous GTEB decision constituted res
judicata to the instant case on the ground that the
former decision was a final judgment on the merits. –
NO
2. W/N Glorious was accorded due process in relation
to the 1984 GTEB decision. – NO
Held:
The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal
of private respondent Glorious, the Office of the
President “had unwittingly made itself a tool in a
cunning move to resurrect a decision which had
become final and executory more than three years
earlier. The petitioner asseverates resolution
dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was res judicata on the
matter.
The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements
for a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case is
that the it must be a judgment on the merits. A
judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a
declaration of the law as to the respective rights and
duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact or
state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and
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evidence, and upon which the right of recovery
depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objection or contentions. Certainly, the dismissal of
G.R. No. 67180 cannot be categorized as a judgment
on the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve
anything. In fact, when the court heard the parties
during the oral arguments, GTEB was not able to
present any showing of mis-declaration if imports. The
motion to withdraw te petition arose from the
fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that not only Glorious
Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed
by the martial law regime. The resolution dismissing
G.R. No. 67180 was based solely on the notice of
withdrawal by the private respondent. The dismissal
of the petition was clearly based on a technical matter
rather than on the merits of the petition. Hence, it
cannot constitute res judicata.
With regards to the second issue, the Petitioner
contend that Glorious Sun was not denied due
process. Although AIFC admits that the 1984
GTEB decision failed to disclose to Glorious vital
evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its
conclusion that Glorious was guilty of dollar-
salting, it contends that the subsequent
disclosure in 1987, where relevant documents
were given to Glorious and that the latter was
given an opportunity to comment thereon, cured
the defect. This contention by AIFC, the court holds,
is MISLEADING. The SC recognized that the instant
petition involves the 1984 resolution of the GTEB.
AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent
disclosure of the evidence used by the GTEB to
Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB resolution.
The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due
process when GTEB failed to disclose evidence used
by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious.
Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by
GTEB in 1987 enhanced the charge that the former
was denied due process.
Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit,
wherein Puno, the Chairman of the Investigating
Panel created by the Ministry of Trade and Industry
admitted that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin to
look for ways and means to remove the quotas from
Glorious. AIFC claims that it is an inconsequential
matter in that the GTEB Board did not give credence
to it and also, none of the members of the committee
would agree that there was any pressure or
instruction from Minister Ongpin.
The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other
members would not agree that there was pressure
from Ongpin does not mean that Puno was not telling
the truth. Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured. He
did not state that the members of the investigating
panel were pressured. Mr. Puno was the Chairman of
the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in
view of his position he was the one pressured by
Minister Ongpin. There is every reason to suspect that
even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a
decision to strip it of its quotas and to award them to
friends of their administration had already been made.
The Supreme Court also held that although factual
findings of administrative agencies are generally
accorded respect, such factual findings may be
disregarded if they are not supported by evidence;
where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion; where the procedures which lead to the
factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when grave abuse of discretion
arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
Contrary to the petitioners posture, the record clearly
manifests that in cancelling the export quotas of the
private respondent GTEB violated the private
respondent’s constitutional right to due process.
Before the cancellation in 1984, Glorious had been
enjoying export quotas granted to it since 1977. In
effect the private respondent’s export quota allocation
which initially was a privilege evolved into some form
of property right which should not be removed from it
arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly
confer it on another.
The motion for reconsideration was GRANTED. The
instant petition is DISMISSED.
[ GR No. 33237, Apr 15, 1988 ]
GREGORIO T. CRESPO v. PROVINCIAL BOARD
OF NUEVA ECIJA +
DECISION
Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija in the local elections of 1967. On 25
January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed
against him by private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco
for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression[1].
As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to
why he should not be dealt with administratively, with
the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, in accordance
with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185[2].
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner
or his counsel, public respondent Provincial Board
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conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative
case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T.
Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial
and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the
evidence presented, the respondent Provincial
Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively
suspending petitioner from his office as municipal
mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija[3].
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks
to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public
respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending
him from office and to enjoin public respondent from
enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive
suspension and from proceeding further with the
administrative case.
According to petitioner, the order of preventive
suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued by
the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed,
atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section 5
of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing
and investigation of the truth or falsify of charges
before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing
the order of preventive suspension, the respondent
Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated
the fundamental and elementary principles of due
process[4].
On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary
injunction[5].
We agree with the petitioner that he was denied due
process by respondent Provincial Board.
In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.[6] this Court
held:
"It is a principle in American jurisprudence which,
undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that
one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a
"property right", and the wrongful interference
therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is
considered to be properly within the protection of a
constitutional guaranty of due process of law"[7].
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was
issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be
heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he
was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing,
respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum,
contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel
for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in
writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board
his desire to be given opportunity to argue the
explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the usual
time of the respondent Board's meeting, but
unfortunately, inspite of the time allowed for the
counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as
requested by him, he failed to appear"[8].
The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand
alone in the absence of proof or evidence to
support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15
February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that,
in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation
submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The
assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the
evidence prevented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.
In Azul vs. Castro[9], this Court said:
"From the earliest inception of constitutional
government in our country, the concepts of notice and
hearing have been fundamental. A fair and
enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without the right to notice and to be heard. The
emphasis on substantive due process and other
recent ramifications of the due process clause
sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget
that due process was initially concerned with fair
procedure. Every law student early learns in law
school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4
Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law
of the land which means
"The general law; a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial x x x that every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under
the protection of the general rules which govern
society".
A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of
judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly
neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of
procedural due process.
We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos
(63 SCRA 392), which, unlike the case before us now,
was only a summary action for ejectment that:
In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence
dictate that a judgment, based only on plaintiff's
evidence adduced ex parte and rendered without
hearing defendant's evidence, should be avoided as
much as possible. In order that bias may not be
imputed to the judge, he should have the patience
and circumspection to give the opposing party a
chance to present his evidence even if he thinks
that the oppositor's proof might not be adequate
8|Page
to overthrow the case for the plaintiff. A display of
petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is
a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the 'cold
neutrality of an impartial judge'[10]".
The petition, however, has become moot and
academic. Records do not show that in the last local
elections held on 18 January 1988, petitioner was
elected to any public office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
preliminary injunction issued by this Court on 3 May
1971 is LIFTED. No costs.
Executive Secretary vs CA
Date of Promulgation: May 25, 2004
Facts:
Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
took effect on July 15, 1995. Before the law took
effect, ARCO-Phil filed a petition asking the court to
declare some provisions of the law unconstitutional.
The law required that only skilled workers were to be
deployed for employed abroad. According to the
respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due
process is violated because they are prevented from
finding employment and earning a living abroad. It
cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune
from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers
are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out
that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected
to abuses by foreign employers. Furthermore, the
prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers
abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal
recruiters. The respondent, likewise, alleged that
Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional
because licensed and authorized recruitment
agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal
recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code
distinguished between recruiters who are holders of
licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of
penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any
distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being
based on an invalid classification are, therefore,
repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides
being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative
of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was
also pointed out that the penalty for
officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies
who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-
scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is
life imprisonment.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8042 is valid
Held:
Section 6 of RA 8042 was previously upheld as valid.
It provides that employees of recruitment agencies
may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment.
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment
agencies and their officers and employees and their
relatives employed in government agencies charged
with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment
and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit
large scale illegal recruitment is not offensive to the
Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal
recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if,
after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the
elements of the crime charged.
The respondent merely speculated and surmised that
licensed and registered recruitment agencies would
close shop and stop business operations because of
the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or
speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce
any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of
the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No.
8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of time
constraints, its members would have to defend foreign
employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based
on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or
difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters
and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to
obtain employment abroad is one of the primary
considerations that led to the enactment of The
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas
Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on
existing laws in the recruitment and placement of
workers for overseas employment.
By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the
petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court
frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal
recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing
hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain
employment abroad as overseas workers, and
blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52
embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042.
9|Page
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary
injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in
front of Malacañang to express their grievances
against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting,
the planned demonstration was confirmed by the
union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration
was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the
demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course
of their business which may result in the loss of
revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they
pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company
reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too
late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for
a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and
the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the CBA?
Held:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation
only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties,
the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to
the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.”
Star Paper Corporation vs. Ronaldo Simbol
G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006
FACTS:
Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-
employee and they eventually had a relationship and
got married. Prior to the marriage, the manager
advise the couple that should they decide to get
married, one of them should resign pursuant to a
company policy: 1) new applicant will not be allowed
to be hired if he/she has a relative, up to 3rd degree of
consanguinity, already employed by the company. 2)
if the two employees got married, one of them should
resign to preserve the policy stated first. Simbol
resigned.
10 | P a g e

ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of the employer banning
spouse from working in the same company, a valid
exercise of management prerogative.
RULING:
No, it is not a valid exercise of management
prerogative and violates the rights of employees
under the constitution. The case at bar involves Article
136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated , or to actually dismiss, discharge ,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.” The
company policy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must
clearly establish the requirement of reasonableness.
In the case at bar, there was no reasonable business
necessity. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage
of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma
Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section,
could be detrimental to its business operations. The
questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136
of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate
effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only
way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it
is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit
disproportionate, effect. Lastly, the absence of a
statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in
our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.
b. Eminent Domain
2. Requisites for Valid exercise
3. Similarities and differences
4. Delegation
B. PRIVATE ACTS AND THE BIIL OF RIGHTS
C. DUE PROCESS- THE RIGHT TO LIFE,
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
1. Relativity of due process
2. Procedural and substantive due process
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction
over the property which is the subject of the litigation
may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution
of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions
of law, the power of the court over the property is
recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the
idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially
such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in
the possession of its owner, in person or by agent;
and he may be safely held, under certain conditions,
to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have
been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco
mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila
to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio
returned to China and there he died on January 29,
1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but
since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to
give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was
also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy,
China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with
this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a
newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded
and judgment by default was rendered. The decision
was likewise published and afterwards sale by
public auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was
confirmed by the court. However, about seven years
after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made
by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of
the original defendant, wherein the applicant
requested the court to set aside the order of default
and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was
that the order of default and the judgment rendered
thereon were void because the court had never
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant and the subject matter of the
action
11 | P a g e
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different,
though related, senses since it may have reference
(1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular
kind of action or to administer a particular kind of
relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the
parties, or (2) over the property which is the
subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court
determines the nature and extent of its powers in
general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
with reference to the actions which it may entertain
and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the
coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of
the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from
the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under
special provisions of law, the power of the court over
the property is recognized and made effective. In the
latter case the property, though at all times within the
potential power of the court, may never be taken into
actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction
acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the
beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage
of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the
litigation. An illustration of what we term potential
jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to
register the title of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court, without taking
actual physical control over the property
assumes, at the instance of some person claiming
to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over
the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of
the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to
foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi
in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is
not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of
that nature and is substantially such. The expression
"action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only
with reference to certain proceedings in courts of
admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the
proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs
from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as defendant, and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or
other disposition of the property of the defendant,
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of
remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the
defendant for whom publication is made appears, the
action becomes as to him a personal action and is
conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear
the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles governing
actions in rem.
G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and
MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of
Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark
Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The
warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along
with the request. Charges include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
12 | P a g e
Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a
designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty
which they found having matters needed to be
addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of
all the documents included in the extradition request
and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The
Secretary of Justice denied request on the following
grounds:
He found it premature to secure him copies prior to
the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time,
the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the
procedures and requirements under the relevant law
(PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-
US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by
the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ
of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like
in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal
prosecution inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized
disclosure of the information in the documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request,
as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law
of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the
Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion
favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to
issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as
conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is
now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situations
in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts
should be done to harmonize them. In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner,
and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of
the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is
so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
Gonzales vs NLRC
372 Phil. 39
BELLOSILLO, J.:
By way of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court petitioner seeks the nullification of the Decision
of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, Fifth Division, which reversed and set
aside that of Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J.
Martinez.
Lorlene Gonzales, petitioner, has been a
schoolteacher in the Elementary Department of
private respondent Ateneo de Davao University
(hereafter ATENEO) since 1974 assigned to teach
Reading, Mathematics, Language and Pilipino in the
Grade VI class, while ATENEO is an educational
institution, a corporation duly organized under the
laws of the Philippines, with principal address at
Jacinto St., Davao City.
Sometime in 1991 Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., Ateneo
Grade School Headmaster, sent a letter dated 11
April 1991 informing petitioner Lorlene A. Gonzales of
the complaints of two (2) parents for alleged use of
corporal punishment on her students. Petitioner
13 | P a g e
claimed that she was not informed of the identity of
the parents who allegedly complained of the corporal
punishment she purportedly inflicted in school-year
1990-1991. She likewise claimed that she was not
confronted about it by private respondent ATENEO in
1991 and that it was only two (2) years after the
complaints were made that she discovered, through
her students and their parents, that ATENEO was
soliciting complainants to lodge written complaints
against her.
On 31 March 1993 she wrote a letter to Fr. Oscar
Millar, S.J., demanding that she be formally informed
of the complaint and be duly investigated.
On 9 June 1993 petitioner was informed of the
composition of an investigative committee organized
by Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., to look into the alleged use of
corporal punishment by petitioner in disciplining her
students. It can be gleaned from the records that she
was duly furnished with the rules of procedure,
informed of the schedule of the hearings, and given
copies of the affidavits executed by the students who
testified against her.
Petitioner refused to take part in the investigation
unless the rules of procedure laid down by the
Committee be revised, contending that the same were
violative of her right to due process. Petitioner
specifically objected to the provision which stated: x x
x 3) Counsel for Ms. Lorlene Gonzales shall not
directly participate in the investigation but will merely
advise Ms. Gonzales x x x (par. 3).[1]
But the Committee was steadfast in its resolve to
adopt the aforementioned rules. In its letter dated 9
August 1993, private respondent informed petitioner
that the rules of procedure to be applied were
"substantially the same rules that were used in the
investigation of a former Ateneo employee and
therefore we are under legal advice not to change
these rules."[2] Over the objection of petitioner the
Committee commenced with its investigation without
petitioner's participation. Out of the twenty -two (22)
invitations sent out by ATENEO to petitioner's
students and their parents to shed light on the matter
of corporal punishment allegedly "administered" by
her, eleven (11) appeared and testified before the
committee. The eleven (11) witnesses also executed
written statements denominated as "affidavits."
On 10 November 1993 private respondent served a
Notice of Termination on petitioner pursuant to the
findings and recommendation of the Committee.
Thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the
president of ATENEO demanding her voluntary
resignation a week from receipt of the letter,
otherwise, she would be considered resigned from the
service.
On 29 November 1993 petitioner filed a complaint
before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. After
trial, Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J. Martinez
found her dismissal illegal for lack of factual basis and
ordered ATENEO to award petitioner separation pay,
back wages and 13th month pay. In her decision, the
Executive Labor Arbiter opined that although
petitioner was afforded procedural due process
respondent institution "failed to establish
substantial evidence as to the guilt of the
complainant of the offense charged"[3] thus -
x x x the complainant was afforded procedural due
process. There is convincing and sufficient evidence x
x x showing respondent complied with the notice and
hearing requirement x x x x.[4]
After considering the evidence, arguments and
counter-arguments of the parties, this office finds that
the respondent failed to establish substantial evidence
as to the guilt of complainant of the offense charged x
x x x.[5]
Complainant has sufficiently established that she is a
very good teacher. She is equipped with the
appropriate educational qualifications, trainings,
seminars and work experiences. Such fact was
affirmed by her present and former students, their
parents, colleagues and the former headmaster of the
grade school x x x x[6]
As a matter of fact, six (6) out of the nine (9) students
and their parents/guardians have retracted and
withdrawn their statements x x x x[7]
Both parties appealed to the NLRC which on 25
March 1996 reversed the decision of the Executive
Labor Arbiter by declaring petitioner's dismissal valid
and legal but added that since ATENEO offered
petitioner her retirement benefits it was but proper that
she be extended said benefits. Petitioner now seeks
the reversal of the decision; hence, this petition.
The crux of the controversy is whether the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining
as valid and legal the dismissal of petitioner by
private respondent ATENEO.
The NLRC, in our view, appears to have skirted
several important issues raised by petitioner
14 | P a g e
foremost of which is the absence of due process.
Upon being notified of her termination, she has the
right to demand compliance with the basic
requirements of due process. Compliance entails the
twin requirements of procedural and substantial due
process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the
employee to defend herself either personally and/or
with assistance of a representative; to know the
nature of her offense; and, to cross examine and
confront face to face the witnesses against her.
Likewise, due process requires that the decision must
be based on established facts and on a sound legal
foundation.
It is precisely to demand compliance with these
requirements that petitioner at the very onset of the
investigation demanded the revision of the rules laid
down by the Investigative Committee. The adamant
refusal of the Committee to accede to this demand
resulted in her failure to confront and cross-examine
her accusers. This is not "harping at technicalities" as
wrongfully pointed out by the NLRC but a serious
violation of petitioner's statutory and constitutional
right to due process that ultimately vitiated the
investigation.
Moreover, the failure of ATENEO to refute the
contention of petitioner that the joint affidavits
executed by the students and parents were "pre-
prepared" raises serious doubts as to the probative
value of this evidence. As correctly pointed out by the
Executive Labor Arbiter, "there is more reason to
disregard it especially where the same was
challenged and has remained unexplained." Hearsay
evidence, in the strict sense, has no probative value
whether objected to or not.
In the instant case, ATENEO failed to prove by
substantial evidence that petitioner had inflicted
corporal punishment on her students. In Ang Tibay
v. CIR, the Court set the measure of evidence to be
presented in an administrative investigation when it
said, "substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." The evidence of private respondent did
not measure up to this standard. It relied solely on the
witnesses' affidavits with questionable veracity.
Moreover, the affidavit of recantation executed by
some students and their parents all the more
weakened the case of private respondent. Failure in
this regard negates the very existence of the ground
for dismissal.
On the other hand, petitioner adequately proved, by
means of affidavits, letters of petition and manifesto
made by her students and co-teachers, that she was
a competent and dedicated teacher having spent
seventeen (17) years of her life in the service of the
very institution which is now seeking her dismissal.
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of the NLRC
is unwarranted. Employment is not merely a
contractual relationship; it has assumed the nature of
property right. It may spell the difference whether or
not a family will have food on their table, roof over
their heads and education for their children. It is for
this reason that the State has taken up measures to
protect employees from unjustified dismissals. It is
also because of this that the right to security of tenure
is not only a statutory right but, more so, a
constitutional right.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated 25 March 1996 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter
Conchita J. Martinez "declaring the dismissal of
complainant Lorlene A. Gonzales illegal for lack of
factual basis and ordering respondent Ateneo de
Davao University to pay complainant separation pay,
back wages and 13th month pay in the total amount of
TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT and 70/100 PESOS
(P216,938.70) x x x [f]urther, ordering respondent to
pay 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's
fees to counsel for complainant x x x [d]ismissing all
other claims for lack of merit," is REINSTATED,
AFFIRMED and ADOPTED herein as the decision in
the instant case.
People vs Nazario
Facts:
Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal
and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to
Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation
provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as
amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and
just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon
with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years
in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and
1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if
he was covered under the ordinance. He was found
guilty thus this petition.
Issues:
15 | P a g e
1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
amended null and void for being ambiguous and merely because general terms are used therein, or
uncertain because of the employment of terms without defining
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional
them. There is no positive constitutional or statutory
for being ex post facto
command requiring the legislature to define each and
Held:  every word in an enactment. Congress’ inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the
as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least,
comes with the term “Manager”. He was the one who can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
spent money in developing and maintaining it, so
expressed in the Plunder Law.
despite only leasing it from the national government,
the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
“Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond plain, and ordinary acceptation and signification,
started operating in 1964”. unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted technical or special legal meaning to those words.
in 1955 so it can’t be that the amendment under
Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively.
Every provision of the law should be construed in
Also, the act of non-payment has been made
punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is relation and with reference to every other part.
not imposing a retroactive penalty
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the
The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the provisions of R.A. 7080
appellant.
No. The legislature did not in any manner
refashion the standard quantum of proof in the
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 14560, 36
crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
SCRA 394 (November 19, 2001)
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every
Facts:
fact or element necessary to constitute a crime.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
sufficient to form a combination or series which
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as
would constitute a pattern and involving an
amended by RA 7659..
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need
Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed
to prove each and every other act alleged in the
law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin
information to have been committed by the accused in
but distinct line which divides the valid from the
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear violation
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
of the fundamental rights of the accused to due
wealth.
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation.
No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in
RA No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
Issue/s:
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished
are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional
are mala in se and it does not matter that such
for being vague.
acts are punished in a special law, especially since
Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence
in the case of plunder that predicate crimes are
for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and
mainly mala in se.
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due
Its abomination lies in the significance and
process.
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum
of the larger socio-political and economic context in
prohibitum.
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop
and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Ruling:
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the

16 | P a g e
population, the Philippine Government must muster
the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so
deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society
and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide
even the most basic services to its people, any form
of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival
of people it governs over.
Note:
A statute establishing a criminal offense must define
the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked
against the specie of legislation that is utterly vague
on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by
a saving clause or by construction.
The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired
such exalted statute in the realm of constitutional
law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause
which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack
comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. The first may be “saved” by
proper construction, while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding
and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
“vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The
theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value of all
society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify along attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the persons making
the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute draw with narrow specificity.
The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terorrem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA
R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against
Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA
8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making
false information as to their residence in their
applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer
that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the
COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to
reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000,
they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5
years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a
preliminary investigation be conducted by the
COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
17 | P a g e
Issue: WON due process was violated.
Held: No.
First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private
respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a
language which embraces the allegations necessary
to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g)
and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due
process on the claim that the election offenses
charged against them by private respondent are
entirely different from those for which they stand to be
accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the
Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before
the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private
respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by
Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to
be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and
which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on
the same set of facts as originally alleged in the
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that
the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by
the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature
of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the Information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or
Information.
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not
support their claim of lack of due process because, as
we have said, the charges contained in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as
directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on
the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the
criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-
Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the
Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the
COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such
that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able
to refute or submit documentary evidence against the
charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC.
Petitioners were afforded due process because they
were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations
in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April
2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit,
petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion
to Dismiss with the Law Department of the
COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum
before the said body. Finding that due process was
not dispensed with under the circumstances in the
case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of
the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably
apprised of the nature and description of the charges
against them. It likewise bears stressing that
preliminary investigations were conducted whereby
petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against them. They were given
the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for
their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively
participated.
FABELLA V. CA G.R. NO. 110370 (1997)
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino
issued a return-to-work order to all public school
teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes
on various dates during the period of September to
October 1990. The mass action had been staged to
demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and
passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October
1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases
against respondents, who are teachers of
Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets
required respondents to explain in writing why they
should not be punished for having taken part in the
mass action in violation of civil service laws.
Administrative hearings started on December 1990.
Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of
the proceedings on the following due process
grounds: first, they were not given copies of the
guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and denied access to evidence; second,
the investigation placed the burden of proof on
respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the
investigating body was illegally constituted, their
composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the
action assailing the validity of the administrative
proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a
decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered
their immediate dismissal.
ISSUE:
18 | P a g e
Whether or not private respondents were denied due
process?
HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has
been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or
with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as
well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
for consideration during the hearing or contained in
the records or made known to the parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known
as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
which specifically covers administrative proceedings
involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law
expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the division
as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers’ organization
and a supervisor of the division. In the present case,
the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents
did not include “a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have
no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings
undertaken by them were necessarily void. They
could not provide any basis for the suspension or
dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers’ organization in these
committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural
due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor
issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was
complied with because the respondents are members
of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree.
Mere membership of said teachers in their respective
teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make
them authorized representatives of such organizations
as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this
section, the teachers’ organization possesses the
right to indicate its choice of representative to be
included by the DECS in the investigating committee.
Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the
secretary of education or the director of public schools
or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the
DECS as members of its investigating committee was
ever designated or authorized by a teachers’
organization as its representative in said committee.
Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon
principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a
previous specific law, unless there is an express
stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize
them.
[G.R. NO. 173918 : April 8, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), Petitioner,
v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated
4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.
SP No. 82183.1 The appellate court reversed the
Decision2 dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the
President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared
that Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85
dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for
failure to comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7
of the Administrative Code of 1987,3 which requires
the publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administration Register (ONAR) of administrative
issuances. Thus, surcharges provided under the
aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon
respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing
under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the
business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and
other related activities.4
The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government
agency under the direct control and supervision of the
Office of the President. The Department is mandated
by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate,
coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs,
projects and activities of the Government relative to
19 | P a g e
energy exploration, development, utilization,
distribution and conservation.
On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No.
1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price
changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments
and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and
imported petroleum products.5
Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984
was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to
reimburse oil companies the additional costs of
importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to
fluctuation in foreign exchange rates to assure
adequate and continuous supply of petroleum
products at reasonable prices.6
Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November
1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the
Energy Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices
of domestic oil products every two months to reflect
the prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum. The
prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost,
increasing or decreasing this price component as
necessary to maintain the balance between revenues
and claims on the OPSF.7
On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was
enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the
sources and utilization of the OPSF in order to
maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products
at reasonable levels.8
On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs
(OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that
respondent's contributions to the OPSF for foreign
exchange risk charge for the period December 1989
to March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task
Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75
by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the
underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was
imposed upon respondent. The said surcharge was
imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular
No. 2-94,9 which provides that:
2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided
for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall be
made not later than 20th of the month following the
month of remittance of the foreign exchange payment
for the import or the month of payment to the
domestic producers in the case of locally produced
crude. Payment after the specified date shall be
subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent (15%) of the
amount, if paid within thirty (30) days from the due
date plus two percent (2%) per month if paid after
thirty days.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11
to respondent advising the latter of its additional
underpayment to the OPSF of the foreign exchange
risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the
period April 1991 to October 1991. In addition,
surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were
imposed thereon.
In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the
OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the
transactions in question were based on a valid
interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April
1985 and MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May
1985.12
On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full
the principal amount of its underpayment, totaling
P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges.13
In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the
respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF
a total amount of P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on
the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for
the period December 1989 to October 1991.
In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated
its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges
due. Otherwise, the DOE warned that it would
proceed against the respondent's Irrevocable Standby
Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges.
On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal
before the Office of the President. The Office of the
President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE,
contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11
July 1996. While it admitted that the implementation of
MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its
publication and filing with the ONAR, it noted that
respondent failed to adduce evidence of lack of
compliance with such requirements. The
aforementioned Decision reads:16
Given the foregoing, the DOE's implementation of
MOF Circular 1-85 by imposing surcharges on
Pilipinas Shell is only proper. Like this Office, the DOE
is bound to presume the validity of that administrative
regulation.
20 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of
the Department of Energy, contained in its letters
dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the
President, which was denied on 28 November
2003.17
Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9
February 200418 and 11 February 200419 issued by
ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF
Circular No. 1-85 respectively, have not been filed
before said office.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the
Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574
and ruled that MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was
ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to
file with ONAR. It decreed that even if the said circular
was issued by then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo
de Roda, Jr. long before the Administrative Code of
1987, Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies
that rules already in force on the date of the effectivity
of the Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed
within three months from the date of effectivity of said
Code, otherwise such rules cannot thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons.20
According to the dispositive of the appellate court's
Decision:21
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2003 and
the Resolution dated November 28, 2003 of the Office
of the President, are hereby REVERSED.
ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of surcharges upon
petitioner is hereby declared without legal basis.
On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following
issues were raised:22
I persons.
THE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF
FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN
AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED
VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT,
MOF CIRCULAR NO. 1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED
INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF
A LAW REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF THE MOF
CIRCULAR WITH THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL
REGISTER
II
ASSUMING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF MOF
NO. 1-85 IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT WAIVED
ITS OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OF NON-
REGISTRATION WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT
REQUIRED BY PETITIONER.
This petition is without merit.
As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera23
enunciated that publication is indispensable in
order that all statutes, including administrative rules
that are intended to enforce or implement existing
laws, attain binding force and effect, to wit:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis
provided.)
Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII thereof
specifically providing that:
Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University
of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies
of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date
of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be
the basis of any sanction against any party or
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this
section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by
the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection. (Emphasis provided.)
21 | P a g e

Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF
Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those
issuances which should be published before it
becomes effective since it is intended to enforce
Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular
should also comply with the requirement stated under
Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987 - filing with the ONAR in the University
of the Philippines Law Center - for rules that are
already in force at the time the Administrative Code of
1987 became effective. These requirements of
publication and filing were put in place as safeguards
against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as
guarantees to the constitutional right to due process
and to information on matters of public concern and,
therefore, require strict compliance.
In the present case, the Certifications dated 11
February 200425 and 9 February 200426 issued by
ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its
amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not
been filed before said office. Moreover, petitioner was
unable to controvert respondent's allegation that
neither of the aforementioned circulars were
published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper
of general circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the
requirements of publication and filing of administrative
issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, ineffective.
In National Association of Electricity Consumers for
Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board,27 this Court
emphasized that both the requirements of publication
and filing of administrative issuances intended to
enforce existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity
of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it specified
several instances wherein this Court declared
administrative issuances, which failed to observe the
proper requirements, to have no force and effect:
Nowhere from the above narration does it show that
the GRAM Implementing Rules was published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both
the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly
provide that they "shall take effect immediately."
These clauses made no mention of their publication in
either the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Moreover, per the Certification
dated January 11, 2006 of the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR), the said
implementing rules and regulations were not likewise
filed with the said office in contravention of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera,
the Court has previously declared as having no force
and effect the following administrative issuances: (1)
Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of
Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment
Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation
of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2)
Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering the suspension
of payments due and payable by distressed copper
mining companies to the national government; (3)
Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration regulating the
recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; (4)
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued
by the Philippine International Trading Corporation
regulating applications for importation from the
People's Republic of China; (5) Corporation
Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the
Department of Budget and Management discontinuing
the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to
government officials and employees; and (6) POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which
provided for the schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies
or authority holders.
In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances
questioned therein were uniformly struck down as
they were not published or filed with the National
Administrative Register. On the other hand, in
Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the
Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of the
National Telecommunications Commission had not
become effective despite the fact that it was filed with
the National Administrative Register because the
same had not been published at the time. The Court
emphasized therein that "publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a
condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or
regulations can take effect."
Petitioner's argument that respondent waived the
requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of
underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious.
MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended imposes
surcharges, while respondents' underpayment is
based on MOF Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April
1985.
22 | P a g e
Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF
Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no
longer necessary since the respondent knew of its
existence, despite its non-registration. This argument
is seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence.
Strict compliance with the requirements of publication
cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties
were notified of the existence of the implementing
rules concerned. Hence, also in National Association
of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy
Regulatory Board, this Court pronounced:
In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be
declared ineffective as the same was never published
or filed with the National Administrative Register. To
show that there was compliance with the publication
requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC
dwell lengthily on the fact that parties, particularly the
distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly
notified of the public consultation on the ERC's
proposed implementing rules. These parties
participated in the said public consultation and even
submitted their comments thereon.
However, the fact that the parties participated in the
public consultation and submitted their respective
comments is not compliance with the fundamental
rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any
administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law, must be published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The requirement of publication of
implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may
not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this
case, there was public consultation and submission
by the parties of their comments.28 (Emphasis
provided.)
Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, gains its vitality from the subsequent
enactment of Executive Order No. 137, which
reiterates the power of then Minister of Finance to
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement the executive order. Such contention is
irrelevant in the present case since the power of the
Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and
regulations is not under dispute. The issue rather in
the Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his
administrative issuance for non-compliance with the
requisite publication and filing with the ONAR. And
while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, may be
unimpeachable in substance, the due process
requirements of publication and filing cannot be
disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of
Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No.
1-85, as amended from the aforementioned
requirements.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is
DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August
2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost.
Pefianco v. Moral
322 SCRA 439
FACTS: Former DECS Secretary filed an
administrative complaint against respondent for
dishonesty. She was dismissed. Respondent filed a
petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish
her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report. It was denied.
HELD: A respondent in an administrative case is not
entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him. He
is entitled only to the administrative decision and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent had been
accorded these rights.
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC
Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents.
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set
aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner
Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications
Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services
involving telecommunications. Charging rates for
certain specified lines that were reduced by order of
herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates
were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the
NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued
without prior notice and hearing.
23 | P a g e
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner
was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June
17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public
Service Commission the Supreme Court said that
although the rule-making power and even the power
to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines-may partake of a legislative character.
Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is
the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It,
however, insists that notice and hearing are not
necessary since the assailed order is merely
incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature but the supreme court said that
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending
final determination of the application of petitioner,
such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is
not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with
regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a
hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t
scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the
petitioner
Lao Gi v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 81789
Facts:
Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when
a judgment was rendered cancelling his citizenship
(obtained from a prior judgment) on the ground that it
was founded on fraud and misrepresentation.
Petitioners were required to register as aliens but
refused. They filed a motion for reconsideration of the
of the order directing them to register as aliens and to
oppose the motion for their arrest but was denied by
Acting Commissioner Nituda. Petitioners filed for
certiorari in the CFI of Manila which was dismissed fo
lack of legal basis. Petition for certiorari was also
dismissed on appeal in the CA and a motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue:
WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due
process even if they are aliens.
Held:
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It
is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of
the people.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake
of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such
person to due process should not be denied. Thus,
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings.
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940 as amended, it is provided:
c)No alien shall be deported without being informed of
the specific grounds for deportation nor without being
given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the
acts or omissions complained of which must be stated
in ordinary and concise language to enable a person
of common understanding to know on what ground he
is intended to be deported and enable the CID to
pronounce a proper judgment.
Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of
the respondent commission on immigration and
deportation is hereby set aside.
24 | P a g e
Velasco vs Villegas GR L-24153 14 February 1983
11
Wednesday
Mar 2015
Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests,
Constitutional Law II
Facts: Petitioners assailed the validity of Ordinance
4964, prohibiting barbershop to conduct massaging
customers in a separate room or in any room in the
same building where the operator of the barbershop
and the room of massaging is the same. The
contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of
property of petitioners-appellants of their means of
livelihood without due process of law. Lower Court
dismissed the petition for declaratory relief.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 4964 is
unconstitutional?
Decision: Decision affirmed. Order 4964 is a police
power measure in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of
separate rooms for massage of customers.
City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)
Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist
Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels,
hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited
certain forms of amusement, entertainment,
services and facilities where women are used as
tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb
the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses,
night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns.
Owners and operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three months to wind up
business operations or transfer to any place outside
Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other
kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also
provided that in case of violation and conviction, the
premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the
lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as
it included motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid
and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly
because it is not a valid exercise of police power
and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under
the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case
was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance is constitutional.
Held:
SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
several reasons.
First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police
power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police
power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but (2)the means employed must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of
the ordinance was the promotion and protection
of the social and moral values of the community.
The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses allowed under
the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its
purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the
enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote social and moral welfare of the community. It
will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
disease in Manila.
Second. The modality employed constitutes
unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable
and oppressive as it substantially divests the
respondent of the beneficial use of its property.
The ordinance forbids running of the enumerated
businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs
owners/operators to wind up their business operations
or to transfer outside the area or convert said
business into allowed business. An ordinance which
permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot
be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
25 | P a g e
property without just compensation. It is intrusive and
violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking
and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property, as in this
case.
Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection
clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to the rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not
be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the
subjects of legislation provided the classification is
reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: (1)It must be based on
substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply
equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s
view, there are no substantial distinction between
motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. By
definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the
public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and
inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses
or other similar establishments. The Court likewise
cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business
and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside this area. A noxious establishment
does not become any less noxious if located outside
the area.
Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general
laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in
contravention of the Revised Administrative Code
as the Code merely empowers the local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated. Not only that, it
likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
The P.D. Had already converted the residential
Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The
decree allowed the establishment and operation of all
kinds of commercial establishments.
Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision
of the RTC was AFFIRMED.
YNOT v. IAC
FACTS
Here, the constitutionality of former President
Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed.
Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-
provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose) and carabeef.
The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of
this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government, to be distributed to charitableinstitutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may
see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of
carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers
as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see
fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were
confiscated by the police for violation of the above
order. He sued for recovery, which the RTC
granted upon his filing of a supersedes bond
worth 12k. After trial on the merits, the lower court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as
they can no longer be produced, directed
the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on
the constitutionality of the executive order, on the
grounds of want of authority and presumed
validity. On appeal to
the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was
upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from
invalidity because it is imposed without giving the
owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE
Whether  EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being
violative of the due process clause.
HELD
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the
following must be present: (a) that the interests of the
public, generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference, and; (b)
that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the
Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above
requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s
tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the
public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order,
and that the method chosen is also reasonably
necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and
not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of
carabaos except those seven years old if male
26 | P a g e
and eleven if female upon issuance of
a permit adequately works for the conservation of
those still fit for farm work or breeding, and
prevention of their improvident depletion. Here,
while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to
observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement. The object of the
prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is
missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial
transport of the animals can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than
in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that
moving them to another will make it easier to kill them
there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable
relation between the means and the end, the penalty
is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation,
denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the
Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the
property being transported is immediately impounded
by the police and declared as forfeited for the
government. Concededly, there are certain occasions
when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed
with, such as summary abatement of a public
nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs.
However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy
of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of
the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such
pressure is present. The manner by which the
disposition of the confiscated property also presents a
case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since
the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the
NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited
discretion. The usual standard and reasonable
guidelines that said officers must observe in making
the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they
are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this
makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and
even corruption.
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM
CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO,
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-
Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments
in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance
sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC),
Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and
operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila,
filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the
ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as
it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions
of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises
and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the
right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from
the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless
be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that
the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities the power
to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. Also, they contended that
under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they
have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of
the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and
to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an
invalid exercise of police power; and it is
27 | P a g e
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it
held that the ordinance did not violate the right to
privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments
that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the
virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained
through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the
ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral
activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the
well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of
police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a
valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only
the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the
1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of
Manila. The common thread that runs through those
decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the
respective ordinances. All three ordinances were
enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle
case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At
its core, this is another case about the extent to which
the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A
long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and
distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a
day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the
police power as conferred on local government units
by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity
of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself
and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if
not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These
goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic
view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as
to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would
seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that
they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also
recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as
well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those
persons who would be deprived of availing short time
access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein
fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined
by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and
the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude.
The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right
must be recognized and the invasion of it should be
28 | P a g e
justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence
accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a
wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in
fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police
work would be more effective in easing the situation.
So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance
can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those
engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers
and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from
their clientele by charging their customers a portion of
the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of
its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance
may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well
as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains
the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as
well as restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
D. EQUAL PROTECTION
1. Concept
2. Requisites for valid classification
PEOPLE V. CAYAT (1939) |EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939
DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to
all members of the same class.                      
FACTS:
1. Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio,
Benguet and a member of the non-Christian
tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2
and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an
intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is
not a native wine.
2. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native
of the Philippines who is a member of the
non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and
possess any intoxicating liquor other than
their so-called native wines. Consequently,
29 | P a g e
 Section 3 thereof provides for its
punishment.
3. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act
No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws, violative of the due
process and it is an improper exercise of
police power.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal
protection clause?
RULING:
  No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of
the equal protection clause.
 Equal protection of the laws is not violated by
a legislation based on reasonable
classifications. The classification to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
 Act No. 1639 satisfies these
requirements. On the first requisite, the
classification rests on real and substantial
distinctions. The non-Christian tribes
refer not to the religious belief, but in a way
to the geographical and more directly to the
natives of the Philippines of a low grade of
civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was
designed to insure peace and order
among the non-Christian tribes. The
experience of the past and the lower court
observed that the use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian
tribes often resulted in lawlessness and
crimes, which hamper the efforts of the
Government to raise their standard of life
and civilization. Third, the said act is
intended to apply for all times as long as the
conditions exist. Legislature understood that
civilization of a people is a slow process and
that hand in hand with it must go measures
of protection and security. Fourth, the act
applies equally to all members of same
class.
TIU V. CA (1999) | EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
February 5, 2017
G.R. No. 127410, 37 SCRA 99, January 28, 1971
DOCTRINES:
1. The Constitution does not require
absolute equality among residents. It is
enough that all persons under like
circumstances or conditions are given
the same privileges and required to follow
the same obligations.
2. The classification based on a valid and
reasonable standard does not violate the
equal protection clause.
FACTS:
1. RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion
of military reservations into other productive
uses. Section 12 thereof created the Subic
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ),
which includes the City of Olongapo,
Municipality of Subic and the lands
occupied by the Subic Naval Base and
granted special privileges.
2. Thereafter, EO 97 was issued to clarify the
application of the incentives provided by RA
7227. Sec. 1 of EO 97 provides for the tax
and duty-free importations shall only be
applied raw materials, capital goods and
equipment brought in by business
enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these
items, importations of other goods into the
SSEZ, whether by business enterprises,
resident individuals are subject to the taxes
and duties under Philippine laws. The
exportation or removal of tax and duty free
goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other
parts of the Philippines shall be subject to
duties and taxes under Philippine laws.
3. Section 1.1 thereof grants the enjoyment of
the tax and duty incentives to the business
and enterprises and residents within the
presently fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base only. It excludes the the first two
component cities as provided for by Sec. 12
of RA 7227.
ISSUES:
Whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection of the
laws?
RULING:
  No, EO 97-A is not violative of the equal
protection of the laws.
 The fundamental right of equal protection of
the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification.
 Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to
the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class.
30 | P a g e
  RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the
conversion of military reservations into
productive uses.
 The Government provides enticements as to
persuade and attract investors to pour in
capital with the said military bases. Among
such enticements are: (1) a separate
customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-
and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured
income tax rates on business enterprises
within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange
control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking
and finance, and (6) the grant of resident
status to certain investors and of working
visas to certain foreign executives and
workers.
 The purpose of the law is to convert former
military base to productive use for the benefit
of the Philippine economy. Hence, there was
no reasonable basis to extend the tax
incentives in RA 7227.
Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services G.R. No.
167614 March 24, 2009 Non-impairment of
Contract Clause, OFW Employment Contract
DECEMBER 4, 2017
FACTS:
For Antonio Serrano, a Filipino seafarer, the last
clause in the 5thparagraph of Section 10, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042, does not magnify the contributions of
OFWs to national development, but exacerbates the
hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their
entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their
lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of
their employment contract “or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less”
(subject clause).  Petitioner claims that the last clause
violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it
impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of
equal protection and denies them due process.
 
ISSUE:
Does the 5th paragraph of Section 10, RA 8042 violate
the non-impairment of contract clause of the
Constitution?
 
RULING:
NO. The prohibition is aligned with the general
principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or
contracts already perfected; however, as to laws
already in existence, their provisions are read into
contracts and deemed a part thereof.  Thus, the non-
impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is
limited in application to laws about to be enacted that
would in any way derogate from existing acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A.
No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the
employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998.  Hence, it cannot be argued that
R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause,
impaired the employment contract of the parties. 
Rather, when the parties executed their 1998
employment contract, they were deemed to have
incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
BIRAOGO V. TRUTH COMMISSION (2010) | EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
G.R. No. 192935, 637 SCRA 78, December 7, 2010
Doctrines:
1. For a classification to be valid, it should
be applicable to future conditions as well.
2. While reasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it
be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
Facts:
1. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC).
2. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President, which is tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption
and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.
3. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
4. Petitioners filed a case alleging the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 for it violates
the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of
the other administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable. It does not apply
equally to all members of the same class
such that the intent of singling out the
“previous administration” as its sole object
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 makes the PTC an “adventure in partisan
hostility.
5. They argue that the search for truth behind
the reported cases of graft and corruption
must encompass acts committed not only
during the administration of former President
Arroyo but also during prior administrations
where the “same magnitude of controversies
and anomalies” were reported to have been
committed against the Filipino people.
6. They assail the classification formulated by
the respondents as it does not fall under the
recognized exceptions because first, “there
is no substantial distinction between the
group of officials targeted for investigation by
Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or
persons who abused their public office for
personal gain; and second, the selective
classification is not germane to the purpose
of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.”
Issue:
WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the equal protection clause.
Held:
 Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection
clause.
 The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the
truth “concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous
administration” The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
 the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
 While reasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it
be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
G. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
1. Concept and scope
2. Prior restraint (censorship)
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff (G.R. No. L-64261)
Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño,
Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City],
issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We
Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6
months following the raid to question the validity of
said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge
Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of
Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as
evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC
Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of
subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance
of search warrants.
Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. In mandating that “no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than
32 | P a g e
personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement
in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant. Further, when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher
or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice.
CORRO VS LISING
F:         Respondent Judge issued a search warrant
for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner
in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were
printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper
dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and
tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The
petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion
was denied.
HELD:  The statements made in the affidavits are
mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause. The language used is
all embracing as to include all conceivable words and
equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are
legal or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant
which is objectionable. VV.
MARCH 30, 2013
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS:
Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station
dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the
conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the
2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June
2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press
conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played
before the presidential press corps two compact disc
recordings of conversations between a woman and a
man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings
as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of
the second compact disc had been “spliced” to make
it appear that President Arroyo was talking to
Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and
stated that the woman’s voice in the compact discs
was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile,
other individuals went public, claiming possession of
the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent
Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media
organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for
possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release
warning radio and television stations that airing the
Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005,
NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters
group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC
and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing
commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the
“acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and
respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following
grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of
expression and the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article
III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra
vires when it warned radio and television stations
against airing the Garci Tapes.
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether
the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11
June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint
on freedom of expression.
1. Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the
issue involves freedom of expression, as in the
present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to
question the constitutionality of a government action
in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not
the government action is directed at such citizen.
Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the
preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is
33 | P a g e
of transcendental importance that must be defended
by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.
2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint
and Subsequent Punishment
Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free,
open and democratic society. Freedom of expression
is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of
almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of
expression allows citizens to expose and check
abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression
allows citizens to make informed choices of
candidates for public office.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the
enactment of any law curtailing freedom of
expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any
prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution
commands that freedom of expression shall not be
abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out
narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of
necessity.
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to
prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely:
pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected
expression or high-value expression. Any content-
based prior restraint on protected expression is
unconstitutional without exception. A protected
expression means what it says – it is absolutely
protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no
prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or
repeal of existing laws, on the ratification of treaties,
on the imposition of new tax measures, or on
proposed amendments to the Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or
idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it
burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a
restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of
the expression in public places without any restraint
on the content of the expression. Courts will subject
content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An
example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit
specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing
through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior
restraint on protected expression which does not
touch on the content of the expression enjoys the
presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject
to appeal to the courts.
Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is
unprotected expression or low-value expression. By
definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is
content-based since the restraint is imposed because
of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are
currently only four categories of unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This
Court recognized false or misleading advertisement
as unprotected expression only in October 2007.
Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior
restraint. However, any such prior restraint on
unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier.
First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional.
Second, the government bears a heavy burden of
proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom
of expression than subsequent punishment. Although
subsequent punishment also deters expression, still
the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior
restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to
the public.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected
expression, such expression may be subject to
subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally.
Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not
warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still
be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or
criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected
expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the
lesser restriction of subsequent punishment, logically
it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction
of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or
“hate speech” against a religious minority is not
subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction,
such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.
If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint,
necessarily the same expression is subject to
subsequent punishment. There must be a law
34 | P a g e
punishing criminally the unprotected expression
before prior restraint on such expression can be
justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the
constitutionality of government action imposing prior
restraint on three categories of unprotected
expression – pornography,31 advocacy of imminent
lawless action, and danger to national security – is the
clear and present danger test.32 The expression
restrained must present a clear and present danger of
bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a
right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be
grave and imminent.
Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many
forms – it may be a law, administrative regulation, or
impermissible pressures like threats of revoking
licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The
impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a
government agency regulation, but may emanate from
policies, advisories or conduct of officials of
government agencies.
3. Government Action in the Present Case
The government action in the present case is a
warning by the NTC that the airing or broadcasting of
the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a
“cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued
to radio and television stations. The NTC warning,
embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds.
First, the airing of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or
Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV
stations.” Second, the Garci Tapes have not been
authenticated, and subsequent investigation may
establish that the tapes contain false information or
willful misrepresentation.
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression that
may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not
specify what substantive evil the State seeks to
prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the
Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public
airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and
imminent character, that the State has a right and
duty to prevent.
The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its
conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of whether a
wireless cellular phone conversation is covered by the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in
claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes
a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and
television stations were not even given an opportunity
to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe
basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations.
The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not
been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The NTC
also concedes that only “after a prosecution or
appropriate investigation” can it be established that
the Garci Tapes constitute “false information and/or
willful misrepresentation.” Clearly, the NTC admits
that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain
false information or willful misrepresentation.
4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case
The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci
Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is
directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The
NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain “false
information and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus
should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the
restraint is content-based.
5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case
The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected
expression because it does not fall under any of the
four existing categories of unprotected expression
recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci
Tapes is essentially a political expression because it
exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly
improper conversations with a COMELEC
Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last
presidential elections.
Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects
gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on
the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected
expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In
any event, public discussion on all political issues
should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide
open.
The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there
can be no content-based prior restraint on protected
expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press
release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts
determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping,
35 | P a g e
illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the
public airing of the tape becomes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint.
However, there is no claim here by respondents that
the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves
national security and publicly airing the tapes would
endanger the security of the State.
The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the
right to privacy because the content of the Garci
Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The
Constitution guarantees the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern. The remedy
of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the
Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law after the commission of the
crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful
defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected
expression, there can be subsequent punishment for
protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In
the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint
on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of
personnel of radio and television stations for actual
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior
Restraint
The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior
restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does
not vest NTC with any content-based censorship
power over radio and television stations.
In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a
protected expression that can never be subject to
prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake
of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts
have the power to adjudicate on the factual and legal
issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes
presents a clear and present danger of bringing about
a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty
to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.
Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected
expression requires prior adjudication by the courts on
whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a
necessary consequence from the presumption of
invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected
expression.
7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of
Invalidity
Respondents did not invoke any compelling State
interest to impose prior restraint on the public airing of
the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they
merely “fairly warned” radio and television stations to
observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC
circulars on program standards. Respondents have
not explained how and why the observance by radio
and television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a compelling
State interest justifying prior restraint on the public
airing of the Garci Tapes.
Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the
violation of any criminal statute, can always be subject
to criminal prosecution after the violation is
committed. Respondents have not explained how the
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the
pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless
behavior or endanger the security of the State.
8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior
Restraint
The NTC press release threatening to suspend or
cancel the airwave permits of radio and television
stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting
to prior restraint on protected expression. Whether the
threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or
press release, the chilling effect is the same: the
threat freezes radio and television stations into
deafening silence. Radio and television stations that
have invested substantial sums in capital equipment
and market development suddenly face suspension or
cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus
real and potent.
9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an
unconstitutional prior restraint on protected
expression. There can be no content-based prior
restraint on protected expression. This rule has no
exception.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
119673, July 26, 1996
DECISION
I.      THE FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by
the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures
36 | P a g e
and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs
allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited
by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial
biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against
contrary religious beliefs.  Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its religious
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of
respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent
Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for
its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent
Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that:
(1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power
to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and
(2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse
of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition
on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on
the ground that the materials constitute an attack
against another religion. The CA also found the
subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and
contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme
Court.
II.    THE ISSUES
(1)  Does respondent Board have the power to review
petitioner’s TV program?
(2)  Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board
gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the
airing of petitioner’s religious program?
III.   THE RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar
as the CA sustained the action of the respondent
Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos.
115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the
CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of
the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner’s TV
program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]
1.    YES,  respondent Board has the power to
review petitioner’s TV program.
Petitioner contends that the term “television program”
[in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board
has the power to review and classify] should not
include religious programs like its program “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged,
will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution
which guarantees that “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”
[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate.
program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes
and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule
thatthe exercise of religious freedom can be regulated
by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the
State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment
to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the
exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal
mind but history counsels the Court against its blind
adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile
area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court]
shall continue to subject any act pinching the space
for the free exercise of religion to a heightened
scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to
the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and
its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
2.    YES,  respondent Board gravely abuse its
discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent
Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-
rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” either
religions, especially the Catholic Church. An
examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-
called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court
as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they
were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be
prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of
PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion. xxx.
The respondent Board may disagree with the
criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives
it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
37 | P a g e
unclean they may be. Under our constitutional
scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch
the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply
because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. In a State where there ought to be no
difference between the appearance and the reality of
freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology
is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion
is freedom of thought and it is best served by
encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When
the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more speech
for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of
colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the
respondents failed to apply the clear and present
danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of
Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can
be justified like other restraints on freedom of
expression on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled
that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger  to the
security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger.”
The records show that the decision of the respondent
Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft of findings of facts  to justify
the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There
is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life
of a reality already on ground.
II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme
Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the
issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to
prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the
dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in
the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of
what he considers to be a civic duty, requested
Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to
denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's
attorney, the respondent publicly announced having
sent to the United States the designs of the postage
stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of
wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green,
brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by
1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20,
36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this
day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is
sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of
prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may
properly restrain ministerial functions. While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will
not issue to restrain or control the performance of
other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J.,
6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by
statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior
tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether
excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and
226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial"
and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in
38 | P a g e
the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and
include the challenged act of the respondent Director
of Posts in the present case, which act because
alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari
"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory
rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of
prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or
tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own
jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching
upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue,
in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose
acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary
for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive
or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43
Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the
alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent
in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
It is alleged that this action of the respondent is
violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3,
Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which
provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces
or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary
of the principle of separation of church and state.
Without the necessity of adverting to the historical
background of this principle in our country, it is
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the
history of mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions
might arise when the estate will use the church, and
the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance
of their recognized this principle of separation of
church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the
Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain
of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President
McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission,
reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the
autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally
embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the
supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost
trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both
religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the
Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking
their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind
themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its
inherent limitations and recognized implications. It
should be stated that what is guaranteed by our
Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply
felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people,
in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid
of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they
thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt
from taxation properties devoted exclusively to
religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4,
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec.
344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not
prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to
the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art.
VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional
mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code).
Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving
Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal
holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular
idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial
moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes
polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against
39 | P a g e
religious worship are considered crimes against the
fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent
Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM
OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE
SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE
INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND
PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW
DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is
hereby appropriated and made immediately available
out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of
postage stamps with new designs, and other
expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is
hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any
portion of the amount herein appropriated in the
manner indicated and as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not
otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of
sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and
other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the
amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government". The printing and issuance of the
postage stamps in question appears to have been
approved by authority of the President of the
Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made
part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A.
The respondent alleges that the Government of the
Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is
granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from
the sale of the postage stamps in question at
P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be
sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in
view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance
of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to
the Government." Of course, the phrase
"advantageous to the Government" does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not
authorize the appropriation, use or application of
public money or property for the use, benefit or
support of a particular sect or church. In the present
case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in
question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications was not inspired
by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not
issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of
June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing
and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist to this country."
The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an
event considered of international importance "to give
publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of
the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications to the President of the Philippines,
June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is
significant to note that the stamps as actually
designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a
Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of
the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-
7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious
that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an
event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the
Government should not be embarassed in its activities
simply because of incidental results, more or less
religious in character, if the purpose had in view is
40 | P a g e
one which could legitimately be undertaken by
appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not
be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental
results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts,
175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed.,
168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of
counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the
complete separation of church and state and curb any
attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional
inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene
of religious intolerance and prescription, care should
be taken that at this stage of our political development
nothing is done by the Government or its officials that
may lead to the belief that the Government is taking
sides or favoring a particular religious sect or
institution. But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the
attending circumstances, we have come to the
conclusion that there has been no constitutional
infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, discretion to
misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government."
Even if we were to assume that these officials made
use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the
postage stamps in question still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the
exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists
which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting
aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
G.R. No. 106440 January 29, 1996
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA
and LEONICA MANOSCA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V.
PELAYO,
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari,
from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 15
January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled
"Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V.
Pelayo, et al."), this Court is asked to resolve whether
or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent
Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the
Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so
declared by the National Historical Institute ("NHI") as
a national historical landmark.
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P.
Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila, with an
area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square
meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI
to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the
founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No.
1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be
a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on
06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of
the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987,
the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he
explained:
According to your guidelines, national landmarks are
places or objects that are associated with an event,
achievement, characteristic, or modification that
makes a turning point or stage in Philippine history.
Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had
made contributions to Philippine history and culture
has been declared as a national landmark. It has
been held that places invested with unusual historical
interest is a public use for which the power of eminent
domain may be authorized . . . .
In view thereof, it is believed that the National
Historical Institute as an agency of the Government
charged with the maintenance and care of national
shrines, monuments and landmarks and the
development of historical sites that may be declared
as national shrines, monuments and/or landmarks,
may initiate the institution of condemnation
proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in
question in accordance with the procedure provided
for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
proceedings should be instituted by the Office of the
Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a
complaint for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging,
inter alia, that:
Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260,
the National Historical Institute issued Resolution No.
1, Series of 1986, which was approved on January,
1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
41 | P a g e
Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land
which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the
"Iglesia ni Cristo," as a National Historical Landrnark.
The plaintiff perforce needs the land as such national
historical landmark which is a public purpose.
At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent
motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take
immediate possession of the property. The motion
was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial
court issued, on 03 August 1989,4 an order fixing the
provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed
(P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing
the Republic to take over the property once the
required sum would have been deposited with the
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the
main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for
a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni
Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.5
Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in
the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of
the trial court.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by
respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners' motion
seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court
issued its denial of said motion to dismiss.6 Five (5)
days later, or on 20 February 1990,7 another order
was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and
academic the motion for reconsideration and/or
suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with the
rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss. Petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February
1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its
16th April 1991 order.8
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its now
disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the appellate
court dismissed the petition on the ground that the
remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was an
adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in any
case, had failed to show any grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdictional competence on the
part of the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration
of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992
resolution of the appellate court.
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with
a few known postulates.
Eminent domain, also often referred to as
expropriation and, with less frequency, as
condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an
inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed
with any constitutional gear to exist; instead,
provisions in our Constitution on the subject are
meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the
exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so
described as "the highest and most exact idea of
property remaining in the government" that may be
acquired for some public purpose through a method in
the nature of a forced purchase by the State.9 It is a
right to take or reassert dominion over property within
the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It
is said to be an essential part of governance even in
its most primitive form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty. 10 The only direct constitutional
qualification is that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation." 11 This
proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against
possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual
against whose property the power is sought to be
enforced.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to
meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of
Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 12 to wit: (a)
the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number
of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and
economic reform.13 Petitioners suggest that we
confine the concept of expropriation only to the
following public uses, 14 i.e., the —
. . . taking of property for military posts, roads, streets,
sidewalks, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers,
public buildings including schoolhouses, parks,
playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells,
water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries,
crematories, and railroads.
This view of petitioners is much too limitative and
restrictive.
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of
the extent of the President's power under
Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire
private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or
farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It
was in this particular context of the statute that the
Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines
in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature
42 | P a g e
and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain
should not now be understood as being confined only
to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed
estates. 15
The term "public use," not having been otherwise
defined by the constitution, must be considered in its
general concept of meeting a public need or a public
exigency. 16 Black summarizes the characterization
given by various courts to the term; thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and
statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain.
For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which
confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is
not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in
terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for
which condemnation is sought and, as long as public
has right of use, whether exercised by one or many
members of public, a "public advantage" or "public
benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.
Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769,
772, 773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the
exercise of the right to take private property in virtue
of eminent domain, means a use concerning the
whole community as distinguished from particular
individuals. But each and every member of society
need not be equally interested in such use, or be
personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to
satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is
sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262
U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term
may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It
may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or
restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for
a particular individual. The use must be a needful one
for the public, which cannot be surrendered without
obvious general loss and inconvenience. A "public
use" for which land may be taken defies absolute
definition for it changes with varying conditions of
society, new appliances in the sciences, changing
conceptions of scope and functions of government,
and other differing circumstances brought about by an
increase in population and new modes of
communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon,
156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. 17
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it
is not at all to be said, however, that public use should
thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The
idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases
of "use by the public" has long been discarded. This
Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,18 quoting
from Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27),
held:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of
the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See
DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424,
96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In
the present case, the Congress and its authorized
agencies have made determinations that take into
account a wide variety of values. It is no for us to
reappraise them. If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress,
the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent
domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is
merely the means to the end. See Luxton v. North
River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808,
810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric
R. Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct
427.
It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila
Railroad Co., 19 that:
. . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the
term "public use" to be one of constant growth. As
society advances, its demands upon the individual
increase and each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for
"whatever is beneficially employed for the community
is a public use.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There
was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy,
as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more.
As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
43 | P a g e
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to
remove any doubt, determines what is public use.
One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is
the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use. 20
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M.
Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 21 has
viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one
that "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically"
so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever
problems the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed
that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept
of public use which is just as broad as "public
welfare." 22
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual
interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's)
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
would benefit? This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration,
for what should be significant is the principal objective
of, not the casual consequences that might follow
from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in
setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the
culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the
Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be
derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by
most others could well be true but such a peculiar
advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property
does not necessarily diminish the essence and
character of public use. 23
Petitioners contend that they have been denied due
process in the fixing of the provisional value of their
property. Petitioners need merely to be reminded that
what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be
heard;24 contrary to petitioners' argument, the
records of this case are replete with pleadings 25 that
could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the
provisional value of the property.
Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate
court in sustaining the trial court's order which
considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of
Manila. 26 Both courts held correctly. The Republic
was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange
between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners which
(the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could
properly be bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to
be in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-
53487; 25 MAY 1981]
Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by
Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of
Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-
religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the
said projects will be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor
of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain
in his residence for one year and until the election of
his successor. The image would be made available to
the Catholic Church during the celebration of the
saint’s feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters,
and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church
of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to
the barangay council, as it was the church’s property
since church funds were used in its acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of
hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest
for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12
appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to
the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the
constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with
44 | P a g e
Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church,
contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article
VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause
in the Constitution violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty
quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs
of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be
made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was
the council’s funds that were used to buy the image,
therefore it is their property. Right of the determination
of custody is their right, and even if they decided to
give it to the Church, there is no violation of the
Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of
public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding
separation of church and state, freedom of worship
and banning the use of public money or property.
Austria v. NLRC G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and
the minister as an employee is purely secular in
nature because it has no relation with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church, such affairs
are governed by labor laws. The Labor Code applies
to all establishments, whether religious or not.
Facts:
The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious
corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a
pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991,
when his services were terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991,
Austria received several communications form
Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking
him to admit accountability and responsibility for the
church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,
Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to
the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be
made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat and
Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes
and offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the
collecting.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate.
The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of
employer's duly authorized representative as grounds
for the termination of his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatement
and backwages plus damages. Decision was
rendered in favor of petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in
favor of respondent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of
the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such,
involves the separation of church and state.
2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has
jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by
petitioner against the SDA.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its
religious ministers but what is involved here is the
relationship of the church as an employer and the
minister as an employee, which is purely secular
because it has no relationship with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for
petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of
Labor Code.
2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management
prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an
employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would
have been a different case if Austria was expelled or
excommunicated from the SDA.
45 | P a g e
G.R. No. 45330 March 7, 1989
EXALTACION CAÑETE, SOFIA CAVITE and
FATHER MANUEL V. GOMEZ, petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GENEROSA V. MAZO,
CORNELIA FLORES, EUTROPIA GOBENCIONG,
JACINTA ANIBAN, MERCEDES CEMPIS,
FELICIDAD MORANTE, VALERIANA DE VEYRA,
EXUPERIA PUMANES, FRANCISCA ABANO,
MARIA N. VILLEGAS, DOLORES B. FLORES,
ANATOLIA CREER, EUGENIA BARANDA,
CORNELIA MOLON, FILOMENA R. CINCO,
VISITACION MIRANDA, and CONSOLACION
VENTURA, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the
reversal of the August 12, 1976 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57172-R entitled
"Generosa V. Mazo, et al., plaintiffs-appellees v.
Exaltacion Canete et al., defendants-appellants"
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch IV, in Civil Case No. 4929 entitled
"Generosa Mazo et al., plaintiffs v. Exaltacion Canete,
et al., defendants", for 'Recovery of Personal
Properties with Damages" which declared the
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) as members of
the Cofradia de Nuestra Senora de Belen of Tanauan,
the true owners of the images, investments, standarte
and funds and ordered the defendants (petitioners
herein) to pay jointly and severally private
respondents, damages and attorney's fees and the
Order of said appellate court dated November 24,
1976 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration
of said decision.
The findings of fact by the trial and appellate courts
are as follows:
In the early 1900's, a certain Inocenta de Veyra from
Tanauan, Leyte founded the "Cofradia de Nuestra
Senora de Belen", a voluntary religious group of
hermanas mayores. In 1919 and 1930, Inocenta
donated to the Cofradia the disputed images of the
Holy Infant Jesus and of the Blessed Virgin (de
Belen), respectively. The Cofradia is responsible for
the material care of the religious icons, as well as for
the ceremonies and rites which culminate in the
annual observance of the fiesta. Said religious group
has been largely governed through the years by
customs and traditions. It is not known if there are by-
laws within the association.
It was the unbroken practice in the Cofradia that the
hermana mayor, during her incumbency, would keep
in her custody as trustee, the two images, the
investments, garments and standarte, including the
cash contributions of its members, with the tacit
understanding that the said religious images and the
unspent funds would be turned over to the next
hermana mayor on the first day of the succeeding
year.
In January of 1972, petitioner Exaltacion Canete was
elected as the hermana mayor and as such she took
possession of the subject religious articles and funds
of the Cofradia.
Because of the quarrel between the parish priest of
Tanauan, Fr. Manuel Gomez and Bishop Salvador of
the Diocese, resulting in the suspension and relief of
the former, the Cofradia, an erstwhile cohesive group
of women devotees, had been drawn into the
controversy and was now split into two camps: one
loyal to the ex-parish priest Fr. Gomez, and the other,
identified with the newly-designated parish priest Fr.
Parilla. The Cofradia members with Fr. Gomez
elected Sofia Cavite as the hermana mayor for 1973,
replacing Exaltacion Canete, while the group with Fr.
Parilla chose Bienvenida Casas. Exaltacion Canete
surrendered the images to Sofia Cavite.
Claiming to be members of the Cofradia and owners
in common of its properties including the disputed
images of the Blessed Virgin (de Belen) and the Holy
Infant Jesus, respondents, originally twenty-one in
number, brought an action against Exaltacion Cañete
and Sofia Cavite for the "Recovery of Personal
Properties with Writ of Attachment and Damages"
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV
(Civil Case No. 4929).
Petitioners countered that the subject images were
ecclesiastical properties and therefore outside the
province of the civil courts, and that respondents, as
members of an unregistered organization, had no
legal personality to sue. On the other hand, the
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) maintain that
these chattels are properties of their Cofradia. 1
The complaint was later amended to include Fr.
Gomez as additional defendant because according to
defendants' answer, the image of the Blessed Virgin
(de Belen) as in Fr. Gomez' custody. 2
46 | P a g e

Pursuant to a writ of replevin issued by the trial court
against petitioners, the latter delivered to respondents
the possession of the chattels in question and the
amount of P142.65 representing the funds of the
Cofradia. 3
On October 14, 1974, the trial court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the plaintiffs, as members of the Cofradia de
Nuestra Senora de Belen of Tanauan, the true owners
with right to possession of the images, investments,
standards and funds in question; ordering the
defendants to respect the ownership and possession
of the plaintiffs of said chattels; ordering the
defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs
moral damages in the sum of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) and other sum of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation; and pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."4
Eleven days later and over petitioners' vigorous
objection, the trial court allowed the immediate
execution of the aforesaid judgment upon the filing by
respondents of a bond in the amount of P4,000.00.5
On Appeal to the Court of Appeals, the findings of the
lower court were substantially adopted by the
appellate court except for the award of moral
damages. .6
Hence, this petition.
In this case, petitioners raised the following
assignments of errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
PLAINTIFFS TO SUE UNDER THE NAME OF THE
COFRADIA DE BELEN WHICH HAS NO
CORPORATE PERSONALITY TO SUE AND TO BE
SUED.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
LITIGATION BY TRYING AND DECIDING THE
CASE SINCE THE ISSUE INVOLVED THE
DETERMINATION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF
CHURCH PROPERTIES AND THE COURT A QUO
ERRED IN RECOGNIZING THE COMPLAINTS OF
THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WHO HAVE NOT
EVEN ESTABLISHED OWNERSHIP BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE PROPERTIES
SEIZED.
III. THE COURT EXCEEDED ITS POWERS, OR HAD
NO JURISDICTION, WHEN IT TREATED AND
DECIDED THE ISSUE ON THE VALIDITY OR NON-
VALIDITY OF THE SUSPENSION OF FATHER
MANUEL GOMEZ AND THE ISSUE AS TO WHO IS
THE LAWFUL PARISH PRIEST OF TANAUAN,
LEYTE, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE COURT WAS
THE VERY ROOT OF THE PRESENT
CONTROVERSY, THE MATTER HAVING BEEN AL
READY DECIDED BY ROME IN FAVOR OF
FATHER MANUEL GOMEZ
IV. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN REJECTING
THE COUNTERBOND FILED BY THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, THOUGH THE SAME
WAS SUFFICIENT AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE
AND WAS FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD OF FIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
SEIZURE OF SUBJECT RELIGIOUS PROPERTIES,
THUS PREVENTING THE RETURN OF THE SAME
TO THE DEFENDANTS.
V. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN JUMPING TO
THE CONCLUSION THAT THE IMAGES ARE NOT
CHURCH PROPERTY MERELY ON THE
INCOMPLETE INVENTORY PRESENTED BY
FATHER DENNY PARILLA, A, NEWLY ORDAINED
PRIEST, WHICH INVENTORY OMITTED THE
OTHER PAGES WHERE OTHER IMAGES ARE
MENTIONED INCLUDING THE CONTROVERSIAL
IMAGES SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASE.
VI. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO
REALIZE THAT THE PROPERTIES IN THE
INSTANT CASE ARE GOVERNED BY
"ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, CUSTOM, AND RULE OF
THE CHURCH."THE COURT A QUO ALSO ERRED
IN CONSTRUCTING THE TESTIMONY OF
SIMPLICIA CREER TO MEAN THAT BECAUSE SHE
ADMITTED THAT THE IMAGES BELONGED TO
THE COFRADIA THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT
CHURCH PROPERTY. THE COURT A QUO ALSO
ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE CLAIM OF THE
PLAINTIFFS THAT THE PARISH PRIEST HAD
NOTHING TO DO WITH THE COFRADIA AND ITS
PROPERTIES.
VII. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPLYING
ARTICLE 559 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE
INSTANT CASE, SINCE THE ORIGINAL OWNER,
47 | P a g e
INOCENTA DE VEYRA, HAD DONATED THE
IMAGES TO THE COFRADIA, AND THEREFORE
HAD NOT BEEN UNLAWFULLY DEPRIVED OF HER
PROPERTY. THE DEFENDANTS, WHO ARE BONA
FIDE MEMBERS OF THE COFRADIA, CANNOT BE
CALLED UNLAWFUL POSSESSORS OF THE
IMAGES. NEITHER CAN THE COURT CONSIDER
SEVERINA DE VEYRA AND GENEROSA MAZO
THE GRANDCHILDREN OF INOCENTA DE VEYRA,
THE. LAWFUL HEIRS AND THEREFORE OWNERS
OF THE IMAGES OF LIEU OF INOCENTA DE
VEYRA.
VIII. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BUILDING UP
ITS THEORY OF THE ORIGINAL OWNERSHIP,
FIRST BECAUSE THERE IS NO QUESTION OF
RESTORING IT TO THE ORIGINAL OWNER (OR
THE HEIRS), AND SECONDLY, BECAUSE THOSE
IN POSSESSION BECAME SO LAWFULLY.
IX. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING
DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEIR
SUPPOSED SUFFERINGS, MORAL OR SPIRITUAL
WERE CLEARLY IMAGINARY AND
INCONCEIVABLE, AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS WERE THE
ONES WHO HAD REALLY AND ACTUALLY
SUFFERED FROM THE HARASSMENTS BY THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES.
X. THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING
VERY PREMATURELY THE MOTION OF THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES FOR EXECUTION
PENDING APPEAL EVEN BEFORE THE
DEFENDANTS- APPELLANTS BECAME AWARE OF
THE ADVERSE DECISION AND ALSO BEFORE
THEY COULD AVAIL OF THEIR RIGHT TO APPEAL
THE CASE WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWABLE BY
LAW; AND IN SPITE OF ABSENCE OF JUSTIFIED,
VALID, AND SPECIAL REASONS STATED IN THE
MOTION WHY EXECUTION SHOULD ISSUE
PENDING APPEAL OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE OBJECTS
OF PLAINTIFFS- APPELLEES' ACTION FOR
REPLEVIN WERE ALREADY SECURELY IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE COURT, AND AFTER A FEW
DAYS AWARDED THE SAME TO THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES. 7
Stripped to bare essentials, it will be observed that the
issues raised herein such as: (a) competence of the
civil courts to rule on allegedly ecclesiastical issues;
(b) ownership of the controversial images; and (c)
respondents' legal personality to sue are but a
reiteration of what petitioners have advanced before
the Court of Appeals and the latter has already
passed upon them after making a careful discussion
of the evidence.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded:
The plaintiffs are suing in their own behalf as co-
owners of the images in question. They merely allege
to be members of the Cofradia de Belen.
The images in question are not church properties.
They belonged to the founder of the Cofradia who
donated said images to the members of said religious
association.
The suspension of the defendant Fr. Manuel Gomez
is not relevant to the issue involved. The lower court
simply mentioned the incident as a background of the
case.
The evidence justifies the award of attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation to the plaintiffs. The
defendants had no rights to retain the images in
question. To recover said images and their
investments the plaintiffs had to go to court and
employ counsel.
However, the equity and circumstances of the case do
not warrant any award of moral damages to the
plaintiffs. As to other matters, the lower court did not
commit a reversible error.8
Being based on substantial evidence, no cogent
reason could be found to disturb the above findings of
the Court of Appeals. As reiterated in a long line of
decisions, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In
petitions for review of decisions of the Court of
Appeals, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
confined to a review of questions of law, except where
the findings of fact are not supported by the record or
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious
abuse of discretion.9
However, the crux of the controversy appears to be
who of the two factions would be entitled to
possession of the properties in litigation, all of them
being members of the same association.
As correctly ruled by the trial court, the question which
came before it concerns rights of property held by a
religious society, strictly independent of the church.
48 | P a g e
Hence, the rights of such an organization to the use of
its property must accordingly be determined by the
ordinary principles which govern voluntary
association. 10
Citing Watson v. Jones , 11 in a similar case, this
Court ruled that the use of properties of a "religious
congregation" in case of schism, is controlled by the
numerical majority of the members. The minority in
choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body,
and refusing to recognize the authority of the
government body, can claim no rights in the property
from the fact that they once had been members. 12
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed, in toto.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary,
et al (2003)
FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates
under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim communities. Among the
functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars,
orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal
certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee
its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA
has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates
and perform other related regulatory activities.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State and that it is unconstitutional for the
government to formulate policies and guidelines on
the halal certification scheme because said scheme is
a function only religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the
Muslims.
ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional
provision as to freedom of religion
RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals
with the societal, legal, political and economic
concerns of the Muslim community as a "national
cultural community" and not as a religious group.
Thus, bearing in mind the constitutional barrier
between the Church and State, the latter must make
sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious
matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause
and the "free exercise of religion" provision found in
Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom
of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware
that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good." Without
doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from
the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO
46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for
Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of
issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect
forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention
of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement
of religious freedom. If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society
with a democratic framework like ours, the State must
minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens
and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no
compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their
religious right to classify a product as halal, even on
the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The
protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right
to health are already provided for in existing laws and
ministered to by government agencies charged with
ensuring that food products released in the market are
fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.
Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory
bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and
check the quality and safety of food products, the
perceived danger against the health of Muslim and
non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal
certifications issued by petitioner and similar
organizations come forward as the official religious
approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption.
The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s.
2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
49 | P a g e

Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION
106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959
FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose
children were expelled from their schools when they
refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge
during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued
by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the
manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The
petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their
plight and requested to reinstate their children. This
was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Secretary and
Director of Public Schools to restrain them from
implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and
contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual
and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious
group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem
of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion
and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the
complete separation of church and state in our system
of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any
religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently
does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual
is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the
courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect,
much less to a follower of said group or sect;
otherwise, there would be confusion and
misunderstanding for there might be as many
interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain
ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or
sects or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption
form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations
promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the
flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no
compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to
obey school regulations about the flag salute they
were not being persecuted. Neither were they being
criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If
they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they
merely lost the benefits of public education being
maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens,
nothing more. According to a popular expression, they
could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply
with the regulations about the flag salute, they
forfeited their right to attend public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires
religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty,
an emblem of freedom, liberty and national
unity; that the flag salute is not a religious
ceremony but an act and profession of love
and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the
fatherland which the flag stands for; that by
authority of the legislature, the Secretary of
Education was duly authorized to promulgate
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that
the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said
Department Order No. 8, does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of
religion and exercise of religion; that
compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school
discipline, including observance of the flag
ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in
public schools; and that for failure and
refusal to participate in the flag ceremony,
petitioners were properly excluded and
dismissed from the public school they were
attending.
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received
complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and
private schools, which refused to sing the Phil.
National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the
patriotic pledge.
50 | P a g e

Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B.
Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her
Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108,
dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors,
High School Principals and Heads of Private
Educational institutions to remove from service, after
due process, teachers and school employees, and to
deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of
public education, if they do not participate in daily flag
ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such
memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief
and choose not to obey. Despite a number of
appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to
let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow
their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order
was issued by the district supervisor of Daan
Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990,
ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in the school
register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils
from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their
belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however,
given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their
mind.
Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the
Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to
their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed
special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without
prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their
right to due process, their right to free public
education and their right to freedom of speech,
religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the
voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the
rolls’ issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and
enjoining respondent from barring them from classes;
and compelling the respondent and all persons acting
for him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-
admission I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to
their respective classes until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
comment to the petitions defending the expulsion
orders issued by the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in
the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through observance of the flag ceremony.
They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those
who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there
is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of
Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates right
receive free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness
from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the
duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education, and to make such
education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV).
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag
Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such
patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention
during flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose ‘a
grave and present danger of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate
public interest that the state has a right and duty to
prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of
our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino,
regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the
invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before
every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had
lived through that dark period of our history, they
would not quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted
and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set
aside.
51 | P a g e
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of
Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a
man who is not her husband, for more than twenty
five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she
entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said
RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society.
They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to
legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent
for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she
is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred
of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts
to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public
and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends
only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres
the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of
religion.
Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
2010
SEPTEMBER 19, 2018
FACTS:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds
stating that the party’s definition of the LGBT sector
makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. Upon its
seeking reconsideration, the COMELEC again denied
its application mentioning that:
The party has not proven that its interests are also the
nation’s.
There is no substantial differentiation – they are
granted the same rights as others as men and
women.
The party espouses values contrary to public morals.
The RPC prohibits immoral doctrines, etc…
Ang Ladlad filed this petition to annul the COMELEC’s
resolutions.
ISSUE:
Wherther the COMELEC’s resolutions denying
registration to Ang Ladlad is justified – NO.
RATIO:
52 | P a g e

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for
registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941,
nor is it associated with or related to any of the
sectors in the enumeration.
The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no
misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s
initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in
each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner
alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons;
that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic
discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself
to be “a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang
Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that
“[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s
Petition for Registration
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years,
homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons
behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not
seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these “generally accepted public morals”
have not been convincingly transplanted into the
realm of law.
Equal Protection
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act
of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as
the party-list system is concerned does not imply that
any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals under different circumstances
would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s
position that homosexuals are a class in themselves
for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We
are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated
treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence
to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make
such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis
as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
COMELEC made “an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the
case.”
Freedom of Expression and Association
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may
believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold
and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs
and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with
equal fervor that relationships between individuals of
the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and
express that view. However, as far as this Court is
concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community
to exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these
Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations
and obligations outlined in said Principles which are
not reflective of the current state of international law,
and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and
rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
53 | P a g e

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Case Summary of Cantwell v. Connecticut:
A man and his two sons, who were all Jehovah’s
Witnesses, were going door to door in a
predominantly Catholic neighborhood, asking people
to hear recordings about their religion. Their
preaching offended some listeners.
The State charged, and ultimately convicted, them of
soliciting contributions without a permit, and convicted
one son of inciting a breach of the peace. The State
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions.
Applying the First Amendment to the States, the Court
held that the permit requirement was a prior restraint
on religious freedom and the breach of the peace
conviction violated the defendant’s right to religious
liberty and freedom of speech.
Cantwell v. Connecticut Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
Morris Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell,
were going door to door in a predominantly Catholic
neighborhood in New Haven. With pamphlets and a
portable record player, they were trying to persuade
people to listen to information about their religion –
Jehovah’s Witnesses – and were asking for
contributions. At one point, Jesse asked to play a
recording for some onlookers, and when the recording
offended the onlookers, Jesse packed up his things
and went on his way.
State officials charged the Cantwells with soliciting
contributions without a permit, and with inciting a
breach of the peace.
Procedural History:
The three defendants were tried and convicted of the
offenses.
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed all three
convictions regarding the permit, and affirmed the
conviction for breach of the peace against Jesse
The defendants then appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, claiming that their freedom of speech and their
right to the free exercise of religion under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
violated.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue and Holding:
Did the convictions for failure to get a permit to solicit
contributions, and for inciting a breach of the peace,
violate the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause? Yes.
Judgment:
The decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court is
reversed and remanded.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
The First Amendment applies to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the State’s cannot
put unreasonable restraints on a person’s free
exercise of religion, which includes the right to preach
one’s views in a reasonable setting.
Reasoning:
The statute that requires a permit to solicit money for
religious, or other purposes, is unconstitutional
because it deprives the defendants of liberty without
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The fundamental concept of liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the guarantees in the First
Amendment.
The First Amendment safeguards the freedom for
someone to believe whatever he or she wants, as well
as the freedom to express or preach their religion to
others. With regard to the freedom to express or
preach religion, a State can regulate the time, place,
and manner generally in the interest of public safety
and convenience. However, it cannot put a prior
restraint on religious speech with a licensing
requirement.
Further, Jesse’s conviction for breach of the peace
must be set aside because Jesse’s behavior was not
so disruptive that it outweighed his freedom to
express his religious beliefs. When his religious
recording offended onlookers, he walked away.
Therefore, the conviction merely punished his
religious expression, which the Constitution cannot
allow.
Significance:
Cantwell v. Connecticut is a landmark decision
because it made clear that the religious freedoms in
the First Amendment applied to State and local
governments. That principle was not clear before
54 | P a g e
Cantwell. Seven years later, the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause was incorporated to the States
in Everson v. Board of Education.
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770 July 18, 2012
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-2255-MTJ)
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte,
Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed the
present administrative case against Judge Ignacio B.
Macarine (respondent) for violation of OCA Circular
No. 49-20031 dated May 20, 2003.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign
travels of judges and court personnel, regardless of
the number of days, must be with prior permission
from the Court. A travel authority must be secured
from the OCA Judges must submit the following
requirements:
(1.) application or letter-request addressed to the
Court Administrator stating the purpose of the travel
abroad;
(2.) application for leave covering the period of the
travel abroad, favorably recommended by the
Executive Judge; and
(3.) certification from the Statistics Division, Court
Management Office, OCA as to the condition of the
docket.2
The complete requirements should be submitted to
and received by the OCA at least two weeks before
the intended time of travel. No action shall be taken
on requests for travel authority with incomplete
requirements.3
Judges and personnel who shall leave the country
without travel authority issued by the OCA shall be
subject to disciplinary action.4
On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court
Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Portugal
Perez, requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong
with his family for the period of September 10 - 14,
2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. The
respondent stated that his travel abroad shall be
charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did
not submit the corresponding application for leave.
For his failure to submit the complete requirements,
his request for authority to travel remained unacted
upon. The respondent proceeded with his travel
abroad without the required travel authority from the
OCA.
On January 28, 2010,5 the respondent was informed
by the OCA that his leave of absence for the period of
September 9-15, 2009 had been disapproved and his
travel considered unauthorized by the Court. His
absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits
but from his salary corresponding to the seven (7)
days that he was absent, pursuant to Section 50 of
the Omnibus Rules on Leave.6 The respondent was
also required to submit his explanation on his failure
to comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
In his letter-explanation dated February 25, 2010, the
respondent narrated that his daughter, a nurse
working in New Jersey, USA, gave him a trip to
Hongkong as a gift for his 65th birthday. In the first
week of September 2009, he received a call from his
daughter that she had already booked him, together
with his wife and two sons, in a hotel in Hongkong
from September 13 to 15, 2009. They flew in to
Manila from Surigao City on September 9, 2009,
intending to prepare the necessary papers for his
authority to travel at the Supreme Court the following
day. However, sensing time constraint and thinking of
the futility of completing the requirements before their
scheduled flight, he opted not to immediately
complete the requirements and simply went ahead
with their travel abroad. He thought of submitting his
compliance upon his return to Manila. He
acknowledged his mistake and regretted his failure to
comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003. He promised
not to commit the same infraction again. He further
requested for reconsideration of the OCA’s intended
action to deduct his salary corresponding to the seven
(7) days that he was absent, instead of charging his
absences to his leave credits.
In an Evaluation Report dated September 6, 2010, the
OCA found the respondent guilty of violation of OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 for traveling out of the country
without filing the necessary application for leave and
55 | P a g e
without first securing a travel authority from the Court.
The OCA recommended:
a) this matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;
b) Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, MCTC, Gen. Luna,
Surigao del Norte, be FINED in the amount of
P5,000.00 for Violation for Circular No. 49-2003 dated
May 20, 2003; and c) the Financial Management
Office, Finance Division, OCA, be DIRECTED to
DEDUCT the amount equivalent to the seven (7) days
salary of Judge Ignacio Macarine as a result of his
disapproved and unauthorized leave of absence
pursuant to Section 50, Omnibus Rules on Leave,
without deducting his leave credits thereof.
[emphases supplied]
True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the
Constitution.1âwphi1 However, the exercise of such
right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel
provided that such restriction is in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health as may
be provided by law. This, however, should by no
means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent
power of administrative supervision over lower courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely
regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by
judges and court personnel, before they can go on
leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or
prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate"
is to govern or direct according to rule.
To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid
disruption in the administration of justice, OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to
travel abroad to submit, together with his application
for leave of absence duly recommended for approval
by his Executive Judge, a certification from the
Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the
OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on his
Certificate of Service for the month immediately
preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within
three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to
Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.7
For traveling abroad without having been officially
allowed by the Court, the respondent is guilty of
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Under Section
9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, violation
of Supreme Court directives and circular is considered
a less serious charge and, therefore, punishable by
suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than
three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00.8
Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the
disciplining authority the discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the
proper penalty. The Court had in several instances
refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the
presence of mitigating facts, such as the employee’s
length of service, acknowledgement of his or her
infractions and feelings of remorse for the same,
advanced age, family circumstances, and other
humanitarian and equitable considerations.
In the present case, the respondent, after learning
that his daughter had already booked him and his
family in a hotel in Hongkong, immediately went to
Manila to secure his travel authority from the Court.
However, with the short period of time from their
arrival in Manila on September 9, 2009 up to the time
of their booking in Hongkong from September 13 to
15, 2009, he was pressed for time and opted not to
complete the required travel authority, with the
intention of securing one after his travel. The
respondent regretted his failure to comply with the
requirements of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. He
acknowledged his mistake and promised not to
commit the same infraction in the future.
We consider the outlined circumstances as mitigating.
Following judicial precedents, the respondent
deserves some degree of leniency in imposing upon
him the appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ignacio B.
Macarine, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna,
Surigao del Norte, is hereby given the ADMONITION
that he acted irresponsibly when he opted not to
immediately secure a travel authority and is saved
only from the full force that his violation carries by the
attendant mitigating circumstances. He is also
WARNED that the commission of a similar violation in
the future will merit a more severe penalty. The
recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administration that his absences, which were
unauthorized, shall not be deducted from his leave
credits but from his salary is hereby APPROVED.
56 | P a g e

RIGHT TO INFORMATION (LIMITATIONS)
Chavez vs PCGG
G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998
Facts: Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to
information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the
national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since
it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy”
that would be greatly prejudicial to the national
interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in
general have a right to know the transactions or deals
being contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging
a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs.
They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is
premature, because there is no showing that he has
asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet
be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements
have not become effective and binding.
Issues: Whether the constitutional right to information
may prosper against respondents’ argument that the
“should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions
of the Agreements are not yet effective and binding
Held: Yes.
Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the
following recognized restrictions: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets
and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4)
other confidential information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
General and Supplemental Agreements dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos
heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND
VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government
functionaries and officials who are or may be directly
or indirectly involved in the recovery of the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public
the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as
well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-
gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions
embodied in this Decision.
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio
Dionisio
G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989
Facts:
The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject
parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio,
the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that
the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-
Air Village Association, the respondent, and must
abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the
Association in the interest of the sanitation, security
and the general welfare of the community.
The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on
the following grounds: the questioned assessment is
a property tax outside the corporate power of the
association; the association has no power to compel
the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of privity
of contract; the questioned assessment should not be
enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary,
oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory; the
respondent association is exercising governmental
powers which should not be sanctioned.
Issue:
Whether or not the association can lawfully collect
dues
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered
land are bound by the annotations found at the back
of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of
land. The petitioner’s contention that he has no privity
with the respondent association is not persuasive.
When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject
parcel of land it was understood that he took the same
57 | P a g e
free of all ecumbrances except annotations at the
back of the certificate of title, among them, that he
automatically becomes a member of the respondent
association. One of the obligations of a member is to
pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of
the association.
The mode of payment as well as the purposes for
which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the
dues are not in the concept of a property tax as
claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the
common expenses for necessary services.
property tax is assessed according to the value of the
property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the
area of the lot. The dues are fees which a member of
the respondent association is required in hiring
security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets,
street lights and other community projects for the
benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village.
These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable
for the particular community involved.
The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do
not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. The
constitutional proscription than no person can be
compelled to be a member of an association against
his will applies only to governmental acts and not to
private transactions like the one in question.
The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is
compelled to be a member of the association against
his will because the limitation is imposed upon his
ownership of property. If he does not desire to
comply with the annotation or lien in question, he can
at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of
disposing of the property and free himself from the
burden of becoming a member of the association.
EMINENT DOMAIN (CONCEPT)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2832. November 24, 1906. ]
REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic
administrator of this vacant bishopric and legal
representative of the general interests of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva
Caceres, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. P. VICENTE RAMIREZ,
ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Parochial
Church of Lagonoy, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF
LAGONOY, Defendants-Appellants.
Manly & Gallup, for Appellants.
Leoncio Imperial and Chicote, Miranda & Sierra, for
Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CHURCH BUILDINGS; POSSESSION;
ADMINISTRATION; ESTOPPEL. — In an action
brought by the Roman Catholic Church to recover a
church building, against a priest whom it has put in
possession thereof to administer the same, the latter
A is estopped from alleging ownership at the time he
took possession either in himself or in a third person.
2. ID.; ID.; EJECTMENT; RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION. — Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron (6
Phil. Rep., 286), followed to the point that a person in
possession of real estate who has been derived of
such possession can recover it unless the defendants
can show a better right thereto.
3. ID.; TRANSFER TO MUNICIPALITIES BY
GOVERNMENT. — The Government of the Philippine
Island has never undertaken to transfer to the
municipalities the ownership or right of possession of
the churches therein.
4. ID.; OWNERSHIP; POSSESSION. — Prior to the
cession of the Philippines to the United State the King
of Spain was not the owner of the consecrated
churches therein and had no right to the possession
thereof. The exclusive right to such possession was in
the Roman Catholic Church and such right has
continued since cession and now exists.
5. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. — The Roman
Catholic Church is a judicial person in the Philippine
Islands.
PER CARSON, J., concurring in the
result:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
6. CHURCH BUILDINGS; OWNERSHIP. — The legal
title to the State-constructed churches in the
Philippine Island is in the United States.
7. ID.; USUFRUCT. — The beneficial ownership of
these churches is in the people of the Philippine
Islands.
8. ID.; POSSESSION AND CONTROL. — The right to
the possession and control of these churches is in the
Roman Catholic Church so long as it continues to use
them for the purposes for which they were dedicated.
58 | P a g e
There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church
in the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos
Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869,
the church and convent were burned. They were
rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There was evidence
that this was done by the order of the provincial
governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction
was performed by the people of the pueblo the
direction of the cabeza de barangay. Under the law
then in force, each man in the pueblo was required to
work for the government, without compensation, for
forty days every year. The time spent in the
reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a
part of the forty days. The material necessary was
brought and paid for in part by the parish priest from
the funds of the church and in part was donated by
certain individuals of the pueblo. After the completion
of the church it was always administered, until
November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic
Communion and all the people of the pueblo
professed that faith and belonged to that church.
The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by
the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the
church on the 5th of July, 1901. he administered it as
such under the orders of his superiors until the 14th
day of November, 1902. His successor having been
then appointed, the latter made a demand on this
defendant for the delivery to him of the church,
convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments,
books, jewels, money, and other property of the
church. The defendant, by a written document of that
date, refused to make such delivery. That document is
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At 7 o’clock last night I received through Father
Agripino Pisino your respected order of the 12th
instant, wherein I am advised of the appointment of
Father Pisino as acting parish priest of this town, and
directed to turn over to him this parish and to report to
you at the vicarage. In reply thereto, I have the honor
to inform you that the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction
with the parish priest thereof, has seen fit to sever
connection with the Pope at Rome and his
representatives in these Islands, and join the Filipino
Church, the head of which is at Manila. This resolution
of the people was reduced to writing and triplicate
copies made, of which I beg to inclose a copy
herewith.
"For this reason I regret to inform you that I am unable
to obey your said order by delivering to Father
Agripino Pisino the parish property of Lagonoy which,
as I understand, is now outside of the control of the
Pope and his representatives in these Islands. May
God guard you many years.
"Lagonoy, November 14, 1902.
(Signed) "VICENTE RAMIREZ.
"RT. REV. VICAR OF THIS DISTRICT."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The document, a copy of which is referred to in this
letter, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"LAGONOY, November, 9, 1902.
"The municipality of this town and some of its most
prominent citizens having learned through the papers
from the capital of these Islands of the constitution of
the Filipino National Church, separate from the control
of the Pope at Rome by reason of the fact that the
latter has refused to either recognize or grant the
rights to the Filipino clergy which have many times
been urged, and it appearing to us that the reasons
advanced why such offices should be given to the
Filipino clergy are evidently well-founded, we have
deemed it advisable to consult with the parish priest of
this town as to whether it would be advantageous to
join the said Filipino Church and to separate from the
control of the Pope as long as he continues to ignore
the rights of the said Filipino clergy, under the
conditions that there will be no change in the articles
of faith, and that the sacraments and other dogmas
will be recognized and particularly that of the
immaculate conception of the mother of our Lord. But
the moment the Pope at Rome recognizes and grants
the rights heretofore denied to the Filipino clergy we
will return to his control. In view of this, and subject to
this condition, the reverend parish priest, together with
the people of the town, unanimously join in declaring
that from this date they separate themselves from the
obedience and control of the Pope and join the
Filipino National Church. This assembly and the
reverend parish priest have accordingly adopted this
resolution written in triplicate, and resolved to send a
copy thereof to the civil government of this province
for its information, and do sign the same below.
Vicente Ramirez, Francisco Israel, Ambrosio Bocon,
Florentino Relloso, Macario P. Ledesma, Cecilio
Obias, Balbino Imperial, Juan Preseñada, Fernando
Deudor, Mauricio Torres, Adriano Sabater."cralaw
virtua1aw library
At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in
this document was adopted, there were present about
59 | P a g e
100 persons of the pueblo. There is testimony in the
case that the population of the pueblo was at that time
9,000 and that all but 20 of the inhabitants were
satisfied with the action there taken. Although it is of
no importance in the case, we are inclined to think
that the testimony to this effect merely means that
about 100 of the principal men of the town were in
favor of the resolution and about 20 of such principal
men were opposed to it. After the 14th of November,
the defendant, Ramirez, continued in the possession
of the church and other property and administered the
same under the directions of his superior, the Obispo
Maximo of the Independent Filipino Church. The rites
and ceremonies and the manner of worship were the
same after the 14th day of November as they were
before, but the relations between the Roman Catholic
Church and the defendant had been entirely severed.
In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action
against the defendant, Ramirez, alleging in his
amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church
was the owner of the church building, the convent,
cemetery, the books, money, and other property
belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the
possession thereof and that the defendant render an
account of the property which he had received and
which was retained by him, and for other relief.
The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to
a general denial of the allegation of the complaint,
admitted that he was in the possession and
administration of the property described therein with
the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the
inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners
of the said property. After this answer had been
presented, and on the 1st day of November, 1904, the
municipality of Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it
be allowed to intervene in the case and join with the
defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This
petition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day
of December filed an answer in which it alleged that
the defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the
property described in the complaint under the
authority and with the consent of the municipality of
Lagonoy and that such municipality was the owner
thereof.
Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in
intervention, and the case was tried and final
judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants. The defendants then brought
the case here by a bill of exceptions.
That the person in the actual possession of the church
and other property described in the complaint is the
defendant, Ramirez, is plainly established by the
evidence. It does not appear that the municipality, as
a corporate body, ever took any action in reference to
this matter until they presented their petition for
intervention in this case. In fact, the witnesses for the
defense, when they speak of the ownership of the
buildings, say that they are owned by the people of
the pueblo, and one witness, the president, said that
the municipality as a corporation had nothing
whatever to do with the matter. That the resolution
adopted on the 14th of November, and which has
been quoted above, was not the action of the
municipality, as such, is apparent from an inspection
thereof.
The witnesses for the defenses speak of a delivery of
the church by the people of the pueblo to the
defendant, Ramirez, but there is no evidence in the
case of any such delivery. Their testimony in regard to
the delivery always refers to the action taken on the
14th of November, a record of which appears that in
the document above quoted. It is apparent that the
action taken consisted simply in separating
themselves from the Roman Catholic Church, and
nothing is said therein in reference to the material
property then in possession of the defendant,
Ramirez.
There are several grounds upon which this judgment
must be affirmed.
(1) As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that
he took possession of the property as the servant or
agent of the plaintiff. The only right which he had to
the possession at the time he took it, was the right
which was given to him by the plaintiff, and he took
possession under the agreement to return that
possession whenever it should be demanded of him.
Under such circumstances he will not be allowed,
when the return of such possession is demanded by
him the plaintiff, to say that the plaintiff is not the
owner of the property and is not entitled to have it
delivered back to him. The principle of law that a
tenant can not deny his landlord’s title, which is found
in section 333, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and also in the Spanish law, is applicable
to a case of this kind. An answer of the defendant,
Ramirez, in which he alleged that he himself was the
owner of the property at the time he received it from
the plaintiff, or in which he alleged that the pueblo was
the owner of the property at that time, would
constitute no defense. There is no claim made by him
60 | P a g e
that since the delivery of the possession of the
property to him by the plaintiff he has acquired the title
thereto by other means, nor does he is own behalf
make any claim whatever either to the property or to
the possession thereof.
(2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer,
claims as such, to be the owner of the property. As we
have said before, the evidence shows that it never
was in the physical possession of the property. But
waiving this point and assuming that the possession
of Ramirez, which he alleges in his answer is the
possession of the municipality, gives the municipality
the rights of a possessor, the question still arises,
Who has the better right to the present possession of
the property? The plaintiff, in 1902, had been in the
lawful possession thereof for more than thirty years
and during all that time its possession had never been
questioned or disturbed. That possession has been
taken away from it and it has the right now to recover
the possession from the persons who have so
deprived it of such possession, unless the latter can
show that they have a better right thereto. This was
the preposition which was discussed and settled in
the case of Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 1 No. 1748,
decided June 1, 1906. That decision holds that as
against one who has been in possession for the
length of the plaintiff has been in possession, and who
had been deprived of his possession, and who can
not produce any written evidence of title, the mere fact
that the defendant is in possession does not entitle
the defendant to retain that possession. In order that
he may continue in possession, he must show a
better right thereto.
The evidence in this case does not show that the
municipality has, as such, any right of whatever in the
property in question. It has produced no evidence of
ownership. Its claim of ownership is rested in its brief
in this court upon the following propositions: That the
property in question belonged prior to the treaty of
Paris to the Spanish Government; that by the treaty of
Paris the ownership thereof passed to the
Government of the United States; that by section 12
of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, such property
was transferred to the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and that by the circular of that Government,
dated November 11, 1902, the ownership and the
right to the possession of this property passed to the
municipality of Lagonoy. If, for the purposes of the
argument, we should admit that the other propositions
are true, there is no evidence whatever to support the
last proposition, namely that the Government of the
Philippine Islands has transferred the ownership of
this church to the municipality of Lagonoy. We have
found no circular of the date above referred to. The
one of February 10, 1903, which is probably the one
intended, contains nothing that indicates any such
transfer. As to the municipality of Lagonoy, therefore,
it is very clear that it has neither title, ownership, nor
right of possession.
(3) We have said that it would have no such title
or ownership ever admitting that the Spanish
Government was the owner of the property and it has
passed by the treaty of Paris to the American
Government. But this assumption is not true. As a
matter of law, the Spanish Government at the time the
treaty of peace was signed, was not the owner of this
property, nor of any other property like it, situated in
the Philippine Islands.
It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times
the parish churches in the Philippine Islands were
built by the Spanish Government. Law 2, title 2, book
1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies is, in
part, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and
parish houses of the Spaniards and natives of our
Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost
and expense of our royal treasury, and applied for
their service and maintenance the part of the tithes
belonging to us by apostolic concession according to
the division we have made."cralaw virtua1aw library
Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial
churches such as the one in question. That law is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The parish churches which was erected in Spanish
towns shall be of durable and decent construction.
Their costs shall be divided and paid in three parts:
One by our royal treasury, another by the residents
and Indian encomenderos of the place where such
churches are constructed, and the other part by the
Indians who abide there; and if within the limits of a
city, village, or place there should be any Indians
incorporated to our royal crown, we command that for
our part there be contributed the same amount as the
residents and encomenderos, respectively, contribute;
and the residents who have no Indians shall also
contribute for this purpose in accordance with their
stations and wealth, and that which is so given shall
be deducted from the share of the Indians should
pay."cralaw virtua1aw library
61 | P a g e
Law 11 of the same title is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We command that the part of the tithes which
belongs to the fund for the erection of churches shall
be given to their superintendents to be expended for
those things necessary for these churches with the
advice of the prelates and officials, and by their
warrants, and not otherwise. And we request and
charge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in
the collection and disbursement thereof, but to guard
these structures."cralaw virtua1aw library
Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In all settlements, even though the Indians are few,
there shall be erected a church where mass can be
decently held, and it shall have a donor with a key,
notwithstanding the fact that it be the subject to or
separate from a parish."cralaw virtua1aw library
Not only were all the parish churches in the
Philippines erected by the King and under his
direction, but it was made unlawful to erect a church
without the license of the King. This provision is
contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found,
and maintain all cathedrals, parish churches,
monasteries, votive hospitals, churches, and religious
and pious establishments where they are necessary
for the teaching, propagation, and preaching of the
doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith, and to
aid to this effect with out royal treasury whenever
possible, and to receive information of such places
where they should be founded and are necessary,
and the ecclesiastical patronage of all our Indies
belonging to us:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We command that there shall not be erected,
instituted, founded, or maintained any cathedral,
parish church, monastery, hospital, or votive
churches, or other pious or religious establishment
without our express permission as is provided in Law
1, title 2, and Law 1, title 3, of this book,
notwithstanding any permission heretofore given by
our viceroy or other ministers, which in this respect we
revoke and make null, void, and of no effect."cralaw
virtua1aw library
By agreement at an early date between the Pope and
the Crown of Spain, all tithes in the Indies were given
by the former to the latter and the disposition made
the King of the fund thus created is indicated by Law
1, title 16, book 1, which is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies
belong to us by the apostolic concessions of the
supreme pontiffs, we command the officials of our
royal treasury of those provinces to collect and cause
to be collected all tithes due and to become due from
the crops and flocks of the residents in the manner in
which it has been the custom to pay the same, and
from these tithes the churches shall be provided with
competent persons of good character to serve them
and with all ornaments and things which may be
necessary for divine worship, to the end that these
churches may be well served and equipped, and we
shall be informed of God, our Lord; this order shall be
observed where the contrary has not already been
directed by us in connection with the erection of
churches."cralaw virtua1aw library
That the condition of things existing by virtue of the
Laws of the Indies was continued to the present time
is indicated by the royal order of the 31st of January,
1856, and by the royal order of the 13th of August,
1876, both relating to the construction and repair of
churches, there being authority for saying that the
latter order was in force in the Philippines.
This church, and other churches similarly situated in
the Philippines, having been erected by the Spanish
Government, and under its direction, the next
question to be considered is, To whom did these
churches belong?
Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the
ownership of things and, after discussing what can be
called public property and what can be called private
property, speaks, in Law 12, of those things which are
sacred, religious, or holy. That law is as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Law XII. — HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS
CAN NOT BE OWNED BY ANY PERSON.
"No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the
service of God, can be the subject of ownership by
any man, nor can it be considered as included in his
property holdings. Although the priests may have
such things in their possession, yet they are not the
owners thereof. They, hold them thus as guardians or
servants, or because they have the care of the same
and serve God in or without them. Hence they were
62 | P a g e
allowed to take from the revenues of the church and
lands what was reasonably necessary for their
support; the balance, belonging to God, was to be
devoted to pious purposes, such as the feeding and
clothing of the poor, the support of orphans, the
marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil
women because of their poverty, and for the
redemption of captives and the repairing of the
churches, and the buying of chalices, clothing, books,
and others things which they might be in need of, and
other similar charitable purposes."cralaw virtua1aw
library
And then taking up for consideration the first of the
classes in to which this law has divided these things, it
defines in Law 13, title 28, third partida, consecrated
things. That law is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sacred things, we say, are those which are
consecrated by the bishops, such as churches, the
altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments,
books, and all other things which are in tended for the
service of the church, and the title to these things can
not be alienated except in certain specific cases as
we have already shown in the first partida of this book
by the laws dealing with this subject. We say further
that even where a consecrated church is razed, the
ground upon which it formerly stood shall always be
consecrated ground. But if any consecrated church
should fall into the hands of the enemies of our faith it
shall there and then cease to be sacred as long as the
enemy has it under control, although once recovered
by the Christians, it will again become sacred,
reverting to its condition before the enemy seized it
and shall have all the right and privileges formerly
belonging to it."cralaw virtua1aw library
That the principles of the partida in reference to
churches still exist is indicated by Sanchez Roman,
whose work on the Civil Law contains the following
statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First Group. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical.
A. Spiritual. — From early times distinction has been
made by authors and by law between things governed
by divine law, called divine, and those governed by
human law, called human, and although the former
can not be the subject of civil juridical relations, their
nature and species should be ascertained either to
identify them and exclude them from such relations or
because they furnish a complete explanation of the
foregoing tabulated statement, or finally because the
laws of the partida deal with them.
"Divine things are those which are either directly or
indirectly established by God for his service and
sanctification of men and which are governed by
divine or canonical laws. This makes it necessary to
divide them into spiritual things, which are those
which have a direct influence on the religious
redemption of man such as the sacrament, prayers,
fasts, indulgences, etc., and corporeal or
ecclesiastical, which are those means more or less
direct for the proper religious salvation of man.
"7. First Group. Divine things. B. Corporeal or
ecclesiastical things (sacred, religious, holy, and
temporal belonging to the church). Corporeal or
ecclesiastical things are so divided.
"(a) Sacred things are those devoted to God,
religion, and worship in general, such as temples,
altars, ornaments, etc. These things can not be
alienated except for some pious purpose and in such
cases as are provided for in the laws, according to
which their control pertains to the ecclesiastical
authorities, and in so far as their use is concerned, to
the believers and the clergy. (2 Derecho Civil
Español, Sanchez Roman, p. 480; 8 Manresa,
Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, p. 636; 3
Alcubilla, Diccionario de la Administracion Española,
p. 486.)"
The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to
the public in general and what belonged to private
persons. In the first group churches are not named.
The present Civil Code declares in article 338 that
property is of public or private ownership. Article 339,
which defines public property, is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Property of public ownership is —
"1. That destined to the public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed
by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that
of similar character.
"2. That belonging exclusively to the state without
being for public use and which is destined to some
public service, or to the development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for
the defense of the territory, and mines, until their
concession has been granted."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The code also defines the property of provinces and
of pueblos, and in defining what property is of public
63 | P a g e
use, article 344 declares as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Property for public use in provinces and in towns
comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares,
streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades,
and public works of general service supported by the
said towns or provinces.
"All other property possessed by either is patrimonial,
and shall be governed by the provisions of this code,
unless otherwise prescribe in special laws."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is
any mention made of churches. When the Civil Code
undertook to define those things in a pueblo which
were for the common use of the inhabitants of the
pueblo, or which belonged to the State, while it
mentioned a great many other things, it did not
mention churches.
It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for
the Execution of the Mortgage Law indicates that
churches belong to the State and are public property.
That article is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There shall be excepted from the record required by
article 2 of the law:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First. Property which belongs exclusively to the
eminent domain of the State, and which is for the use
of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands, rivers
and their borders, wagon roads, and the roads of all
kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets, parks,
public promenades, and commons of towns, provided
they are not lands of common profit to the inhabitants;
walls of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads, and
any other analogous property during the time they are
in common and general use, always reserving the
servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea
and borders of navigable rivers.
"Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic
faith."cralaw virtua1aw library
A reading of this article shows that far from proving
that churches belong to the State and to the eminent
domain thereof, it proves the contrary, for, if they had
belonged to the State, they would have been included
in the first paragraph instead of being placed in a
paragraph by themselves.
The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the
cession of the Philippines to the United States,
churches and other consecrated objects were
considered outside of the commerce of man. They
were not public property, nor could they be subjects of
private property in the sense that any private person
could the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of
property distinctive characteristic of which was that it
was devoted to the worship of God.
But, being material things was necessary that some
one should have the care and custody of them and
the administration thereof, and the question occurs,
To whom, under the Spanish law, was intrusted that
possession and administration? For the purposes of
the Spanish law there was only one religion. That was
the religion professed by the Roman Catholic Church.
It was for the purposes of that religion and for the
observance of its rites that this church and all other
churches in the Philippines were erected. The
possession of the churches, their care and custody,
and the maintenance of religious worship therein were
necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that body. It was,
by virtue of the laws of Spain, the only body which
could under any circumstances have possession of,
or any control over, any church dedicated to the
worship of God. By virtue of those laws this
possession and right of control were necessarily
exclusive. It is not necessary or important to give any
name to this right of possession and control exercised
by the Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings
of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to
show that the church as a juridical person was the
owner of the buildings. It is sufficient to say that this
right to the exclusive possession and control of the
same, for the purposes of its creation, existed.
The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain
with reference to the churches in the Philippines, did
not give him any right to interfere with the material
possession of these buildings.
Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the
Indies treats Del Patronazgo Real de las Indias. There
is nothing in any one of the fifty-one laws which
compose this title which in any way indicates that the
King of Spain was the owner of the churches in the
Indies because he had constructed them. These laws
relate to the right of presentation to ecclesiastical
charges and offices. For example, Law 49 of the title
commences as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Because the patronage and right of presentation of
all archbishops, bishops, dignitaries, prevents,
64 | P a g e
curates, and doctrines and all other beneficiaries and
ecclesiastical offices whatsoever belong to us, no
other person can obtain or possess the same without
our presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws
of this title."cralaw virtua1aw library
Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of
patronage vesting in private persons, but there is
nothing in any one of its fifteen laws which in any way
indicates that the private patron is the owner of the
church.
When it is said that this church never belonged to the
Crown of Spain, it is not intended to say that the
Government and had no power over it. It may be that
by virtue of that power of eminent domain which is
necessarily resides in every government, it might
have appropriated this church and other churches,
and private property of individuals. But nothing of this
kind was ever attempted in the Philippines.
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the
treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by
law the exclusive right to the possession of this
church and it had the legal right to administer the
same for the purposes for which the building was
consecrated. It was then in the full and peaceful
possession of the church with the rights aforesaid.
That these rights were fully protected by the treaty of
Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8, provides,
among other things, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or
cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding
paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the
property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful
possession of property of all kinds, or provinces,
municipalities, public or private establishments,
ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other
associations having legal capacity to acquire and
possess property in the aforesaid territories
renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, or
whatsoever nationality such individuals may
be."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions
of that treaty. Neither the Government of the United
States, nor the Government of these Islands, has ever
attempted in any way to interfere with the rights which
the Roman Catholic Church had in this building when
Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. Any
interference that has resulted has been caused by
private individuals, acting without any authority from
the Government. Against such interference by private
persons with the rights of others, redress is given in
the courts of justice without reference to the
provisions of the treaty of Paris.
No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any
distinction should be made between the church and
the convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed
to the church and, as to it, the provisions of Law 19,
title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the
Indies would apply. That law is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We command that the Indians of each town or barrio
shall construct such houses as may be deemed
sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barrios
may live comfortably adjoining the parish church of
the place where that may be built for the benefit of the
priests in charge of such churches and engaged in the
education and conversion of their Indian parishioners,
and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any
other purpose."cralaw virtua1aw library
The evidence in this case makes no showing in
regard to the cemetery. It is always mentioned in
connection with the church and convent and no point
is made by the possession of the church and convent,
he is not also entitled to recover possession of the
cemetery. So, without discussing the question as to
whether the rules applicable to churches are all
respects applicable to cemeteries, we hold for the
purpose of this case that the plaintiff has the same
right to the cemetery that he has to the church.
(4) It is suggested by the appellant that the
Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in
the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with
reference to an institution which antedates by almost
a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and
which existed "when Grecian eloquence still
flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still
worshiped in the temple of Mecca," does not require
serious consideration. In the preamble to the budget
relating to ecclesiastical obligations, presented by
Montero Rios to the Cortes on the 1st of October
1871, speaking of the Roman Catholic Church, he
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Persecuted as an unlawful association since the
early days of its existence up to the time of Galieno,
who was the first of the Roman emperors to admit it
among the juridical entities protected by the laws of
the Empire, it existed until then by the mercy and will
of the faithful and depended for such existence upon
pious gifts and offerings. Since the latter half of the
65 | P a g e
third century, and more particularly since the year
313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan,
inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the
latter gradually entered upon the exercise of such
rights as were required for the acquisition,
preservation, and transmission of property the same
as any other juridical entity under the laws of the
Empire. (3 Dictionary of Spanish Administration,
Alcubilla, p. 211. See also the royal order of the 4th of
December, 1890, 3 Alcubilla, 189.)"
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the Appellant. After the
expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let
judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten
days thereafter the record be remanded to the court
below for execution. So ordered.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law –
Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)
FACTS:
After the owner of a parcel of land that has been
rented and occupied by the government in 1947
refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced
expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not when the
proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the
disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the “taking” of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely
(1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the
private property for more than a momentary period,
and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has
taken place when the condemnor has entered and
occupied the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when
the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1)
Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for
more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant
of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present
when the government entered and occupied the
property under a contract of lease.
ABS-CBN VS PMSI SUPRA
PUBLIC USE
Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan Airport G.R. No.
156273. October 15, 2003 Just Compensation,
Power of Eminent Domain
JANUARY 26, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioners owned (2) parcels of land. In 1949 MCIAA
wanted two lots of petitioners for the proposed
expansion of Lahug Airport. To entice the landowners
to cede their properties, the government assured
them that they could repurchase their lands once
Lahug Airport was closed or its operations transferred
to Mactan Airport. On December 1961 the RTC
promulgated its Decision condemning lots of petitioner
and other lots for public use upon payment of just
compensation. Petitioners were paid. At the end of
1991 Lahug Airport ceased operations. Lots of
petitioners which had been expropriated for the
extension of Lahug Airport were not utilized. In fact,
no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken by
MCIAA. On March 1997 petitioners filed a complaint
for reconveyance and damages with RTC against
respondent MCIAA to compel the repurchase of their
lots.
ISSUE:
Must just compensation include interest? How much?
RULING:
NO, only if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and
the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to
place the owner in a position as good as (but not
better than) the position he was in before the taking
66 | P a g e
occurred. The amount of the interest is 6% per annum
as stated in the Rules of Court.
MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to
reconvey the lots to petitioners who shall hold the
same subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold
right of DPWH. In return, petitioners as if they were
plaintiff-beneficiaries of a constructive trust must
restore to MCIAA what they received as just
compensation for the expropriation of the lots with
consequential damages by way of legal interest from
16 November 1947. Petitioners must likewise pay
MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred
in sustaining the properties and the monetary value of
its services in managing them to the extent that
petitioners will be benefited thereby. The government
however may keep whatever income or fruits it may
have obtained from the parcels of land, in the same
way that petitioners need not account for the interests
that the amounts they received as just compensation
may have earned in the meantime. As a matter of
justice and convenience, the law considers the fruits
and interests as the equivalent of each other.
The National Airports Corporation (NAC) filed a
complaint for expropriation in order to expand the
Cebu Lahug Airport. It sought to acquire, by
negotiated sale or expropriation, several lots adjoining
the then existing airport which included the parcels of
land owned by the predecessors-in- interest of
respondents Benjamin Tudtud et al. NAC assured the
owners that they would reacquire the land if it is no
longer needed by the airport. The Court of First
Instance of Cebu granted the expropriation. No
structures related to the operation of the Cebu Lahug
Airport were constructed on the land expropriated.
Respondent Lydia Adlawan (Lydia), acting as
attorney-in-fact of the original owners, sent a letter to
the general manager of the petitioner Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA), the new
owner of the lot and demanded to repurchase the lot
at the same price paid at the time of the taking,
without interest. Lydia filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for
reconveyance and damages against the MCIAA. The
RTC of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of Tudtud et
al. MCIAA appealed to the Court of Appeals but it
affirmed the RTC decision. MCIAA then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tudtud et al. are entitled for the re-
conveyance of the land expropriated
HELD:
Tudtud et al.’s witness respondent Justiniano Borga
declared that the original owners did not oppose the
expropriation of the lot upon the assurance of the
NAC that they would reacquire it if it is no longer
needed by the airport. The rights and duties between
the MCIAA and Tudtud et al are governed by Article
1190 of the Civil Code which provides: When the
conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment
of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the
fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other
what they have received. In case of the loss,
deterioration, or improvement of the thing, the
provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid
down in the preceding article [Article 1189] shall be
applied to the party who is bound to return. While the
MCIAA is obliged to re-convey Lot No. 988 to Tudtud
et al., they must return to the MCIAA what they
received as just compensation for the expropriation of
Lot No. 988, plus legal interest to be computed from
default, which in this case runs from the time the
MCIAA complies with its obligation to the
respondents. Tudtud et al., must likewise pay the
MCIAA the necessary expenses it may have incurred
in sustaining Lot No. 988 and the monetary value of
its services in managing it to the extent that Tudtud et
al., were benefited thereby. Following Article 1187 of
the Civil Code, the MCIAA may keep whatever
income or fruits it may have obtained from Lot No.
988, and Tudtud et al., need not account for the
interests that the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime.
JUST COMPENSATION
Municipality of Makati vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a
portion of land owned by private respondent Admiral
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the
RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at
P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this
amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00
which was earlier released to private respondent. It
then issued the corresponding writ of execution
accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of
the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner
67 | P a g e
filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its
funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor
levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the
disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law. The RTC denied
the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a
petition for review before the SC.
Issue:
1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt
from garnishment and levy upon execution?
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private
respondents?
Held:
1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that
public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute. More
particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether
real or personal, which are necessary for public use
cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to
satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has
passed an ordinance appropriating from its public
funds an amount corresponding to the balance due
under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may
be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner.
2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private
respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse.
Where a municipality fails or refuses, without
justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail
of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the
enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed
possession and use of the subject property
notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with
its legal obligation to pay just compensation.
Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the
property since the same has been the site of Makati
West High School since the school year 1986-1987.
This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal
to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation
proceedings it had in fact initiated. The State's power
of eminent domain should be exercised within the
bounds of fair play and justice. (Municipality of Makati
vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990)
MIAA vs. Joaquin Rodriguez
G.R. No. 161836, February 28, 2006
(Constitutional Law, Expropriation)
FACTS
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA), a GOCC operating the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Complex, implemented
expansion programs for its runway in the 70’s. So it
bought and occupied some of the properties
surrounding the area through expropriation. In 1996,
respondent lot owner proposed to sell to MIAA at
P2,350.00 per square meter one of the lots already
occupied by the expanded runway. No deal was
made. So respondent Rodriguez bought the bigger
lot, a portion of which was occupied by the runway, as
well as all the rights to claim reasonable rents and
damages for the occupation, from its owner then,
Buck Estate, Inc., for P4 million.
Rodriguez demanded from the MIAA full payment for
the property and back rentals for 27 years, amounting
to P468.8 million. Failing to reach an agreement with
MIAA, Rodriguez filed a case for accion
reinvindicatoria with damages. Finding that the MIAA
had illegally taken possession of the property, the trial
court ruled respondent’s favor. The Court of Appeals
modified the trial court’s decision, holding that
Rodriguez is entitled to back rentals only from the
time he became the registered owner of the property
in 1996.
ISSUES
1.) Was Rodriguez a buyer in bad faith for having
bought the subject lot in a highly speculative and
scheming manner, and in anticipation of a grossly
disproportionate amount of profit at the expense of the
Government?
2.) Is Rodriguez entitled to exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees?
RULING
The petition is partly meritorious.
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There is “taking” when the expropriator enters private
property not only for a momentary period but for a
more permanent duration, or for the purpose of
devoting the property to a public use in such a
manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof. In this context, there
was taking when the MIAA occupied a portion thereof
for its expanded runway. Where actual taking was
made without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the
possession of the property prior to the filing of
expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably
ruled that it is the value of the property at the time of
taking that is controlling for purposes of
compensation.
Thus, in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos,
wherein it took the owner of a parcel of land thirty-five
(35) years before she filed a case for recovery of
possession taken by the local government unit for a
road-right-of-way purpose, this Court held:
…there being no other legal provision cited which
would justify a departure from the rule that just
compensation is determined on the basis of the value
of the property at the time of the taking thereof in
expropriation by the Government, not the increased
value resulting from the passage of time which
invariably brings unearned increment to landed
properties, represents the true value to be paid as just
compensation for the property taken.
The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v.
Lara, is that —
". . . (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of
the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may
be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is
taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may
have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may
have been a natural increase in the value of the
property from the time the complaint is filed, due to
general economic conditions. The owner of private
property should be compensated only for what he
actually loses.
The subject lot was occupied as a runway of the MIAA
starting in 1972. Thus, the value of the lot in 1972
should serve as the basis for the award of
compensation to the owner.
On actual damages for the occupation of the subject
lot, undeniably, the MIAA’s illegal occupation for more
than 20 years has resulted in pecuniary loss to
Rodriguez and his predecessors-in-interest. Such
pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation
in the form of actual or compensatory damages, which
in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the
value of the land at the time of taking, from said point
up to full payment by the MIAA. This is based on the
principle that interest runs as a matter of law and
follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in
as good position as money can accomplish, as of the
date of the taking. Case laws ruled that the indemnity
for rentals is inconsistent with a property owner’s right
to be paid legal interest on the value of the property,
for if the condemnor is to pay the compensation due
to the owners from the time of the actual taking of
their property, the payment of such compensation is
deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the
property, and hence, there is no basis for claiming
rentals from the time of actual taking.
On buyer in bad faith, the point is irrelevant.
Regardless of whether or not Rodriguez acted in bad
faith, all that he will be entitled to is the value of the
property at the time of the taking, with legal interest
thereon from that point until full payment of the
compensation by the MIAA. There is nothing wrongful
or dishonest in expecting to profit from one’s
investment. However, Rodriguez can fault but only
himself for taking an obvious risk in purchasing
property already being used for a public purpose. To
our mind, these are wanton and irresponsible acts
which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence,
the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees
is in order.
CONTRACT CLAUSE
[G.R. NO. 166800 : September 25, 2007]
LECA REALTY
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MANUELA
CORPORATION and MS. MARILOU O. ADEA,
as REHABILITATION RECEIVER for MANUELA
CORPORATION, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 168924 : September 25, 2007]
LECA REALTY
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MANUELA
CORPORATION and MS. MARILOU O. ADEA,
as REHABILITATION RECEIVER for MANUELA
CORPORATION, Respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
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These are consolidated Petitions for Review
on Certiorari filed by Leca Realty Corporation
(LECA), petitioner, assailing the separate related
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87185 and CA-G.R. SP No. 80861.
[G.R. NO. 168924
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, petitioner LECA assails the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (Special 8th Division) dated
April 28, 2005 and its Resolution of July 15, 2005
in CA-G.R. SP No. 87185.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the
Rehabilitation Plan of Manuela Corporation
(Manuela), respondent. Petitioner now contends
that the Rehabilitation Plan has impaired its
contract of lease with respondent over a tract of
land consisting of almost three (3) hectares.
Petitioner is the owner of the property situated on
Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City.
[G.R. NO. 166800
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
the same Rule questioning the Decision dated
September 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
(17th Division) and its Resolution dated January
25, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80861.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's Order denying petitioner's motion for
extension of time to file its Record on Appeal in
Civil Case No. LP-02-0028, entitled "In the Matter
of the Petition for Rehabilitation of Manuela
Corporation."
As found by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87185, the antecedent facts, common to both
petitions, are:
On January 31, 2002, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253, Las
Piñas City, a Petition for Rehabilitation,
docketed as Civil Case No. LP-02-0028.
The petition alleges inter alia that respondent is a
corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines, primarily
engaged in the business of leasing to retailers
commercial spaces in shopping malls. Its principal
office address is Alabang-Zapote Road, Pamplona,
Las Piñas City.
Respondent is the owner and operator of the
following malls strategically located in Metro
Manila:
a) M Star One
b) M Star
c) Starmall
d) Metropolis Star
e) Pacific Mall
Respondent has assets valued at P12.43 billion
and total liabilities of P4.87 billion as of December
31, 2001.
However, due to reasons that shall be discussed
below, respondent is now having severe cash flow
problems which prevent it from paying its debts
as they fall due.
In order to finance the costs of building the
Metropolis Star and the Pacific Mall, respondent
obtained several loans from two syndicates of
lenders. The first syndicate is composed of Bank
of Philippine Islands, BPI Family Bank,
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Allied
Bank, and Bank of Commerce;
the second syndicate is composed of Allied Bank,
Bank of Commerce, Philippine National Bank, and
Equitable PCI Bank. Respondent's loans are
governed by the Loan Agreement dated July 5,
1995 and the Syndicated Loan Agreement dated
December 16, 1996.
Respondent's total outstanding loan from the
syndicates (e.g., principal plus interest) is P2.174
billion as of December 31, 2001. These loans are
secured by a mortgage over M Star One and M
Star, both located in Las Piñas City.
Respondent also has liabilities to the Hero
Holdings, Inc. and its trade suppliers and other
parties in the sum of P1.476 billion as of
December 31, 2001.
At the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997,
the banks stopped their lending activities to
borrowers, including respondent. This event took
its toll upon respondent since its malls failed to
operate sufficiently resulting in heavy losses.
Matters finally came to a head in 1997 when
respondent could no longer pay its trade suppliers
for maturing obligations. Neither could it pay its
creditor banks. The adjusted interest rates on its
outstanding loans, as a result of the Asian
financial crisis, were between 18% to 30% which
added to respondent's liquidity problems.
70 | P a g e
Nonetheless, respondent has been acting in good
faith and has exerted earnest efforts to avert its
worsening financial problems. It closed down non-
income generating businesses, concentrated on
its business of leasing commercial spaces,
intensified collection efforts, reduced personnel,
negotiated for restructuring of loans with
creditors, and worked out a viable payment
scheme without giving undue preference to any
creditor. Despite its efforts, respondent could no
longer pay its suppliers and the maturing
interests on its loans.
The petition further alleges that respondent can
only be brought back to its financial viability if its
proposed Rehabilitation Plan is approved and that
it is given a respite from its creditors' demands
through the issuance of a Stay Order. The
successful implementation of the proposed
Rehabilitation Plan will enable it to settle its
remaining obligations in an orderly manner,
restore its financial viability, and allow it to
resume its normal operations.
On February 5, 2002, the trial court issued a Stay
Order,1 thus:
xxx
a) a stay in the enforcement of all claims,
whether for money or otherwise and whether
such enforcement is by court action or otherwise,
against petitioner MANUELA, its guarantors and
sureties not solidarily liable with it;
b) prohibiting MANUELA from selling,
encumbering, transferring or disposing in any
manner any of its properties except in the
ordinary course of business;
c) prohibiting MANUELA from making any
payment of its liabilities outstanding as of the
filing of the instant petition;
d) prohibiting MANUELA's suppliers of goods and
services from withholding supply of goods and
services in the ordinary course of business as long
as MANUELA makes payments for the goods and
services supplied after the issuance of this Stay
Order; and
cralawlibrary
e) directing the payment in full of all
administrative expenses incurred after the
issuance of this Stay Order.2
In the same Stay Order, the trial court appointed
Marilou Adea, also a respondent, as Rehabilitation
Receiver. On February 12, 2002, respondent Adea
accepted her appointment.
In its Order dated May 21, 2002, the trial court
referred the petition to respondent Adea for
evaluation and recommendation. On September
28, 2002, she submitted to the trial court her
Report and Recommendation finding respondent
Manuela's Rehabilitation Plan viable and feasible
and recommending its approval.
Respondent Adea then held several consultative
meetings with respondent Manuela's creditors to
discuss their respective concerns and suggestions
relative to its rehabilitation. For their part, the
creditors filed their various comments/oppositions
to respondent Manuela's Petition for Rehabilitation
and Rehabilitation Plan.
On July 31, 2002, petitioner filed with the trial
court its Comment and/or Formal Claim with
Leave of Court against respondent Manuela
amounting to P193,724,262.34 as of February 28,
2002, representing unpaid rentals, security
deposits, interests, and penalty charges.
On September 30, 2002, respondent Adea issued
a Notice informing all creditors, claimants,
suppliers, lot and/or house buyers, counsels,
oppositors, and other parties that copies of her
Report and Recommendation on respondent
Manuela's Petition for Rehabilitation are available
and on file with the trial court for distribution to
all parties concerned.
On October 22, 2002, petitioner filed its comment
on respondent Adea's Report and
Recommendation. Petitioner opposed her
recommendation to reduce respondent Manuela's
liability, considering its contractual nature which
cannot be impaired during the process of
rehabilitation.
On July 28, 2003, the trial court issued an Order
approving the Rehabilitation Plan, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by
the Rehabilitation Receiver, pp. 120 to 165 of the
Report and Recommendation on Manuela
Corporation (Manuela)'s Petition for Rehabilitation
revised June 9, 2003, is APPROVED. Petitioner is
strictly enjoined to abide by its terms and
conditions and the Rehabilitation Receiver shall,
unless directed otherwise, submit a quarterly
report on the progress of the implementation of
the Rehabilitation Plan.3
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the trial court its
Notice of Appeal with Motion for Extension of
Time to File Record on Appeal.4
71 | P a g e
However, the trial court issued an Order denying
the Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on
Appeal, thus:
Before the Court is a Notice of Appeal with Motion
forExtension of Time filed by creditor Leca Realty
Corporation praying for a period of thirty (30)
days from August 21, 2003 to September 20,
2003 to file its intended record on appeal.
However, under Rule 3, Section 1 of the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, a
motion for extension is a prohibited pleading.
WHEREFORE, the subject motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80861
and assigned to the 17th Division.
On September 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
lack of merit.5
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied by the appellate court in its
Resolution dated January 25, 2005.6
Hence, the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 166800.
G.R. No. 168924
In the meantime, petitioner seasonably filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, alleging that the RTC erred in
approving respondent Manuela's Rehabilitation
Plan as it violates its (petitioner's) constitutional
right to non-impairment of contract and the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation.
On April 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals (Special
8th Division) promulgated its Decision denying
the petition, holding that:
x x x The pendency of the rehabilitation
proceedings cannot be interpreted to impair the
contractual obligations previously entered into by
the contracting parties because the automatic
stay of all actions is sanctioned by P.D. 902-A
which provides that "all actions for claims against
corporations, partnerships or associations under
management or receivership pending before any
court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended
accordingly [Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC,
391 Phil. 318 (2000)].
On May 20, 2005, petitioner filed with the Court
of Appeals a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied in its Resolution dated July 15, 2005.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition
for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
168924.
In view of the identity of parties and the inter-
relationship of the issues involved in G.R. No.
166800 and G.R. No. 168924, we resolved to
consolidate the two petitions.
The issue posed before us in G.R. No. 166800
for certiorari and mandamus is whether the trial
court erred in ruling that a motion for extension
of time to file record on appeal is a prohibited
pleading under Section 1 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation which
provides:
Section 1. Nature of Proceedings. - Any
proceeding initiated under these Rules shall be
considered in rem. Jurisdiction over all those
affected by the proceedings shall be considered as
acquired upon publication of the notice of the
commencement of the proceedings in any
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
in the manner prescribed by these Rules.
The proceedings shall also be summary and non-
adversarial in nature. The following pleadings are
prohibited:
A. Motion to Dismiss;
b. Motion for Bill of Particulars;
c. Motion for New Trial or For Reconsideration;
d. Petition for Relief;
e. Motion for Extension;
f. Memorandum;
g. Motion for Postponement;
h. Reply or Rejoinder;
i. Third Party Complaint;
72 | P a g e
j. Intervention;
xxx     xxx     xxx
The prohibited pleadings enumerated above are
those filed in the rehabilitation proceedings. Once
the trial court decides the case and an aggrieved
party appeals, the procedure to be followed is
that prescribed by the Rules of Court as
mandated by Section 5, Rule 3, of the same
Interim Rules, thus:
The review of any order or decision of the court or
on appeal therefrom shall be in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
In this connection, Section 11, Rule 11, of the
Rules of Court (now the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended), states:
Extension of time to plead. - Upon motion and on
such terms as may be just, the court may extend
the time to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an
answer or other pleading to be filed after the time
fixed by these Rules.
Verily, the trial court erred in denying petitioner's
motion for extension of time to file record on
appeal. At any rate, this petition has become
moot considering that the Court of Appeals gave
due course to LECA's Petition for Review (CA-G.R.
SP No. 80861) which eventually reached this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 168924.
In G.R. No. 168924, petitioner ascribes to the
Court of Appeals the following assignment of
errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN RULING THAT THE "PENDENCY OF THE
REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS CANNOT BE
INTERPRETED TO IMPAIR THE CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS PREVIOUSLY ENTERED INTO BY
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BECAUSE THE
AUTOMATIC STAY OF ALL ACTIONS IS
SANCTIONED BY P.D. 902-A WHICH PROVIDES
THAT "ALL ACTIONS FOR CLAIMS AGAINST
CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS OR
ASSOCIATIONS UNDER MANAGEMENT OR
RECEIVERSHIP PENDING BEFORE ANY COURT,
TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR BODY SHALL BE
SUSPENDED ACCORDINGLY," CITING
RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.), INC. V. NLRC, G.R. NO.
128003, JULY 26, 2000, 336 SCRA 433.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE LOWER COURT'S APPROVAL OF
RESPONDENT MANUELA'S REHABILITATION PLAN
EVEN IF SUCH PLAN IS NOT VIABLE OR FEASIBLE
BECAUSE RESPONDENT MANUELA CORPORATION
COULD NOT EVEN COMPLY WITH THE TERMS AND
PROVISIONS OF THE COURT-APPROVED
REHABILITATION PLAN.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN NOT
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF THE LOWER
COURT'S FAILURE TO ACT, THAT IS, APPROVE OR
DISAPPROVE, THE REHABILITATION PLAN OF
MANUELA CORPORATION WITHIN EIGHTEEN
MONTHS AFTER THE FILING OF THE PETITION
FOR REHABILITATION.
Petitioner contends that the approved
Rehabilitation Plan drastically altered the terms of
its lease contract with respondent Manuela,
hence, should be declared void.
The contract of lease between petitioner and
respondent Manuela7 for twenty-five years, from
August 1, 1995 to July 31, 2020, stipulates that
the rates of rental on the leased parcel of land are
as follows:
On the other hand, the Rehabilitation Plan
prescribes the following rental rates:
Clearly, there is a gross discrepancy between the
amounts of rent agreed upon by the parties and
those provided in the Rehabilitation Plan.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected
petitioner's contention that the approved
Rehabilitation Plan impairs the obligation of
contract, ratiocinating that the automatic stay of
all actions is sanctioned by Section 5 (c) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A which
provides that "all actions for claims against
corporations, partnerships or associations under
management or receivership pending before any
court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly."
Petitioner, in support of its contention, cites in its
Memorandum the treatises of Ateneo Law Dean
Cesar L. Villanueva and former SEC Commissioner
Danilo L. Concepcion, both known authorities on
Corporation Law. In his Article which appeared in
the Ateneo Law Journal, Dean Villanueva said:
The nature and extent of the power of the SEC to
approve and enforce a rehabilitation plan is
73 | P a g e
certainly an important issue. Often, a
rehabilitation plan would require a diminution, if
not destruction, of contractual and property rights
of some, if not most of the various stakeholders
in the petitioning corporation. In the absence of
clear coercive legal provisions, the courts of
justice and much less the SEC would have no
power to amend or destroy the property and
contractual rights of private parties, much less
relieve a petitioning corporation from its
contractual commitments.8
On the other hand, Professor Concepcion stated
that what is allowed in rehabilitation proceedings
is only the suspension of payments, or the
stay of all actions for claims of distressed
corporations, and upon its successful
rehabilitation, the claims must be settled in
full.9
We agree with petitioner.
In The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd., v.
Court of Appeals, et al., we held:
When the language of the contract is explicit
leaving no doubt as to the intention of the
drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it
any other intention that would contradict its plain
import. The Court would be rewriting the contract
of lease between Insular and Sun Brothers under
the guise of construction were we to interpret the
'option to renew' clause as Sun Brothers
propounds it, despite the express provision in the
original contract of lease and the contracting
parties' subsequent acts. As the Court has held in
Riviera Filipina, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 'a court,
even the Supreme Court, has no right to make
new contracts for the parties or ignore those
already made by them, simply to avoid seeming
hardships. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of
liberal construction justifies the creation of a
contract for the parties which they did not make
themselves or the imposition upon one party to a
contract of an obligation not assumed.'10
The amount of rental is an essential condition of
any lease contract. Needless to state, the change
of its rate in the Rehabilitation Plan is not justified
as it impairs the stipulation between the parties.
We thus rule that the Rehabilitation Plan is void
insofar as it amends the rental rates agreed upon
by the parties.
It must be emphasized that there is nothing in
Section 5 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A authorizing the
change or modification of contracts entered into
by the distressed corporation and its creditors.
Moreover, the Stay Order issued by the trial court
directed respondent Manuela to pay in full, after
the issuance of such Order, all administrative
expenses incurred. Administrative expenses are
costs associated with the general administration
of an organization and include such items as
utilities, rents, salaries, postages, furniture, and
housekeeping charges.11
Inasmuch as rents are considered administrative
expenses and considering that the Stay Order
directed respondent Manuela to pay the rents in
full, then it must comply at the rates agreed
upon.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Respondent Manuela, therefore, must update its
payment of rental arrears and continue to pay
current rentals at the rate stipulated in the lease
contract. The rentals shall incur interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum. Upon finality of this
Decision, the legal rate shall be 12% per annum,
pursuant to the following rulings of this Court:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it
consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be imposed
at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6%
per annum. No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin
to run from the time the claim is made judicially
or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably ascertained). The actual
base for the computation of legal interest shall, in
any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a
sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12%
74 | P a g e
per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.12
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review
in G.R. No. 168924. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87185
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
Rehabilitation Plan, insofar as it modifies the
rental rates agreed upon by petitioner LECA and
respondent Manuela, is declared VOID.
Respondent Manuela is ordered to pay the rentals
and all arrearages at the rates stipulated in the
lease contract with interest at 6% per annum.
Upon the finality of this Decision, the interest
shall be 12% per annum until fully paid.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No.
166800 is DENIED for being moot. It has been
overtaken by events. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGESTS, MERCANTILE
TRANSPORTATION LAW
Kuwait Airways v. PAL (G.R. No. 156087)
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not CAB can compel PAL to terminate the
Commercial Agreement with petitioner.
Ruling: NO.
[We do not doubt that the CAB, in the exercise of its
statutory mandate, has the power to compel
Philippine Airlines to immediately terminate its
Commercial Agreement with Kuwait Airways pursuant
to the CMU. Considering that it is the Philippine
government that has the sole authority to charter air
policy and negotiate with foreign governments with
respect to air traffic rights, the government through
the CAB has the indispensable authority to compel
local air carriers to comply with government
determined policies, even at the expense of economic
rights.]
However, this is not a case where the CAB had duly
exercised its regulatory authority over a local airline in
order to implement or further government air policy.
What happened instead was an officer of the CAB,
LAW,
acting in behalf not of the Board but of the Philippine
government, had committed to a foreign nation the
immediate abrogation of Philippine Airlines’
commercial agreement with Kuwait Airways.

Nor can we presume, simply because Dr. Linlingan,

Kuwait Airways and Philippine Airlines (PAL) entered
Executive Director of the CAB had signed the CMU in
into a Commercial Agreement to assist each other to
behalf of the Philippine Panel that he could have done
develop traffic on the route Kuwait-Bangkok-Manila
so bearing the authority of the Board, in the exercise
and vice-versa. Under the said agreement, Kuwait
of regulatory jurisdiction over Philippine Airlines. For
Airways obligated itself to share with PAL revenue
one, the CAB is a collegial body composed of five
earned from the uplift of passengers between Kuwait
members and no one member–even the chairman–
and Manila and vice-versa. Sometime later,
can act in behalf of the entire Board. The Board is
delegations from Philippines and Kuwait (Philippine
disabled from performing as such without a quorum.
Panel and Kuwait Panel) met and agreed that
For another, the Executive Director of the CAB is not
effective upon the signing of the Confidential
even a member of the Board, per R.A. No. 776, as
Memorandum of Understanding (CMU), the exercise
amended.
of the third and fourth freedom traffic rights shall not
be subject to any royalty payment or commercial
*The general rule is CAB has the power to regulate
agreements. The Philippine Panel composed of
the airline companies/air transportation industry BUT
officials from CAB, DFA, and PAL and headed by the
this case is an exception.
Executive Director of the CAB signed the CMU – in
behalf of the Philippine Government. A month later,
petitioner sent a letter informing PAL that by virtue of
Legal assistance
the CMU the termination of the royalty payment is in
effect. PAL insisted that the Agreement should
EN BANC
continue to be in force and petitioner is still obligated
to pay PAL revenue until such date. Petitioner
G.R. No. 47685 September 20, 1940
refusing to pay, PAL filed a complaint before the RTC
which ruled in its favor. Hence this petition.

75 | P a g e
JESUS TOMAS CABANGIS, recurrente,
vs.
JUEZ NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, recurrida.
D. Leonardo C. Perez en representacion del
reccurido.
La recurrida en su propia representacion.
Sres. Hill y Falgui como amicus curiae.
Sres. DeWitt, Perkins y Ponce Enrile como amicus
curiae.
IMPERIAL, J.:
SEC. 17 (Rule 4). Procedure on minor matters. —
Where a claim does not exceed twenty pesos, no
written or formal pleadings need be filed, but the
judge shall note the claim, and in such form as he
may deem best and convenient under the
circumstances shall summons the parties and hear
them as well as their witnesses. If the defendant fails
to appear at the first informal call, a formal summons
with an information as to the claim against him may
be issued. After the hearing, both parties shall be
informed of the judgment, which may be oral, but shall
be noted in the corresponding docket together with
the claim, defense and all the proceedings had
thereon. No fees shall be charged or costs allowed in
such proceedings.
G.R. No. L-21707 March 18, 1967
FELIPE ACAR, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. INOCENCIO ROSAL, in his capacity as
Executive Judge, Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, 12th Judicial District, respondent.
F. S. Villarin for petitioners.
Jose B. Navarro for respondent.
BENGZON J.P., J.:
All over the world, Constitutions share one purpose: to
protect and enhance the people's interest, as a nation
collectively and as persons individually. The Philippine
Constitution is no exception. Interpretation of its
provisions, therefore, should be done with a view to
realizing this fundamental objective. Among the
provisions in our Constitution is one both, timely and
far-reaching, as it affects the people at large and
relates to social justice problems of the day. It is
Subsec. 21, Sec. I of Art. III: "Free access to the
courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty." It is the one involved in this case.
A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental on February 21, 1963 by ten persons
for their own behalf and that of 9,000 other farm
laborers working off and on in sugar cane plantations
at the Bais milling district, Negros Oriental, against
Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas, Central
Azucarera de Bais, Compañia Celulosa de Filipinas,
Ramon Barata, Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and Miguel
Franco. Plaintiffs sought to recover their alleged
participations or shares amounting to the aggregate
sum of P14,031,836.74, in the sugar, molasses,
bagasse and other derivatives based on the
provisions of Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of
1952), particularly Sections 1 and 9 thereof:
SECTION 1. In the absence of written milling
agreements between the majority of planters and the
millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the
Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that
district from the milling by any sugar central of the
sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter or plantation
owner, as well as all by-products and derivatives
thereof, shall be divided between them as follows:
Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty per centum
for the central in any milling district the maximum
actual production of which is not more than four
hundred thousand piculs: Provided, That the
provisions of this section shall not apply to sugar
centrals with an actual production of less than one
hundred fifty thousand piculs;
Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the planter, and
thirty-seven and one-half per centum for the central in
any milling district the maximum actual production of
which exceeds four hundred thousand piculs but does
not exceed six hundred thousand piculs;
Sixty-five per centum for the planter, and thirty-five
per centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds six
hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed nine
hundred thousand piculs;
Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for the planter,
and thirty-two and one-half per centum for the central
in any milling district the maximum actual production
of which exceeds nine hundred thousand piculs but
does not exceed one million two hundred thousand
piculs;
76 | P a g e
Seventy per centum for the planter, and thirty per
centum for the central in any milling district the
maximum actual production of which exceeds one
million two hundred thousand piculs.1äwphï1.ñët
By actual production is meant the total production of
the mill for the crop year immediately preceding.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 9. In addition to the benefits granted by the
Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any increase in
the participation granted the planters under this Act
and above their present share shall be divided
between the planter and his laborers in the plantation
in the following proportion:
Sixty per centum of the increased participation for the
laborers and forty per centum for the planters. The
distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers
shall be made under the supervision of the
Department of Labor.
The benefits granted to laborers in sugar plantations
under this Act and in the Minimum Wage Law shall
not in any way be diminished by such labor contracts
known as "by the piece," "by the volume," "by the
area," or by any other system of "pakyaw," the
Secretary of Labor being hereby authorized to issue
the necessary orders for the enforcement of this
provision."
Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as by
separate motion, that the aforementioned court
authorize them to sue as pauper litigants, under Sec.
22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 22. Pauper litigant. — Any court may authorize
a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a
pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means
to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the
corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer,
or otherwise. Such authority once given shall include
an exemption from payment of legal fees and from
filing appeal bond, printed record and printed brief.
The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment
rendered in the case favorably to the pauper, unless
the court otherwise provides.
invoking Sec. 1, subsec. (21) of Art. III of the
Constitution of the Philippines. They alleged that they
had no means, to pay the docket fee of P14,500.00,
being laborers dependent solely on their daily wages
for livehood and possessed of no properties. And in
support of the foregoing, the ten named plaintiffs
submitted certificates of the municipal treasurers of
their places of residence stating that they have no real
property declared in their names in said
municipalities.
Acting on the petition to litigate in forma pauperis, the
Court of First Instance issued an order on May 27,
1963, denying the same upon the ground that the
plaintiffs have regular employment and sources of
income and, thus, can not be classified as poor or
paupers.
Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of said order but
reconsideration was denied in an order dated June
11, 1963. Assailing said two CFI orders and asserting
their alleged right not to be denied free access to the
courts by reason of poverty, plaintiffs in said case filed
herein, on August 1, 1963, the present special civil
action or certiorari and mandamus. Petition to litigate
as pauper in the instant case before Us was also filed.
And on August 16, 1963, We allowed petitioners
herein to litigate in this Court as paupers and required
respondent to answer. Respondent's answer was filed
on November 2, 1963. After hearing on February 10,
1964 this case was submitted for decision.
The sole issue herein is whether petitioners were
deprived, by the orders in question, of free access to
the courts by reason of poverty. In denying petitioners'
motion to litigate as paupers, respondent Judge
adopted the definition at "pauper" in Black's Law
Dictionary (at p. 1284) as "a person so poor that he
must be supported at public expense". And, as afore-
stated, he ruled that petitioners are not that poor.
Such interpretation, to our mind, does not fit with the
purpose of the rules on suits in forma pauperis and
the provision of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights,
that: "Free access to the courts shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty." As applied to
statutes or provisions on the right to sue in forma
pauperis, the term has a broader meaning. It has thus
been recognized that: "An applicant for leave to sue in
forma pauperis need not be a pauper; the fact that he
is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is
no answer to his statement that he has not sufficient
means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs"
(14 Am. Jur. 31). It suffices that plaintiff is indigent
(Ibid.), the not a public charge. And the difference
between "paupers" and "indigent" persons is that the
latter are "persons who have no property or source of
income sufficient for their support aside from their own
labor, though self-supporting when able to work and in
77 | P a g e
employment" (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913,
"Indigent", citing People vs. Schoharie County, 121
NY 345, 24 NE 830). It is therefore in this sense of
being indigent that "pauper" is taken when referring to
suits in forma pauperis. Black's Law Dictionary in fact
defines pauper, thus: "A person so poor that he must
be supported at public expense; also a suitor who, on
account of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend
without being chargeable with costs" (p. 1284,
emphasis supplied).
It is further argued that the docket fee of P14,500
would very well be shouldered by petitioners since
there are around 9,000 of them. It must be
remembered, however that the action in question was
filed by way of a class suit. And the Rules of Court
allowing such procedure state under Sec. 12, Rule 3:
SEC. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons, and the parties are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all. But in such case the court shall make sure that
the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous
and representative so that all interest concerned are
fully protected. Any party in interest shall have a right
to intervene in protection of his individual interest.
So that in the suit before respondent Judge the ten
named petitioners herein are the ones suing, albeit for
the benefit of all the others. It follows that the payment
of docket fee would be directly charged upon them,
not upon the unnamed "9,000 other laborers." And
even if the 9,000 other laborers should later bear the
payment of said docket fee of P14,500, the same
would be spread among them at about P1.60 each.
Said cost of pressing their respective average
demand of P1.60 each is, to Our mind, a substantial
imposition on a seasonal farm laborer earning barely
subsistent wages. And as pointed out, this is only the
initial fee; subsequent fees and charges would have
to be paid. The philosophy underlying the
constitutional mandate of free access to the courts
notwithstanding poverty, therefore, calls for exemption
of herein petitioners from payment of the aforesaid
legal fees in their assertion and claim of substantial
rights under the Sugar Act of 1952.
Returning to the purpose of all Constitutions, as
mentioned earlier, We find this course the most
sensible, logical and practical construction demanded
by the free access clause of the Constitution. For a
contrary interpretation could not make said provision
the living reality that it is designed to be.
As regards the fact that the supporting certifications of
indigence refer only to the ten named plaintiffs, suffice
it to reiterate that this involves a class suit, where it is
not practicable to bring all the other 9,000 laborers
before the court. This Court finds the supporting
evidence of indigence adequate, showing in
petitioners' favor, as plaintiffs in the suit before
respondent Judge, the right not to be denied free
access to the courts by reason of poverty. Since they
were excluded from the use and enjoyment of said
right, mandamus lies to enforce it. Appeal was
unavailing, since they were not even accorded the
status of litigants, for non-payment of docket fee; and
perfecting an appeal would have presented the same
question of exemption from legal fees, appeal bond
and similar requisites.
Wherefore, petitioners are declared entitled to litigate
as paupers in their class suit before respondent Judge
and the latter is hereby ordered to grant their petition
to litigate in forma pauperis. No costs. So ordered.
RIGHTS OF SUSPECT
Facts and Case Summary - Miranda v. Arizona
Facts
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona
addressed four different cases involving custodial
interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant
was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a
prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off
from the outside world. In none of these cases was
the defendant given a full and effective warning of his
rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all
the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions
and, in three of them, signed statements that were
admitted at trial.
Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home
and taken in custody to a police station where he was
identified by the complaining witness. He was then
interrogated by two police officers for two hours,
which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial,
the oral and written confessions were presented to the
jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape
and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on
each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona
held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession.
78 | P a g e
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New
York police in connection with the robbery of a dress
shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first
taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He
was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he
orally admitted the robbery and was placed under
formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct
for detention, where he was questioned by an
assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing
reporter who transcribed the questions and answers.
At trial, the oral confession and the transcript were
presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first
degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years
imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without
opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals.
Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by
local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas
City robberies and taken to a local police station. A
report was also received from the FBI that Westover
was wanted on a felony charge in California.
Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and
the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents
continued the interrogation at the station. After two-
and-a-half hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover
signed separate confessions, which had been
prepared by one of the agents during the
interrogation, to each of the two robberies in
California. These statements were introduced at trial.
Westover was convicted of the California robberies
and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each
count. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a
series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the
victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant,
Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks
stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested
at his home. Police also arrested Stewart’s wife and
three other people who were visiting him. Stewart was
placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was
interrogated on nine different occasions. During the
ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had
robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her.
At that time, police released the four other people
arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence
to connect any of them with the crime. At trial,
Stewart’s statements were introduced. Stewart was
convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California
reversed, holding that Stewart should have been
advised of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel.
Issues
Whether “statements obtained from an individual who
is subjected to custodial police interrogation” are
admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether
“procedures which assure that the individual is
accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate
himself” are necessary.
Supreme Court holding
The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the
Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action
is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such, “the
prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.”
The Court further held that “without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a
defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.”
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the
judgment of the New York Court of Appeals in
Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and
affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of
California in Stewart.
Argued: Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966
G.R. No. 91374 February 25, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
79 | P a g e
JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Josefa K. Cauton for defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Essential in the success of the prosecution of an
offense is the proof of the identity of the offender. This
is usually attained through the testimony of
eyewitnesses during, before, or even after the
commission of the offense. In the absence of such
primary evidence the prosecution generally falls back
on such other evidence as the ballistic examination of
the murder weapon, a handwriting expert, the
extrajudicial confession or similar resources.
Otherwise, circumstantial evidence is resorted to
which consists in the piercing together of tiny bits of
evidence with a view towards ascertaining the
accused as the person responsible for the
commission of the offense.
In the case now before this Court the defendant-
appellant John Gabriel Gamboa was charged with the
crime of murder together with Miguel Celdran in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. After arraignment but
during the trial, the case against Celdran was
dismissed. Thereafter, a decision was rendered on
August 30, 1989, finding Gamboa guilty of the crime
of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P30,000.00, with costs against him. The fatal weapon,
a shotgun, was ordered forfeited in favor of the
government.1
The defendant-appellant interposed this appeal from
said judgment alleging that the trial court committed
the following errors:
I abdomen. The victim fell face upward on the bed and
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES CRISTINA SOLEDAD, ENRICO ACRE
AND MARIO GASCON.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD BEEN POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED AS THE ASSAILANT OF THE VICTIM
RENE IMPAS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD CONFESSED TO OR
ADMITTED THE KILLING.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING
THE ALLEGED MURDER WEAPON (EXHIBIT "A")
AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
EXHIBIT "A" WAS THE ACTUAL MURDER
WEAPON.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING
THE PARAFFIN TEST RESULTS AS INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUIRING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.2
At around 1:15 o'clock in the morning of August 21,
1988, Cristina Soledad, common-law wife of Rene
Impas, was conversing with the latter inside a
bedroom in Rene's house located at John Avenue,
Cebu City. Suddenly someone kicked open the door
and Soledad saw the appellant and Celdran. From a
standing position the appellant fired his shotgun at
Rene. Rene was hit on the right side of the chest so
he slid slightly, his head leaning on the wall the
appellant fired a second shot hitting the victim on the
died immediately.
Soledad shouted for help. Rico Acre, a tenant in the
same house, responded. He entered the room as the
appellant went out of the house. The former fired a
third time.
Acre noticed the victim having difficulty in breathing,
so he ran out of the house and shouted for help.
Mario Gascon, a neighbor, came and together with
Acre they lifted the victim and loaded him in the car of
80 | P a g e
the victim's father, police Major Impas, which was
parked in front of the house.
As Gascon stepped out of his house to extend
assistance, he saw the appellant and another person
running towards a yellow car. The appellant was still
holding the shotgun then. Soledad, together with
Acre, Gascon and Maj. Impas, who was living in the
house nearest to the victim's house, boarded the
latter's car and brought the victim to the Southern
Island Hospital, Cebu City.
The medico legal report of Dr. Jesus Cerna of the PC-
INP, Cebu showed that the victim suffered the
following gunshot wounds:
Shotgun wounds:
(1) ENTRANCE. ovaloid, 2.0 x 1.8 cm., with
5 stray pellets wounds of entrance around, in an area
of the chest, right, 5.5 x 5.0 cm., edges inverted, chest
right anterior aspect, 6.0 cm. from the anterior median
line and 128.0 cm. above right heel; directed
backward, downward and medially, involving skin and
the underlying soft tissues, into thoracic cavity,
lacerating extensively the lungs, upper and lower
lobes right extensively and the ascending orta, and
finally a plastic wad was embeded and recovered
from the upper lobe of right lung and three (3) pellets
were recovered from the soft tissue of the back,
thoracic region, left, 5.0 cm. from the posterior median
line and 127.0 cm. above left heel.
(2) ENTRANCE, (pellets wounds) six in
numbers, of varying sizes, ranging from 0.6 x 0.5 cm.
to 0.5 x 0.4 cm., edges inverted, dispersed in an area
of the abdomen, anterior aspect, right, 5.0 x 4.5 cm.
7.5 cm. from the anterior median line and 108.0 cm.
above right heel, directed backward, upward and
laterally involving skin and the underlying soft tissues,
into a thoracic abdominal cavity, lacerating
extensively portion of small and large intestine, liver,
and finally 4 pellets wound were embeded and
recovered from the soft tissues back, left thoracic
abdominal region, 10.0 cm. from the posterior median
line and 107.0 cm. above left heel, (one existed).
(3) ENTRANCE. ovaloid, 9.0 x 3.0 cm.
irregular in shape, edges inverted, hand, posterior
aspect, right; directed forward, upward, thru and thru.
Heart: auricular and venticular chambers, filled with
dark-red liquid and clotted blood, with normal
myocardium.
Gastrointestinal tract and other visceral organs pale.
Stomach, empty.
Hemothorax, approximately 1500 cm.
Hemoperitoneum, approximately 1000 cc.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shot wounds, chest, abdomen and hand, right.3
Under the first assigned error, the appellant raises the
issue relating to the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses in that their testimonies are full of
inconsistencies which elicit doubt as to their
truthfulness.
In the case of Soledad, the latter allegedly testified
that the appellant shot the victim twice, while the
victim's father testified that he heard three successive
shots. There is no inconsistency here. It was
established that the appellant shot the victim twice
while inside the house and fired the third shot when
he was already outside the house. This accounts for
the three shots heard by Major Impas.
The appellant also stated that Soledad testified on
direct examination that when the victim was hit by the
first shot his body leaned on the wall but on cross
examination, she said that the victim was lying flat on
the bed after the first shot. Whether the victim was
leaning on the wall or lying down after the first shot is
of no material consequence. The fact remains that
Soledad saw the appellant shoot the victim twice with
a shotgun.
Another alleged contradiction is that Soledad said she
knew Acre to be a cousin of the victim but Acre
himself denied such relationship. Again such
inconsistency, if it is indeed an inconsistency at all, is
on a minor matter.
The appellant states that while Acre testified that at
the time of the shooting he could clearly be seen from
the victim's room, Soledad never mentioned having
seen Acre at or near the door of the victim's room. It is
also indicated that while Acre said that appellant
made some remarks to him in a loud voice before the
shooting, Soledad on the other hand testified that she
did not hear any statement from the appellant before
the shooting.
81 | P a g e
Suffice it to state that at the time of the shooting, the
appellant and Celdran were standing at the door,
effectively blocking the view outside the room, hence
Soledad did not see Acre. Moreover, at the time
Soledad's attention at that moment was focused on
her common-law husband who was shot twice and
who fell on the bed. She was a witness to a startling
occurrence. It is not improbable that because of shock
she did not hear any remarks made by the appellant
outside the room.
The appellant makes much capital of the fact that
Acre did not reveal the identity of the appellant to the
victim's father when they were together in the car on
the way to the hospital. This is understandable
considering that Soledad had already revealed the
appellant's identity to Major Impas when they boarded
the car. There was no need for Acre to give the same
information to the victim's father.
In the case of Modesto Gascon, it is contended that
he could not have seen the appellant running away
from the scene of the shooting since even before
Gascon went down from his house, the appellant was
already running towards the get-away car and so it
was allegedly impossible for Gascon to identify the
appellant.
On cross-examination, Gascon stated that after
hearing gunshots he ran out of his house to ascertain
where the shots came from. He ran to the corner or to
the "second bend" outside the house of the victim's
father and he saw the appellant at the "second bend."
Gascon ran into the appellant while running to the
house of the victim. He was only four to five arms-
length away when he saw the appellant, thus his
positive identification of the appellant.
Another alleged discrepancy is between the version of
Major Impas that the appellant and his companion
were running towards the car and that of Gascon's
testimony that the appellant was back-tracking
towards the car. The record discloses that what Major
Impas meant to convey was that he saw the appellant
and his companion fleeing from the scene of the crime
to their get-away car while the description of Gascon
that the appellant was "back-tracking" towards the car
was a description of how the appellant fled from the
victim's house to the car, to make sure that they were
not being followed.
The alleged contradiction between Gascon's
affidavit,4 wherein he mentioned that he saw the
appellant and another person running towards the car,
and his testimony on cross-examination that he only
saw the appellant, is of no material consequence
considering that the appellant has been positively
identified as the assailant. Moreover, as it is generally
pointed out, an affidavit taken ex-parte almost always
cannot be relied upon as oftentimes it is inaccurate.5
By and large, the Court is not persuaded that the
appellant's claim of contradictions and inconsistencies
on the part of the prosecution witnesses puts into
serious doubt their credibility, Different persons who
witnessed an incident from different angles and
situations could not be expected to give uniform
details of what they saw and heard. Such minor
discrepancies and inconsistencies are to be expected
because of the human differences in perception. Such
contradicting statements are on minor details, as
hereinabove discussed, and rather than affect the
credibility of the witnesses, the same are badges of
candor.
Nevertheless, under the second assigned error, the
appellant alleges that his identification by the
prosecution witnesses cannot be relied upon
considering that they did not immediately inform the
police investigators of the identity of the assailant
upon their arrival. Although it may be true that the
eyewitnesses did not immediately identify the
appellant as the assailant to the responding
policemen, it is also a matter of fact that Major Impas
informed Cpl. Petallar while they were on the way to
the Southern Islands Hospital, where the victim was
brought, that the assailant is the appellant.6 The
second instance was when Soledad went to the
mobile patrol division and revealed to Cpl. Petallar
that the appellant was the one who shot her common-
law husband.7
It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not
immediately report the identity of the offender after a
startling occurrence more especially when they are
related to the victim as they just had a traumatic
experience. More so as in the case of Major Impas
who is the victim's father and Soledad, his common-
law wife. Nevertheless, a delay of about a few hours
before the identification of the offender by the
prosecution witnesses does not thereby affect their
credibility.
The inadmissibility of the alleged verbal confession of
the appellant is raised on the ground that he was
maltreated as a result of which he suffered twenty-
seven injuries in the form of contusions, lacerations
and abrasions. It does not appear, however, that the
82 | P a g e
prosecution proposed to rely on this alleged
confession of the appellant, or that the trial court
considered the same at all in the resolution of the
case. If it were to be considered at all, it would be
worthless because of the undeniable fact that the
appellant was not only arrested without a warrant and
entry into his house was effected without a search
warrant, but worse, he was maltreated since his arrest
so much so that he suffered multiple injuries. The
police investigators responsible for this manhandling
should be investigated and held to account. Such
involuntary confession cannot help the case of the
prosecution. It is a stain in the record of the law
enforcement agents who handled the case.
Under the fifth assigned error, the appellant questions
the admissibility of the shotgun as the alleged murder
weapon.1âwphi1 He says it was not found in his
possession but his house was searched and the
shotgun was confiscated without a search warrant.
He also alleges that the three (3) empty shells that
were submitted for the ballistics examination were not
recovered from the scene of the crime and their
production is a frameup by the police. Again, the
Court observes that the police investigators
confiscated the shotgun from the premises of the
residence of the appellant without a search warrant.
Such violation of the constitutional rights of a person
should be investigated and inquired into.
Nevertheless, the Court is not persuaded that the
police investigators in this case would willingly allow
themselves to be instruments to frame the appellant
for so serious a crime as murder. It appears that the
three empty shells were actually recovered from the
vicinity of the scene of the crime. The ballistics
examination shows that it was fired from the very
shotgun of the appellant. This evidence corroborates
the theory of the prosecution, very strongly, that the
appellant was the assailant of the victim.
Even if the Court disregards the shotgun as having
been illegally secured as well as the results of its
ballistic examination in relation to the empty shells,
still there is adequate evidence in the record to justify
a verdict of conviction. Indeed, the Court did not even
consider it necessary to inquire into the motive of the
appellant in the light of his positive identification by
the prosecution witnesses.
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was
subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth
assigned error, that it was not conducted in the
presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any
person under investigation for the commission of an
offense whose confession or admission may not be
taken unless he is informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent
counsel of his own choice.8 His right against self-
incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right
extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when
the body of the accused is proposed to be examined
as in this case.9 Indeed, the paraffin test proved
positively that he just recently fired a gun. Again, this
kind of evidence buttresses the case of the
prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the sole modification that the
indemnity to the heirs of the offended party is
increased to P50,000.00, with costs against the
appellant. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Chairman of the Philippine National Police for his
information and appropriate action on the actuations
of the law enforcement agents hereinabove
discussed.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597, G.R. No.
130514 June 17, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABUNDIO TOLENTINO, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This case is before us for the automatic review 1 of
the decision 2 of 19 May 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Macabebe, Pampanaga, Branch 55, in
Criminal Case No. 96-1763, in view of the death
penalty imposed on accused-appellant Abundio
Tolentino (hereafter TOLENTINO).
TOLENTINO was charged with the crime of rape in an
information 3 which reads:
That during the period from May 1, 1995 to July 1995,
in Masantol, Pampanga, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused ABUNDIO
TOLENTINO, step father of nine (9) year old Rachelle
Parco, the former being the common-law spouse of
the latter's mother, Teresa David, by taking advantage
of his moral ascendancy over Rachel Parco, then
eight (8) years old, did then and there, willfully,
83 | P a g e
unlawfully and feloniously thru force and intimidation,
had carnal knowledge of the said minor Rachel Parco,
against her will and consent.
The facts as synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in the Appellee's Brief, 4 which we
hereby quote and adopt as our own for being fully in
accord with the transcript of stenographic notes of
witnesses, are as follows:
On May 1, 1995, at past noon, Rachelle Parco, 8
years old, was inside one of the two bedrooms at the
second floor of the house of her grandmother, which
was located at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga
(TSN, January 22, 1997). Rachelle was arranging the
clothes while in the room (Ibid, p. 7).
Suddenly, Abundio Tolentino, the stepfather of
Rachelle Parco, entered the same room and closed
the door (Ibid). Abundio Tolentino ordered Rachelle
Parco to stand up and lie down on the bed (Ibid, pp.
7-8). When Rachelle Parco was already on the bed,
Abundio Tolentino removed his short pants and the
short pants of Rachelle Parco (Ibid, p. 8).
Abundio Tolentino placed his sex organ on Rachelle
Parco's genitals and bumped (binubundol-bundol)
hers with his (Ibid). At that moment, Rachelle Parco
remained silent, because she was afraid and did not
know what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her (Ibid,
pp. 8-9). Abundio Tolentino's carnal act lasted only for
three minutes, because Rachelle Parco's brother
knocked at the door and ask money from Abundio
(Ibid, p. 9). Abundio Tolentino told Rachelle's brother
to ask money from Lola Iding (Ibid). Thereafter,
Abundio Tolentino put on his short pants and hers and
went down the house (Ibid).
Abundio Tolentino repeatedly did the same thing to
Rachelle Parco at least three to four times a week in
May, June, and July 1995 (Ibid, pp. 11-12). Rachelle
Parco was overc[o]me by fear that she did not tell
anyone about what Abundio Tolentino was doing to
her.
When the family [of] Rachelle Parco transferred
residence to Taguig, because Masantol became
flooded, it was then that Rachelle Parco mustered
enough courage to tell her mother, Maria Teresa
David, about Abundio Tolentino's bestial behavior
(Ibid, pp. 12-13). Upon learning her daughter's sad
flight, Maria Teresa David accompanied her on May
20, 1996, to the National Bureau of Investigation,
Manila, to file a complaint against Abundio Tolentino
(TSN, February 10, 1997, p. 14).
The victim, Rachelle Parco (hereafter RACHELLE)
was likewise subjected to a physical examination, the
result of which revealed that she was still a virgin and
that her hymen was still intact and its orifice was 0.5
cm. in diameter "as to preclude complete penetration
by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury." 5
In his defense, TOLENTINO interposed alibi, claiming
that it was impossible for him to be in Masantol on 1
May 1995 because as a taxi driver he would come
home to Masantol every Sunday only, which was his
rest day. He also claimed that the incident was a
concoction of Cecille Yabut, the grandmother of
RACHELLE, as she was opposed to his relationship
with her daughter Ma. Teresa David. 6
On 19 May 1997, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting TOLENTINO of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and
indemnify RACHELLE in the sum of P100,000.
In his Appellant's Brief, TOLENTINO submits this lone
assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE
GUILT OF HEREIN ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
First, TOLENTINO raises the issue of jurisdiction of
the trial court. He maintains that the alleged rape was
committed in Taguig, Metro Manila, and hence the
trial court, had no jurisdiction thereon. We are not
persuaded. RACHELLE testified that she was
sexually abused by TOLENTINO in their residence in
Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. 7
TOLENTINO likewise asserts that the prosecution
failed to prove with moral certainty that rape had been
committed because the physical examination
disclosed no genital or extragenital injuries on
RACHELLE; her hymen was intact, and the orifice
was so small as to "preclude penetration by an
average-size adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing any genital injury." If there had
been penetration as claimed by RACHELLE, there
would have been injuries to her genitals, considering
her age and the number of times the incident
allegedly took place. RACHELLE's testimony in the
vernacular that "binundul-bundol ang kanyang ari" by
84 | P a g e
TOLENTINO does not conclusively prove that rape
was committed, to the exclusion of other offenses, in
light of the aforesaid medical findings; besides, that
testimony is subject to different interpretations and will
not lead to the conclusion that TOLENTINO's intent
was to have carnal knowledge of her.
Lastly, TOLENTINO faults the trial court in not
considering that the incident was concocted by his
mother-in-law, who was against his relationship with
her daughter, the victim's mother.
In its Appellee's Brief, the OSG supports the appealed
judgment and asks us to affirm the death penalty
imposed by the trial court.
Rape is committed even with the slightest penetration
of the woman's sex organ. It is enough that there is
proof of the entrance of the male organ within the
labia of the pudendum of the female organ.
Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the
vagina, even without rupture or laceration of hymen,
suffices to warrant a conviction for rape. Thus, a
finding that the victim's hymen is intact and has no
sign of laceration does not negate a finding that rape
was
committed. 8
Pertinent portions of the findings 9 of Dr. Armie M.
Soreta-Uniel, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, are as
follows:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and labia minora,
coaptated. Fourchette, tense, vertibular mocusa,
pinkish. Hymen, short, thin, intact. Hymenal orifice,
measures 0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and
Rugosities cannot be reached by the examining
finger.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries
noted on the body of the body of the subject at the
time of the examination.
2. Hymen, intact and its orifice small (0.5 cm. in
diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an
average-sized, Adult, Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury.
In light of these findings of the medico-legal officer, a
rigorous scrutiny of the testimony of RACHELLE must
perforce be made to determine whether there was
evidence of the entrance of TOLENTINO's male
organ within the labia of the pudendum or the lips of
the vagina of RACHELLE, without necessarily
reaching either the orifice or the hymen. The following
is RACHELLE's testimony:
Q You said that on May 1, 1995, your were inside this
room. What were you doing then?
A I was folding clothes, sir.
Q While you were folding clothes, what happened
next?
A Abundio Tolentino entered the room, sir.
Q Where did he enter the room?
A In the place where I was situated, sir.
Q Did he pass through a window or through the door
of the room?
A He entered through the door, sir.
Q After Tolentino entered the room, what happened
next?
A When he entered the room, he closed the door, sir.
Q After he closed the door, what did Abundio
Tolentino do, if he did anything?
A He told me to stand up.
Q What did you tell him?
A I did not tell him anything. I just stood up.
Q Did you stand?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then what happened?
A Then he told me to lie down on the bed.
Q What happened next?
A He removed his shorts, sir.
Q And then what happened?
85 | P a g e
A He removed my shorts also, sir.
Q When Abundio Tolentino removed his shorts as
well as yours, what transpired next?
A He placed his sex organ, sir.
Atty. Gutierrez:
May we request that the words used by the witness,
"binubundul-bundol ang kanyang ari" be placed on the
records, your Honor.
Court:
Granted.
Pros. Datu:
Will you please explain what you mean by the word
"binubundul-bundol"?
A He was trying to force his sex organ into mine, sir.
Q How long did that take?
A Around three (3) minutes, sir.
Q What did you do, if you did anything, when the
accused was forcing his sex organ into yours?
A I did not do anything, sir. I remain[ed] silent.
Q Why did you remain silent?
A I was afraid, sir.
Q Why were you afraid?
A Because I did not know what he was doing.
Q What was your reaction when Abundio Tolentino
was trying to force his sex organ into yours?
A I was just looking at our aparador and remaining
[sic] silent.
Q You said that the accused was doing this to you in
a span of 3 minutes. What happened next?
A My brother knocked at the door, sir.
Q What is the name of your brother?
A Mariel D. Parco, sir.
Q When Mariel Parco knocked at the door, what
happened next?
A He was asking for some money from Abundio
Tolentino, sir.
Q Do you mean to say, Mariel was able to enter that
room?
A No, sir, he was just near the door.
Q And what happened next?
A Abundio Tolentino told my brother to ask money
from Lola Iding.
Q What happened next?
A Before he went down, he put on my shorts and also
his shorts. 10
There was nothing from RACHELLE's testimony that
proved that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of
the pudendum of RACHELLE's vagina. As translated,
she only said: "He placed his sex organ to my sex
organ, sir." This was the translation of the
"binubundul-bundol." And when asked to explain what
she meant by it, she answered: "He was trying to
force his sex organ into mine, sir."
The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate
questions to get some more important details that
would demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that
TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the
pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE's vagina. It
should have, for instance, asked whether
TOLENTINO's penis was firm and erect or whether
RACHELLE's legs were spread apart to bring us to
the logical conclusion that, indeed, TOLENTINO's
penis was not flabby and had the capacity to directly
hit the labia of the pudendum or the lips of
RACHELLE's vagina. There is paucity of evidence
that the slightest penetration ever took place.
Consequently, TOLENTINO can only be liable for
attempted rape.
Under the law 11 there is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In this case, there is no
86 | P a g e
doubt at all that TOLENTINO had commenced the
commission of the crime of rape by (1) directing
RACHELLE to lie down, (2) removing his shorts and
hers, and (3) "trying to force his sex organ into"
RACHELLE's sex organ. But there is no conclusive
evidence of the penetration, however slight, of
RACHELLE's sex organ. The penetration was an
essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus,
in the absence of a convincing evidence thereof,
TOLENTINO should be given the benefit of the doubt
and can be convicted of attempted rape only.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower
by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the
rape if it had been consummated would have been
death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since
RACHELLE was eight years old and TOLENTINO
was the common-law spouse of RACHELLE's mother.
The last paragraph thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
The information specifically alleges that RACHELLE
was eight years old when the crime was committed
and TOLENTINO was "the stepfather . . . being the
common-law spouse of [RACHELLE's] mother,
Teresa David." That allegation is inaccurate.
TOLENTINO was not RACHELLE's step-father, for
that relationship presupposes a legitimate
relationship, i.e., he should have been legally married
to Teresa David. A step-father is the husband of one's
mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of
which the person spoken of is the offspring; 12 or, a
stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by a
previous marriage or the daughter of one of the
spouses by a former marriage. 13 Nevertheless, since
the information specifically alleges that TOLENTINO
was the common-law-spouse of RACHELLE's mother
and that RACHELLE was under eighteen years of
age, we shall appreciate these special qualifying
circumstances.
We disagree with the contention of the OSG that
"relationship" is an aggravating circumstance in this
case 14 in that TOLENTINO was the step-father of
RACHELLE. In the first place, as stated earlier,
TOLENTINO was not the step-father of RACHELLE.
Second, the alternative circumstance of relationship
can be considered only "when the offended party is
the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by
affinity in the same degree of the offender." 15
RACHELLE does not fit in any of the enumeration. At
any rate, the circumstance that TOLENTINO was the
common-law spouse of RACHELLE's mother,
together with the fact that RACHELLE was eight years
old when the rape was committed, has already served
as a special qualifying circumstance in this case.
TOLENTINO's allegation of ulterior motive cannot be
sustained. We cannot believe that the grandmother
would expose her granddaughter RACHELLE, a
young and innocent girl, to the humiliation and stigma
of a rape trial just to stop the relationship between
TOLENTINO and her daughter, the mother of
RACHELLE. There is, as well, no showing
whatsoever that RACHELLE allowed herself to be
manipulated by her grandmother to tell a lie just to
satisfy the wishes of the latter. Granting arguendo that
TOLENTINO and RACHELLE's grandmother did not
get along well, we do not see how RACHELLE would
be able to concoct a story of rape, risk public censure,
and expose herself to the rigors and embarrassment
of a public trial if her motive had been other than to
secure justice. 16
Besides, against RACHELLE's positive testimony,
TOLENTINO had nothing to offer but denial and alibi.
Settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger
than negative testimony. 17 Equally settled is that alibi
a weak defense, for it is easy to concoct and,
fabricate. It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in
the face of, the positive identification by a credible
witness that the accused committed the crime. 18
RACHELLE positively identified TOLENTINO as her
rapist.
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion
temporal, which is the penalty lower by two degrees
that death. However, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty
whose minimum shall be within the range of prision
mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range
of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to
Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
87 | P a g e

And now on the damages which may be awarded to
RACHELLE. There have been new developments in
jurisprudential law on the matter. In People v. Prades,
19 we ruled that irrespective of proof thereof, the
victim of consummated rape is entitled to moral
damages of P50,000. In People v.
Victor, 20 we also increased to P75,000 the indemnity
in rape cases if the penalty of death is to be imposed.
The trial court awarded P100,000 as indemnity.
Clearly, the award finds no support in the law and in
our decisions. Since TOLENTINO is found guilty of
attempted rape only, an indemnity of P50,000 and
moral damages of P25,000 are in order.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
modifying the appealed decision of 19 May 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga,
Branch 55, in Criminal Case No. 961763-M. As
modified, accused-appellant ABUNDIO TOLENTINO
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal
of the crime of attempted rape, under Article 335, in
relation to Article 51, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; and, pursuant to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer no
imprisonment penalty ranging from ten (10) years of
prison mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the victim RACHELLE PARCO
the sums of P50,000 as indemnity and P25,000 as
moral damages.1âwphi1.nêt
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
WRIT OF AMPARO, HABEAS DATA AND
KALIKASAN
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012
FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in
Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and
classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army
Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining
PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was
violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities
as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of
habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in
preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
RULING
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
in which such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It
must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of
the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable
to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance.
In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that
the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege
of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
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NATURALIZATION/DENATURALIZATION
G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007
EDISON SO, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80437 which reversed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in
Naturalization Case No. 02-102984. Likewise assailed
is the appellate court’s Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration of its Decision.
Antecedents
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed
before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known
as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He
alleged the following in his petition:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is
a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares
St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he
derives an average annual income of around
P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other
benefits; he is single, able to speak and write
English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the
filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of
the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended,
because he was born in the Philippines, and
studied in a school recognized by the Government
where Philippine history, government and culture are
taught; he is a person of good moral character; he
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
constitution; he has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community
in which he is living; he has mingled socially with the
Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipino people; he has all the qualifications provided
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is
not opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who uphold
and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; he is not defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of
men’s ideas; he is not a polygamist or a believer in
the practice of polygamy; he has not been convicted
of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not
suffering from any incurable contagious diseases or
from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a
citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it is his
intention in good faith to become a citizen of the
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he
will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
time of the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission as citizen of the Philippines. The petition
was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 02-102984.
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit of
Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and
petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth,5 Alien Certificate
of Registration,6 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence.7
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order setting
the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12
and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned
were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition
should not be granted. The entire petition and its
annexes, including the order, were ordered published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in the
Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise
ordered that copies of the petition and notice be
posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila
City Hall Building.9
Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above
order, as well as the entire petition and its annexes, in
the Official Gazette on May 20, 200210 and May 27,
2002,11 and in Today, a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and
June 1, 2002.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing,
petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that
he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal
consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He
would usually attend parties and other social functions
hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be
89 | P a g e
obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral
character, including all the qualifications mandated by
law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner
was gainfully employed and presently resides at No.
528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila; petitioner had
been practicing Philippine tradition and those
embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had been
socially active, mingled with some of his neighbors
and had conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed
Christmas and New Year and some occasions such
as fiestas. According to the witness, petitioner was not
disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino
citizen: he is not opposed to organized government or
believes in the use of force; he is not a polygamist
and has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; neither is he suffering from any mental
alienation or any incurable disease.12
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified
that he has known petitioner for ten (10) years; they
first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner
were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas
(UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a
member of some school organizations and mingled
well with friends.13 Salcedo further testified that he
saw petitioner twice a week, and during fiestas and
special occasions when he would go to petitioner’s
house. He has known petitioner to have resided in
Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of
good moral character, and believes in the principles of
the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful
occupation, has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner and has all the qualifications to
become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he
has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a citizen of the
Philippines.
At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence,
petitioner offered in evidence the following
documents: (1) Certificate of Live Birth;14 (2) Alien
Certificate of Registration;15 (3) Immigrant Certificate
of Residence;16 (4) Elementary Pupil’s17 and High
School Student’s18 Permanent Record issued by
Chang Kai Shek College; (5) Transcript of Record
issued by the University of Santo Tomas;19 (6)
Certification of Part-Time Employment dated
November 20, 2002;20 (7) Income Tax Returns and
Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001;21 (8)
Certification from Metrobank that petitioner is a
depositor;22 (9) Clearances that he has not been
charged or convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;23 and (10) Medical Certificates and
Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine
General Hospital.24 The RTC admitted all these in
evidence.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.25 The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
GRANTING the petition and declaring that
petitioner EDISON SO has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications to become a
Filipino citizen and he is hereby admitted as citizen
of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of
allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final,
subject to payment of cost of P30,000.00.
Creation of agencies
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE V.
ABUEVA, RAUL P. DE GUZMAN, RUBEN P.
ASPIRAS, EMMANUEL P. BELLO, WILFREDO P.
DAVID, CASIANO S. ABRIGO, and JOSEFINA R.
LICUANAN, Petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN S.
DIZON, his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80,
STERN BUILDERS, INC., and SERVILLANO DELA
CRUZ, Respondents. (G.R. No. 171182; August 23,
2012)
FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into
a General Construction Agreement with respondent
Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the
construction and renovation of the buildings in the
campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its
first and second billing. However, the third billing
worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its
disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA).
Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid
balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its
decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on
January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for
reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The
denial of the said motion was served upon Atty.
Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal
Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was
not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS
inDiliman, Quezon City.
90 | P a g e

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3,
2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the
notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On
October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the
RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied
UPs petition. The denial became final and executory.
Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for
execution despite their previous motion having
already been granted and despite the writ of
execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003,
the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on
May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued
the writ of execution on October 4, 2002).
Consequently, the sheriff served notices of
garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the
RTC ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA
sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?
II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed
out of time?
HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not
subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public funds;
suability vs. liability of the State)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP
remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is
a government instrumentality, performing the States
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds
sourced from the fees and income enumerated under
Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No.
714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve
the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as
expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds
going into the possession of the UP, including any
interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any
banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund,"
the disbursement of which should always be aligned
with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always
be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the
UP are government funds that are public in character.
They include the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for
the attainment of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the
State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A
distinction should first be made between suability and
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on
the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by
the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be
sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." The execution of
the monetary judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment
that a final and executory decision already validated
the claim against the UP.
HELD: The period of appeal did not start without
effective service of decision upon counsel of record.
(The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment;
service of judgments; fresh-period rule; computation
of time)
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of
the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from
its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the
judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs
appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26,
2002. It is true that a decision that has attained finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and whether the modification is made by the
court that rendered it or by this Court as the highest
court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a
final judgment has not been absolute, and has
admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c)
void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision that render
its execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the
UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of
the exceptional power to disregard the declaration of
91 | P a g e
finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear
violation of the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal
Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was
admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily,
the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration could only be validly made upon the
OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a
party has appeared by counsel, service must be made
upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section
2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court,
which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared
by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his
counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party
himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel
appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to
one copy of any paper served upon him by the
opposite side."
denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution," is impervious to any serious
challenge. This is because there are no vested rights
in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May
17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the
UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was
not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule.
For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from
service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration
would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday.
Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June
3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal,
conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court,
which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall
not run until the next working day. GRANTED.

Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty.

Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the
remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal
would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be
correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became
final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of
appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so
declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the
UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in
the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration interrupted the running of the
period for filing the appeal; and that the period
resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC
might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the
rule then prevailing.

However, equity calls for the retroactive application in

the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court
first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its
ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration." The retroactive
application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law
that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order

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