2 I HEADLINES
ilitary personnel problems need more than quick
ndonesian Military (TNI)
I commander Air Chief Mar -
shal Hadi Tjahjanto recently
announced major personnel poli -
cy changes. Sixty high-rankin g of-
ficer positions are to be created as
new command posts or units are
to be established and some exist -
ing ones "up-ranked ". This means
that some positions that normal -
ly require a colonel -rank officer
would now be held by a one-star
general and some that used to
require a one-star would now re -
quire a two-star and so on .
The TNI might also send more
officers to key ministries . The re -
tirement age for non -commis -
sioned officers (NCOs) and enlist -
ees would also be extended to 58
years old.
These policies, according to
the TNI leadership, target a fun -
damental problem: the grow-
ing number of "non-job" officers.
But they are quick fixes that do
not address the deeper prob -
lems within the TNI's personnel
management.
"Non-job" officers are an "out -
put" of a flawed personnel man -
agement system . They specifi-
cally indicate the presence of
promotional logjams: officers not
ThruakartaPost SATURDAYFebruary 2, 20 19
being promoted to the right posi-
INSIGHT only a third stayed outside the data used to assess the track re - dominate key positions at the ex-
tions at the right time.
Officers might have stayed in
some posts too long and prevent
TNI after the re,formasi, thou -
sands had to "return " and com -
pete for increasingly scant struc -
cord are incomplete or inaccu -
rate. The individual "assess ment
list" form that is key in assessing
pense of younger and often large r
cohorts.
Finally, the constant tinke ring
younger officers from coming tural posts. personality, skill, phys ical health, of organizational structures since
in, or there are too many equal- The large number of Army even personal and profess ional the 1950s causes incons istent per-
ly qualified officers for the same Staff and Command College (Ses- potential, is often filled subjec - sonnel management policies. The
position. Evan A. koad) graduates is also problem - tively and haphazardly by superi - tinkering (dubbed "organiza tional
Left unaddressed, these log- Laksmana atic. If Seskoad does not reduce or officers at the last minute. validation"), recalibrates key po-
jams pile up and distort the ideal JAKAR TA its graduates to around 150 soon, Furthermore, sen ior officer ap- sitions or personnel requiremen t
personnel structure. The recent there could be a surplus of up to pointments continue to be hap - witho ut fundamental overhaul.
surplus of NCOs and enlistees - years, over 100 for two years and 600 officers by 2027. hazard or political, rather than Between 1954 and 2016, there
thousands by some estimates - over 300 for one year . The Army Large academy col101tshave had based on professional track -re - were at least 23 structural chang -
has distorted the ideal ratio of 3:2:1 had a "surplus" of roughly 30 gen - to bear the brunt of the logjams in cord . Informal institutions such es to the mil itaiy organizat ion .
for combat, combat support and eral -rank officers and almost 330 recent years, especially when the as patronage further hinders ob - This roughly translates to new
administrative support (or 3:1 for colonels on average per year from officer retirement age was extend - jective considerations . changes every three years. Con -
combat and support) . The ratio is 2011 to 2017. ed to 58 in 2004, prolonging the While informal institutions sequ ently, the TN I never had the
now 1:2.4for combat and support. This problematic output stay of older academy cohorts . could provide social capital and chance to form u late and imple -
Extending the retirement age comes out of a flawed "process - The absence of an "up -or-out" private goods that the TNI can - ment a long -term personnel man -
of enlistees and NCOs would pro - ing " system - personnel manage - policy - giving officers a limited not provide (e.g. supplementaiy agement system.
long their stay in the TNI when ment - and "input " - where offi- length of service to get promoted income), they underm ine profes - The proposed policies do no t
the organization already has too cers come from . - exacerbates the problem. Most sional personnel management. confront these deeper person n el
many of them . They also exacer - The academy graduates, while academy graduates are all but Sometimes, patronage opens management challenges. Ins tead,
bate the officer-level logjams. The only providing less than a quarter guaranteed to reach colonel or "bac k-channels" that influence they are just quick fixes to relieve
logjams particularly affect young - of all officers,provide a large pool of one -star rank regardless of time. promotional and ranking boai·d some of the personnel logjam
er Army officers Oieutenant colo- officers designated to hold a much Meanwhile, the metrics used deliberations . The lack of inter - pressures but leave the unde rly-
nels and colonels who graduated smaller number of key posts. The to evaluate eligibility for promo - nal transparency further under - ing problem intact.
from the academy between the expansion of academy graduates tion are also problematic. While mines morale and professional
late 1980s and early 1990s) . during the New Order made sense career checkmarks are difficult development.
In 2010, hundreds of Army col- then as officers could be placed at to measure, it is puzzling that for- For example, an outgo ing of- The writer is a senior researcher
onels were on promotional "hold " various non -military posts. eign and domestic operations are ficer often recommends a cohort at the Centrefor Strategic
because there were no commen - There were over 12,000 mili - scored lower than military educa - mate to fill the vacancy rather and International Studies (CSIS),
surable billet openings . More tary personnel assigned to non - tion, for example . than promoting younger officers. Jak~~ ~ 1-'IJ;~(aj:l~~'PPeared
than 60 were on hold for three military posts by 1998. But when Additionally, the forms and Some academy classes could thus o the"akarta ost.con1 nFeb. l.