Searle’s Chinese Room Argument 1

Searle’s Chinese Room Argument

Simay Yıldırım, 425750

Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy

Dr. Tadeusz Ciecierski

December 11, 2020

Searle’s Chinese Room Argument 2

An important concept for Searle is intentionality. According to Searle, intentionality is purely

mental. It shows the superiority of minds in terms of the power of representation and symbolization

in terms of concrete concepts, tools, and relationships.

To give an example, we can use the verb "to cut". If we use this verb for cake, we express it as

"cutting the cake" and the first object that we will use while performing this verb will be a knife.

But if we use this verb for lawns, we use the phrase "to cut the grass" and this time we will

immediately think of a lawnmower, not a knife as an object. This example overlaps with the concept

of "Background", which is defined by Searle. What is meant by this definition are the abilities,

capacities, and tendencies that people are not in a state of intentional but can apply according to

demand? The existence of this concept closes the meaning gap that may arise from the substitution

of verbs in the previous example.

Let's move on to Searle's best-known argument. That is the Chinese Room argument. This

argument was a reaction to the concept of powerful artificial intelligence. To put it simply; He

claims that no matter how smart and human-like a computer may be, it can never have a mind,

understanding, and consciousness.

To get into detail, let's say we don't speak Chinese and we are in a room with two holes, a book,

and a few draft papers. Some Chinese characters from the first hole are sent to you. You translate

these characters using the information in the book and pass your results through the second hole. To

the outside world, it looks like you are speaking Chinese, but you don't really know anything about

the Chinese language.

Searle’s Chinese Room Argument 3

Searle's argument comes into play here. This Chinese Room can translate things into Chinese.

But if we ask if he can really understand Chinese, the answer is no. This means, according to Searle,

no matter how well a computer is doing a process, it cannot really understand that process.

Of course, certain people opposed Searle on this issue. For example, according to Stevan

Harnad, Searle actually refers to the concepts of functionalism and numeracy when he says

powerful artificial intelligence and he actually tries to criticize these concepts. Functionalists define

consciousness as information processing units that take place in the brain. Since a computer

program performs its operations according to this definition, it can be claimed by functionalists that

the system is conscious.

But Searle says "it's impossible". Because what we call consciousness is a physical concept.

Whether you set up a digestion simulation in the computer or simulate a fire, in reality, something

will neither be digested nor burn. Because it is not real.

I agree with Searle on this. Because there is doing something with understanding, and there is

just doing it. Naturally, artificial intelligence that can be established cannot have the consciousness

and understanding to go beyond the limits defined for it. It is not programmed that way, and the idea

of programming it is nothing more than science fiction to me at the moment.

Searle’s Chinese Room Argument 4

References

1. Chisholm, Roderick M. (1967). "Intentionality". The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Cilt 4, s.

201

2. Searle, Intentionality (1983)

3. Searle, John (1999). Mind, Language and Society. London: Orion Books Ltd. p. 108. ISBN

978-0-75380-921-1.

4. Harnad, Stevan (2001), "What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument", in

M.; Preston, J., Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument, Oxford University Press.

5. Searle 1980

6. Cole, D. (2020). The Chinese Room Argument (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).