Campbell B 1985 Uncertainty As Symbolic Action in Disputes Among Experts-V-VIT

Uncertainty as Symbolic Action in Disputes among Experts
Author(s): Brian L. Campbell

Source: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Aug., 1985), pp. 429-453
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
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* ABSTRACT
Uncertainty indisputesamongexpertsintheMackenzieValleyPipeline
Inquiry is examinedas symbolicaction- thatis,forthepartthatclaims
concerning theamountofknowledgeplayinexpertdebates.Itis shownthat
scientistsas expertsvarysystematically
intheargumentstheymake
concerning theamountofknowledgewith,inthiscase, 'critics'stating that
thereis uncertaintyand 'defenders'makingclaimsforadequateknowledge.
Thecredibility ofexpertclaimsconcerning theamountofknowledgeis
demonstrated and explored.Thetheoreticaland methodological importance
oftheanalysisofsymbolic actionforthepoliticalsociologyofscienceis
suggested.
Uncertaintyas Symbolic Action

in Disputes Among Experts
BrianL. Campbell
We are sometimestemptedto blame uncertainty forcontroversy. If

onlywe had more information, disagreementswould vanish.This
solutionto social conflictis illusory.Uncertaintyis not something
which causes judgementand controversy,since the quality and
amount of knowledgeare the objects of social negotiation.But
further,since the authorityof expertiseis predicatedon superior
knowledge,the questionof uncertainty toucheson the credibility
and importanceof scientistsas experts,withthe resultthat the
amountofknowledgebecomesa majorthemeinthedebatesamong
scientistswhentheyappear as experts.
The importanceoftheamountof knowledgeto thecredibility of
expertiseis amplifiedin a broadlyempiricistapproachsince,ifthe
validityof sciencelies in the accumulationoffacts,thenthelack of
knowledgecan lead to difficulties ininterpretation.
Thiscan be seen
intheliterature on thepoliticalroleofscientists
as experts.It occurs
in the 'end of ideologyschool', withthe argumentthatthereis a
decline of conflictwit'l the widespread presence of scientistsin
public policyissues, since as science advances and uncertainty is
dispelled the area for judgementand opinion shrinks.'But this
Social StudiesofScience(SAGE, London, BeverlyHillsand New Delhi), Vol. 15
(1985), 429-53

430 Social StudiesofScience
empiricisttreatment of uncertaintyas thebasis of expertconflictis

notconfinedto thetiredold strawmanof theend of ideology.It is
still at the centreof much more sophisticatedanalyses withless
sanguinepoliticalsociologies.2
My analysisof uncertainty stemsfromthe assumptionthatthe
contentofscienceisa socialconstruction. Uncertainty withinscience
is a question for negotiation,decision, and argument.Scientists
cannotbe dividedby a lack of factswhichthenforcejudgement,
since the existence of uncertaintyis the result of continual
interpretationand negotiation. But further,the adequacy of
empirical evidence becomes an importantprop in the social
negotiationsover the credibilityof expert statementsin public
forums,where the authorityof scientistsas expertsis linked to
images of the relationshipbetween scientificunderstandingand
empiricalevidence.
The sociological literatureon scientists'argumentsabout the
adequacy of knowledgewithinscience has tended to show that
scientistsmake claims for certaintyin relation to their own
knowledge.One example is the studyby Pinchon the questionof
uncertaintyin solar neutrino physics. This scientificarea is
interdisciplinary, with four main participatingdisciplines.Pinch
investigated howscientistsdealtwiththequestionofuncertainty and
certainty intheirassessmentofthevariousdisciplines,and theirrole
as thesourceofexperimentaluncertainties. In interviews,scientists
verystrongly tendedto accentuatethe uncertainties in theworkof
scientistsinotherdisciplines,whiletheirownworkwas arguedto be
more firmlygrounded.3Pinch suggeststhatscientistshave taken
him, the researcher,as a representativeof the public, and have
formedtheiraccountsto defendtheirarea to thispublic.4Mulkay
and Gilbert, in recent work on scientists'discourse, have also
pointedto scientists'accountsoftheirown beliefsas couchedin an
empiricistlanguage which emphasizes a high degree of factual
certainty. 5
Neitherof these studiesis directlyabout scientificexpertisein
publicdebates. However,Pinchmakesthesuggestionthatscientists
as expertswilltendto makecertainty arguments.Also, Mulkayand
Gilbertarguethatpublicjustifications byscientistswilltendto use
'empiricist'descriptions.In addition,Mulkayargueselsewherethat
therewould be a pressuretowardsmakingcertainty statementson
the partof scientistsas experts, because of the expert'srole as the
carrier of certified
knowledge. To make an uncertainty claim may

in ExpertDisputes
Campbell: Uncertainty 431
implythatthereis no certifiedknowledge.In effect,if scientists

made uncertainty claimstheywould invalidatetheirrole as expert
and thuslose theirpoliticalweight.In thiswaytheimportanceofthe
amount of knowledgeis clearlylinked by these analyststo the
authorityof expertargument.6 In thispaper, I argueboththatit is
commonforparticulargroupsof scientistsappearingas expertsto
statethatthereis uncertainty,and thatthistypeofargumentcan be
managed and accepted as authoritative.The social context,for
experts,does notalwaysdictatea claimforcertainty.
'Critics'and 'Defenders'inthe
MackenzieValleyPipelineInquiry
The contextofthisanalysisistheMackenzieValleyPipelineInquiry.
This Inquirywas establishedbytheGovernmentofCanada in 1974
to studythesocial,economic,and environmental impactofpipeline
developmentinthewesternarcticofCanada. Two pipelineconsortia
competedto buildnaturalgas pipelinesfromAlaska in theUnited
Statesand the Mackenzie Valley area of theCanadian Yukon and
NorthwestTerritoriesto marketsin theSouth.The proposalswere
massive,expensive,and involvedyearsof projectedconstruction.
The commissioner,JusticeThomas R. Berger, interpretedhis
mandate broadlyto consider not only the immediateeffectsof
pipelineconstruction butalso to covertheentireissue ofeconomic
and politicaldevelopmentintheNorth.The Inquirybecamea major
focusforpoliticaldebate withinCanada on a wide rangeof issues,
includingthe rightsof local aboriginalpeoples to controltheir
society,the need forenergydevelopmentwithinCanada, and the
importanceof the protectionof wilderness.The Inquiry itself
became an issue. JudgeBerger, in a significant break withpast
practices,fundedinterveners and allowed timeforthemto prepare
theircases. There were 281 days of testimony.The Inquiryreport
was tabledin theHouse ofCommonsin May 1977,afterthreeyears
ofinvestigationat a costofover$5 million.7
The argumentsover theimpactto thebiota ofthewesternarctic
werecrucialtotheinquiry.One ofJudgeBerger'smajorfindings was
that a pipeline could never be built across the northernYukon
betweenAlaska and theMackenzieRiverValley,and especiallynot
along thecoast by theBeaufortSea. This struckat theheartof the
major contenderforthe construction of the pipeline,ArcticGas,

since thiscompanyhad to crossthe northernYukon fromAlaska,

and its preferencewas for a route along the northcoast. The
discussionsduringtheInquiryon thebiota rangedovera varietyof
areas, althoughtheywere primarily concernedwithlargeanimals,
not small ones, such as spiders and insects. Caribou, muscrat,
moose, birds(especiallysnowgeese and peregrinefalcons),bears,
and whitewhales were some of the animals whichoccupied the
Inquiry.8
'Social context'is an ambiguousphrase. In thispaper a main
componentof social contextis a formof groupmembership,being
collectively witha 'critical'or 'defensive'stanceinrelation
identified
to pipelinedevelopment.The phenomenonofexpertiseis a feature
of public display,in a set of performanceswhichare quite often
orchestratedby identifiableself-consciously organizinggroups.9
The scientistsdiscussedin thisstudywerepresentedas expertsin a
public inquiryby organizationswitha declared orientationto the
issues in the debate. Experts were collectivelyidentifiedand
recognizedas makingargumentsin supportof clearlyidentifiable
positionsin relationto public issues. In myanalysisI relate what
scientists say about uncertainty(a result of my thematic
interpretation) to theirsocial locationin termsof theirassociation
with a 'defensive'or 'critical'programmein relationto pipeline
development.For example,I took all of thosescientistswho were
presentedbyorganizationswhoformally developeda criticismofthe
pipelineproposals as regardless
'critical', of whether I thoughttheir
individualarguments were'really'criticalintermsofmystandardsof
'critical'adequacy. Further,thecollectively identified of
orientation
argumentdoes not involvea judgementon my part of the 'true'
interestsof thepartiesinvolved,sinceit is a classification based on
thewaythatparticipants constructand organizedebate. In thisway,
I relate argumentative action to the socially constructed
organizationofargument.
SixorganizationspresentedexpertbiologistsattheInquiry.There
were two industrialproponents,ArcticGas and Foothills.Experts
associated with these organizationswere classifiedas part of a
'defensive'argument.There were twointerveners, theCommittee
forOriginalPeople's Entitlement(a nativepeople's organization,
hereafterCOPE), and the Canadian ArcticResources Committee
(an environmentaland northerndevelopment policy group,
hereafter CARC). Expertsassociatedwiththeseorganizations were
classifiedas partofa 'critical'argument.The expertswho appeared

Campbell: Uncertainty
in ExpertDisputes 433
for the two remainingorganizations,the Commission and the

EnvironmentProtectionBoard, were also polarized,foranalytical
purposes,in termsofa dichotomybetween'critics'and 'defenders'.
The case oftheCommissionis interesting in thisparticularinstance
since it became identifiedwith the criticsboth by criticsand
defenders.On a broad range of issues, the Commissionfound
againstindustry in a mannerwhichwas, ifanything, moreconsistent
thanother'critics'.'(It also presenteditsown evidenceto 'test'the
veracityoftheindustrial case and appearedto be inconstantconflict
withbothgovernment and industry throughout thehearings.' Since
I am interestedin theanalysisofthestructure ofcriticalargumentI
classifiedthe Commissionwitnessesas 'critics'.The Environment
ProtectionBoard was an organizationwitha confusedmandate.It
was one of the earliest participantsin the assessment of the
environmental impactofpipelinedevelopmentproposals.It was set
up as an independentassessorin 1970by AlbertaGas TrunkLines
(latercalledFoothillsPipelines).The Board wascomposedmostlyof
academicswhohad an independenceintermsoftheirresearchandin
the publicationof theirreports.Foothillsjoined the Arctic Gas
consortiumand took theBoard withit. The Board was maintained
by Arctic Gas, but Arctic Gas preferredto develop its own
environmental case usingconsultantsas partof its applicationfor
approval, and the design of the pipeline. Matterswere further
confusedwhenAlbertaGas TrunkleftArcticGas to formFoothills
and develop a rivalproposal.The Board was leftbehindin an arms-
lengthassociationwithArcticGas whereitwas fundedon a reduced
basisuntilthepublichearingsintoenvironmental impactwhentheir
financing ended and theydisbanded.Thisconfusedmandatedidnot
resultin an aloofnesson thepartofthemembersoftheBoard since,
atleastinthecase ofthosemembersassociatedwiththetestimony on
biology, they had longstandingassociations with industryand
environmental groupswhichextendedto consultingcontractswith
industry and formalinvolvement withenvironmental organizations.
They became recognizedby themselvesand others as criticsor
defendersof the Arctic Gas case (the supposed topic of their
assessment). The two expertswhom I interviewedwere clearly
recognizedand identified inthisway.2
The resultof theseclassifications is a polarizationof expertsinto
twocampsfortheanalysisofthethemeofuncertainty in arguments
about theimpactto thepipeline.'3 I createpopulations('critics'and
'defenders') throughan analyst'scategorizationof the way that

participantsconstructand organizedebate. In doingthis,I am not

attendingto themanysubtlevariationsin thewaythatparticipants
set about thistask. I am ratherbasing my categorieson general
themesinthestructure organizedargument.
ofcollectively
WhoIs AnExpert?
The same attendanceto the social constructionof argumentis

evidentintheidentification ofexpertbiologistsas a whole.The data
presentedinthispaperreferto thedebateamongexpertbiologistsin
the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry. The population was
identified intwostages.First,I identified all thosepersonswhowere
labelled in thetranscripts oftheInquiryas 'experts'in biology,and
whosetestimony purportedto be aboutthebiologicalenvironment.
This would exclude laymenwho testifiedon questionsrelated to
biology,and biologistswhogave testimony whichpurportedtobe on
non-biologicalquestionssuch as public policy.Thirty-oneexpert
witnesseswereincludedforstudyusingthesecriteria.I interviewed
twentyof these witnesses in an attempt to cover the entire
population.
But thesewitnessesdo not includeall of thescientistswho were
directlyinvolved in the debates withinthe Inquiry.There were
scientificadvisorswithinthevariousorganizationswhichsponsored
testimony who helped to prepareevidence,and wouldoftenadvise
lawyers on a question-by-questionbasis during the cross-
examinationof otherscientists.But, as advisors,theywould not
appear in thetranscript ofthehearing.I discoveredthesepeople by
recommendation.These scientistswere oftenalso witnesses,but
therewerefivescientistswhomI identifiedon thisbasis who would
not otherwisebe includedin the analysis.I was able to interview
threeofthesepeople. In thiswayI interviewed a largesampleofall of
thosescientists whoweredirectly involvedinthedebateoverbiology
intheMackenzieValleyPipelineInquiry.14
As in mygroupclassification of expertsas collectivelyidentified
withcriticalor defensiveprogrammes,thisclassification of 'expert
biologists'is based on a local social construction. I have notdecided
what is testimonyabout the biota: rather, I am using what the
participants in the debate have defined as the testimony about the
biota. This is crucialsincemyanalyticalreadingsof thestructure of
debates and the definitionsof populations are kept separate.

Similarly,'expert'is a nativecategorywhichdid notinvolveme in

judgingthequalifications ofwitnesses.However,inkeepingwiththe
practiceoutlinedinreferenceto thedistinction between'critics'and
'defenders',thisnativeconceptofexpertis notattendedto in terms
ofitsvariability
andstrategicuse inargument.Forexample,one way
thatparticipantsdiscussedthecredibility ofscientists'opinionswas
to label some scientistsas the 'true' experts,and othersas not.
Officialdesignationsand positive informalapplications of the
distinctionhavebeenused as thebasisformyanalyst'sclassification.
inSymbolicAction
Ambiguity
This paper is an exercisein thesociologyofargumentand symbolic

action. As in the recentwork of some discourseanalysts,I am
interestedintheobservablephenomenaofwhatpeople say. Mulkay
has suggestedthat this type of approach may be different from
traditional sociological preoccupations. '5 However, although
clearlydifferent fromsome sociologicalprogrammes, I considermy
approachto be consistentwithcurrentswithincertainlongstanding
traditionswithinsociology- particularly symbolicinteractionism,
and especiallythedramaturgical approachtypified byGoffman.'6In
social dramaturgy people areconsideredas managingimpressions in
relationto a definitionof the situation,and theseimpressionsare
considered as collectivelyavailable featuresof situations.From
withinthisperspective,a distinction can be madebetweenindividual
and collectivemeaning,sinceindividualscan be moreorlesscynical,
confused,sophisticated,and so on. Social structure and interaction
are 'loosely' associatedwithindividualmeaning.So whenI referto
thesocialorganizationofarguments byscientistsas experts,I amnot
implyingthatan individual'sreasoningis distortedbysocial forces.
The rangeofindividualmeaningis inprincipleextensively variable.
Of course, thisambiguityhas been exhaustivelycataloguedin the
social studyof science and it is the bread and butterof much
sociologicalanalysis.But inthepresentanalysisthisvariability is not
treated as a methodologicaldifficulty or a problem for order.
Rather,itis assumedthatsocial structure is possiblebecauseof this
slippage.Orderininteraction is a pastiche,a glosson thisvariability,
so thatthe analysisofinteractiveorderis at thelevel of observable
themeand style,and not of individualmeaningand purpose. One
way or anotherorganizationshave managed to offerscientistsas

expertsin supportoftheirpositions.For thesociologist,thesocially

variable, collectively available, thematic structureof debate
becomesan objectofstudy.
The Data and Its Presentation
There are two types of informationused in this paper: public

information containedprimarily inthetranscripts oftheInquiry,and
taped responsesto open-endedinterviews.Quotes fromthepublic
transcriptare labelled'PublicExtract'whiletheinterview responses
are labelled 'Interview Extract'; and both are numbered
consecutively.The interviewswere conductedin an open-ended
stylefroma setscheduleofquestionswhichwereasked in a flexible
manner.The conversations weretapedand latertranscribed.17
Even thoughthispaperis offeredas an exerciseinthesociologyof
symbolicaction, withthe effectsof social contexton patternsof
discourseas a focusof analysis,thedifferences betweenpublicand
interviewstatementsare not highlighted in the presentdiscussion.
The social contextfor makingcertainty/uncertainty argumentsis
treated as the collectively identifiedorientation of argumentin
relationto pipelinedevelopment. This does not deny differences in
thediscourseofscientists as experts,dependingon whethertheyare
in publicor informalsituations.However,in thistypeof case, the
debates over the adequacy of knowledge appear to cross-cut
differences. These forumsaffectthe wayscientistsmake certainty/
uncertainty arguments, inthattheinterviews arefullofinvectiveand
personal allusions while the formaltestimonyis almost totally
substantive.18 I use tables to display a summaryof interview
responsesinnumericalform.Mypurposeis to maketheinformation
as clearand accessibleto othersas possible.I havetriedto replaceas
many'some (or most)respondentssaid. . .' withspecificcountsof
howmany.In doingthisI havenotoperationalizedinadvancewhatI
meanby'some', orwhatI countas a certaintypeofresponse.Thatis
notthepointoftheexercise.Butwe all 'count'responsesmoreorless
rigorouslywithsuch characterizations as 'typical'and 'most'. I am
simplydisplayingthe reading decisions I have made, withas many
to
quotationsas possible support and test myreading.The numbers
become a shorthandforpatternsto emerge.

The AdequacyofKnowledge
The question of the adequacy of knowledgeenteredthe Inquiry

debate at importantjunctures.The industrialproponentswere
obliged to make an environmentalassessmentas part of their
applicationto governmentto proceedwiththeproject.Industryhad
todo enoughresearchtosupporttheclaimsitmadeinitsapplication.
ArcticGas had spentfiveyearsand abouttwentymilliondollarsin
producing its environmentalstatement.The consultantswho
testifiedon behalf of Arctic Gas expressed a high degree of
confidencein the amountof knowledgetheyhad produced. For
example,hereare remarksmade byBanfield,thecoordinatorofthe
consultantbiologistsforArcticGas:
PublicExtractI
. . . Governmentagencies and the foundationssuch as the ArcticInstituteof
NorthAmericahad notpreviouslyhad thefundsto undertakestudiesat thelevel
thathas been undertakenwithrespectto thisproject.The projecthas made a
majorcontribution to ourknowledgeoffishandwildlifeinthislargearea ofNorth
America.I believethatwe nowhave sufficientinformation toformthebasisofan
adequate environmentalimpact assessmentand of mitigativeproceduresto
protecttheenvironment. '9
Biologists who testifiedon behalf of intervenerssometimes

highlightedthelackofknowledge.Perhapstheclearestuncertainty
positioncame fromCalef, a biologistwho appeared forCOPE on
caribou.In histestimony,
Calefarguedthatfindings bybiologistson
caribouwereinconsistent,and illustrated
hispointbydemonstrating
howvariousscientistshavemadeconflicting assessmentsofthesame
information:
PublicExtract2
Such uncertainty indicatesthateven surveydata are open to interpretation..
thisis notthe level of accuracyforthecontinuityof surveyswhichwe requireto
even detectchangesin cariboupopulations,letalone to attributethemto specific
causes. WithintheCanadian WildlifeService,forexample,we findone groupof
biologistswho believe thatthe caribouhave declined;anothergroupwho think
theyhaven't,bothusingthesame data.211
In theinterviews, I asked scientists

thequestion:'How wouldyou
assess the adequacy of the knowledgebase forthe predictionof
impact?'.The responsesofparticipants are summarizedinFigure1,
wheretheywerecoded as 'adequate', 'inadequate', or 'mixed'.The
codingcriteriaare subjective,and are substantiatedwithillustrative

FIGURE 1
Expertson the Adequacy of Knowledgeby AssociationwithCollectively
Organized'Critical' or 'Defensive' Arguments
CollectivelyOrganizedArgumentson PipelineIssues
Defensive Critical
Adequate 6 3
Scientists
on theAdequacy Mixed 3 2
of Knowledge
Inadequate 1 7
Totals 10(11)* 12(12)
Based primarily
on responsesto thequestion:'How would you assesstheadequacy
of the knowledgebase forthe predictionof impact?'
*The numberin parenthesisis the total numbersize.
discussion.Scientistswerecross-classified in termsofwhetherthey
were'critical'or 'defensive',as outlinedabove.
In the interviews, defendersof developmenttendedto statethat
knowledgewas adequate. Here are some of the remarksof one
defender:
InterviewExtractI
I thinkwe had a prettygood data base on whichto go. Even those who were
adverseto theprojectrecognizedthatthedata base was fairlycomplete.
The opposite'inadequate' assessmentwas clearlythepreference for

criticalscientists.Seven out of twelvecriticalscientistsmade this
remark.The perceptionof a fundamentallack of knowledgeis
clearlycaughtintheremarksofone ofthesescientists:
InterviewExtract2
. . .we are learningeveryyear more about thisecosystem. . . we are learning
moreaboutwhatcan go wrong,butwe arestillso damnfarawayfromreallyhaving
inadequateinansweringspecificquestions. . .
a holdon itthatwe feelconstantly
Here we are dealingwitha soughtafterdegreeof informationwhichwill,infact,
neverbe achieved,or notinthelifetimesofthepeople nowworking.
Scientistsas expertscan make uncertaintyarguments.This is

clearlyshownin thiscase studywherescientistswere splitin their

argumentsovertheamountofknowledge.This splitdoes notoccur
in an accidental way. Critics tend to claim uncertaintywhile
defenderstend to claim adequate knowledge.This may be a very
generalpattern.Nelkinhas observed,fromhercase materials,that
criticsneed not make equal arguments,but can simplyshow a
defender'scase to be insufficient.21 This relationshipbetween a
'critical'or 'defensive'stance and conflictingadequacy arguments
does not necessarilymean thatscientistsare cynicallyconstructing
theiraccountsin a defensiveor criticalway. The motivationsof
individualsare quite complex. In this and most other expert
controversies,expertsappear as witnessesfor interestedparties.
One wayoranotherexpertsare recruitedand arguments aremade.22
Howeverthisis accomplishedwitheach individual,thestructure of
debatesappearsto reinforcea splitintheinterpretation ofadequate
knowledge.
Varyingconceptionsof the reliabilityof knowledgewithinany
science or researcharea may exist independentof any practical
problem.In thepresentcase studyitis evidentthatsome scientists
offercompetingassessmentsof the adequacy of knowledgewithin
theirscienceas a whole.Conflicting assessmentsofadequacydo not
necessarilydepend on different definitionsof the relationshipof
knowledgeto some practicalproblem.23 Scientistscan be dividedby
a varietyofinternalfactors,includingdisciplines,schoolsofthought
withinor acrossdisciplines,or theinterpretive ingenuity whichthey
exhibitas individuals.Interpretation does notstartwithpolicy.
These issuesare complexandconfused.The interview questionon
adequacyreferred to whethertherewas enoughknowledgeto make
a judgementon a practicalproblem-namely, the predictionof
impact. I have received answerswhich address this question by
makingstatementsabout thefundamentaladequacy of knowledge
both on scientificquestions(the dynamicsof animal populations)
withimplicationsforthe practicalproblem,and in relationto the
practicalproblemwithoutanyfundamental assessmentofthestate
of knowledge.But I have also receivedvariousdefinitionsof the
practical problem. The defendersof development who made
'adequate' statements sometimesqualifiedthepurposeinrelationto
whichknowledgewas adequate. For example,one industry scientist
statedthatknowledgewas adequate forthatstageintheapplication
process.Whatis adequate is seen to relateto whatcan be reasonably
expected to be known for an administrative purpose. Another

'defensive'scientiststatedthatknowledgewas adequate forthestate

of the artof assessmentat the time.Like the 'defensive'scientists
above, one of the 'critical'scientistsspecifiedthatknowledgewas
adequate to makea decisionaboutsensitiveareas:
InterviewExtract3
Under the circumstancesI am 100 per cent confident.Anybodywho is doing
researchobviouslyhas neverenoughtime,neverenoughdata. But forthetypeof
workthatwe wereinto,itwas good enough.. . . we knewwherethemostsensitive
areas were.
The problemof adequate knowledgebecomes relatedto practical

purposes, or to a stage in the administrativeprocess, or to
conceptionsoftheindustrial developmentunderstudy.24 In thelight
ofthesefactors,theadequacyofknowledgecan be seentodependon
a greatdeal ofinterpretiveactionaboutwhatissuesa sciencerelates
to.
But the relationshipbetweena defendingor criticalstance and
argumentsabout the amountof knowledgewas not a perfectone.
Sayingthattherewas enoughknownwas not just characteristic of
also made 'adequate'
'defensive'scientists.Three 'critical'scientists
remarks.Here are some oftheremarksofone ofthesescientists:
Interview Extract4
. . . I've spentmywholelifeon thisspecies,and I thinkwe knowquitea bitabout
theanimal.You know,thenextguydowntheroad sayswe don't knowanything
about the animal. But thingsthatcome out in these are thingsthatI thinkare
predictable.so I thinkthatwe havea pretty good database... . [Thisothercritical
on [species],and he's neverstudied[species].And
scientist]isthereas an authority
he's sayingthatwe don'thave a lotofthingsthatwe are supposedto have.
Some criticalscientistsfindit reasonable to argue that there is

enoughknown.Similarly,makinga commentthattherewas insome
way inadequate knowledge was not exclusive to critics. Some
defendersofdevelopmentstatedtherewas notenoughknowledgein
some way. This appeared mostlyin 'mixed' assessmentswith a
statementthattherewas good knowledgein some areas but notin
others.Onlyone 'defensive'scientistmade an 'inadequate' remark,
but thislack of knowledgewas notstatedto be largeor significant.
He claimedthisdeficiency could be remediedwithobservationover
a shorttime period. In all cases, whenevera 'defensive'scientist
made a statementthat there was some gap in the amount of
knowledgeitwas notinterpreted The significance
to be significant.

is a crucialcomponentin theargumentssurrounding
ofuncertainty
theadequacyofknowledge.
The Significance
ofUncertainty
It is clear, then, that there was debate in the Inquiryover the

adequacy of knowledge.But not only do participantsargue over
whetheruncertainty is present,theyalso attendto itsimplications
foraction.The implications whichthecriticalscientist,
Calef,draws
fromthe absence of knowledgeare illustratedfromstatementshe
made laterinhistestimony wherehe addressesthesignificance ofnot
knowing:
PublicExtract3
I made the statementthatthe porcupinecaribou herdcould decline by as
muchas 90% in fiveto tenyears.Suchwas thefateofthe40-mileherd,and such
was thefateoftheNelchinaherdin Alaska. Whetherthedeclinesoftheseherds
can be attributedto thedevelopmentsand activitiesofmanis notentirelyclearto
me. But that90% declineofgreatcaribouherdsdidoccuris unequivocal.I do not
thinkthatwe are in a positionto say thattheproposedCAGSL pipelinewillnot
produceor contributeto similardeclinesin the porcupineherd,and whenwe're
dealingwith115,000animals,withone ofthelastwildlifespectacleson thefaceof
the earth,witha veryimportantpartof the culture,the historyand the current
well-beingof the nativepeoples who have inhabitedthe continentforat least
25,000years,withtherepresentatives ofa groupofanimalswhoseliveshavebeen
partoftheworldofhumanbeingsfortensofthousandsofyears,bothhereand in
Eurasia, I feel thatwe have an awesome responsibility to proceed slowlyand
cautiouslywithprojectswhichmayultimately destroythem.2)
Another major example of the interpretation of uncertaintyas

indicatingcaution is the testimonyof Sergeant,a biologistwho
testified
forCOPE on whitewhales:
PublicExtract4
Withsuch incompleteknowledge,whatactioncan be recommended?I believe
thatitwouldbe prudenttotakeactionwhichwouldpreventthecalvinganimalsin
the delta frombeing subject to the possibilityof disturbance,throughoutthe
wholedeltasimultaneously. Thatis,I believethata sanctuaryor reserveshouldbe
setup inthewesternpartofthedeltawherethemainmassofwhalesoccursinJuly
. . . This reserveshouldbe totallyfreefromall disturbance,includinghunting.26
Both Sergeanton whales and Calef on caribouare makingsimilar

uncertaintyarguments.They both state thatthereis not enough
known,thatpotentialdamage is greatand, therefore,
thatthebest
courseis to avoid disruption.

thata similarargumentwas made byJakimchuk,

It is interesting
ArcticGas' mainconsultantin relationto caribou.Afterextensive
cross-examination, Jakimchuk conceded thatitwas notpossibleto
establisha cause-effect relationshipbetweenthe introduction of a
disturbanceand thedynamicsoftheherdpopulationbecause ofthe
multiplicityof factors involved, and the difficultieswith
measurement.The solution,therefore, is to avoid interaction:
Public ExtractS
to tell,thatiswhywe prefertoavoidanypotentially
It wouldbe difficult damaging
interactions.In otherwords,takingthe- I guesswhatisreferredto as lookingat it
froma downsideriskpointofview,and tryto achieveprotectionbyavoidance.'7
Jakimchuk minimizedtheimportanceofuncertainty byreferringto

theavoidanceofcontactwithcaribou,whichisa designfeatureofthe
pipeline routingand scheduling.Under such circumstancesthe
become unimportant:
uncertainties
PublicExtract6
answersto thepoints. . . justinthesame
It wouldbe desirableto have definitive
fashionas itwouldbe desirableto knowthecause ofthecommoncold,butitisnot
necessaryforthetreatment oftheproblem.8
Otherscientistsassociatedwiththeindustry dealt withthe issue of

uncertaintyby referring to a general body of literature,further
research,and reactiveengineeringdesignsolutions.29 However it
was done,whenuncertainty was recognizedbythesescientists itwas
never allowed to challenge the reasonableness of pipeline
development.Through a varietyof arguments,any uncertainty
whichdid existwas shownto have no negativeconsequencesforthe
construction
effective ofthepipeline.
The interviewsreveala similarpatternto thatofthepublicdebate,
withconflictingwaysofinterpreting theimportanceofuncertainty.
Scientistswereasked thequestion:
Where uncertaintyexistsin the knowledgebase, how do you thinkan impact
assessmentshould be resolved? Would you tend toward caution and decide
againstproceedingwitha project, or would you tend towardconfidenceand
decideinfavouroftheexecutionofa project?
The responseswerecoded as 'uncertainty

manageable','uncertainty
not manageable', and 'mixed'. 'Manageable' remarksare those
whichreduce the importanceof uncertaintyformakingdecisions
about impact,with the recommendationthat it is acceptable to

in ExpertDisputes
FIGURE 2
Expertson the Significanceof Uncertainty by Association
withCollectivelyOrganized'Critical' or 'Defensive' Arguments
CollectivelyOrganizedArgumnents
on PipelineIssues
Defensive Critical
Manageable 11 0
Scientists
on the Significance Mixed 0 2
of Uncertainty
Not Manageable 1 10
Totals 11(11)* 12(12)

Based primarilyon responsesto the question: 'Whereuncertainty existsin the
knowledgebase, how do youthinkan impactassessmentshouldbe resolved?Would
you tendtowardcautionand decideagainstproceedingwitha projector would you
tendtowardconfidenceand decide in favourof the executionof a project?
*The numberin parenthesisis the total sample size.
proceed. 'Not manageable'commentsaccentuatetheimportanceof

uncertainty in makingdecisions,withtherecommendation thatitis
not acceptableto proceed. 'Mixed' remarkswereindecisiveon this
issue. Scientists'commentsare summarizedinFigure2.
All of the scientistswho defendedpipeline developmentwere
classifiedas making'manageable'remarks.Some ofthesescientists
includedreferencesto cautionintheircomments.For example,one
scientiststatedthatwhenthereis uncertainty one should 'proceed
withcaution'andbuildsafetyfeaturesintothedevelopmentplans.It
is noteworthy thatsix of theseeleven 'positive'scientistscriticized
the oppositionforthewaythattheyhandleduncertainty. Here are
some oftheremarksofone ofthesescientists:
Interview Extract5
. . .there's thatendlesscryformoreresearch,moreresearch.Our positionwas,
and certainlyin my mindthe correctand responsibleone is, thatsix yearsof
researchhad goneintoa broadrangeoftopicsat considerablelength- and it'sfor
surewe don'tknowhowecosystemsrespond,we don'tknowhowtheyrespondin
southernAlberta, therefore,the argumentthatwe shouldn'tdo anythingis, I
think,irresponsible.
One ofthesescientists
wentso faras to attackcriticalscientists
who

accentuated uncertaintyas motivated by self-interestin their

attitudestowardsdevelopment:
InterviewExtract6
of biologists,especiallyin universities.They
This is one of the greatdifficulties
wantgrantmonies.They wantto keep goingforthe nextten,fifteenyears.So
they'll always tell you they don't have enough information. . . And if our
motivationthenis eitherwe wantmoregrantmoniesto trainmorestudentsinthe
future,we're nevergoingto admitwe know all we need to. And if our other
motivationis thatwe're not reallyin favourof northerndevelopmentanyway,
thenwe'll use thisas a tool.
Anotherwaythatsome ofthesescientistsattackedcriticalscientists
on uncertainty was to reason thatscience alwayshas elementsof
uncertainty associatedwithitso thatcriticisms based on uncertainty
wereunscientific.
Ten of the twelve criticalscientistswho made remarkswere
classifiedas making'not manageable'comments.Like some of the
'defending'scientists, twoofthesescientists presentedtheircaution
about uncertainty as an extensionof science. For example,one of
them referredto scientistsin general as being conservativeand,
therefore, cautious.In contrast,thesupporters ofdevelopmentwere
describedbythispersonas adoptingan 'engineering approach'with
an emphasison problem-solving ability.Thisconceptofengineering
optimismon thepartof 'defenders'appeared in theremarksoftwo
other'critical'scientists.By implication,optimismis associatedwith
engineeringand not science. On the whole, however, critical
scientists'remarkswerenotaimedat pullingdownindustry. Here is
a typicalresponse:
InterviewExtract7
fallinginthecautiouscategory. . . Butina situationwhereI felt
I wouldsee myself
thatwe reallyknowtoo littleto predictimpact,or to understandimpact,where
therecould in factbe foreseeableeventswhichwould be serious ones on the
environment, thenI would standon theside of cautionand recommendthatwe
wait.
Two 'critical'scientistsmade mixed comments,but neitherof

thesescientistsmade remarkswhichcontradicted themajority.One
of these scientistssimply made a stronguncertainty argumentby
statingthattherewas notenoughknownin thisparticularcase, but
declinedanygeneralremarks.The otheridentifiedtheissue ofthe
significanceof uncertainty as outsideof science, and as such, not
somethingforscientists to decide.

This manoeuvringin relation to uncertaintydemonstratesa

importanceoftheissueofuncertainty
strategic to expertarguments.
PerhapsNelkinand othershave identifiedan importantfeatureof
expert argumentsin the criticalpart theyassign to uncertainty.
Recognizeduncertainty maycallforinterpretation.
To illustrate
this
point,hereis a quote ofsomelengthfromtheremarksmadetomeby
one of the defendingscientistswhen I asked him about the
ofuncertainty
significance foraction:
Interview Extract8
The opposition to any developmentis going to emphasize the gaps in the
information, and theproponentsofthedevelopmentare goingto emphasizethe
largevolumeof information theyhave, and itseems to me, thatwithrespectto
ArcticGas, theyhave outdonethemselves.Now theymayhave made mistakes,
there'sno doubt about that,not so muchin the environmental area, but in the
engineering"F' . . . But ifyou'relookingfortotalcertainty you'llnevergetit. It's
not possible in thisworld,and it's not possiblein science. . . . Well, kindof in
general,I would erron the side of caution,but at the same timeyou've got to
recognizethatthereis a pointbeyondwhichyoucan'tgo. I mean,it'sall verywell
to say thatthecompanieshave to come up withan absolutelyairtight case . . . a
universalstatementthattherewillbe no impacts.Logicalimpossibility. Certainly
impossibleforscience because science doesn't make those kindof statements.
Science deals in probabilities,and itdeals intheories.You're trying to generalize
froma bodyof knownfacts.Well yourgeneralizationcan be wrong.Nobodycan
guaranteethatkindofthing.God mightbe able to,butno man.And howmuchare
we goingto? Companiesaren'tinexhaustible minesofmoney.The companiesthat
can affordthesethingsbythemselves,and withoutgovernment support,are the
kindsofcompaniesthatsimplygo and spendtheirmoneyelsewhere.We have to
have development.Otherwise,intheNorthwest Territories,as I say,I don'tthink
thattheindigenouspeoples can surviveat thepopulationgrowthrate.Theycan't
surviveon a renewableresourceeconomy.. . . I wouldsuspectthatmostofthem
are livingon the dole, and thatmostof the moneythatgoes intothe Northwest
Territoriesis moneythat'sgeneratedin the south and shipped into there. It's
simplygoingto become moreof a problem.Now, I don'tknow.You're goingto
turnit into a zoo up there with a bunch of people runningaround catching
whatevertheycan and livinga substandardexistence,or whatare we goingto do
aboutit.
In the commentsof thisscientistwe see 'political' ideas being

introducedintoan argumentabout theimplicationsofuncertainty.
A judgementon policyissuesappears to be reliedon to resolvethe
'practical' issue of whetherto proceed. In thisway the topic of
'politics'is introducedbythepresenceof thetopicof 'uncertainty'.
But itis notclear thatuncertaintyhas 'caused' politicalconceptsto
fill the gaps in reasoning. Rather, the existenceof uncertainty
becomesan interpretive problem.

Anotherexample,thistimefroma criticalscientist,willhelp to
has caused
withstatingthatuncertainty
demonstratethedifficulties
judgement:
InterviewExtract9
I wouldtendtowardthecautiousside, unlessitcould be shownto mysatisfaction
thatthethingwas reallynecessary.
Thispersonwenton to statethatinthecase oftheMackenzieValley

Pipeline:
Interview Extract10
the area ofthecountry.It is benefitting
. . .it's a projectwhichisn'tbenefitting
people whoare usingtheproductwastefully anyway.
Is thispersonsayingthatpolicyquestionshave not influencedhis

judgementsince he normallywould be cautious? This 'normal'
cautionwouldthenbe affectedbypublicneed, ifthisneed is severe.
But,as partofan argumentagainsttheproject,thispersongoeson to
state thatthe need is not there.Does thismean thatthisperson's
publicpolicyassessmentofa lack ofneed forpipelinedevelopment
has affectedhis reasoningabout impact,or has he referredto this
lack of need as additionaljustificationfor being opposed? The
priorityof 'political'attitudesin thisreasoning,and in thatof the
otherscientistquoted above, is notclear. However,ifuncertainty is
not a statewhichforcesscientiststo reason and argue but is partof
debate and negotiation,thena causal argument ofthiskindbecomes
unimportant. Whatis important is thepivotalpositionofuncertainty
forthedevelopmentofa policyassessment.
The importanceofuncertainty as a strategicpointforargumentis
notrestricted to theintroduction ofpoliticalstatements.Onlythree
scientistsincludedpoliticalstatements intheirinterview remarkson
the significanceof uncertainty.'Non-political' topics are also
introducedto deal withthesignificance ofuncertainty. For example,
one defenderarguedthatuncertainty was nota problembecause the
technologicalcapabilitiesof industry would designsolutionsto any
problemswhichshouldarise,whiletwocriticalscientists questioned
the abilityof engineersto solve problems,citingpast failuresas
evidence.3'Anotherdefenderintroducedan argumentthatarctic
animalsspeciesare moreadaptableandwould,therefore, be able to
take any stresses.32In all of these cases the problem of uncertainty
was attendedto withsome formof introduction of anotherissue,

whichwas thenused as partof a resolution.Uncertainty becomesa

strategicpointin argument.
But howeveruncertainty is attendedto,itsimportanceas a critical
point for interpretation appears even more importantthan the
existenceof uncertainty itself.Indeed, in the case studydiscussed
above thesignificanceofuncertainty provokeda muchclearersplit
betweendefendersand criticsthandidtheissueofwhethertherewas
adequate knowledgein the firstplace. And finally,the strategic
importanceof this debating point is illustratedby how some
participantsused the issue to attack theiropposition. This was
especially the case with defenders, where the suggestion of
uncertaintystruckat thelegitimacy oftheirposition.
Summaryand Conclusions
The above information helpsto establishfivemainpoints.First,the

issue of uncertaintyis a strategicelementof argumentratherthan
somethingwhichcauses argument.Second, argumentsabout the
adequacy of knowledgevarywiththe social situationof experts.
Third,thesocialstructuring ofexpertarguments does notimplythat
scientists'argumentshave been 'distorted'by the social circum-
stances of theirexpertise.Fourth,uncertainty argumentsdo not
necessarilyunderminethe credibilityor effectiveness of certified
scientificexpertknowledge.Fifth,thetypeofapproachdevelopedin
this analysishelps to focus attentionon the politicaldynamicsof
expertise and the complex relationshipsbetween scientificand
policyissues. I would like to develop each ofthesepointsin a little
moredetail.
as Argument
Uncertainty and CognitiveCausality
The issueofuncertainty can be morefruitfully

analyzedas a strategic
element in expert arguments,than as somethingwhich causes
scientistsas expertsto disagree.This is shownin a clearwaybythe
systematicdisagreementon the adequacy of knowledge in the
Inquirydebate. Scientists,both in the Inquiryhearingsand in the
interviews,debate the issue of uncertaintyand resolve it in
conflicting ways. This is, however,not a mechanicalrelationship,
withuncertainty cleanlydividingthedebatorsintoopposingcamps.

Although there is a strong tendencyfor criticsto accentuate

uncertainty and fordefendersto claimmoresolidknowledge,thisis
by no means necessaryfor eitherof these basic arguments.This
elementofflexibilityinuncertainty argumentshelpsto highlight the
importanceof negotiationand interpretation. What is uncertainis
relatedto theproblemwhichis identified and themethodswhichare
put forwardas available forproblemresolution.The problemof
adequate knowledgebecomesrelatedto whatis reasonableto know
forpracticalpurposes;or to a stageintheadministrative process;or
in relation to concepts of what is known and what is reliable
knowledge; or in relationto competingcharacterizationsof the
industrialdevelopmentunder study.The strategicimportanceof
uncertainty demonstrated
is further bytheopportunities itprovides
forresolution.As I have shownabove, scientistsdrawa varietyof
conclusionsabout thesignificance The 'problem'of
of uncertainty.
uncertainty providesan occasionforexplicitjudgement.
Arguments
TheFrequencyof Uncertainty
Scientistsdo not necessarilytend,as experts,to claimthatthereis

certainknowledge.In fact,some scientistsarguethatthereis a lack
of knowledge.This can be understoodifthevariousargumentative
situationsof scientistsas expertsare taken into account. In the
analysisby Pinchoutlinedat the beginningof thispaper, thebasic
argumentative stancewhichscientists are placed inisone ofdefence,
ofjustification.In thistype of situation,scientistswilltendto make
claims for adequate knowledge. Indeed, the data presentedin this
paper demonstrate clearlythat thosescientists whowereplaced in a
defensivepositiondid make certaintyclaims. However, all of the
stancesin relationto a controversy are not necessarilydefensive.
Accentinguncertaintymay be a standardformof argumentfor
criticsacrossa widerangeofexpertscientific issues.33
Social Causalityand Uncertainty

Arguments
My argumentis about thesocial variationin thestyleand logicof a

discourse.WhenI demonstrate that'critical'or'defensive'scientists
tend to make particulararguments,I am not implyingthattheir
statementshave been bentbysocial interests.The mainpointis that

in thesocial situationofexpertsin inquiries(and manyotherpublic

issues) argumentsare controlledby organizations.Organizations
presentexperts as part of an overall argumentativeeffort.My
analysisis aboutthestylewhichan organizationadoptsbecause ofits
social circumstance. In this case the social setting is an
environmental controversy wheresome actorsare called upon to
defendand othersto criticize.How thisis managedwithindividual
expertsis notimportant forthislevelofanalysis.Individualsmaybe
moreor less honest,sophisticated, or independent.
ThePoliticalEffectiveness
of Uncertainty
Arguments
Uncertaintyargumentsby scientistsas expertsdo not necessarily

underminethecredibility, or thepoliticaleffectiveness,ofscientists
as experts.
Certifiedknowledgeis not equivalentto certainknowledge.The
scientistswhomade uncertainty arguments inthiscase studyare not
claimingthattheyare notqualifiedto assessthestateofknowledge.
The relationshipbetweenuncertainty and credibility
maybe quite
complex.It seemspossibleto overclaimthecertainty ofknowledge.
Various sciences may have different traditionsabout the images
concerningcertainty whichare acceptablewithintheircommunity
and outside. For example, broad claimsto certainknowledgefor
social or biologicalsciencemayactuallyhave morelimitedcurrency
than more modest claims,since thereis a longstandingtradition
withinwestern society of consideringsome sciences as more
establishedand factualthanothersciences.
The politicaleffectivenessofexpertiseis notdiminishedbytheuse
of uncertainty arguments.Concretely,JudgeBergerused scientists
as expert sources in justifyinghis extremelyfirmuncertainty
position.34 This is notunique to thiscase. As notedabove, theclaim
that there are uncertainfoundationsmay be a standardcritical
stance.The politicaleffectiveness and theauthority of scientistsas
expertsmustbe weighedin termsof politicalprogrammes.If one's
politicalprogrammeis to justify,thenthe admissionof uncertainty
may at the minimumprovide an occasion for other means of
justification.In thissense scientificexpertisemaylose itspolitical
weight.But if one's politicalprogrammeis critical,then a firm
uncertaintyargumentbacked up with the authorityof scientific
expertiseappearsto have strongpoliticalcurrency.

ThePoliticalSociologyoftheAdequacyofKnowledge
The study of uncertaintyas symbolic action highlightsthe

importanceof theamountof knowledgeas a fundamental problem
forthepoliticalsociologyofscience.The problemofuncertainty in
policyis nottrivialor illusory.Decisionsare made on 'more'or 'less'
informationwiththe interpretation of uncertaintyas a focus for
policy. But the problem of uncertaintyis not fundamentally
quantitative.It is a problemof social definitionand negotiation.
Various groupsnegotiate,argue, and sometimesmonopolize the
definitionsof what problems are important,what methods are
legitimate,whatcountsas evidence,and, correspondingly, whatis
enoughknowledge.The focusfortheanalysisofuncertainty should
not be on how to minimizeor respond to uncertainty, as if the
amount of knowledge is part of an external decision-making
environment.It should ratherbe directed toward these social
processes of definitionand negotiation.35 The real policychoices
whichare boundup withtheamountofknowledgeareconstituted by
theseprocesses.
* NO TES
I have benefitedgreatlyfromthe criticalcommentsby audiences forreadingsof

differentversionsof thispaper, whichwere presentedat a meetingon discourse
Institute
ofYork, UK, and at a seminarat theInternational
analysisat theUniversity
for Applied SystemsAnalysisin Laxenburg,Austria. I especiallythankJoanna
Campbell, HarryCollins,BerkeleyFleming,TrevorPinch,Arie Rip, Roger Smith
and Brian Wynne for reading and commentingon versionsof the paper. The
anonymousreviewersforSocial StudiesofSciencealso providedvaluablefeedback.
This researchwas supportedthrougha doctoralfellowshipoftheSocial Sciencesand
HumanitiesResearchCouncilof Canada, and a traininggrantoftheDepartmentof
Indianand NorthernAffairs.
1. Robert Lane, 'The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable

Society',AmericanSociologicalReviewVol. 22 (1966), 649-62. See also Daniel Bell,
The ComingofPost-Industrial Society(New York: Basic Books, 1976).
2. See especiallyDorothyNelkin,'The PoliticalImpactofTechnicalExpertise',
Social StudiesofScience,Vol. 5 (1975), 35-54; Nelkin,NuclearPowerand Its Critics
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell UniversityPress, 1971); Nelkin,Jetport:The
BostonAirportControversy (New Brunswick,NJ:TransactionBooks, 1973);Nelkin,
'Thoughtson the Proposed ScienceCourt'; Newsletter on Science, Technologyand
Human Values, No. 18 (January1977), 20-31, at 22; Nelkin (ed.), Controversy:
Politicsof TechnicalDecisions(London and BeverlyHills,Calif.: Sage, 1979).

in ExpertDisputes
3. TrevorPinch,'The Sun-Set:The Presentationof Certaintyin ScientificLife',

Social StudiesofScience,Vol. 9 (1981), 145-46.
4. Ibid., 155.
5. See Michael Mulkayand G. N. Gilbert,'AccountingforError',Sociology,
Vol. 16 (1982), 165-83.This is done as partofa generalanalysisofwhatMulkayand
Gilbertdescribeas the 'two repertoires'available to scientistsforthedescriptionof
scientificaction.The 'empiricist'repertoirehighlights scientific
actionas consistent
withthe 'standard'view of science,withthe findingsof sciencefirmly groundedin
neutralprocedures.The 'contingent'repertoireaccentuatesscientific knowledgeas
sociallyvariable.Scientistsoverwhelmingly accountfortheirown beliefsintermsof
theempiricist repertoire whenmakingclaimsforthevalidityoftheirownknowledge,
with an emphasis on the fairlyunproblematicor reasonablycertain nature of
evidence.Foran extendedtreatment ofthesetopicssee G. NigelGilbertand Michael
Mulkay,Opening Patndora'sBox: A Sociological Analysisof Scientists'Discourse
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1984).
6. Michael Mulkay,Scienceand theSociologyof Knowledge(London: George
Allen& Unwin,1979), 117.
7. For details of the Inquiryand its context,see FranqoisBregha, Bob Blair's
Pipeline(Toronto: JamesLorimer& Company,1979), and Earle Gray,SuiperPipe
(Toronto:Griffin House, 1979).
8. For a readablesummaryoftheenvironmental testimony, see Volume I ofthe
reportof the Inquiry:Thomas R. Berger,Northertn Frontier,NorthernHomeland:
The ReportoftheMackenzieValleyPipelineInquiry,VoluimeI (Ottawa: Ministry of
Supplyand ServicesCanada, 1977).
9. For the importanceof interestgroupsto the presentationof argumentsin
publiccontroversies, see BrianL. Campbell, DisputesAmongE.xperts:The Debate
over Biology in the MackenlzieValley Pipeline Inquiry(unpublishedPhD thesis,
McMaster University,1982). See also Brian Wynne,Rationalityand Ritual: The
WindscaleInquiryand Nuclear Decisions in Britain (ChalfontSt. Giles, Bucks.:
BritishSocietyforthe Historyof Science, 1982), and Liora Salterand Debra Slaco
PublicInquiriesin Canada (Ottawa: ScienceCouncilofCanada, 1981).
10. It is difficultto overemphasizethe extentto whichBerger was criticalof
industrialdevelopmentin the North in general and the Arctic Gas pipeline in
particular.However, the importantpointforthe purposesof classificationat this
junctureinthepresentargumentisthatthecommissionpresentedevidencewhichwas
criticalof thepipelineproposals.Whetherthiswas partof theirtaskas independent
assessorsor because theyweretrulyopposed all alongis notofcentralimportance.
I 1. The conflictbetweentheCommissionand theFederalGovernmentis perhaps
bestshownintheinterview remarksofone ofthelegal counselfortheCommission.
Governmentwas afterthe Commissionin a negativesense almost fromthe

beginning. . . Whenitwas apparentthathe [Berger]took hisjob seriously,that
he was goingto engagein a reallyextensiveinvestigation,
theybegan to getgun-
shy. . . They began to cutoffmoney.Theybegan to make expertshardto get. I
rememberat one place theywouldn'tallow civilservantsto testify.Then they
indicatedthatthe decisionwould be made beforethe reportwas available, and
theybeganto pickat us.
12. For information

on the Environment
ProtectionBoard see Campbell,op. cit.

note9 and Bregha,op. cit.note7.

13. Polarization should not be misunderstoodas a general principlewhich
characterizesexpertcontroversies. The degreeto whichvarious'camps' in a dispute
fieldgroupsof expertswho are unanimousand extremein theirargumentsis quite
variable. I have been writingon thistopic underthe title'InterestGroups and the
Cohesiveness of Expert Arguments'.See also Campbell, op. cit. note 9, for an
extensivetreatment.
14. For detailsconsultCampbell,op. cit.note9.
15. The call foran analysisofdiscourseinthesociologyofscienceas a centraltopic
forstudyis made by Michael Mulkay,'Actionand Beliefor ScientificDiscourse?,
PhilosophyofSocial Science,Vol. 11(1981), 163-71.
16. See, especially,ErvingGoffman,The Presentation of Self in EverydayLife
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959). My choice of the phrase 'uncertaintyas
symbolicaction'is influencedbyMurrayEdelman, Politicsas SymbolicAction(New
York: AcademicPress,1971),wherehe appliessomeofthethemesdevelopedwithin
symbolicinteractionism 'structural'questionsof politics.
to the more traditionally
The extensivetheoreticalimplicationsof thisapproachare beyondthescope of this
researchreport.
17. See Campbell,op. cit.note9.
18. This difference is importantand systematic.A firstattemptto come to terms
withsomeofthesedifferences inthewaythatexpertsconductdisputesiscontainedin
mypaper 'AccountingforDisagreementsin DisputesAmongExperts',presentedat
the George Sarton Centennialjoint meetingof the European Associationforthe
Study of Science and Society, the Society for the Social Study of Science, and
Communicationand Cognition,at Ghent,November1984.
19. Transcripts of theMackenzieValleyPipelineInquiry(hereafterMVPI), Vol.
89, 13517-18.
20. MVPI, Vol. 106,16192.
21. See Nelkin,'PoliticalImpact',op. cit.note2.
22. The importanceofinterestgroupsforthestructure andorganizationofdebate
is discussedinCampbell,op. cit.note9, and in Salterand Slaco, op. cit.note9.
23. The relationshipbetweenscientific and practicalproblemshas been examined
most notablyby JeromeRavetz in his book ScientificKnowledgeand its Social
Problems(Oxford:The ClarendonPress, 1971). On the translationof science into
everydayconcernssee the inconsistent,but thoughtprovokingbook by Peter L.
Bergerand Thomas Luckmann,The Social Construction of Reality(Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1966),and theworkofAlfredSchutz,CollectedPapers(The Hague:
MartinusNijhoff,1971),whichis theirmostimportant influenceon thisissue.
24. Thislastpoint,on theimageoftheindustrial actionitself,isa crucialone tothe
developmentof argumentson thistypeof issue. In the presentstudythe technical
abilitytoconstruct oftheindustrial
thepipeline,theresponsibility partiestoconstruct
thepipelinesafely,and whetherthepipelinebyitselfor theentireissueofindustrial
developmentwere the topicsof discussionbecame criticalpointsin argument.For
example,on thislastissue,Sergeant,whowas quotedabove on thelackofknowledge
in relationto whitewhales,constructed hisargumentinrelationto thewholerangeof
possible developmentsin the Mackenzie Delta and not just about the pipeline. In
contrast,witnesseswhotestified forindustryrestrictedtheirstatements to theeffects
ofthepipelinealone. For detailssee Campbell,op. cit.note9.
25. MVPI, Vol. 106,16240.

in ExpertDispultes
26. MVPI, Vol. 122,18494.

27. MVPI, Vol. 94, 14275.
28. MVPI, Vol. 95,14480.
29. See Banfield,MVPI, Vol. 89, 13525-26; McCart, MVPI, Vol. 92, 14010,
14051;and Gunn,MVPI, Vol. 93, 14160.
30. ArcticGas developed engineeringproblemsin the course of the hearings.
Theirdesignforburying a pipelinewhichwas chilledbelowthefreezingpointofwater
in frozengroundranintodifficulties. At streamcrossingsand otherareas wherethe
groundwas notalwaysfrozenand therewas a highwatercontentinthesoil, thepipe
frozethe waterin the soil withresultingpressureon the pipeline.The engineering
designcalled forcounteracting forcesto weighthepipelinedownbuttheseprovedto
be insufficientintrials.Fordetailssee theReportoftheCommission,op. cit.note7.
31. The issueoftheabilityofengineersto solveproblemswas a criticalone forthe
debate. In concretetermsthissurfacedinthefrostheave problemreferred toabove in
note30. Fordetailson thisissuesee Campbell,op. cit.note9.
32. Therewas some debateon theissueofthefragility ofarcticecosystems-that
is, arcticsystemsare sometimescharacterizedas morevulnerablebecause ofslower
growthratesand shorterfood chains. For detailssee Campbell,op. cit. note9, and
Max Dunbar,Environmentand Good Sense(Montrealand London: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1971).
33. For an example,see Nelkin,NuclearPowerand ItsCritics,op. cit. note2, 93-
97.
34. See Berger,op. cit.note 18,57-58.
35. See BrianWynne'sstudyoftheWindscaleInquiry,op. cit.note9, fora study
whichconcentrates on theseprocessesinrelationtotheuse ofscientific
expertisefrom
a perspectivedevelopedwithinthesociologyofscience.
BrianCampbellis interested inthesocialdynamicsofexpertise

as a centraltopicinthepoliticalsociologyofscience.He is
presently analyzingtheuse ofscientistsas expertsinthe
disputesamongbiologistsintheMackenzieValleyPipeline
Inquiry, inthedebateovertheuse ofchemicalsprayinginthe
forestmanagementpolicyoftheCanadianprovinceofNew
Brunswick, and intheEnglishPatentCourt.Author'saddress:
Department ofSociologyand Anthropology, MountAllison
University, Sackville,NewBrunswick, Canada EOA3CO.


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Uncertainty as Symbolic Action in Disputes among Experts

Author(s): Brian L. Campbell

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Uncertaintyas Symbolic Action

We are sometimestemptedto blame uncertainty forcontroversy. If

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empiricisttreatment of uncertaintyas thebasis of expertconflictis

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implythatthereis no certifiedknowledge.In effect,if scientists

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since thiscompanyhad to crossthe northernYukon fromAlaska,

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for the two remainingorganizations,the Commission and the

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participantsconstructand organizedebate. In doingthis,I am not

The same attendanceto the social constructionof argumentis

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Similarly,'expert'is a nativecategorywhichdid notinvolveme in

This paper is an exercisein thesociologyofargumentand symbolic

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expertsin supportoftheirpositions.For thesociologist,thesocially

The Data and Its Presentation

There are two types of informationused in this paper: public

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The question of the adequacy of knowledgeenteredthe Inquiry

Biologists who testifiedon behalf of intervenerssometimes

In theinterviews, I asked scientists

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Totals 10(11)* 12(12)

The opposite'inadequate' assessmentwas clearlythepreference for

Scientistsas expertscan make uncertaintyarguments.This is

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clearlyshownin thiscase studywherescientistswere splitin their

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'defensive'scientiststatedthatknowledgewas adequate forthestate

The problemof adequate knowledgebecomes relatedto practical

Some criticalscientistsfindit reasonable to argue that there is

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It is clear, then, that there was debate in the Inquiryover the

Another major example of the interpretation of uncertaintyas

Both Sergeanton whales and Calef on caribouare makingsimilar

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thata similarargumentwas made byJakimchuk,

Jakimchuk minimizedtheimportanceofuncertainty byreferringto

Otherscientistsassociatedwiththeindustry dealt withthe issue of

The responseswerecoded as 'uncertainty

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Totals 11(11)* 12(12)

*The numberin parenthesisis the total sample size.

proceed. 'Not manageable'commentsaccentuatetheimportanceof

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accentuated uncertaintyas motivated by self-interestin their

Two 'critical'scientistsmade mixed comments,but neitherof

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This manoeuvringin relation to uncertaintydemonstratesa

In the commentsof thisscientistwe see 'political' ideas being

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Thispersonwenton to statethatinthecase oftheMackenzieValley

Is thispersonsayingthatpolicyquestionshave not influencedhis

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whichwas thenused as partof a resolution.Uncertainty becomesa

The above information helpsto establishfivemainpoints.First,the

The issueofuncertainty can be morefruitfully