Patronage in Sicily

Author(s): Jeremy Boissevain

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Mar., 1966), pp. 18-33
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2795898 .
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 PATRONAGE IN SICILY'
JEREMYBOISSEVAIN
of Sussex
University

The purposeofthisarticleis two-fold.First,itseeksto further

ourunderstanding
aspectsof patronage,an institution
of certainorganisational whichhas recently
attention
beengivenconsiderable I96I; Boissevain
(Banfield I962, I965; Campbell
I964; FosterI96I, I963; KennyI960, I96I; Mair I96I; SilvermanI965; Trouw-
borstI96I, I962; Wolf I966). Secondly, it examines someofitsfunctional aspects
and discussesfactorswhichappearto accountforitsimportance in Sicily,thearea
whichprovidestheethnographic dataforthepaper.2
Patronageis foundedon the reciprocalrelationsbetweenpatronsand clients.
By patronI meana personwho useshisinfluence to assistand protectsomeother
person,who thenbecomeshis'client',andin return providescertainservices to his
is
patron.The relationship asymmetrical, for thenature of the services exchanged
may differ considerably.Patronageis thusthecomplexof relations betweenthose
who usetheirinfluence, socialpositionor someotherattribute to assistand protect
others,andthosewhomtheyso helpandprotect.3 The meansbywhichthisrelation-
shipis constitutedand theformwhichit takesdiffer considerably fromsocietyto
society.It variesfromtheformalcontract in EastAfricabetweenmembersof the
dominantclassand thepeasants, whichis usuallysealedby a giftofcattlefromthe
formerto thelatterand entailsa seriesofclearlydelineated, institutionalisedrights
and obligationsforeachparty(ctfMair I96I; TrouwborstI962), to thelessformal
relationshipconcludedbetweentheMediterranean patronand hisclient,in which
the exactnatureof the rightsand obligationsare not clearlydefinedculturally.
The structure of thesystemin theMediterranean is thusmuchmore difficult to
analyse,forit is implicitratherthanexplicit.Nevertheless, commonto both the
formalandinformal systems ofpatronage istheneedforprotectors on theonehand,
and forfollowerson theother.Why thisshouldbe so, at leastin Sicily,is a matter
whichI discusslater.

SicilianSociety
Beforeturning to examinepatronagein SicilyI shallgivea summary ofsomeof
theimportant structural
features I touchupon the
of Siciliansociety.In particular
island'srecentviolenthistory,theimportanceof thefamily,the socio-economic
hierarchyandsomelocalmoralconcepts.Followingtheunification ofItalyin I860,
administratorsfromthenorth,notablyPiedmont,weresentto Sicilyto makethis
regionpartofthenew stateofItalyand to enforceitsnew laws.But theirtaskwas
greatlycomplicatedby theirignoranceof thelocal dialectand customs,notably
thenetworkofkinsmen, friends-of-friends,
friends, patronsand clientsthatbound
baronto brigand,richto poor,and stretched fromone end of Sicilyto theother,
providinga parallelline of communication, and at times,completelyparalysing
 PATRONAGE IN SICILY I9

the attemptsof the centralgovernment to enforceitslaws (cJf Franchetti I925).

The corruption and banditry in Sicilybecamea nationalproblem,and in I875 the
Italianparliament appointeda commissionto reporton the situation.Moreover,
theruralproletariat, includingtheminerstappingtheisland'srichmineraldeposits,
continuedto rebelagainsttheappallingconditionsunderwhichtheyworkedand
lived,andfurther insurrectionsexplodedbeforetheturnofthecentury (cf Sonnino
I925; Renda I956).
Aftertherebellionof theSicilianFasci(I893-4) had beenruthlessly crushedby
the centralgovernment, an uneasypeace reignedwhile the batteredworkers'
movementrecovered.Followingthe I9I4-I8 war the bandits,theirnumbers
swelledby deserters fromthemilitary forcesand discharged soldierswho had no
desireto returnto thesoil,onceagainheldswayin theSiciliancountryside. At the
sametime,Mussolini'sstrong-arm gangssetoffa new wave of violencethatthe
policeand themilitary, in factthegovernment ofthecountry, madelittleattempt
to contain(Mack SmithI959: 348). Thisperiodofunrestwas followedin I922 by
Mussolini'smarchon Rome, thebeginningof2I yearsofoppression, povertyand
war formostSicilians.4
A periodofunrest andviolencealsofollowedtheendofWorldWar II. Conserv-
ativepoliticalforceswithinSicily,aidedby mafiosi andbandits,themostfamousof
whom was Giuliano,soughtto obtaintheindependence of SicilyfromItalyand
to crushthe revivedworkers'movementand the growingpressurefor land
reform(cf Maxwell I956; PantaleoneI962).
Thus forthelastcentury, Sicilyhas been a land whererevolution and violence
have been endemic,whereeconomicexploitation of theproletarian massesby a
smallupperclasscomposedof thebourgeoisieandnobility,oftenaidedby delin-
quents,wenthandin handwiththeircontrolof thelocal and regionaladministra-
tion,andtheirmanipulation ofitforpersonalgain.In shortitwas,andtoan extent
stillis, a landwherethestrongsurviveat theexpenseof theweak.
The centralinstitution of Siciliansocietyis thenuclearfamily.The rightsand
obligationswhichderivefrommembership in it providetheindividualwithhis
basic moral code. Moreovera man's social statusas a personwith honour,an
omuor cristianu, is doselylinkedto hisabilityto maintainorimprovetheeconomic
positionof his familyand to safeguardthe purityof its women, in whom is
enshrined thefamily'scollectivehonour.A person'sresponsibility forhisfamilyis
thusthevalue on whichhislifeis centred.
Othervaluesand organisational principles are of secondaryimportance. If they
interfere withhisabilityto carryouthisobligationto hisfamily, he combatsthem
withintrigue, forceandviolenceifnecessary. In so doinghe is supported bypublic
opinion,eventhoughhe maybe actingcontrary to thelaw.Justice and theruleof
law are not synonymous.
Becausethesystemofreckoning kinis bilateral,eachpersonstandsat thecentre
of a vastnetworkof personsto whomhe is relatedboththroughhis parentsand
throughmarriage.Relativesare expectedto help one another.But thehelp one
can expectfrom,or, reciprocally, the obligationone has to assista kinsman,
diminishas the genealogicaldistancebetweenthe two increases.In generalit is
extendedto blood relativesas faras secondcousins,thelimitof therangewithin
whichtheChurchprohibits marriage. Effectiverecognition forpurposesofmutual
20 JEREMY BOISSEVAIN

aid and friendship generallygoes out only as faras firstcousins.5It is strongest

betweenmembersof thesame nuclearfamily,thatis betweenparentsand their
children, and betweensiblings.Thisobligationto themembersof one'sown natal
familydiminishes whena personmarriesand foundshisown family.
Thus the Siciliandividesthe world aroundhim into kin and non-kin.The
formerare allieswithwhomhe sharesreciprocalrightsand obligationsof mutual
assistance and protection. The latterare eitherenemiesor potentialenemies,each
ofwhomis seekingto protectand improvethepositionofhisown family, ifneed
be at theexpenseof others.6
Siciliansocietyis highlystratified.Away fromthefewlargecitiestheeconomy
is basedupon agriculture. Effectivecontroloverland,thetraditional basisoflocal
wealth,was untilrecently held almostexclusively by theruralbourgeoisiecom-
posed of professionals, shopkeepers, brokersand artisans, who do not work the
land themselves.7 Theseformtheborghesia or bourgeoisie,forwhom mostof the
contadini,8 thosewho physically tillthesoil,work.The proportionof borghesi to
contadini in Leone,9an agro-townof 20,000 in southernSicilywhereI spentseven
monthsin I962 and I963, was i6 to 84 per cent. Only i5 per cent. of the
contadini own or hold the land they work under emphyteutical (perpetual)
leases.The restaresharecroppers orlandlesslabourers;thustheyarethedependents
of thosewho controltheland.
An enormousgulfseparatesthosewho worktheland fromthosewho do not.
Traditionally theretendedto be a strongcorrelation betweenwealthin land and
education,thoughexpandingpubliceducation,the gradualdivisionof the large
estatesi'and thecashnow beingsenthomeby Sicilianmigrantlabourersworking
in northern Europeis rapidlymodifying thisneatalignment. In general,highsocial
statusattaches towealthandto education.Low socialstatusis accordedto thosewho
worktheland,forphysicallabour,especiallyagricultural labour,is despised.The
borghesi arebettereducatedandwealthier. Moreover,theirsonsbecomethemunici-
pal and provincialcivilservants who runtheaffairs of ruralSicily.In contrast,
the
contadini, who by and largeworkfortheborghesi, have an inferior educationand
oftenlivein grinding poverty.The contrast betweenthebourgeoisieand therural
proletariat has thusbeennot onlybetweenemployerand employee,but between
wealthand poverty,betweeneducationand illiteracy.
It mustnotbe thought, however,thatthesebroadclassesareorganised corporate
groups.They areinterest groupswhichareoftenopposed.Thoughtheseparation
betweenthemis marked,thereare manylinesof mutualdependenceas well as
manykinshiplinkswhichcut acrosstheindeterminate frontierbetweenthetwo.
Thoughmostmarriages takeplacebetweenmembersofthesamesocialclass,social
mobilityis quitecommon.Thus manyfamilieshave relativesin the otherclasses
locatedat variouslevelsof thesocio-economic hierarchy.
whentakenin consideration
This stratification, withtheoverriding obligation
of mutualaid thatexistsbetweenclose kinsmen,has importanteffects on the
politicallife.Civil servantsgenerally favourtheircloserelatives, and tryto derive
a personaladvantagefromtheirposition.Sincemostaremembersof theborghesia,
thismeansthattheupperclassesreceivepreferential treatment.In northern Europe
or NorthAmerica,civilservants who behavein thisway and who are caughtare
punishedby law and by thepressure of publicopinion,whichregardsas immoral
 PATRONAGE IN SICILY 21

and contemptible thebureaucrat who betraysthepublicserviceethicof honesty

andimpartiality. Butin Sicily,thereis no neatcorrelationbetweenwhatis legaland
moral.It is illegalfora brotherto murderthe personwho has raped his sister,
yetthis,intermsofthelocalsystem ofvalues,is a highlymoralact.In thesameway,
it is illegalfora civilservantto let a publiccontractto a personwho giveshim a
largecommission or present.But,seenfromthepointofview ofhisrelatives, this
act is not immoral.On the contrary, by performing it he fulfilshis primary
obligationto aid his own familyand his nearestkinsmen.In practicethismeans
thatthe civilservantis only impartialto personswho are neitherrelativesnor
friends.Yet thesebelongto a categoryof personswhom he mistrusts and, in a
veryrealsense,looksuponas potentialenemies.Thusnon-kinwithwhomhe deals
in hisofficialcapacity,unlesstheyareintroduced bya thirdpartywho is a kinsmen,
friend,patronor client,receiveshortshrift.He is not only impartial,he is so
detachedas to be remote.

Patrons,
clients
andfriends
To an extent,then,everySicilianfeelshimselfto be isolatedin a lawlessand
hostileworldin whichviolenceand bloodshedare stillendemic.Not onlyis he
surrounded by enemiesand potentialenemnies, he is also subjectto theauthority of
an impersonalgovernment whoseaffairs are administered by bureaucrats,each of
whomis eithertryingto derivesomepersonaladvantagefromhisofficial position
or is liable to be manceuvred againsthimby hisenemies.The more one descends
the socio-economicladder,the fartherremovedpeople are fromkinsmenand
friends who wieldpowerand who can therefore controltheforcesshapingtheir
lives.
Thus thebasicproblemtheSicilianfacesin dealingwiththeworldof non-kin
is how to protecthimselffromhis enemies,both known and unknown;and
how to influencethe remote,impersonal,if not hostile,authorities who make
thedecisionswhichcontrolhiswell-beingand thatof hisfamily,withwhom his
honour and standingin the communityis so intimately bound. Most resolve
theseproblemsby seekingout strategically placed protectors and friends,who,
together withkinsmen, makeup thepersonalnetworkof contactsthroughwhom
theaverageSicilianattempts to protectand advancethefortunes of hisfamily.
He oftenseeksto bind an influential, professional-class patronto himselfby
persuadinghim to becomethe godfather, the spiritualsponsorand protector, of
one ofhischildren. Thisis a relationshipthatis notlightlyenteredintosinceit is a
formalcontract,solennisedin publicand beforeGod, and once concludednot
to be broken.Co-godparents, compari,are automatically 'friends',and a compare
is supposedto favourhisgodchild,ifnot thechild'sfather.
Beforeturningto an analysisof theoperationof thesystemof patronage,it is
necessaryto unravelthe apparently overlappingstatusesof kinsman,friendand
patron.I am hereconcernedprimarily withthelasttwo. I believea conceptual
distinction can be made betweenkinship,on the one hand,and patronageand
friendship, on the other,althoughin the actual operationof the system,they
overlap.Theirdifference liesin thedistinction betweentheobligationsof kinship
and patronage.An individualis bornintoa kinshipsystem, and therefinds,ready-
22 JEREMY BOISSEVAIN

madesotospeak, a networkofpersons
withwhomhehasa series ofjurally
defined
obligations. in thesystem
Hisposition is ascribed.Kinsmen aresupposedto help
eachother. Thusifheasksa closekinsman toputhispersonal networkofcontacts
athisdisposal,
thisfavourisaccorded
freely,ifitiswithinthemeansoftherelative
to do so. By accordingthefavour,thekinsman is notnecessarily
contracting
a
reciprocalservice.
Theservice heprovided doesnotplacethekinsman whomheis
helpingunderan obligation overandabovethatwhichexistsnormally between
kinsmen.",
In contrast to theascribed mutualobligations whichexistbetweenkinsmen,
therelationship betweenpatronand client,or betweenfriends, is entered into
voluntarily. A favouror servicegranted createsan obligation whichentailsa
reciprocal servicethatmustbe repaidonmoreorlessa quidproquobasis.Ifitisnot
repaidwhenrequested or expected, therelationship is terminated. A person's
positionin a network ofpatronage is achieved, notascribed, generally speaking.
Itshouldbenoted, however, thattheobligation created bya patron inonegenera-
tionmaynotbe calledon untilthefollowing generation; hencepatron-client
relationsoftenexistbetween families.Thusa patronmayplacehispersonal net-
workofkinsmen, friends, patronsandclients at theservice ofa clientor friend,
butitisa calculatedaction which imposes a verydefinite obligation upontheperson
solicitingthefavour. Itisa debtthathastoberepaidsoonerorlater.Amongclose
kinno detailed ledgerofservices givenandreceived is maintained, whilesucha
socialaccounting isthebasisuponwhicha system ofpatronage rests.However,
becausethereisno cleardemarcation separating kinship andnon-kinship between
distantcousins,thegreater thegenealogical distancebetween twopersons exchang-
ingfavours, themorelikelyit is thatan accounting willbe kept.Kinshipthus
shadesoffintopatronage.
Whiletheinstitution offriendship, amicizia, existsin Sicily,it is necessary to
seeitinitslocalcontext inordertofreeitfromtheburden ofpreconceptions the
outsidertransfersalmost automaticallytotheterm. Giventheoverriding importance
ofthenuclear family in Siciliansociety,andthedistrustful attitude a persontakes
towards non-kin, friendshipisanapparent contradiction totheprinciples presented
above.Butfriendship mustbe qualified. To beginwith,thetiebetween friendsis
alwayssubordinate to thatbetween kinsmen. Secondly, itis a voluntary relation-
shipwhichentails reciprocal Ifthesearenotgranted,
services. it canbe broken.
Becauseitisanunstable thing, friendlynon-kin oftenconvert their friendshipinto
a binding, formal tiethrough theinstitutionofgodparenthood.
The analysis offriendship in Sicilyis further complicated by thefactthatthe
termfriend, amico, is appliedindiscriminately notonlyto all socialequalswith
whoma person isincontact, butalsotopatrons bytheirclients, andto clients by
patrons. Allaregliamici, friends.
The usefuldistinction whichEricWolf (I966: io sqq.) has drawnbetween
'emotional' and 'instrumental'friendshipis very much to the point here.
Emotionalfriendship 'involvesa relationbetweenan ego and an alterin which
each satisfiessome emotionalneed in his oppositenumber'(io). In contrast,in
instrumental friendship 'each memberof the dyadactsas a potentialconnecting
linkto otherpersonsoutsidethedyad'. The formeris associatedwith'closureof
the social circle',the latter'reachesbeyondthe boundariesof existingsetsand
 PATRONAGE IN SICILY 23

seeksto establish beachheadsin new sets'(I2). Friendship in Sicilyis instrumental.

The only friendships thatI encounteredwhich mighthave been describedas
emotionalwere betweenfirstcousins,but therethe membersof the dyadsused
thetermcugino, cousin,and not amico,friend, to addressand referto eachother.I2
Actionswhicharepatently returnservicesrendered by a clientto a patronaresaid
for
to be doneperamicizia, friendship. In fact an informant onceremarkedthatin
is and
Sicilyall friendship political, quoted the proverb 'LHe who has moneyand
friendsholdsjustice by the shorthairs'I3 to emphasisehis point. Thus in the
Siciliancontext, friends areactualorpotentialintermediaries andpatrons.Forwhen
a friendis calledon to provideprotection or assistance-asituationwhichoccurs
notinfrequently in a societysuchas thatin Sicilyin whichthereis greatinequality
in the distribution of economic and politicalpower-the friendship becomes
asymmetrical and shadesoffinto patronage.(Pitt-RiversI954: I54; Campbell
I964: 232 sq.)
The present-day Siciliannormally hasmorethanone patron,and worksthrough
theone he deemsmostusefulin a givensituation.But shouldtwo patronscome
intodirectcompetition, he mustchooseone to theexclusionof theother.How-
ever,as socialrelationsbecomeprogressively andtheSicilianmovesout
specialised,
of his relativelyisolatedcommunityto deal with increasingly diversedecision
makers-thusrequiring functionally specificpatrons-thedangerof an encounter
betweentwo patronsoperatingin thesamesocialfielddiminishes. In contrast,in
thepast,particularly beforethe firstWorld War, ruralcommunities weremore
isolatedfromoutsidecentresof power and the averageSicilianwas limitedto
patronsdrawnfromthelocal le'ite.These were personswho were in directand
continuous competition witheachother.It was consequently normally notpossible
forhimto have morethanone patron.
Up to thispointthebenefits ofa patron-client relationshiphavebeenconsidered
onlyfromthepointofview oftheclient.But clientsprotecta patron'sgood name
and reporton theactivities of hisenemies.It is in theirinterestto do this,forthe
strongertheirpatronis, the betterhe is able to protectthem.Favourssuch as
reportson the manceuvring of an enemyare serviceswhichgeneratereciprocal
obligations, thusstrengthening thetiebetweenclientandpatron.In a societywhere
socialprestige is measuredby theresources a personcan commandto protectand
advancethepositionofhisfamily, ofpersonswho owe services
a clientele ofvarious
typesis a considerable asset.It enablesthepatronto perform, in his turn,a large
varietyof favoursforhis own patronsand 'friends',and makeshimmoreattrac-
tiveas a patron.Thusanincreaseofeitherclientsorpatronsbringsaboutan increase
of theother.
Many of theservicesthata professional-class patroncan claimfromhis clients
are activitiesthata memberof his socialclasscould not perform-either because
theyare beneathhis dignity,or becausetheyare illegal-such as threatening or
committing violenceon thepersonor property ofa personalenemy,or theenemy
of some friend,or some friend-of-a-friend. A contadino is sometimeswillingto
performunpleasant, if not illegal,servicesfor a social superior,forit placeshis
a
patronunder heavyobligation that can be turned to good advantageat a later
date,possiblyto helpsome 'friend',who thenbecomesa client.A contadino with
sucha patronis in a positionboth to obtainprotection and to commandservices.
24 JEREMY BOISSEVAIN

If he is astute(and ruthless)he maybe able to turnselectedcontactsintoan ever-

wideningnetwork,'4whichcan oftenbe convertedintopoliticaland economic
power,and thusenablehim to move up in thesocio-economichierarchy. Many
membersof the borghesia owe theirsecuremiddle-classpositionsas landowners,
shopkeepers, or evenprofessionals,to theextra-legal activities
of an ancestorwho
startedthefamilyon itsway up. The lifehistory ofthelateDon CalogeroVizzini,
theso-calledcapo-mafia ofSicilyuntilhisdeathin I954, providesa well-documented,
if extreme, case in point(PantaleoneI962: 94 sqq.).
Thereare thenin Sicilypersonsseekingprotectors even as thereareinfluential
personsseekingfollowers.The dangers,imaginary or real,whichwould surround
theclientshouldhis patronwithdrawhis support,and theneed thata personhas
fora large and powerfulclientelein his competition withhis peers,ensurethat
both patronand clientgenerallymeet theirreciprocalobligationswhen called
upon to do so.

Patronage in action
It may now be askedhow a systemof patronageactuallyoperates.We have
examinedthestructural principlesupon whichit rests.But whatare itsorganisa-
tionalelements? MichaelKennyhasnotedthreebasicrolesina system ofpatronage:
patron/client, patron/patron and client/patron. A fourthlogical possibility,
client/client,he rulesout,forby definition, as soon as one clientoffers theother
some service,he is no longera client(Kenny I960: 23). But if we acceptthis
argument,can we not also say thatthe role relationpatron/patron is a logical
impossibility, forifonegivesandtheotherreceives, isnottherelationasymmetrical
at any particular moment?Most personsin factoccupyrolesas bothpatronand
client.Patrons,at leastin present-daySicily,do notforma separatesocialcategory
as landowners or school or
teachers municipaladministrators, thoughit is fairto
in
saythat thepastthose who to
belonged these socialcategoriesmonopolisedthe
linkswith centresof power outsidethe communityand were thus the most
important local patrons.
Relationsbetweenpatronsand clientsinvolvesuperordination and subordin-
ation. But by superordination I mean greateraccessto power, not necessarily
superiorsocial rank; thoughas noted,in thepast,economicand politicalpower
and highsocialrankcoincided.Today thesituation is morecomplex.Personswho
aresonsofcontadino andwho thushavelow standing
families, in thelocalhierarchy
of prestige, now not infrequently occupypositionsof power in politicalparties
and workers'syndicates. They are consequently able to dispensefavoursto and
intercede on behalfofwealthylandowners who havemuchhighersocialstanding.
Traditionalrolesare reversed;economicand politicalsuperordination no longer
coincide.I5
Thoughthedyadicsetspatron/client and client/patronarethebasisuponwhich
thesystemrests,a systemofpatronageis morethanjust thesumtotalofan almost
infinitenumberof dyadicsets,each of whichis cut offfromothersets.I shall
arguethatessentialto understanding patron-client relationshipsas a systemis the
notionthattwo dyadscan make a triad.The keypersonin thesystemis theman
in themiddle,thebroker,who hasdyadicrelations witha widevarietyofpersons,
and is thusin a positionto placetwo people,possiblyunknownto eachother,into
 PATRONAGE IN SICILY 25

a mutuallybeneficialrelationship fromwhich he derivesa profit.This is the

raisond'6treof thebroker,of whom thereare a greatvarietyin Sicilyas in other
Mediterranean countries.
It is at thispointthatI differ fromtheformalanalysisofpatronagepresented by
Professor Foster(I963). WhileI agreewithhimthateachindividualcan be seenas
standingat 'the centreof his privateand unique networkof contractualties',
I disagreewhenhe arguesthattheoverlapofthispersonalnetworkwithothersimi-
larnetworks has'no functional significance' (I28 i). On thecontrary, it is precisely
becausethisoverlapexiststhatwe can speakofa system ofpatronage.The factthat
B is a clientof a powerfulpersonA is oftenprecisely thereasonwhy C becomes
B's client.As Fosternotes,thereis no dyadicor contractual relationship between
A and C. But I suggesthe failsto appreciate theimportance ofthefactthatbecause
boththepersonalnetworksofA and C includeB, C canworkthrough B to come
in contactwithA. They are friends-of-friends, amicidegliamici,whichin Sicily,
and I suggestin othersocietiesin whichpatronageoperates,is an important social
category.The undue emphasisthatFosterhas placed on the dyadic contract,
whichby his definition bindsonly two persons(I28I), has obscuredthis.More-
over,theinformal dyadic'contract'betweentwo personsis veryoftenconverted
to a reciprocalrelationship betweentwo groupsof persons,and is therefore no
longerdyadicin Foster'sterms.'6
But to returnto thetwo basicpatronagerolerelationssuggestedabove. Action
based upon patronageis varied,and normallyinvolvestwo otherrole relations
at the same time,namelyfriend/friend and kinsman/kinsman. While theremay
be a directperson-to-person transaction betweena clientandthepatronwhomheis
tryingto influence, the manipulationof the systemis not usuallythatsimple.
A personseekingto influencean importantdecisionmakerwho is his social
superior,but not his patron,selectsa patron in his own networkwho is
dose to thisperson.The relationship is vertical.But hispatron,thesocialequal of
the personwhom be wishesto influence, moves horizontally, possiblymaking
useofhisown kinshipnetworkin theprocess.Frequently a clientmovesvertically
and horizontally by usingrecommendations, raccomandazioni. Where the person
seekinga favourmustmove outsidehisface-to-face community theserecommen-
dationsareoftenthepersonalcallingcardsofthelastpatronwarmlyrecommending
hiscarissimo amico, ordearfriend,to a relativeor a friend farther alongthepatronage
networkin the directionthe clientwishesto move. The personpresenting the
raccomandazione is a friend-of-a-friend, and is helped because of that. Usually
therelationship betweenthepersonbeingpassedalongand thosewho helphimis
quiteimpersonal:he is merelya counterin thesocialgameplayedbetweenthose
amongwhomhe is passed.
I shouldliketo give a fewexamplesof patronagein operation.The firstis that
of thehorizontal-vertical approach.Salvatore,a studentfromSyracusewho had
workedin Leone,wishedto come intopersonalcontactwitha certainprofessor
at theUniversity of Palermoin orderto obtainpermission to presenta thesis,for
whichregistration had closed two monthsbefore.He made a specialtripfrom
Syracuseto Leone to discussthisproblemwithAvvocato Leonardo,the Secretary
of theChristian DemocraticPartyin thetown. Six monthsbefore,whilehe was
stillin Leone, Salvatorehad helpedLeonardopreparea draftof an important
26 JEREMY BOISSEVAIN

memorandumon the town whichhad been requestedby theparty'sprovincial

leaders.Salvatoreexplainedhistripby saying,Leonardo midovevaquesta, Leonardo
owed me this(favour).Salvatoreknewthelawyerwas in touchwithmanypeople
in Palermoand feltsurethatthroughhim he could come into personalcontact
withhisprofessor.
Leonardowas willingto helpandgave Salvatorea cardtohiscousin,thepersonal
secretaryofa Palermitan askinghimto help.He alsooffered
official, to letSalvatore
copy his thesis,whichhe pointedout would save a greatdeal of bother,sinceit
was a good thesisandhadbeenpresented to a different a fewyearsbefore.
professor
Salvatorethankedhim but repliedthathe wantedto do his own thesis,forthe
experience.
Armedwith Leonardo'sraccomandazione, Salvatoreset out forPalermo.The
followingdayhe metLeonardo'scousinandexplainedwhathe wanted.The cousin
suggested thathe seehisbrother, who knewmanypeoplein theUniversity, andin
histurngavehima card.ThateveningSalvatoremetthebrotherwho saidthathe
knewtheprofessor's and gave hima cardintroducing
assistant, himas hiscarissimo
amico.The next day Salvatorecalled on the assistantwith his raccomandazione
and explainedhiscasein full,askingwhathe shoulddo. The assistant repliedthat
he could arrangematters withtheProfessore but onlyon conditionthatSalvatore
make electoralpropagandain Leone and thesurrounding area fortheProfessore,
who was standing fortheChamberofDeputiesintheelectionthefollowingmonth.
Salvatoreunderstood and pretendedto live in Leone,and not in Syracuse,which
was outsidetheelectoraldistrictin whichtheProfessore was standing, a factwhich
made him quiteuseless.The assistant thentelephonedtheProfessore and made an
appointment forSalvatore.
Salvatorewentto see theProfessore and explainedhis wishto presenthis thesis
thatJune.The Professore looked ratherdoubtful,but Salvatorementionedthat
he was impressed withhispublicspirit,and had alreadyspokenabouthiscandida-
tureto severalofhisfriends in Leone. The Professoreloosenedup at once.He indi-
cated thatthe thesisshouldnot presenta problem.He thenwrote a letterfor
Salvatoreto takeback to a formerstudentof hisin Leone,whomhe also askedto
help in hiscampaign.
Salvatorereturned to Syracuse,via Leone,wherehe deliveredtheletter,and at
oncebeganto workon histhesis.Eventuallyhisthesis,whichwas verygood,was
acceptedand today Salvatorehas his degree.The Professore, however,was not
elected.
In hispassagealongthispatronage network, whichwas essentiallythenetworkof
Leonardowho placedit at his disposal,Salvatoreof coursewas momentarily in
contactwithLeonardo'scousinsandhisprofessor's As he washelpedalong
assistant.
notforhisown sake,butbecausehe had beenpassedalongby a friendor kinsman,
his relationswith thesepersonswere qualitativelydifferent from the others.
LeonardodidnotweakenhispositionwithSalvatoreby placinghisnetworkat the
latter'sdisposal.On thecontrary he strengthened it,forthanksto him,Salvatore
attainedhis goal, and in so doing became aware of the efficacy of Leonardo's
network.Moreover,shouldhe wishto use thenetworkagain,he would have to
pass throughLeonardoagain in orderto receivethesameco-operation fromthe
nextlink.
 PATRONAGE IN SICILY 27
The second example illustrates what may be called the vertical-horizontal
approach.Calogero,a smallland-broker, wishedto becomea municipalemployee
in Leone. He basedhiscaseon thefactthathe had beenemployedas a clerkin the
Town Hall beforehe had emigrated to Argentina, thathe was a woundedveteran
ofWorld War II (andas suchshouldreceivepreference), and thathe possessedthe
educationalrequirements. Aftera greatdeal of manoeuvring at thelocal level,he
succeededin gettingthe Leone town council to propose his name to the
CommissioneProvincialedi Controllo(CPC), thebodythatscreensthecredentials
of all candidatesproposedforofficeby towncouncilsin theprovinceand decides
whethertheyshallbe accepted.The membersof theCPC arenormallysubjectto
considerable pressurefrompoliticalpartiesand influential personsseekingto have
theircandidatesacceptedand thoseof theirrivalsrejected.Calogero was afraid
thathisnamewould be rejectedby theboardbecauseofthecountermanipulation
ofenemiesinLeone,who hadtheirown candidate.As he hadno directcontactwith
anyof themembersoftheboard,he workedthroughtwo patrons.The firstwas a
formercommanding officer.He explainedhisfearsand askedforhelp.The major
agreedto helphisformercorporal,and proceededto contactone of themembers
of theboardwhom he knew personally. The secondpatronwas a lawyerin the
provincialcapitalwhom Calogero had knownformanyyears.The lawyerwas
able to contactanothermemberof theboardwho was a formerclassmateand a
memberofthesameexdusivesocialclub.The pressure appliedby thetwo patrons
effectively counteredthemove of Calogero'srivals,and he was appointedto the
to note thathe had retainedthelawyerto represent
post.It is interesting himin
muchtheway thatanyprofessional clientmightdo and had paid hima feeforhis
troubles.Yet the relationbetweenthe two was more complicatedthanthe im-
personalmarketrelations basedon an exchangeofservices forcash.Calogerolooked
uponthelawyeras hispatron,hisprotector at theprovincialcapitalwho was able
to contactthe importantdecision-makers as an equal and friend.The actionof
thelawyerwas notreciprocated completely by thefeehe received,forhe retained
a claimon theloyaltyand servicesof Calogero,who would be morethanwilling
to defendhisnameand to providehisserviceswithinthemorelimitedsocialfield
of Leone,shouldhe be requestedto do so.
The finalexampleillustrates thelastpoint as well as thecontinuing natureof
patron-client foras Sicilianfamilies
relations, aretightly united,so a serviceto one
memberisfeltto be givento thegroup,creatinga collectivereciprocalobligation.
One SundayProfessore Volpe discussedcertainpersonalproblemswithme as we
strolled backandforthin thevillagesquare.He hadbeenhavingproblemsoverthe
educationof his eldestson. Both theproblemsand the methodsused to resolve
themare ratherSicilian.He suspectedthatone of hiscolleaguesat thesecondary
schoolintheneighbouring townwherehetaught,andwherehissonwentto school,
was tryingto injurehim by failinghis son and thusblockinghisentranceto the
University. Thiswould havedamagedthefamily'spositionas an important mem-
ber of the professional classin Leone. He was able to have his enemyfollowed
wheneverthelatterpassedthroughLeone on hisway to theprovincialcapitalor
Palermoby certainof his own clientsand thoseof his brother,an important
notaryin Palermo.He was proudthathisbrother, who livedon theothersideof
Sicily,but'who hasfriends everywhere', was evenableto obtainreports, fromone
2+M
28 JEREMY BOISSEVAIN

of thosefriends, of conversationsheld by the suspectat the latter'ssocial club.

Both the conversationoverheardand the observedcontactsin Palermoof his
enemyseemedto confirmhis suspicion.Professore Volpe's brotherthenmoved
swiftly to applycounterpressure througha namelessimportant personin Palermo.
This personthenplaced pressureon his client,the importantdecision-maker,
regardingtheboy's admissionto University, who had beenpreviouslycontacted
by the patronof Professore Volpe's enemy.As the two brothersbetweenthem
boasteda widerrangeofcontactsand a morepowerfulprotection thantheirrival,
theywere able to resolvetheaffair to theirsatisfaction. The son was admittedto
theUniversity.
It is of coursequitepossiblethattheentireplot to dishonourthefamilywas a
figmentof Professore Volpe's imagination,forit was all based upon intuition and
indirectevidence.The suggestionsby his brother to his influentialfriend in
Palermowere mostcertainlycouchedin allegory and as
allusion, was his recital
to me in whichno namesor specificaccusations werementioned. ProfessoreVolpe
believed it to and
be true, actedaccordingly, thereby illustratingwell severalofthe
pointsI have triedto makeabove.
But the storycontinues.Several monthsafterhis son was admittedto the
University, ProfessoreVolpe was insultedin frontof mostofhisfellow-teachers by
hisold enemy.He toldme thathe was so angrythathe had to leavethecommon
room,butbeforeslammingthedoor he had shoutedat hisenemythathe would
have his apology. He had returnedto Leone and duringhis eveningstrollthe
samedaymet'unodeiquelli'('one ofthem',an expression oftenusedto alludeto a
mafioso). In tellingme this,he pulledhiscap downoverone eyeto indicateto me
a mafioso in Siciliansignlanguage.This personwas one of thosewho had helped
keep his enemyunderobservationtwo monthsbeforewhen he passedthrough
Leone on hisway to theprovincialcapitaland Palermo.He mentionedtheinsult
he had received,and his amicosaid,Ci pensoio, I'l] see to it.The amicoapparently
wentto theneighbouring townlate one eveningsoon afterand knockedon his
enemy'sdoor. In a courteousbut toughvoice-which theProfessore imitatedfor
me-he informed theenemythatitwould be betterto apologiseor theremightbe
unpleasantness. Two dayslatertheProfessore got a shortnoteof apologyby post.
When I askedhow muchhe had had to pay his amicoforall his help,he smiled
and replied,'Nothing,of course',and explainedthattheamicowas theson of a
manwhomhisown father, who had beenan important notary,hadhelpedto keep
out ofprisonfortyyearsbefore.'He helpedme foramicizia.Becauseof ourfather
we havefriendsall overSicily.They are not criminals. They are menwho make
themselves respected.They will help you when you need it, but... when they
turnto you forhelp,you give it or- . . ', and he made thechoppingmotionthat
meanstheapplicationof violence.'You helpthemand theyhelpyou. They give
and you give.'
Professore Volpe endedby sayingthathissonis doingwell at theUniversity and
thusjustifiedhis faithin his abilityand intelligence. 'But his youngerbrotheris
lazy and not verybright',he observed.'He will probablybe failedthisyear.
My enemiesare busyagain.I mustsee whatcan be done.' And muttering about
themanyresponsibilities of fatherhood,he wentoffto lunch.
Fromtheforegoing andthethreecaseswe haveexamineditis evident
discussion
 PATRONAGE IN SICILY 29

thatwhileat the analyticallevel a distinction can be drawnbetweenpatronage,

friendship and kinship,thisdistinction has littleimportanceat the operational
level. The Sicilianuses all threeinterchangeably to influencethe outcome of
decisionswhichconcernhim.Of thei8 dyadicsetsbasedon kinship, friendshipor
patronagewhichconstituted theportionsofthenetworks thatSalvatore,Calogero
and Professore
Volpe manipulated to achievetheirends,threewerebasedon kin-
ship,six on friendship
and nineon patronage(fourpatron/client and fiveclient/
patron).Theseare summarised in Table I. It is-notpossibleto givepriorityto one
to theexclusionof theothers.
TABLE ofNetworks.
I. Summary
SocialbasisofDyads Salvatore Calogero Volpe Total
Kinship 2 I 3
Friendship 2 2 2 6
Patronage 9
Patron/Client I 3 (4)
Client/Patron I 2 2 (s)
TOTAL 6 4 8 I8

Discussion
The systemof patronageis seento be an essential
partof thepoliticalsystemin
Sicily,forthroughit individualsand groupsinfluence the outcomeof decisions
whichconcernthem.It providesa systemof communication whichis parallelto
the officialchannelsof the government.This is of particularimportancein a
societysuchas thatin Sicily,whichis highlystratified
and in whichpositionsof
authorityarefrequentlyoccupiedbypersonswho belongto theupperstrataofthe
socio-economichierarchy.For in such a societythe lines of communication
throughtheformalsystemaretenuousand difficult to followbecauseofthesocial
distancebetweenthosewho wishto make theirvoicesheardon high,and those
who controlthe channelsthroughwhich such messagesnecessarily mustpass.
Those desiringto communicate are facedby therigidapparatusof a ponderous
bureaucratic system.The systemof patronagepermitsa personto contactofficials
on a personalbasis. Campbellhas remarkedin describingthe operationof the
patronagesystemin Greecethat 'it introducesa flexibility into administrative
machinery whose workingsare veryoftendirectedby personsremotefromthe
peoplewhosefortunes
theyareaffecting'
(I964: 247). It meansthatthecontadini
havesomeway ofcontrolling theharshforcesthatsurround them.To someextent
then,it givesthema voice in theirown destiny.It not onlyprovidesprotection
and facilitates
communication, butmayalsofurnish a way ofmovingupwardin a
stratified
society.'7
Beyond theindividualand familylevels,patronagecan be seento linkentire
villagesto the structure of government, for the personalnetworksof village
leaders,whilemanipulatedprimarily forpersonalends,also providethelinesof
communicationalong which village businessmoves upward,and provincial,
regionaland nationalfundsflowdownwardintothevillageforpublicworksand
otherdevelopmentprojects.At thislevel the patronagesystemis linkedwith
thestructure and operationof politicalparties(cf.BoissevainI965: 120-33; I966).
Thisis a subjectI shalldeal withmorefullyelsewhere.
30 JEREMY BOISSEVAIN

A system ofpatronagecanalsobe likenedto a parasitic vineclingingto thetrunk

of a tree.As thevinesapsthestrength of thetree,so patronageweakensgovern-
ment. It leads to nepotism,corruption,influence-peddling and, above all, it
weakenstheruleof law. And,in Sicily,becauseviolenceis stillpartof thesocial
currency, it has led to thepersistence of brokerswho are specialists in mattersof
violence,themafiosi. In brief,itleadsto andperpetuates theveryconditions which
have broughtit intobeing,nurtured it, and permitted it to developto thepoint
whereit is perhapsthemostimportant channelof communication.
Why has patronageassumedsuchsocialimportance in Sicily?
Ties of dependencyexistbecausethereis stillneed forprotectionthatneither
the Statenor thefamilyis able to provide.'8The Sicilianrequiresprotection not
onlyfromhis neighbours, who are tryingto protectand advancethemselves at
hisexpense,butalsofroma powerfulgovernment whichhe feelshasbeenimposed
uponhimand whichhe regardsas corrupt.He also needsprotection fromthelaw
whichhe notonlybelievescanbe manipulated byhisenemiesto hisdetriment, but
withwhichhe is also oftenin conflict becauseof thediffering requirementsof the
legalsystemand thoseof traditional justice.Finally,he needsprotection fromthe
violenceand exploitation thatare a partof Sicilianlife.It is obviousthatmanyof
theconditions whichgiveriseto theneedforprotection, andhencepatronage, are
simplytheresultof the successful operationof thepatronagesystem.Patronage
is, to a verylargeextent,a self-perpetuating systemof beliefand actiongrounded
in thesociety'svalue system.
Nonetheless,thereis anotherimportantfactorwhich I believehas favoured
the persistence of patronagein Sicily.This is the continuingimportanceof the
Catholicreligion.Despiterampantanti-clericalism, theRoman Catholicreligion
remainsdeeplyrootedin thelifeand customsof thepeople.The manyreligious
processions and feastsforthevariouspatronsaintsare stillamong themostim-
portantsocialeventsof thecountryside. I suggestthatin sucha societythereis a
strongideologicalbasisfora politicalsystembased upon patronage.There is a
striking functional similarity betweentherole of saintsas intermediaries between
God and man,and themortalpatronwho intercedes withan important personon
behalfof his client.'9In fact,a patronis sometimescalled a santoor saint,and
peopleoccasionally quotetheproverbSenza santinunsi va 'n paradisu, withoutthe
helpof saintsyou can'tgetto heavenzo,to illustrate theimportanceof patronsin
achievingone's desires.This parallelwas drawnfor me by the Archpriest of
Leone as he soughtto explainthespiritual roleofsaints.He notedthatjust as you
wouldnotthinkofapproaching a cabinetminister butwouldworkthrough
directly,
someinfluential friend who couldintroduce youto thelocaldeputywho couldthen
stateyour case to the minister, so too mustyou not approachGod directly.
You mustworkthroughyourpatronsaintwho, beingcloserto God thanyou,is
in a betterpositionto persuadeHim to heed your prayers.The role of patron
in Sicily thus receivesconstantand authoritative validationfromthe Church
throughthe widespreadcult personalof and communitypatronsaints.It is a
fact
striking thatin Catholic countries with a strongcultof saints,sucha thosein
the Mediterranean area and in Latin America, thereis also a politicalsystem
whichifnot basedupon,is at leaststrongly influenced by patron-client relations.
These countriesmay be contrasted to Catholicsocietiesin thenorthof Europe
 PATRONAGE IN SICILY 3I

wherethe cultof saintsis considerably lesspronounced,as is the importanceof

patron-client I do notmeanto suggestthatthereis a causalconnection
relations.2I
betweenthecultof saintsand a systemof politicalpatronage,althoughtheremay
be. But I thinkit is obviousthatreligiousand politicalpatronagereinforce each
other.Each servesas a modelfortheother.
Thus spiritual patronsjoin themoremortalpatrons,friends, and kinsmenwho
make up the personalnetworkwhichindividualSiciliansmanipulatein order
to influence the outcomeof decisionsand events,bothnaturaland supernatural,
which affectthe well-beingof theirfamilies.22 I see the systemof patronage
as partof a giganticnetworkin which all Sicilianshave a place. The average
Sicilianis in contactwithmanyothersthroughwhom,followingselectedstrands,
he is able to come into personalcontactwith almosteveryotherpersonin the
samenetwork.He is at thesametimetheclientof a numberof patrons,each of
whomnormallyoperatesin a separatesocialfield,and thepatronof a numberof
clients.Each of his patronsand clientshave otherswho dependon themand on
whom theydepend.He also has lineswhichlink him laterallyto friendswith
whomhe exchangesfavours.He is thecentralpointfora numberof strands. The
moreselectedstrandsto influential persons,and especiallyto personswithmany
clients,thatpass throughhim,the stronger his positionbecomes,forhis power
growsin proportionto thenumberof appealsmade to and throughhim. Some
personsarein contactwithonlya fewpeople.Othersarelinkeddirectly withmany
above and below themas well as with equals,and serveas brokersforvarious
typesof services.Yet others,veryfewto be sure,are immensecentresof power
fromwhichstrands radiatedirectlyto everypartofthenetwork.Thesearepersons
who occupykeypositionsin thepoliticalstructure.

NOTES
II readan earlier version ofthispaperat theI964 meeting oftheAmerican Anthropological
Association in Detroitand I am grateful forthecomments of thosewho participated in its
discussion. Professor F. G. Bailey,Dr A. Balikci,Dr A. Blok, Dr P. and Dr J. Schneider,
Dr A. Trouwborst andDr A. Xibiliakindlyreadand criticised themanuscript.
2 The fieldworkuponwhichthisarticle is basedwas carriedoutin I962 and I963 andwas
madepossibleby grants fromtheCentroRegionaleperlo Sviluppodi Comunit'a, thePenrose
FundoftheAmerican PhilosophicalSociety(grant3275) andtheCo-operative forAmerican
Reliefto Everywhere (CARE, Inc.),forwhichI am mostgrateful.
3 I havepurposely useda verybroadworkingdefinition ofpatronage, foras willbe apparent
fromthefollowing analysis, relations
patron-client areoftenrelations betweenfriends.
4 The attitude of Sicilianstowardsthe Fascistperioddependsin partupon theirpresent
politicalpersuasion andtheirsocialposition.Manyconservative bourgeoiswho heldpositions
ofpowerundertheFascistregime,look backwithnostalgiato theMussoliniera.Theirmore
liberalcounterparts do notdo so, nordoesthemassoftheruralproletariat, whichregards this
periodas oneofoppression andgrinding poverty. Thisdoesnotnecessarily meanthattheyfeel
Sicilywouldhavebeenbetteroffeconomically withouttheFascists.
5 Thereis no sociallyrecognised limit,as withtheSarakatsani in Greece,wherethelimit
is setclearlyat secondcousin(CampbellI964: 36).The dividing linebetweenkinship andnon-
kinshipforpurposesof mutualaid varieswiththe personalpreferences of theindividuals
concerned, andalsowiththeirsocio-economic class.In generalthewealthier one is thefarther
outthelimitsofkinshipobligations areextended.
6 Banfield (I958) foundthatmuchthesameattitude prevailedamongthepeasants ofMonte-
granoin Lucania,andcalledit 'amoralfamilism'. But itis ofcourseonly'amoral'in theeyes
oftheoutsideobserver. The peopleofLucaniaandSicilyregardit as a highlymoralattitude,
and consider thosewho actaccordingly as actingmorally.
7 Veryoften thelandwas,andstillis,ownedbymembers ofthenobility residentinthecities,
32 JEREMY BOISSEVAIN

who leasetheirestatesen blocto intendents orgabellotti, or in smallerparcelsunderemphy-

teutical leases(whichgiveperpetual effective controloverthelandin return fora smallannual
groundrent)to otherprominently placedmembersof thebourgeoisie. Thesein turneither
employlandlesslabourers, braccianti, to cultivateit forthem,or theysubleaseit to share-
croppers, mezzadri, who in theirturneithercultivate itthemselves or employbraccianti to help
them.
8 Technically speaking contadini arethosewho ownlandandworkitthemselves. I avoidthe
useofthetermin thissenseandemployitas do mostSicilians, as a socialcategory to designate
all thosewho workon theland.
9 A pseudonym.
I0 The gradualapplicationof land reformlaws afterI950 has had surprisingly little
effect uponthisgeneralised picture(cf.Blok I964; RochefortI96I: IO9 sqq.).
II Campbell(I964: 99) makesa similar point.
I2Cf. Campbell(I964: IOI sqq., 205, 230,233) foran analysis ofcousinageandfriendship in
Greece,whichhasmanyparallelsto thesituation in Sicily.
13 Cu' havidenaro edamicizia, si teniintralu cululagiustizia.
'4 Banfield (I96I) in hisinteresting studyoftheoperation ofpatronage ('politicalinfluence'
inhisterms) inChicagomakesa similar pointwithregardtothetrading ofpoliticalfavours(I7).
One regrets thathe did not displaythesamepoliticalsensitivity in hisstudyof Montegrano
(Banfleld I958), wherehe reducedpoliticalactivity to votingbehaviour.
I5 SydelSilverman (I965) givesan excellent accountoftheevolutionofpatronage in Central
Italy.This parallelschangestakingplace in Sicily,thoughthe replacement of traditional
multi-purpose patronsby functionally specific 'intermediaries' hasnotgoneas farin Leoneas
it hasin hervillageof Colleverde.
I6 Silverman (I965: I78) makesa similar point.
I7 Trouwborst (I959) andMair(I96I) haveobserved a similar connection betweenpatronage
and socialmobility in EastAfrica.
I8 Cf.MarcBloch,who seesthefactthatthekinship groupwas notableto offer adequate
protection to theindividual againsttheviolenceandgenerallawlessness thatfollowedthebreak
up oftheRomanEmpireas a primary reasonforthedevelopment oftherelations ofpersonal
protection and subordination so characteristic of feudalism. 'For theonlyregionsin which
powerfulagnaticgroupssurvived-German landson the shoresof the NorthSea, Celtic
districts of theBritishIsles-knewnothingof vassalage,thefiefand themanor.The tie of
kinshipwas one of theessential elements of feudalsociety;itsrelativeweaknessexplainswhy
therewas feudalism at all' (I96I: I42).
'9 Kennyalsopointsto thisfunctional similarityinhisstudyofpatronage inSpain(I960: I7).
20 FortheMalteseversion ofthesameproverbsee BoissevainI965 (I2I).
2I Wolf(I966: i8), forexample,remarks on theabsenceamongtheSouthTyroleseof the
patron-client tieofthetypediscussed here.In a personalcommunication he informed me that
thepubliccultof saintsthereappearsto be less important thanin thesouthof Italy.The
feastof theSacredHeartofJesus was celebrated withfargreater pompthanthatofthepatron
saintof theTyrolesevillagehe studied.
22 In factwhatI callthepatronage network is nothingless,thoughit doesincludesomething
more-theimportance ofthetiesbetweenpatronsandtheirclients-thanthepersonal network
discussed by Barnes(I954: 43 sqq.).

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