Grounds for disciplinary

proceedings against judges

and justices

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

Arellano University School of Law – Arellano Law
Foundation
2016-2017

1
 Resolution to protect members of
judiciary from baseless complaints
• First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the
applicability of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution
Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the Judiciary
from Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints, which
took effect on November 3, 2003.

• Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious

administrative or criminal cases against members of the
judiciary for purposes of harassment, we issued said
Resolution, which provides:

2
Cont…

• 2. If the complaint is
(a)filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a
Justice or Judge;
(b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year
before such filing; and
(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it
must forthwith be recommended for dismissal.

3
Cont…

• If such is not the case, the Office of the Court

Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment
within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and
submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later
than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The
Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of
compulsory retirement of the respondent, or, if it is not
possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date
without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits
less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld,
taking into account the gravity of the cause of action
alleged in the complaint.

4
 Power of the Supreme Court

• Article 8 Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have

administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof. – Philippine Constitution 1987

• By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that

can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. –
Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22,
1993

5
 Competence to review a judicial order
or decision belongs to the Court
• “No other entity or official of the Government, not the
prosecution or investigation service of any other branch,
not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a
judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or
not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts
alone.”- De Vera v. Pelayo, 335 SCRA 281(2000)

6
 Powers, functions, and duties of the
Office of the Ombudsman
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required
by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or
impropriety in the performance of duties.
xxx

7
 Ombudsman Act of 1989 [R.A. 6770]

• Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides:
• “Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.”
xxx xxx
• “Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment
or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

8
 When criminal complaint against a Judge or
other court employee arises from their
administrative duties

• In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other

court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties. - Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez,
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993

9
 Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could
entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification
submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming
that it can, whether a referral should be made
first to the Supreme Court.
• Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the
true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the
necessary records to make such a determination.
• The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow
its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. -
Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781. April 22,
1993
10
 Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation
over the acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence
of an administrative charge for the same acts before
the Supreme Court.

• Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a

criminal or administrative complaint before his office
against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to
investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the
case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. - Fuentes
v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295,
October 23, 2001

11
 Whether the MTC can take cognizance of a
complaint of reckless imprudence against an
incumbent judge pending the resolution of an
administrative complaint arising from the same
facts
• On January 31, 2003, complainant filed a letter complaint before
the Ombudsman-Vizayas, charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia, then
Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental
with the crime of murder and the administrative offenses of grave
misconduct and abuse of authority.
• The complaint arose from the death of complaianant’s husband, on
November 12, 2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap between a
Toyota Land Cruiser driven by Judge Garcia and the motorcycle
driven by the deceased.
• The Graft Investigation Officer found the existence of probable
cause for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
and recommended the filing of the corresponding charges against
Judge Garcia.

12
Cont…

• Judge Garcia filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the

following grounds:xxx; (2) that the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and over his
person; and,xxx.

• Petitioner [judge] argues that respondents violated this

Court’s pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman,
directing the Ombudsman to refer all cases against judges
and court personnel filed before his office to the Supreme
Court; and, in Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
restricting not only the Ombudsman and the prosecution arm
of the government, but also other official and functionary
thereof in initiating or investigating judges and court
personnel.

13
 Held

• In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against

petitioner was in no way related to the performance of his
duties as a judge.
• From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges
against the petitioner before the MCTC was warranted by the
above circumstances.
• To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the
MCTC is a criminal case under its own jurisdiction as
prescribed by law and not an administrative case. To be
sure, trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal
aspect of offenses committed by judges of the lower courts.
– Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009

14
 When to file administrative case
against judges
• Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort
to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding,
are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to
an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative
liability may be said to have opened, or closed. - Bello III v.
Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003

15
Cont…

• Prosecution of the judge can be had only if “there be a

final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the
challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or
bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part
of the judge in rendering said judgment or order” or under
the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. – Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311.
October 3, 2003

16
 Anonymous complaint

• First, we clear the objection of respondent judge that the

letter-complaint should not be given due course because it
is only anonymous. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that the disciplinary proceedings
against judges and justices may be instituted under either
of three ways:
• 1. by the Supreme Court motu proprio;
• 2. upon a verified complaint; or
• 3. upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records
of indubitable integrity.
• Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, A.M. No. RTJ-
05-1955, May 25, 2007

17
 Lack of verification is
only a formal defect
• As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not
have taken cognizance of the complaint because the letter-
complaint was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B, §1
of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys, suffice it to say that such constitutes only a
formal defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the
Court over the subject matter of the complaint. "The
verification is merely a formal requirement intended to
secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true
and correct — the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice
may be served." (Fernandez v. Atty. Novero Jr., A.C. No.
5394, December 02, 2002)

18
 Effect of retirement of respondent
judge

• Respondent's retirement from office did not render the

present administrative case moot and academic. Neither does
it free him from liability. (Lagcao v. Judge Gako, A.M. RTJ-
04-1840, August 2, 2007)

19
 Death of respondent judge

• The dismissal of the administrative case against Judge

Butacan by reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote
v. Judge Eduardo where the Court held that in view of the
death of Judge Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is
inappropriate to impose any administrative liability of a
punitive nature; and declared the administrative complaint
against the respondent Judge, dismissed, closed and
terminated. - RE: Application for retirement/gratuity
benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret., April 22, 2008

20
 Judge also liable if court employee
fraternized with litigant
• Unfortunately, these standards were not met by respondent
Judge Alagar in this case having tolerated unknowingly his
employee to fraternize, receive or give personal favors no
matter how small, with party litigants in a case pending
before his sala.

• Thus, while this Court finds the respondent Judge to have

acted with impartiality and propriety in dealing with the
complainants in Criminal Case No. 4252 , we find fault on
his part in failing to supervise the conduct and behavior
of his court employee for the latter’s improper use of his
vehicle, to the detriment of the court’s image. - Balderama
v. Judge Alagar, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1449. January 18, 2002

21
 Having lunch with counsel

• For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong

per se. The Canons, however, provides that as much as
possible he should be scrupulously careful to avoid any
suspicion that his social or business or friendly
relationship is an element in “determining his judicial
course.” Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the
petitioner in an annulment case pending before him, the
respondent judge should have thought twice about joining
counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at that. -
Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September
12, 2003

22
Effect of reconciliation of the parties

• The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an

administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its
resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely
obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not
extend to erase the offense that may have been committed
against the public service. (Flores v. Judge Garcia, A.M.
No. MTJ-03-1499, October 6, 2008)

23
 Conviction in a criminal case

• Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not

necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against
the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for
the dismissal of the administrative case.
• Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not
automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the
administrative case. We emphasize the well-settled rule that
criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to it. In
other words, the disposition in the first two will not
necessarily govern the third, and vice versa. (Velasco v.
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, August 15,
2007)

24
 Effect of resignation from office

• Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted

by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and
academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction
that the Court had at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent
acceptance – without prejudice – by this Court, has ceased
to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court
retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official
innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary
rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications. (Non-disclosure before
the JBC of the administrative case filed against Judge Jaime
V. Quitain, JBC no. 013, August 22, 2007)

25
 Grounds for outright dismissal

• Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a

retiring judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) the complaint must have been filed within six months
from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice;
(2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year
before such filing; and
(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass
the respondent. (Miguel Colorado v. Judge Ricardo M.
Agapito, A.M. no. MTJ-06-1658, July 3, 2007)

26
 Warning is not a penalty

• A warning, however, no matter how stern, is not a penalty. -

Rosauro M. Miranda v. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr., A.M.
No. RTJ-01-1665, November 29, 2001

27
 Gross ignorance of the law

• To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject

decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance
of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the
case before us, the administrative complaint does not even
allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus
motivated. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-
99-1447. September 27, 2000

28
 Rendering an unjust judgment

• Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal

and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished
under Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of
which are:
(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for
decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust; and
(d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.
• The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment
be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it
to be unjust. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

29
There is no liability at all for a mere
error

• An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not

supported by evidence or both. The source of an unjust
judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at
all for a mere error. It is well-settled that a judicial
officer, when required to exercise his judgment or
discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he
commits, provided he acts in good faith.
• Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If in
rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was
unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and
must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy,
revenge, greed or some other similar motive. - Sps. Daracan
v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000
30
Cont…

• Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of

the law does not constitute the crime. - Sps. Daracan v.
Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

31
 When good faith will not be applied

• We need not belabor jurisprudence to accommodate

respondent’s argument which in effect posits that not every
judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanction. So we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in
cases within the parameters of tolerable judgment.
• Where, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so
evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to
still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which,
hopefully, was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy
purpose. – Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1447. September 27, 2000

32
 Complaint for gross ignorance of the
law is impermissible if case is
appealed
• The main issue for our resolution is whether the instant
administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law is
permissible in light of the filing by complainants of a
notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari assailing
respondent judge’s decision and his order of execution.

• In the present case, the complainants filed this

administrative case against respondent judge while their
appeal and petition for certiorari challenging his decision
and order were still pending with the RTC. Following our
settled pronouncements cited above, the instant complaint is
impermissible. – Camacho v. Judge Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-
1252. December 17, 2002

33
 Period to decide or resolve the case
submitted for decision
• The 90-day period to decide or resolve the case submitted
for decision, fixed no less by the Constitution, is a
mandatory requirement. Hence, non-compliance thereof shall
subject the erring judge to administrative sanction as this
Court may deem appropriate.
• It is only in certain meritorious cases, i.e., those
involving difficult questions of law or complex issues or
when the judge is burdened by heavy caseloads, that a longer
period to decide may be allowed but only upon proper
application made with the Supreme Court by the concerned
judge.- Dr. Seares v. Judge Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1160
November 22, 2000

34
 Judge attended the hearing of his
brother

• Judge Dojillo “sat beside the counsel of his brother” and

“actively coached, aided, assisted, and guided said counsel
by now and then saying something, handing piece of writing,
reminding, and or stopping the counsel from manifesting
something to the court, and other similar acts.”

35
Cont…

• Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the

hearing of his brother’s election protest case just to give
moral support and, in the process, also observe how election
protest proceedings are conducted. Although concern for
family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture,
respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind that he is
also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving
the integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only
impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in
all activities. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-
05-1591. July 14, 2005

36
 Judge is a heckler

• The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted

by a heckler in the audience hurling various accusatory
remarks and insults at the council members. The heckler is
a judge, the incident, the subject of this case.
• All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute the facts as laid
down by the complainants and the latter’s witnesses. He
justified his behavior though as the fulminations of a
righteously outraged citizen which according to him should
be segregated from his function as a judge.
• Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his
outrageous behavior as it clearly violates the Code of
Judicial Conduct. – Hon. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon AM No.
RTJ-02-1669. April 14, 2004

37
 No dichotomy of personality

• Thus, the Court has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaon’s

suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a
taxpayer or ordinary citizen and not as that of a judge.

• In fact, his utterances were not made under a cloak of

anonymity, for the members of the council, as well as some
of the people in the gallery knew very well that he was a
judge. It is highly probable that his invectives took on a
greater imperative on the listeners precisely because he was
a judge, with all the authority attendant to the office. -
Hon. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon AM No. RTJ-02-1669, April
14, 2004

38
 Comment on Certiorari filed by public
respondent judge in behalf of private
respondent
• Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a comment with the
court on behalf of one of the parties, engaged in the private
practice of law.
• Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule
5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law.
• In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision in
the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
“Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the
petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or
file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein.
If either party elevates the case to a higher court, the public
respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However,
unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall not appear or
participate in the proceedings therein. - Tuzon v. Judge Cloribel-
Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 [2001]
39
 Can the members of the Supreme Court be
removed from office only by impeachment?
• Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the Court may be removed
from office only by impeachment. Since removal from office is a
disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows that there is
no manner by which a Justice of this Court may be disciplined for
acts done during his incumbency. Considering that the power to
impeach a Justice of this Court is lodged in the legislative branch
of the government, the Court is without authority to proceed
against and discipline its former Member. He added that what
constitutes impeachable offenses is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature, and that the misconduct of leakage is not one of the
impeachable offenses. - In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C.
Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R.
No.179120A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009

40
Cont…

• When Justice Reyes compulsorily retired upon reaching the

mandatory age of 70, his perceived mantle of protection and
immunity, that the mode of his removal from office can be
done only through impeachment, no longer exists. His duties
and responsibilities as a Justice having ceased by reason of
his retirement, he is reverted to the status of a lawyer
and, consequently, can be subjected to appropriate sanctions
for administrative offenses, particularly, an act of
misconduct. The fact that the Investigating Committee,
created per Resolution dated December 10, 2008 of the Court,
commenced the investigation during the incumbency of Justice
Reyes is of no moment, as he was then not yet a respondent
in an administrative matter against him. - In Re: Undated
Letter of Mr. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120 A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009

41
 Res ipsa loquitor

• Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may

impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on
their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the
law or misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M. No.
RTJ-97-1375. October 16, 1997]

42
 Res ipsa loquitor

• In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without

further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where
the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability. – Query of
Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August
19, 2009
• Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on
records showing his unethical misconduct. - In re: Complaint
against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987
• A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur. - In re: Complaint
against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987

43
 Quantum of evidence

• It is likewise a settled rule in administrative proceedings

that the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint
with substantial evidence falls on the complainant. -
Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J
[2006]

44
 Quantum of evidence required for removal of
judge from office

• Jurisprudence dictates –

“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should

be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule
where the charges on which the removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or
incompetence. The general rules with regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. -
Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713
[2005]

45
 Acts of a collegial court

• It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31,

2004 was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his
individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court
whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. Consequently, the
filing of charges against a single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid
A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]
• The act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without
the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of
the collegial body itself. – ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong,
et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010

46
 “Rendering knowingly unjust judgment" does
not apply to a collegial court
• Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment"
refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to
him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would
pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him
but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the
same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court.
Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no
application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court
or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of
violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground
that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. -
Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

47
 Judge's conviction by the RTC does not
necessarily warrant her suspension
• The mere existence of pending criminal charges against the
respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the
door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of
numerous criminal cases against them.
• By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction
by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We
agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction
of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before
the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she
still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. -
Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC
January 31, 2008

48
 Existence of a presumption indicating the
guilt of the accused does not in itself
destroy the constitutional presumption of
innocence
• It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself
destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless
the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence,
or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the
accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of
innocence continues. - Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M.
No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

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Preventive suspension not applicable to
judges
• Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the
resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspension
pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to
be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules
on preventive suspension of judges, not having been
expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at
best. – Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-
RTC January 31, 2008

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Preventive suspension for erring lawyer

• Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court. - After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of
the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at
the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney
from the practice of his profession for any of the causes
specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of
the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the
Supreme Court.

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 Collegial court needs to
act as one body
• Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of
the Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted
hearings, considering that the three of them were in the same venue
and were acting within hearing and communicating distance of one
another.

• The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would
base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried
before it must be made directly available to each and every one of
its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and
full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of
their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three
members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and
communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question,
as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances
not all of them sat together in session. - ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v.
Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010
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Thank you for your
attention!!

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