Criticism of Libet’s argument intending to undermine free will

Criticism of Libet’s argument intending to undermine free will

Lake Forest College

Anastasija Rudan

FIYS 171:My Brain Made Me Do It

Professor Paul Henne

October 16, 2020

Criticism of Libet’s argument intending to undermine free will

The result of an experiment Libet performed in 1983 showed that our brain initiates

the unconscious decisions to act before we are consciously aware of them (Libet, 1999,

p.47). Libet argued that free will does not initiate voluntary acts, but can only control the

performance of them (Libet, 1999, p.47). However, while Libet’s findings seem to undermine

free will, free will can only be seen through complex movements such as shooting a gun,

rather than observed through something as simple as deciding whether and when to perform

the action of flicking the wrist.

Libet designed an experiment to see whether voluntary acts are subject to laws of

determinism or do free acts appear without any constraints, non-determined by natural laws

(Libet, 1999, p.47). The voluntary acts are preceded by a slow electrical change recordable

on vertex region of the scalp (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965).The electrical change was

referred to as “Bereitschaftspotential” or “readiness potential” (Libet, 1999, p.49).

Electroencephalograms (EEG) recorded electrical activity that occurred within the subject’s

brain while the subject decided when to perform the action of flicking the wrist. Libet

instructed subjects to flick their wrist whenever they wanted to and note the position of the

clock spot when the subject first became aware of the intention to flick the wrist. The time

which was associated with the first awareness of wish to act was reported later after the trial

was over (Libet et al, 1983a). The first conscious wish to act was around 200 milliseconds

before the action of flicking the wrist while the readiness potential was about 500

milliseconds before the unplanned voluntary act. If the voluntary act contained immediate

pre-planning then readiness potential occurred around 1000 milliseconds before action

happened. There was a 350 milliseconds difference between the conscious wish to act and

the brain preparing for voluntary action of flicking the wrist .Moreover, skin stimuli of

performing an action were around 50 milliseconds before the action of flicking of the wrist.

Libet concludes that we do not have complete control of our voluntary actions as the first

wish to perform an act is actually unconscious. Libet also states that actions can be

automatized if one performs them many times, and this automatization could lead to shorter
Criticism of Libet’s argument intending to undermine free will

duration of readiness potential than is seen in action that are not automatized (Libet, 1999,

p.52).

Libet also argues about the possibility of free will stopping or vetoing the action that

was unconsciously decided by our brain, thus indicating that we have control over results of

our unconscious decisions .When vetoing an action, an individual can consciously decide

not to perform act which was unconsciously initiated by our brain (Libet, 1999, p.52).

Readiness potential actually preceded the planning of action that was later vetoed, clearly

indicating that the subject was preparing to perform an act, even though action never

occurred as it was stopped by the conscious free will (Libet, 1999, p.52). Furthermore, the

result of the experiment showed that readiness potential did not precede the very act of

vetoing (Libet, 1999, p.52).The veto of an act can be seen in everyday situations such as

having an urge to curse at your boss. Consider a situation where boss assigns individual

with many tasks that need to be completed as soon as possible. Therefore, individual is

extremely overloaded by the amount of work given and as a result feels frustrated and wants

to curse at the one’s boss. One eventually decides not to perform the action as it will have

severe consequences.

Libet’s findings may undermine free will as free will cannot by itself initiate voluntary

actions, but can only affect when and whether voluntary action will be performed. The

subject still decides when to perform motor action and has a possibility to veto the

movement of flicking the wrist. Subjects were instructed to flick the wrist whenever they

wanted to. Even if there was a readiness potential that preceded this action, there still was a

choice whether to veto the action of flicking the wrist. However, subjects will only later

become aware of the conscious wish to act since the first thought created by our brain is

unconscious. Therefore, Libet’s argument could undermine the existence of free will as the

voluntary actions appear to happen before one is conscious of the action he/she makes.

While Libet’s argument may seem to undermine free will, actions of conscious free

will are much more complex than simply flicking a wrist. Actions of free will often consist of

sequence of complex actions rather than the one simple motor action as shown in Libet’s
Criticism of Libet’s argument intending to undermine free will

experiment. Stealing someone’s wallet or shooting a gun is an example of conscious action.

People are held consciously responsible for an action that is thoroughly planned rather than

the action of flicking the wrist which is an individual motor movement (Roskies, 2011, p.18).

The action of pulling a trigger on the gun seems simple and could be regarded as simple

motor movement; however, there are numerous small actions and conscious decisions that

led to the final action of shooting the handgun and possibly committing homicide (Roskies,

2011, p.19). Finger motion is absolutely necessary for shooting the gun; however in absence

of other elements such as the gun itself the movement of fingers is not important (Roskies,

2011, p.19). Consider another example such as playing the violin. The production of sound

will be only the final action in a sequence of numerous planned actions. First, you need to

obtain a violin and bow, and then you would place your fingers on the right spots on the

fingerboard to play different notes. Finally, you need to pull the bow over the strings in order

to produce sound. The movement of your hand and fingers is absolutely irrelevant if there is

no violin to be played. This example indicates that conscious actions are sequence of

movements and cannot be looked as only one simple action.

Roskies states that the movement of flicking the wrist Libet is focusing on is

irrelevant to conscious free will, as it is only a simple motor action. Furthermore, Roskies

implies that if one is interested in exploring the relationship between awareness and action,

which also have an effect on responsibility and freedom of will, they should observe

electrical activity of more complex movement that consists of many steps (Roskies, 2011,

p.19). She also argues that the establishment of a plan to act or to act otherwise occurs

before the readiness potential is noted on EEG, even if readiness potential precedes the

motor action which emerged from decision to act (Roskies, 2011, p.19). Therefore, free will

does require conscious actions to be a sequence of complex behaviors, thus undermining

the necessity of monitoring electrical activity of simple motor movement in Libet’s

experiment.

Libet’s findings seem to undermine the presence of free will in a way that conscious

free will can only control whether and when to veto motor action. Furthermore, Libet argues
Criticism of Libet’s argument intending to undermine free will

that free will cannot in any way initiate the voluntary action itself. Subjects do not consciously

decide to perform an action such as flicking the wrist but are only later aware of the

appearance of conscious wish to flick a wrist. However, conscious free will cannot be

observed through simple and automatic actions such as the movement of the wrist. Complex

voluntary actions can only be observed through a series of intertwined complex actions such

as stealing someone’s wallet or shooting a gun (Roskies, 2011, p.18).

References:

Libet, B. (1999). Do we have free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(8-9), 47-57.

Roskies, A. L. (2011) Why Libet’s studies don’t pose a threat to free will. In L.Nadel & W. P.

Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A Tribute to Benjamin Libet.

Oxford University Press. (pp. 11-22)