F3367 20 High Intensity Radiated

This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles
for the
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
Designation: F3367 − 20
Standard Practice for

Simplified Methods for Addressing High-Intensity Radiated
Fields (HIRF) and Indirect Effects of Lightning on Aircraft 1
This standard is issued under the fixed designation F3367; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A
superscript epsilon (´) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
1. Scope mendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical

1.1 This practice covers simplified methods for addressing Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) and the Indirect Effects
of Lightning (IEL) on aircraft. The material was developed 2. Referenced Documents
through open consensus of international experts in general 2.1 Following is a list of external standards referenced
aviation. This information was created by focusing on Aircraft throughout this practice; the earliest revision acceptable for use
Certification Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 Normal Category is indicated. In all cases, later document revisions are accept-
aeroplanes. The content may be more broadly applicable. It is able if shown to be equivalent to the listed revision, or if
the responsibility of the applicant to substantiate broader otherwise formally accepted by the governing civil aviation
applicability as a specific means of compliance. The topics authority; earlier revisions are not acceptable.
covered within this practice are: Overview; Minimum Design 2.2 ASTM Standards:2
Requirements; Aeroplane Assessment Level; HIRF and IEL F3060 Terminology for Aircraft
Safety Analysis; HIRF Compliance; IEL Compliance. F3230 Practice for Safety Assessment of Systems and
1.2 An applicant intending to propose this information as Equipment in Small Aircraft
Means of Compliance for a design approval must seek guid- F3309/F3309M Practice for Simplified Safety Assessment of
ance from their respective oversight authority (for example, Systems and Equipment in Small Aircraft
published guidance from applicable CAA) concerning the 2.3 EUROCAE Standards:3
acceptable use and application thereof. For information on ED-14E Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for
which oversight authorities have accepted this practice (in Airborne Equipment
whole or in part) as an acceptable Means of Compliance to ED-107 Guide to Certification of Aircraft in a High-Intensity
their regulatory requirements (hereinafter “the Rules”), refer to Radiated Field (HIRF) Environment
the ASTM Committee F44 web page (www.astm.org/
COMMITTEE/F44.htm). 2.4 European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA):4
CS-23 Amdt 5 Certification Specifications for Normal-
1.3 Units—The values stated in SI units are to be regarded Category Aeroplanes
as standard. No other units of measurement are included in this AMC 20-136 Aircraft Electrical And Electronic System
standard. Lightning Protection
1.4 This standard does not purport to address all of the AMC 20-158 Aircraft Electrical And Electronic System
safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection
responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appro- 2.5 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA):5
priate safety, health, and environmental practices and deter- AC 20-136B Aircraft Electrical and Electronic System
mine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use. Lightning Protection
1.5 This international standard was developed in accor-
dance with internationally recognized principles on standard-
ization established in the Decision on Principles for the 2
For referenced ASTM standards, visit the ASTM website, www.astm.org, or
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recom- contact ASTM Customer Service at service@astm.org. For Annual Book of ASTM
Standards volume information, refer to the standard’s Document Summary page on
the ASTM website.
1 3
This practice is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee F44 on General Available from EUROCAE, 9-23 rue Paul Lafargue, "Le Triangle" building,
Aviation Aircraft and is the direct responsibility of Subcommittee F44.50 on 93200 Saint-Denis, France, https://eshop.eurocae.net/.
4
Systems and Equipment. Available from European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA ), Postfach 10 12 53,
Current edition approved June 1, 2020. Published June 2020. Originally D-50452 Cologne, Germany, https://www.easa.europa.eu.
5
approved in 2019. Last previous edition approved in 2019 as F3367–19a. DOI: Available from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 800 Independence
10.1520/F3367-20. Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20591, http://rgl.faa.gov.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. United States
Copyright by ASTM Int'l (all rights reserved); Fri Jul 3 12:19:36 EDT 2020
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Downloaded/printed by
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F3367 − 20
FIG. 1 Overview Flowchart
AC 20-158A The Certification of Aircraft Electrical and mance aboard the aircraft that, by itself, provides a completely
Electronic Systems for Operation in the High-Intensity recognizable operational capability.
Radiated Fields (HIRF) Environment 3.2.2.1 Discussion—For example, “display aircraft attitude
AC 23.1309-1E System Safety Analysis and Assessment for to the pilot” is a function. One or more systems may perform
Part 23 Airplanes a specific function or one system may perform multiple
AC 25.1309-1A System Design and Analysis functions, or both.
Part 25 Amdt 25-122 Airworthiness Standards: Transport
Category Airplanes 3.2.3 primary system—a system that is the primary means of
Part 23 Amdt 23-64 Airworthiness Standards: Normal Cat- providing the function.
egory Aircraft 3.2.3.1 Discussion—For example, a primary flight display
2.6 RTCA:6 would have the primary display of attitude information to the
DO-160E (or later when not specified) Environmental pilot.
Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment
3.2.4 redundant system—a system that provides an identical
2.7 SAE Recommended Practice:7
function to one performed by another system.
SAE ARP 5412B Aircraft Lightning Environment and Re-
lated Test Waveforms 3.2.5 secondary system—an independent system that can be
used to accomplish the same function in addition to the primary
3. Terminology system.
3.1 Definitions—Terminology specific to the system safety 3.2.5.1 Discussion—For example, a standby attitude indica-
assessment process is contained in Practice F3230. Terminol- tor provides a secondary means of presenting attitude informa-
ogy specific to this practice is provided in 3.2. For general tion to the pilot in addition to the primary attitude indicator.
terminology, refer to Terminology F3060.
3.2.6 system—a combination of inter-related items arranged
3.2 Definitions of Terms Specific to This Standard:
to accomplish a given function.
3.2.1 dB—A measure of signal or field strength attenuation
in decibels. 3.2.7 V/m—A measure of electrical field strength in volts
3.2.2 function—intended behavior of a product based on a per meter.
set of defined requirements regardless of implementation. The 3.3 Abbreviation:
specific action of a system, equipment, and flight crew perfor- 3.3.1 IEL—Indirect Effects of Lightning
6
Available from RTCA, 1150 18th NW, Suite 910, Washington DC 20036, 4. Overview Flowchart
http://www.rtca.org.
7
Available from SAE International (SAE), 400 Commonwealth Dr., Warrendale, 4.1 The flowchart in Fig. 1 provides an overview of the
PA 15096, http://www.sae.org. methods outlined in this practice.
2
F3367 − 20
5. Minimum Design Requirements 7. HIRF and IEL System Safety Analysis
5.1 In order to utilize the methods described in this practice, 7.1 Perform HIRF and IEL System Safety Analysis:
the following minimum design considerations should be ad- 7.1.1 Obtain the assessment of system failure conditions
dressed. If deviations from these minimum design consider- that was performed as part of the system safety assessment
ations are desired, the acceptability of the methods described process in accordance with Practices F3230 or F3309/F3309M.
must be agreed to by the applicable Civil Aviation Authority. This will typically take the form of a Functional Hazard
5.1.1 Systems that are part of the Type Certificated Engine Assessment but simpler methods may have been employed
must be installed in accordance with the engine manufacturer’s depending on the complexity of the system.
requirements. The minimum HIRF and lightning qualification
in accordance with Sections 8 and 9 of this ASTM practice 7.1.2 Identify those failure conditions where exposure to
should be met at the aircraft level. HIRF or IEL could result in a failure condition that:
5.1.2 The recommended test levels for a higher Certification 7.1.2.1 Would prevent continued safe flight and landing.
Level aeroplane are acceptable in all cases for a lower These failure conditions would be classified as Catastrophic in
Certification Level aeroplane. For example, the HIRF require- the assessment discussed in 7.1.1.
ments specified for a Level 2 or 3 aeroplane may be used on a 7.1.2.2 Would significantly reduce the capability of the
Level 1 aeroplane in any frequency band. aeroplane or the ability of the flight crew to respond to an
5.1.3 The airframe should incorporate low impedance elec- adverse operating condition. These failure conditions would be
trical conductors for lightning current to flow through the classified as Hazardous in the assessment discussed in 7.1.1.
aeroplane. The low impedance conductors should be incorpo- 7.1.2.3 Would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the
rated into the basic structure of the aeroplane. ability of the flight crew to cope with adverse operating
5.1.3.1 For aeroplanes with primarily aluminum structure, conditions. These failure conditions would be classified as
the aluminum skin provides a low impedance electrical con- Major in the assessment discussed in 7.1.1.
ductor. Standard rivets and bolts provide adequate electrical
bonding between permanent structural joints. Electrical bond- NOTE 1—Compliance with 7.1.2.3 is only required when the cognizant
ing straps or jumpers should be installed on moving parts or for CAA requires major failure conditions to be addressed for HIRF or
indirect effects of lightning, or both.
removable panels or parts.
5.1.3.2 For aeroplanes with primarily carbon fiber or fiber- 7.1.2.4 In addressing the requirements of 7.1.2, the nature of
glass structure, metal mesh, metal foil, or expanded metal foil HIRF and IEL should be considered.
should be incorporated onto the external surfaces of the (1) The potential for common mode failures across mul-
aeroplane composite structure. This mesh or foil must be tiple systems performing the same or different functions due to
joined together electrically and provide a continuous electrical the simultaneous exposure to the HIRF and IEL threat must be
conductor between the extremities of the aeroplane. Use of considered. Simultaneous and common mode failures due to
metallic components internal to the structure of the aeroplane HIRF or lightning does not have to be assumed for multiple
may also be used to provide similar shielding for equipment systems that contribute to a hazardous failure condition when
and its wiring. consisting of federated equipment installations that are not
5.1.3.3 For aeroplanes constructed of tube and fabric, the identical in design.
tube skeleton can be considered as the low impedance electri- (2) The inherent immunity of mechanical systems with no
cal path through the aeroplane. The bonding also may be electrical circuitry should also be considered.
achieved by the use of bonding straps or jumpers where 7.1.2.5 In addressing the requirements of 7.1.2, the effects
required to electrically bond other metallic sub-structure that of HIRF and IEL should not be combined with random failures
might be relied upon to provide bonding for equipment. that are not the result of the HIRF and Lightning threat.
5.1.4 Electrical bonding specifications and verifications Additionally, the effects of HIRF and Lightning do not need to
should be developed and implemented on the production be considered in combination.
drawings and instructions for continued airworthiness. 7.1.3 Identify what systems and equipment are required to
6. Aeroplane Assessment Level Assignment prevent the failure conditions identified in 7.1.2.
7.1.4 The minimum HIRF and lightning qualification in
6.1 Determine the Aeroplane Assessment Level using Table
accordance with Sections 8 and 9 of this ASTM practice should
1. This Aeroplane Assessment Level assignment of I, II or III
be met at the aircraft level. A minimum of one system must
will be used to determine the applicable IEL and HIRF
meet availability requirements, or, specifically for HIRF, mul-
requirements for each aeroplane.
tiple systems may be used to show availability requirements
across the entire frequency band. If multiple systems are used
TABLE 1 Aeroplane Assessment Level Matrix
to show availability for HIRF, then each of those systems
Aeroplane Aeroplane Assessment Level should automatically recover the function after the threat is
Certification Reciprocating Engine(s) Turbine Engine(s) removed. For example, the Primary system meets requirements
Level 1 >1 1 >1 for a certain frequency range while the STBY system meets the
Level 1 I II II II requirements at frequencies the Primary was not able to. In this
Level 2 I II II II
Level 3 III III III III example, both the Primary and STBY should automatically
recover the function after the threat is removed.
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8. HIRF Compliance 8.2.3.2 When the requirements of 8.2.3.1 are met, recovery
8.1 HIRF compliance may be shown using the methods of normal operation of that function in redundant systems is not
described in this section. necessary. It is acceptable for the function to be lost in lieu of
presenting erroneous or misleading information.
8.2 For the systems and equipment identified in 7.1.3, 8.2.3.3 If erroneous (Note 7) operation of the function is
establish appropriate pass/fail criteria that ensures the follow- considered to be Hazardous, then the function shall not be
ing requirements are met: adversely affected. The function does not need to recover if the
8.2.1 For failure conditions where the loss of a function is availability is not considered Major/Hazardous.
Catastrophic:
8.2.1.1 The function at the aeroplane level is not adversely NOTE 7—Erroneous behavior may be Hazardously Misleading Infor-
mation (HMI) presented to the pilot as well as erroneous information that
affected during and after the time the aeroplane is exposed at is an input to a system (for example, AP, FADEC, De-Ice, etc.), either of
the HIRF environment. It is not necessary for all redundant which may result in a Major/Hazardous condition for the aircraft.
systems to pass this requirement provided at least one system 8.3 Demonstrate that the systems and equipment success-
maintains the function in the presence of HIRF, in the entire fully meet the pass criteria established in 8.2 when subjected to
frequency band. the required HIRF Levels specified in Table 2. The demonstra-
NOTE 2—At a minimum, the other redundant systems must still be tion of meeting HIRF levels may be performed via test or
tested to the HIRF levels corresponding to the hazard classification analysis, or both.
associated directly with the loss of, or erroneous operation of, the
redundant system. 9. Indirect Effects of Lightning Compliance
8.2.1.2 When the requirements of 8.2.1.1 are met, recovery 9.1 Indirect Effects of Lightning compliance may be shown
of normal operation of that function in redundant systems for using the methods described in this section.
Level 1, 2, and 3 aeroplanes can be accomplished by pilot
9.2 Compliance with the requirements of this section are
action.
required for those aircraft whose operations are likely to be
NOTE 3—It is accepted that a system upset by the exposure to HIRF will struck by lightning.
recover their normal operation after a system reset is performed. The use 9.2.1 Compliance with this section must be addressed for
of a circuit breaker is an acceptable form of resetting the equipment, given aircraft that are approved for IFR operations.
how infrequently this is likely to occur. No HIRF testing is required to
demonstrate that the affected redundant systems will recover after removal 9.2.2 Applicants must coordinate with their CAA to deter-
of the HIRF threat and a system reset is performed. mine if any other operations must be considered.
8.2.2 When erroneous (Note 4) behavior of a function is 9.2.3 No additional IEL compliance is required for aero-
considered Catastrophic: planes limited to VFR only.
8.2.2.1 The function shall not be adversely affected during 9.2.4 For failure conditions where the loss of a function is
and after the time the aeroplane is exposed at the HIRF Catastrophic:
environment, if the adverse effect is considered Catastrophic. 9.2.4.1 The function at the aeroplane level is not adversely
affected during and after the time the aeroplane is exposed to
8.2.2.2 If the availability of the function is not considered
lightning. It is not necessary for all redundant systems to pass
Catastrophic, then the function does not need to recover normal
this requirement provided at least one system maintains the
operation. It is acceptable for the function to be lost at the
function.
Catastrophic test level in lieu of presenting erroneous or
misleading information. NOTE 8—At a minimum, the other redundant systems must still be
tested to the IEL levels corresponding to the hazard classification
NOTE 4—Erroneous behavior may be Hazardously Misleading Infor- associated directly with the loss of, or erroneous operation of, the
mation (HMI) presented to the pilot as well as erroneous information that redundant system.
is an input to a system (for example, AP, FADEC, De-Ice, etc.), either of
which may result in a Catastrophic condition for the aircraft. 9.2.4.2 When the requirements of 9.2.4.1 are met, recovery
of normal operation of that function in redundant systems for
8.2.3 For Major/Hazardous failure conditions:
Level 1, 2, and 3 aeroplanes is not necessary. There must be a
8.2.3.1 Electrical/electronic systems must recover normal means for the pilot to attempt to reset the affected redundant
operation of that function in a timely manner after the systems.
aeroplane is exposed to the HIRF environment, if the avail-
ability of the function is considered to be Major/Hazardous. NOTE 9—The use of a circuit breaker is an acceptable form of resetting
the equipment, given how infrequently this is likely to occur. No IEL
NOTE 5—Major failure conditions are only required to be addressed if testing is required to demonstrate that the affected redundant systems will
required by the cognizant CAA. recover.
NOTE 6—Some CAA regulations currently state that requirement only
applies to IFR operations. Aircraft approved for VFR operation fly in the
9.2.5 When erroneous (Note 4) behavior of a function is
same HIRF environment as IFR approved aircraft. At the time the rule was considered Catastrophic:
made, it did not consider certain technologies that have emerged since 9.2.5.1 The function shall not be adversely affected during
then (for example, EVTOL, Unmanned aircraft with fly-by-wire and after the time the aeroplane is exposed to lightning if the
capability, etc.) for aircraft that are approved for VFR operations. The adverse effect is considered Catastrophic.
operations of these new technologies may lead to Major/Hazardous failure
conditions that were not previously considered. Therefore, this paragraph 9.2.5.2 If the availability of the function is not considered
is also considered applicable to aircraft that have been approved for VFR Catastrophic, then the function does not need to recover normal
operations. operation. It is acceptable for the function to be lost at the
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TABLE 2 Acceptable HIRF Test Methods
NOTE 1—In accordance with AC/AMC 20-158A, systems with Catastrophic failure conditions were split into Level A and Level A Display. The test
methods and levels described in this practice for catastrophic failure conditions are acceptable for both Level A and Level A Display systems.
NOTE 2—For assessment level I, some CAA may require testing to the level shown for assessments II and III. These CAAs may be willing to accept
RTCA DO-160, Section 20, Category R on a case-by-case basis.
NOTE 3—If the cognizant CAA requires major failure conditions to be addressed for HIRF, the test levels shown can be used.
Aeroplane Required HIRF Levels
Assessment
Level
(Refer to Sec- Catastrophic Failure Conditions Major Failure Conditions
Hazardous Failure Conditions
tion 6) (Notes 1 and 2) (Note 3)
I System or Equipment Level Test - DO-160/ED- Equipment Level Test to DO-160/ED-14, Sec- Equipment Level Test to DO-160/ED-14, Sec-
14, Section 20, Category R tion 20, Category T for both radiated and tion 20, Category T for both radiated and
for both radiated and conducted susceptibility, conducted susceptibility, regardless of aircraft conducted susceptibility, regardless of aircraft
regardless of aircraft construction. construction. construction.
II System Testing using the following default levels, System or Equipment Level Test - DO-160/ED-
regardless of aircraft construction. 14, Section 20, Category R for both radiated
1) Conducted Susceptibility in accordance with and conducted susceptibility, regardless of
the Generic Conductive Curve <25 m (refer- aircraft construction.
ence Figure A-1 of AC/AMC 20-158) extrapo-
lated to Env I. This is the same as DO-160E/
ED-14E, Section 20, Category A.
III 2) Radiated Susceptibility in accordance with Air-
craft Generic Attenuation Curves applied to
Env I:
• Use 0 dB attenuation from 100 to 400
MHz.
• Use –6 dB attenuation from 400 MHz to 1
GHz.
• Use –12 dB attenuation from 1 to 18 GHz.
Catastrophic test level in lieu of presenting erroneous or 9.2.7.2 If the availability of the function is not considered
misleading information. Hazardous, then the function does not need to recover normal
9.2.6 For Hazardous failure conditions: operation. It is acceptable for the function to be lost in lieu of
9.2.6.1 Electrical/electronic systems must recover normal presenting erroneous or misleading information.
operation of that function in a timely manner after the
aeroplane is exposed to lightning if the availability of the 9.3 Determine the applicable IEL test levels using Tables 3
function is considered to be Hazardous. and 4. Demonstrate that the systems and equipment pass the
9.2.6.2 When the requirements of 9.2.6.1 are met, recovery pass/fail criteria established in 9.2 at the appropriate levels.
of normal operation of that function in redundant systems is not The demonstration of meeting IEL test levels may be per-
necessary. It is acceptable for the function to be lost in lieu of formed via test and or analysis.
presenting erroneous or misleading information.
9.2.7 When erroneous (Note 7) behavior of a function is 10. Test Considerations
considered Hazardous:
10.1 When testing is performed to the levels shown in
9.2.7.1 The function shall not be adversely affected during
Sections 8 and 9, the test configuration should be representa-
and after the time the aeroplane is exposed to lightning if the
adverse effect is considered Hazardous. tive of the aircraft installation.
TABLE 3 Determination of IEL Approach

NOTE 1—The applicable method for the aeroplane construction type must be selected when choosing the test levels. Refer to Table 4.
NOTE 2—In accordance with AC/AMC 20-136, systems with Catastrophic failure conditions were split into Level A and Level A Display. The test
methods and levels described in this practice for catastrophic failure conditions are acceptable for both Level A and Level A Display systems.
Required IEL Test Levels
Aeroplane Assessment Level (See Note 1)
(Refer to Section 6) Catastrophic Failure Conditions
Hazardous Failure Conditions
(See Note 2)
I C or D E or F
II A or B C or D
III A or B C or D
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TABLE 4 IEL Test Methods
Test Categories
IEL Approach
Aeroplane Construction Type IEL Test Method Unshielded
(Refer to Table 3) Shielded Cable Bundle
Cable Bundle
A Primarily Metal System or Equipment level testing to DO- A3J33 A3G33
160/ED-14 revision E/F, Section 22, OR
System or Equipment level testing to DO- A3J3L3 A3G3L3
160/ED-14 revision G, Section 22
B Primarily carbon fiber, fiberglass structure, System or Equipment level testing to DO- B3K33 B3H33
or other non-conductive material 160/ED-14 revision E/F, Section 22, OR
System or Equipment level testing to DO- B3K3L3 B3H3L3
C Primarily Metal System or Equipment level testing to DO- A2J22 A2G22
D Primarily carbon fiber, fiberglass structure, System or Equipment level testing to DO- B2K22 B2H22
E Primarily Metal System or Equipment level testing to DO- A1JJ11 A1G11
F Primarily carbon fiber, fiberglass structure, System or Equipment level testing to DO- B1K11 B1H11
10.1.1 Use DO-160/ED-14 for guidance on bonding, inter- 10.4 In cases where the testing performed cannot achieve
connecting wiring/cables and other test related aspects. test levels on all equipment and cables at the same time, the
10.1.2 For wiring, the construction types used can make a results of the testing should be reviewed to consider the
difference to the testing. Therefore, the use of shielded wires common mode nature of HIRF and Indirect Effects of Light-
and the manner in how the shields are terminated during the ning.
testing should be replicated in the aircraft installation.
10.2 The system safety analysis from Section 7 should have 11. Keywords
determined what functions need to be addressed to meet HIRF 11.1 HIRF; indirect effects of lightning; simpler method of
and Indirect Effects of Lightning requirements. Create the test compliance
set-up that allows the necessary functions or data, that might be
relied upon, to be monitored during the testing.
10.3 The hardware and software should be representative of
the final configuration. Any differences between tested version
and final configuration should be assessed to ensure it did not
impact testing.
APPENDIX
(Nonmandatory Information)
X1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION
The FAA had created a HIRF and Lightning policy paper that was developed for systems
performing catastrophic functions for low-end part 23 aircraft. The rationale from the FAA policy
paper has been captured in this Appendix. This has been used as the starting point and further
developed for Hazardous functions with the approach of making proportionate or tiered requirements
where higher criticality has higher requirements while lower criticality systems have lower
requirements. This maintains the same approach that currently exists within AC 20-136 and
AC 20-158.
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F3367 − 20
X1.1 HIRF service experience is not adequate to support modifying the
X1.1.1 Considering the typical 12 dB attenuation for level A HIRF certification requirements for part 23 class IV aeroplane
display systems allowed by EUROCAE ED-107A, and AC systems with catastrophic failure conditions.
20-158A, appendix 1, the level of HIRF qualification require- X1.2 Lightning
ments can be as high as 750 V ⁄m (pulsed). This requirement is
orders of magnitude higher than the actual level used to qualify X1.2.1 Research on lightning strikes to aeroplanes shows
most low end part 23 aeroplanes in operation today. Part 23 the rate of lightning strikes per flight cycle is strongly
aeroplanes in operation today have systems that either have no correlated to the physical dimensions of the aeroplane. This
HIRF qualification or—if certified to the latest HIRF regula- correlation provides a method for estimating the likelihood of
tions or EASA Certification Review Items (CRI)/Special con- lightning strikes to smaller aeroplanes. Fig. X1.1 shows a
ditions (SCs)—have a large number of systems/functions correlation of the lightning strike rate versus the aeroplane size
qualified between 5 V ⁄m (MAJ) and 150 V pulsed (HAZ). when plotting the rate of lightning strikes against the length
There are few known field or service issues related to HIRF multiplied by the wingspan for these aeroplanes. Table X1.1
even though class I and II aeroplane airframes may provide provides estimated small aeroplane lightning strike rates based
little RF energy attenuation due to the following common on this correlation. Existing service report databases include
design features: few reports of lightning strikes to small aeroplanes. This data
X1.1.1.1 Large percentage of the aeroplane is transparent to brings into question the likelihood of lightning strikes to small
HIRF from windows (for both metal and composite aero- aeroplanes and level of lightning protection required for these
planes). aeroplanes.
X1.1.1.2 Composite construction (carbon fiber as well as X1.2.2 The 2015 FAA General Aviation Survey8 provides
fiberglass with and without protection). additional data that may be used to further adjust the data based
X1.1.1.3 Fabric material used for skin (that is, aeroplanes upon aeroplane use and the conditions in which they are flown.
constructed of steel tubes covered with fabric skins). Table X1.2 provides an adjusted estimate of small aeroplane
X1.1.2 Part 23 aeroplanes are designed using risk based lightning strike rates based on this additional data.
quantitative rates of failures that depend on the class of the part X1.2.3 The data in Table X1.2 indicates that small aero-
23 aeroplane. AC 23.1309-1E uses a quantitative failure rate planes are at a lower risk to lightning strikes than larger
that results in catastrophic conditions of less than 10-6 per aeroplanes. The smaller the aeroplane, the lower the likelihood
flight hour for class I aeroplanes, and 10-7 per flight hour for of a lightning strike occurring. This correlation provides a
class II aeroplanes. The service experience of aeroplanes shows means to adjust and standardize lightning test levels to account
that using the HIRF equipment certification requirements for exposure risk and the aeroplane size.
found in this policy should satisfy the safety objectives in AC
23.1309-1E if applied to part 23 class I and II aeroplane 8
See http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/general_
systems with catastrophic failure conditions. Similarly, this aviation/CY2015/.
FIG. X1.1 Lightning Strike Rates Compared to Aeroplane Size
7
F3367 − 20
TABLE X1.1 Estimated Small Aeroplane Lightning Strike Rates
Lightning Strike Rates Small Piston Aeroplane Small Turboprop Aeroplane Small Turbojet Aeroplane
Aeroplane wingspan - meters 12.0 13.1 15.5
Aeroplane length - meters 7.9 9.0 16.3
Small aeroplane lightning strike per 2.7E-05 3.4E-05 7.2E-05
flight cycle
TABLE X1.2 Estimated Small Aeroplane Lightning Strike Rates—Adjusted

Small Piston Aeroplane Small Turboprop Aeroplane Small Turbojet Aeroplane
Percentage of general aviation operations in instrument 10 % 27 % 38 %
meteorological conditions
Adjustment factor for general aviation versus scheduled 0.26 0.71 1.00
operations in IMC
Rate of lightning strikes per flight cycle 7.0E-06 2.4E-05 7.2E-05
Hours per flight cycle 0.73 0.80 1.41
Rate of lightning strikes per flight hour 9.6E-06 3.0E-05 5.1E-05
Hours between lightning strikes 104 000 33 000 20 000
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F3367 20 High Intensity Radiated

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F3367 20 High Intensity Radiated

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This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles

Standard Practice for

1. Scope mendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical

FIG. 1 Overview Flowchart

TABLE 3 Determination of IEL Approach

X1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

FIG. X1.1 Lightning Strike Rates Compared to Aeroplane Size

TABLE X1.2 Estimated Small Aeroplane Lightning Strike Rates—Adjusted

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