DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A.

VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

FACTS:

Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly
thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to
serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse,
Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his
appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would
argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned
from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to
President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of
his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this
petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of
Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and
academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs
Macapagal Arroyo namely:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;

c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar and the public;

d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for the
exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:

a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court

b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;

c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and

d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis
mota of the case

ISSUES:

a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court

b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four
(4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed
under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

HELD:

Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has “far-
reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the
public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the
instant petition.

In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called “non-
traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:

a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;

b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question

c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and

d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives
as legislators.

On the substantive issue:

Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the
other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for
the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment as COA
Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from February 2008 to February 2015––given his
four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court.
While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there has
been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or
commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view
would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally
offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LARRY M.

ALFONSO G.R. No. 179452 June 11, 2009

Facts: Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources ManagementDepartment of
PUP. On July 6, 2006, an Affidavit-Complaint filed against Alfonso forviolation of Republic Act (RA) No.
6713, charging the latter with grave misconduct,conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service,
and violation of Civil Service Law,rules and regulations. The affidavit-complaint was lodged before the
Civil ServiceCommission (CSC). The affidavit alleged that respondent repeatedly abused hisauthority as
head of PUP’s personnel department. The CSC charged Alfonso with gravemisconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and imposing a90-day preventive suspension against him.
Respondent argued that the CSC had nojurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case filed
against him. The PUP Boardof Regents that has the exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP
employeespursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. No. 4670. Without rulingon the
motion, the head of CSC-NCR, issued an Order directing the Office of thePresident of PUP to implement
the preventive suspension order against respondent.Respondent sought relief before the CA via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. CArendered a Decision in favor of Alfonso.

Issue:

Whether the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed againstAlfonso.

Held:We find in favor of petitioner. SECTION 9 Powers and Functions of the Commission. –The
Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have thefollowing powers and function: (j) Hear
and decide administrative disciplinary casesinstituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or
brought to iton appeal; Section 37.Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (a) The Commission shall decide
uponappeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty ofsuspension for
more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary,demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaintmay be filed directly with the Commission by a
private citizen against a governmentofficial or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case
or it may deputizeany department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the
investigation.The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission
withrecommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.We are not unmindful
of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinarycommittees and governing bodies in
different branches, subdivisions, agencies andinstrumentalities of the government to hear and decide
administrative complaintsagainst their respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot
interpretthe creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as – R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670allowing
for the creation of such disciplinary bodies – as having divested the CSC of itsinherent power to
supervise and discipline government employees, including those inthe academe. Equally significant is
the fact that he, Alfonso, had already submittedhimself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his
counter-affidavit and his motionfor reconsideration and requested for a change of venue from the CSC-
Central Office tothe CSC-NCR. It was only when his motion was denied that he suddenly had a changeof
heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction. This cannot be allowed because itwould violate the
doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable toadministrative cases as well. At the very
least, respondent’s active participation in theproceedings by seeking affirmative relief before the CSC
already bars him fromimpugning the Commission’s authority under the principle of estoppel by laches.
In thiscase, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees.

Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation v. Hon.

Vicente T. Leogardo, Deputy Minister of Labor and Vicente D. Ellelina, G.R. No.
58494, July 5, 1989.

Facts:

PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).

it filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment... a clearance application to... dismiss/terminate the
services of private respondent, Vicente D. Ellelina, a contractual employee.

Ellelina's alleged commission of a crime (Alarm or Public Scandal) during a Christmas party... because of
the refusal of the raffle committee to give him the prize corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried
to grab the armalite rifle of the PC Officer outside the building despite the warning shots fired by the...
latter
Clearance to dismiss was initially granted by MOLE but was subsequently revoked and petitioner was
ordered to reinstate Ellelina to his former position

Petitioner appealed to the Minister of Labor who... affirmed, on 14 August 1981, the appealed Order

Issues:

Ellelina's dismissal is valid and just because it is based upon the commission of a crime.

Ruling:

Civil Service embraces government owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

PNOC-EDC, having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law, is a government-owned or
controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.

Thus, the reinstatement ordered by public respondent, without loss of seniority rights, is proper.

Dismissal ordered by petitioner was a bit too harsh considering the nature of the act which he had
committed and that it was his first... offense.

Employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service
Law and not by the Labor Code. The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Employees
of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as
subsidiaries under the... general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the
Labor Code.

Government owned corporations are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code
notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We held
that the NLRC has jurisdiction... over the... employees of NASECO "on the premise that it is the 1987
Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision... being a
corporation without an original charter, the employees of NASECO are subject to the provisions of the
Labor.
3. Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. National Labor Relations
Commission and Odin Security Agency, G.R. No. 94825, September 4, 1992
The petitioner is a government-owned or controlled corporation created by P.D.
No. 977.
On November 11, 1985, it entered into a contract with the Odin Security Agency
for security services of its Iloilo Fishing Port Complex in Iloilo City. The pertinent
provision of the contract provides:
OBLIGATION OF THE FISHING PORT COMPLEX:
1. For and in consideration of the services to be rendered by the AGENCY to the
FISHING PORT COMPLEX, the latter shall pay to the former per month for eight (8)
hours work daily as follows:
OUTSIDE METRO MANILA
Security GuardP1,990.00
Security Supervisor 2,090.00
Det. Commander 2,190.00

The Security Group of the AGENCY will be headed by a detachment commander

whose main function shall consist of the administration and supervision control of
the AGENCY'S personnel in the FISHING PORT COMPLEX. There shall be one
supervisor per shift who shall supervise the guards on duty during a particular
shift. The contract for security services also provided for a one year renewable
period unless terminated by either of the parties.
On October 24, 1987, and during the effectivity of the said Security Agreement,
the private respondent requested the petitioner to adjust the contract rate in
view of the implementation of Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on November
1, 1984.
Thus on June 7,1988, the private respondent filed with the Office of the Sub-
Regional Arbitrator in Region VI, Iloilo City a complaint for unpaid amount of re-
adjustment rate under Wage Order No. 6 together with wage salary differentials
arising from the integration of the cost of living allowance under Wage Order No.
1, 2, 3 and 5 pursuant to Executive Order No. 178 plus the amount of P25,000.00
as attorney's fees and cost of litigation.
Issue
1: WON an indirect employer is bound by the ruling of NLRC which made the
indirect employer liable when the guards are not employees of the petitioner
because the contract of services explicitly states that the security guards are not
their employees thus, no employer-employee relationship, thus the jurisdiction of
the CSC may not be invoked in thiscase.
Held: Notwithstanding that the petitioner is a government agency, itsliabilities,
which are jointly and solidary with that of the contractor areprovided in Art. 106,
107 and 109. Its liabilities are under the NLRC scope and in addition, book
threetitle ii on wages provides that the term employer includes anyperson acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employerin relation to an employee and
shall include the Government andall its branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, all GOCCsand institutions as well as non-profit private
institutions ororganizations.

Issue 2: Who should carry the burden of the wage increases?Held: It is settled that
in job contracting, the petitioner as principal is jointlyand severally liable with the
contractor for the payment of unpaidwages. In the case at bar, the action was for
the payment of unpaidwage differentials under Wage Order No. 6. In the case of
Eagle Security vs. NLRC:The solidary liability of PTSI and EAGLE, however, does not
preclude theright of reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid. It is
withrespect to this right of reimbursement that petitioners can find support inthe
aforecited contractual stipulation and Wage Order provision.

The Wage Orders are explicit that the payment of the increases are to beborne by
the principal or client. To be borne, however, does not meanthat the principal,
PTSI in this case, would directly pay the security guardsthe wage and allowance
increases because there is no privity of contractbetween them. The security
guards contractual relationship is with theirimmediate employer, EAGLE. As an
employer, EAGLE is tasked, amongothers, with the payment of their
wages.Premises considered, the security guards immediate recourse for
thepayment of the increases is with their direct employer, EAGLE. However,
inorder for the security agency to comply with the new wage and allowancerates
it has to pay the security guards, the Wage Order made specificprovision to
amend existing contracts for security services by allowing theadjustments of the
consideration paid by the principal to the securityagency concerned. What the
Wage orders require, therefore, is theamendment of the contract as to the
consideration to cover the servicecontractors payment of the increases
mandated. In the end, therefore,ultimate liability for the payment of the
increasees rests with the principal. The Wage Orders are statutory and mandatory
and can not bewaived. The petitioner can not escape liability since the law
providesthe joint and solidary liability of the principal and the contractor for the
protection of the laborers. But the Court here did not apply the Eagle case
because the petitioner is equally guilty by not abiding to the law in the
subsequent change of contract even when the WO6 was already implemented.
Therefore, security guards immediate recourse is with directemployer but the
latter is not prejudiced as to the claim of of thewages it shall give the
guards.Doctrine: Principal liable for Wage Orders mandating wage increases.But
when principal cannot pay, contractor is the immediate recourse andshould pay
the whole claim with right to reimbursement from principal.But if contractor is at
fault, will be liable to of the claim.

HON. CESAR D. BUENAFLOR V. JOSE R. RAMIREZ, JR.

G.R. NO. 201607
FEBRUARY 15, 2017

FACTS:

Chairman Eufemio Domingo of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) appointed respondent
Jose R. Ramirez, Jr. as Executive Assistant III and concurrently designated him as Assistant Accountant.
On September 28, 2001, Chairman Domingo resigned,and petitioner Cesar D. Buenaflor succeeded him.
The petitioner terminated Ramirez as of the same date as Chairman Eugenio's resignation on the ground
that his tenure had expired by virtue of the position of Executive Assistant being personal and
confidential, and, hence, co-terminous with that of the appointing authority.
Believing that his appointment had been contractual in nature, Ramirez sued in the RTC to declare his
dismissal null and void. The RTC rendered judgment declaring Buenaflor guilty of unlawful termination
because he had not discharged his burden of proving that Ramirez's employment was coterminous with
that of Chairman Domingo, and ruling in favor of Ramirez.

Buenaflor seasonably filed his motion for reconsideration and later on was denied. Buenaflor assailed
the order of the RTC by petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging that the RTC thereby gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Buenaflor moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Court of Appeals, in arriving its decision and resolution, decided the case in accordance with law and
existing jurisprudence?

2. Court of Appeals committed grave abused of discretion in not declaring that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil service related case, which is under the sole jurisdiction
of the CSC?

RULING:

1. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiffs
allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the
jurisdiction of courts.

2. It is clarified that the CSC has jurisdiction over a case involving a civil servant if it can be regarded as
equivalent to a labor dispute resoluble under the Labor Code; conversely, the regular court has
jurisdiction if the case can be decided under the general laws, such as when the case is for the recovery
of private debts, or for the recovery of damages due to slanderous remarks of the employer, or for
malicious prosecution of the employees.

Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.

197762, March 7, 2017.
FACTS:
● Blesilda Lodevico (Lodevico) was appointed by then President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo on May 14, 2008 as Director III, Recruitment and

Career Development Service, CESB.

● Lodevico possesses a Career Service Executive Eligibility since

November 29, 2001, as evidenced by the Certificate of Eligibility

issued by the CSC.

● June 30, 2010: Office of the President (OP) issued Memorandum

Circular 1 (MC1) which declared all non-career executive service

positions vacant.

● July 16, 2010: OP promulgated the Implementing Guidelines of MC

1, which states that all non-Career Executive Service Officers (nonCESO) in all agencies of the Executive
Branch shall remain in office

and continue to perform their duties until July 31, 2010 or until their

resignations have been accepted and/or their replacements have

been appointed or designated, whichever comes first.

● Pursuant to MC 1, Abesamis of CESB issued a memorandum

informing Lodevico that she shall only remain in office until July 31,

2010.

● Lodevico filed her appeal on the memorandum issued by Abesamis

before the CSC. CSC ruled in favor of Leodevico and declared the

memorandum null and void.

● Career Executive Service board filed an MR but it was denied.

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 62.

● Respondents aver that the petitioners resorted to a wrong mode of

appeal as Rule 43 is the proper remedy.

ISSUE: WON Certiorari and Prohibition under rule 65 is proper? No

HELD:

● It is well-settled that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and

prohibition are resorted to only where (a) a tribunal, a board or an

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without

or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal

or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

law.
● In the case at bar, it is clear that the second requirement is absent as

petition for review under Section 118 of Rule 43 ·is available to

petitioners. However, there are exceptions to the aforementioned

rule, namely: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public

policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c)

when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order

amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

Narciso Y. Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission and Leonardo A.

Jose, G.R. No. 81467, October 27, 1989
FACTS:
Then Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada extended a permanent promotional
appointmen as Customs Collector III, to petitioner Santiago, Jr. The said appointment was
approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), NCR. Prior thereto, Santiago held the position
of Customs Collector I. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit
Systems Promotion Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the ground
that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board referred the
protest to Commisioner Tanada for appropriate action. Commmissioner Tanada upheld
Santiago's promotional appointment. Respondent Jose then appealed to the Board, which,
decided to revoke the petitioner Santiago's appointment and directed that respondent Jose be
appointed in his stead. The Board denied Santiago's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. Respondent Commission affirmed the Board Resolutions on its own Resolution No. 87-
554 saying that although both Santiago and Jose are qualified for the position of Customs
Collector III, respondent Jose has far better qualifications in terms of educational attainment,
civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses taken, and holding as he does by
permanent appointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range. Hence, this
Certiorari Petition filed by Santiago. ARGUMENTS: Respondent argued that since he is next-in-
rank, he should be appointed to the position of Collector of Customs III. On the other hand,
Commisioner Tanada, upholding Santiago's promotional appointment, argued that: (1) The
next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory; (2) the protestee is competent and qualified for the
position and such fact was not questioned by the protestant; (3) existing laws and
jurisprudence give wide latitude of discretion to the appointing authority provided there is no
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Santiago's promotional appointment should be upheld.
HELD:
YES, the petitioner's promotional appointment as Customs Collector III should be upheld.
Previous ruling in Taduran vs. Civil Service Commission states that there is no mandatory
norperemptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to

preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be
considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same
shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment. One who is next-in-rank is entitled to
preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily
follow that he and no one else can be appointed as provided for in Section 41 CSC Resolution
No. 83-343.The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide-
latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule
peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of
the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion
and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment. Given this, there is no
reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The minimum qualifications and the
standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing
authority. The latter has not been shown to have committed any grave abuse of discretion.

An employee who holds a next-in-rank position who is deemed the most competent and
qualified, possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility, and meets the other conditions for
promotion shall be promoted to the higher position when it becomes vacant. However, the
appointing authority may promote an employee who is not next-in-rank but who possesses
superior qualifications and competence compared to a next-in-rank employee who merely
meets the minimum requirements for the position.

Victor Aquino vs CSC & Leonarda dela Paz, GR No.

92403, April 22,1992

Facts: Petitioner Victor Aquino was designated as Officer-in-Charge of the Division Supply Office
by the then DECS Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer. Two (2)
years after, or on September 19, 1986, the Division Superintendent of City Schools of San Pablo
City, Milagros Tagle, issued a promotional appointment to private respondent Leonarda D. de la
Paz as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division of San Pablo City. She assumed and performed the
duties and functions of the position and received the compensation and benefits therefor. The
Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment as permanent "provided that there is
no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the
appointment, nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of
(the) appointment". Petitioner filed a protest with the DECS Secretary questioning the
qualification and competence of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I. In a
decision dated May 4, 1987, DECS Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing sustained the protest of
petitioner and revoked the appointment of private respondent. Petitioner Aquino was issued a
permanent appointment dated August 11, 1987 as Supply Officer I by the DECS Regional
Director Pedro San Vicente effective October 26, 1987. On the date of effectivity of his
appointment, petitioner assumed the duties and functions of the position. The said
appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV on October 27, 1987.
Respondents subsequent appeal to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) was denied.
However, when she appealed MSPBs decision to public respondent Civil Service Commission
(CSC), it overturned MSPBs decision and revoked Aquinos appointment and restored private
respondent to her position as Supply Officer 1.

Issue: W/N the DECS erred in revoking private respondents appointment based on the grounds
relied upon by petitioner in his protest?

Held: Yes, the revocation of private respondents appointment was invalid. The Court ruled that
the moment the discretionary power of appointment has been exercised and the appointee
assumed the duties and functions of the position, the said appointment cannot be revoked by
the appointing authority on the ground merely that the protestant is more qualified than the
first appointee, subject however to the condition that the first appointee should possess the
minimum qualifications required by law. Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed by
Article IX-B, Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution would be rendered meaningless if the
appointing authority is allowed to flip-flop in exercising its discretionary power of appointment.
The Court stressed that while a protest is a mode of action that may be availed of by the
aggrieved party to contest the appointment made, the protest must be "for cause" or
predicated on those grounds provided for under Section 19 par. (6) of the Civil Service Law (P.D.
807), namely: (1) that the appointee is not qualified; (2) that the appointee is not the next-in-
rank; and (3) in case of appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or by original appointment,
that the protestant is not satisfied with the written special reason or reasons given by the
appointing authority. According to the Court, for cause means for reasons which the law and
sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is legal cause, and not
merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It
is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of
removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the
administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature
directly affecting the rights and interests of the public."
CASE DIGEST: CSC V SALAS
FACTS: On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal security
staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was terminated
by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.

DECISION: No

RATIO DECIDENDI: It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is
primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could
be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing
authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close relationship with the occupant. Where the
position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is
no longer predominant.

JAIME HERNANDEZ VS. EPIFANIO VILLEGAS G.R. NO. L-17287, JUNE 30, 1965
FACTS:

Respondent Villegas is a lawyer and civil service eligible and wasappointed as Director of Security of the
Bureau of Customs on Nov. 1, 1955.A year after his appointment, he was sent to the United States to
study. Hereturned to the Philippines after one year of study. Upon his return, he wasTEMPORARILY
assigned as Arrastre Superintendent and at the same time, hestill received his salary as Director of
Security of the Bureau of Customs.John Keefe was designated as Director of Security of the Bureau of
Customson an ACTING capacity. On January 1958, Secretary of Finance hereinpetitioner proposed that
both Villegas and Keefe be appointed to the currentposition they hold from TEMPORARY to
PERMANENT APPOINTMENT.Respondent did not know about such chances in appointment and so
onMarch 1958; he informed the Bureau of Customs Commissioner that he wasresuming his duties and
functions of his office as Director of Security of theBureau. As well, he wrote to other concerned officials
asking them todisapprove the promotional appointment of Keefe. He then filed a case forquo warranto
in the CIF of Manila which granted Villegas the right to collectback-pay as Director of Security and CA
affirms the decision. Thus this caseis filed.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the Office of the Director of Security of the Bureau ofCustoms IS A PRIMARY
CONFIDENTIAL POSITION and

(2) (2)Whether the Director of Security CAN BE TRANSFERRED TOANOTHER POSITION without cause

RULING:
The Court of Appeals relied mainly on Section 671 of the Revised Administrative Code the following
officers and employees constitute the unclassified service :(1) Positions which may be declared by the
President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, as policy
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical.

The only authority who, by constitutional and, legal provisions, is compete ntto classify a position into
primary confidential is the President. The heads of departments and the Commissioner of Civil Service
can only recommend or make comments.

For the Court, they do not need to consider the position involved in this caseis primarily confidential,
because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless SUBJECT to the Constitutional provision
that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause." (Phil.
Const., Art. XII, sec. 4)

It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions
continue only for so long as confidence in the mendures. The termination of their official relation can be
justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no
removal but merely the expiration of the term of office two different causes for the termination of
official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers. But the point is that as long as confidence in
them endures and it has been shown that it has been lost in this case the incumbentis entitled to
continue in office.

HELD: The Court therefore hold that Villegas' removal from the office of Director for Security is without
cause and is therefore illegal. The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

ISABELO J. ASTRAQUILLO V. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 88183,

OCTOBER 3, 1990.
Facts:

Petitioner was appointed by the President on July 22 1986 as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary and Chief of Mission to the United Arab Emirates. He occupied the post for two years
before he was accused, along with his wife and cousin-in-law of improper interference with the
Philippine Labor Attaché’s functions.

An investigation was made, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recommended to the President the
termination of petitioner’s services as ambassador. The recommendation was “APPROVED by authority
of the President”. He was then notified of the termination of his services effective immediately, and the
designation of Counsellor Donato Felicio as Charges D’Affaires.
He challenged his removal from the post, citing that the Foreign Affairs Secretary had no power as
department head and without prior authorization of the President, to terminate his services, he being a
presidential appointee; he claims that under the Foreign Service Code of 1983, his removal could only be
predicated upon good cause duly established at a hearing of which he was entitled to notice and an
opportunity to defend.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a cause must be explicitly stated pursuant to the Foreign Service Act or the Civil Service
Law.

RULING:

No.

The Civil Service Law, PD 807, classified employment in the Government into “career” and “non-career”
service. Petitioner clearly pertains to the Non-Career Service. His appointment to the Foreign Service
was made on “bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career
service, his entrance was not based on merit and fitness determined by competitive examinations or
based on qualifications. This being so, his tenure was coterminous with that of the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasures.

Regarding his appointment as chief of mission, the Court held that it simply meant that as ambassador
extraordinary and plenipotentiary, he was being placed in charge of the embassy or legation therein.

Regarding the argument that his separation from service is illegal because it was not effected by the
President, the Court held that it was the President who ordered their removal. The record shows that
the President approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the termination of
their services.

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. BIENVENIDO A.

ICASIANO, G.R. NO. 119903, AUGUST 15, 2000.
Facts:

Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division

Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary
Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the
retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the
implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to security
of tenure.

The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the
same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential
immunity from suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from
suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of
tenure.
Held:
1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is
directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts
are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court
that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same
can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V.
Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his
qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical
education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than
temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the
(reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said
Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary
or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is
specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to
reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of
the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the
private respondent.
MA. CHONA M. DIMAYUGA V. MARIANO E. BENEDICTO II, TOLL REGULATORY
BOARD, GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, G.R. NO. 144153,
JANUARY 16, 2002
FACTS:
Chona M. Dimayuga was appointed in a permanent capacity to the position of Executive
Director II of the Toll Regulatory Board (TBR) in 1992. At that time, said position was excluded
from the coverage of the Career Executive Service, so petitioner was able to occupy said
position although she was not a career service executive officer (CESO). Then on 1994, the
Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular 21.Section 4 of the said circular
states that incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive Service positions
for the first time pursuant to this Resolution who hold permanent appointment thereto shall
remain under permanent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion or
transfer to other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents shall be under
temporary status in said positions until they qualify. During the petitioners tenure, she became
the subject of several administrative and criminal complaints designed to coerce her removal.
On September 28, 1998, while she was on leave, petitioner received a Vigilar informing her that
then President Joseph E. Estrada had appointed respondent Mariano E. Benedicto II in her
stead as Executive Director II of the Board. The letter cited a Memorandum dated June
30, 1998 issued by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora addressed to all heads of
departments, agencies, and offices, as follows:1. Pursuant to existing laws and
jurisprudence, non-career officials/personnel or those occupying political positions are
deemed co-terminous with the outgoing Administration.2. Accordingly, they shall vacate their
positions effective 01 July 1998 and turnover their offices to the highest ranking career
officials, unless otherwise specifically retained by the Department Heads concerned or
extended new appointments by the President. Since she had been effectively removed
from her position, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before the Court of Appeals,
the appellate court rendered the assailed decision dismissing petitioner's suit.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERRORIN LAW
WHEN IT REJECTED PETITIONER'S CLAIM TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
RULING:
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The
appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated. If a career executive officer's security of tenure pertains only to his rank and not to
his position, with greater reason then that petitioner herein, who is not even a CESO eligible,
has no security of tenure with regard to the position of Executive Director II of the Toll
Regulatory Board which was earlier classified on June4, 1993 as part of the career executive
service or prior to the issuance of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21dated May 31,
1994.Petitioner is not a CESO eligible. In other words, her instant petition is devoid of merit.

JOVENCIO L. MAYOR V. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, ET. AL.,

G.R. NO. 87211, MARCH 5, 1991.
FACTS: Jovencio Mayor, a member of the Philippine Bar, was appointed Labor Arbiter in 1986
after he had,according to him, met the prescribed qualifications and passed a “rigid screening
process.” Fearing that he wouldbe removed from office on account of the expected
reorganization, he filed in this court the action assailing RA6715. (This case involves 5
consolidated cases of civil actions that involve 1 common, fundamental issue:constitutionality
of RA 6715.)
RA 6715: declares vacant "all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and
Labor Arbiters of theNational Labor Relations Commission," and operates to remove the
incumbents upon the appointment andqualification of their successors. So basically, the
petitioners here were removed from office pursuant to RA 6715.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners’ removal under RA 6715 is unconstitutional YES

HELD:Security of tenure is a protected right under the Constitution. The right is secured to all
employees in privates aswell as in public employment. "No officer or employee in the civil
service," the Constitution declares, "shall beremoved or suspended except for cause provided
by law."
Now, a recognized cause for several or termination of employment of a Government officer or
employee is theabolition by law of his office as a result of reorganization carried out by reason
of economy or to removeredundancy of functions, or clear and explicit constitutional mandate
for such termination of employment.

Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that that office is vacant.
While it isundoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it cannot be
conceded the power to simplypronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove
the occupants or holders thereof from the civilservice. Such an act would constitute, on its face,
an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security oftenure, and will have to be struck
down on that account. It cannot be justified by the professed "need toprofessionalize the
higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to
upgradetheir qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments."
No express or implied abolition of the offices of petitioners, therefore, their removal is
unconstitutionalIt is immediately apparent that there is no express abolition in RA 6715 of the
petitioners' positions. So,justification must be sought, if at all, in an implied abolition thereof;
i.e., that resulting from an irreconcilableinconsistency between the nature, duties and functions
of the petitioners' offices under the old rules and thosecorresponding thereof under the new
law. An examination of the relevant provisions of RA 6715, with a view todiscovering the
changes thereby effected on the nature, composition, powers, duties and functions of
theCommission and the Commissioners, the Executive Director, the Deputy Executive Director,
and the labor Arbitersunder the prior legislation, fails to disclose such essential inconsistencies.
There are no irreconcilable inconsistency in the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners’
officers under theold law and new law. – no implied abolition of the offices.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. COURT OF

APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, G.R.
NO. 85279, JULY 28, 1989.
Facts:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on
June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and
that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands,
which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6)
months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and
payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State
"shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the
meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission
that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of
unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No.
180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"]
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having
been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC,
G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.
ANTONIO P. SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 139792,
NOVEMBER 22, 2000.
Fact:
Santos, an appointed judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, retired in 1992 and acquired his
retirement gratuity under RA 910. In 1993, he was appointed Director III of the Traffic
Operation Center of the MMA. In 1995, the MMA was reorganized and renamed as MMDA.
Santos, in 1996, was voluntarily separated from the service and was entitled to separation
benefits equivalent to 1 ¼ monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Sec. 11 of
the MMDA Law.”

Issue:
w/n Santiago is entitled to a separation benefit computed from the years of service as Metc
judge to Director III because the retirement gratuity he received under RA 910 is not considered
as double compensation?

Held:
The retirement benefits which Santiago had received or has been receiving, under RA 910, do
not constitute double compensation. But, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the
computation of his separation pay under RA 7924 would be to countenance double
compensation for exactly the same services.

GABRIEL C. SINGSON, ET. AL., V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. NO. 159355,

AUGUST 9, 2010.

FACTS: The Philippine International Convention Center, Inc. (PICCI) is a government

corporationwhose sole stockholder is the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). Petitioner Araceli E.
Villanueva wasthen a member of the PICCI Board of Directors and Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
PICCI, while co-petitioners Gabriel C. Singson, Andre Navato, Edgardo P. Zialcita, and Melpin A.
Gonzaga, AlejandraC. Clemente, Jose Clemente, Jr., Federico Pascual, Albert P. Fenix, Jr., and
Tyrone M. Reyes were thenmembers of the PICCI Board of Directors and officials of the BSP. By
virtue of the PICCI By-Laws,petitioners were authorized to receive P1,000.00 per diem each for
every meeting attended. Pursuant toits Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 15 as amended
the BSP MB granted additional monthlyRATA, in the amount of P1,500.00, to each of the
petitioners, as members of the Board of Directors ofPICCI. Consequently, from January 1996 to
December 1998, petitioners received their correspondingRATA in the total amount of
P1,565,000.00.

On June 7, 1999, then PICCI Corporate Auditor Adelaida A. Aldovino issued Notice of
Disallowanceaddressed to petitioner Araceli E.Villanueva disallowing in audit the payment of
petitioners' RATA inthe total amount of P1,565,000.00, and directing them to settle
immediately the said disallowances.They alleged that there was double payment which was in
violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the1987 Constitution and PICCI By-laws.

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Notice of Disallowance, but the PICCI Corporate
AuditorAldovino denied it. They filed a notice of appleal but Director Sunico of the Corporate
Audit Office Iof COA affirmed the disallowance based upon the principle expression unius est
exclusio alterius (theexpress mention of one thing in a law means the exclusion of others not
expressly mentioned). Neithercan the payment of RATA be legally founded on Section 30 of the
Corporation Code. The power to fixthe compensation which the directors shall receive, if any, is
left to the corporation, to be determined inits by-laws or by the vote of stockholders. The PICC
By-Laws allows only the payment of per diem tothe directors. Thus, the BSP board resolution
granting RATA of P1,500.00 to petitioners violated thePICCI By-Laws.

Director Sunico also explained that although MB Resolution No. 15, dated January 5, 1994,
asamended by MB Resolution No. 34, dated January 12, 1994, would have the effect of
amending thePICCI By-laws, and may render the grant of RATA valid, such amendment,
however, had no effectbecause it failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth
under Section 48 of theCorporation Code. On petition for review by petitioners, the COA
rendered the assailed decisionaffirming the COA I decision. Thus this petiton.

Petitioners contend that since PICCI was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission(SEC) (SEC Regulation No. 68840) and has no original charter, it should be governed
by Section 30 ofthe Corporation Code. According to petitioners, their receipt of RATA as
directors of PICCI wassanctioned by PICCI's sole stockholder, BSP. Respondent counters that
said provision does not apply topetitioners as Section 8 of the PICCI By-laws provides that the
compensation of the members of thePICCI Board of Directors shall be given only through per
diems.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners' right to compensation as members of the PICCI Board of Directors
islimited only to per diem of P1,000.00 or is it P1,500
HELD: It's limited only to per diem of P1,000, BUT they don't need to refund the amount.
Section 30 of the Corporation Code, which authorizes the stockholders to grant compensation
to itsdirectors, states: "In the absence of any provision in the by-laws fixing their compensation,
thedirectors shall not receive any compensation, as such directors, except for reasonable per
diems;Provided, however, that any such compensation (other than per diems) may be granted
to directors bythe vote of the stockholders representing at least a majority of the outstanding
capital stock at a regularor special stockholders' meeting. In no case shall the total yearly
compensation of directors, as suchdirectors, exceed ten (10%) percent of the net income
before income tax of the corporation during thepreceding year.

In construing the said provision, it bears stressing that the directors of a corporation shall not
receiveany compensation for being members of the board of directors, except for reasonable
per diems. Thetwo instances where the directors are to be entitled to compensation shall be
when it is fixed by thecorporation's by-laws or when the stockholders, representing at least a
majority of the outstandingcapital stock, vote to grant the same at a regular or special
stockholder's meeting, subject to thequalification that, in any of the two situations, the total
yearly compensation of directors, as suchdirectors, shall in no case exceed ten (10%) percent of
the net income before income tax of thecorporation during the preceding year.

Section 8 of the Amended By-Laws of PICCI, in consonance with Section 30 of the Corporation
Code,restricted the scope of petitioners' compensation by fixing their per diem at P1,000.00.
However, theBoard of Directors may increase or decrease the amount of per diems, when the
prevailingcircumstances shall warrant. No other compensation may be given to them, except
only when theyserve the corporation in another capacity.Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution provides that no elective or appointive public officer oremployee shall receive
additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized bylaw, nor accept
without the consent of the Congress, any present emolument, office or title of any kindfrom
any foreign government. Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double
orindirect compensation. This provision, however, does not apply to the present case as there
was nodouble compensation of RATA to the petitioners.