Funa vs.

Villar

Petitioner Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo Villar as Chairman of
the COA

 Following the retirement of COA Chairman Carague in 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar
as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 2008 to
April 2008.
 Subsequently, after the said term, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
 Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment.
 However, as indicated in his appointment paper, he was to serve as Chairman of COA only until
the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or the remaining 3 years.

 The petitioner argues that:

o Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
 The Chairman and Commissioners on Audit shall be appointed by the President
for a term of seven years without reappointment.

 Respondent Villar argued, in fine, that:

o his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to
lapse.

 However, before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar wrote a letter to the President
signifying his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement.
o And thus, Villar vacated his position when President Aquino named appointed a new
COA Chairman, Chairman Tan.

RULING:

The Court ruled that this development has rendered this petition moot and academic.

1. On mootness
 A case is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy due
to supervening events, so that a resolution of the case would be of no practical value or use.

 As a general rule, the Court does not act upon and decide a moot case.
o However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court accepted certain exceptions to the
issue of mootness, thus:

o Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

 first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution,
 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved,
  third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and
 fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

 The Court ruled that this case falls within the requirements for review of a moot and academic
case, since it asserts the exceptions to the mootness rule:
o The situation at hand is of such exceptional nature as to necessarily call for the
promulgation of principles that will "guide the bench, the bar and the public" should like
circumstance arise.
o Confusion in similar future situations would be smoothed out if the issues advanced in
the instant case are settled definitely.

 Thus, the Court proceeds to rule on the procedural and substantive issues raised.

2. W/N the requirements of judicial review are met ---

 The requisites for judicial review are:

o (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy;
o (2) the question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
o (3) the person challenging the act must have legal standing; and
o (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be
the very litis mota of the case.

Legal standing
 As to legal standing, the Court has defined it to be:
o a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
o The term "interest" means a material interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

 To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that:

o he has sustained or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government action,
o or have a "material interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act.

 However, the Court has practiced liberality on the locus standi requirements, provided that a
constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake.

 In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before "non-traditional suitors" may be
extended standing to sue, thusly:
o For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
o For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question;
o For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
o For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
their prerogatives as legislators.
  In the case at hand, the Court ruled that it is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has
"far-reaching implications," and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench,
bar, and the public in future analogous cases.
 The Court, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.

As to actual case or controversy

 Under the expanded concept of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution, certiorari may be
invoked not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government."
 "Grave abuse of discretion" denotes:
o such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction

 in this case, the remedy of certiorari was properly availed of in view of the allegation that then
President Macapagal-Arroyo exercised her appointing power in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion.

3. W/N Villar’s appointment as Chairman for a whole term of 7 years is valid

 Petitioner argues that:
o Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind
within the commission, including appointment to a higher position.

 The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit.

o The Court held that the petitioner confuses the term “reappointment” as to embrace all
types of appointment.

 The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
o In this case, the first sentence of the invoked provision is clear.
 Once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven
years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman
or Commissioner.

o On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of seven years.
 This is even qualified by the third sentence which states that “the appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor.”

 In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
condition.
  Thus, in the same manner, the Court likewise strikes down Villar’s proposition that his
promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7-year term
o In no case can one be a COA member for an aggregate term of more than 7 years.
o A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation
which would break the rotational system of succession.

 In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had validly appointed Villar as
COA Chairman even for a shorter term of 4 years, corresponding to his remaining term as
commissioner.
o A commissioner who resigns after less than 7 years is eligible for an appointment to the
position of Chairman only for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman
o In this case, the position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term
of the predecessor
o Villar’s appointment would likewise break the rotational system of succession of 7 years

RULING:

WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of then Commissioner Reynaldo A.
Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose
term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec.
1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.