Pacas, Shaira Micah B.

2nd yr. Arellano

Case Digests
Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Frisco T. Lilagan
(A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2011)

FACTS:
On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port
area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee to
said cargo. While the cargo was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's
accompanying documents where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the
NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the boat, and three
cargo trucks were seized and impounded.

On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a Criminal

Complaint for the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. 705, The Forestry Code of
the Philippines as amended, against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez,
Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi.
The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.

On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the three trucks, through
the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice were issued to the consignee, Robert
Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.

On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items
seized by the DENR and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.

On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-296 and on March
17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez
and his counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and
directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and
to deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy
of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March
19, 1998.

Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a letter addressed to the
Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.

Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to be recovered are
involved in criminal proceedings. He also submits that respondent judge is either grossly
ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L Hadja and to
prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor
on the  Philippine Coast Guard. According to the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left
the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his direct
connivance with interested parties. Moreover, complainant pointed out that respondent sheriff
released the seized tanbark to Hernandez within the five day period that he was supposed to keep
it under the terms of the writ, thereby effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying
the integrity of said evidence.

Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was premature since there
is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case. Further, he claimed
that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued
an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the subject
items, pending resolution of an urgent manifestation by the complainant. Respondent judges
stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down
in Rule 60 of the Revised Rule of Court. He also pointed out that no apprehension report was
issued by the NBI regarding the shipment and neither did the DENR issue a seizure report.

Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard to prevent the
departure of subject vessel since he does not have the means to physically prevent the vessel
from sailing. He further claimed that he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it
came from a legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order.
Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent
any instruction to the contrary.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999, recommended that the
judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and that the charges
against respondent sheriff be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence for
issuing the writ of replevin.

RULING:
The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the vessel on which it was
loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also stated that the
NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action".
These allegations would have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had
custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been
commenced concerning the shipment.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who
seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin
outright.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his representatives
may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed or
abandoned, including the conveyances involved in the offense.

It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement of forestry laws,
rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within
the primary and special responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction.
The court held that the assumption of the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative ageny's prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an administrative body of special
competence.

The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates
ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. To measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep abreast of all laws
and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance
of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.

On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA that they should be
dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his material duty to serve the writ with
reasonable celerity and to execute it promptly in accordance with the mandates.

Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is
accordingly ordered to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt more severely. The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV
Leonardo V. Aguilar is dismissed for lack of merit.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Republic of the Philippines v. Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc.

(G.R. No. 159308. September 16, 2008)

FACTS:
On October 14, 1994, Petitioner and respondent execute Industrial Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-040.

On August 17, 1995, responded later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and
Management Plan (CDMP) which was approved by the DENR.

On October 8, 1998, DENR Region IX creates team to evaluate and assess IFMA in response to
several complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe regarding PCT’s failure to implement
the CDMP, disrespecting the IP’s rights, and constant threat and harassment by armed men.

On October 22, 1998, DENR sends letter giving notice of the evaluation and assessment to be
conducted on the area.

On October 23, 1998: DENR Evaluation Team go to IFMA site and conduct assessment,
revealing the ff:
- only 98 out of 2,008 seedling hills survived
- some areas planted on belong to the Certificates of Stewardship Contracts (CSC)
- only 1 look-out tower, 1 bunkhouse, 1 stockroom, 1 dilapidated billboard poster, 1 multi-
purpose shed, 2 concrete monuments
- facilities generally below par
- only 28% of the target goal area planted

On October 29, 1998, DENR Evaluation Team holds exit conference, explaining findings, and
asking Santiago (the Operations Manager of PCT) if he had any questions. He had none, but only
requested a copy of the assessment.The Evaluation Team recommended that PCT explain why
they failed to develop IFMA according to the CDMP, as well as hiring a full-time forester, and
amending the boundary to exclude the areas covered by the CSC. However, RED Mendoza
submitted a memorandum to DENR Secretary Cerilles recommending that IFMA be cancelled
for PCT’s failure to implement the CDMP and adopt agreements w/ communities and relevant
sectors. DENR Sec. Cerilles thus issued an Order canceling IFMA, which was affirmed by the
OP. Respondent went to the CA, which ruled in its favor, thus this petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the IFMA is a contract and not a mere privilege
granted by the State.

Whether or not the CA erred in ordaining that PCT can invoke prior resort to arbitration or the
option to mend its violations under IFMA

HELD:
The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

and the DENR Order as well as the Resolutions of the Office of the President are REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

DENR v. DENR Region 12 Employees

(G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003)

FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the
Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional
Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City.  The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

ISSUES:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING: 
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is
corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.  He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer
of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato.  The
exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of
the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Felipe Calub v. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000.)

FACTS:
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced
lumber. The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending
team impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly
taken by the drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again
apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was
again loaded with forest products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver,
filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin
against petitioners DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, is a suit against the State

HELD: 
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit
against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to
hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by
this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith
and without willfulness, malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature.
In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure
carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and
did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence,
a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper
without the State’s consent.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Bataan Seedling Association Inc. vs. Republic of the Philippines

(G.R. No. 141009. July 2, 2002)

FACTS:
Petitioner entered into a contract with respondent, represented by the DENR for the reforestation
of a forest land within a period of 3 years. Petitioner undertook to report to DENR any event or
condition which delays or may delay the project. With the contract was the release of
mobilization fund but the fund was to be returned upon completion or deducted from periodic
release of mhoneys to petitioner.

Believing that petitioners failed to comply with their obligations, respondent sent a notice of
cancellation. Petitioners failed to respond to the notice, thus, respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners. The RTC held that respondent had sufficient grounds to cancel the
contract but saw no reason why the mobilization fund and the cash advances should be refunded
or that petitioners are liable for liquidated damages. Both parties appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the trial court and that the balnce of the fund should be returned with 12% interest.

ISSUE:
Whether the order to refund the balance of the fund with 12% interest pa is proper.

HELD:
No. Interest at the rate of 12% pa is impossible if there is no stipulation in the contract. Herein
subject contract does not contain any stipulation as to interest. However, the amount due to
respondent does not represent a loan or forbearance of money. The word “forbearance” is
defined, within, the context of usury law, as a contractual obligation of lender or creditor to
refrain, during given period of time, from requiring borrower or debtor to repay loan or debt then
due and payable. In the absence of stipulation, the legal interest is 6% pa on the amount finally
adjudged by the Court.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

DENR vs. Gregorio Daraman, et. al. (G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002)

FACTS:
This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio Daraman
and Narciso Lucenecio who were caught by one Pablo opinion to transport illegal pieces of
lumber using the vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy Cross Funeral Services. Here, the
respondents alleged that one Asan, owner of furniture shop ask the two to bring also some pieces
of wood to his house located near the funeral’s location. Opinion, DENR employee, saw the
vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some lumber and issued an order of forfeiture. The court
granted bond and released the funeral car and lumber because it was found out that Daraman and
Lucenecio were not owners of the vehicle and lumber. Hence, this complaint was filed.

ISSUES:
Whether the respondents violated P.D. 705 section 68-A.

HELD:
Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A P.D. 705 is also applicable to those who
transport lumber without proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no permit to
transport lumber although they were only asked to bring the lumber to the house of one Asan.
The RTC has overstepped its jurisdiction of the case since DENR was given the power to
confiscate the property in favor of the state/government. The release of this property defeated the
purpose of section 68-A of P.D. 705. Therefore, SC granted the petition of DENR, RTC’s
decision was reversed and set aside.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Enrique Oribello, Jr.

(G.R. No. 199501. March 6, 2013)

FACTS:
The present controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Olongapo City, which was once
classified as forest land by the Bureau of Forest Development. The property was originally
occupied by a certain Valentin Fernandez (Valentin) in 1968 by virtue of a Residential Permit
issued by the same government office. Upon Valentin’s death, his son, Odillon Fernandez
(Odillon), continued to occupy the property, together with spouses Ruperto and Matilde Apog.
Sometime in 1969, Odillon sold the property to a certain Mrs. Florentina Balcita who, later on,
sold the same property to Oribello.

Oribello filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which denied the application since the land remained forest land.

On 20 February 1987, the subject property was declared open to disposition under the Public
Land Act. Thus, Oribello filed another Miscellaneous Sales Application. The Director of Lands
issued an Order for the issuance of a patent in favor of Oribello.

Matilde Apog and Aliseo San Juan claiming to be actual occupants of the property, protested
with the DENR the issuance of the sales patent and OCT in favor of Oribello. They sought the
annulment of the sales patent, arguing that Oribello and Land Inspector Dominador Laxa
committed fraud and misrepresentation in the approval of the Miscellaneous Sales Application of
Oribello. They alleged that Laxa submitted a false report to the Director of Lands, by stating that
there were no other claimants to the property and that Oribello was the actual occupant thereof,
when the contrary was true.

The OSG, representing petitioner, instituted a complaint for reversion and cancellation of title
before the RTC. The case was thereafter consolidated with Civil Case No. 233-0-91, a complaint
for recovery of possession filed by Oribello against Apog and San Juan.

RTC dismissed the consolidated cases without prejudice for non- substitution of the deceased
plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that the
Order applied exclusively to Civil Case No. 233-0-91 (for recovery of possession) and did not
affect Civil Case No. 225-0-92 (for reversion of property). RTC allowed the continuation of the
presentation of petitioner’s evidence.

Aggrieved, Oribello’s heirs filed a Manifestation and Motion, bringing to the attention of the trial
court the previous 12 September 1997 Order declaring petitioner to have abandoned the
reversion case. Oribello’s heirs pointed out that from the time petitioner received the Order in
1997, it did nothing to question the same, making the Order final. RTC finding merit in
defendants’ Motion and Manifestation, the Order dated 29 June 2005 granting the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General is recalled and the above-entitled case is
DISMISSED.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

The CA denied petitioner’s appeal ruling “that the remedy of appeal is no longer available” to
petitioner and that petitioner has lost its right to participate in the proceedings of Civil Case No.
225-0-92 when it failed to question the trial court’s 12 September 1997 Order, declaring it to
have abandoned the case. As a consequence of petitioner’s inaction, such order inevitably
became final.

Petitioner contends that the 12 September 1997 Order of the trial court, deeming it to have
abandoned the case, is interlocutory in nature; thus, is not appealable. Respondents argue
otherwise, maintaining that such Order is a dismissal of the complaint on the ground of failure to
prosecute which is, under the Rules, considered an adjudication on the merits, and hence
appealable.

ISSUE:
Whether the consolidated cases, without any order of severance, cannot be subject of multiple
appeals.

HELD:
YES.Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket are
to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy
while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule allows the consolidation and
a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those
cases. The Court explained, thus:

In the context of legal procedure, the term “consolidation” is used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is
referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a
single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set
out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character
and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits
into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for
trial)

In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was
consolidated with the complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello (Civil Case No.
223-0-91). While these two cases involve common questions of law and fact, each action retains
its separate and distinct character. The reversion suit settles whether the subject land will be
reverted to the State, while the recovery of possession case determines which private party has
the better right of possession over the subject property. These cases, involving different issues
and seeking different remedies, require the rendition and entry of separate judgments. The
consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of
possession proceeded independently of the reversion case, and was disposed of accordingly by
the trial court.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is
not necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule or law
prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with
other cases. Further, severance is within the sound discretion of the court for convenience or to
avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the Rules of Court that the court sever one case from
the other cases before a party can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Republic of the Philippines v. Technological Advocates For Agro-Forest Programs

Association, Inc.
(G.R. No. 165333. February 9, 2010)

FACTS:
On November 27, 1995, respondent Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest Programs
Association, Inc. (TAFPA) and DENR, Regional Office (RO) No. IX, represented by its then
Regional Executive Director (RED), Cipriano B. Paet, entered into a contract[2] for...
community organizing activities, social investigation, and information education campaign at the
San Isidro Tinago Reforestation Sub-Project in Sergio Osmeña, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte.
On December 15, 1999, respondent filed with the RTC, Zamboanga City, a special civil action
for Mandamus with Prayer for Damages, docketed as SPL. CIVIL ACTION No. 459, praying
that after notice and hearing, a writ be issued commanding the RED of the DENR to pay
respondent
P802,350.64, representing the latter's unpaid claims, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
by way of attorney's fees and legal interest on the principal sum demanded. The RTC
subsequently treated the case as one for specific performance rather than an action for
mandamus,... since the allegations in the complaint clearly reflected that respondent's cause of
action was based on a contract.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 2000, Atty. Vidzfar A. Julie (Atty. Julie), entered his appearance as
counsel for DENR.

On June 8, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Julie as special
counsel to assist the Solicitor General in the subject case.

On March 16, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision[12] in favor of the respondent and against the
petitioner.

On May 22, 2001, petitioner, through its deputized counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[15] but it was denied on September 18, 2001.

On February 19, 2002, the RTC made an Entry of Final Judgment[17] stating, among other
things, that the decision dated March 16, 2001 had, on January 31, 2002, become final and
executory, there being no appeal filed by any party before any appellate court.
Respondent thus filed an urgent motion for execution with the RTC which was granted on March
14, 2002.

Subsequently, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion[19] asking the RTC to set aside the
March 16, 2001 Decision on the ground of lack of due process. On May 20, 2002, the RTC
issued an Order[20] denying the motion.

Undeterred, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal[21] dated July 23, 2002, before the RTC raising
the following issues: (1) whether or not plaintiff has a cause of action against defendant; and (2)
whether or not plaintiff is entitled to be paid his money claim... against defendant.[22]
On December 27, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[23] disapproving the motion
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA via a petition for Annulment of
Judgment[25] under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the decision of the
RTC dated March 16, 2001, based on the following grounds: (1) That the... action lies within the
jurisdiction of the [Commission on Audit] COA and not before the courts; (2) That private
respondent did not exhaust administrative remedies against petitioner, hence, no cause of action
against petitioner; and (3) Respondent is not entitled to be paid its... money claim against
petitioner.

On September 9, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision[27] denying the petition

In denying the petition, the CA opined that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over respondent's
cause of action. The CA added that the rule on due process was not violated as petitioner was
given all the opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the RTC, which it in fact... did,
and was duly notified of all court processes, orders, and decision.

ISSUES:
Denying the petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

RULING:
An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted
indiscriminately by the court. It is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in
exceptional cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from...
being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has
long become final and executory.[29]

Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for
annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending...
party or over the subject matter of the claim.[30] It is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the
court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter

It should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction,
petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion, but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction.

The action a quo is one for mandamus and, under Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as
amended, the Regional Trial Court exercises original jurisdiction in the issuance of the writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,... habeas corpus, and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their regions.

concluded that the action is one for specific performance and proceeded to hear it as such. In
doing so, the said... court retained jurisdiction. The same law grants the Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation
Pacas, Shaira Micah B.
2nd yr. Arellano

In this recourse, petitioner is no longer questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC based on the
above arguments. Petitioner now questions the propriety of the notice sent to the deputized
counsel of the OSG, arguing that notice to its deputized counsel is not notice to the OSG.
Hence, absent such notice, the decision of the RTC did not become final and executory.
Moreover, the failure of the RTC to serve the OSG copies of legal notices, orders, and judicial
processes constitutes lack of due process. This Court disagrees.

Verily, it was Atty. Julie who entered his appearance as counsel for DENR on January 18, 2000
and, as such, was the counsel on record. It was only later or on June 8, 2000 that the OSG,
through Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez, informed Atty. Julie that the latter...
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor General in the case pending before the RTC. As such,
being the counsel on record, Atty. Julie had the authority to represent the petitioner, and it was
but logical that notices of court processes sent to him were sufficient to bind... petitioner. Thus,
the CA correctly concluded that petitioner's right to due process was not violated.

Since Atty. Julie had the authority to represent the DENR before the RTC, notices of decision,
orders, and other court processes to him as counsel on record and the duly deputized counsel of
the OSG were sufficient to bind petitioner, and both the counsel and the OSG's failure... to
appeal the decision and to avail themselves of the other remedies provided by the Rules was
likewise binding upon petitioner.