Dennis Jay A.

Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

Ramon Corporal vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 86020
August 5, 1994

Facts:

Herein petitioner (Ramon) is the husband of Norma Corporal, a public school teacher
who was initially assigned in Juban, Sorsogon. She was confined at the Esteves Memorial
Hospital from November 28 to November 30 of 1977 for acute coronary insufficiency
and premature ventricular contractions. She was reassigned to Banadero Elementary
School in Daraga, Albay. Due to the lack of any transportation to and from the place
where she stayed, Norma had to walk for up to three (3) kilometers just to get to school.
Because of this, Norma was rushed to the Albay Provincial Hospital after suffering a
complete abortion during her fourth pregnancy.

In September of 1984, Norma, who has 6 months into her fifth pregnancy at that time,
was transferred to Kilicao Elementary School, where she had to walk one (1) kilometer of
rough road. She gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1984 with the aid of a
traditional midwife (hilot). She was rushed to the Immaculate Conception Hospital an
hour later due to vaginal bleeding. Norma had undergone hysterectomy, but had
eventually met her untimely demise due to uterine prolapse post-partum.

Aggrieved by the death of her wife, petitioner Ramon filed a claim for death
compensation benefit with Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). However, the
GSIS denied his claim, saying that uterine prolapse is not considered as an occupational
disease as contemplated under P.D. 626. It added that the nature of the deceased’s work
did not cause the aggravation of her condition. Herein petitioner filed for numerous
motions for reconsideration, but to no avail. Dissatisfied, Ramon elevated the case to
herein respondent ECC, which requested GSIS to re-evaluate petitioner’s claim. The
GSIS once again denied the claim, prompting the ECC to do the same in its decision on
September 7, 1988.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of Norma due to uterine prolapse is compensable.

Ruling:

No. Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as
compensable by the ECC and he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must
positively show that the risk of contracting Norma’s illness was increased by her working
conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the onus imposed by law. The fact
that Norma had to walk six kilometers every day and thereafter, a shorter distance of
more than one kilometer just to reach her place of work was not sufficient to establish
that such condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even
present medical findings on the veracity of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like
spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and rectum. Norma developed prolapse of the
uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and quite
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

beyond the safe childbearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child—she was already
forty years old.

The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma’s uterus developed before or after
her fifth pregnancy is therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the
physiological structure and changes in the body on pregnancy and childbirth. With the
evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioner’s prayer cannot be granted. While
as a rule labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the
applicant, (Tria v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there
is also the rule that such liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be
applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as amended,
are clear and leave no room for interpretation.

Decision:

But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents
grant ex gratia some form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner’s
wife.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

Zaida Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 58445
April 27, 1989

Facts:

Herein petitioner (Zaida) was employed as a Mining Recorder at the Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences Regional Office at Daet, Camarines Sur on March 17, 1975. On 1979, she
began to feel severe recurring headaches paired with the blurring of vision. After a couple
of absences due to her condition, Zaida went to Makati Medical Center for a check-up.
After that, she was diagnosed to be suffering from a brain tumor, which took its toll on
her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power. Because of that, her husband
filed for a claim for disability benefits before the GSIS.

However, the claim was denied by GSIS. Zaida’s husband filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was also denied by the latter. The husband elevated the case
to herein respondent ECC, but it ended up affirming the GSIS’ decision.

Issues:

1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during
employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.

2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the

present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease.

Ruling:

(1) The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the
Commission’s allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be
compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably
considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in
Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain
chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally
accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law
requires for others is proof. The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to
prove a positive thing --- that the illness was caused by employment and the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since
the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is
contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of
otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.

(2) No. The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of
workmen’s compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a
fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the
compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of
benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of
causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits. “Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a
claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and
controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and
concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the

public respondents is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. vs. Heirs of Ricardo Ganal

G.R. No. 220168
June 7, 2017

Facts:

Herein respondents are the heirs of Ricardo Ganal, who was employed by herein
petitioner as an oiler of one of its ship, the MV Stadt Hamburg on September 16, 2011.
At around 7 o’clock in the evening of April 15, 2012, a party for the crewmembers was
organized aboard the ship. At that time, the ship was anchored on off the coast of
Chittagong, Bangladesh. After Ricardo finished his shift at midnight, he joined the party
and then became drunk. Around 3am of that day, He was ordered by the ship captain to
proceed to his cabin in order for him to take a rest. However, Ricardo ignored the order
of the ship captain. Because of that, a ship officer and a security watchman attempted to
escort him to his room, but Ricardo resisted. After finding a chance to escape, he then
decided to proceed to the railings of the ship and willfully dove overboard, plunging
straight into the deep waters.

The man-overboard alarm was sounded off and life rings were thrown at Ganal’s
direction, but to no avail. The crewmembers were unable to locate the whereabouts of
Ganal. The coast guard were also contacted in efforts to rescue the latter. After a few
hours, Ganal’s lifeless body was found floating in the water.

On October 29, 2012, Ganal’s wife, Gemma Boragay (Gemma), filed for a complaint for
the recovery of death benefits and other claims before the LA, which denied the same in
its decision for the failure of respondents to present evidence that would validate their
claims. However, the LA ordered herein petitioners to pay the respondents the amount of
US$ 5,000 as financial assistance.

Dissatisfied, the respondents elevated their claims to the NLRC, which issued an order in
favor of the assailed decision of the LA. In its October 21, 2013 decision, the NLRC
ruled that the petitioners have duly proven that Ganal’s death is not compensable, as it is
a direct result of his deliberate and intentional act. Thus, no one can be held accountable
for his demise but himself. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the
NLRC, but the same was denied.

This prompted the respondents to file a petition before the CA. In its February 25, 2015
decision, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and reversed the assailed decisions of the
LA and NLRC. The CA stated that Ganal’s act was without intention to harm himself, as
his judgment was impaired and clouded by alcohol at that time.

In short, his action was a result of his drunkenness. Petitioners filed an MR, but to no
avail.

Hence, this present petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Ganal’s death is compensable.

(2) Whether or not Ganal’s act was willful.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

Ruling:

(1) No. In the present case, it may be conceded that the death of Ganal took place in
the course of his employment, in that it happened at the time and at the place
where he was working. However, the accident which produced this tragic result
did not arise out of such employment. The occasion where Ganal took alcoholic
beverages was a grill party organized by the ship officers of MV Stadt Hamburg. It
was a social event and Ganal attended not because he was performing his duty as a
seaman, but was doing an act for his own personal benefit. Even if the Court were
to adopt a liberal view and consider the grill party as incidental to Ganal’s work as
a seaman, his death during such occasion may not be considered as having arisen
out of his employment as it was the direct consequence of his decision to jump
into the water without coercion nor compulsion from any of the ship officers or
crew members. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature
of his employment. It was a risk to which any person on board the MV Stadt
Hamburg, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been
exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Ganal had.

(2) Yes. Contrary to the findings of the CA, both the LA and the NLRC found and
ruled in the affirmative. After a careful review of the records of the case, this
Court agrees with the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC. The term
“willful” means “voluntary and intentional,” but not necessarily malicious. 22 In
the case of Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 23 the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck and committed
an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his
own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman. This
Court held that the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized
as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. In the
same manner, in the instant case, Ganal’s act of intentionally jumping overboard,
while in a state of intoxication, could be considered as a deliberate and willful act
on his own life which is directly attributable to him.

Indeed, Ganal may have had no intention to end his own life. For all we know he
was just being playful. Nonetheless, he acted with notorious negligence. Notorious
negligence has been defined as something more than mere or simple negligence or
contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard
his own personal safety. In any case, regardless of Ganal’s motives, petitioners
were able to prove that his act of jumping was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners
should not be held responsible for the logical consequence of Ganal’s act of
jumping overboard.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated February 25, 2015 and August
18, 2015, respectively, are SET ASIDE. The October 21, 2013 and November 21, 2013
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 08-000774-
13 (NLRC NCR OFW [M]-00-10-16061-12) are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 94167
January 21, 1991

Facts:

On July 13, 1987, Romulo Sentina, the husband of herein private petitioner (Cecilia)
started his work as a 4th Engineer aboard the M/V Harmony 1 for herein petitioner
Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI for brevity). At around 3pm on January 16,
1988, Sentina arrived on board the vessel from his shore leave in Piraeus, Greece. At that
time, he was visibly drunk and inebriated. He then went to the mess hall and took a fire
axe and challenged those who are eating inside at the time. Sentina’s shipmates were able
to pacify him and accompanied him to his room. However, he then proceeded to come
back at the mess hall and run amok for the second time. He smashed and threw a cup
towards the head of one Emmanuel Eno, an oiler of the ship who was eating at the time.
Eno touched his head and noticed blood coming from it. This prompted Eno to fight with
Sentina, which resulted in the untimely demise of the latter. Sentina was declared dead on
arrival on January 17, 1988, while Eno was arrested by Greek authorities and was jailed
in Piraeus.

Because of the incident, herein private respondent Cecilia filed a complaint for the
payment of death benefits; burial expenses, unpaid salaries and overtime pay with
damages against herein petitioners before the POEA on October 26, 1988. In its July 11,
1989 decision, the POEA ruled in favor of Cecilia, ordering herein petitioners to pay her
the following: (1) Php 230,000.00 for the deceased’s death benefit and burial
compensation; (2) US$ 350.00 for shipboard pay and fixed overtime pay; and (3) plus
10% for attorney’s fees.

Aggrieved, herein petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. In
its March 31, 1990 decision, the NLRC ruled in favor of respondent and affirmed the
assailed decision.

Hence, this present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the employer is exempted from liability in Sentina’s death.

Ruling:

Yes. The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not
automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as
well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and
seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability to pay death
benefits. When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his
own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No
doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision.

By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck,
or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so
that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful
act on his own life directly attributable to him. First he challenged everyone to a fight
with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the messhall, picked up and broke a cup and
hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus provoked, the oiler fought back. The
death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus is not
compensable.

Even under Article 172 of the Labor Code, the compensation for workers covered by the
Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund are subject to the limitations on
liability. “Art. 172. Limitations of liability.—The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for
the compensation to the employee or his dependents except when the disability or death
was occasioned by the employee’s intoxication, willful intent to injure or kill himself or
another, notorious negligence, or otherwise provided under this Title.” Private respondent
pointed out that petitioner MSSI endorsed the claim for compensation of private
respondents. Said petitioner admits this fact but asserts that it was not favorably acted
upon by its principal, petitioner Skippers Maritime Co., Inc. because of the circumstances
that led to the death of Sentina.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

Inter Orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. vs. Constancia Pineda

G.R. No. 115497
September 16, 1996

Facts:

Herein respondent (Constancia) is the mother of Jeremias Pineda, a seaman who was
previously employed by herein petitioner (Inter Orient Maritime) as an oiler on board the
M/V Amazonia that was owned and operated by its foreign principal and co-petitioner,
Fircroft Shipping Corporation. At the time of his employment, Jeremias had a basic
salary of $276.00 plus overtime rate of $83.00 under a 12-month contract from December
28, 1988 up to his repatriation in September 28, 1989, due to the end of his contract. At
that time, Jeremias was reportedly suffering from a mental illness that was brought about
by the constant threats that he received from his fellow seamen. Jeremias’ flight from
Dubai to Manila included a lay-over in Bangkok, Thailand. Upon arriving in Bangkok, he
disembarked from the plane that was supposed to take him to his connecting flight from
Bangkok to Hongkong, and finally to the Philippines.

After disembarking, Jeremias brandished a knife approached a Thai Officer on-duty, with
the intention of stabbing him. Because of that, the Thai Officer had no choice but to pull
the trigger on the former, which caused the untimely demise of Jeremias.

Aggrieved, herein respondent filed for death benefit claims against herein petitioner.
After the parties had presented their respective evidences, a decision in favor of the
respondent was rendered by the POEA Administrator which held petitioners liable for the
payment of death compensation benefits and burial expenses to herein respondent. The
petitioners appealed before the POEA, but the same was denied.

Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners can be held liable for the death of seaman Jeremias Pineda.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioners are in error. This Court agrees with the POEA Administrator that seaman
Pineda was no longer acting sanely when he attacked the Thai policeman. The report of
the Philippine Embassy in Thailand dated October 9, 1990 depicting the deceased’s
strange behavior shortly before he was shot dead, after having wandered around Bangkok
for four days, clearly shows that the man was not in full control of his own self.

Firstly, the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his
repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that
thereby, his will must have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the
policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his
part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased’s mental
condition, petitioners “should have observed some precautionary measures and should
not have allowed said seaman to travel home alone," 16 and their failure to do so
rendered them liable for the death of Pineda. Indeed, “the obligations and liabilities of the
(herein petitioners) do not end upon the expiration of the contracted period as (petitioners
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C

are) duty bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the
contract of employment.

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its
agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by
petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some
mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling, to say
the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically
owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise
lost their usefulness.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the

Decision assailed in this petition is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO
ORDERED.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD- 2 BLOCK-C
Labor Law 1- C