Dennis Jay A.

Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

Gloria D. Menez vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, GSIS

G.R. No. L-48488
April 25, 1980

Facts:

Herein petitioner (Menez) worked as a social studies teacher (Teacher IV) at the Rajah
Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila, which is situated near a heavily-
polluted creek. She had been exercising her profession for 32 years, until her early
retirement in August 31, 1975 due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. At that
time, she was just 54 years old, which meant that she was 11 years short of the
retirement age which is 65 years. Petitioner claims that she contracted her ailments on
January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of her employment.

On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed for a claim for disability benefits pursuant to
Presidential Decree 626, with herein respondent GSIS. However, on October 25,
1976, her claim was denied by GSIS, which stated that rheumatoid arthritis and
pneumonitis are not among those considered as occupational diseases of those who are
in the education sector and that petitioner’s ailments are not work-related.

On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a letter-request to GSIS for the

reconsideration of her claim, but it was also denied. Another letter of reconsideration
was sent by petitioner on March 7, 1977, but to no avail.

On March 11, 1977, GSIS elevated the entire records to herein respondent Employees’
Compensation Commission (ECC) for review. In its March 1, 1978 decision, the ECC
held that herein petitioner’s ailments were not work-related and that they were not
listed among those that are considered as compensable under PD 626.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s ailments are compensable?

Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

Ruling:

Yes. It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of the Raja Soliman High
School which is located in the heart of Binondo District. She was constantly exposed
to the heavily polluted air and congestion (squatter’s area) characteristic of the area.
She was not only exposed to the elements—varying degrees of temperature
throughout the day and night—but also had to withstand long hours of standing while
performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to regularly negotiate long trips from
her home in Project 2, Quirino District, Quezon City (her residence) to said high
school in Binondo, scampering from one ride to another, rain or shine, and sweating in
the process. More often than not, a teacher who has no other source of income takes to
—aside from the poor man’s staple diet of tuyo, daing, and rice—legumes like mongo,
vegetables and fruits with edible seeds which contain much uric acid.

Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School
Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a
school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health
of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that “Teachers shall be
protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing
laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers’ health shall be
recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws”.

Dissenting Opinion: J. Melencio-Herrera

Petitioner retired due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Those ailments are not
listed as occupational diseases. Nor is there adequate proof that the risk of contracting
them was increased by conditions under which petitioner worked.

In fact, in so far as rheumatoid arthritis is concerned, it has been described as a

“chronic systemic inflammatory disease of unknown cause” (Current Medical
Diagnosis and Treatment, Krupp & Chatton, 18th Annual Revision, p. 474). It is also
a disease that is worlds apart from acute arthritis, mentioned in page 7 of the Decision.

And, as I stated in my dissent in Biscarra vs. Republic and WCC (G.R. No. L-43425),
Mitra vs. ECC (G.R. No. L45846), and Torbela vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-42627), the
rulings and opinions of administrative agencies in areas within their competence
command great respect and weight, except in case of palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion. With these factors absent in this particular case, I vote for the affirmance of
the ruling of the Employees’ Compensation Commission.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

Carolina Clemente vs. GSIS

G.R. No. L-47521
July 31, 1987

Facts:

Pedro Clemente, herein petitioner’s late husband, was employed as a janitor in the
Department of Health (Dagupan City) and was assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin
Clinic Laoag City. At the course of his employment therein, he contracted nephritis,
portal cirrhosis and leprosy, which were the reasons of his hospitalization from
November 3 to 14, 1976 at the Tala Sanitarium in Caloocan City. On November 14,
1976, Pedro succumbed to his ailments which resulted in his untimely demise.

Herein petitioner filed a claim for employees’ compensation before herein respondent
GSIS. However, it was denied by respondent on February 4, 1977, which contended
that the diseases that were contracted by her late husband was not among those which
are considered as occupational diseases in line with his duties and conditions at work.

Petitioner requested for the reconsideration of her claim before the GSIS on March 9,
1977, averring that her late husband’s ailments were contracted during the course of
his employment and was aggravated by the nature of his work as a janitor of the Ilocos
Norte Skin Clinic.

On April 11, 1977, the GSIS had then again denied petitioner’s claim. It elevated the
case to the ECC for review on April 14, 1977. On its October 26, 1977 decision, the
ECC affirmed the action of denial of GSIS, which resulted in the dismissal of
petitioner’s claim.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not leprosy can be considered as a ground for compensation due to the
nature of work petitioner’s late husband?
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

Ruling:

Yes. The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos
Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was ex posed to different carriers of viral and
bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different
illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipment that had been
used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each
working day. He was the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of
infected materials, and not being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to
avoid infection. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clemente's
working conditions definitely increased the risk of his contracting the aforementioned
ailments.

This Court has held in appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the
respondents is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the
social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanes
v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., L-50255, January 30, 1982; and
Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., supra). It clashes with the
injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) that, as a rule, doubts
should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee (Mercado, Jr., v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270, 277). The respondents admit there may
have been aggravation of an existing ailment but point out that aggravating is no
longer a ground for compensation under the present law. They contend that the
compensable factor of increased risks of contracting the disease is not present in this
case. The fallacy in this theory lies in the failure to explain how a sick person was able
to enter the government service more than ten years before he became too ill to work
and at a time when aggravation of a disease was compensable. There is no evidence to
show that Mr. Clemente was hired inspite of having an existing disease liable to
become worse.

The petitioner's arguments of recurrence of an already cured disease or the contracting

of the disease due to increased risks become more plausible. When there are two or
more possible explanations regarding an issue of compensability that which favors the
claimant must be chosen.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

Nicanor Ceriola vs. NAESS Shipping Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 193101
April 20, 2015

Facts:

Herein petitioner (Ceriola) was employed as a seafarer by herein respondent (NAESS

Shipping) from 1981 up to April 12, 2002. On June 6, 1999, Ceriola entered into a
two-year contract with NAESS Shipping, where he was deployed in the vessel named
GAS AL AHMADI. During the course of his employment with respondent NAESS,
Ceriola had experienced a recurring pain in his lower back. After the completion of
the contract, he then decided to undergo an extensive medical examination, in which
he was diagnosed to be suffering from early stage of Lumbar Spondylosis.

Despite of the diagnosis, Ceriola’s employer had declared him fit for work and was
even deployed by NAESS to be on board the vessel GAS AL BURGAN on two
occasions: from July 8, 2000 to April 12, 2001 and from July 7, 2001 until April 12,
2002.

In between these employment contracts, petitioner had undergone another medical

examination due to the severe back pain that he had experienced. It was found out that
the dislocation of petitioner’s lumbar vertebrae had been aggravated. However,
Ceriola was re-deployed to the vessel GAS AL BURGAN, as his contract was still
effective at the time.

On April 13, 2002, herein petitioner was discharged from the vessel upon completing
his last contract with the respondents. He then filed a claim for disability benefits
before the respondent NAESS Shipping for the severe back pain that he was suffering,
which was later found out as Lumbar Spondylosis. However, his claim was denied by
the respondent.

Aggrieved, Ceriola then filed a complaint before the LA. In its decision, the LA stated
that there was no showing that the petitioner had suffered any injury or illness during
the pendency of his term, which can be the basis for a claim of disability/injury benefit
claims.

Dissatisfied with the LA’s ruling, Ceriola elevated the case to the NLRC, which ruled
in his favor. In its ruling, the NLRC reversed the assailed decision of the LA. It
granted the petitioner’s claim for disability benefits.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

NAESS Shipping elevated the case to the CA, which ruled in its favor. In its decision,
the CA ruled that petitioner Ceriola is not qualified to receive disability/injury
benefits, as he was not suffering from any medical condition during the term of his
contract nor was there any proof presented that whatever medical condition he was
suffering was caused by the nature of his work, as he was declared as fit to work in his
last contract.

Thus, this present petition.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioner Ceriola is entitled to disability benefits.

Ruling:

No. While petitioner has asserted that his disability is work-related and
occurred during the term of his contract, what jumps out of the different factual
findings of all three labor tribunals, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, is that petitioner did not undergo a post employment medical examination
as required in Section 20 of both the 1996 and 2000 POEA-SEC. In fact, petitioner
refers to the medical examination he underwent as a "Pre-Post Employment Medical
Examination" from 11 June 2002 to 1 April 2003, which yielded a medical
certification that petitioner is "UNFIT" to work due to a work-related injury or illness.

Contrary to his present claims, on the date nearest the expiration of his
employment contract, specifically, 16 April 2002, petitioner accomplished a
Debriefing Questionnaire acknowledging that "all [was] ok during his contract[,]
including his health."19 He deliberately glosses over the mandatory nature, of the
post-employment medical examination, which he did not undergo, by his general
averment that after expiration of his last employment contract in April 2002, he
underwent medical examination from June 2002 to April 2003, and was no longer
re-deployed since he was found "UNFIT" due to a work-related illness.

In all, petitioner utterly failed to establish by substantial evidence, his

entitlement to disability benefits for a work-related illness under the POEA-SEC,
having failed to undergo a post-employment medical examination by a company
designated physician within three (3) working days from his return without valid or
justifiable reason.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

Social Security System vs. Edna A. Azote

G.R. No. 209741
April 15, 2015

Facts:

Herein respondent (Edna) and her late husband (Edgardo) are members of herein
petitioner Social Security System (SSS for brevity). They had six children in total. On
April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS, with Edna and their three
older children as the beneficiaries. He then submitted another Form E-4 to herein
petitioner, designating his three younger children as the additional beneficiaries.

Edgardo passed away on January 13, 2005. Herein respondent Edna tried to file her
claim for her husband’s death benefits, but it was denied by petitioner. It was found
out that the late Edgardo had submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982,
where he chose another set of beneficiaries. In that said form, he chose a certain
Rosemarie Azote as his spouse, and Elmer Azote as his son.

Edna filed a petition before the SSC on March 13, 2007, to claim death benefits, lump
sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She averred that she is the legal wife of
Edgardo and that she and her sons should be the rightful beneficiaries of the latter.
The petitioner published summons on a newspaper of general circulation with the
intent to inform herein respondent but to no avail. Due to the inaction of Edna, she
was declared in default.

In its December 8, 2010 resolution, the SSC denied the petition of Edna, stating that
although she and her children were chosen by Edgardo as his beneficiaries, the earlier
designation of Rosemarie was still presumed to be valid due to the absence of any act
of revocation towards the designation in question. Thus, the SSC presumes that
Rosemarie is Edgardo’s legitimate wife. Upon SSC’s inspection with the records of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) it found out that Edgardo was in fact married to
Rosemarie Teodora Sino and that it was registered on July 28, 1982. It also averred
that Edna’s marriage with Edgardo was void, as there was no showing that the prior
marriage was legally annulled or dissolved.

In its June 8, 2011 order, the SSC denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration for
the reason that she failed to prove the validity of her marriage with the late Edgardo.
Herein respondent elevated the case to the CA, which ruled in her favor. In its ruling,
the CA had reversed the order of the SSC, stating that Edgardo had made a voluntary
act to revoke the 1982 E-4 form by submitting the one that was executed in 1994. The
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

CA further stated that as the designated beneficiaries of the 1994 E-4 form, Edna and
her children are entitled to the death benefits and other claims. The SSC filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the designation of private respondent as wife-beneficiary is valid.

Ruling:

No. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal
spouse of the deceased member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS
benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier
marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo
even acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4
designating Rosemarie as his spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt,
failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already
removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule
that “whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his
or her right thereto by substantial evidence.” Edna could not adduce evidence to prove
that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there
was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo.
What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo.

Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a
deceased member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the
death benefits of Edgardo.

The Court does not subscribe to the disquisition of the CA that the updated Form E-4
of Edgardo was determinative of Edna’s status and eligibility to claim the death
benefits of deceased member. Although an SSS member is free to designate a
beneficiary, the designation must always conform to the statute. To blindly rely on the
form submitted by the deceased member would subject the entire social security
system to the whims and caprices of its members and would render the SS Law
inutile.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

Social Security System vs. Rosanna H. Aguas

G.R. No. 165546
February 27, 2006

Facts:

On December 13, 1996, herein respondent (Rosanna) filed a claim with petitioner SSS
for the death benefits of her deceased spouse, Pablo Aguas who died on December 8,
1996. She indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by their child
named Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Herein petitioner granted
Rosanna’s claim on February 13, 1997.

On April 2, 1997, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, the late Pablo’s sister, had sent a letter
to petitioner SSS for the cancellation of Rosanna’s claim. Leticia stated the following
reasons: (1) that Rosanna had left the family home six year before; (2) that the
deceased had no legal children with herein respondent; (3) that on November 1, 1990,
respondent had contracted a marriage with a certain Romeo Dela Pena (Romeo); and
(4) that on November 15, 1996, their marriage had produced a child by the name of
Jefren H. Dela Pena.

After receiving such shocking news on September 1997, the petitioner SSS suspended
the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension. It also took steps in verifying
the authenticity of Leticia’s contentions. At the course of the investigation, the SSS
asked Mariquita Dizon, Pablo’s cousin and neighbor, along with another neighbor by
the name of Jessie Gonzales, about the allegations. Both of them had confirmed
Leticia’s allegations, stating that the union between Rosanna and Pablo did not
produce any legal children because of Pablo’s infertility, which was confirmed by Dr.
Manuel Macapinlac, and that Jeylnn and Jefren are actually the children of Romeo and
herein respondent.

Herein petitioner had decided to stop the payment of respondent’s pensions, and had
advised her to refund the SSS within 30 days the amount of Php 10, 350.00 which was
the total of the death benefits that were released to her and Jeylnn from December
1996 to August 1997 at Php 1,150.00 per month.

Aggrieved, Rosanna and Jeylnn filed a petition for the restoration of the payment of
pensions with petitioner SSS. They were joined by one Janet Aguas, who claims to be
the daughter of the deceased.

In their petitioner, the following adocuments were attached: (1) Pablo and Rosanna’s
marriage certificate; (2) Janet and Jeylnn’s certificates of live birth; and (3) Pablo’s
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1

death certificate. However, their petition was denied by SSS. Aggrieved, respondent
elevated the matter to the SSC, which ruled in favor of herein petitioner. In its
decision, the SSC held that Rosanna was no longer entitled to the death benefits of
Pablo due to her act of adultery. It further concluded that the children whom Rosanna
contends to be Pablo’s were actually the products of Romeo and Rosanna’s marriage.
The SSC gave credence on Leticia’s claims. The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied by the SSC. Disgruntled, Rosanna appealed
to the CA, which ruled in her favor. In its September 9, 2003 decision, the CA held
that Rosanna and her children are entitled to the SSS pension and death benefits of
Pablo.

Thus, this present petition.

Issue:

Whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing
from the death of Pablo.

Ruling:

The petition is partly meritorious. The Court has reviewed the records of the case and
finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the
signature of Pablo.

Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing
that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo
were married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death
on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and
Pablo’s marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the
SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is
his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely
“adopted” by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot
qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of
Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present
any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for
support even if they were already living separately.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
JD-2 Block-C
Labor Law 1